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55°41′18.37″N 37°37′24.69″E / 55.6884361°N 37.6235250°E / 55.6884361; 37.6235250

Russian Post (Russian: Почта России, Pochta Rossii) is an Aktsionernoye Obschestvo (AO, private limited company)[1] which is the national postal operator of Russia. The company is responsible for the delivery of mail in Russia, and the issuing of postage stamps. Russian Post employs about 390,000 people and has over 42,000 post offices,[4] with its headquarters in Moscow. In 2012 the Russian Post delivered more than 2.4 billion pieces of mail and accounted for more than 54 million parcels and more than 100 million in remittances.[5] In March 2013 a presidential decree signed by President Vladimir Putin included the Russian Post in a list of so-called strategic enterprises.[6]

Key Information

Russian Post owns 49.99% of the "Pochta Bank" (formerly Leto-Bank).

Postal services in Crimea are handled by a separate company, Post of Crimea.[7]

History

[edit]
A 1958 stamp of the Soviet Union depicting a 16th-century mail courier, issued for the 100th anniversary of Russian postage stamps
See also: Postage stamps and postal history of Russia and yam (route)

Early history

[edit]

Records mention a system of messengers in the 10th century. Early letters were carried in the form of a roll, with a wax or lead seal; the earliest known of these seals dates from 1079, and mentions a governor Ratibor of Tmutarakan.

By the 16th century, the postal system included 1,600 locations, and mail took three days to travel from Moscow to Novgorod. In 1634, a peace treaty between Russia and Poland established a route to Warsaw, which became Russia's first regular international service.

Russian Empire

[edit]
A Russian Empire postman

Peter the Great enacted reforms making the postal system more uniform in its operations, and in 1714 the first general post offices opened in Saint Petersburg and Moscow. “Regular post service” was established along the Moscow and Riga routes. In February 1714, the postal service started biweekly runs from St. Petersburg to Riga; in June of that year it started runs from St. Petersburg to Moscow. The field post office was founded in 1716, and the so-called ordinary post service in 1720, for fast conveyance of state ordinances and papers. Regular delivery of private parcels (the so-called heavy post) was organized in the 1730s and ’40s. In 1746, parcels and private correspondence were first delivered by courier, and starting in 1781 money, too, could be delivered to one's door. The earliest known Russian postmark dates from July 1765; it is a single line reading "ST. PETERSBOVRG" (in Latin letters), but the first official recommendation to use postmarks did not come until 1781.

First Russian stamp, 1857

Post coaches appeared in 1820. In 1833, the St. Petersburg City Post was created, and the city was divided into 17 districts with 42 correspondence offices located in trade stores. In 1834, reception offices appeared in the suburbs (in St. Petersburg there were as many as 108). Delivery of printed periodicals was organized in St. Petersburg in 1838. The Department of Coaches and T-carts was opened in 1840 at the Moika Embankment; light cabriolets carried surplus-post, coaches delivered light post, and T-carts dealt with “heavy" post. Green street mail boxes were installed in 1848, the same year stamped envelopes were issued; orange mailboxes for same day service appeared near railway stations in 1851, with the first prepaid postage stamps appearing in 1857.

The Imperial Russian Historical Society estimated that in 1854 the Russian postal system was formed by a network of 16,510 mail couriers and of 3,950 relay stations, positioned every around 85,000 versts (roughly 90,500 kilometres). This structure was capable of delivering packages and letters twice a week in most of the Russian cities, 6 days in 63 cities and two times a year in the Kamchatka.[8]

Post and telegraph office in Vladivostok, built in 1897-1899

Local postal systems used stamps referred to as Zemstvo stamps, from the term for local government begun under Alexander II in 1864.[9]

Russian Post is a founding member of the Universal Postal Union created in 1874. In 1902 Chief Postal Service was made part of the Internal Affairs Ministry and in 1917 under the Provisional Government it became part of Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Soviet Union

[edit]

During World War II, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War, Soviet postal service was a part of the People's Commissariat for Communications of the USSR. It delivered up to 70 million parcels per month to the Soviet Army front from the rear under extremely difficult and often very dangerous conditions. In the postwar years, mail service has undergone quantitative and qualitative changes. In 1946, the People's Commissariat for Communications was transformed into the USSR Ministry of Communications. Postal service has been carried out by the Post Office, which was part of the Ministry of Communications, along with other offices of telecommunications industries. By 1950, the postal industry, destroyed by the war, was restored to the pre-war level.

Post office in Voronezh

Russian Federation

[edit]

During the Soviet era, postal and telecommunications enterprises were unified, initially existing within regional and republican communications departments, and later within state-owned communications and information technology enterprises; the USSR Ministry of Communications was at the top of the communications hierarchy.[10] Following the collapse of the USSR, a decision was made to separate postal services into an independent industry: on November 16, 1992, the Federal Postal Administration (Russian: Федеральное управление почтовой связи) was established under the Ministry of Communications of the Russian Federation.[11] which was supplemented with a governmental resolution no. 798 issued on August 14, 1993.[12] By order of the Ministry of Communications, effective January 1, 1993, territorial (regional, territorial, and republican) federal postal administrations and postal institutions in Moscow and St. Petersburg were established within the Federal Postal Administration.[13] This order also approved the list of activities for separating postal and telecommunications structures and the principles for separating postal and telecommunications.

Flag of the Federal Postal Service of the Russian Federation

In 1994, a professional holiday for postal workers was established – Russian Post Day.[14] Furthermore, in 1997, in order to restore the heraldic traditions of the Russian postal service and enhance its authority, a flag and emblem were established for the federal postal service organizations of the Russian Federation.[15]

On October 17, 1995, the Federal Postal Administration was reorganized into the Federal Postal Service (Russian: Федеральная почтовая служба).[16] On August 14, 1996, the Federal Postal Service was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Communications of Russia.[17]

In 1996, for the first time in the centuries-long history of the Russian postal service, the Ministry of Communications of Russia decided to break the state postal monopoly on certain postal services, resulting in the emergence of commercial postal companies in Russia. The services of these new companies included courier delivery of mail, pensions and benefits, parcel forwarding, and distribution of periodicals. Another presidential decree in 1997 restored the heraldic traditions of the Russian postal service—the emblem and flag.

In 1998, the country's postal network included 149 post offices, 28 mail delivery offices at railway stations and airports, and 43,000 post offices. The state postal service's gross revenue in 1997 amounted to 9 billion rubles.[18]

2002 reform

[edit]
A mailbox in Lipetsk

Since the Soviet Union dissolved, the Federal Postal Service consisted of a network of 90 disparate entities which were mainly listed as state institutions or federal state unitary enterprises. In legal terms, they were completely independent concerns. They were linked to the Federal Postal Network only by a trunk intrazonal and inter-district transmission and delivery system. Different parts of the same system, connected by a single mechanism in adjacent regions, were in outright competition with each other, trying to lure corporate clients away from other competitors even if it involved an operating loss. There were no uniform budgeting, planning or other processes. These companies operated using outdated postal facilities representing as many as 50 different IT solutions in terms of industry technology.

On June 28, 2002, the Government of the Russian Federation approved the Concept for the Restructuring of Federal Postal Service Organizations.[19] The Concept proposed merging all existing federal postal service organizations and creating a federal state unitary enterprise called Russian Post, based on economic management rights, with subsequent corporatization while maintaining state control.

The Russian Post was established by a decree of the Government of Russia on September 5, 2002.[20] Its charter was approved on February 11, 2003.[21] State registration of the enterprise was completed on February 13, 2003.[22]

The formation of the enterprise and the restructuring of the postal network occurred in several stages. In 2004, the existing unitary enterprises of the postal industry were merged with Russian Post: the International Post Office, the St. Petersburg Center for Automated Information Technology Systems of Postal Communications, the Federal Postal Service Administration of Moscow (Moscow Post Office), the Center for Automated Operational and Technical Management of Communications, and the Federal Postal Service Administration of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast.[23] In 2005, 81 federal government institutions were liquidated: the federal postal service administrations of the republics, regions, and districts, as well as the Main Center for Trunk Mail Transportation; their property was assigned to Russian Post.[24]

Post-reform period

[edit]

In 2004 Elsag Datamat won the tender to build Russian Post's first automated sorting centre.[25] In 2008, Andrey Kazmin, former CEO of Sberbank was appointed to the CEO of the company.[26]

In January 2009 it was announced that Kazmin was to leave his position as CEO of the Russian Post due to a financial crisis from ambitious but poorly implemented reforms.[27] From 2009 until his ousting in the 2013 reforms the General Director was Aleksandr Kiselyov. The current CEO of Russian Post is Mikhail Volkov.[28]

Growing inefficiency in the 2010s

[edit]
Russian Post delivery truck (GAZelle)

The early 2010s saw a rise in complaints. The number of parcels from foreign online retailers had been rising steadily for several years and was certain to rise further.[29] According to Russian Post's own estimates, orders from Internet retailers are delivered to Russia mostly in ordinary or registered parcels; in 2009 there were 2.3 million, by 2012 the number had soared to 17 million. On March 6, 2012, five trucks from Germany were in queue to be unloaded at Vnukovo International Airport. At the International Post Office, 12,300 parcels, 5,300 EMS packages, and 36,000 minor incoming parcels had piled up. Another 2,000 parcels were waiting for customs clearance at Sheremetyevo International Airport.[30]

In 2012 a group of people dissatisfied with the state of affairs established the website "anti-Russianpost.ru"; its goal was to allow users to highlight instances of disappointing or unsatisfactory service from Russian Post. In the middle of March the clients of on-line retailers launched a massive spam attack on the Moscow office of the Roskomnadzor watchdog. In this period the company received up to 1,000 messages from individuals with complaints about delayed deliveries of purchases made at Internet shops.

2013 collapse and reform

[edit]

In March 2013 Russian Post reported the unfavourable state of affairs. In a special message Russian Post's deputy general director, Nina Fetisova, told the Federal Communications Agency Rossvyaz and the Federal Customs Service that the processing of international mail was in a critical situation at the customs posts Vnukovo and Sheremetyevo International Airport and also at the Central International Post Office in Moscow. The director of the federal postal services of the Vologda Oblast said: "The reason for delays is not our own ineffectiveness, but the pressure of social factors. We have too many official functions: the delivery of pensions, of written correspondence, and subscriptions to newspapers and magazines".

In order to improve the services, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a government decree to take the Russian Post out of the sphere of competence of the Federal Communications Agency Rossvyaz, and subordinate it directly to the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media.[30][31] Also, On April of that year, the General Director of the Post, Alexander Kiselyov was ousted from the office.[32]

The company's new management, in October 2013, declared an ambitious goal of doubling revenues to make the company ready for an initial public offering in 2018 by allowing it to provide banking services, reducing the number of unprofitable branches and focusing on providing deliveries from on-line retailers.[33]

In order to handle the growth of parcels, production capacity has been expanded at regional exchange centres, with the company opening new international mail processing centres in Moscow at the Kazan station and in Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk. In addition, Russian Post agreed with foreign postal operators on pre-sorting international mail delivery by region while the mail is still in the sender's country (pre-sorting began in China, the largest source of Russian imports), which allows a reduction in the delivery time of international mail. For example, after opening an exchange centre in Yekaterinburg, a parcel from China to Sverdlovsk can be delivered in five days, including all customs clearance.[34]

In August 2013 Russian Post had launched its first regional flight in the far eastern Russian republic of Yakutia. The company held a ceremony at Yakutsk Airport to launch its second new airmail plane under a programme to expand links to remote areas, its first being a flight in the Khabarovsk Krai territory on Russia's east coast. Russian Post deputy director general Alexei Skatin said: "The mail must be delivered on time despite the difficult geography of the region. We are starting to improve the postal logistics in the remote regions of Russia".[35]

2014–2023 development program

[edit]
Post office in Sochi

In late October 2013 Prime Minister Medvedev generally approved the Post's development program in a meeting with Minister of Communications Nikolai Nikiforov. Among its goals are to turn the Russian Post from a model of "subsidized postal operator" to "self-sustaining postal business", modernization of its logistics infrastructure and making its work more efficient. Companies will create eight main hubs with automated sorting and direct exchange with each other. The service area of each hub will be about a 700-km radius. The number of branches in the cities will grow, while the placement of new areas will be determined by regulation. In rural areas, there will be new formats of work: "letter carrier plus internal transport," according to the reform. This is expected to reduce the number of unprofitable offices from 14 thousand to about 8.5 thousand, most of which are in rural areas.[36] Also discussed in the draft is non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure of the postal service.[37] In December 2013, the government published its draft Federal Law on Postal Communications, which is expected to be approved in Spring of 2014. In that year Russian Post was to begin deploying a unified ERP system — a set of integrated applications that allows creation of a single environment to automate planning, accounting, control and analysis of all core business operations across the enterprise. In September 2013 Deputy Minister of Communications Mikhail Evrayev said that one of the major problems of the Russian Post was the lack of a unified information system working both at the central office and at all branches.[38] Russian Post at the end of 2015 presented a new digital subscription service. Russian Post acted as a subscription agency for direct cooperation with publishers.

Since 2015, Russian Post has ceased receiving state subsidies for the provision of socially significant services such as universal communication services and the distribution of periodicals. Subsidies allocated to cover a portion of the costs associated with the operation of post offices located in the Far North, related to the provision of regulated postal services, have ceased.[39]

On March 6, 2016, the Russian Post launched a new website. In September 2021, Vladimir Putin charged to increase capitalization of Russian Post from state budget for modernization of branches in rural and hard-to-reach areas by 2025.[40] Russian Post expects IPO in 2023 in a way to avoid probability of liabilities default as well as call for 500 billion roubles of pump priming in two years, accordingly to Russian Post strategy by 2030.[41]

Since 2022, the Russian Post in 75 cities has been providing sellers of marketplaces with a service for the delivery of goods to warehouses of trading platforms. In May 2022, the Russian Post and JSC "Russian Railways" launched the first mail container train "Russia" on the route Moscow — Vladivostok. The service is focused on the transportation of postal items, as well as commercial bulk cargo. In June 2022, the company launched delivery from 60 minutes from retail and online stores. It plans to provide retailers with its couriers and IT infrastructure, and the stores themselves will be engaged in sales.

Since September 1, 2022, Stoloto lottery tickets have ceased to be sold through the Russian Post (40 thousand branches). Despite a 36% reduction, the number of Stoloto distribution points was about 70 thousand.[42][43][44]

Structure

[edit]
A post office in Sochi

Russian Post includes:[45]

  • central administrative apparatus, consisting of 22 units (Directorate departments, the Secretariat);
  • 87 branches;
  • 41,901 post offices.

Enterprise branches are divided into 82 territorial control federal postal service and 5 specialized, which include:[45]

  • The main centre-haul mail - Russian Post;[45]
  • EMS Russian Post;
  • Automated sorting centres - branch office of Russian Post;
  • Hybrid mail centres - branch office of the Russian Post;
  • Russian Post - Russian Post in Berlin.

Branches are separate structural subdivisions, including post offices, a department for transportation of mail, and mainline and regional sorting centres.[45]

In 2021, the company's revenue amounted to 217 billion rubles.[46]

Operations

[edit]

Russian Post offers all traditional mail services in its 42,000 offices. In addition it offers to cash payment cards, accept utilities payments, execute cash transfers, receive and pay off consumer loans, and to sell lottery, rail, flight and theatre tickets. It also retails various products including phone cards, envelopes and, of course, postage stamps. In October 2012 the Russian Post had launched SMS notification for domestic shipments, and since December 2013 in a pilot program, Moscow clients of the Russian Post began to receive free SMS notification of passage of parcels from abroad. According to the postal operator, a notice will inform the customer about the admission of international mail at the point of issuance and will complement the traditional paper notices. In the future, the Post plans to inform the customer via SMS about all stages of the passage of parcels including delivery in Russia, customs control and admission to point of delivery.[47]

The Russian Post has created a network of drop-off points where it accepts large shipments of parcels with orders, including those issued on marketplaces. The company is also providing a fulfillment service to e-commerce companies based on its logistics centers.

Pochtomat

[edit]
Pochtomat

In late 2010, a new delivery method with automated machines called Pochtomat (Russian: почтомат), is a parcel locker service, whose name is made up of a combination of the words "почта", "post" in Russian, and automat, came into use. In 2011, a number of those postmats were deployed in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.[48] In April 2013 the first Pochtomat began working in Saransk[49] and in the summer of 2013 first Pochtomat in the South Urals began in Chelyabinsk. Automatic issue of shipments is made under a special code that the recipient receives via cell phone as an SMS. By June 2013, Russian Post operated 145 Pochtomats in 60 cities.[50]

Financial services

[edit]

In August 2013 Russian Post began accepting loan payments on behalf of any Russian bank. Repayment of loan is made by postal transfer to a subsidiary of the Post, ООО "Rapid", then the money is sent by bank transfer to the appropriate bank. Postal employees themselves complete a payment form for the customer, then the postal order form is printed and signed by the customer. For the usage of postal services, operators charge a fee of 1.9 percent, with a minimum of 50 rubles.[51]

Postal kiosks

[edit]

In 2011 the Russian Post launched postal kiosks based on the results of a pilot project. This began in 2011 with seven stalls of 6 square meters each. Besides sending and receiving regular and express mail, insurance and credit cards can be issued, loan payments can be made, payments for cellular communication, Internet and utilities and the purchase of railway and flight tickets. In September 2013 the Russian Post management decided to radically revise its approach to retail, and in particular refused to sell food in the offices. It was decided to expand the idea of postal kiosks, and even entered the draft of a new strategy of development of the Russian Post until 2023, which was prepared by Boston Consulting Group. In 2014 the Russian Post plans to open 10-15 new kiosks in Moscow and another 150 in other regions.[52]

Mobile post

[edit]

Beginning in the 2010s Russian Post began using Mobile Post Van, also called "Post on Wheels" (Russian: Почта на колесах) which drive with driver and post seller into remote villages where the Post office was closed due to being ineffective (small rural communities), and provides all the post services that were once were in the post office.[53]

Regional sorting center

[edit]

Russia's first automated regional sorting center opened in Podolsk, near Moscow in late 2009, using equipment of Italian company Elsag Datamat, SpA. In June 2011 another center was opened, in Saint Petersburg, which serves the Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov Oblasts.[54]

UAV delivery

[edit]
VRT 300 post edition drone
BAS 200 post edition drone

In 2021, Russian Post successfully tested UAV delivery and the commercial launch of Russian Post drones on 9 routes in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug region by the end of 2022.[55]

International exchange points

[edit]

Russian Post operates 13 points of customs clearance of postal items. Until 2013, the Moscow MMPO processed up to 80% of all incoming international shipments to Russia which created much stress on the Russian Post. In order to speed up the time for delivery of international parcels, the Russian Post opened two new international postal exchange points in Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk. The latter one can process up to two thousand international EMS-daily departures, with an area more than 2,000 square meters. The Yekaterinburg Koltsovo international postal exchange point is the first international postal exchange in the Urals Federal District. It can handle up to 20,000 parcels and small packets per day in the 3,700m facility. Until the end of 2014 Russian Post expects to reduce the Moscow point of exchange share to 55%.[56][57] In addition there are exchange points in Bryansk, Samara, Orenburg, Petrozavodsk and Vladivostok.[58][59]

Foreign cooperation

[edit]

In 2009, a first formal cooperation agreement came between the Russia and Italy to work together to develop the postal system in Russia. On late November 2013 Russian Post and Poste Italiane have signed a new agreement to cooperate further in order to improve the Russian postal system. The agreement, which was signed along with their technology supplier Selex, was sealed at a trade summit in Trieste during an official visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin, following up earlier agreements between the three companies. Along with development of e-commerce and international express mail services, the new agreement aims to develop hybrid mail in Russia for businesses, direct marketing and e-government services. This would allow mailers to send information electronically to be turned into physical mailpieces local to the recipient.[60]

Russian Post is currently suspended from PostEurop, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[61]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Russian Post

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Russian Post (Russian: Почта России, Pochta Rossii), officially Joint Stock Company "Russian Post" (AO "Pochta Rossii"), is the state-owned national postal operator of the Russian Federation, tasked with delivering mail and parcels, facilitating financial services such as money transfers, issuing postage stamps, and providing courier operations as a full member of the Universal Postal Union. Tracing its institutional roots to the first post offices founded by Peter the Great in 1714, the entity maintains an extensive network of approximately 42,000 post offices—predominantly in rural and remote areas—and employs roughly 350,000 personnel, positioning it among Russia's largest employers by workforce size. In addition to traditional mail handling—processing billions of letters and hundreds of millions of parcels yearly—it has adapted to modern demands through digital platforms for tracking and e-commerce integration, while undergoing modernization efforts including office renovations funded by state allocations exceeding targeted rural upgrades. The organization has encountered operational strains, including staff reductions and closures of underutilized rural branches amid low remuneration and demographic shifts, as well as financial volatility with a reported net loss of 27.2 billion rubles in 2022 attributed to sanctions-induced disruptions, followed by a rebound to 6 billion rubles gross profit in 2023.

History

Origins in the Russian Empire

The origins of the organized postal system in the date back to the fifteenth century, with initial testimonies of court messengers under Prince Ivan III facilitating communication within the Muscovite state. By the seventeenth century, the had developed a network of nine main relay routes radiating from , utilizing the yam system of postal stations where couriers changed horses to expedite official dispatches. This infrastructure primarily served state needs, with private mail handling emerging sporadically but lacking formal structure until later reforms. Under , the postal service underwent significant modernization starting in the early eighteenth century, establishing the first uniform post offices in and St. Petersburg in 1716 to handle both official pochta (mail delivery) and proezd (relay transportation). Peter's decrees in 1714 enabled private correspondence delivery, marking the transition from elite-only use to broader access, though rates favored official over civilian traffic. By the mid-eighteenth century, the system expanded with fixed routes, such as the weekly Moscow-Riga line initiated in 1665 and later formalized, supporting imperial administration across vast territories. The introduction of prepaid postage stamps in 1857 represented a pivotal advancement, with the first 10-kopeck issue featuring the imperial entering circulation on January 1, 1858, following official issuance on December 22, 1857. This reform, inspired by European models like Britain's , shifted from cash-on-delivery to adhesive stamps, enhancing efficiency and revenue collection under ; approximately 1.5 million stamps were printed initially at the Imperial Typography. By the late nineteenth century, the network included thousands of stations, facilitating domestic and international mail amid the Empire's territorial growth.

Development During the Soviet Union

Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, the Russian postal system was fully nationalized under the newly formed People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs, which assumed control from the pre-revolutionary Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs to administer all postal, telegraph, and related communications as a state monopoly. This reorganization integrated postal operations into the central planning apparatus, prioritizing ideological dissemination through mail, including propaganda materials and state newspapers, while facing severe disruptions from the ensuing Civil War (1918–1922), which reduced operational capacity and infrastructure. By the mid-1920s, reconstruction efforts restored and expanded the network, with the commissariat introducing mobile postal units in 1924 to serve remote rural areas, reflecting the regime's emphasis on universal access amid collectivization drives. The postal system's structure evolved with Soviet administrative changes; in 1932, it merged into the all-Union People's Commissariat for Communications, overseeing mechanization of sorting and delivery processes during the industrialization push of , though central directives often led to inefficiencies such as chronic underinvestment in rural facilities compared to urban centers. (1941–1945) strained resources, with postal services repurposed for military logistics and censored correspondence, resulting in temporary closures of thousands of offices, but postwar recovery accelerated under the Ministry of Communications (reorganized in 1946), expanding post offices to facilitate mass distribution of periodicals, which by the 1950s constituted over 70% of mail volume. Annual mail growth averaged approximately one billion items from 1950 onward, driven by rising literacy and state-subsidized subscriptions, though delivery delays persisted due to bureaucratic rigidities and limited . Technological integration with telegraph and emerging radio networks enhanced reliability, with aerial mail routes established in the 1920s and helicopter deliveries tested in later decades for Siberian regions, yet the system's state-controlled nature prioritized quantity over efficiency, leading to widespread queues and service gaps in non-priority areas by the . Philatelic output served purposes, issuing stamps glorifying Soviet achievements, while preferential rates for workers and peasants underscored class-based policies, though from declassified analyses indicates that actual lagged behind Western counterparts due to absence of market incentives. By 1991, the network encompassed tens of thousands of facilities, but inherited structural flaws contributed to post-dissolution challenges.

Post-Soviet Transition and Early Reforms

Following the on December 26, 1991, the Russian postal system, previously integrated within the USSR Ministry of Communications, faced immediate fragmentation as independent republics established their own services, leaving Russia's operations decentralized and reliant on legacy Soviet infrastructure. In the early , postal services across Russia's regions were delivered by disparate legal entities, which hindered centralized oversight, of tariffs, and maintenance of uniform . This structure exacerbated vulnerabilities during the period's economic shock therapy, characterized by rapid price liberalization and fiscal austerity. To rectify the disarray, the Russian government decreed the formation of the Federal Enterprise "Post of the Russian Federation" on November 16, , consolidating approximately 82 regional postal operators into a unified state entity under federal control. This reorganization aimed to restore operational coherence, enable coordinated , and preserve the nationwide network of over post offices inherited from the Soviet era. However, the transition unfolded amid profound economic distress: peaked at around 2,500% in , eroding real revenues and prompting frequent tariff hikes that failed to keep pace with costs; mail volumes plummeted due to contracting economic activity and emerging alternatives like and early ; and logistical issues arose from shortages, equipment obsolescence, and irregular salary payments to the workforce of roughly 400,000 employees. Early reform initiatives in the mid- to late emphasized survival over transformation, including administrative streamlining to reduce redundancies and selective investments in urban sorting facilities amid chronic underfunding. The 1998 ruble crisis intensified pressures, with default on domestic debt disrupting payments to suppliers and further delaying infrastructure upgrades, resulting in widespread service delays and a reliance on subsidies that strained the federal budget. Legislative groundwork laid by the 1999 "On Postal Communications" (enacted July 17, 1999) introduced basic regulatory frameworks for licensing and competition, though enforcement was weak given the state's monopoly on obligations. These measures provided marginal stability but did little to address systemic inefficiencies, such as overstaffing and manual processing dominant in rural areas serving 80% of outlets. By 2002, ongoing fiscal recovery enabled a further restructuring into the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Post" via government decree on September 5, 2002, granting limited commercial flexibility while retaining to underpin its role in remote delivery.

Contemporary Challenges and Modernization Efforts (2000–2025)

Following the post-Soviet transition, Russian Post encountered persistent operational inefficiencies, including outdated infrastructure and overstaffing, prompting significant restructuring efforts in the early . By 2009, the organization implemented a modernization program that involved cutting 33,000 jobs to streamline operations while renovating 2,700 post offices nationwide, with plans to renew an additional 160 by year's end. This initiative aimed to transform Russian Post into a more efficient entity, as endorsed in its mid-term development program, which focused on enhancing service delivery and competitiveness. Digitalization emerged as a core modernization strategy, particularly from the onward, to address the rise of and improve customer service. In recent years, Russian Post transitioned to a new IT , enabling faster processing and integration with online platforms, amid challenges posed by growing parcel volumes that strained profitability. support bolstered these efforts, with authorized capital increased by 16.5 billion rubles since 2021 to fund upgrades and operational enhancements. However, the renovation of post offices progressed slowly; despite 17 billion rubles allocated between 2021 and 2025 for modernizing 3,355 facilities, annual funding of around 500 million rubles suggested completion could extend centuries under current rates. The 2022 imposition of Western sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine exacerbated challenges, disrupting access to imported technologies and leading to manual sorting processes that caused delivery delays of up to a month even for domestic mail by 2025. Financial pressures intensified, with projected losses reaching 379 million USD in 2023, prompting plans to close unprofitable branches and refinance debt, alongside proposals to levy a 0.5% fee on marketplaces to offset costs. Audits revealed systemic issues, including alleged misuse of public funds for pensions and benefits, underscoring ongoing and hurdles despite continued discussions on further development.

Organizational Structure

Governance and Leadership

Russian Post, legally structured as a (AO "Pochta Rossii") wholly owned by the Russian Federation, operates under direct state oversight, with its governance framework emphasizing alignment with national postal policy objectives set by the federal government. The company's supreme governing body is the , which provides strategic direction, approves major financial and operational plans, and ensures compliance with state mandates; this board's composition is approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, reflecting the state's through representation by ministries such as the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and . The Board typically includes government officials, industry experts, and company executives, with its structure updated periodically to address operational challenges, as seen in the 2020 revision that incorporated figures like former Maxim Akimov. Executive leadership is headed by the General Director, who serves as the responsible for day-to-day , of board-approved strategies, and reporting to state authorities. Mikhail Yuryevich Volkov has held this position since January 2023, succeeding Maxim Akimov; Volkov, born in 1976 and educated at State Academy of Economics and Law, previously led the National Lottery and brings experience in financial and operational to address Russian Post's modernization and financial recovery efforts amid sanctions and logistical disruptions.) Under Volkov's tenure, leadership priorities have included cost reductions, such as staff payroll cuts initiated in February 2025 targeting 200-350 thousand rubles in savings, and pursuing profitability projected for 2026 through state-supported measures. The governance model integrates a Management Board, subordinate to the General Director, which handles tactical operations across departments like , , and digital services; key deputies include figures such as Vyacheslav Bocharov, First Deputy CEO since 2015, overseeing specialized functions. Appointments to roles are influenced by governmental , ensuring policy coherence with federal initiatives on and infrastructure resilience, though this has drawn criticism for prioritizing state directives over market-driven efficiencies. The structure's state-centric nature underscores Russian Post's role as a , with annual financial results and strategic plans subject to board and ministerial review, as evidenced by the mid-2023 approval of operating profit amid ongoing losses.

Infrastructure and Operational Network

Russian Post maintains a vast domestic network of approximately 42,000 s, ensuring coverage across urban, rural, and remote regions of , including and the . This infrastructure supports mail collection, distribution, and customer services, with ongoing renovations targeting rural branches; between 2021 and 2024, over 3,000 such facilities received upgrades funded by state investments exceeding 17 billion rubles. The operational backbone consists of regional logistics and postal centers equipped for automated sorting and processing. Key facilities include centers in , , , Samara, and , with the center—covering 36,000 square meters—handling up to 1 million items daily and serving 3,500 post offices across multiple federal districts since its 2018 launch. Expansion efforts in 2024 introduced new centers in (21,000 sq.m), (14,800 sq.m), (15,000 sq.m), (15,000 sq.m), and (8,000 sq.m), each incorporating automated sorting capabilities to enhance parcel throughput amid rising e-commerce volumes. Additional hubs, such as the facility, process up to 1.5 million letters and parcels per day, facilitating faster delivery to Siberian populations. Transportation infrastructure encompasses a multimodal fleet for nationwide and international exchange. Ground operations rely on over 17,000 motor vehicles, including specialized delivery vans, supplemented by more than 800 owned railway cars for bulk transport. assets, including dedicated aircraft and helicopters like the VRT-300 in Russian Post , enable service to inaccessible areas, while partnerships extend rail and air capacity as needed. Complementary networks include over 7,500 automated parcel terminals (postamats) deployed by 2022, with thousands installed in retail partners like stores to streamline last-mile pickup. This integrated system processes millions of items daily, though sanctions have occasionally necessitated manual sorting adjustments, impacting efficiency.

Services and Operations

Domestic Mail and Parcel Handling

Russian Post manages domestic mail and parcel handling through an extensive network exceeding 42,000 postal facilities, enabling collection from urban mailboxes and rural outposts across Russia's 17 million square kilometers. Items undergo initial processing at local branches before transport to regional hubs via ground vehicles, prioritizing universal coverage under state mandate despite varying population densities. Central to operations are logistics and sorting centers, with five major facilities operational as of early 2024 in , St. Petersburg, , Samara, and , supplemented by plans for five additional centers in , , , , and . The center spans over 36,000 square meters and processes more than 1 million items daily, including over 150,000 parcels, utilizing automated sorting lines for efficiency. Other sites, like , handle approximately 237,000 shipments per day across 14,800 square meters. A forthcoming facility aims for 1.5 million parcels and letters daily in over 50,000 square meters, reflecting investments to accommodate e-commerce-driven parcel surges amid stagnant or declining letter mail. Post-sorting, items distribute via a fleet exceeding 17,000 vehicles for inter-regional , transitioning to local couriers, foot carriers, or hand delivery for parcels up to 5 kg, with standard domestic transit targeting 3 business days in major cities but often extending in remote zones due to and . Services include ordinary, registered, and express options, though sanctions-induced equipment shortages prompted a shift to manual letter sorting by April 2025, resulting in delays exceeding one month for some domestic . Annual handling historically encompasses around 2.5 billion letters and 300 million parcels, with parcels showing growth from online retail while letters erode from digital substitution, though precise 2023-2025 volumes remain undisclosed in public reports.

Financial and Retail Services

Russian Post offers through its approximately 42,000 post offices, which serve as agent locations for money transfers, bill payments, and basic banking operations. Domestic and international money transfers are facilitated via postal orders and partnerships, including , allowing cash-based remittances without requiring bank accounts. Payment services include acceptance of utility bills, traffic fines, taxes, and mobile top-ups, often processed over the counter or through terminals in larger branches. These operations position post offices as key access points for financial transactions in rural and underserved areas, where traditional banking infrastructure is limited. In collaboration with Post Bank, Russian Post previously provided integrated banking products such as deposits, loans, debit cards, and servicing directly at postal counters, leveraging its network for widespread availability. Russian Post held a 49.99% stake in Post Bank until 2024, when VTB accelerated acquisition of the remaining shares, potentially altering the scope of these embedded services. Retail services encompass sales of transportation tickets (rail, air, theater), postal supplies like materials, and periodical subscriptions, supplementing core postal functions with convenience-oriented commerce. Lottery ticket distribution was offered until September 2022, when sales of certain state ceased at post offices. These ancillary retail activities generate additional streams, with contributing to overall business growth, as evidenced by a 2% increase in that segment reported for recent fiscal periods.

Innovative Delivery Technologies

Russian Post has implemented automated s, known as postamats, to facilitate contactless retrieval of small packages and orders. These stations allow recipients to access prepaid parcels using a code sent via or app, without interacting with staff, enhancing convenience and reducing queues at traditional post offices. As of May 2024, postamats were operational in approximately 1,000 postal departments across , supporting deliveries from partner online retailers. In partnership with , Russian Post launched a pilot program for autonomous delivery robots in select neighborhoods in October 2021. These ground-based robots, capable of navigating urban sidewalks, transport letters and small parcels from 27 participating post offices to nearby addresses, operating day and night under remote supervision. The initiative aims to address last-mile delivery challenges in densely populated areas, with robots demonstrated in operation as recently as 2023. Russian Post has pursued unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for parcel and delivery in remote and hard-to-reach regions, such as and the . In 2021, the company announced plans to deploy drones on 10 routes in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug by 2024 to ensure reliable service amid harsh weather and vast distances. Agreements, including one signed with the Kamchatka Territory government in September of an unspecified recent year, target drone-based correspondence , while tests of longer-range flights up to 100 km have been reported. Early trials, such as a 2018 demonstration in , encountered technical failures, but ongoing developments, showcased at events like the 2021 MAKS airshow, indicate continued investment in aerial innovations.

International Mail Exchange

Russian Post facilitates international mail exchange as the designated postal operator of Russia, adhering to the standards of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), of which it has been a member since the Soviet era. Outgoing and incoming international correspondence, parcels, and EMS shipments are processed through specialized exchange bureaus that serve as extraterritorial offices of exchange (ETOE), handling customs clearance, sorting, and handover to foreign operators under UPU conventions for letter-post items and parcels. These operations ensure reciprocal exchange, with accepting inbound mail from UPU members while dispatching outbound items via air, land, or sea routes, often through partnerships for transit. Key infrastructure includes the primary international exchange hub in , supplemented by additional terminals opened in and in the early 2010s to accelerate parcel processing and reduce delivery times for e-commerce volumes. Russian Post also maintains three ETOE in , with the main facility in facilitating exchanges with continental operators. Processing involves automated sorting for letters and parcels up to 31.5 kg, with tracking available via the Track & Trace system integrated with UPU's , though delays can occur due to bilateral protocols. Services encompass standard letters, priority , economy parcels, and express EMS deliveries to over 190 destinations, with tariffs set by UPU terminal dues and national rates; for instance, EMS to typically takes 3-7 days under normal conditions. However, geopolitical tensions have disrupted direct exchanges: following Russia's 2022 invasion of , the suspended all international acceptance to Russia effective March 11, 2022, citing transportation unavailability from sanctions. Similarly, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) indefinitely suspended Russia and memberships on March 17, 2022, halting streamlined cooperation with many EU states and prompting rerouting via third countries like or Central Asian partners. These restrictions have compelled indirect routing for Western-bound mail, elevating costs and transit times, while exchanges with non-Western partners—such as nations and Asia—remain operational, supporting growth. In August 2025, Russian Post temporarily halted acceptance of outbound parcels containing goods to the due to the expiration of duty-free regimes and new import tariffs exceeding thresholds, affecting non-document shipments. Despite these challenges, the operator continues UPU-compliant exchanges where feasible, with resumed land deliveries to select European countries reported in prior years to mitigate air route limitations. Overall, international volumes have faced contraction amid global postal declines post-pandemic, compounded by Russia's isolation from key markets.

Financial Performance

Russian Post's primary revenue streams include postal services, which encompass domestic and international mail handling and parcel delivery; financial services such as money transfers, bill payments, and banking partnerships; and retail trading activities involving sales of goods like stationery, periodicals, and consumer products at post offices. In 2023, postal services generated 152.98 billion rubles, accounting for the largest share, followed by trading at 26.8 billion rubles and financial services at 9.2 billion rubles. Digital and e-commerce-related revenues, often integrated across streams particularly in parcel logistics for online marketplaces, reached 73.4 billion rubles that year.
YearTotal Revenue (bn RUB)Postal Services (bn RUB)Trading (bn RUB)Financial (bn RUB)Digital/E-commerce (bn RUB)
2021217.0 (+2.8%)166.7 (+2.2%)27.6 (+6.7%)-52.8 (+42%)
2022208.44 (-4%)152.78 (-8.4%)28.78 (+4.1%)--
2023212 (+1.7%)152.98 (+0.1%)26.8 (-6.7%)9.2 (+6.2%)73.4 (+18.7%)
2024219 (+3%)----
Data compiled from Russian accounting standards (RAS); growth percentages year-over-year. Overall growth has been modest, with total figures fluctuating amid declines in traditional letter mail offset by expansions in parcel volumes tied to Russia's surge. Postal services showed stagnation in 2023 at +0.1%, reflecting persistent drops in correspondence volumes, while digital revenues expanded rapidly at +18.7%, driven by partnerships with platforms for last-mile delivery. In the first half of 2024, revenues from collaborations increased 1.5-fold year-over-year, contributing to commercial segments' outperformance. By 2024, rose 3% to 219 billion rubles, with postal communication services up 3%, indicating gradual recovery in core operations amid broader demand. maintained steady growth at +6.2% in 2023, supported by payments and remittances, though trading dipped due to competitive retail pressures.

Persistent Losses and State Subsidies

Russian Post has incurred net losses annually in recent years, reflecting operational challenges in maintaining a vast network amid declining traditional mail volumes and rising costs. In 2022, the company reported a net loss of 30.3 billion rubles ($385 million), escalating from prior deficits due to inefficiencies and external pressures. This figure adjusted to 7.2 billion rubles in 2023, a reduction attributed to partial cost controls, though still indicative of underlying unprofitability. Losses rebounded to 20.5 billion rubles for 2024, with operating losses reaching 17.1 billion rubles by year-end, more than double the previous year's operational shortfall. For the first half of 2025, net losses surged to 23.8 billion rubles, compared to 12.2 billion rubles in the same period of , driven by elevated expenses outpacing growth in parcel and . An highlighted that these deficits, often exceeding norms by factors of ten, stem from mismanagement and overexpenditures, such as 2 billion rubles in excess IT spending from 2021–2023. Despite reaching 212 billion rubles in 2023—a 1.7% increase—core activities like mail handling remain unprofitable without external support. To offset these persistent shortfalls, Russian Post relies heavily on state subsidies, fulfilling its role as a provider across Russia's expansive territory. In the first half of 2025 alone, it received 327 million rubles in budgetary subsidies. Additional allocations include over 15 billion rubles beyond an initial 17 billion rubles already disbursed, earmarked for branch modernization in the coming three years, alongside 2.1 billion rubles for other infrastructure needs. These funds, often channeled through ministries like Minpromtorg, underscore the state's commitment to subsidizing loss-making operations deemed essential for social connectivity, though critics argue they enable avoidance of structural reforms. Without such interventions, the company's debt servicing costs—projected to rise—and operational deficits would likely intensify, as evidenced by cumulative losses exceeding tens of billions annually since 2021.

Controversies and Criticisms

Operational Inefficiencies and Service Failures

Due to Western sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of , Russian Post transitioned to manual letter sorting in early 2025, as automated equipment could no longer be maintained or repaired due to restricted access to parts and technology. This shift resulted in domestic mail delivery delays extending to one month or longer, even for intra-city shipments, exacerbating longstanding bottlenecks in processing volumes that reached over 1 billion letters annually prior to the disruption. Pension and benefit payments, a core service handled by Russian Post, have faced for inconsistent timeliness, with an in July 2025 examining alleged misuse of funds amid reports of delays attributed to recipient unavailability or logistical failures. The organization claimed 98.6% of pensions were delivered on schedule in the period reviewed, yet independent analyses highlighted systemic understaffing at facilities as a primary cause of parcel backlogs, with processing times for international and items routinely exceeding advertised norms by weeks. Operational reliability has been further undermined by equipment overheating leading to frequent breakdowns in sorting facilities and a rise in cyber incidents, including data breaches that disrupted service continuity in 2022 and persisted into subsequent years. Customer complaints, particularly in parcel handling, often cite lost shipments and unverifiable delivery claims, where recipients allege non-receipt to fraudulently reclaim payments, straining the system's tracking and accountability mechanisms. These failures reflect broader infrastructural decay, with rural post offices operating outdated systems ill-equipped for modern volumes, contributing to a service failure rate that lags behind international benchmarks.

Allegations of Corruption and Mismanagement

In 2016, the Prosecutor-General's Office of Russia initiated a criminal case against Dmitry Strashnov, then-general director of Pochta Rossii, accusing him of abuse of office and related to the of postal vehicles and equipment. Strashnov denied the allegations, asserting that the purchases were conducted transparently and in compliance with procedures, though the case highlighted concerns over inflated costs and favoritism in supplier selection. Regional-level incidents have also surfaced, including the 2010 charging of Vladimir Chechikov, head of the postal service in Russia's Jewish Autonomous Region, with for approximately 1.2 million rubles (equivalent to about $38,570 at the time) through falsified expense reports. More recently, in August 2024, authorities in detained a postal employee for suspected during an internal probe by the and Directorate. In a related scheme spanning 2018–2023, former head Magomed-Bashir Kalimatov was jailed in May 2025 after conviction on eight counts of and , involving the diversion of over 2 billion rubles from social benefit payments processed through postal channels in . Allegations of financial mismanagement have persisted, with Russia's Accounts Chamber deeming Pochta Rossii's operations ineffective as of 2025, citing low-quality financial oversight that contributed to chronic deficits and inefficient resource allocation. In July 2025, the postal service faced an over claims of misusing public funds designated for and social benefit deliveries, prompting reviews of expenditure practices amid broader scrutiny of state enterprise . These issues culminated in projected losses of up to 35 billion rubles (about $379 million) for 2023, leading to decisions to close unprofitable branches and refinance debts, as acknowledged in internal financial assessments.

Effects of State Monopoly and Reform Resistance

The state monopoly granted to Pochta Rossii on universal postal services, including letter delivery, has insulated the organization from competitive pressures, fostering inefficiencies such as chronic delivery delays and suboptimal . Public complaints about protracted times have intensified, with reports highlighting "outrageous" lags in parcel and handling that undermine reliability for both domestic and remote areas. This lack of rivalry contrasts with liberalized postal markets elsewhere, where drives improvements in speed and cost, but Russia's retention of monopoly protections perpetuates bureaucratic inertia and resource misallocation. Antimonopoly regulators have repeatedly intervened due to abuses stemming from this dominant position. In 2021, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) ruled that Pochta Rossii violated legislation by imposing a 100% surcharge on parcels to hard-to-reach regions without justification, exploiting its exclusive access to postal infrastructure. Similar findings in 2024 led to FAS issuing prescriptions to cease , underscoring how monopoly power enables discriminatory pricing and hinders market entry for private operators. These incidents reflect broader risks of state-granted privileges enabling predatory behavior, as monopolies in postal sectors globally can leverage reserved services to cross-subsidize competitive activities unfairly. Financial underperformance exacerbates these effects, with the monopoly failing to generate sustainable profits despite share. Pochta Rossii recorded a RUB 27.2 billion ($353 million) loss in 2022—its first in nine years—attributed partly to external sanctions but rooted in structural vulnerabilities like high overheads and outdated operations unpressured by rivals. Pre-tax losses nearly doubled by mid-2025, signaling ongoing fiscal strain from monopoly-induced complacency rather than adaptive efficiency. Reform efforts have encountered significant resistance, preserving the monopoly amid entrenched state control. Governmental directives in aimed at crafting long-term financial models for Pochta Rossii under varying economic scenarios, yet core structural changes like partial or introduction remain unrealized, prioritizing job preservation and political stability over market . This stasis aligns with Russia's broader pattern of state-owned enterprises resisting , where monopoly retention sustains patronage networks but stifles and productivity gains observed in digitized partial reforms. Consequently, the absence of credible threats to the monopoly perpetuates dependency on subsidies and hampers alignment with global postal trends toward contestable markets.

International Cooperation

Bilateral Partnerships and Agreements

Russian Post has established several bilateral agreements with foreign postal operators to facilitate efficient international mail exchange, parcel handling, and logistics integration, often supplementing frameworks with customized terms on tariffs, transit routes, and protocols. These partnerships prioritize operational streamlining and volume growth in cross-border shipments, particularly with operators in and neighboring states. In December 2019, Russian Post signed a cPacket business cooperation agreement with , aimed at enhancing efficiency in postal operations through standardized electronic data exchange and optimized parcel processing for high-volume flows between the two countries. A separate cooperative agreement with was also formalized by Russian Post's General Director Dmitry Strashnov and China Post Group President Li Guohua to further strengthen mutual capabilities. On June 10, 2025, Russian Post and Mongol Post committed to joint development of and solutions, including expedited rail and air delivery services, as well as handling for goods originating from third countries such as and . In 2018, a bilateral agreement on international postal services was concluded with Azerpost, enabling coordinated handling of cross-border mail and followed by a of cooperation to expand service scopes. Russian Post has also expanded its agreement with to simplify shipments from , leveraging Russian Post's domestic network for increased inbound volumes while providing with streamlined access to Russian distribution channels. Recent discussions in September 2025 at the Universal Postal Union Congress included prospects for deepened ties with , focusing on reciprocal access to domestic markets and eased procedures for sellers, and with the UAE postal operator to integrate into broader international systems supporting growth. These initiatives reflect a strategic emphasis on partnerships with geopolitically aligned or economically complementary operators amid evolving global dynamics.

Geopolitical Constraints on Global Operations

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, Western sanctions and associated geopolitical tensions imposed severe restrictions on Russian Post's international mail exchange. Numerous postal operators in Europe, North America, and allied nations suspended services to and from , citing risks from the conflict and compliance with sanctions prohibiting dealings with sanctioned entities. For instance, the postal services of , , , , and halted exchanges in March-April 2022, leading Russian Post to reciprocate by suspending acceptance of shipments to these countries. The similarly suspended all mail classes to , a restriction that persists as of October 2025. Private international couriers, including , , and UPS, also ceased operations in due to the conflict and sanctions. These suspensions extended to broader European networks, with the Association of European Public Postal Operators (PostEurop) indefinitely barring Russian Post and Belposhta from membership in July 2022, limiting access to coordinated regional logistics and standards. Financial sanctions, including Russia's partial exclusion from the SWIFT system, disrupted settlement payments for cross-border mail, while aviation bans and airspace closures eliminated direct flights, forcing reliance on costlier indirect routes or ground/sea transport where feasible. Russian Post responded by halting exchanges with additional non-cooperating nations, including the , , the , and most members, effectively severing reliable postal links to the West. The constraints resulted in a sharp contraction of global operations, with international mail volumes plummeting due to reduced demand, logistical barriers, and payment issues. In 2022, these factors drove a primary decline in Russian Post's international revenue streams, contributing to the company's first annual loss in nine years—25 billion rubles (about $350 million)—as transport restrictions and exchange halts curtailed flows. Ongoing sanctions have sustained these limitations into 2025, prompting Russian Post to redirect efforts toward partnerships in , , and , such as expanded EMS agreements with through the Universal Postal Union, though total international throughput remains substantially below pre-2022 levels.

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  78. https://tadviser.com/index.php/Article:Information_security_in_Russian_Post
  79. https://www.rbth.com/business/2014/07/21/russian_post_to_develop_internet_shopping_with_the_help_of_ebay_38573.html
  80. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-post-general-director-denies-embezzlement-allegations/28143371.html
  81. https://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_Regional_Postal_Chief_Charged_With_Fraud/2225657.html
  82. https://en.mvd.ru/news/item/54409947/
  83. https://oc-media.org/former-post-office-head-jailed-in-karachay-cherkessia-over-ingushetian-pension-fraud-case/
  84. https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2025-02/risc-wp-25-001.pdf
  85. http://en.fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=55194
  86. https://www.oreanda-news.com/en/gosudarstvo/fas-accused-russian-post-of-violating-the-competition-law/article1538324
  87. https://en.iz.ru/en/1800693/2024-12-03/fas-issued-prescription-russian-post-violating-law-competition
  88. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/opportunities-for-anticompetitive-behavior-in-postal-services/
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  103. https://www.ukrposhta.ua/en/news/57687-new-postal-sanctions-posteurop-suspended-the-membership-of-russia-and-belarus-for-an-indefinite-period
  104. https://www.pochta.ru/support/no-mail-exchange
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