Hubbry Logo
Russian RepublicRussian RepublicMain
Open search
Russian Republic
Community hub
Russian Republic
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Russian Republic
Russian Republic
Russian Republic
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Key Information

Part of a series on the
History of Russia
Russia in 1730
Periods
Prehistory  • Antiquity  • Early Slavs
Rus' people pre-9th century
    Rus' Khaganate
    Arthania
    Garðaríki
879–1240: Ancient Rus'
Novgorod Land 882–1136
Principality of Polotsk 987–1397
Principality of Chernigov 988–1402
Rostov-Suzdal 1093–1157
    full list...
1240–1480: Feudal Rus'
Novgorod Republic 1136–1478
Vladimir-Suzdal 1157–1331
Principality of Moscow 1263–1547
    full list...
1480–1917: Tsarist Russia
Tsardom of Russia 1547–1721
     Time of Troubles (Smuta) 1598–1613
     Polish occupation 1610–1612
Russian Empire 1721–1917
     Russian America 1799–1867
     Grand Duchy of Finland 1809–1917
     French invasion of Russia 1812
     Congress Poland 1867–1915
     Russian Manchuria 1900–1905
     Uryankhay Krai 1914–1921
1917–1923: Russian Revolution
Russian Republic 1917–1918
     General Secretariat of Ukraine 1917–1918
Russian SFSR 1917–1922
     Ukrainian SSR 1919–1922
     Byelorussian SSR 1920–1922
     Transcaucasian SFSR 1922–1922
Russian State 1918–1920
     Provisional Priamurye Govt. 1921–1923
    full list...
1923–1991: Soviet Era
Soviet Union 1922–1991
     Russian SFSR 1922–1991
     Karelo-Finnish SSR1940–1956
        full list...
Tannu Tuva1921–1944
since 1991: Modern Russia
Russian Federation 1991–present
     Republic of Tatarstan 1994–present
     Chechen Republic 2000–present
     Republic of CrimeaA 2014–present
     Donetsk People's RepublicAB 2022–present
     Luhansk People's RepublicAB 2022–present
     Kherson OblastAB 2022–present
     Zaporizhzhia OblastAB 2022–present
        full list...
^A Not internationally recognized.
^B Not fully controlled.
Timeline
860–1721 • 1721–1796 • 1796–1855
1855–1894 • 1894–1917 • 1917–1927
1927–1953 • 1953–1964 • 1964–1982
1982–1991 • 1991–present
flag Russia portal

In the wake of the Romanov dynasty's collapse following the February Revolution, the Russian Provisional Government established a short-lived, nascent parliamentary system known as the Russian Republic. The Provisional Government, a caretaker administration that faced immense internal and external pressures, formalized the Republic's inception on September 14, 1917, through a decree signed by its leaders, Minister-Chairman Alexander Kerensky and Minister of Justice Alexander Zarudny.

The political entity, later defined in its 1918 Constitution as the Russian Democratic Federative Republic, struggled for legitimacy and stability from its inception. Its existence was predicated on the promise of eventual elections to a Constituent Assembly that would determine the nation's permanent political structure. However, the government's authority was fatally undermined by its unpopular decision to continue Russia’s involvement in World War I, which exacerbated widespread societal discontent and economic hardship. This culminated in the Bolshevik-led October Revolution, which saw the Republic's executive body, the Directorate, unceremoniously dismantled on November 7, 1917, following a seizure of power.

Despite the Bolsheviks' pre-emptive usurpation of control, a partially democratic election for the long-awaited Constituent Assembly was still held in November. In its singular session on January 18, 1918, the assembly issued a final decree affirming Russia as a democratic federal republic. However, this declaration was immediately nullified by the Bolsheviks, who forcibly dissolved the assembly the very next day, thereby extinguishing the last vestiges of non-Bolshevik democratic governance and paving the way for the consolidation of Soviet authority.

Principal institutions

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Russian Republic

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Russian Republic (Russian: Российская республика) was a provisional democratic state formed in the territories of the former after the abdication of amid the on 2 March 1917 (Old Style), with its formal proclamation as a republic occurring on 14 1917 (New Style) by the under . This transitional regime, initially led by Prince and succeeded by Kerensky, aimed to organize elections for a to establish a permanent government while maintaining Russia's commitments in . However, it operated in with the increasingly influential , which undermined its authority through radical agitation among soldiers and workers. The Republic's short tenure was marked by significant challenges, including , peasant seizures, and military defeats that fueled demands for and social reform, which the liberal-leaning hesitated to address decisively to preserve property rights and alliances. Its continuation of the war effort, despite public exhaustion, contributed to its unpopularity and paved the way for the Bolshevik-led on 25–26 October 1917 (Old Style), which overthrew the government and dispersed the brief democratic experiment. Notable events included the failed in August 1917, an attempted conservative coup that further weakened the regime by bolstering Bolshevik influence, and the eventual dissolution of the Republic's continuity claims by anti-Bolshevik forces amid the , culminating in the Soviet signing of the on 3 March 1918, which ceded vast territories. Despite aspirations for constitutional , the Republic's inability to deliver immediate , redistribution, and bread—core demands of the masses—highlighted the fragility of bourgeois provisional rule in a society primed for radical upheaval.

Origins and Establishment

Preconditions of the February Revolution

The Russian Empire's autocratic system under Tsar Nicholas II perpetuated political stagnation, with the monarch retaining absolute veto power over the established after the 1905 Revolution, limiting meaningful liberalization despite growing demands for constitutional governance. This structure exacerbated elite alienation, as evidenced by the assassination of on December 30, 1916 (Old Style), by nobles who viewed his influence over the imperial family as symptomatic of governance decay. Socially, deep class divisions persisted: peasants, comprising about 80% of the population, suffered from land scarcity and redemption payments lingering from the 1861 emancipation, fueling agrarian unrest, while rapid industrialization since the 1890s created an urban proletariat facing harsh working conditions, low wages, and frequent strikes—over 1,000 in 1912 alone. Economic backwardness compounded these tensions, with Russia's agrarian economy inefficient due to outdated communal (mir system) that hindered productivity, leading to chronic food shortages even before the war; by 1913, grain yields lagged behind , and industrial output, though growing, was hampered by poor infrastructure like inadequate railways, which bottlenecked distribution. The partial success of Pyotr Stolypin's reforms (1906–1911), which encouraged individual farming and dissolved some communes, failed to resolve underlying inequities, as only about 2 million households participated by 1916, leaving mass discontent intact. World War I, commencing August 1, 1914, acted as the primary catalyst by exposing and amplifying these frailties: Russia's mobilization of 15 million men strained resources, resulting in approximately 2 million military deaths and 4–5 million wounded by early 1917, alongside massive desertions due to morale collapse from defeats like the (August 1914) and supply failures. Economic mobilization led to —prices rose 400% by 1917—and acute shortages, as railway inadequacies prevented food transport from rural areas to cities; in Petrograd, bread rations fell to 1 pound per day by January 1917, sparking worker protests amid factory shutdowns. The Tsar's personal assumption of army command in September 1915 further linked military setbacks directly to the throne, eroding loyalty across classes and setting the stage for spontaneous urban uprisings.

Abdication of Nicholas II and Initial Transition

The , erupting in Petrograd on February 23, 1917 (Julian calendar; March 8 Gregorian), involved widespread strikes, food shortages, and military mutinies that paralyzed the capital and spread to other cities, compelling to confront the collapse of imperial authority. Nicholas, traveling by train from the headquarters at , found his route blocked by revolutionaries, forcing a detour to where he arrived on March 1 (Julian; March 14 Gregorian). There, influenced by telegrams from high-ranking generals including and Mikhail Alekseev, who warned of army disintegration and urged abdication to preserve the war effort, Nicholas drafted and signed the abdication manifesto on March 2 (Julian; March 15 Gregorian). In the manifesto, renounced the throne not only for himself but also on behalf of his hemophiliac son, Alexei, designating his brother Michael Alexandrovich as successor, an unprecedented dynastic deviation justified by as necessary for the monarchy's continuity amid crisis. The document, countersigned by ministers and military aides, emphasized loyalty to the nation and continuation of the war against , reflecting 's prioritization of military obligations over personal rule. Historical analyses of the manifesto's drafts confirm its authenticity through archival comparisons, though debates persist on the exact influence of advisors like General in altering phrasing to favor Michael over Alexei. Grand Duke Michael, consulted by Duma leaders in Petrograd, deferred acceptance pending public consultation and declined the throne on March 3 (Julian; March 16 Gregorian), effectively ending the Romanov dynasty's 304-year rule and leaving a power vacuum. The State Duma's Temporary Committee, formed on February 27 (Julian; March 12 Gregorian) amid the revolution's onset, seized the initiative by establishing the Provisional Government on the same day as Michael's refusal, comprising liberal and moderate socialist figures committed to democratic reforms and war prosecution. Prince Georgy Lvov was appointed chairman, with Pavel Milyukov as foreign minister and Alexander Kerensky representing socialist elements, marking the initial shift from autocracy to a caretaker executive without a constituent assembly. This transition institutionalized , as the coexisted uneasily with the of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which issued Order No. 1 on March 1 (Julian; March 14 Gregorian), subordinating units to soviet oversight and democratizing army discipline. The government's legitimacy derived from continuity and acceptance, but its provisional nature—pledging elections for a —exposed vulnerabilities to radical pressures, setting the stage for ongoing instability without immediate republican declaration. and his family were initially detained under guard, transitioning to internal exile, underscoring the incomplete consolidation of the new order.

Proclamation of the Republic

The proclamation of the took place on 1 September 1917 (Old Style; 14 September New Style) via a signed by , who served as of the . This formal declaration ended the provisional status of the government established after II's on 15 March 1917 (O.S.) and explicitly repudiated monarchical rule, transitioning to a republican framework. The move came in the aftermath of the failed in late August 1917, during which General attempted a coup against the , prompting Kerensky to consolidate authority by affirming republican principles to rally support among democratic forces and soldiers. The decree emphasized the need to strengthen national unity and democratic governance amid ongoing and internal instability, stating that the republic's establishment would secure the gains of the . Prior to this proclamation, the had operated without a formal constitutional designation as a republic, maintaining ambiguity to avoid alienating conservative elements, but the escalating crises necessitated clarity on the regime's anti-monarchical stance. The announcement was disseminated through official channels, including state proclamations, and received coverage in international press, signaling Russia's alignment with republican ideals despite the provisional nature of the government. This proclamation did not immediately alter the governmental structure but provided a legal basis for ongoing reforms and the convening of a , intended to draft a permanent . However, its effectiveness was undermined by persistent economic woes, military defeats, and rising Bolshevik influence, culminating in the less than two months later, which overthrew the on 25 October 1917 (O.S.). The short-lived republic's formal inception thus represented a pivotal, yet precarious, step toward in , reflecting the Provisional Government's aspirations for a federated, democratic state free from .

Governmental Structure and Leadership

Composition of the Provisional Government

The Provisional Government was initially composed of 15 ministers drawn primarily from liberal and moderate conservative elements of the Russian political spectrum, with the sole exception of socialist Alexander Kerensky as Minister of Justice. Formed on March 15, 1917 (March 2 Old Style), following Tsar Nicholas II's abdication, the cabinet was led by Prince Georgy Lvov as Minister-President and reflected the influence of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) and allied groups like the Octobrists and Progressives, who held a majority of portfolios. This structure emphasized continuity with pre-revolutionary moderate reformism, prioritizing legal order and war continuation over radical socioeconomic overhaul.
PortfolioMinisterPolitical Affiliation
Minister-PresidentPrince Georgy LvovIndependent liberal (Kadet sympathizer)
Foreign AffairsKadet
War and NavyOctobrist
JusticeTrudovik/Socialist Revolutionary
FinanceMikhail TereshchenkoIndependent progressive
InteriorAlexander Protopopov (initially, then reassigned; later Prince Lvov held ad interim)Moderate (transitional)
Trade and IndustryAlexander KonovalovProgressist/Kadet
TransportNikolai NekrasovKadet
AgricultureAndrei ShingarevKadet
EducationAlexander ManuilovKadet
Food SupplyVladimir RittikhIndependent
Posts and TelegraphsIrakli Tsereteli (briefly; initially Nekrasov ad interim)Menshevik (later addition)
WelfareVladimir VerderevskyIndependent
State ControllerMikhail KhvostovModerate conservative
Subsequent cabinets underwent significant reshuffling amid crises, incorporating socialists from the to broaden support. The First , formed May 5, 1917, after the April Crisis prompted resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov over disputes, added six socialists including and Socialist Revolutionaries, with Kerensky assuming War and Navy while retaining socialist dominance in labor and welfare roles. Lvov resigned July 20, 1917, yielding to Kerensky as in the Second , which featured a precarious balance of 11 socialists and 8 liberals amid the unrest. The final Third , established July 25, further diluted liberal influence by including more Soviet-aligned figures, yet retained Kerensky's central role until the Bolshevik overthrow in November. These shifts aimed to stabilize but highlighted underlying tensions between liberal commitment to property rights and socialist pressures for redistribution and .

Key Figures and Their Roles

Prince served as the first Minister-Chairman of the from March 15, 1917, to July 20, 1917, leading the initial liberal-dominated cabinet formed after Tsar Nicholas II's abdication. A nobleman and advocate for local self-government through zemstvos, Lvov focused on stabilizing the administration and preparing for a while deferring major reforms to avoid further unrest. His resignation stemmed from mounting pressures, including military setbacks and internal divisions, paving the way for a more centralized socialist influence. , a member of the , emerged as the dominant figure, initially appointed Minister of Justice on March 17, 1917, as the sole socialist in the government to bridge liberals and soviets. He assumed the role of Minister of War and Navy on May 5, 1917, amid the government's crisis following the April demonstrations against war policies, and became Minister-Chairman on July 21, 1917, after Lvov's departure. Kerensky proclaimed the Russian Republic on September 1, 1917 (), dissolving monarchical remnants, but his leadership faltered due to failed offensives like the in July 1917, which resulted in heavy casualties—over 60,000 Russian deaths—and widespread desertions exceeding 1 million by autumn. , leader of the (Kadets), held the position of Foreign Minister from March 17 to May 15, 1917, advocating continuity in Russia's Entente alliances and territorial aims, including access to . His April 18, 1917, diplomatic note affirming commitment to "decisive victory" and annexations provoked mass protests in Petrograd, killing over 100 and forcing his resignation, which widened the rift between the government and soviets. , an Octobrist and early leader, served as Minister of War and Navy from March 17 to May 2, 1917, tasked with army reorganization amid collapsing morale, but resigned citing inability to enforce discipline against soviet interference, such as Order No. 1 on March 1, 1917, which democratized military units and undermined officer authority. Mikhail Tereshchenko succeeded Milyukov as Foreign Minister from May 18, 1917, to October 8, 1917, attempting to align government policy with soviet peace demands while maintaining alliances, though efforts like the Stockholm Conference proposal in June 1917 failed to materialize. The , established following Nicholas II's on March 15, 1917 (New Style), derived its initial legal authority from the abdication manifesto, which transferred executive power to his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, who declined the throne the following day after consultations with the 's Temporary Committee, thereby vesting sovereign authority in the Provisional Government formed by Duma deputies. This transition created a republican framework without a formal , as the positioned itself as a temporary executive body tasked with maintaining order, prosecuting the , and convening a to establish permanent institutions and resolve fundamental laws. Institutionally, the government retained and adapted the imperial ministerial structure, comprising a cabinet led by a (initially Prince , succeeded by in July 1917), with portfolios such as Interior, Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs assigned to liberal and moderate socialist figures drawn primarily from the 's Progressive Bloc. Lacking legislative oversight from a dissolved or elected body, it exercised legislative powers through decrees with the force of , continuing pre-revolutionary statutes unless explicitly repealed, while issuing proclamations to liberalize —such as abolishing and religious restrictions on April 2, 1917 (New Style)—pending the Constituent Assembly's ratification. This decree-based governance emphasized administrative continuity amid revolutionary upheaval, but its provisional nature precluded comprehensive constitutional reform, relying instead on ad hoc orders to address immediate crises like land redistribution and military discipline. The formal proclamation of the Russian Republic occurred on September 1, 1917 (Julian calendar), via a from Kerensky's , which declared the abolished and affirmed the Provisional Government's sovereign role until the —elections for which were scheduled for November 12, 1917—could draft a defining the state's republican institutions, , and . However, this legal evolution faced challenges from dynamics with the , which claimed parallel authority through its own orders, undermining the Provisional Government's monopoly on legislative acts despite its formal investiture with full sovereign power independent of soviet or accountability.

Domestic Policies and Reforms

Political Liberalization Efforts

The Provisional Government, formed on March 2, 1917 (O.S.), issued a proclamation on March 3 outlining immediate political reforms to establish civil liberties and democratic processes. This document granted a general amnesty for all political, religious, and related offenses, including terrorist acts, military revolts, and agrarian disorders. It proclaimed freedoms of speech, press, labor unions, assembly, and strikes, extending these rights—with limitations imposed by wartime conditions—to soldiers and sailors. The proclamation also abolished social estates, religious and national restrictions, and the institution of police supervision, replacing the secret police with a national militia elected by local self-governing bodies. Further measures reinforced these liberties: was abolished, enabling unrestricted publication and political discourse. On March 25, (O.S.), the death penalty was eliminated for civilian offenses, though it persisted at lines amid ongoing needs. A enacted on March 20 extended equal civil rights to women, aligning with broader efforts to end class, religious, and nationality-based discriminations. proliferated without restriction, and the jury system was reinstated for criminal trials, signaling a shift toward . These reforms dismantled tsarist repressive apparatus, such as the , fostering an environment where over 1,000 newspapers emerged by mid-1917. Central to liberalization was the pledge to convene a elected by universal, direct, equal, and secret to determine Russia's permanent government form and constitution. Preparations included drafting electoral laws by April 1917, but elections—initially slated for June—were deferred to September due to logistical challenges from war and regional disruptions, and later to November. These postponements, justified by the government as necessary for fair nationwide participation, eroded public confidence amid escalating economic and military crises. Despite such delays, the enacted over 100 decrees by October, prioritizing legal equality and preparatory democratic institutions over immediate power consolidation.

Agrarian and Economic Challenges

The Provisional Government inherited a deeply inequitable agrarian structure, where peasants, comprising over 80% of the rural population, held only about half of arable land despite emancipation in 1861, with much of the remainder controlled by nobility and state estates. Long-standing land hunger intensified by wartime conscription and food requisitions prompted widespread peasant demands for immediate redistribution, but the government, prioritizing legal continuity, established provincial land committees in April 1917 to inventory holdings and prepare for post-Constituent Assembly reforms rather than enact expropriation. This deferral, rooted in liberal commitments to property rights, clashed with peasant expectations, leading to autonomous actions such as the occupation of over 1,000 noble estates by July 1917 and the destruction of manor houses in regions like Tambov and Saratov provinces. Viktor Chernov, the Socialist Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture from May 1917, advocated voluntary land socialization but lacked the coercive power to prevent seizures, as committees often sympathized with local peasants and facilitated informal divisions of pastures and forests. By autumn, unrest encompassed , appropriation, and refusal to harvest for urban markets, undermining grain supplies and contributing to a 20-30% drop in sown acreage compared to pre-war levels in key black-earth regions. These disorders reflected not ideological radicalism but pragmatic responses to , as peasants prioritized subsistence amid disrupted markets, though government appeals for order via Cossack detachments proved ineffective and alienated rural socialists. Economically, the war's legacy amplified agrarian disruptions, with removing 15 million men from fields and railways, causing acute shortfalls—urban deliveries fell to 40% of 1916 levels by summer 1917. eroded incentives, as fixed-price state purchases yielded losses for producers while urban prices quadrupled; monthly inflation rates surpassed 15% by mid-year, halving the ruble's and sparking factory closures in Petrograd and due to and deficits. The government's August 1917 and monopoly extensions, intended to stabilize supplies, instead provoked and black-market proliferation, as peasants withheld surpluses from cities facing starvation-level rations of under 500 grams of per day. Industrial output contracted by 36% from 1913 to 1917, exacerbated by 2 million worker strikes and , while fiscal deficits—reaching 81.7% of expenditures covered by money printing—fueled monetary collapse without corresponding productivity gains. These failures stemmed from the impasse, where Soviet influence vetoed harsh measures like on farms, rendering the Provisional Government's economic apparatus—beset by bureaucratic inertia and ministerial turnover—incapable of restoring pre-war export levels of 11 million tons annually.

Social and Labor Policies

The Provisional Government prioritized the expansion of as a foundational social immediately after its formation. On March 3, (Old Style), its provisional committee issued a guaranteeing freedoms of speech, press, assembly, , and the right to form labor unions and conduct strikes, while declaring a broad political for common-law and political prisoners and abolishing the death penalty except in the field armies. These measures, extending to soldiers insofar as military exigencies allowed, aimed to legitimize the new regime by reversing Tsarist repression, though their application strained under wartime censorship remnants and regional variations. Labor policies focused on accommodating workers' demands to avert industrial collapse, with the government tacitly endorsing the Petrograd Soviet's March 10, 1917 (Old Style) resolution instituting an eight-hour workday in the capital's factories. This concession, formalized after negotiations with industrialists who capitulated to avoid shutdowns, addressed pre-revolutionary grievances over 12-14 hour shifts but remained localized, as the refrained from a nationwide amid supply disruptions and military needs. The establishment of a Ministry of Labor, initially led by Socialist Revolutionary Alexander Peshekhonov, promoted union recognition, dispute mediation, and preparatory steps toward unemployment insurance and minimum wages, yet enforcement faltered as strikes proliferated—numbering over 1,000 major actions by summer, involving roughly two million participants—exacerbating production shortfalls. Social initiatives extended to preparatory equality measures, including promises of and women's enfranchisement for the anticipated , alongside release of approximately 10,000 political prisoners by April 1917. However, substantive reforms in areas like peasant land redistribution or comprehensive welfare were deferred pending electoral outcomes, reflecting the government's commitment to legal continuity over immediate redistribution, which fueled discontent among soviets advocating worker control and factory committees. These policies, while advancing liberal norms, proved causally insufficient against (prices rising 200-300% by October) and food shortages, as empirical data from factory reports indicated persistent and output declines despite concessions.

Foreign Policy and the World War

Commitment to Entente Obligations

Following the , the affirmed its dedication to fulfilling Russia's pre-existing military alliances with the Entente powers, rejecting any notion of with the . In a formal declaration dated March 27 (April 9 New Style), 1917, the government explicitly stated its intent to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion, emphasizing loyalty to allied commitments despite domestic pressures for . This stance aligned with the government's broader policy of maintaining international obligations inherited from the Tsarist regime, even as it publicly renounced aggressive war aims such as annexations or indemnities in favor of a defensive posture aimed at . To demonstrate resolve to the Entente and revitalize the faltering Russian army, Minister of War authorized a major offensive along the Southwestern Front commencing on June 18 (July 1 New Style), 1917. Planned in coordination with Allied military leaders earlier that year, the operation sought to relieve pressure on other fronts and honor Russia's role in the coalition by advancing against Austro-Hungarian positions in Galicia, initially capturing significant territory including 10,000 prisoners and 30 guns. However, the offensive rapidly stalled due to logistical failures, low morale, and counterattacks, resulting in over 60,000 Russian casualties and widespread desertions that exacerbated internal instability. The Provisional Government's unyielding adherence to Entente obligations, including the rejection of peace overtures from in the summer of 1917, contrasted sharply with growing pacifist sentiments in the and among troops, who favored an immediate armistice without annexations. This policy, driven by fears of Allied reprisals and hopes for postwar territorial gains like access to , ultimately undermined public support, as evidenced by the April Crisis triggered by Foreign Minister Pavel Milyukov's reaffirmation of full commitment to victory, which sparked mass demonstrations. By prioritizing coalition fidelity over domestic consensus, the government preserved Russia's formal alliance status until the Bolshevik accession but at the cost of accelerating revolutionary radicalization.

Military Developments and Failures

The Provisional Government's commitment to continuing efforts against the was undermined from the outset by the Petrograd Soviet's Order No. 1, issued on March 1, 1917 (Old Style), which mandated the formation of elected committees in all military units, placed weapons under committee control rather than officers, and subordinated political actions of the armed forces to the Soviet and its committees. This order, intended to secure loyalty amid revolutionary unrest, rapidly spread across the , eroding traditional command structures as committees frequently vetoed officer orders, demanded democratic participation in decisions, and fostered indiscipline through politicization of ranks. The resulting democratization of the military exacerbated pre-existing morale issues, with soldiers increasingly prioritizing Soviet directives over those of the or frontline commanders. Desertions surged as discipline collapsed, with Russian authorities detaining 195,130 soldiers attempting to flee the front lines by March 1, 1917, reflecting accumulated and revolutionary agitation. By autumn 1917, estimates indicated approximately 2 million troops had deserted, many slipping away to return home amid land hunger and opposition to further offensives, further hollowing out an already strained by over 7 million total since 1914. Efforts to restore order, such as Alexander Kerensky's appointment as Minister of War on May 5, 1917, and his patriotic appeals framing the war as a defense of the revolution, yielded limited results, as soviet portraying the conflict as imperialist continued to resonate with exhausted peasant-soldiers. The , launched on June 18, 1917 (Old Style), represented the Provisional Government's most ambitious military development, aimed at breaking the on the Eastern Front, bolstering Allied support, and revitalizing under General Aleksei Brusilov's command. Initial advances penetrated 5 to 40 kilometers in Galicia and , capturing thousands of Austro-Hungarian prisoners and briefly recapturing key positions. However, the operation quickly faltered due to mass refusals to advance, mutinies, and heavy artillery barrages, with Russian forces suffering around 40,000 killed and 20,000 wounded during the subsequent retreat, alongside widespread desertions and captures totaling over 400,000 losses when including non-combat attrition. German counteroffensives, including the capture of on September 3, 1917, exploited the disarray, inflicting further defeats and accelerating the army's disintegration, as units dissolved into rioting and fraternal killings of officers. These failures stemmed from systemic issues, including inadequate supplies, radicalized soldier committees blocking reinforcements, and the inability to enforce discipline without alienating the rank-and-file, ultimately discrediting the and paving the way for demands to end the war. By late , the front had effectively collapsed, with effective fighting strength reduced to a of its 1914 levels, rendering further Entente-aligned operations untenable.

Peace Initiatives and Negotiations

The , influenced by the Petrograd Soviet's demands for an end to the war, issued a on March 27 (April 9 New Style), 1917, affirming that "free " pursued no territorial conquests or domination over other nations and sought a peace grounded in the of peoples. This statement aimed to counter rumors of a separate peace with the while maintaining alliances with the Entente, emphasizing national unity for defense and post-war strength without explicit renunciation of all war aims. However, Foreign Minister Pavel Milyukov's diplomatic note of April 18 (May 1 NS), 1917, to the Allied powers reaffirmed Russia's intent to prosecute the war to a "decisive victory," including securing control over and the straits, which clashed with socialist interpretations of peace without annexations. The note's publication sparked the April Crisis, with mass protests in Petrograd decrying perceived imperialist continuity, forcing Milyukov's resignation and the inclusion of socialists like in a restructured . This episode highlighted the government's internal divisions, as liberal leaders prioritized Entente obligations over immediate , while radicals demanded unilateral withdrawal. Subsequent efforts under Kerensky, who became Minister of War in May 1917, shifted toward revitalizing military morale rather than pursuing negotiations; he authorized the June (July NS) Offensive to demonstrate Russia's commitment and preempt Bolshevik agitation for peace. The offensive's rapid collapse, marked by heavy casualties and widespread mutinies, intensified domestic pressure for armistice but yielded no direct talks with the , as the government rejected to avoid alienating allies. No formal negotiations occurred during the Provisional Government's tenure, with peace rhetoric serving primarily to placate internal opposition amid ongoing Entente coordination, ultimately eroding its authority as battlefield failures fueled revolutionary sentiment.

Internal Conflicts and Dual Power

Emergence of the Petrograd Soviet

The February Revolution erupted in Petrograd on 23 February 1917 (8 March Gregorian), sparked by mass strikes commemorating , bread shortages, and a lockout at the Putilov armaments factory that idled over 20,000 workers. By 26 February, government troops fired on demonstrators, killing dozens, but on 27 February, units of the Petrograd garrison—totaling around 160,000 soldiers—mutinied en masse, refusing orders and joining protesters, which tipped the balance against the imperial regime. Amid this chaos, spontaneous assemblies of workers from major factories like Putilov, Obukhov, and Erikson, alongside soldier delegates from mutinous regiments such as the Volynsky and Pavlovsky Guards, convened at the to coordinate actions and voice grievances. On 27 February 1917 (Julian), these groups formally established the of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as a representative body, drawing on the precedent of soviets as councils for direct worker-soldier input outside tsarist structures. The Soviet's founding resolution, published in its organ Izvestiia the following day, proclaimed it a defender of revolutionary gains, calling for an end to the war, land redistribution, and democratic elections, while asserting authority over Petrograd's labor and military forces. Delegates numbered initially in the dozens but swelled rapidly to over 500 by early March, elected proportionally from workplaces (one per 1,000 workers) and regiments (one per company), reflecting broad proletarian and garrison representation rather than centralized party control. An Executive Committee, elected that evening under Menshevik chair Nikolai Chkheidze and Socialist Revolutionary (among others), assumed de facto leadership, handling daily operations from the while the full Soviet met in plenary sessions. This committee, dominated by moderate socialists wary of bourgeois , prioritized stabilizing the revolution through appeals for unity with the emergent but also issued Order No. 1 on 1 March (14 March Gregorian), mandating soldier committees in units, subordination of the military to the Soviet over the government, and abolition of tsarist ranks—moves that institutionalized soviet influence and sowed seeds of . By mid-March, the Soviet controlled key infrastructure, including railroads and telegraph lines, via affiliated and garrison committees, emerging as a parallel authority amid the 's formation from Duma liberals.

Ideological Divisions Among Revolutionaries

The ideological divisions among revolutionaries following the of 1917 primarily revolved around the 's role, the continuation of , and the pace of socioeconomic transformation. Moderate socialists, led by and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), who controlled the Petrograd Soviet's executive committee from March 1917, pursued a strategy of "revolutionary defensism." This entailed conditional backing of the liberal-leaning to secure bourgeois-democratic reforms—such as and preparation for a —while prosecuting the war to safeguard the revolution from counterrevolutionary threats, rejecting outright as defeatist. Bolsheviks, representing a more intransigent Marxist faction, initially aligned against the even prior to Vladimir Lenin's return, as evidenced by the Russian Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee's March 4, 1917, resolution in denouncing it as insufficiently revolutionary and unfit to resolve the crisis without proletarian oversight. Lenin's , presented on April 4, 1917 (March 22 Old Style), crystallized this opposition, arguing that the revolution's peculiarities—Russia's weak bourgeoisie, advanced worker organization in soviets, and the war's imperialist character—necessitated bypassing the bourgeois stage. He demanded "all power to the Soviets" as organs of direct proletarian and peasant rule, immediate armistice to end the "predatory" war without annexations or indemnities, nationalization of land without compensation, and worker control over production, explicitly repudiating Menshevik-SR collaboration with liberals as capitulation to . These cleavages surfaced acutely in soviet deliberations; Menshevik and SR majorities defeated Bolshevik anti-defensist motions at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets (March 29–April 3, 1917) by a vote of 325 to 57, affirming war continuation under revised "non-annexationist" terms while subordinating soviets to governmental pressure rather than supplanting it. SRs, agrarian-oriented and dominant among peasants, mirrored Menshevik gradualism by prioritizing land reform via the Constituent Assembly over soviet expropriation, with figures like Alexander Kerensky joining the government as Minister of Justice in May 1917 to enact incremental changes. Bolshevik critiques, framing moderates as enablers of tsarist-era militarism and economic stagnation, gained traction amid soldier desertions (over 2 million by summer 1917) and urban shortages, polarizing revolutionaries and undermining dual power's fragile equilibrium.

Regional Autonomy and Separatist Movements

Following the , ethnic minorities across the former accelerated demands for regional autonomy, capitalizing on the Provisional Government's centralized structure and preoccupation with national politics and war efforts. These movements, rooted in long-standing cultural and linguistic grievances under tsarism, proliferated in 1917 as local councils and assemblies formed to assert , often bypassing Petrograd's authority. The government's initial rejection of —favoring a unitary pending a —failed to stem the tide, fostering fragmentation that undermined central control. In Finland, the Senate proposed power transfer from Petrograd on July 18, 1917, via an autonomy law passed by the Diet, escalating tensions until Parliament declared full independence on December 6, 1917, amid the Bolshevik seizure in . Similarly, Ukraine's , established in March 1917, issued its First Universal on , proclaiming autonomy over Ukrainian-populated provinces within a federated , forming a General Secretariat as despite Provisional Government protests. Baltic provinces saw parallel initiatives: Estonian and Latvian national councils demanded cultural and administrative by mid-1917, with Estonian Maapäev (Land Council) elected in September pushing for self-rule, while Lithuanian Taryba formed in to seek separation, all amid soldier soviets and German occupation threats. In the Volga-Ural region, Tatar and Bashkir leaders convened in in June 1917, declaring for Muslim as , encompassing , , and adjacent areas with a population of 14-15 million. Central Asian established in December 1917 via the Alash Orda congress, claiming steppe territories and advocating democratic self-rule under Alikhan Bukeikhan. Siberian regionalists, including oblastniki intellectuals, promoted administrative decentralization through the Provisional Siberian Government's precursor committees by summer 1917, seeking economic autonomy from . In the , proto-separatist groups laid groundwork for the later Mountain Republic, with ethnic assemblies in 1917 demanding land reforms and amid Cossack-Russian dominance. These efforts, while varying in radicalism, collectively eroded the Provisional Government's legitimacy, as local power vacuums invited Bolshevik or White interventions post-October, preventing sustained federal resolution.

Path to Collapse

Kornilov Affair and Loss of Authority

In late July 1917 (Old Style), appointed General as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, following the failure of the and amid rampant indiscipline, desertions, and Bolshevik influence in the ranks. , a staunch monarchist and anti-Bolshevik, prioritized restoring military order through harsh measures, including the suppression of soviets and radical agitation, which aligned initially with Kerensky's concerns over anarchy but clashed with the Provisional Government's commitment to democratic reforms. Tensions escalated in mid-August when Kornilov demanded the imposition of in Petrograd to disarm revolutionary units and close the Bolshevik press, citing intelligence on an imminent uprising. On August 26 (Old Style), Kornilov dispatched the 3rd Cavalry Corps under General toward the capital, intending to secure government buildings and quell disorders, while issuing a denouncing the "Jewish-German" Bolshevik conspiracy—a prepared with input from right-wing figures like but not pre-approved by Kerensky. Kerensky, initially supportive of Kornilov's anti-radical stance, grew suspicious of a power grab after ambiguous telegrams and reports from Socialist Revolutionary spies; on , he demanded Kornilov's resignation, dismissed him, and declared him a traitor, prompting Kornilov to press forward with the advance. The government's response fractured its authority: lacking reliable troops, Kerensky appealed to the on August 27, authorizing the arming of workers and releasing Bolshevik prisoners to form Red Guard detachments numbering around 25,000 by early September. Bolshevik-led agitation, including propaganda leaflets and railway sabotage, demoralized advancing units; by August 30, Krymov's forces—totaling about 50,000 but plagued by defections—halted short of Petrograd, with many soldiers refusing orders upon encountering worker militias. Kornilov surrendered on September 1 (Old Style) near and was arrested, while Krymov committed after interrogation; the affair collapsed without significant bloodshed, but interpretations vary, with some evidence suggesting Kerensky's telegrams were mistranslated or forged by intermediaries like Nikolai Savich, fueling claims of a manufactured rather than a genuine coup. The irreparably eroded the Provisional Government's legitimacy. Kerensky faced condemnation from conservatives for betraying a general they viewed as essential for order, leading to mass resignations from the Kadet Party and alienation of military elites who saw the regime as unreliable. Simultaneously, reliance on soviet forces to thwart the advance empowered , who portrayed themselves as saviors of the revolution, boosting their representation in soviets from 10% to over 50% in Petrograd by September. The episode exposed the government's dependence on its ideological opponents, shattered army loyalty—evident in subsequent mutinies—and accelerated demands for soviet power, rendering Kerensky's Directory of Five ineffective and hastening the regime's collapse.

Bolshevik Agitation and October Events

Following Vladimir Lenin's return to Russia on , 1917 (Julian calendar), he presented the to the Bolshevik Party, rejecting cooperation with the and advocating immediate transfer of power to soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies, immediate cessation of the war without annexations or indemnities, and nationalization of land. This marked a shift from the party's initial support for the after the , positioning as opponents to the liberal-socialist coalition and emphasizing over bourgeois democracy. The theses, though initially controversial within the party, reoriented Bolshevik strategy toward agitation among war-weary soldiers, urban workers facing food shortages, and peasants demanding land redistribution, with slogans like "Peace, Land, and Bread" resonating amid and military defeats. Bolshevik agitation intensified through control of key newspapers such as and speeches in factories and barracks, exploiting the Provisional Government's inability to end Russia's involvement in or resolve agrarian unrest. By summer 1917, Bolshevik influence grew in the , where they secured a majority by July, and in soldier committees disillusioned by continued offensives like the failed in June-July. The July Days unrest (July 3-7, 1917), a spontaneous demonstration turning violent, was suppressed by government forces, leading to accusations against for incitement; Lenin fled to amid warrants for his arrest on espionage charges, though the party regrouped underground. This period saw Bolshevik membership swell from about 24,000 in February to over 200,000 by September, fueled by decrying the government as continuation of tsarist imperialism. The in September further eroded authority, as positioned themselves as defenders of the revolution by arming workers against the perceived right-wing threat, gaining Red Guard militias and soviet endorsements. Lenin, from hiding, urged insurrection in letters like "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" (September 12-14, 1917) and "Can the Retain State Power?" (late September-early October), arguing delay would forfeit revolutionary momentum amid peasant revolts and military desertions totaling over 1 million soldiers by autumn. On October 10 (Julian), the Central Committee voted 10-2 to prepare seizure of power, forming the (MRC) under on October 16 to coordinate Petrograd garrison forces, numbering around 20,000-30,000 sympathetic troops. The October Events unfolded rapidly in Petrograd: on October 24, forces seized bridges, telegraphs, and the post office, countering attempts to close Bolshevik presses and mobilize loyal units. By October 25, the cruiser Aurora fired blanks at the , symbolizing the assault; minimal resistance ensued, with government ministers arrested after midnight into October 26, resulting in fewer than a dozen deaths overall—a nearly bloodless coup compared to the February Revolution's toll. The Second , convened that evening with Bolshevik-majority delegates (about 60% of 670 attendees), ratified the actions, forming a Soviet government under Lenin while and Socialist Revolutionaries walked out in protest. Bolshevik control extended unevenly beyond Petrograd, facing resistance in (where fighting lasted until November 2, costing thousands) and rural areas loyal to other socialists.

Seizure of Power by the Bolsheviks

, under Vladimir Lenin's leadership, orchestrated the seizure of power in Petrograd on October 25, 1917 (Julian calendar; November 7 Gregorian). The (MRC), established by the Bolshevik-dominated on October 16 to ostensibly defend the city but effectively to coordinate the uprising, directed Red Guard units, sailors from , and sympathetic soldiers to occupy strategic infrastructure. Actions commenced late on October 24, with forces seizing bridges, railway stations, the central , , and telegraph office, encountering minimal resistance as many troops defected or remained neutral. By the morning of October 25, the Provisional Government's control over Petrograd was effectively nullified, though Prime Minister attempted to rally loyalist Cossack and officer units, which proved insufficient and fragmented. The cruiser Aurora fired blank shots toward the in the evening, signaling the assault; Bolshevik forces, numbering around 20,000-30,000, stormed the palace after a brief , arresting most ministers except Kerensky, who fled southward. The operation, planned primarily by as chair, relied on Bolshevik influence in the soviets and garrison rather than broad popular mobilization, with participation limited to party militants and allies amid widespread but no mass demonstrations. By , the Second , convened amid the chaos, ratified the takeover, dissolving the and proclaiming Soviet authority under a Bolshevik-led with Lenin as chairman. This coup-like transfer, executed by a minority faction backed by armed proletarian and military elements, marked the end of the Russian Republic's brief democratic experiment.

Achievements, Criticisms, and Legacy

Positive Contributions to Russian Modernization

The , upon assuming power on March 15, 1917 (Old Style), issued a granting immediate general for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and agrarian offenses, thereby releasing thousands of political prisoners and fostering an environment for open political discourse. This measure dismantled key repressive institutions of the Tsarist regime, such as the , and abolished press censorship, enabling the proliferation of over 800 new newspapers by mid-1917 and laying groundwork for a free press essential to modern civic participation. Legal reforms advanced rule-of-law principles by reinstating the jury system for all criminal offenses on March 20, 1917, and abolishing the death penalty, which had been sporadically applied under the Tsars; these changes aimed to standardize judicial processes and reduce arbitrary state power, aligning Russia with contemporary European standards of . On the same date, a declared all adult citizens equal regardless of sex, effectively granting women and civil equality, a progressive step that expanded democratic participation ahead of elections planned for November 1917. In ecclesiastical policy, the government proclaimed the independence of the Orthodox Church from state control on August 23, 1917, allowing for internal self-governance and reducing the intertwining of religious and political authority that had characterized autocratic rule, thus promoting secular modernization. These initiatives collectively transitioned Russia from absolutism toward constitutionalism, with freedoms of speech, assembly, and association enabling the formation of diverse political parties and trade unions, which organized over 2 million workers by summer 1917 and contributed to nascent civil society structures. Despite the government's brevity, such reforms provided a blueprint for democratic institutions that influenced subsequent Russian constitutional experiments, though their implementation was curtailed by ensuing civil strife.

Failures and Causal Factors in Downfall

The Provisional Government's persistent commitment to Russia's involvement in , despite widespread war weariness, eroded public support and precipitated military collapses. The , launched on June 18, 1917 (), aimed to bolster morale and secure Allied aid but resulted in over 60,000 Russian casualties within days, triggering desertions and mutinies that further demoralized the army. This failure not only highlighted the government's inability to command effective military loyalty but also intensified anti-war sentiment, paving the way for Bolshevik slogans of immediate peace. Economic mismanagement compounded these woes, as —reaching 300% by mid-1917—and food shortages fueled urban riots and seizures of . The prioritized war financing over stabilizing supply chains, leading to factory shutdowns and a 36% drop in industrial output from 1916 levels, without enacting or agrarian reforms until after promised elections. , comprising 80% of the population, ignored official moratoriums on land redistribution, autonomously expropriating noble properties in 1917, which underscored the regime's detachment from rural realities and its deference to future decisions over urgent action. Politically, the structure with the diluted authority, as Soviet orders like Order No. 1 (March 1917) subordinated officers to elected committees, fracturing discipline. The in August-September 1917, where General Lavr Kornilov's attempted march on Petrograd was thwarted partly by arming , exposed Kerensky's vacillations—initially supporting Kornilov before denouncing him—and legitimized Bolshevik paramilitaries, accelerating the government's perceived impotence. Ideological rigidity, rooted in liberal commitments to constitutional processes amid a society primed for radical redistribution, prevented decisive interventions, while Allied diplomatic pressures reinforced war continuation, rendering the regime structurally vulnerable to organized opposition.

Historiographical Debates and Modern Assessments

Historiographical interpretations of the Russian Republic's have traditionally divided along ideological lines, with Soviet-era scholarship portraying it as a transient bourgeois interlude inevitably doomed by its failure to address proletarian demands, such as immediate land redistribution and peace without annexations, thereby paving the way for Bolshevik ascendancy. Western historians, conversely, often emphasized its liberal aspirations and structural constraints, arguing that the arrangement with the eroded its authority from inception, compounded by commitments to wartime alliances that precluded unilateral withdrawal from . Key debates center on the government's viability: some scholars contend its collapse stemmed from contingent errors, like Alexander Kerensky's mishandling of the in September 1917, which alienated conservatives without consolidating leftist support, while others assert inherent weaknesses, including delayed elections and inability to quell peasant land seizures, rendered the regime untenable amid economic disintegration and military mutinies. A persistent contention involves the Provisional Government's agency in its downfall versus exogenous factors; critics like Leonard Schapiro highlighted its reluctance to suppress Bolshevik agitation decisively, interpreting this as ideological naivety toward revolutionary threats, whereas defenders point to the regime's initial broad legitimacy—evidenced by voluntary tsarist on , , and early democratic overtures—as suggesting potential longevity absent radical interference. Soviet accounts, biased toward Marxist , systematically undervalued these elements to justify the coup as historically predetermined, a narrative challenged by post-1991 archival disclosures revealing the government's substantive reforms in and local . Modern reassessments, informed by declassified documents and post-Soviet perspectives, increasingly portray the Russian Republic not as a mere prelude to but as a critical, if flawed, experiment in transitional whose unraveling exposed causal linkages between unresolved agrarian crises—exacerbated by wartime requisitions—and urban radicalization. Scholars such as Daniel Orlovsky underscore its "unique qualities" in fostering institutional pluralism amid chaos, arguing that failures in coercive capacity, rather than ideological bankruptcy, precipitated collapse, with the of July symbolizing desperate bids for Allied leverage that backfired amid 1.5 million desertions by mid-. These views counter earlier deterministic framings by attributing Bolshevik success partly to opportunistic exploitation of the republic's legalistic restraint, highlighting how the absence of a strong repressive apparatus—deliberate to legitimize democratic credentials—enabled the seizure of Petrograd on October 25-26, , despite limited nationwide backing. Recent analyses also note systemic biases in pre-1991 , where Western liberal sympathy occasionally overlooked grassroots discontent, yet affirm the republic's legacy as a cautionary model of liberalization's perils in polarized societies.

References

  1. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/the-provisional-government/
  2. https://www.archontology.org/nations/rus/01_polity3.php
  3. https://newspapers.library.in.gov/?a=d&d=EVRP19170917.2.17&
  4. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/d33
  5. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/february-revolution/february-revolution-texts/formation-of-the-provisional-government/
  6. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/treaty-of-brest-litovsk/
  7. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/d579
  8. https://explaininghistory.org/2025/02/27/the-causes-of-the-russian-revolution-a-literature-review/
  9. https://www.historyhit.com/what-were-the-key-causes-of-the-russian-revolution/
  10. https://www.thoughtco.com/causes-of-the-russian-revolution-1221800
  11. https://journals.muni.cz/cphpjournal/article/download/15093/12109
  12. https://www.history.com/articles/world-war-i-russian-revolution
  13. https://alphahistory.com/worldwar1/russian-revolution/
  14. https://web.mit.edu/russia1917/papers/0302-AbdicationOfTsarNicholasII.pdf
  15. https://www.hoover.org/research/document-ended-empire
  16. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/february-revolution/february-revolution-texts/abdication-manifesto/
  17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/128136
  18. https://slavica.indiana.edu/content/RGWR/INTRO427.pdf
  19. https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619540
  20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/persons
  21. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/provisional-government/
  22. https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSprovisional.htm
  23. https://open.bu.edu/bitstream/2144/21059/1/Slessinger_Sermour_1952_web.pdf
  24. https://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/lvov.htm
  25. https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSlvov.htm
  26. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksandr-Kerensky
  27. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/alexander-kerensky/
  28. https://worldhistoryedu.com/alexander-kerensky/
  29. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pavel-Milyukov
  30. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/miliukov-pavel-nikolaevich/
  31. https://www.odu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ib-crisis-russia-1917.pdf
  32. https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution/The-February-Revolution
  33. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Russian-Provisional-Government
  34. https://www.worldhistory.org/article/2763/russias-provisional-government-of-1917/
  35. https://project1917.com/posts/22402/
  36. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/constituent-assembly/
  37. https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSassembly.htm
  38. https://www.academia.edu/39522531/The_Provisional_Government_February_October_1917
  39. https://www.johndclare.net/ER8.htm
  40. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/good-land-and-freedom-for-former-serfs-determinants-of-peasant-unrest-in-european-russia-marchoctober-1917/5F6760AA2A5501EB7B7B6166995D3DE9
  41. https://web.mit.edu/russia1917/papers/0901-PeasantViewsonLandReforms&Governance.pdf
  42. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/russia-great-war-mobilisation-grain-and-revolution
  43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/150077
  44. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/rgwr_postprint.pdf
  45. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/food-and-nutrition-russian-empire/
  46. https://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2667&context=etd
  47. https://read.dukeupress.edu/agricultural-history/article/98/1/71/386129/Russian-Grain-Procurement-in-a-Revolutionary
  48. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/kerensky-on-the-provisional-governments-reforms/
  49. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/d26
  50. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1314&context=honors-theses
  51. https://web.mit.edu/russia1917/papers/0618-KerenskyOffensive.pdf
  52. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/provisional-government/
  53. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40401040
  54. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/revolution-in-the-army/revolution-in-the-army-texts/order-no-i/
  55. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/revolution-in-the-army/
  56. https://web.mit.edu/russia1917/papers/0618-SoldiersDiscontentAndOrderNo.One.pdf
  57. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/between-acceptance-and-refusal-soldiers-attitudes-towards-war-russian-empire-1-1/
  58. https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSfww.htm
  59. https://roadstothegreatwar-ww1.blogspot.com/2017/07/100-years-ago-kerensky-offensive-is.html
  60. https://www.dhr.history.vt.edu/modules/eu/mod03_1917/evidence_detail_30.html
  61. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/kerenskii-aleksandr-fedorovich/
  62. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-was-the-february-revolution
  63. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/february-revolution/
  64. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/february-revolution/february-revolution-texts/formation-of-the-soviets/
  65. https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/a-revolutionary-line-of-march-old-bolshevism-in-early-1917-re-examined/
  66. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm
  67. https://isreview.org/issue/106/april-1917-how-lenin-rearmed/index.html
  68. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13085
  69. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav02/ch6subch1
  70. https://www.britannica.com/place/Finland/The-struggle-for-independence
  71. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/the-empire-falls/the-empire-falls-texts/first-universal-declaration/
  72. https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CE%5CCentralRada.htm
  73. https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Independence-and-the-20th-century
  74. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/revolutions-east-central-europe/
  75. https://users.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue1/art11.htm
  76. https://astanatimes.com/2023/10/alash-orda-reflecting-foundations-of-kazakh-statehood/
  77. https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9798887196596-004/html?lang=en
  78. https://www.columbusstate.edu/archives/_docs/gah/1994/235-263.pdf
  79. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/kornilov-affair/
  80. http://www.orlandofiges.info/section6_TheOctoberRevolution1917/KerenskyandKornilov.php
  81. https://kyleorton.co.uk/2021/12/08/unravelling-the-kornilov-affair-the-last-stop-before-the-bolshevik-takeover-of-russia/
  82. https://study.com/academy/lesson/kornilov-affair-history-impact.html
  83. https://www.socialistalternative.org/russian-revolution-1917/april-1917-bolsheviks-adopt-program-power/
  84. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-timeline-1917/
  85. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/november-6/bolsheviks-revolt-in-russia
  86. https://www.thoughtco.com/russian-revolution-timeline-1779473
  87. https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/november-2017-october-revolution-russia
  88. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/bolsheviks-seize-power/
  89. http://www.orlandofiges.info/section6_TheOctoberRevolution1917/LeninandtheOctoberCoup.php
  90. https://journals.librarypublishing.arizona.edu/uahistjrnl/article/572/galley/559/download/
  91. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/october-revolution/
  92. https://stanfordmag.org/contents/a-doomed-democracy
  93. https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z43tcqt/revision/7
  94. https://www.johndclare.net/ER1.htm
  95. https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution
  96. https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zyc72hv/revision/2
  97. https://study.com/academy/lesson/provisional-government-in-russia-overview-politics-post-revolution-chaos.html
  98. https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/handle/11122/5422
  99. https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/27939/GCSE/History/Outline-the-main-reasons-why-the-Kerensky-government-fell-in-1917-in-Russia/
  100. https://www.academia.edu/12540524/Historiography_of_the_Russian_Provisional_Government_1917_in_the_USSR
  101. https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-historiography/
  102. https://www.tracesofevil.com/2014/03/russian-revolution-historiography.html
  103. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4807/
  104. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1965/12/09/kerenskys-case/
  105. https://nanovic.nd.edu/news/russias-failed-revolution/
  106. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230504806_31
  107. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26549833
  108. https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publishing/review/29/long-look-russian-revolution/
  109. https://isreview.org/issue/108/debating-russian-revolution-and-its-relevance/index.html
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.