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Siege of Fallujah (2016)
Siege of Fallujah (2016)
Siege of Fallujah (2016)
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For the battle in which ISIL captured Fallujah in 2014, see Fall of Fallujah. For other battles in Fallujah, see Battle of Fallujah (disambiguation).

Siege of Fallujah (2016)
Part of the War in Iraq and the Anbar campaign (2015–16)

The beginning of the Operation Breaking Terrorism in the next phase of the struggle for Fallujah.
Date2 February 2016 – 22 May 2016
(3 months, 2 weeks and 6 days)
Location
Fallujah and Al-Karmah, Anbar Governorate, Iraq
Result
Belligerents

Air support:[1]

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Commanders and leaders
Haider al-Abadi (Prime Minister of Iraq)
Iraq Maj. Gen. Fadhil Barwari
(ICTS commander)
Suhaib al-Rawi (Governor of Anbar)
Issa Sayyar Al Isawi (Mayor of Fallujah)
Sayeer al-Essawie (Iraqi Major of Fallujah)
Iran Qasem Soleimani (Head of the Quds Force)[5][6][7]		 Abu Waheeb † (Top ISIL commander in Anbar)[8]
Hussein Alawi † (ISIL commander in south Fallujah)[9]
Ayad Marzouk al-Anbari † (Senior ISIL Fallujah commander)[10]
Units involved
ISOF

Military of ISIL

  • Secret Police Force (Al-Hisbah)
Strength

11,000–14,500 fighters

  • 7,000–10,500 Iraqi soldiers[12]
  • 4,000 Shi'ite militiamen[13]
 4,000 militants[14]
Casualties and losses
180+ Iraqi tribesmen captured,[15] and 10 executed[16] 248+ killed (By 20 May)[17][18][19]
140 civilians dead from starvation[20][21]
Hundreds of people executed
90,000 civilians are besieged in Fallujah (April 2016 estimate)[3][22]

The siege of Fallujah was an offensive launched in February 2016 by the Iraqi government against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in al-Karmah and in the city of Fallujah, with the aim of enforcing a siege of the latter. During the early stages of the operation, local Sunni residents revolted against ISIL for a period of three days. On 22 May, after completing preparations around the city, the Iraqi Army and supporting Shi'ite militias launched the third Battle of Fallujah.

Background

[edit]
Main articles: Fall of Fallujah (2014), Anbar campaign (2015–16), and Battle of Ramadi (2015–16)

On 4 January 2014, ISIL, then known as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, captured the city of Fallujah after Iraqi government forces withdrew from the city following a five-day battle. This victory allowed ISIL to capture its first city on Iraqi soil and also allowed them to establish a stronghold only 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.

From April to May 2015, the Iraqi Army launched an offensive in and around the town of al-Karmah. During the offensive, the Iraqi Army made some limited gains in the al-Karmah area by capturing some territory in the town. In addition, the Iraqi Army built a base for a future assault to fully recapture both Fallujah and al-Karmah.[23]

In mid-May 2015, ISIL captured Ramadi after a large series of suicide attacks during a sandstorm prompted Iraqi forces to abandon the city to ISIL. Two months later, the Iraqi security forces recovered from their loss in the Anbar's provincial capital, and on 13 July 2015, launched an offensive to recapture Anbar Province. During the offensive, ISIL suffered a major blow after they lost Ramadi to Iraqi government forces in February 2016.

On 1 February, the Iraqi Army launched an offensive on the Khalidiya Island area, which is the region located between the villages Albu Nasir and Albu Shajal, situated between Ramadi and Fallujah.[24] On the same day, the Iraqi Army managed to capture the villages of Albu Shalib and Albu Shajal, to the northwest of Fallujah.[25]

The offensive

[edit]

Total siege begins

[edit]

On 2 February, the Iraqi Army fully severed the last supply lines between the Khalidiya Island region and the city of Fallujah, completely besieging the city.[2] This led to concerns that an estimated 30,000–60,000 civilians trapped in Fallujah would starve, due to the lack of airdropped supplies into the city.[26] On 10 February, it was reported that the Iraqi Army had fully recaptured the Khalidiya District, including the Khalidiya Island area.[27]

Fallujah revolt and al-Karmah offensive

[edit]

From 15 to 19 February, the Iraqi Army launched an offensive into the town of al-Karmah, located northeast of Fallujah, killing dozens of ISIL militants.[28][29]

On 18 February,[30] a large number of local Sunni tribesmen revolted against ISIL, after ISIL beat a woman, among other restrictive practices enforced by ISIL's Hisbah secret police, amid the ongoing siege. ISIL was reported to have withdrawn into Fallujah city, after local Sunnis burned the Hisbah headquarters and clashes spread.[31][32] On 20 February, the clashes began to decrease as ISIL began carrying out mass arrests, and it was reported that there were still some Sunni fighters who were pinned down in parts of Fallujah, who would likely be massacred if the Iraqi government or the US-led CJTF–OIR coalition did not intervene.[30] On 21 February, the Iraqi Army began shelling ISIL positions on the outskirts of Fallujah, in support of the Sunni tribal fighters.[33] Late on 21 February, ISIL crushed the revolt, and detained 180 men.[15] On the same day, the Iraqi Army deployed reinforcements to Fallujah in preparation to storm the city.[34]

On 23 February, the Iraqi Army fully recaptured the town of al-Karmah after they destroyed ISIL's last stronghold in the town.[4]

On 24 February, a CJTF–OIR coalition airstrike killed 30 ISIL militants in the Karama sub-district, just east of Fallujah.[35]

Tightening the siege

[edit]

On 25 February, the Iraqi governor of Anbar province stated that the battle for Fallujah would begin soon, and that it would be much shorter than the battle for Ramadi.[36] On the same day, the Iraqi Army tightened their siege on Fallujah,[3] pushing into the outskirts of the city and securing all of the bridges leading into the city.[37][38] On the same day, the Iraqi Army cleared the Albu Daeig district in southern Fallujah, killing 19 ISIL militants.[37] It was also reported that ISIL was using food as a weapon in Fallujah, denying food supplies to the people it suspected of having links to the rebel tribesmen or being non-ISIL sympathizers.[3]

On 27 February, the Iraqi government reported that 600 ISIL fighters had managed to flee Fallujah to nearby areas,[39] and to the city of Mosul.[40] After the defections, local sources estimated that there were only 400 ISIL militants remaining inside Fallujah city.[39] On 28 February, the Shi'ite militia forces repelled an ISIL counterattack on al-Karmah, which was described as one of the largest attacks on the town.[41] Later on the same day, Iraqi government forces repelled a massive ISIL suicide attack in Abu Ghraib and western Baghdad, which was the largest attack carried out by the group in the area in nearly two years. The assault left 48 ISIL militants and 23 Iraqi soldiers dead.[42]

On 4 April, Iraqi security forces killed 150 ISIL fighters near Fallujah. CJTF–OIR coalition spokesman Col. Steve Warren said that US forces in Iraq could not confirm the number of extremist fighters killed, but some 100 militants were killed on the same day by airstrikes conducted by the coalition, which could have been part of the tally.[43]

On 6 April, eight Iraqi soldiers were killed in an attack launched by ISIL on a military barracks in al-Ma'amel village, east of Fallujah.[44] On 9 April, ten civilians were killed and 25 others were injured after Iraqi Army airstrikes and artillery shelling targeted the al-Fallujah market and Nezal district in the downtown area of the city.[45] On 10 April, six ISIL militants were killed by Iraqi Army artillery shelling in the area of Falahat, west of the city.[46]

On 21 April, the US-led coalition conducted an airstrike on an ISIL gathering in the Ahsi area near Amiriyah Fallujah, killing the top ISIL commander in southern Fallujah, along with six of his assistants.[47] On 26 April, warplanes bombarded a number of areas in al-Resala, central Fallujah, resulting in the death of eight civilians, including three children, and wounding 13 others.[48] On 27 April, six ISIL militants were killed and five others were wounded, when the Iraqi Army bombarded ISIL positions in the city with artillery.[49] On 28 April, coalition aircraft conducted three airstrikes on ISIL headquarters in the al-Rofah area, north of al-Karma District, killing 15 ISIL terrorists, including three leaders, named Khattab al-Halabusi, Aush al-Shami, and Mosadaq Abdel Galil. Meanwhile, an ISIL vehicle carrying machine guns was also destroyed.[50]

On 30 April, unidentified fighters attacked a gathering of ISIL militants near the Alwa area in the al-Joulan neighborhood, in central Fallujah, killing seven ISIL militants.[51] On 2 May, Iraqi security forces carried out a large-scale military operation targeting ISIL gatherings in the al-Falahat area, killing 15 ISIL members and injuring ten others, as well as bombing a laboratory for manufacturing booby-trapped vehicles.[52]

On 3 May, the Iraqi Army and allied militia forces launched an offensive in the southern Fallujah area, capturing the areas between Amiriyah and Fallujah city.[53] By the next day, Iraqi government forces had come within 3 kilometers of Fallujah's southern entrance, capturing four villages, killing 100 ISIL militants, and destroying ten ISIL tunnels.[17][54]

On the morning of 5 May, violent clashes broke out between two ISIL factions belonging in Nazzal neighborhood, in central Fallujah, after the theft of 700 million dinars that were deposited with one of the ISIL leaders called Jabbar Auf, resulting in the killing of ten ISIL members and injuring eight others.[55] Meanwhile, Anbar Operations Commander Major General Ismail Mahlawi told Anadolu Agency that the Iraqi Army had captured five areas of the city.[56]

On 7 May, Iraqi security forces conducted operations that targeted the headquarters and gatherings of ISIL in the areas of al-Hur and Zebin al-Hanshl in the vicinity of Amiriyah Fallujah, resulting in the death of 25 ISIL elements.[57]

On 8 May, coalition warplanes carried out an airstrike on ISIL positions in south of Fallujah, killing 14 ISIL militants. Warplanes also destroyed three car bombs and killed their suicide bombers as they were trying to attack Iraqi security forces in the same area near Fallujah.[58]

On 9 May, the Iraqi Air Force bombarded two ISIL buildings, two caches of weapons, and 60 rocket launchers in the area of Albu Shehab and Amiriyah Fallujah. Earlier on the same the day, 20 ISIL militants were killed during an aerial bombardment in south of Fallujah.[59] Between 4–9 May, 140 ISIL militants were killed in clashes in the western and southern suburbs of Fallujah.[19]

On 10 May, it was reported that 2,000 families were trapped in two villages, Albu Huwa and Hasai, and were being used as human shields by ISIL.[60]

On 11 May, eight ISIL militants were killed and two more were wounded, as coalition warplanes conducted two airstrikes against a booby-trapped ISIL vehicle near the Fallahat and Halabisah villages.[18]

On 14 May, ISIL forces claimed to have killed 100+ Iraqi forces in a large suicide attack at the residential compound in Amiriyah Fallujah.[61] Another report put the death toll at 70 soldiers and one policeman.[62]

Aftermath – late May offensive

[edit]
Main article: Third Battle of Fallujah

On 22 May, after the prolonged siege, the Iraqi Army announced that it was building up its forces around Fallujah, in preparation for a large-scale assault on the city that would soon be initiated.[63] According to Iraqi military leaders, these plans were in place to build on the momentum from a recent victory against ISIL in the town of Rutbah and were also in place to degrade ISIL's ability to conduct suicide bombings in Baghdad; the recent Baghdad attacks that killed up to 200 civilians were widely believed to have come out of Fallujah.[64] The army sent messages to besieged residents to "be prepared to leave Fallujah through secured routes that will be announced later."[65] According to the UNHCR, 80 families had managed to escape before 24 May, however, the danger was made clear through civilian contacts who said that ISIL death squads "will kill anybody in Fallujah who leaves their house or waves a white flag."[64]

The Popular Mobilization Forces declared on 23 May that they had captured Sejar and fully captured al-Karmah, about 16 kilometers (10 miles) northeast of Fallujah, bringing most of the territory east of Fallujah under government control.[66] They also announced the liberation of al-Harariyat, al-Shahabi and al-Dwaya and the killing of 40 ISIL militants during the military operation.[67] The Iraqi government announced that pro-government fighters had captured the villages of Luhaib and Albu Khanfar on 24 May.[68]

On 25 May, 16 towns and districts on the eastern outskirts of Fallujah were cleared by Iraqi security forces.[69] An additional 123 ISIL militants, 15 civilians and 35 Iraqi forces and militiamen were killed[70] in clashes which gained the Iraqi army control over the remaining districts in the southeast, allowing them to create a corridor that cut the ISIL-controlled zone into two sections. According to Qasm Araji, a member of the defense committee, the advancing forces were continuously gaining ground and "nearing Fallujah's Eastern gate."[70]

Humanitarian impact

[edit]
The refugees in Abu Ghraib camp

As the siege tightened and shortages intensified, tens of thousands of Iraqis trapped in Fallujah were left without regular access to food and medicine. While Iraqi authorities stated that there were 50,000 people left in the city during the siege, local sources said the number was as high as 196,000. Many human rights experts deemed the situation in Fallujah as a humanitarian disaster, and the situation only became more dire after 22 May 2016, when the Iraqi Army launched a direct assault on the city.[71]

Supplies were available in some stores, but only for ISIL fighters or sympathizers, according to local reports. Iraqi officials said that negotiations led by the International Red Cross were ongoing in an attempt to get ISIL to allow some aid teams to enter into the city and provide basic assistance. Hekmat Sulaiman, the spokesperson for the governor of Anbar province, said that the Iraqi Army had tried to deliver food to the civilians, but that ISIL had blocked the efforts. A senior federal security official confirmed that negotiations were ongoing, but declined to specify whether the talks were happening with ISIL leaders inside the city, or elsewhere.[3][72]

The Iraqi government did not prepare the residents of Fallujah with assistance before cutting off supply lines at the start of the siege.[71] The destruction of the city's infrastructure by airstrikes only intensified the humanitarian disaster. Houses, schools, sewage pipes, and electric and water lines became increasingly unusable by the residents left in the city, and there were documented reports that women and children were forced to sleep outside in the harsh weather. Some residents reported that they had no fuel to heat themselves during the cold winter. Many residents were unable to access the medical care and supplies they needed, an issue which intensified after Fallujah hospital was shelled during the subsequent offensive in late May.[71]

Enforced disappearances and executions

[edit]

As the Iraqi Army tightened its siege of the city, local reports indicated that ISIL grew bloodier and more desperate, terrorizing and increasing its aggression against Fallujah's residents. ISIL death squads were reportedly roaming the streets, saying they will kill anybody in Fallujah who leaves their house or waves a white flag.[73][74]

On 30 March, a commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces units, Colonel Mahmoud Mardi Jumaili, said ISIL killed 35 people in the central district of Fallujah after accusing them of attempting to escape from the city.[citation needed] On 4 April, ISIL reportedly burned 15 civilians to death for trying to escape Fallujah.[75] On 14 April, a security source said ISIL militants began a massive offensive in the al-Halabese and al-Bualawan areas of Western Fallujah, abducting at least 100 Iraqi civilians. ISIL elements took the abducted civilians to the organization's prisons in the city.[76]

Iraqi pro-government militia groups also participated in systematically abducting and executing civilians who fled the area, claiming that they were associated with ISIL. It has since become clear that the Shia militia groups (associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces) deliberately targeted families who were known to be Sunni Arabs for the furtherance of their sectarian agenda. In several instances, entire families were either disappeared or executed, which lent evidence to the fact that fighting ISIL was often a pretext for sectarian violence. Most of those civilians abducted by the militias were disappeared; to this day, their locations and whereabouts remain unknown.[77]

In 2020, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report regarding the enforced disappearances from Anbar province during this time. Evidence included in the report estimated that around 1,000 civilians were subject to enforced disappearances and "related violations."[78] However, there is credible evidence that the number of individuals forcibly disappeared from Fallujah and surrounding areas, both during the siege and in the subsequent battle, is much higher.[79] The report also notes that little progress has been made in locating forcibly disappeared civilians.

For more information on violations in 2015-2016 in the Anbar province, see Third Battle of Fallujah.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Siege of Fallujah (2016)

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Third Battle of Fallujah, launched as Operation Breaking Terrorism on 23 May 2016, was an offensive by to expel the (IS) from the city, which the group had held since January 2014 following its capture amid the collapse of local governance. The operation followed months of encirclement beginning in January and involved around 30,000 troops from the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service-led security forces, Shi'ite-dominated Popular Mobilization Units, and 6,000 Sunni tribal fighters, bolstered by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes targeting IS positions. Facing an estimated 3,500 mostly Iraqi IS fighters entrenched in urban terrain with tunnel networks for ambushes, Iraqi forces advanced methodically from multiple axes, recapturing the city center by 26 June after intense close-quarters combat that inflicted over 1,800 confirmed IS deaths in the final phase alone. Iraqi military sources reported hundreds of their own troops killed alongside thousands of IS militants overall, though independent verification remains limited due to the chaos of urban fighting and restricted access. The battle marked a key erosion of IS's self-declared in , enabling subsequent operations like the push toward , but at the cost of widespread infrastructure devastation that left largely uninhabitable. Civilian impacts were severe, with most of the pre-battle population of around 100,000 evacuated prior to the main assault, though IS had killed over 1,200 residents during its two-year rule; post-liberation, over 1,000 suspected IS affiliates infiltrated refugee flows, while Popular Mobilization Units faced accusations of arbitrary arrests, abductions, and sectarian reprisals against Sunnis. These militia actions, including an unauthorized incursion on 13 June, risked alienating local Sunnis and complicating stabilization, underscoring causal tensions from integrating irregular Shi'ite forces—often Iran-influenced—into operations against a Sunni extremist foe. Despite the military success, reconstruction lagged, exacerbating displacement and highlighting institutional biases in post-conflict reporting that often minimized militia excesses relative to IS atrocities.

Background

Historical Context of Fallujah

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, , located in Anbar Province along the River, rapidly emerged as a focal point of Sunni Arab resistance to coalition forces, serving as a safe haven for insurgents comprising Ba'athist remnants, disaffected local tribes, and incoming foreign jihadists aligned with emerging networks. The city's strategic position near the Syrian border facilitated the influx of foreign fighters, estimated in the thousands during the mid-2000s, who viewed Anbar as a primary transit route and operational base for attacks against U.S. and Iraqi targets. This entrenchment reflected broader post-Saddam instability, where the abrupt dissolution of the Iraqi army and policies disenfranchised Sunnis, fostering grievances that insurgents exploited to portray themselves as defenders against perceived Shia dominance in the new Iraqi government. The in April–May 2004 was precipitated by the ambush and mutilation of four Blackwater contractors on , prompting a U.S. Marine operation to dismantle insurgent control, which involved intense urban combat but was halted short of full clearance due to political concerns over civilian casualties. Coalition forces suffered approximately 110 killed and 600 wounded, while inflicting around 3,000 insurgent casualties or captures, underscoring the entrenched jihadist presence that required systematic clearance to disrupt. Renewed in November 2004 as Operation Phantom Fury (al-Fajr), the Second Battle involved over 10,000 U.S., Iraqi, and British troops assaulting fortified positions held by an estimated 1,000–1,500 insurgents, resulting in 1,200–1,500 enemy killed and 1,000 captured, alongside 51 U.S. fatalities and 425 wounded. These engagements demonstrated the necessity of decisive, large-scale operations against urban jihadist strongholds, as partial measures allowed insurgents, including precursors, to regroup amid tribal support and foreign reinforcements. Persistent insurgent activity in and Anbar persisted into 2006, fueled by in Iraq's (AQI) coercive tactics against locals, until the Anbar Awakening movement shifted tribal alliances toward cooperation with U.S. forces, significantly degrading AQI through 2007–2008 by targeting foreign fighter networks and local enablers. However, the U.S. military withdrawal in December 2011 transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces amid incomplete stabilization, creating a governance vacuum exacerbated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's sectarian policies, including arrests of Sunni leaders and suppression of protests, which reignited disenfranchisement and eroded tribal gains against jihadists. This post-withdrawal fragility, rather than inherent Iraqi incapacity, enabled AQI's evolution into the to exploit Anbar's unresolved tribal dynamics and security gaps, reestablishing as a jihadist bastion by early 2014.

ISIS Seizure and Governance of the City

In early January 2014, following anti-government protests and escalating clashes in Anbar Province, Iraqi security forces withdrew from , enabling militants from the to seize the city on January 4. This capture represented ISIS's first major territorial gain in an Iraqi urban center, with fighters raising their black flag over government buildings and consolidating control amid minimal resistance from retreating Iraqi troops. Upon securing Fallujah, ISIS executed captured Iraqi security personnel, including police and soldiers who failed to escape, with reports documenting dozens of such killings in the immediate aftermath as part of purges against perceived collaborators. The group imposed its caliphate governance model, establishing Sharia courts, a hisba morality police force, and bureaucratic departments to administer daily life under strict Islamic law derived from their Salafi-jihadist ideology. Public punishments, including floggings for infractions like smoking or non-compliance with dress codes, became routine, enforced through patrols and surveillance to suppress dissent and enforce ideological conformity. ISIS policies included forced of local Sunni residents into combat roles or support functions, often under threat of execution for refusal, bolstering their defenses while depleting the civilian population's autonomy. Religious sites deemed idolatrous, such as those associated with Shia or Sufi practices, faced destruction or as part of broader campaigns against perceived , though Fallujah's predominantly Sunni character limited the scale compared to mixed areas. These measures, combined with executions for alleged or sorcery, created a climate of terror, with documenting systematic abuses mirroring ISIS's territorial playbook. Economically, ISIS sustained control through extortion and taxation, imposing levies on , , and incomes—estimated to generate tens of millions monthly across holdings—while exploiting routes for from Anbar fields to fund operations. By mid-, approximately 50,000 to 100,000 civilians remained subjugated in , barred from fleeing and exploited as human shields, with ISIS obstructing food supplies and aid to maintain leverage, precipitating famine-like conditions as noted in UN and NGO assessments. This entrapment and resource predation positioned ISIS as the architect of the ensuing humanitarian emergency, rendering civilian presence a tactical asset against liberation efforts.

Iraqi Government and Coalition Preparations

In early 2016, Prime Minister oversaw the assembly of Iraqi security forces for operations against ISIS-held , integrating regular army units, Federal Police, the elite Counter-Terrorism Service, and Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) into a coordinated command structure. This joint effort emphasized unified planning to encircle the city, drawing on lessons from the successful recapture of in December 2015, where combined ground maneuvers and coalition airstrikes had degraded ISIS defenses. U.S. advisors embedded with Iraqi units provided logistical guidance and targeting support, focusing on intelligence sharing about fortifications such as extensive tunnel networks, improvised devices (IEDs), and positions within Fallujah's urban layout. surveillance assets, including drones and , mapped enemy supply routes and command nodes, enabling prepositioning of over 20,000 Iraqi and PMU fighters in staging areas southeast and southwest of the city by late May. The U.S.-led coalition committed to intensified , with commitments for precision strikes on positions validated through joint targeting cells, mirroring the tactical integration that had minimized civilian risks while maximizing casualties in prior Anbar Province operations. Iraqi forces conducted rehearsals for tactics, stockpiling ammunition and engineering equipment to counter booby-trapped buildings, ensuring operational readiness without premature engagement of enforcement.

Prelude to the Main Offensive

Initiation of the Siege

On February 2, 2016, (ISF), including elements of the Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Units, severed all major supply routes into , initiating the encirclement phase of the operation against the (ISIS). This action targeted ISIS logistics networks, including smuggling paths through the River and adjacent areas like Khalediya Island, compelling the group to depend on pre-existing stockpiles estimated to sustain several thousand fighters for a limited period. The cutoff aimed to degrade ISIS mobility and prevent reinforcements, a tactical imperative given the group's prior use of as a conduit for weapons and personnel from and western . Subsequent weeks involved incremental isolation efforts, such as operations in al-Karmah to the northeast, where ISF clashed with ISIS outposts to block potential escape or resupply corridors without penetrating the urban core. barrages and airstrikes targeted identified ISIS command nodes and vehicle convoys on the periphery, disrupting an estimated 70-80% of external networks by mid-March, according to Iraqi military assessments. These measures forced ISIS into a defensive posture, though the group retaliated with ambushes and fire on probing ISF units. ISIS exacerbated the by systematically obstructing civilian evacuations, positioning families as human shields near fighting positions and executing those attempting to flee, which prevented an estimated 50,000-90,000 residents from exiting despite ISF-designated safe corridors. This refusal, documented through resident testimonies and of blocked routes, contrasted with ISF efforts to facilitate humanitarian pauses, underscoring ISIS's strategy of leveraging civilian presence to deter advances.

Local Resistance and Supply Disruptions

The initiation of the siege on February 2, 2016, severed key supply routes into from surrounding areas, including Khalediya Island, severely limiting the group's access to fuel, food, and munitions. By late March, reports indicated acute shortages of fuel and other essentials within the city, affecting both civilians and fighters amid the enforced by and allied militias. attempted to circumvent these restrictions through extensive tunnel networks extending up to four miles, used for supplies and repositioning snipers, though such efforts proved insufficient to sustain prolonged defense as Iraqi forces tightened . These logistical strains eroded ISIS internal cohesion, with ammunition stocks depleting amid ongoing skirmishes and the inability to replenish via overland convoys or underground routes. Iraqi psychological operations amplified this pressure, including leaflet drops by the on May 23, 2016, calling on ISIS members to abandon positions and surrender, exploiting fatigue and resource scarcity to encourage defections. Verifiable instances of weakened resolve emerged, as evidenced by collapsed defensive lines and minimal organized resistance during the final ground push, suggesting some fighters disengaged or fled rather than contest advances. In Anbar Province broadly, Sunni tribal elements conducted operations against positions during early 2016, reporting hundreds of militant casualties in clashes that indirectly undermined the group's hold on by diverting resources and fostering localized opposition. While remained a core bastion with limited documented internal revolts, the combination of siege-induced deprivation and targeted incentives highlighted pre-existing anti- sentiments among segments of the local population, which the Iraqi campaign leveraged to hasten operational collapse without relying solely on external force.

Evacuation Attempts and ISIS Obstruction

In March 2016, Iraqi government forces established limited humanitarian corridors to facilitate civilian evacuations from prior to the escalation of the main offensive, enabling the displacement of approximately 80,000 people from Anbar province areas including the city's periphery since early that month. These routes, opened on amid ongoing conditions, were intended to allow safe passage despite the risks of ambushes and improvised explosive devices, though access remained constrained by security protocols to screen for embedded fighters attempting infiltration. ISIS systematically obstructed mass civilian exits by executing those attempting to flee, including a documented case of a man killed on March 21 and reports of 35 civilians executed for escape efforts by late March, as corroborated by Iraqi officials and activist accounts. The group further employed tactics, ordering residents to remain in place or face immediate death, with escapee testimonies describing families shot or killed in homes for non-compliance, while booby-trapping potential exit paths with improvised explosives to deter movement. These measures trapped tens of thousands within the city, prioritizing ISIS defensive strategies over civilian welfare and countering narratives of uniform Iraqi blockades by demonstrating the group's active prevention of departures despite available corridors. Screening procedures at Iraqi-held checkpoints, while causing delays, were implemented as necessary precautions against ISIS fighters disguising themselves among evacuees, a tactic observed in prior operations and aimed at preventing insurgent breakthroughs into lines. This process, involving identity verification and searches, addressed verified risks of infiltration rather than indiscriminate restriction, with advisories via leaflets urging civilians to use designated safe routes. By May, partial successes in these efforts had allowed several thousand families to reach displacement camps, underscoring the corridors' functionality amid ISIS-imposed barriers.

Conduct of the Offensive

Launch of Ground Operations

The launch of ground operations in the Fallujah offensive occurred on , 2016, as (ISF), under the Joint Operations Command, initiated coordinated advances from multiple axes to encircle the city and probe (ISIS) defenses. Over 30,000 troops, including Iraqi Army divisions, Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) units, federal police, and Sunni tribal fighters, participated alongside Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in blocking positions. Advances originated primarily from the south via the Nuaimiya district, with supporting pushes from the east through al-Karmah and from the north near Saqlawiyah, enabling rapid seizure of rural outskirts and villages that served as forward defenses. Iraqi armored units, employing tanks and supported by , breached perimeter defenses, achieving initial territorial gains of several kilometers into semi-industrial and agricultural fringes despite ambushes involving snipers, improvised explosive devices, and vehicle-borne suicide attacks. PMU forces, numbering in the thousands and primarily Shiite militia components, were integrated into rearward blocking roles to seal escape routes westward and northward, thereby containing fighters within the urban core and reducing early exposure of irregular units to intense close-quarters combat. This phased approach under centralized command fostered operational coherence, prioritizing and attrition of supply lines before deeper penetration.

Key Battles and Urban Clearance

The ground offensive into commenced on May 23, 2016, with (ISF) and (PMF) advancing from multiple axes, encountering fierce resistance from fighters entrenched in urban districts. Initial pushes focused on the northern and western outskirts, including the recapture of Saqlawiyah, a key suburb on the western approach, by June 5, which completed the city's encirclement and severed remaining supply lines. House-to-house fighting intensified in central districts such as al-Jumhuriya and al-Nasr starting late May, where employed snipers positioned in high-rise buildings and booby-trapped structures rigged with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and tunnel networks packed with explosives to slow advances. Iraqi units and federal police conducted methodical urban clearance operations, utilizing small-unit tactics to breach fortified positions, often preceded by precision airstrikes targeting nests and command points to minimize close-quarters risks. Drones provided real-time for detecting hidden IEDs and ISIS movements, enabling targeted responses that attrited defender positions amid the dense urban terrain. By mid-June, these efforts had progressed through phases of incremental , with ISF securing peripheral neighborhoods before pushing inward, though progress remained deliberate due to the prevalence of vehicle-borne IEDs and ambushes. Casualties mounted heavily during this period, with Iraqi officials reporting approximately 500 security personnel killed and over 3,000 wounded in the sustained attritional combat, reflecting the toll of clearing booby-trapped environments. suffered significant losses, with more than 1,800 fighters killed according to assessments of the operation's final phases, underscoring the impact of combined , armor, and air integration against a defender force reliant on static defenses. By June 20, Iraqi commanders claimed control over roughly 80% of the city, including major central areas, though pockets of resistance persisted in northern sectors requiring continued clearance.

Role of Air Support and ISIS Countermeasures

Coalition air support, primarily from U.S.-led forces under Operation Inherent Resolve, provided critical enabling capabilities by targeting ISIS command nodes, fortifications, and logistics, thereby weakening defender cohesion ahead of and during ground assaults. Strikes focused on precision-guided munitions to destroy fighting positions, vehicles, and weapon systems, with examples including three airstrikes on May 31, 2016, that eliminated five ISIS fighting positions, five vehicles, and a heavy machine gun near Fallujah. On June 14, two strikes destroyed 19 fighting positions, two vehicles, four heavy machine guns, and four weapons caches in the same area. Such operations also accounted for high-value targets, including an airstrike on May 27 that killed an ISIS military commander at a headquarters in the city. These airstrikes demonstrated improved precision over prior urban campaigns, resulting in limited verified casualties—18 reported deaths from actions in during 2016, including five children—relative to the operation's scale and the presence of up to 50,000 trapped non-combatants. This contrasts with broader anti-ISIS efforts, where strikes inflicted disproportionate damage on militants while minimizing extraneous harm through intelligence-driven targeting. ISIS adapted with defensive measures to mitigate air superiority, including positioning fighters among civilian populations to exploit proximity as a deterrent, as evidenced by UN reports of militants holding families in central to serve as human shields. The group also relied on subterranean tunnels for mobility, resupply, and ambush preparation, a tactic integrated into their doctrine across Iraqi urban holdings. Vehicle-borne improvised devices (VBIEDs) were deployed to disrupt Iraqi advances, prolonging engagements despite aerial . Air power's evolution from the 2004 Fallujah battles—where U.S. forces endured 95 fatalities amid reliance on less discriminate like AC-130 gunships—enabled greater standoff degradation of defenses in 2016, reducing the need for costly assaults and lowering proportional ground force losses for the larger Iraqi-led . This shift underscored causal advantages of precision strikes in urban , accelerating ISIS operational collapse by severing command links and fortifications without equivalent exposure of friendly troops.

Liberation and Immediate Aftermath

Final Assault and City Recapture

In mid-June 2016, Iraq's elite Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), under Abdul-Wahab al-Sa'adi, spearheaded the final advances into Fallujah's central districts, confronting diminished ISIS defenses as many militants abandoned positions and fled rather than engage. Iraqi forces encountered minimal organized resistance in these core areas, allowing rapid penetration after weeks of peripheral fighting that had already eroded ISIS capabilities. On June 17, federal police units raised the Iraqi flag over the compound and , symbolizing control of key administrative sites amid ongoing clearance operations. CTS and supporting federal police conducted systematic sweeps to verify cleared zones, neutralizing isolated pockets and securing heavily damaged by prior combat, including booby-trapped buildings and improvised explosive devices left by retreating elements. By June 26, Iraqi Prime Minister declared the city fully recaptured, with CTS-led forces having expelled remaining holdouts from the urban core and outskirts, marking the operational success of the offensive despite the city's widespread devastation from , airstrikes, and . This phase yielded captures of weapons caches, vehicles, and documents, underscoring the militants' collapse in organized defense.

Handling of ISIS Escape Convoys

As Iraqi forces declared Fallujah liberated on June 27, 2016, intelligence from Iraqi security forces identified two large convoys of ISIS fighters and associates attempting to evacuate westward toward areas like Ramadi, prompting immediate coalition and Iraqi airstrikes on June 29. The first convoy, struck overnight into June 29 near Fallujah, comprised over 100 vehicles observed by ground spotters as carrying armed ISIS elements interspersed with families, justifying targeting to disrupt potential reconstitution of fighting units capable of renewed attacks on nearby population centers. U.S.-led coalition aircraft destroyed 55 vehicles in the initial strike, while Iraqi forces, using helicopters and ground assets, eliminated an additional 138, confirming the convoys' fighter-heavy composition through visual identification of weapons and militant tactics like abandoning vehicles to flee on foot. A second convoy, targeted later on June 29 near , saw coalition jets destroy about 120 vehicles, with U.S. officials estimating up to 250 ISIS fighters killed across both actions based on vehicle capacity and post-strike assessments. Iraqi reports claimed higher totals, including over 440 militants eliminated, emphasizing the convoys' role in preserving ISIS operational capacity if unchecked. These strikes countered narratives of indiscriminate attacks on civilians by relying on real-time ground that negated claims of purely evacuee status, as no evidence emerged of unarmed civilian-only groupings amid the observed escorts and flight patterns. Iraqi ground interdictions, including assaults, complemented the air campaign by blocking escape routes and capturing stragglers, ensuring fragmented ISIS remnants could not rapidly reform for . The operations degraded ISIS mobility and manpower, with total losses exceeding 300 when including Iraqi contributions, directly hindering the group's ability to leverage as a launchpad for broader campaigns.

Initial Security and Screening Operations

Following the recapture of on June 17, 2016, prioritized securing the liberated areas against potential ISIS infiltrations and reprisal attacks by establishing checkpoints and conducting patrols with local Sunni tribal elements, including the Dera' al-Fallujah Brigade of Hashd al-Ash'iri, to maintain order and build resident confidence. These measures addressed the risk posed by ISIS fighters attempting to blend with civilians, as over 1,000 militants were reported to have infiltrated among fleeing refugees during the operation's final stages. Screening operations for returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) were implemented at designated sites outside the city, involving rigorous background checks to identify suspected affiliates and prevent their reintegration into the population. Individuals flagged through intelligence vetting were detained or barred from entry, reflecting the security imperative to dismantle embedded networks amid reports of widespread civilian displacement, with approximately 87,000 people having fled the area during the fighting. Initial stabilization efforts included limited aid distribution to vetted returnees amid the ruins, though like and water remained unavailable due to severe damage from the prolonged and urban combat. Patrols and checkpoints continued to enforce movement controls, mitigating risks of sectarian tensions exacerbated by the mixed presence of Iraqi Army units and in securing peripheral districts.

Humanitarian and Civilian Dimensions

Impact of the Siege on Population

Prior to the ground offensive launched on May 23, 2016, an estimated 50,000 to 90,000 civilians remained trapped in under ISIS control, having been prevented from fleeing since the group's consolidation of the city in early 2014. ISIS militants systematically obstructed civilian exits, using residents as human shields and executing or targeting those attempting to escape, which exacerbated pre-existing shortages of food and medicine. Reports documented severe , with children dying from and related illnesses, primarily attributable to ISIS hoarding supplies for fighters and imposing punitive taxes on locals, rather than the external siege alone. Iraqi forces established humanitarian corridors to the west, southwest, and southeast of the city to facilitate civilian evacuations, enabling hundreds of families to flee in the initial weeks despite fire and booby traps set by . However, actively blocked many escape attempts by relocating families within the city or firing on fleeing groups, limiting the corridors' effectiveness and prolonging entrapment for tens of thousands. By mid-June 2016, approximately 85,000 civilians had successfully displaced from and surrounding areas, overwhelming reception camps in Anbar and Baghdad provinces with strains on , , and medical services. The siege compounded infrastructure collapse, as ISIS had long controlled and sabotaged utilities, including electricity grids and systems, to maintain dominance and deny resources to opponents, leaving residents without reliable access to clean or power even before the offensive intensified shortages. Hospitals under ISIS rule prioritized combatant care, with non-functional services contributing to untreated and disease outbreaks among the trapped population. Iraqi authorities and international agencies responded by air-dropping leaflets with evacuation instructions and prepositioning supplies at camps, mitigating some immediate post-displacement crises despite logistical challenges.

Civilian Casualties During

Estimates from Iraq Body Count, based on cross-verified media and reports, indicate 581 to 670 civilian deaths occurred across Fallujah's nine neighborhoods during the urban phase of the offensive from late May to early June 2016. These figures encompass fatalities from ground engagements, artillery, and airstrikes amid house-to-house fighting, where an estimated 50,000 civilians remained trapped due to restrictions on evacuation. Independent documentation efforts, drawing from and eyewitness statements, confirmed at least 518 deaths, including 157 women and 146 children, underscoring the intensity of close-quarters battles in densely populated areas. A significant factor inflating civilian exposure was ISIS's deliberate use of human shields, with the reporting that militants held hundreds of families in central to deter advances by Iraqi forces and air support. videos and survivor testimonies documented fighters positioning snipers and improvised devices in residential zones, firing from behind non-combatants, and executing civilians suspected of aiding escape attempts—actions that prolonged engagements and channeled combat into civilian spaces. Such tactics mirrored patterns observed in prior -held urban strongholds, where embedding among populations maximized collateral risks to opposing forces. Casualties stemmed primarily from crossfire in these contested environments, ISIS executions for perceived disloyalty, and incidental strikes on militant positions, rather than targeted attacks by or Iraqi units. Reports from the period noted ISIS killing civilians attempting flight, including shootings at checkpoints and drownings in the during desperate crossings. In context, these losses—while grave—arose in operations against a force that, from 2012 to the offensive's start, had already caused 1,627 documented deaths in through governance by terror, including mass executions and enforced disappearances. The battle's toll reflected the inherent hazards of liberating ISIS-controlled terrain, where militants prioritized civilian entanglement over withdrawal.

Post-Operation Abuses and Accountability Issues

Following the recapture of Fallujah on June 17, 2016, elements of the (PMF), predominantly Shia militias, were implicated in post-operation abuses during the screening of displaced civilians, including arbitrary detentions exceeding 1,700 individuals in areas like Saqlawiya, , enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions targeting Sunni males of fighting age suspected of affiliations. Over 600 men presented at Amiriyat al-Fallujah hospital with injuries consistent with severe beatings, burns, knife wounds, and bruising indicative of , while specific incidents included the summary of 17 men from the on June 2 and the mutilation of corpses documented in videos. These actions contrasted with the more structured screening efforts by regular , such as the elite Counter-Terrorism Service, though some Federal Police units were also involved in detainee mistreatment. Amnesty International documented the abduction of at least 643 men and boys by PMF elements from screening sites in Saqlawiya on June 3, 2016, with survivors reporting systematic through beatings with metal cables and pipes, as well as deaths from shootings, thirst, or injuries at unofficial detention sites like the "yellow house"; many remain missing without resolution. corroborated patterns of disappearances, including at least 70 young men from Karma, and noted that only 605 of the 1,700 detained in Saqlawiya were released by June 5, with 4-5 reported deaths in custody. Prime Minister responded on June 4, 2016, by launching a investigation into the abuses, ordering the of perpetrators, and forming a on June 5 to examine disappearances and violations in the context; the Anbar provincial separately reported the 643 missing cases to al-Abadi by June 11. Despite announcements of detainee transfers to judicial authorities and one reported of a , the probes stalled amid , yielding no public findings, prosecutions, or accountability for commanders, largely due to the PMF's operational independence and weak central oversight. Iraqi authorities maintained that rigorous screenings were essential to dismantle ISIS networks among Fallujah's displaced population, where from prior ISIS control substantiated risks of embedded fighters, though documented abuses were tied to rogue PMF actions rather than coordinated policy.

Strategic Outcomes and Controversies

Military Successes and ISIS Setbacks

The recapture of on June 27, 2016, by marked a significant tactical victory, depriving of its longest-held urban stronghold in and a critical node for command, control, and logistics in Anbar Province. Prior to the operation, Fallujah facilitated supply lines and operational planning, with forces severing these routes as early as February 2016 to isolate the city. Estimates placed 1,800 to 2,500 fighters in the city at the outset, many of whom were killed or dispersed during the assault, weakening local leadership including high-value targets eliminated by coalition airstrikes. Iraqi forces demonstrated matured capabilities, attributable to U.S.-led training programs that rebuilt units post-2014 collapses, enabling sustained urban combat with integrated ground and air operations. The operation involved over 20,000 troops from the Iraqi Army, federal police, and counterterrorism units, who advanced methodically despite IEDs, snipers, and booby-trapped structures, recapturing key districts like the government center. This performance reflected improved unit cohesion and logistics, contrasting earlier high-desertion patterns, and provided operational experience that accelerated preparations for the larger Mosul offensive launched in October 2016. The loss eroded ISIS's so-called by eliminating as a , contributing to broader territorial contraction—from controlling approximately 40% of at its 2014-2015 peak to less than 10% by late 2017. In Anbar, post-operation data indicated a sharp decline in ISIS-initiated attacks, shifting the group from conventional defense to guerrilla tactics amid reduced safe havens. While these setbacks fragmented ISIS command structures and resource flows, they did not extinguish the , as remnants adapted to hit-and-run operations in rural areas.

Sectarian Dynamics and Militia Involvement

The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), including factions such as the and , played a critical role in the 2016 Fallujah operation by supplying substantial manpower to compensate for deficiencies in the Iraqi Army's capacity following years of attrition against ISIS. These predominantly Shia militias, formed in response to ISIS's 2014 advances, filled operational voids where regular forces were insufficient, enabling the encirclement and isolation of ISIS fighters despite U.S. concerns over their potential to exacerbate sectarian tensions. While PMU elements were restricted from leading assaults in the city center to mitigate reprisal risks, their peripheral contributions proved indispensable for securing the broader perimeter and preventing ISIS reinforcements. Accusations of PMU misconduct, including looting of civilian property, arbitrary detentions, and of Sunni detainees, surfaced during and after the operation, fueling narratives of sectarian revenge against Fallujah's population for prior harboring. Reports documented instances of PMU fighters executing suspected collaborators and displacing families, actions that, while condemned, often aligned with patterns of retribution in Sunni areas recaptured from control. Prime Minister responded on June 4, 2016, by initiating investigations into these abuses and ordering arrests of perpetrators, demonstrating efforts to assert central authority over militia actions amid Iranian advisory influence. Sectarian dynamics were amplified by pre-existing grievances, with Sunni communities wary of PMU dominance as an extension of Iranian proxies, yet the efficacy underscored their utility in reversing territorial losses that regular forces alone could not achieve. Abadi's oversight, including formal integration of PMU under state command via subsequent legislation, countered unchecked proxy fears by subordinating factions to Baghdad's chain of command during the campaign. While Sunni tribal leaders voiced legitimate concerns over reprisals, some acknowledged the broader liberation's necessity, prioritizing expulsion over isolated militia excesses that paled against the caliphate's systematic atrocities. Overemphasis on Shia misconduct in Western and media narratives often obscured the causal primacy of defeating to avert further Sunni .

Long-Term Reconstruction Challenges

The recapture of Fallujah in June 2016 left the city with relatively contained structural damage compared to other ISIS-held urban centers, with approximately 10% of buildings destroyed due to pre-battle evacuations and tactical operations that limited widespread bombardment. However, infrastructure rehabilitation proved protracted, with essential services like water supply, schools, and waste management remaining deficient into 2025; for instance, only $8 million was allocated for water improvements and $4 million for four new schools by mid-2025, reflecting chronic underfunding amid competing national priorities and diversion of resources through corruption. International efforts, including the UNDP's Funding Facility for Stabilization initiated in 2017, targeted housing, roads, and bridges to facilitate returns, but systemic graft eroded efficiency, prioritizing militia-linked contracts over broad recovery. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) returns stagnated below 40% intentions in district by 2021, constrained by incomplete , substandard shelter, and inadequate public services rather than irreconcilable sectarian divides. Corruption in aid distribution, intertwined with networks persisting post-caliphate, diverted reconstruction funds, delaying habitability and perpetuating informal economies that hindered formal reintegration. Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), predominantly Shia militias integrated into state forces, assumed dominant roles in local security post-2016, effectively suppressing remnants through patrols and enabling strikes that reduced the group's sustained threat by 2025. This presence stabilized the area against jihadist resurgence—evident in minimal large-scale attacks compared to pre-liberation levels—but engendered Sunni , as PMU oversight evoked fears of demographic engineering and resource capture, amplified by corrupt practices within the units rather than primordial sectarian animosities alone. Analyses from 2020 onward highlight ongoing demands for PMU accountability and demobilization to mitigate governance distortions, yet attribute Fallujah's avoidance of revival to this hybrid security model, outperforming more fragmented recoveries elsewhere through enforced order despite inefficiencies.

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