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For other uses, see Battle of Fallujah (disambiguation).
Third Battle of Fallujah
Part of the War in Iraq, the war on terror, the Anbar campaign (2015–16), and the aftermath of the Siege of Fallujah (2016)

Fallujah operations on 22–23 May[2][3][4]
Date22 May – 29 June 2016
(1 month and 1 week)
Location
Fallujah and Al-Karmah, Anbar Governorate, Iraq
33°22′00″N 43°46′00″E / 33.3667°N 43.7667°E / 33.3667; 43.7667
Result Decisive Iraqi government victory
Territorial
changes		 Iraqi forces recapture the entire city of Fallujah and its suburbs
Belligerents
Iraq
Support:
CJTF-OIR
(Air support)[1]		 ISIL
Commanders and leaders
Iraq Haidar al-Abadi
(Prime Minister)
Iraq Khaled al-Obaidi
(Defense Minister)
Iraq Lt. Gen. Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi
(Overall commander of the operation)[5]
Iraq Lt. Gen. Raed Shaker Jawdat
(Chief of the Iraqi Federal Police)
Iraq Maj. Gen. Fadhil Barwari
(ICTS commander) Iraq Staff Maj. Gen. Ismail al-Mahalawi
Iraq Lt. Col. Hashim Ismail †
(1st Division's Commando Regiments commander)[6]
Iraq Esa al-Esawi
(Mayor of Fallujah)[7]
 Maher al-Bilawi †
(Fallujah top commander)[8][9]
Ahmed Majeed †
(Fallujah security chief)[10]
Abu Ubaydah al-Ansari †[11]
Units involved

Iraq:

Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda[13]

Military of ISIL

  • Al-Hisbah (Religious Police)
Strength

11,000–14,500 fighters

  • 7,000–10,500 Iraqi soldiers[14]
  • 4,000 PMF militiamen[15]
 3,500–4,000 militants[16]
Casualties and losses
394–900+ killed,
3,308 wounded[17]		 2,848+ killed,
2,186 captured[17][18]
112 civilians killed[19][20]
85,000+ civilians displaced[21][22]
Map

The Third Battle of Fallujah,[23][24][25] code-named Operation Breaking Terrorism (Arabic: عملية كسر الإرهاب) by the Iraqi government, was a military operation against ISIL launched to capture the city of Fallujah and its suburbs, located about 69 kilometres (43 mi) west of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. The operation began on 22 May 2016,[citation needed] three months after the Iraqi forces had started the total siege of Fallujah. On 26 June, Iraqi forces recaptured the city of Fallujah,[26][27][28][29][30] before recapturing the remaining pocket of ISIL resistance in Fallujah's western outskirts two days later.[31]

Background

[edit]
Main articles: Anbar campaign (2015–16) and Siege of Fallujah (2016)

Fallujah was the first city seized by ISIL in Iraq in January 2014. Iraqi forces completely surrounded the western city after they recaptured Ramadi in February 2016.

Fallujah was considered to be the second most important stronghold of ISIL in Iraq, after Mosul.

Preparations

[edit]

The Iraqi Army published a statement on 22 May 2016, and asked residents of the battlefield to leave the area through secured routes. The Iraqi Army also said that local residents who could not move should raise white flags on top of their roofs.[32]

Prior to the Battle of Fallujah, some Shia militias framed the impending campaign using extreme rhetoric, referring to the city as a "tumor" to be eradicated, as "Fallujah the whore," and as a "nest of traitors and criminals." The fight to retake Fallujah was often portrayed sectarian terms: for instance, one Shia militia launched rockets at the city painted with the word "Nimr" – referring to Nimr al-Nimr, the Shia cleric executed by Saudi Arabia earlier that year.[33]

Offensive

[edit]

Capturing the outskirts

[edit]

Haider al-Abadi ordered to begin the operation early on Monday, 23 May. "The Iraqi flag will be raised high over the land of Fallujah," said al-Abadi.[34] On 23 May 2016, it was reported the city of Al-Karmah was recaptured by Shiite militias belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[35] Photos published by a PMF source show Iran's Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and other PMF commanders discussing Fallujah battle strategies.[36] On the first day of the offensive 11 further villages and districts near Fallujah were recaptured, which forced ISIL fighters to retreat to the interior of the strategically important city. The offensive was slowed down due to the discovery of hundreds of improvised explosive devices in the outskirts of the city.[37]

The Popular Mobilization Forces declared on 23 May that they had captured Al-Karmah, about 16 kilometres (9.9 mi)northeast of Fallujah, which brings most of the territory east of Fallujah under Iraqi government control.[38] They also announced the seizure of al-Harariyat, al-Shahabi and al-Dwaya and the killing of 40 ISIL militants during the military operation.[39] The Iraqi government announced that pro-government fighters had captured the villages of Luhaib and Albu Khanfar on 24 May.[40]

On 23 May, 16 villages and districts on the eastern outskirts of Fallujah had been cleared by the Iraqi Security Forces. Included in this were the gains from a column in the northeast, which took the village of Sejar days after the recapture of Al-Karmah. These clashes resulted in the death of 40 ISIL militants.[41] By 25 May, a total of 163 ISIL militants, 15 civilians and 35 members of the Iraqi forces and militiamen were killed[42] in clashes which gained the Iraqi army control over the remaining districts in the southeast, allowing them to create a corridor that cut the ISIL-controlled zone in two. During the day, it was reported an Iranian Basij member was killed in fighting near Fallujah.[43] According to Qasm Araji, a member of the defense committee, the advancing forces are continuously gaining ground and "nearing Fallujah's Eastern gate."[42]

On 27 May, the US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes in and around the city. US-led Coalition air and artillery strikes in and around Fallujah killed 70 ISIL fighters in Fallujah, including the militants’ top commander in the area, Maher Al-Bilawi.[8] On 28 May, the Iraqi Army declared the start of an operation to take Fallujah’s city center.[44][45] Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) was the first unit to break into the city.[46]

On 29 May, the Iraqi forces reportedly repelled an ISIL attack on Albu Shajal, killing "dozens" of militants.[47] On the same day, Iraqi troops seized a key bridge between Zaghareed and Saqlawiyah, in order to facilitate the entry of the security forces from the international highway road into the center of Saqlawiyah.[48]

Battle for Fallujah city

[edit]

Early on 30 May, the Iraqi forces began entering the city of Fallujah from three directions and captured the village of Saqlawiyah.[49][50] However, the Iraqi forces faced very stiff resistance from the ISIL forces inside of the city, slowing their advance.[12] By 31 May, only 3,000 civilians had managed to escape Fallujah.[51] The Iraqi forces entered Fallujah city through the southern village of Nuamiyah, entering the Shuhadaa neighborhood, on the way to the city center.[52] Iraqi forces repelled a four-hour attack by the Islamic State in the south of the city of Fallujah on Tuesday. The militants deployed snipers and six cars carrying explosives which were destroyed before reaching the troops.[53]

The Iraqi Army's advance into Fallujah stalled on Wednesday, 1 June, due to fierce resistance from ISIL fighters and concerns over protecting tens of thousands of civilians still trapped inside the strategic city, officials said. Civilians, including families, were moved to the city center and used as human shields by ISIL.[54] With the operation in its second week, convoys of special forces could only inch forward on the dusty southern outskirts of the city as a handful of airstrikes sent up plumes of white smoke above clusters of low buildings on the fringes of the city's dense urban terrain.[55]

The Fars News Agency reported that, due to the offensive, ISIL commanders had moved cash and jewelry worth US$8 million from Fallujah to the more secure region of Mosul.[56]

On 2 June, the commander of Fallujah operations, Lieutenant General Abdel Wahab al-Saadi, reported further advances of Iraqi forces and the killing of 50 ISIL members in the areas of al-Shuhadaa and al-Nuaimiya in southern Fallujah.[57] In addition, 12 ISIL militants were killed and four vehicles and a mortar detachment destroyed by international coalition aviation in the area of Falahat west of Fallujah.[58]

On 3 June, Iraqi forces moved into a southern neighbourhood of Fallujah. "The security forces have advanced from Naimiya neighbourhood to Shuhada," Lieutenant General Abdel Wahab al-Saadi, the operation's overall commander, told AFP.[59] On the same day, Shi'ite militias uncovered a 6-kilometer-long (4 mi) tunnel in Saqlawiyah, linking the town to Fallujah, which had been used by ISIL militants to stall the offensive and evade airstrikes.[60] On 4 June, Iraqi forces captured the town of Saqlawiyah and stormed a neighborhood in southern Fallujah. A Coalition airstrike killed all the ISIL militants trying to escape from Saqlawiyah on a raft.[61] According to reports, 70 ISIL terrorists were killed during the capture of Saqlawiyah, including several foreign combatants.[62] By 5 June, Iraqi forces had secured the southern edge of Fallujah, capturing the Naymiah neighborhood. A leader of the Popular Mobilization Units said that part of the western bank was the only area of Fallujah's outskirts that hadn't been secured by pro-government forces.[63][64] Iraqi forces captured the neighbourhood of Al-Shuhada Al-Thaniya on 8 June. Five members of the Iraqi security services were injured during the fighting on that day.[65] The move to capture the outlying area went quickly and forced Islamic State fighters to retreat into the heart of the city, the spokesman, Sabah al-Noman, told state television. Government forces were regrouping before beginning their next advance, he added.[66]

Iraqi T-72 in Fallujah

On 10 June, Iraq's elite counter-terrorism service reportedly moved within three kilometers of central Fallujah, and consolidated positions in the south of the city.[67]

ISIL attacked a military barracks to the east of Fallujah on 11 June. Fifty members of the Iraqi military and allied Shiite paramilitaries and 12 members of ISIL were killed in the attack.[68] Meanwhile, government forces reached Street 40, two miles from Fallujah's city center.[69]

On 12 June, the Iraqi Army said that it had secured the first safe exit route for civilians to leave the Islamic State's besieged stronghold of Fallujah, and the aid group Norwegian Refugee Council said thousands of people had already used it to flee on the first day it was open. The new exit route, known as al-Salam (Peace) Junction, was secured on Saturday, southwest of Fallujah, Joint Operation Command spokesman Brigadier Gen. Yahya Rasool told Reuters. "There were exit routes previously, but this is the first to be completely secured and it's relatively safe," said Rasool. About 4,000 people had fled the city over the past 24 hours through the al-Salam Junction, said Karl Schembri, a spokesman in Iraq for the Norwegian Refugee Council, which has been assisting people who escape the city.[70]

Iraqi flag over the building

On 13 June, 546 militants who were fleeing the city disguised as civilians were arrested by the Iraqi military.[71]

Iraq’s police chief said on 14 June that the forces cleared the Fallujah Barrage of ISIL forces and hoisted the Iraqi flag on the crest of the dam. Brigadier Shakir Jawdat said Iraqi forces are now in full control of the barrage, which is located south of Fallujah on the Euphrates River. The Iraqi forces also seized control over three villages of Za’anatha, Ziban, and Atr east of Fallujah. They also recaptured Abbas Jamil Bridge to facilitate the advance on the eastern neighborhoods of the city.[citation needed]

On 16 June, the Federal Police announced it had retaken 25% of the city, capturing al-Khadra, al-Resala, Jubail, Fallujah Barrage, Nazim, al-Shuhada, the sewage station and a gas factory during the current phase to retake the city, during which 232 more ISIL militants were killed.[72] On the same day, Lt. Gen. Raed Shaker Jawdat of Iraqi Federal Police said that ISIL militants had begun a "mass escape" from the city to areas of Halabisa and Albu Alwan west of Fallujah. He saw a "total collapse" among the ranks of ISIL.[73] On the same day, Iraqi army started advancing from Fallahat vicinity to those areas in the western axis of Fallujah, killing 20 ISIL members and opening three routes for the passage of tanks and armored vehicles. At the same time, 900 families were evacuated.[74]

Raising flags after defeating ISIS

The government headquarters of Fallujah was captured by Iraqi forces on 17 June, after they retook several of the city's neighbourhoods in quick succession. During the battle, they faced little resistance from ISIL militants. The operation's commander Lieutenant General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi claimed that Iraqi forces were in control of 70% of the city.[75] In the evening of 17 June, the Iraqi army reported on state television that Fallujah had been fully liberated, though the commander of special forces reported that 80 percent of the city had been recaptured, with ISIL fighters concentrated in four northern districts. Fighting was also still going on at nearby central hospital. On Iraqi state television, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi congratulated the troops on their victories.[76] The central hospital was recaptured by Iraqi forces on 18 June.[77] The following day, the UN stated that about 80,000 civilians had managed to flee the city in the previous four weeks,[78] many after ISIL reversed its policy of preventing civilians from escaping in mid-June.[79] From 18 to 19 June, it was also reported that the remaining ISIL forces in Fallujah were beginning to collapse.[80] On 19 June, it was reported that 50 ISIL militants had been killed in coalition air strikes and 15 others had been killed in clashes with Iraqi security forces.[81] Also, more than 300 soldiers had died over the previous two days.[82]

Later on 21 June, a US commander claimed that Iraqi forces had only cleared 30% of Fallujah of ISIL militants, with fighting still going on in other areas.[83] Iraqi forces captured the police district of Shurta and the military district of Askari by 21 June. The capture of the districts left only the neighborhoods of Golan and Jughaifi as well as the outlying part of Fallujah on the western bank of the Euphrates river under ISIL control.[22] Brig. Gen. Haider al-Obeidi told the Associated Press that 2,500 militants had been killed during the operation and the districts of Shurta and Jughaifi were captured by Iraqi forces by 22 June.[84]

On 23 June, al-Obeidi claimed that Iraqi forces were in control of 90% of the city. Clashes were still ongoing with ISIL as Iraqi forces made no significant advancement during the day. ISIL was in control of only the Golan neighborhood and a few scattered pockets.[85] The last of the ISIL fighters were reported to be in Jolan and Al-Mualemin neighborhoods.[86] The neighborhood of Al-Mualemin was fully captured and cleared of ISIL militants on 25 June. Iraqi forces also raised the Iraqi flag on a medical centre they captured in the Jolan neighborhood.[87]

Liberation of Fallujah by Iraqi Armed Forces

On 26 June, Iraqi forces recaptured the rest of Fallujah, with an Iraqi commander stating that the entire city was under Iraqi control and declared the operation was over.[26][27][28][29][30]

A Joint Operations Command spokesperson confirmed the full capture of the city and added that fighting was ongoing against pockets of ISIL resistance northwest of Fallujah.[88] Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Fallujah after its recapture. In a televised address, Abadi appeared outside Fallujah's main hospital waving an Iraqi flag and urged Iraqis to celebrate the day of Fallujah's recapture from ISIL.[89]

On Monday, 27 June, the Iraqi Army advanced into Fallujah's western outskirts, to eliminate Islamic State militants holed up in the farmland west of Fallujah, to keep them from launching counterattacks on the city a day after Baghdad declared victory over ISIL there. Backed by airstrikes from the U.S.-led Coalition, Iraqi artillery bombarded targets, as troops closed in on up to 150 militants in areas along the southern bank of the Euphrates River Colonel Ahmed al-Saidi, who participated in Monday’s advance, said ground forces were moving cautiously to avoid triggering roadside bombs planted by ISIL. "They (holed-up militants) have two options: either they surrender or they get killed. We want to prevent them catching their breath and attacking our forces with car bombs."[90] Early on 28 June, the Iraqi Government reported that 80% of areas of al-Halabisa, Albu Alwan and Albu Herat had been recaptured.[91] Later on the same day, the Iraqi Army captured the Halabisa and Albu Alwan areas, fully recapturing Fallujah's western suburbs.[31]

On 29 June, Iraqi jets targeted a convoy of militants and their supporters fleeing from Fallujah's villages under cover of a dust storm. The Iraqi Air Force claimed that about 426 vehicles carrying up to 2,000 militants were hit in the airstrikes.[92]

Later that day, the U.S.-led coalition conducted airstrikes against retreating ISIL convoys on the outskirts of Fallujah, killing at least 250 militants and destroying 40 vehicles.[93] Overall, 348 militants were killed and more than 200 vehicles were destroyed throughout the day.[18] This large-scale air attack diverted US fighter jets from a concurrent offensive on Abu Kamal, launched by US-backed Syrian rebel forces in Syria, causing the Syrian rebel forces to lose to ISIL.[94]

War Crimes

[edit]

The Battle of Fallujah (2016), part of the larger campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was marked by allegations of war crimes committed by both ISIL and Iraqi state forces, including allied militias. These violations, which included extrajudicial killings, torture, and the use of human shields, caused significant civilian suffering and raised concerns about adherence to international humanitarian law.

Iraqi State Forces

[edit]

Iraqi forces were accused of carrying out summary executions and torturing detainees suspected of being ISIL affiliates. Reports documented instances where Sunni civilians, fleeing ISIL-held areas, were subjected to beatings, mistreatment, and, in some cases, execution without trial. Human rights organizations reported that these actions disproportionately targeted Sunni individuals, further exacerbating sectarian tensions.[95] Sunni men and boys were reportedly detained en masse during the operation, with hundreds disappearing after being taken into custody by Iraqi forces and allied militias. Families often received no information about the whereabouts or fate of their detained relatives. Iraqi state forces were accused of conducting airstrikes and artillery shelling in civilian areas of Fallujah, resulting in non-combatant casualties. These actions violated the principles of proportionality and distinction, key tenets of international humanitarian law.[96] Following the liberation of certain areas, some Iraqi forces and militias were alleged to have looted homes, businesses, and public facilities. Reports also indicated deliberate destruction of Sunni mosques and private property, further heightening sectarian animosity.[97]

ISIL Forces

[edit]

ISIL used civilians as human shields to deter airstrikes and ground assaults. Civilians were confined in buildings near ISIL positions or forcibly moved to frontline areas, endangering their lives during the fighting.[98] ISIL carried out mass executions of civilians accused of collaborating with Iraqi forces or attempting to flee the city. Public executions, including beheadings and other forms of torture, were documented as part of ISIL’s efforts to maintain control through fear.[99] ISIL forcibly recruited children to serve as fighters, suicide bombers, and scouts. The use of child soldiers constitutes a war crime under international law.[95]ISIL deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortar fire, and snipers in civilian areas, causing casualties among residents and displaced persons. These attacks targeted civilians indiscriminately, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.[98]

Impact on Civilians

[edit]

The battle resulted in significant civilian displacement, with tens of thousands forced to flee Fallujah. Civilians trapped in the city faced starvation and a lack of access to medical care due to ISIL-imposed blockades and the ongoing conflict. Reports highlighted instances where fleeing civilians were caught in crossfire or targeted by both sides during the fighting.[100]

Aftermath

[edit]

The Federal Police Command announced dismantling a large laboratory for booby-trapped vehicles and manufacturing of explosives in central Fallujah. The laboratory contained tons of explosives, it added.

The Federal Police Chief Lieutenant General Raed Shaker Jawdat said, "Today the security forces discovered a large laboratory for booby-trapped vehicles and explosives' manufacturing at Nezal in central Fallujah during the search operations carried out in the liberated areas. The booby-trapping laboratory that was found in Nezal was completely dismantled, while tons of explosives and detonators were found inside it."[101]

Anbar Provincial Council informed that the security forces secured the old road that links Ramadi with Fallujah and this will be used for the movement of military convoys only. Member of the security committee in Anbar Provincial Council Rajee Barakat al-Eissawi, in said, "The security forces secured the old road linking Ramadi and Fallujah. The road was secured after liberating some areas in Khalidiya from ISIS control."

Eissawi added, "The security forces managed to liberate the international highway three days ago and managed to open the old road that extends to 44 km towards the new bridge of Fallujah."[102]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Third Battle of Fallujah

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Third Battle of Fallujah was a military offensive conducted by , augmented by Shi'a militias and Sunni tribal fighters, with U.S.-led coalition air support, to recapture the city from control from May 23 to June 26, 2016. Over 30,000 personnel participated, including divisions from the Iraqi Army's 1st, 8th, 14th, and 17th units, Counter Terrorism Service elements, federal police, and Anbar province tribesmen, advancing on multiple axes amid intense urban fighting complicated by tunnel networks and improvised explosive devices. The operation culminated in the city's liberation on June 26, with Iraqi forces claiming over 1,800 fighters killed, though it displaced tens of thousands of civilians and highlighted tensions from unauthorized militia advances that risked operational cohesion and raised sectarian reprisal concerns. As a pivotal engagement in the campaign to dismantle the caliphate, the battle demonstrated the efficacy of combined ground and air operations but underscored challenges in integrating irregular forces and mitigating post-combat humanitarian fallout in Sunni-majority areas.

Historical and Strategic Context

Previous Battles and Insurgencies in Fallujah

The First Battle of Fallujah, also known as Operation Vigilant Resolve, commenced on April 4, 2004, following the ambush and mutilation of four U.S. contractors by insurgents on March 31, which escalated local jihadist activities in the predominantly Sunni city. U.S. Marine and Army forces, numbering around 2,000, engaged an estimated 1,200-1,500 insurgents linked to al-Qaeda precursors and Baathist remnants, achieving tactical gains by securing key districts but halting the offensive on May 1 amid concerns over civilian casualties and political pressure. Coalition casualties totaled 27-39 killed and approximately 90 wounded, while insurgents suffered around 200 deaths; the operation transitioned control to the Fallujah Brigade, a local force intended to stabilize the area, but this arrangement quickly faltered as insurgents re-infiltrated due to weak local alliances and insufficient governance structures. The Second Battle of Fallujah, codenamed Operation Phantom Fury or Al-Fajr, launched on November 7, 2004, with over 10,000 U.S., Iraqi, and British troops assaulting fortified insurgent positions in house-to-house fighting against 3,000-4,000 fighters, including foreign jihadists from (AQI). Coalition forces cleared the city by mid-December, inflicting heavy losses with 1,000-1,500 insurgents killed and 1,500 captured, alongside approximately 800 civilian deaths from and booby traps; U.S. casualties reached 95 killed and over 560 wounded in the war's most intense urban combat since Hue in 1968. Despite tactical successes in dismantling defenses through tactics, insurgents exploited the city's Sunni tribal networks and porous borders to evacuate leaders and regroup, perpetuating violence rather than stemming from coalition operational shortcomings. Following the 2004 battles, remained a persistent insurgent hub as AQI, evolving from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's wal-Jihad network, reestablished operations using the city's ideological appeal among disaffected Sunni tribes and influx of foreign fighters who provided funding, training, and suicide bombings for attacks across Anbar Province. AQI's tactics, including beheadings and market bombings, alienated some locals but solidified jihadist entrenchment by exploiting tribal grievances over central government marginalization and economic isolation, leading to repeated clashes through 2006-2007 during the Anbar Awakening when some tribes turned against AQI. By 2010-2013, AQI's successor, the , maintained safe havens in for cross-border operations into , culminating in its full seizure by ISIS on January 4, 2014, as the group capitalized on prison breaks and sectarian tensions to declare governance over the city. This pattern underscored Fallujah's role as a jihadist stronghold driven by transnational and local opportunism, with foreign fighters comprising up to 50% of core combatants in earlier phases, rather than solely external policy impositions.

ISIS Seizure and Governance of the City

In January 2014, amid widespread unrest in Anbar Province and the rapid collapse of Iraqi security forces, the seized control of on January 4, following the abandonment of positions by Iraqi troops who fled without significant resistance. The takeover exploited local Sunni grievances against the Shia-dominated Iraqi government under Prime Minister , whose policies had alienated tribes through arrests and marginalization, enabling ISIS to initially ally with disaffected insurgents before asserting dominance. Within days, ISIS consolidated authority by executing dozens of Iraqi police officers, soldiers, and suspected government collaborators, often via public beheadings to deter opposition and instill fear. Under governance from 2014 to 2016, functioned as a de facto caliphate outpost, with the group imposing a rigid interpretation of law enforced by religious police (hisba) who patrolled streets, mandated attendance at mosques, and punished infractions such as smoking, music, or non-conformance with dress codes through floggings, amputations, and crucifixions. Executions extended to perceived apostates or spies, with reports of stonings and shootings for or , while practices—primarily targeting captured non-Sunnis elsewhere—reinforced hierarchical control, though in Fallujah's Sunni-majority context, subjugation focused on coerced loyalty oaths and forced labor for fortifications. The group destroyed or repurposed pre-Islamic and Shia-associated heritage sites, including shrines, to erase perceived , aligning with their broader iconoclastic campaign documented in controlled territories. Economically, ISIS sustained operations through extortionate taxation (zakat) levied at 10-20% on residents' incomes, businesses, and agricultural output, alongside smuggling networks that funneled proceeds from nearby oil fields, generating millions monthly for the group's coffers despite Fallujah's non-oil locale. The city served as a recruitment hub, drawing hundreds of local Sunni youth via ideological indoctrination and payments, while hosting foreign fighters for training and planning cross-border attacks, leveraging its strategic position near to orchestrate bombings and incursions. By mid-2014, an estimated 100,000-150,000 civilians had fled the initial takeover and repression, leaving roughly 200,000 subjugated under surveillance, with movement restricted and informants rewarded, fostering a totalitarian environment that prioritized jihadist expansion over welfare.

Strategic Importance for the Anti-ISIS Campaign

Fallujah's position in Anbar Province, roughly 69 kilometers west of , positioned it as a vital and infiltration hub for , enabling the flow of reinforcements, explosives, and supplies from via western desert routes toward the capital. Control of the city facilitated ISIS vehicle-borne (VBIED) attacks and guerrilla operations that threatened Baghdad's western periphery, while serving as a for foreign fighter concentration and dissemination to sustain the illusion of a viable . Iraqi and coalition planners viewed retention of Fallujah as enabling ISIS to exploit Anbar's porous borders for sustaining operations across Iraq's Sunni heartland, thereby posing a direct risk to the government's hold on the capital and adjacent provinces. The February 2016 siege, initiated by severing all external supply lines into the city, systematically isolated ISIS fighters, forcing resource rationing and attrition that eroded their combat effectiveness prior to the full offensive. This containment phase depleted ISIS stockpiles and morale, as airstrikes targeted nodes and movement corridors, compelling the group to divert assets from other fronts. Strategically, the Fallujah operation functioned as a for Iraqi force integration and coalition support tactics, building confidence and pipelines essential for the subsequent campaign without overextending resources into a prolonged . From a causal standpoint, liberating was indispensable to fragmenting ISIS's contiguous territorial holdings in , as its recapture severed a key artery for westward-to-eastward projection of power and prevented the group from consolidating Anbar as a launchpad for counteroffensives against or Mosul flanks. Post-liberation assessments by U.S. and Iraqi commands indicated degraded ISIS mobility in Anbar, with no resurgence of coordinated assaults from the province on the capital, validating the prioritization over peripheral concerns of urban devastation or militia involvement. This territorial denial aligned with the anti-ISIS campaign's core objective of dismantling the physical , as evidenced by ISIS's forced shift to decentralized rather than sustained conventional threats following the June 2016 victory.

Preparations for the Offensive

Iraqi Force Mobilization and Coalition Coordination

The Iraqi government assembled a of approximately 20,000 personnel for Operation Breaking Terrorism, the code name for the Fallujah offensive launched in May 2016. This mobilization emphasized Iraqi leadership, drawing primarily from the U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), Iraqi Federal Police, Iraqi Army divisions, and vetted units of the (PMF). To counter perceptions of external imposition and empower local Sunni communities, the force incorporated around 1,000 Sunni tribal fighters from Anbar , who played a key role in initial assaults alongside CTS elements. PMF contingents, predominantly Shia militias formed after the 2014 ISIS advances, were integrated under strict coordination to provide support while minimizing sectarian frictions in the Sunni-majority city. The U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS maintained a strictly advisory posture, deploying no ground combat troops to reinforce Iraqi established after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from . contributions centered on embedding advisors with Iraqi units for real-time intelligence sharing and coordination of precision airstrikes, enabling targeted strikes on ISIS command nodes and supply lines prior to the ground push. This approach built on post-2014 reforms, where U.S. and coalition training programs addressed the Iraqi Army's prior collapse—attributed to leadership failures, corruption, and low morale—through enhanced officer selection, equipment modernization, and doctrinal updates focused on operations. Coordination mechanisms included joint operations centers in and Anbar, where Iraqi commanders directed movements with coalition input limited to non-combat enablers. Over the preparatory phase from to May 2016, coalition aircraft conducted hundreds of airstrikes, degrading defenses and facilitating the encirclement of without direct foreign troop involvement. This structure underscored a deliberate shift toward sustainable Iraqi capabilities, avoiding the heavy U.S. ground presence of earlier conflicts.

Siege Operations and Civilian Evacuations

Iraqi security forces began tightening the siege around in early February 2016 by severing key ISIS supply lines, including routes connecting the city to Khalediya Island and other external areas, isolating an estimated 1,000-2,000 ISIS fighters within the urban area. This encirclement, part of broader operations under the and supported by intelligence, progressively restricted ISIS access to reinforcements, weapons, and , contributing to documented internal strains such as forced of staples among fighters and civilians, as evidenced by intercepted communications and defector reports indicating declining by April. The strategy empirically degraded ISIS defensive capabilities, with airstrikes targeting remaining smuggling paths and ammunition caches, reducing the group's operational tempo ahead of the ground assault. In coordination with the and humanitarian agencies, Iraqi forces established multiple evacuation corridors in mid-May 2016, prior to the main offensive launch on May 23, facilitating the exodus of approximately 85,000 civilians from the city's outskirts and eastern sectors through designated safe routes to the southwest and southeast. Leaflets airdropped and announcements urged residents to use these paths, with initial waves evacuating hundreds daily despite logistical strains on receiving camps; by early June, over 4,000 had fled via a newly secured corridor in a single day. These measures, emphasized by Iraqi statements as prioritizing civilian safety, displaced the majority of the estimated pre-siege population of 100,000-150,000, though UN observers noted the corridors' effectiveness was hampered by obstructions. ISIS actively impeded evacuations by positioning snipers along escape routes and executing civilians attempting to leave, with reports confirming targeted killings of fleeing families to deter mass exits and maintain human shields. Booby-trapped homes and barricaded exits further confined residents, leaving an estimated 50,000 civilians trapped in central at the offensive's outset, many coerced into proximity to ISIS positions. Iraqi and forces paused advances periodically to sustain corridor access, mitigating potential casualties despite these adversarial tactics, as verified by post-evacuation displacement tallies exceeding 80,000 by late May.

Intelligence Gathering and Planning

Prior to the main assault launched on May 23, 2016, intelligence efforts fused U.S.-provided unmanned aerial systems for persistent surveillance with intercepts and Iraqi from ground sources to identify command-and-control nodes, tunnel networks, and fortified positions within . This integration, facilitated through Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command fusion cells, enabled the generation of 3-5 high-confidence targets daily, emphasizing precision to disrupt mobility and logistics while informing advance routes that prioritized peripheral isolation over immediate urban penetration. Planning phases, spanning March to May 2016 amid the ongoing initiated in February, focused on achieving full territorial clearance through sequential advances designed to encircle and degrade defenses, deliberately avoiding the protracted house-to-house fighting characteristic of the 2004 battles by leveraging intel-driven airstrikes and ground maneuvers. Contingencies addressed potential ISIS employment of chemical agents, informed by prior captures of munitions from Saddam-era sites and documented uses in , incorporating protective measures for advancing forces and restrictions on operations in suspected hazard areas. Iraqi Prime Minister maintained direct oversight of the operation, coordinating among security forces to align military imperatives with political considerations, including delays for civilian evacuation corridors to mitigate humanitarian fallout and sustain domestic support amid economic strains. This inter-agency approach integrated Coalition airpower planning with Iraqi ground assessments, ensuring strikes adhered to restrictive that required confirmation and senior-level approval to limit non-combatant risks.

Course of the Battle

Assault on the Outskirts and Perimeter

initiated the assault on Fallujah's outskirts on the evening of May 22, 2016, with Prime Minister announcing the launch of Operation Breaking Terrorism early the next day. Advances proceeded along multiple axes from the north and south, aiming to breach ISIS perimeter defenses and secure surrounding villages to isolate the city center. Iraqi Army divisions, Counter-Terrorism Service units, and employed heavy armor, including tanks and MRAP vehicles, to lead the pushes against ISIS-deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). In the northern sector, forces advanced toward Saqlawiyah, a village northwest of under ISIS control, repelling militant counterattacks amid intense small-arms and . Southern advances targeted farmland and peripheral positions, where Iraqi units cleared IED-laden routes and neutralized VBIED threats, reporting the elimination of dozens of ISIS fighters in initial engagements. These efforts resulted in incremental gains that severed key supply lines into the city, with estimates of approximately 100 ISIS combatants killed across the early perimeter clashes. To facilitate sustained operations, Iraqi commanders established forward bases in captured outskirts areas, enabling resupply and positioning for deeper incursions while mitigating logistical vulnerabilities exposed by ambushes. These positions also supported the consolidation of gains in agricultural zones, further encircling Fallujah's defenses without penetrating the urban core.

Urban Clearing Operations

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service units and Federal Police commenced house-to-house clearing in Fallujah's central districts on June 17, 2016, advancing into the urban core after earlier penetrations from the southern edges around June 6. Operations involved methodically searching and securing buildings in a densely packed environment riddled with ISIS fortifications, prioritizing the neutralization of immediate threats to enable controlled progress. During sweeps, Iraqi forces uncovered multiple ISIS torture facilities repurposed from ordinary homes, featuring downstairs group cells, upstairs rooms, and evidence of brutality such as bloodstained walls and restraint chains. Weapons caches containing rifles, , and components for improvised explosives were routinely discovered and dismantled, highlighting the extent of ISIS entrenchment in civilian infrastructure. ISIS defenders relied on snipers embedded in upper stories of booby-trapped buildings, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and hidden explosives along streets, forcing Iraqi troops to employ deliberate, block-by-block tactics supported by to suppress fire and expose traps. These measures addressed the jihadists' strategy of blending into the urban fabric to inflict attrition on advancing forces. Iraqi troops captured the compound on June 17, raising the national flag over the town hall despite persistent and bomb threats. Subsequent mopping-up eliminated residual pockets in areas like al-Julan, with the city declared fully cleared of organized resistance by June 26. Iraqi command reported approximately 1,800 ISIS fighters killed in the urban phase, reflecting the intensity of close-quarters engagements.

Key Tactics and Coalition Air Support

(ISF), primarily the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army divisions, utilized infantry-heavy assaults augmented by mechanized elements, including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, to penetrate ISIS-held districts from the southern and eastern approaches starting May 23, 2016. Small commercial drones were employed for tactical reconnaissance, enabling real-time identification of enemy positions and booby-trapped structures, which facilitated deliberate clearing operations block-by-block while minimizing unplanned engagements. This approach diverged from the 2004 U.S.-led battles by emphasizing velocity through fire support integration rather than attrition-based ground dominance, allowing ISF to advance up to 2 kilometers per day in initial phases despite dense urban obstacles. Coalition air assets, coordinated via Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) embedded with ISF units, delivered precision strikes using missiles from MQ-9 Reaper drones and laser-guided bombs from F-16s and A-10s, targeting ISIS snipers, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and leadership elements. These strikes supported ground maneuvers by suppressing defenses, with empirical data from indicating over 85% weapon-to-target accuracy in urban environments through fused intelligence from and ground spotters, thereby curtailing ISIS counterattacks and enabling ISF to isolate pockets without disproportionate ground casualties. Electronic warfare innovations, including coalition-provided signals jamming to degrade radio networks and improvised explosive triggers, complemented physical disruptions of underground tunnels via airstrikes and ISF breaching teams, applying operational lessons from the Ramadi campaign (December 2015–February 2016) where analogous combined-arms denial of subterranean mobility prevented enemy reinforcement and exfiltration. This synergy of ground maneuver, , and standoff fires empirically validated a low-footprint model, as ISF recaptured 90% of the city by June 17 with coalition airpower accounting for an estimated 40% of confirmed combatant kills, preserving Iraqi operational tempo amid fortified defenses.

ISIS Tactics and Atrocities

Defensive Fortifications and Booby Traps

ISIS fighters, having seized Fallujah in January 2014, spent over two years fortifying the city against anticipated counteroffensives, constructing extensive networks of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) deployed in patterned formations akin to conventional minefields to channel and ambush advancing forces. These IEDs, often concealed in homes, vehicles, and infrastructure, created interconnected "kill zones" rigged for remote or pressure-plate detonation, designed to inflict maximum casualties and slow ground movements through deliberate booby-trapping of everyday objects and structures. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) were prepositioned as mobile threats, complementing static defenses to prolong engagements. In addition to surface-level traps, excavated approximately four miles of subterranean tunnels beneath the city, enabling covert fighter movement, positioning, weapon caching, and evasion of detection or airstrikes while connecting frontlines for rapid reinforcement or . , trenches, and fortified positions, including elevated nests integrated into tunnel exits, further entrenched these defenses, with some tunnels reportedly packed with secondary explosives to detonate upon breaching. These preparations empirically hindered rapid advances, as evidenced by ISIS maintaining control of the northwestern al-Golan for nearly a week after Iraqi forces reached the city center on , , compelling methodical clearing operations that heightened risks from undetected traps. By embedding explosives throughout populated areas, the fortifications extended the duration of urban combat, thereby sustaining civilian proximity to ongoing fighting despite evacuation corridors. Ultimately, the sheer scale of defensive proved insufficient against sustained pressure, as ISIS losses exceeded 1,800 fighters, with defenses overwhelmed by coordinated assaults.

Use of Human Shields and Civilian Endangerment

During the 2016 battle for Fallujah, ISIS systematically employed civilians as human shields by relocating families to central urban areas under their control, complicating Iraqi and coalition advances and increasing risks to non-combatants. officials reported that ISIS was holding hundreds of families in these positions to deter assaults, a tactic that prevented comprehensive evacuations prior to the main offensive launched on May 23. Approximately 50,000 s remained trapped inside the city, facing the prospect of forced use as shields amid restricted escape routes. ISIS fighters actively targeted civilians attempting to flee, including through sniper fire on humanitarian corridors established by . A U.S. official stated that ISIS snipers were positioned to block civilian departures from , firing on those seeking to reach government-held areas. On June 10, ISIS opened fire on groups escaping southern , killing at least 30 according to Iraqi reports. The documented ISIS shootings of civilians trying to exit, while noted regular instances of executions or direct attacks on escapees during the siege. These practices aligned with ISIS operational patterns observed in prior battles, such as and , where the group prioritized territorial defense and propaganda value over civilian welfare by embedding fighters among populations and punishing non-compliance with death. In , for instance, ISIS similarly forced thousands into combat zones as shields, a that extended to by design to maximize operational friction for advancing forces.

Documented Terror Acts Under ISIS Control

During its control of Fallujah from January 2014 to June 2016, the () imposed a of terror characterized by systematic executions, corporal punishments, and coercive measures to enforce compliance with its strict interpretation of Islamic law. Public executions, often by beheading or shooting, targeted individuals accused of , collaboration with Iraqi forces, or tribal opposition, with bodies frequently displayed in public spaces to deter resistance. Residents fleeing the city reported that broadcast executions via loudspeakers across neighborhoods to amplify psychological intimidation, including killings of suspected spies and those refusing to pledge allegiance (). In one documented incident near , executed 25 members of the Al-Bu Isa tribe in response to tribal resistance, leaving their bodies visible as a warning. Public floggings for offenses such as smoking, listening to music, or minor infractions were routine, administered in mosques or open areas under the group's hisba enforcement squads. ISIS exerted economic terror through food and hoarding, prioritizing fighters while restricting civilian access to exacerbate dependence and control. By late 2015, as Iraqi forces encircled the city, ISIS prevented most civilian evacuations, confining up to 50,000 residents and commandeering food supplies, which led to widespread and at least 10 deaths by early 2016. Forced labor was imposed on locals for constructing defensive fortifications, including tunnels, berms, and IED placements, under threat of execution for non-compliance; post-liberation inspections revealed extensive civilian-dug networks repurposed from residential areas. The group conscripted children as young as 10 into its ranks, indoctrinating them through religious classes and training camps in , where they served as lookouts, suicide bombers, or fighters, contributing to long-term societal trauma from disrupted education and exposure to violence. UN documentation of ISIS practices across highlights the systematic nature of child recruitment, with boys forced into combat roles under penalty of death for families refusing. To deepen sectarian divides, ISIS demolished Shia religious sites and artifacts in Anbar Province, including near , framing such acts as purification while using to vilify Shia Iraqis and justify killings, thereby radicalizing locals against perceived external threats. Psychological domination was maintained via mandatory loyalty oaths to leadership, enforced through surveillance committees that punished dissent with imprisonment or execution, fostering an atmosphere of pervasive fear over the two-year occupation. This governance model, rooted in , prioritized ideological purity and territorial control, resulting in documented cases of arbitrary arrests, in makeshift prisons, and the erosion of community structures through tribal decapitation.

Allegations Against Iraqi and Coalition Forces

Claims of Excessive Force and Civilian Casualties

reported allegations of indiscriminate artillery shelling and airstrikes by Iraqi forces during the offensive, which allegedly struck civilian areas and contributed to non-combatant deaths, though the organization emphasized the challenges of verification in a combat zone controlled by ISIS until late June 2016. documented claims of excessive force in the battle's periphery, including reports of ground operations leading to civilian harm, but noted that such accusations often stemmed from unconfirmed eyewitness accounts amid ISIS's use of populated zones for military purposes. Post-liberation, concerns intensified over actions by Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), Shi'a militias integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus. cited specific incidents of alleged extrajudicial executions and torture of Sunni men suspected of ISIS affiliation, with reports estimating dozens to over 100 such cases in detention facilities near Fallujah in the weeks following the city's recapture on June 26, 2016; these claims were based on interviews with released detainees and families, but lacked independent forensic corroboration due to restricted access. similarly highlighted potential revenge killings by PMU elements against civilians perceived as collaborators, urging to assert command and control over irregular forces. Iraqi officials rejected assertions of deliberate excessive force, asserting that civilian casualties—estimated by government sources at under 100 during the main assault phase—resulted from 's deliberate endangerment of non-combatants through shielding and booby-trapped urban environments, rather than coalition or Iraqi policy. The confirmed held approximately 50,000 civilians in central as potential shields starting in May 2016, complicating precise targeting and contributing to incidental harm from necessary . In response to the allegations, Haider al-Abadi's government announced an investigation into PMU conduct on June 9, 2016, framing any abuses as isolated deviations rather than systematic, though outcomes remained limited by evidentiary gaps and political sensitivities around militia accountability. No independent assessments found of a deliberate policy of disproportionate force by Iraqi or coalition elements; instead, reviews emphasized the operation's adherence to necessities against fortified ISIS positions, with coalition airstrikes—totaling around 100 sorties—targeted based on intelligence to minimize , per U.S. Central Command disclosures. Claims of specific incidents, such as strikes on mosques allegedly used by ISIS for command posts, were contested by Iraqi denials attributing damage to insurgent munitions or staged , underscoring the evidentiary challenges in attributing amid biased reporting from ISIS-affiliated media.

Investigations and Contextual Defenses

Following the conclusion of the battle on June 17, 2016, allegations of excessive force primarily targeted (ISF), including Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), for reported abuses against civilians during and after evacuation efforts, such as arbitrary detentions, , and extrajudicial killings of suspected ISIS sympathizers. Iraqi Prime Minister responded by launching a formal investigation on June 4, 2016, into these claims and ordering the of perpetrators, emphasizing centralized command to curb militia autonomy. U.S. of Defense publicly urged completion of these probes while praising the operation's success, noting the coalition's advisory role limited direct ground involvement and liability. Outcomes included no widespread prosecutions, attributed to evidentiary challenges in chaotic post-battle screenings and operational imperatives to neutralize ISIS holdouts amid real-time intelligence constraints. Coalition airstrikes, numbering over 1,000 in support of ISF advances, underwent internal U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reviews under protocols, which generally deemed most engagements lawful given ISIS's tactic of embedding fighters in civilian areas and using human shields. These assessments highlighted limitations of real-time intelligence, where targets were validated as high-value ISIS positions based on ISF reports, with minimal confirmed civilian deaths from coalition munitions—contrasting with higher incidental harm in denser urban fights like . The coalition's non-combatant advisory posture further insulated it from ground-level accountability, as ISF retained operational control. Defenses against broader excessive force claims underscored pre-assault evacuations, which displaced over 85,000 civilians—reducing the at-risk population to an estimated 50,000-90,000 trapped by —and resulting in ratios far lower than in (where over 10,000 non-combatants died amid 1.5 million residents and incomplete evacuations). Command oversight mitigated Shia excesses by integrating PMU under Joint Operations Command, prioritizing ISIS elimination over peripheral risks in a fortified urban environment laced with improvised devices. Political critiques of sectarian overreach were contextualized as deviations from unified ISF , not systemic flaws, with al-Abadi's directives enforcing accountability to preserve operational cohesion.

Comparative Scale of Atrocities

Under ISIS control of Fallujah from January 2014 to May 2016, violent incidents claimed at least 1,200 civilian lives, with ISIS enforcers conducting frequent public executions for perceived infractions such as smoking, insufficient religious observance, or suspected collaboration, as reported by escaping residents and documented fatalities. These acts formed part of ISIS's systematic governance strategy, which prioritized terror to maintain dominance, including forced conscription and killings of families to deter flight, contrasting sharply with the incidental nature of civilian deaths during the ensuing liberation offensive. In comparison, estimates of civilian fatalities in the May-June 2016 battle range from several hundred to under 1,000, primarily resulting from crossfire, collapsed structures, and indirect effects in a densely booby-trapped urban environment where ISIS deliberately co-located fighters with non-combatants. This disparity underscores premeditated versus tactical necessities: ISIS's pre-battle body count in reflected intentional elimination of dissenters and minorities, evidenced by regional mass graves holding thousands of executed victims across ISIS-held , while coalition and Iraqi forces adhered to emphasizing target verification and proportionality to mitigate harm amid confirmed ISIS human shielding. Absent ISIS's fortifications in civilian homes, deliberate prevention of evacuations, and use of inhabitants as shields—tactics that inflated risks and prolonged exposure—civilian casualties would have been substantially lower, as urban combat models indicate minimal collateral in evacuated zones. Equivalence narratives falter under causal scrutiny: defeating an entity committing ongoing mass atrocities, including beheadings and enslavement documented in , necessitated prioritizing the existential threat over zero-risk ideals, with post-battle investigations by coalition partners confirming over 90% ROE compliance in strikes, far exceeding unchecked insurgent impunity. Such metrics reveal ISIS's engineered humanitarian catastrophe dwarfing operational frictions, as the group's territorial rule alone correlated with thousands of verifiable executions in , rendering battle-related losses a fraction of the baseline horror it imposed.

Casualties, Humanitarian Impact, and Outcomes

Military Casualties and ISIS Losses

(ISF), including the Iraqi Army, Counter-Terrorism Service, and , along with coalition air support, sustained comparatively low casualties relative to the scale of the operation, attributable to extensive U.S.-led airstrikes that neutralized defenses prior to ground advances. Early clashes on , 2016, resulted in at least 130 ISF killed from counterattacks, but overall losses were contained through technological superiority and support. Iraqi military sources estimated total ISF fatalities in the low hundreds, with hundreds more wounded, reflecting effective minimization of exposure in urban fighting. No U.S. or coalition ground troop fatalities were reported, as involvement was limited to aerial and advisory roles. ISIS suffered devastating personnel losses, with Iraqi Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahab al-Saadi, the operation commander, reporting at least 1,800 fighters killed during the May-June 2016 offensive. This tally, derived from battlefield counts and intelligence, aligned with assessments from the operation's final phase, though U.S. officials refrained from independent confirmation. Several hundred ISIS personnel were captured in sweeps following the city's liberation on , 2016, alongside the elimination of key leaders, including a senior commander via U.S. precision strike on May 27. Material losses further degraded ISIS capabilities, as coalition airstrikes destroyed over 500 fleeing enemy vehicles and positions. ISF vehicle damage from IEDs and ambushes was offset by seizures of ISIS arms caches, including weapons, ammunition, and improvised explosives, bolstering Iraqi sustainment. The lopsided attrition—thousands of ISIS dead or captured against hundreds of ISF casualties—demonstrated the campaign's operational success in dismantling the group's with minimal friendly attrition.

Civilian Displacement and Suffering

Prior to the ground offensive launched on May 23, 2016, the prolonged of had displaced approximately 85,000 civilians, leaving an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 trapped inside the city under ISIS control, according to assessments. As Iraqi forces advanced, over 40,000 additional civilians fled the combat zone, navigating ISIS-placed snipers, booby traps, and restricted escape corridors that exacerbated risks during evacuation. Displacement camps in nearby areas such as Ashti and Khalidiya swelled beyond capacity, accommodating tens of thousands in tented settlements with limited , , and supplies, though Iraqi and international efforts provided essentials like medical screenings and rations to mitigate immediate crises. Civilian casualties during the battle totaled 581 to 670 documented deaths, primarily in urban fighting zones where , collapsing structures, and devices contributed to fatalities. The pre-offensive siege intensified suffering through severe , with up to 50,000 residents facing risks due to ISIS restrictions on movement and supplies, compounded by shortages of and heightened vulnerability in overcrowded conditions. Many escapees reported acute hardships, including , untreated injuries, and family separations amid chaotic flights from ISIS-held areas. Following the city's liberation on June 26, 2016, civilian returns were significantly delayed by widespread demining operations targeting thousands of ISIS-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and that rendered neighborhoods uninhabitable. Lingering health effects from siege-induced persisted, including weakened immune systems and chronic conditions among returnees, while the battle's destruction amplified exposure to environmental hazards like dust from rubble, though systematic data on post-liberation recovery indicated stabilization through restored access to aid and services absent under ISIS governance.

Achievement of Operational Objectives

Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Army, Counter-Terrorism Service, and , completed the recapture of from control on June 26, 2016, achieving the primary operational objective of expelling the group from the city after a that began in . This success severed key ISIS supply routes that had sustained the group's hold on the city since its capture in 2014, disrupting logistics networks linking to other ISIS-held areas in Anbar province. The victory demonstrated Iraqi forces' capacity for coordinated urban operations against a dug-in adversary, fostering momentum for larger-scale efforts such as the subsequent offensive later in 2016, where lessons from informed tactical adjustments. Unlike the 2004 battles, where U.S.-led coalitions cleared insurgents but faced rapid resurgence due to persistent local grievances and incomplete governance transitions, the 2016 operation resulted in sustained Iraqi government control over , with no territorial reversion to ISIS control in the years following. Claims labeling the outcome a , often citing high civilian displacement or infrastructure damage, fail to account for the empirical reality of irreversible territorial gains against the ISIS caliphate's core objective of holding contiguous urban strongholds essential for and resource extraction. involvement remained limited to air strikes and advisory roles, incurring negligible U.S. ground casualties while enabling Iraqi-led restoration at minimal external cost. These outcomes empirically validated the operation's strategic value in degrading ISIS operational tempo in western Iraq and bolstering national forces' cohesion against the caliphate threat.

Aftermath and Long-Term Consequences

Immediate Post-Liberation Stabilization

Following the declaration of Fallujah's liberation on June 26, 2016, conducted extended clearing operations to eliminate pockets of remaining fighters who had shifted to guerrilla tactics. These efforts, led primarily by Iraqi Army units and supported by intelligence, focused on urban searches and in booby-trapped structures, preventing immediate resurgence in the city's core districts. Security stabilization emphasized Iraqi-led measures, including the establishment of checkpoints at key entry points and displacement screening centers to vet returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) for affiliations. Over 1,000 suspected infiltrators were identified among refugee flows through biometric and -based vetting, minimizing the risk of sleeper cell activation. Local Sunni tribes played a critical role by providing on-the-ground on hidden fighters and potential threats, fostering tribal buy-in to counter insurgent remnants without widespread programs for low-level combatants. Governance initiatives reformed local security councils by integrating Sunni tribal elements, such as the Dera’ al-Fallujah Brigade (a local Hashd al-Ashairi unit), alongside recruited police forces to build community trust and handle patrols in residential areas. The (PMF) were largely restrained from dominating urban zones, confined instead to peripheral roles to mitigate sectarian tensions, though their presence in outlying sectors raised local Sunni concerns about overreach. These steps contributed to a marked decline in attacks compared to the pre-liberation period under ISIS control, when the city served as a launchpad for external bombings; post-liberation incidents were contained through proactive intelligence rather than escalating into widespread . Challenges persisted from ISIS sleeper cells attempting to exploit returnee networks, but these were largely neutralized via tribal-sourced tips and joint Iraqi-coalition operations, averting the kind of protracted seen in other liberated areas. By mid-July 2016, basic security architecture had stabilized the city center, enabling limited civilian returns under vetted conditions.

Reconstruction Efforts and Challenges

Following the liberation of Fallujah in June 2016, the Iraqi government allocated funds through mechanisms like the Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terroristic Operations (REFAAO), which initiated rehabilitation projects including street repairs in the city's Al-Ta'mim area by October 2024. International organizations contributed via targeted initiatives, such as the (IOM), which supported the rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing for 445 households in Anbar province, including , during 2023. The World Bank's Iraq Reconstruction and Investment Framework emphasized transitioning from to recovery, incorporating tools like parametric modeling to plan post-conflict rebuilding in and similar cities. Efforts extended to basic , with agencies like ACTED aiding farming communities by repairing irrigation canals, water ponds, and pumps to resume , a key local economic driver devastated under ISIS control. By 2023, housing assessments indicated a remaining need for 4,216 units alongside 1,562 uninhabitable structures, reflecting partial recovery from widespread wartime destruction amid ongoing rehabilitation. Returns of displaced persons accelerated post-liberation, with over 572,000 individuals resettling in Fallujah district by recent counts, enabling gradual service improvements like water access surpassing ISIS-era deprivations. Persistent challenges impeded full revival, including a legacy of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps sown by retreating ISIS fighters, which delayed agricultural resumption and safe land use. further eroded progress, as local contractors and officials diverted reconstruction funds, resulting in disbursed money yielding disproportionately limited tangible rebuilding despite security gains by 2021 that facilitated initial investments in Anbar. From 2021 to 2025, heightened stability supported incremental economic activity, including farm rehabilitations under UN programs, though graft and continued to constrain broader housing and livelihood restoration compared to pre-conflict baselines.

Broader Implications for Iraq's Security

The successful liberation of in June 2016 validated a model of (ISF) conducting urban clearances with integrated coalition , providing tactical and operational lessons that scaled to the October 2016 offensive and subsequent territorial defeats of ISIS. This approach, emphasizing precision airstrikes alongside ground maneuvers, minimized some risks to advancing units while degrading ISIS defenses, contributing causally to the group's loss of major urban strongholds by mid-2017. Incorporation of local Sunni tribal elements within the and Anbar-based militias during the operation underscored the efficacy of decentralized, community-inclusive strategies over rigid centralized control, which had precipitated the ISF's 2014 collapse in northern . Such inclusion fostered local intelligence and post-combat stabilization, contrasting with earlier failures where top-down directives alienated Sunni populations and enabled ISIS recruitment. These dynamics affirmed that hybrid ISF structures, blending professional units with tribal allies, enhanced resilience against in Sunni-majority areas like Anbar Province. By 2019, the Fallujah-modeled campaigns had dismantled ISIS's territorial , forcing the group into a persistent but low-intensity characterized by guerrilla tactics and sleeper cells rather than conventional control. In 2025, ISIS maintains negligible territorial footholds in , with activity limited to infrequent attacks amid heightened ISF vigilance and advisory support, empirically demonstrating the rollback of jihadist proto-states through sustained, adaptive counteroffensives. Fallujah's relative post-liberation stability, with reduced extremist incidents compared to pre-2016 levels, exemplifies how early urban victories can anchor broader provincial security gains when paired with tribal reintegration.

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