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Operation Shader
Operation Shader
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Operation Shader
Part of the Military intervention against ISIL
in Iraq, and Syria and Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War

A Typhoon FGR4 flies over Iraq on 22 December 2015.
Date9 August 2014 – 28 September 2024[1]
Location
Status
  • British airstrikes and ground support against ISIL in Iraq and Syria
  • Recapture of all ISIL-held territory in Iraq by 10 December 2017[4]
  • Complete military defeat of ISIL in Syria on 23 March 2019
  • Numerous ISIL leaders killed
  • Multiple terrorist acts committed by ISIL in London and Manchester leading to 34 deaths
Belligerents
United Kingdom Islamic State
Commanders and leaders
Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Leader of IS)
Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi 
Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi 
Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi [5]
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi [6]
Islamic State Abu Alaa Afri [7]
Abu Suleiman al-Naser 
Abu Ali al-Anbari 
Abu Omar al-Shishani 
Units involved
 Royal Air Force
 British Army
 Royal Navy
Military of ISIL
Strength
See Deployed forces
  • 9,000–18,000 (U.S. intelligence estimate, January 2015)[8]
  • 20,000–31,500 (CIA estimate, September 2014)[9]
    * 850 British jihadists[10]
Casualties and losses
3 servicemen killed (2 non-combat)[11][12][13]
2 servicemen wounded[14]
8 volunteer SDF fighters killed[15]
2 volunteer aid workers executed[16]
1 journalist missing[17]
4,066 killed, 303 injured (per UK, 2021)[18][19]

Operation Shader is the operational code name given to the contribution of the United Kingdom in the ongoing military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The operation involves the British Army providing ground support and training to allied forces fighting against ISIL, the Royal Air Force providing humanitarian aid airdrops, reconnaissance and airstrikes, and the Royal Navy providing reconnaissance and airstrikes from the UK Carrier Strike group and escort to allied carrier battle groups.[20]

Additionally, UK Special Forces have reportedly operated in Iraq, Syria and Libya.[21]

By January 2019, the Ministry of Defence stated that 1,700 British airstrikes had killed or injured 4,315 enemy fighters in Iraq and Syria, with one civilian casualty.[22] The RAF had also delivered £230 million worth of humanitarian aid.[23] Overall, the operation had resulted in a net cost of £1.75 billion.[24] The number of airstrikes carried out in Iraq and Syria has been second only to the United States, with a report that the Royal Air Force has conducted 20 per cent of all airstrikes.[25][26] The operation is the most intense flying mission the RAF has undertaken in 25 years.[27]

On 28 September 2024 the Ministry of Defence announced that British jets will cease strike operations over Iraq and Syria following the conclusion of the Global Coalition's military mission against Daesh, which will draw to a close over the next 12 months.[28]

Background

[edit]

In 2014, the militant group Islamic State made vast territorial gains in Iraq and Syria following several offensives. It declared its captured territory a caliphate within which it enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia. The group, which is designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, received widespread condemnation for its human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. The Iraqi government formally requested the United States and wider international community to carry out airstrikes against ISIL in support of their fight on the ground.[29][30] During the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry pressed Ministers of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom to support a coalition to combat ISIL militarily and financially.[31][32] The United States launched the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) on 17 October with the stated aim of degrading and destroying ISIL.

Iraq

[edit]

Humanitarian aid and surveillance

[edit]
Two Royal Air Force (RAF) C-130J Hercules aircraft in Iraq, after being unloaded of vital humanitarian supplies on 9 September 2014.

On 9 August 2014, following the genocide of Yazidis and other ethnic minorities by ISIL in northern Iraq, the British government deployed the Royal Air Force to conduct humanitarian aid airdrops. The first airdrop was conducted on 9 August, with two Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft, flying from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, airdropping bundles of aid into Mount Sinjar.[33][34] A second airdrop on 12 August had to be aborted due to a perceived risk of injury to civilians.[35] The airdrops were able to resume within 24 hours and two large consignments of aid were airdropped over Mount Sinjar.[36] During the same day, the Ministry of Defence announced the deployment of Tornado GR4 strike aircraft to help coordinate the airdrops using their LITENING III reconnaissance pods; they were not authorized to conduct any airstrikes prior to Parliamentary approval.[37] Four Chinook transport helicopters were also deployed alongside them to participate in any required refugee rescue missions.[38] On 13 August 2014, two C-130 Hercules aircraft dropped a third round of humanitarian aid into Mount Sinjar.[39] This was followed by a fourth and final round on 14 August, bringing the total number of humanitarian aid airdrops conducted by the RAF to seven.[40] The UK suspended its humanitarian aid airdrops on 14 August 2014 due to the "improved humanitarian situation" in Mount Sinjar.[41]

On 16 August 2014, following the suspension of humanitarian aid airdrops, the RAF began shifting its focus from humanitarian relief to surveillance. The Tornado GR4s, which were previously used to help coordinate humanitarian aid airdrops, were re-tasked to gather vital intelligence for anti-ISIL forces. A RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft was also deployed on what was the type's first operational deployment since entering service.[42] The aircraft was based at RAF Al Udeid in Qatar alongside American aircraft.[43][44] In addition to Tornado and Rivet Joint, the RAF also deployed Reaper, Sentinel, Shadow and Sentry aircraft to fly surveillance missions over Iraq and Syria.[45][46][47]

When asked whether the country would participate in airstrikes or send ground troops, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated: "We have not been asked to commit either combat troops on the ground – and we are not going to do that – and we have not been asked to join in other air strikes though we certainly welcome [them]".[48]

Parliamentary approval

[edit]

On 20 September 2014, Iraq presented a letter to the UN Security Council (of which the United Kingdom is a permanent member) calling for military assistance in its fight against ISIL, echoing calls they made at the Paris conference on 15 September.[49]

On 26 September 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron recalled Parliament to debate the authorisation of British airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. Cameron insisted that intervention, at the request of the Iraqi government, to combat a "brutal terrorist organisation" was "morally justified". He went on to state that ISIL was a "direct threat to the United Kingdom" and that British inaction would lead to "more killing" in Iraq. Following a seven-hour debate, Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of airstrikes, with 524 votes in favour and 43 against.[50][51] The 43 'No' votes came from 23 Labour MPs, six Conservative MPs, five Scottish National Party MPs, three Social Democratic and Labour Party MPs, two Plaid Cymru MPs, one Liberal Democrat MP, one Green Party MP, and one Respect Party MP.[50] Following the vote, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon told the BBC that the priority would be to stop the slaughter of civilians in Iraq, and that the UK and its allies would be guided by Iraqi and Kurdish intelligence in identifying targets.[50]

Airstrikes

[edit]
A Tornado GR4 returns to RAF Akrotiri after the first airstrikes on 30 September 2014.
A Tornado GR4 destroys an ISIL armoured vehicle in Al Qaim on 2 November 2014.
A Typhoon FGR4 is refueled over Iraq by the US Air Force on 22 December 2015.

The Royal Air Force began conducting armed sorties over Iraq immediately after parliamentary approval, using its six Tornado GR4s stationed at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus.[52] The first airstrike took place on 30 September 2014, when a pair of Tornado GR4s attacked an ISIL heavy weapons position using a Paveway IV laser-guided bomb and an armed pickup truck using a Brimstone missile.

In October 2014, a further two Tornado GR4 strike aircraft and an undisclosed number of armed MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles joined the operation.[53][54] The first MQ-9 Reaper airstrike took place on 10 October 2014.[55] Elsewhere, the Royal Navy tasked Type 45 destroyer HMS Defender to escort the US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) whilst it launched aircraft into Iraq and Syria.[20]

According to Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, the UK had conducted a "huge number of missions" over Iraq by 13 December 2014, a number which was "second only to the United States" and "five times as many as France".[26] By 5 February 2015, the UK had contributed 6% of all coalition airstrikes in Iraq – a contribution second only to the United States – which the Defence Select Committee nevertheless described as "modest".[56][57]

By 26 September 2015, a full year after the operation first began, Tornado and Reaper aircraft had flown over 1,300 missions against ISIL and had conducted more than 300 airstrikes, killing more than 330 ISIL fighters.[2][58][59] The aircraft had released a combined 311 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 117 Brimstone missiles and 540 Paveway IV laser-guided bombs by 24 January 2016.[60] In June 2016, the RAF used its Storm Shadow cruise missiles against ISIL for the first time, attacking a large concrete bunker in Western Iraq.[61]

On 14 March 2017, Forces.net reported that the RAF had conducted more than 1,253 airstrikes in Iraq, a number which remained second only to the United States.[25]

After ISIL were defeated at the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani in March 2019, the RAF only conducted 7 flying missions in the rest of 2019.[62] After a nine-month period of no airstrikes, they resumed once again on 10 April 2020 when two Eurofighter Typhoons, together with an MQ-9 Reaper, identified and engaged ISIL forces in Iraq, about 200 km north of Baghdad.[63] By July 2020, the UK had carried out 40 airstrikes in the past year.

In March 2021, a series of airstrikes were carried out by the RAF against ISIL hidden within caves in Northern Iraq. The initial sorties saw the first-time combat use of the Storm Shadow cruise missile by the Eurofighter Typhoon, followed by up to 20 Paveway IV laser-guided bombs in the days after.[64] The remains of a Storm Shadow cruise missile were later discovered in Northern Iraq and reported in Iraqi media, however it is not known whether these remains belonged to an RAF missile or one from the French Air Force.[65]

The Royal Navy deployed UK Carrier Strike Group 21, a carrier strike group centred around the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, on a debut operational deployment in June 2021. Operating from the eastern Mediterranean, the aircraft carrier launched its embarked RAF and US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II multirole combat aircraft over Iraq and Syria.[66] Whilst the MOD made little comment regarding airstrikes, the United States Naval Institute confirmed they had taken place.[67] By early July, the carrier strike group had ended its support and continued on its primary tasking to the Indo-Pacific via the Suez Canal.[68]

Between January 2019 and January 2021, British airstrikes in Iraq and Syria killed at least 67 ISIS militants and injured a further four.[19]

In 2022, the UK conducted a total of two airstrikes in Iraq.[69] In 2023, the UK struck two ISIL targets in northeastern Iraq in support of an Iraqi security forces operation.[70]

On 21 April 2024, a pair of Typhoons struck a rocket launcher which was targeting coalition forces in northwestern Iraq.[71]

Training mission

[edit]
A member of the Royal Army Medical Corps demonstrating chest compressions to Iraqi soldiers.

In October 2014, the British Government agreed to send 12 members of the 2nd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (2 YORKS) into Irbil to train Peshmerga on how to use UK-supplied heavy machine guns.[72] The number of British troops involved in this training mission eventually rose from 12 to 50 before being bolstered by an additional batch of British troops numbering in the "low hundreds".[26] It was also disclosed that a small team of "combat-ready" troops were sent along with them to provide force protection.[26] By 2016, an additional 30 troops were deployed to train Iraqi forces, which brought the total number of deployed British troops in Iraq to 300.[73] The British Army had also trained over 31,000 Iraqi and Peshmerga fighters.[74]

In 2016, a squadron of up to 80 Royal Engineers was deployed to help construct better training facilities at the Al Asad Airbase.[74] This was followed by a six-month deployment of 44 Royal Engineers of 5 Armoured Engineer Squadron, 22 Engineer Regiment to Al Asad Airbase in 2017. This brought the number of British personnel at the base to more than 300 and the total in Iraq to around 600.[75]

In January 2017, the BBC reported that L/Cpl Scott Hetherington died in a "shooting accident" at Camp Taji, Iraq. Hetherington was a member of the Force Protection Platoon, Blenheim Company, 2nd Battalion Duke of Lancaster's Regiment; he was the first British soldier to die in Iraq in almost eight years. About 150 soldiers from the battalion were being deployed to Iraq for a period of six months, forming part of a 500-strong force being sent to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces.[11]

In January 2020, amid heightened tensions between the United States and Iran following the Baghdad International Airport airstrike, which killed the senior Iranian military commander, Qasem Soleimani, the British Army training mission in Iraq was temporarily suspended due to safety concerns.[76] Around two months later, a rocket attack on the Iraqi military base Camp Taji, hosting British, American and Australian military personnel, resulted in the death of three soldiers, including one Briton. She was later identified as L/Cpl Brodie Gillon of the Royal Army Medical Corps and reservist of the Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry.[77] At the time of the attack, the training mission was still suspended and had been scaled down in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[78] An Iranian-backed militia was believed to be responsible for the attack and was subsequently targeted by an American retaliatory airstrike.[79]

Elements of the Welsh Guards were deployed to Erbil, Iraq between June and December 2022.[80]

In February 2023, the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards returned from an operational tour in Iraq, providing protection for UK personnel deployed on Operation Shader.[81]

Ground support

[edit]

Following the start of aerial operations, there was public concern regarding mission creep and the involvement of British combat troops in what some feared could become another protracted ground war, similar to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan.[82][83] The British government made persistent assurances that no British troops would be committed on the ground in a combat role, instead focusing on training and non-combat support. The only exception to this was the deployment of 2nd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment (2 YORKS) to Irbil which helped secure an area for a possible helicopter refugee rescue mission in 2014. The battalion, which at the time was the Cyprus-based Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB) for Operation Herrick in Afghanistan, had left Irbil within 24 hours.[84] Beyond the scope of regular ground forces, British special forces are widely believed to have been involved, including in combat.[85][86]

Outcome

[edit]

On 10 December 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that Islamic State had been completely "evicted" from Iraq after losing control of all of its territory.[4] Despite this, British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace insisted that ISIL remained the "most significant threat" to the UK and its potential resurgence in future remained a concern.[87] For that reason, UK military aircraft continue to patrol the skies over Iraq almost daily.[87]

On 28 September 2024, the UK's role in Iraq and Syria would evolve following the conclusion of the Global Coalition's military mission against Daesh. Over the following year, the UK would transition into a bilateral security partnership with Iraq and cease further missions there.[88]

Syria

[edit]

Preceding events

[edit]

Prior to Operation Shader, the House of Commons voted on whether or not take military action against the Syrian Government in response to the Ghouta chemical attack in 2013. The House voted against taking military action — the first time a British government had been blocked from taking military action by Parliament.[89] Whilst the outcome was widely reported as a defeat for Prime Minister David Cameron, a spokesman for the Prime Minister nevertheless stated that he had "not ruled anything out" in relation to airstrikes against ISIL.[90] Cameron later elaborated that there was a case for airstrikes in Syria but conceded that any airstrikes would require another House of Commons vote unless it was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.[91]

In 2013, two British aid workers, David Haines and Alan Henning, were kidnapped by armed groups in two separate incidents in Syria whilst carrying out humanitarian aid work. In September 2014, ISIL executed an American hostage and threatened to execute Haines if the United States did not end its military interventions in Iraq and Syria. Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the terrorists and stated the UK would "never give into terrorism", adding that ISIL would "be squeezed out of existence".[92][93] ISIL subsequently released a video of Haines being beheaded by an ISIL executioner — an as-yet unidentified British national which the media named Jihadi John. Cameron reacted by stating: "We will do everything in our power to hunt down these murderers and ensure they face justice, however long it takes."[94] An intense manhunt involving MI5, Scotland Yard and the CIA began in an effort to identify John. In October 2014, John executed Henning in retaliation for the UK carrying out airstrikes in Iraq.[95] John was subsequently identified as Mohammed Emwazi, a Kuwaiti-born British national who previously lived in London.

In 2014, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that surveillance missions were being flown over Syria by the Royal Air Force, including via MQ-9 Reaper drones based in Cyprus.[96][47] In November, a US drone strike targeted and killed Emwazi in Raqqa with support from the Royal Air Force. Prime Minister David Cameron confirmed his death and stated it was an "act of self-defence" achieved through working "hand in glove, round the clock" with the United States.[97]

In 2015, Cameron made repeated calls for airstrikes in Syria following the 2015 Sousse attacks which were perpetrated by ISIL and left 30 Britons dead. These calls were echoed by the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, who claimed that there was an "illogicality" of British forces observing the Iraq-Syria border whilst ISIL did not. Fallon stated that the UK did not need the backing of Parliament to launch airstrikes in Syria but the House of Commons would have the final say.[98] The Prime Minister later stated that the UK was committed to destroying the caliphate in both Iraq and Syria.[99] It later emerged that British pilots were taking part in airstrikes in Syria whilst embedded with US and Canadian forces.[100][101] However, British forces themselves remained committed to surveillance and, by November, its Reaper drones had been responsible for 30% of all coalition aerial surveillance in Syria.[102]

An RAF MQ-9 Reaper, similar to the one used in the strike against Rayeed Khan and Rahoul Amin in Syria.

In September 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that two British-born Islamic State fighters, Rayeed Khan and Rahoul Amin, were targeted and killed in Syria by a Royal Air Force Reaper drone. During a statement in Parliament, the Prime Minister explained that it was a "lawful act of self defence" as the two fighters had been plotting attacks against the United Kingdom.[103] The Ministry of Defence later clarified that the strike was not part of Operation Shader.[104]

Airstrikes

[edit]
A Sentinel R1 taking off from RAF Akrotiri in support of Operation Shader.
Two Boeing E-3 Sentry aircraft at RAF Akrotiri.

In November 2015, following the November 2015 Paris attacks and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, David Cameron made his first case to Parliament for the UK to conduct airstrikes against ISIL in Syria. He argued that the United Kingdom would be safer by conducting airstrikes and that the UK could not outsource its security to allies. The Prime Minister went on to state that he would not hold a vote on airstrikes until he was sure he could win it.[105][106] In the days following, French President François Hollande and French Defense Secretary Jean-Yves Le Drian made calls for Britain to join airstrikes.[107] This was followed by an appeal from the Russian Ambassador to the UK, Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko.[108]

In December 2015, the House of Commons held a ten-hour debate on participating in airstrikes against ISIL in Syria with a final vote. The debate ended with 397 votes in favour of airstrikes and 223 against.[109][110][111] Hours after the vote, four Tornado GR4 strike aircraft left Cyprus and attacked ISIL positions in Syria for the first time, aided by a Voyager aerial refuelling tanker and an MQ-9 Reaper drone. The aircraft attacked Omar oilfield in Eastern Syria, one of the largest sources of financial income for ISIL.[55][112] Defence Secretary Michael Fallon subsequently announced that the Royal Air Force would be "doubling its strike force" with six Eurofighter Typhoon multi-role fighters and two more Tornado GR4 strike aircraft.[113]

By 24 January 2016, the RAF had used 7 Hellfire missiles, 9 Brimstone missiles and 34 Paveway IV laser-guided bombs in Syria.[60]

Forces.net reported that as of 14 March 2017, Britain had carried out 85 strikes in Syria, a number second only to the United States.[25]

In June 2021, the Royal Navy deployed a carrier strike group, UK Carrier Strike Group 21, centred around the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to support anti-ISIL operations. A joint force of RAF and US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II combat aircraft began launching combat sorties over Syria from the aircraft carrier whilst in the eastern Mediterranean.[114] Airstrikes were confirmed by the United States Naval Institute.[67] By early July, the carrier strike group had withdrawn and headed east via the Suez Canal.[68]

On 14 December 2021, an RAF Typhoon shot down a hostile drone which posed a threat to Coalition forces at the Al-Tanf military base in Southern Syria. It was the RAF's first air-to-air engagement in combat conducted by a Typhoon. An ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missile was used in the engagement.[115]

In December 2022, the RAF carried out a drone strike which killed a leading member of ISIL in al-Bab, Syria. The individual's activity was related to chemical and biological weapons.[116] This was the only UK airstrike to occur in Syria in 2022.[69]

In June 2024, the RAF carried out a drone strike against a known member of ISIL in an undisclosed area of the Syrian desert.[117] This was followed by a similar strike in Aleppo during March 2025.[118]

Training mission

[edit]

In 2016, a team of 75 British military trainers were deployed to Turkey and other nearby countries in the anti-ISIL coalition to assist with the US-led training programme in Syria. The training programme provided small arms, infantry tactics and medical training to Syrian moderate opposition forces for over three years.[45] Additionally, British forces reportedly helped in the building up of a mechanised battalion in Southern Syria, consisting of tribal fighters to combat Bashar al-Assad's army.[119]

Ground support

[edit]

In May 2015, surveillance by UK Special Forces had reportedly confirmed the presence of a senior ISIL leader, named Abu Sayyaf, in al-Amr, Syria, after which US Special Operations Forces conducted an operation to capture him. The operation resulted in his death and the capture of his wife Umm Sayyaf.[120] During the same year, UK Special Forces reportedly killed six ISIL fighters during a rescue operation.[121] It was also reported that the UK had supplied anti-ISIL forces with 500,000 rounds of ammunition.[2]

In 2016, The Telegraph reported that UK Special Forces had been operating on the frontline in Syria; in particular in May when they frequently crossed the border from Jordan to support a New Syrian Army unit composed of former Syrian Special Forces defending the village of al-Tanf against ISIL attacks. The New Syrian Army captured the village in that month and faced regular ISIL attacks. British forces also helped rebuild the base following a suicide attack.[122] The New Syrian Army acknowledged that UK Special Forces had provided training, weapons and other equipment; an independent source confirmed that UK Special Forces were operating against ISIL in Syria, Iraq and Libya.[123] In August, BBC News released exclusive images showing UK Special Forces operating in Syria.[124] The pictures, which dated from June, were taken following an attack by ISIL on the New Syrian Army base of Al Tanaf and appear to be showing UK Special Forces securing the base's perimeter.[123][125] UK Special Forces in Syria were reportedly engaged in wide-ranging roles that included surveillance, advisory and combat, in relatively small numbers.[123]

In 2018, a member of UK Special Forces was killed in Syria, along with an American soldier, by "explosives" carried by allied American forces following an accidental detonation. This was the first British soldier to die in active duty during operations against ISIL.[12]

In 2019, two British special forces soldiers were reportedly injured in an attack carried out by ISIL while supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces' Deir ez-Zor campaign; one Kurd also died.[126]

Outcome

[edit]

On 23 March 2019, following the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani, Islamic State lost its final significant territory in Syria to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the US and its coalition partners, including the UK. This was widely announced as the "defeat of ISIL" by the SDF and its allies.[127] British Prime Minister Theresa May praised the courage of the British Armed Forces and its allies and stated: "The liberation of the last Daesh-held territory wouldn't have been possible without the immense courage of UK military and our allies".[128] Major General Chris Ghika, Deputy Commander Strategy and Information of CJTF-OIR, stated that "Operation Shader would remain" as ISIL was not "leaderless or rudderless" despite its losses. He added that he could not predict how the losses would affect the terror threat posed by ISIL to the UK.[128]

Libya

[edit]

In 2015, following the rise of Islamic State in Libya, Prime Minister David Cameron confirmed the UK was prepared to intervene militarily, especially if there was an imminent threat to British lives.[129][130][131] However, the intervention would be pending the formation of a stable unity government in Libya.[132][3] The Royal Air Force began carrying out reconnaissance missions over Libya, which the media reported as being in preparation for an intervention.[3] One such reconnaissance flight, which involved a Boeing RC-135, reportedly targeted and jammed an Islamic State communications frequency emitting from a stronghold in Sirte.[133][134] Leaked reports and Libyan officials have also confirmed the presence of UK Special Forces on the ground and in combat.[135][136][137][138][139][140] An official statement by King Abdullah II of Jordan corroborated these reports and disclosed UK Special Forces had carried out joint operations with their Jordanian counterparts.[141] Additionally, 20 British troops were deployed to neighbouring Tunisia to help guard its border with Libya.[21]

Deployed forces

[edit]

In 2019, there were approximately 1,350 UK military personnel deployed on Operation Shader, with approximately 400 based in Iraq.[142]

British Army

[edit]
Foxhound armoured patrol vehicles arrive in Iraq.

The British Army had a total of 1,920 personnel deployed in 2018.[143] This included at least one infantry battalion on a six-month rotation to provide training support and force protection. These units operate from three main sites in Iraq: Camp Taji near Baghdad,[144] Union III in Baghdad and Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.[142] British troops have also been based at Al Asad Airbase[145] and Besmaya Range Complex.[146]

The units involved have included:

Royal Air Force

[edit]
RAF Tornado GR4 over Iraq on an armed reconnaissance mission.
An RAF C-17 aircraft being refueled at RAF Brize Norton before delivering Iraq-bound aid to RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus.
An RAF Voyager tanker refuels two Tornado GR4s over Iraq on 4 March 2015.

In 2018, the RAF had 1,950 personnel deployed on Operation Shader.[163] No. 83 Expeditionary Air Group based at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is responsible for command and control and has four Expeditionary Air Wings assigned to it.[142][47][148]

Withdrawn assets

Royal Navy

[edit]
Royal Navy destroyer HMS Defender (D36) escorts the American aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) through the Middle East during Operation Shader.

The Royal Navy routinely deploys a frigate or destroyer to the Middle East to carry out maritime security operations in support of Operation Kipion. These ships have occasionally provided escort to allied carrier strike groups involved in strike operations.[20][181] In June 2021, the Royal Navy contributed its own carrier strike group and carried out maritime strike operations against ISIL for the first time.[182] Additionally, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has resupplied coalition warships and, in 2016, operated airborne surveillance and control (ASaC) helicopters.[183]

Tri-Service

[edit]

Reactions

[edit]

Domestic

[edit]

On 26 September 2014, prior to the parliamentary vote on airstrikes in Iraq, Labour Party MP and Shadow Education Minister, Rushanara Ali, wrote to Labour Leader Ed Miliband to announce her resignation as Shadow Minister, in advance of her deliberate abstention in the vote. In the letter, she wrote that "I appreciate the sincerity of members of parliament from all sides of the House who today support military action against ISIL. I know that British Muslims stand united in the total condemnation of the murders that ISIL have committed. However, there is a genuine belief in Muslim and non-Muslim communities that military action will only create further bloodshed and further pain for the people of Iraq." Ali also added in the letter her concerns that the potential effect military actions might have on the radicalisations of British Muslims had not been thought through.[202][203]

Anti-war groups, including Stop the War Coalition (StWC), planned a protest march through London on 4 October 2014 in response to Operation Shader. A spokesman of StWC said "All evidence shows that all interventions will just cause more violence". The StWC website argued that the previous two interventions in Iraq had "helped create the current chaos".[citation needed] StWC held another protest in London on 1 December 2015, ahead of the parliamentary vote on airstrikes in Syria.[204]

On 3 December 2015, it was reported that several Labour Party MPs had received death threats and abuse for their support for airstrikes in Syria.[205] On 15 October 2021, long-serving British politician and Member of Parliament (MP) David Amess was attacked and murdered by Islamist Ali Harbi Ali. At court, Ali claimed he attacked Amess in response to him voting in favour of airstrikes in Syria.[206]

International

[edit]

The United States welcomed the UK's involvement in the anti-ISIL coalition, with President Barack Obama stating: "Since the beginning of the counter-ISIL campaign the United Kingdom has been one of our most valued partners".[207] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated he welcomed British airstrikes in Syria, adding "more universal efforts against Islamic State would be more effective".[208] Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko, made calls for British airstrikes in Iraq.[108]

Islamic State

[edit]

On 3 October 2014, ISIL executed British aid worker Alan Henning in response to British airstrikes in Iraq.[95] The group has also claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks, including the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing and Westminster attack, which it claimed were in retaliation for British military action in the Middle East.[209][210][211] In the same year, ISIL also claimed responsibility for the Parsons Green train bombing, with the assailant previously blaming his father's death in Iraq on the UK.[212] ISIL claimed responsibility for the 2020 Streatham stabbing, stating it was in response to its calls to "attack citizens of coalition countries".[213]

Service medal

[edit]

It was reported that Shadow Defence Secretary Nia Griffith called for a specific award for those who have served in Operation Shader, after visiting troops deployed on the Operation and speaking to armed forces based at RAF Akrotiri. The proposal was submitted for review by the Operational Recognition Board at the Permanent Joint Headquarters.[25]

On 20 September 2017, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that the "Op Shader Medal" will be awarded to those serving in Iraq and Syria. He used the announcement to highlight a lack of recognition for those personnel deployed on the operation, but not located directly within the award criteria; such as Coalition Staff in Kuwait/Turkey and RAF Reaper pilots elsewhere in the Middle East.[214]

Following the announcement, a Defence Instruction and Notice (DIN) was released confirming the eligibility, medal design and production timeline.

The eligibility is 30 Days Continuous Service within the boundaries of Iraq and Syria (45 Days Accumulated) from 9 August 2014[215] to a date yet to be set.

The medal will remain a "Coin"; the same one was used for the medals for Afghanistan and the Congo. The Awards are differentiated by the Ribbon and the clasp (if any). The Ribbons for all iterations of the OSM bear a central group of 5 stripes in light blue, dark blue and red (a broader band in the centre), to represent the 3 Services. These are flanked by a colour specifically chosen to represent the campaign. In the case of the OSM "Iraq & Syria" a recommendation will be made that this outer stripe is Air Superiority Grey, in recognition of the large number of RAF airframes participating in the operation.

Although entitlement has already been agreed, distribution of the medal will not begin until September 2018 due to financial reasons. All 3,600+ outstanding medals from 2014 to 2018 expected to be received by December 2018.

On 1 July 2018, a pre-release if the OSM (Iraq & Syria) was published by a medal manufacturer, showing the finalised ribbon (MOD Approved) and stating a release date of 18 July 2018. It is expected the full size medals will begin being presentated in line with this date.

On 18 July 2018, Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson presented the Operation Shader Medal, officially known as the Operational Service Medal Iraq and Syria. It has its own distinct ribbon and clasp.[216] He also announced that Her Majesty the Queen had approved an extension to the eligibility criteria for the medal to include personnel outside of the 'conventional area of operations' in Iraq and Syria which would include the Royal Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper crews.[217]

See also

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References

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from Grokipedia

Operation Shader is the operational codename for the United Kingdom's military contribution to the multinational 's campaign to defeat the , known as Daesh, in and , which began in September 2014 as part of . The operation integrated airstrikes, training for and Kurdish ground forces, maritime support, and intelligence operations across all three services to degrade Daesh's territorial control, disrupt its financing, and prevent foreign fighter flows. Key achievements include the RAF conducting over 10,000 sorties that struck more than 1,400 targets, accounting for approximately 20 percent of all coalition airstrikes—second only to the —and providing training to over 111,000 personnel, contributing to the territorial defeat of Daesh's self-proclaimed by 2019. While the coalition's combat mission in Iraq transitioned to advisory support in September 2024 following the restoration of Iraqi security and services, RAF patrols and strikes persist against residual Daesh threats in Syria, underscoring the operation's role in enabling local forces to reclaim and stabilize liberated areas with minimal reported UK-attributable civilian casualties.

Origins and Mandate

Threat of ISIS and Initial Triggers

The Islamic State of Iraq and (ISIS) exploited the power vacuum in northern following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent disintegration of , launching a major offensive in early June 2014 that captured key cities including and then on June 10. , Iraq's second-largest city with an estimated population exceeding 1.5 million, fell with minimal resistance as approximately 30,000 Iraqi troops abandoned their positions, allowing ISIS to seize vast quantities of U.S.-supplied military equipment including tanks, artillery, and small arms, which bolstered its operational capacity and projected an image of unstoppable momentum. This rapid expansion controlled roughly 40% of Iraqi territory by mid-2014, providing ISIS with revenue from oil fields, taxation, and estimated at $2 billion annually, enabling sustained military campaigns and global outreach. On June 29, 2014, formally declared a spanning its holdings in and , renaming itself simply the and designating leader as caliph, a move that rejected national borders and appealed to jihadists worldwide by claiming religious legitimacy over rival groups like . This declaration amplified ISIS's propaganda apparatus, which disseminated videos and statements via to recruit foreign fighters—over 20,000 from more than 80 countries by late 2014, including an estimated 500-700 British nationals—while directing plots for attacks in the West to avenge perceived crusader aggression. The 's pseudo-state infrastructure, including governance and media production, facilitated planning of external operations, transforming ISIS from a regional into a transnational threat capable of inspiring lone-actor attacks without direct command. Direct threats to the materialized through 's execution of Western hostages and explicit calls for violence against British targets; on August 19, 2014, the group released a video depicting the beheading of American journalist James Foley, captured in in 2012, as retaliation for U.S. actions and a warning to other Western powers including the . British intelligence assessed 's ideology as driving nascent plots, prompting the to elevate its national terror threat level from substantial to severe on August 29, 2014, reflecting heightened risks from returnee fighters and homegrown radicals radicalized online. These triggers aligned with the U.S.-initiated , which commenced airstrikes against in on June 15, 2014, to protect civilians and Iraqi forces, establishing a multinational framework that underscored the imperative against 's expansionist ambitions. In August 2014, the UK Cabinet authorized the initial deployment of assets, including Tornado GR4 jets and Voyager tankers, to support and humanitarian air drops in at the request of the Iraqi government amid the rapid advance of forces. This executive decision preceded broader military engagement and reflected the government's assessment of an urgent and threat to regional stability. On 26 September 2014, the was recalled for an emergency debate and voted 524 to 43 in favor of a government motion authorizing air strikes against targets in as part of an international coalition effort. The motion explicitly precluded the deployment of armed forces in ground combat operations, limiting involvement to air power, training, and advisory roles to , thereby adhering to conventions of parliamentary oversight for sustained military commitments. The legal basis for the intervention rested on the invitation extended by the sovereign Iraqi government, which invoked collective under Article 51 of the UN Charter against the Islamic State, whose territorial control and attacks constituted an armed attack on Iraq's integrity. This framework treated Islamic State's actions as an extension of transnational terrorism justifying assistance to the victim state, distinct from interventions requiring UN Security Council authorization for threats to international peace. UN Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014), adopted on 15 August, reinforced this by condemning Islamic State's abuses and urging states to counter its recruitment and financing, though it stopped short of endorsing coercive force.

Stated Objectives and Rules of Engagement

The stated objectives of Operation Shader, as articulated in the UK's parliamentary motion of 26 September 2014, centered on supporting the Iraqi government's request for military assistance to restore against through targeted airstrikes, with the explicit aim of degrading and ultimately defeating the group's capabilities in . This initial mandate emphasized enabling to regain control of seized territories, thereby denying a base for operations that could threaten regional stability and UK by facilitating external terrorist attacks. Upon parliamentary extension to on 2 December 2015, objectives expanded to include disrupting command and control structures, interdicting supply lines, and preventing the group from projecting power beyond its , all while prioritizing the territorial denial necessary to mitigate direct threats to the UK . Rules of engagement (RoE) for RAF operations under Shader were governed by stringent protocols requiring positive identification of targets as combatants or military objectives, verifiable intelligence to confirm hostile intent, and rigorous proportionality assessments to minimize civilian casualties and to infrastructure. These rules, informed by lessons from prior engagements like , mandated the use of precision-guided munitions and real-time dynamic targeting only where immediate threats justified engagement, with static targets subject to higher command approval to ensure compliance with principles of distinction and necessity. Success metrics outlined in official doctrine focused on confirmed enemy kills, destruction of command nodes, and degradation of logistics, while evolution from initial humanitarian in August 2014 to sustained counter-ISIS strikes reflected a shift toward proactive territorial without ground combat involvement.

Operations in Iraq

Humanitarian and Surveillance Missions (2014)

In August 2014, the United Kingdom launched initial humanitarian operations in Iraq under Operation Shader in response to Islamic State (ISIS) advances that included the mass persecution and displacement of Yazidi communities, with thousands trapped on Mount Sinjar without access to food or water following ISIS assaults beginning on August 3. The Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted its first airdrop of humanitarian aid—consisting of bottled water and emergency rations—on August 10 using C-130J Hercules aircraft, targeting the stranded civilians to mitigate immediate risks of dehydration and starvation. Subsequent drops followed on August 11 and 12, delivering over 7,000 water bottles and 1,400 ready-to-eat meals to support up to 40,000 displaced individuals, as assessed by UK intelligence confirming the humanitarian crisis's scale. To facilitate these relief efforts and monitor ISIS movements, the RAF deployed Voyager (A330 MRTT) tanker aircraft alongside RC-135W Rivet Joint platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions starting in mid-August, providing real-time electronic intelligence and support over northern . These assets verified ISIS tactics, including the deliberate use of sieges to induce in besieged areas such as Amerli and surrounding Yazidi regions, where militants restricted supplies to coerce surrenders or force displacements, as corroborated by intercepted communications and ground reports. Concurrently, Special Air Service (SAS) teams conducted on-ground intelligence gathering to assess threats like ISIS's capture of on August 7, which risked catastrophic flooding downstream due to potential of the aging structure, informing responses to avert humanitarian disaster. These non-kinetic missions emphasized ISR over kinetic action, with Voyager and Rivet Joint flights enabling persistent overhead monitoring of convoys and positions amid the Yazidi crisis and dam threat, while avoiding direct engagement until parliamentary authorization on September 26. By late September, as continued offensives, the operations evolved into armed patrols, setting the stage for initial airstrikes without yet conducting them.

Initial Airstrikes and Escalation

The initial kinetic operations of Operation Shader commenced on 30 September 2014, when two Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 aircraft, supported by a Voyager tanker and protected by Typhoon fighters, conducted the first airstrikes against Islamic State positions in Iraq. These strikes targeted a convoy of armed pickup trucks and a heavy truck mounting a howitzer south-west of Baghdad, using Paveway IV guided bombs, and were reported as successful by the UK Ministry of Defence. The action followed parliamentary approval on 26 September and integrated UK forces into the US-led coalition's Operation Inherent Resolve, enabling coordinated intelligence sharing and deconfliction to support Iraqi ground forces. Subsequent airstrikes rapidly escalated, with RAF aircraft conducting increasing numbers of sorties focused on disrupting , including vehicle convoys and oil extraction facilities that funded their operations. By 2015, contributions had grown to hundreds of sorties annually over , often striking time-sensitive targets identified through joint , which contributed to halting advances and facilitating ' counteroffensives, such as retreats from positions around and subsequent territorial recoveries. These operations emphasized precision to minimize civilian risk, with bombs and Brimstone missiles employed against high-value assets like oil tankers and refineries, aligning with broader efforts to sever 's economic lifelines. The airstrikes demonstrated empirical effectiveness in degrading Islamic State's capabilities, notably through the destruction of financial infrastructure; coalition attacks, including strikes on convoys and facilities, contributed to reducing Islamic State's -derived from an estimated peak of up to $3 million per day in mid-2014 to under $1 million daily by late , cumulatively denying the group billions in potential funding over the campaign's initial phase. This collapse forced Islamic State to rely more on and foreign donations, weakening their sustainment of territorial control and enabling ground partners to exploit momentum from air-enabled disruptions.

Training and Capacity-Building for Iraqi Forces

As part of Operation Shader, initiated in September 2014 at the invitation of the Iraqi government, the deployed military advisors to train (ISF) and Kurdish Peshmerga units, focusing on building sustainable capabilities to combat without committing British ground combat troops. Approximately 400 personnel were based in for this purpose, embedded within training teams across multiple sites, emphasizing skills such as weapons maintenance, counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tactics, and basic operations. By March 2020, British troops had trained over 100,000 Iraqi and personnel, enabling these forces to conduct independent operations and hold recaptured territories more effectively after major offensives like the 2016-2017 battles for and . programs prioritized practical, localized instruction, including target identification for threats like bombers, which contributed to improved force resilience against guerrilla tactics post-territorial defeat in by December 2017. This approach aligned with strategies to transition security responsibilities to local partners, reducing the need for ongoing Western advisory presence. Efforts targeted both the ISF, which integrated diverse Shia, Sunni, and minority elements, and the , whose decentralized structure required tailored modules on coordination to address vulnerabilities exposed during early advances in 2014. Verifiable outcomes included enhanced territorial control, with trained units demonstrating greater ability to prevent resurgence in cleared areas through 2019, as evidenced by sustained Iraqi-led patrols and reduced dependency. However, challenges persisted, including equipment shortages and internal Iraqi political frictions, which limited full operational independence despite training inputs. In line with exit strategies, advisory numbers began drawdown in , shifting to bilateral and NATO-linked programs by 2021, reflecting Iraq's progress toward self-reliance while maintaining minimal presence for counter-ISIS persistence operations. This evolution underscored the emphasis on capacity-building as a core pillar of Operation Shader, prioritizing long-term local empowerment over prolonged foreign involvement.

Close Air Support in Major Battles

In the Battle of Tikrit from March to April 2015, RAF Tornado GR4 aircraft under provided to advancing against positions, employing Brimstone missiles against terrorist targets in the urban environment. These precision-guided munitions enabled strikes on dynamic threats, contributing to the disruption of ISIS defenses and supporting the recapture of the city. During the 2016 offensive to liberate , forces as part of the coalition delivered air support that aided in overcoming fortifications, with RAF assets conducting and targeted strikes to neutralize militant strongholds. The use of precision weaponry in this urban battle minimized risks to advancing troops by focusing on verified enemy positions, enhancing ground maneuverability against entrenched fighters. The Battle of Mosul (October 2016–July 2017) saw extensive RAF , with and aircraft delivering guided bombs and Brimstone missiles against ISIS vehicle convoys, command posts, and firing points in densely populated areas. Brimstone's fire-and-forget capability allowed for rapid engagement of moving targets, achieving high destruction rates of jihadist assets while integrated with joint terminal attack controllers to reduce incidents. This tactical precision broke key ISIS defensive lines, facilitating Iraqi advances and the evacuation of civilians from besieged districts despite tactics employed by militants.

Post-Caliphate Persistence and Drawdown Efforts

Following the territorial collapse of the caliphate in March 2019, Operation Shader activities in shifted toward low-intensity operations targeting remnant elements, including sleeper cells and leadership networks, while emphasizing advisory support to . personnel focused on intelligence sharing, training, and enabling Iraqi-led counter-terrorism efforts, with assets conducting occasional precision strikes informed by ground intelligence on hideouts and movements. For example, on April 28, 2020, RAF Typhoon aircraft, supported by Voyager tankers, struck Daesh militants concealed in cave complexes in northern as part of coalition operations against persistent threats. Armed reconnaissance patrols persisted from in , sustaining surveillance over to detect and disrupt financing networks, weapon caches, and mobility, amid intelligence indicating ongoing insurgent activity in rural and border areas. These efforts contributed to coalition-wide metrics of degradation, including the neutralization of mid-level operatives and prevention of territorial recovery, though official UK-specific post-2019 strike tallies remain limited in public disclosure. By May 2024, parliamentary statements affirmed Operation Shader's role in bolstering Iraqi forces against Daesh, with UK advisory teams embedded to enhance local capabilities amid stabilized frontlines. Drawdown signals emerged in September 2024, when the and agreed to conclude the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS's military mission in over the subsequent 12 months, prompting the to align by ceasing RAF airstrikes within under Operation Shader. This transition reflected Iraqi forces' increased self-sufficiency following years of capacity-building, with over 1,400 UK airstrikes cumulatively conducted against ISIS targets in and since 2014. However, bilateral UK- security cooperation endured into 2025, prioritizing counter-terrorism advisory roles to address residual Daesh threats without fixed combat deployments. As of early 2025, operations emphasized disruption of ISIS resurgence risks, leveraging to target financing and logistics amid governance challenges in former ISIS-held areas.

Operations in Syria

The parliamentary debates preceding the extension of Operation Shader to Syria intensified following the ISIS-claimed coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, which resulted in 130 deaths and demonstrated the group's ability to orchestrate mass-casualty operations from its strongholds in eastern Syria. UK government statements emphasized ISIS's transnational threat, including the involvement of approximately 700 British nationals in the group and plots against UK targets, arguing that Syrian territory served as a sanctuary enabling such attacks despite Iraqi invitations for coalition support. These discussions contrasted the consensual legal framework in Iraq—where the government explicitly requested assistance—with Syria's fragmented sovereignty, where the Assad regime controlled limited areas and failed to counter ISIS effectively, creating ungoverned spaces exploited by the militants. On 2 December 2015, the approved a government motion authorizing airstrikes against in by a vote of 397 to 223, following a ten-hour that highlighted the operation's necessity to prevent from using as a base for further attacks on the and allies. The motion explicitly confined military action to targeting infrastructure and fighters, with no objectives related to overthrowing the Assad regime, distinguishing it from prior s in 2013 that rejected intervention against Syrian government forces. The government's legal rationale invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter for collective self-defence, positing that ISIS's cross-border attacks from justified action in support of Iraq's , even absent formal consent from , as the Assad regime was considered unwilling or unable to address the threat. Individual self-defence was also cited, given ISIS's on the and its demonstrated intent and capability to strike British interests, as evidenced by plots involving returning foreign fighters. UN Security Council Resolution 2249, adopted unanimously on 20 November 2015, condemned ISIS and called for states to take "all necessary measures" against its threats but stopped short of authorizing force, leaving room for interpretive debate on its binding nature. Critics, including some legal scholars and opposition MPs, contended that the absence of Syrian government invitation or explicit UN mandate undermined the action's lawfulness under international norms, though the government maintained that the terrorist threat's immediacy overrode such requirements.

Airstrikes Targeting ISIS Strongholds

The Royal Air Force initiated airstrikes against strongholds in on 3 December 2015, shortly after parliamentary authorization, with Tornado GR4 aircraft striking six targets at an ISIS-controlled oilfield in eastern Syria to sever revenue streams from illicit production. These initial precision attacks employed guided bombs, focusing on infrastructure critical to ISIS logistics and finances without reported . Subsequent RAF operations targeted command nodes, training camps, and weapon storage sites in key strongholds like , the ISIS capital, contributing to the degradation of its operational capacity through repeated strikes assessed via battle damage imagery. By mid-2016, RAF Reapers and Tornados had conducted dozens of such missions, expending over 500 munitions in alone in the first year, correlating with observed ISIS territorial contractions and disrupted command structures as reported in assessments. In 2019, Typhoon FGR4 jets progressively supplanted the retiring Tornado fleet, introducing enhanced Brimstone missile capabilities for standoff precision strikes against mobile ISIS elements in stronghold peripheries, maintaining operational tempo amid evolving threats. Throughout, RAF aircraft integrated with U.S.-led coalition assets via real-time data links and airspace deconfliction protocols to mitigate risks in Syria's contested airspace, where multiple actors operated, ensuring strikes aligned with verified intelligence on high-value ISIS infrastructure. This coordination facilitated over 2,000 RAF sorties in Syria by 2020, with munitions releases directly linked to ISIS command disruptions per UK Ministry of Defence evaluations.

Advisory Support to Ground Partners

United Kingdom special forces conducted small-scale advisory operations in from 2015 onward as part of Operation Shader, embedding with coalition partners to provide non-combat training to local ground forces combating , including elements aligned with the (SDF). These efforts emphasized practical skills such as maneuvers and (IED) detection and neutralization, enabling proxies to conduct effective operations without direct British combat involvement. This advisory role supported SDF-led encirclement strategies that isolated positions, contributing to measurable territorial advances, such as the constriction of control in northeastern between 2015 and 2017, while adhering to rules prohibiting UK conventional troops on Syrian soil due to sovereignty constraints absent in . Unlike the larger-scale training missions for , Syrian advisories relied on elite, rotational deployments to minimize footprint and risk, reflecting a deliberate proxy-centric model informed by legal debates over intervention without Assad regime consent. Empirical evidence of impact includes SDF reports of enhanced tactical proficiency correlating with reduced ISIS breakout attempts during sieges, though attribution to specific UK inputs remains operationally sensitive and unclassified details sparse, underscoring the classified nature of special forces contributions.

Operations in Raqqa and Baghouz

The Raqqa campaign, launched by the in June 2017, saw RAF Typhoon FGR4s, Tornado GR4s, and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft deliver precision strikes against fortifications within the city's urban core. These targeted tunnels, sniper nests, command-and-control nodes, and armored vehicles that employed to defend its self-proclaimed capital, supporting SDF advances amid intense house-to-house fighting. By September 2017, ongoing RAF operations from bases including had struck Daesh positions across and adjacent areas like Dayr az Zawr, degrading defensive capabilities that relied on improvised explosive devices and entrenched fighters. In the final phase of the campaign through October 2017, coalition airpower, including UK contributions under Operation Shader, neutralized over 2,000 targets in province, with RAF assets focusing on dynamic threats such as counterattacks and logistics routes. This enabled the SDF to isolate and overrun the last holdouts, culminating in the city's capture on October 17, 2017, after had fortified it with extensive networks and booby-trapped structures. Without such aerial , ground forces would have faced prolonged attrition from these defenses, as evidenced by pre-air campaign stalemates in similar urban battles. The Battle of Baghouz in February–March 2019 marked the climactic assault on 's remaining territorial enclave in eastern , where RAF patrols integrated into coalition efforts struck final pockets of resistance, including weapon caches and fleeing convoys along the . These operations supported SDF encirclement tactics, leading to the surrender of approximately 30,000 fighters, families, and supporters by March 23, 2019, and the elimination of key leaders embedded in the shrinking holdout. Typhoons and Reapers conducted armed reconnaissance over during this period, confirming strikes on Daesh remnants that accelerated the collapse of organized resistance. Precision airstrikes in both and Baghouz exemplified airpower's causal role in compressing operational timelines: coalition data indicate that integrated air-ground maneuvers destroyed fortified positions and mobility assets, averting scenarios where SDF casualties could have escalated due to unaided assaults on urban kill zones. Analyses of the campaigns show that air-delivered effects reduced ISIS's effective fighting strength by targeting enablers like heavy machine guns and VBIEDs, enabling partner forces to achieve decisive gains in weeks rather than months, as ground-only advances would have succumbed to defensive depth and manpower shortages. This dynamic held despite ISIS's adaptive tactics, underscoring empirical advantages of standoff precision over attrition-based warfare.

Ongoing Counter-Daesh Patrols (Post-2019)

aircraft have sustained armed reconnaissance patrols over since the 2019 territorial defeat of the Daesh , focusing on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to detect and neutralize residual insurgent threats. MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft played a central role in these missions until their retirement on October 3, 2025, after accumulating over 173,000 flight hours across operations including . These platforms identified Daesh operatives for targeted strikes, such as Hellfire missile engagements against confirmed terrorists during routine patrols. In response to Daesh's shift to an adaptive , patrols emphasized monitoring potential transit routes and operative movements to preempt attacks and disrupt networks. By 2023–2024, amid reports of rising Daesh attacks—on pace to double from prior years—RAF FGR4s conducted regular patrols over , often in coordination with partners, enabling occasional precision responses to resurgence indicators. Sortie rates remained low, with monthly updates indicating routine ISR dominance over kinetic actions, signaling effective containment of threats without large-scale engagements. These efforts aligned with the Global 's phased drawdown post-caliphate, yet persisted into 2025 for proactive threat neutralization, even as Daesh exploited regional instability following the Assad regime's 2024 collapse. UK contributions underscored a commitment to preventing reconstitution, with manned assets assuming Reaper roles to maintain coverage against dispersed cells and camps.

Operations in Libya

Targeted Strikes Against ISIS Affiliates

UK military involvement in Libya under Operation Shader represented a peripheral effort to contain ISIS affiliates who exploited post-2011 instability to establish a stronghold in by early 2015, declaring it a wilayat (province) and attracting foreign fighters. The 's approach emphasized intelligence-driven interventions over extensive combat, providing and via assets like the RC-135 Rivet Joint to identify high-value targets such as training camps and command nodes, while avoiding broad entanglement in Libya's . This support complemented US-led airstrikes under Operation Odyssey Lightning, which targeted ISIS positions in at the GNA's request starting August 2016. UK special forces executed targeted disruptions, including electronic warfare operations to cripple communications and planning in the Sirte region during 2016. Confirmed kinetic sorties by RAF assets remained under ten, prioritizing precision against exported threats like plots to export fighters or attacks beyond Libya. As Libyan GNA-aligned forces, bolstered by international air support, expelled from by December 2016 and dispersed remnants into desert areas, the immediate urban threat subsided. UK operations ceased around 2019, reflecting 's fragmentation and a strategic pivot away from Libya's quagmire toward core counter- efforts elsewhere.

Limited Scope and Cessation

The United Kingdom's military involvement against ISIS in Libya under Operation Shader was confined to small-scale special forces operations, primarily involving SAS teams providing tactical support to Libyan militias battling ISIS in Sirte, without the sustained aerial campaigns or ground training missions deployed in Iraq and Syria. This approach reflected a deliberate strategic choice to prioritize resources against ISIS's core caliphate in the Middle East, where territorial control directly threatened regional stability and UK interests, over expansive commitments in Libya's fragmented political landscape lacking a reliable national partner. Unlike the multi-year advisory roles with Iraqi Security Forces, UK efforts in Libya avoided establishing permanent training elements, limiting exposure to the risks of indefinite entanglement amid competing militias and governance vacuum post-2011 intervention. Empirical indicators underscored the operation's minimal footprint: deployments involved targeted actions, such as SAS personnel destroying an suicide truck with a guided on May 25, 2016, and employing remote systems during engagements in , correlating with 's progressive loss of coastal strongholds without requiring broader resource allocation. By December 2016, Libyan forces, bolstered by international support including , expelled from —its primary Libyan bastion—reducing the group's capacity to project power from Mediterranean enclaves and justifying operational drawdown. This cessation aligned with the achievement of immediate disruption objectives, as fighters dispersed into desert redoubts rather than consolidating territorial gains, obviating the need for prolonged presence. The Libya experience highlighted lessons in constraining scope to avert in unstable environments, where overextension could mirror the 2011 campaign's unintended consequences of prolonged chaos without commensurate strategic returns. policymakers emphasized non-nation-building tactics, focusing on kinetic disruptions to degrade logistics and recruitment hubs while deferring stabilization to local actors, a contrast to the embedded advisory model in the that risked deeper involvement amid civil war dynamics. This prioritization preserved operational bandwidth for high- theaters, underscoring causal linkages between limited commitments and efficient absent viable ground partners.

Deployed Forces and Assets

Royal Air Force Airpower

The provided the primary airpower for Operation Shader, conducting armed reconnaissance, precision strikes, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions against ISIS targets across , , and . Operating from in as the main forward hub, RAF assets enabled sustained operations with quick turnaround times for sorties lasting up to eight hours. Initial strike capabilities relied on Tornado GR4 aircraft, armed with laser-guided bombs and Brimstone missiles, which conducted the first Syrian airstrikes in December 2015 targeting oil infrastructure. Following the Tornado's retirement in 2019, FGR4 squadrons assumed sole responsibility for fast-jet operations, maintaining daily missions with enhanced multi-role versatility. MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft complemented manned platforms by delivering persistent surveillance and precision strikes using Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 bombs. By October 2016, RAF aircrews had flown over 3,000 armed sorties, releasing munitions including more than 1,000 Brimstone missiles valued at £18.7 million. Continued deployments through the , supported by advanced targeting systems such as the LITENING pod for positive target identification, ensured high accuracy in dynamic environments, with operations adapting to post-caliphate threats like counter-drone patrols. Air-to-air refueling via Voyager tankers extended sortie endurance, while integration with Poseidon P-8 enhanced regional awareness in Libya-related efforts.

Royal Navy Maritime Contributions

The 's maritime contributions to Operation Shader primarily involved providing expeditionary platforms, air defence capabilities, and persistent regional presence to enable operations against Daesh in , , and affiliated areas. Deployments focused on the Mediterranean and , offering logistical support, force protection, and deterrence without direct surface engagements with ISIS naval assets, which were negligible. These efforts complemented air and ground components by securing and projecting power from offshore bases. In 2021, HMS Queen Elizabeth spearheaded the UK's deployment to the , marking the first operational use of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers in combat. On 22 June 2021, F-35B Lightning II jets embarked on the carrier executed initial strikes against Daesh targets as part of Operation Shader, relieving pressure on land-based RAF assets and demonstrating integrated carrier-enabled airpower. This deployment, announced on 3 May 2021, involved up to eight UK F-35Bs alongside allied aircraft, conducting armed reconnaissance and precision strikes in support of ground partners until the group's transit through the region. The carrier's role underscored its function as a mobile sovereign base, capable of sustaining high-tempo operations without reliance on foreign airfields. Type 45 Daring-class destroyers provided critical air defence and escort duties, particularly in the . HMS Defender, for instance, operated from October to December 2014 and again from December 2015 to July 2016, serving as an air warfare guard for Carrier Strike Group 1, including escorting USS George H.W. Bush during anti-Daesh missions. Equipped with the (Principal Anti-Air Missile System) and radar, these vessels intercepted potential aerial threats, enforced no-fly zones indirectly through radar coverage, and contributed to maritime amid regional tensions exacerbated by activities. Such deployments enhanced coalition and deterred Iranian proxy interference in Gulf shipping lanes vital for Iraqi logistics. The Royal maintained a continuous Gulf presence through , overlapping with Shader since 2014, to deter Daesh affiliates and secure oil transit routes against spillover threats. Type 23 frigates and support vessels rotated through Bahrain's UK Naval Support Facility, conducting patrols, boarding operations, and intelligence sharing that indirectly supported Shader by stabilizing the maritime domain for and coalition resupply. This forward presence, involving assets like HMS Montrose alongside destroyers, extended beyond direct ISIS targeting to counter broader instability, including Houthi disruptions, ensuring operational freedom for air and advisory missions. By 2024, this commitment included routine deployments of frigates and minehunters, sustaining 's regional deterrence posture.

British Army Ground and Training Elements

The 's primary contribution to Operation Shader involved advisory and training roles embedded within the US-led Global Coalition to build the capacity of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, with deployments concentrated in and limited advisory presence in to avoid direct combat exposure. Up to approximately 400-500 personnel served as trainers at sites such as , focusing on practical skills including marksmanship on purpose-built ranges, (IED) identification and defeat, patrolling techniques, and basic logistics to enable partner forces to conduct independent operations against Daesh remnants. These efforts trained over 120,000 Iraqi and Kurdish personnel since 2014, with a shift toward mentoring local instructors for , culminating in the handover of to Iraqi control in July 2020. In Syria, Army involvement remained minimal and non-combat, consisting of small-scale advisory support to vetted partner groups without establishing permanent training bases, prioritizing scalable partnerships over expansive ground commitments. UK Special Forces elements contributed targeting intelligence and liaison for precision strikes, operating in advisory capacities to gather and relay data on Daesh positions while adhering to rules of engagement that precluded direct kinetic engagement. To maintain operational tempo without escalating troop numbers, the employed rotation systems drawing from regular units and reserves, deploying specialist teams on six-month cycles to deliver expertise in and sustainment while minimizing long-term footprint and exposure risks. This approach aligned with broader coalition strategy, emphasizing partner enablement over unilateral ground maneuvers, and continued post-caliphate territorial defeat through persistent advisory embeds as of 2020.

Tri-Service Logistics and Intelligence

The Royal Air Force's Voyager aircraft provided critical air-to-air refuelling support throughout Operation Shader, enabling extended operational ranges for and fighters conducting strikes against targets in and . This capability allowed for increased durations and reduced reliance on forward basing, with Voyagers routinely offloading fuel to coalition partners as well, enhancing overall mission persistence from bases like in . Intelligence gathering was bolstered by the RC-135W Rivet Joint platform, which debuted operationally in June 2014 to intercept communications and electronic signals, providing real-time (SIGINT) that informed targeting decisions and disrupted enemy command structures. Rivet Joint missions, flown from RAF bases and integrated with tri-service assets, contributed to the identification of high-value targets by fusing SIGINT with other intelligence feeds, thereby improving strike accuracy and operational tempo. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) from the and embedded with partner ground forces, such as Kurdish Peshmerga and , to coordinate from RAF aircraft in real time. These controllers, qualified across services, directed precision strikes while minimizing risks to friendly forces, leveraging secure communications and designation to bridge the gap between ground maneuvers and aerial assets. Strategic airlift via RAF C-17 Globemaster III aircraft sustained supply chains by transporting munitions, spare parts, and personnel directly to theatre, reducing dependence on host-nation infrastructure and enabling rapid resupply amid contested logistics routes. This joint enabler supported sustained operations without overburdening regional partners, with C-17s facilitating the delivery of essential freight for air, land, and maritime elements throughout the campaign.

Strategic Effectiveness and Outcomes

Territorial Defeat of ISIS Caliphate


Operation Shader contributed to the territorial collapse of the by March 2019 through airstrikes that supported local ground partners in reclaiming the entirety of approximately 110,000 square kilometers previously under control across and . UK forces targeted defensive positions and supply lines, enabling advances by Iraqi, Kurdish, and that methodically reduced the caliphate's holdings from urban centers like and outward. This attrition-based approach reversed 's territorial momentum, which had seen rapid conquests of over 100,000 square kilometers in 2014 prior to the coalition air campaign's initiation.
Airstrikes under Operation Shader degraded command and control by striking operational hubs and leadership elements, disrupting the group's ability to coordinate defenses against encroaching ground forces. Concurrent targeting of administrative and financial , such as oil facilities funding governance, undermined the caliphate's pseudo-state functions, including taxation, dissemination, and mechanisms that sustained its territorial viability. These efforts eroded 's appeal as a functional entity capable of providing services and , fostering defections and local resistance that accelerated territorial losses. The causal link between sustained air-enabled attrition and ISIS's defeat is evident in the shift from expansion to contraction: unchecked prior to September 2014, the caliphate's domain shrank progressively under coalition pressure, validating intervention's role in halting and reversing gains through superior firepower supporting ground reclamation without large-scale Western boots on the ground.

Quantitative Metrics: Strikes, Kills, and Disruptions

The Royal Air Force, as part of Operation Shader, conducted over 10,000 sorties against targets in and by September 2024, striking more than 1,700 locations and releasing thousands of precision-guided munitions, including bombs and Brimstone missiles from platforms such as , , and drones. These operations emphasized high-precision targeting to minimize , with the contributing disproportionately to the coalition's efforts relative to its fleet size—often accounting for 10-15% of total strikes despite operating fewer aircraft than the . Confirmed kills of fighters from strikes are not aggregated in public releases, as officials cite risks of aiding enemy propaganda assessments; however, individual post-strike battle damage assessments verified hundreds of enemy (EKIA) across reported engagements, such as strikes eliminating groups of up to 12 fighters in cave complexes in 2020. Coalition-wide, US-led operations attributed over combatant deaths to air campaigns by 2019, with precision strikes—prioritizing dynamic targeting of mobile fighters—playing a key role in degrading frontline capabilities and supporting ground advances by Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Disruptions extended to ISIS economic and command structures: UK strikes, including early Tornado raids on oil tanker convoys and refineries in 2014-2015, contributed to coalition efforts that slashed ISIS oil revenues from a peak of $1-3 million daily to under $1 million by mid-2016, denying the group an estimated $800 million or more in potential income over the campaign. Reaper drone operations further targeted high-value individuals, such as the 2015 strike killing British ISIS propagandist and associate Reyaad Khan, which hampered and by removing key figures in external attack plotting. These actions collectively stifled ISIS sustainment, with post-operation analyses crediting air-delivered disruptions for accelerating territorial losses without verifiable overstatement from official sources.

Broader Counter-Terrorism Impacts

Operation Shader, as the UK's contribution to the Global to Defeat , contributed to the degradation of 's core capabilities in and , which empirically reduced the group's capacity to orchestrate or inspire large-scale attacks abroad. Following the territorial losses inflicted by coalition airstrikes and ground operations from 2017 onward, global ISIS-claimed terrorist attacks declined compared to 2016 peaks, with fewer incidents attributed to the group by 2017 as its command structures fragmented. In the UK, this overseas pressure complemented domestic efforts, correlating with a shift from directed plots to lower-capability inspired incidents post-2017, as evidenced by MI5's foiling of nine Islamist plots in the year to December 2017 amid the caliphate's collapse. The loss of 's proto-state apparatus diminished its propaganda reach and operational direction, limiting the scale of threats to despite persistent lone-actor risks. The coalition's model, bolstered by UK's precision strikes under , set a for coordinated international responses to non-state actors, deterring affiliates by imposing sustained costs on expansion attempts in regions like and . Affiliates faced replicated pressures through shared intelligence and targeted operations, reducing their territorial ambitions and recruitment efficacy globally. This multilateral framework demonstrated that hybrid threats could be contained without full-scale invasions, influencing subsequent coalitions against groups like al-Shabaab. As of mid-2025, 's persistent operations under framework continued to target remnants in and via drone strikes, preventing resurgence and maintaining deterrence against low-level threats. These actions, integrated with partners, have hindered 's ability to rebuild networks capable of exporting , ensuring ongoing preventive efficacy against homeland plots.

Controversies and Criticisms

Civilian Casualty Allegations and Investigations

Allegations of civilian casualties from UK airstrikes under Operation Shader have been limited compared to the overall scale of operations, with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) reporting receipt of fewer than 10 credible claims since 2014, all of which were investigated. The MoD has acknowledged responsibility for just one verified civilian death, stemming from a 2015 strike near Manbij, Syria, following a detailed post-strike review that confirmed unintended harm despite initial assessments. In contrast, the broader US-led Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) has fielded over 1,000 civilian casualty reports across coalition actions since 2014, conducting formal investigations into many, with assessments attributing at least 1,437 unintentional civilian deaths coalition-wide by 2022. Independent monitoring groups, such as Airwars, have alleged higher UK-attributable incidents, estimating up to 29 civilian deaths from RAF strikes between 2016 and 2017, particularly in , based on local reports and cross-referenced data from multiple sources. These claims often rely on unverified eyewitness accounts amid chaotic urban fighting, where deliberately embedded military assets in civilian areas, complicating attribution and verification; Airwars itself notes challenges in distinguishing coalition actions from those of local forces or infighting. The MoD maintains that exhaustive reviews, including and battle damage assessments, found no evidence of civilian harm in the disputed cases, emphasizing rigorous pre-strike targeting protocols compliant with . ISIS frequently exploited alleged coalition strikes for , amplifying unverified claims of civilian deaths to undermine coalition legitimacy, while independently verified reports highlight ISIS's systematic use of human shields—positioning fighters, weapons, and command posts amid populated zones in cities like and . investigations confirmed ISIS's tactics increased civilian risks, with fighters holding civilians in buildings targeted for strikes, yet noted that while coalition actions contributed to some harm, ISIS bore primary responsibility for endangering non-combatants through refusal to allow evacuation and direct attacks on fleeing populations. observers corroborated this, documenting ISIS's intensification of human shielding during the 2017 Mosul offensive, which led to mass casualty events often misattributed solely to airstrikes. To mitigate risks, RAF operations incorporated mandatory legal reviews by trained advisors for each strike, alongside advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets like drones and manned aircraft for real-time monitoring, enabling precision-guided munitions that minimized relative to the operational environment's density. These measures aligned with CJTF-OIR standards, which prioritized feasible precautions under the laws of armed conflict, though critics from groups argue for more transparent post-incident mechanisms; nonetheless, strike accuracy rates exceeded those of prior conflicts like the 1999 Kosovo campaign, per MoD analyses of enemy-to-civilian casualty ratios.

Debates on Strategic Necessity and Proportionality

The parliamentary debate preceding the UK's extension of airstrikes to on December 2, 2015, highlighted divisions over Operation Shader's strategic necessity, with proponents arguing that ISIS's territorial posed an imminent threat to British security through exported terrorism. Prime Minister asserted that ISIS had plotted attacks against the UK, including foiled operations, and that failing to act in —where ISIS operated without borders—would allow the group to grow unchecked, directly endangering British citizens and interests. This view emphasized causal links: ISIS's pre-2014 expansion, including the capture of in June 2014 and control over 40% of Iraqi territory by August 2014, demonstrated its capacity for rapid growth fueled by oil revenues exceeding $1 million daily and recruitment of over 30,000 foreign fighters, enabling external operations like the that killed 130. Opponents, led by Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, contended that airstrikes lacked strategic necessity, arguing they would perpetuate a without addressing root causes like the and could provoke backlash in Europe. Corbyn highlighted the absence of a comprehensive ground strategy or diplomatic framework, noting ISIS's rejection of negotiations but insisting on prioritizing refugee support, arms embargoes, and political settlements over military escalation, which he claimed had failed to degrade ISIS meaningfully in despite over a year of operations. Critics also raised proportionality concerns, questioning whether targeted air campaigns—lacking UK boots on the ground—matched the threat's scale or risked sovereignty erosions in , where the Assad regime had not formally invited coalition strikes, potentially violating international norms absent explicit UN Security Council authorization for force under Resolution 2249. Right-leaning perspectives, echoed in analyses, framed military intervention as essential against an inherently hostile to Western values, rejecting isolationist withdrawal as it would cede initiative to jihadists who view as weakness; ISIS's declaration of a global in June 2014 and systematic executions underscored this rejectionism, rendering non-kinetic options illusory. Left-leaning critiques overstated diplomatic feasibility, given ISIS's ideological commitment to expansion, but highlighted potential long-term blowback from perceived Western overreach. Post-hoc assessments validate necessity through the caliphate's territorial defeat by March 2019, stabilizing regions like northern and reducing ISIS's capacity for large-scale external plots against the , contrasting hypothetical non-intervention scenarios where unchecked growth—evidenced by 2013-2014 gains—might have amplified threats akin to al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 trajectory. Proportionality held in strategic terms, as 's air-centric role (over 1,700 strikes by 2018) aligned with efforts without committing disproportionate ground forces, yielding disruptions to ISIS command while minimizing casualties.

Claims of Ineffectiveness or

Critics, including advocacy groups like Drone Wars , have argued that the prolongation of Operation Shader beyond the March 2019 territorial defeat of the ISIS caliphate demonstrates ineffectiveness, citing a lack of clear strategic gains against root causes of and an estimated £2.6 billion expenditure from to 2023 with relative to evolving homeland threats. These claims portray ongoing air and advisory operations as an undefined "forever war," potentially provoking regional instability without measurable progress toward full threat elimination. Such assessments overlook the operation's adherence to a delimited mandate centered on degradation, distinct from broader or regime-change pursuits seen in prior interventions like the 2003 Iraq invasion. UK contributions, including over 1,000 airstrikes and partner training that enabled Iraqi and Kurdish forces to reclaim territory, directly supported the caliphate's collapse by without expanding to topple the Assad regime in or alter 's government structure. Post-defeat persistence reflects adaptive response to substantiated resurgence risks, as U.S. and intelligence reports document 's evolution into decentralized networks, with over 10,000 fighters in Syrian Democratic Forces detention facilities and coordinated attacks in rising from 1,600 in to higher levels by 2024. Evidence counters ineffectiveness narratives through verifiable disruptions: Reaper and Typhoon strikes eliminated specific ISIS operatives, such as a motorcycle-mounted terrorist in Sarmada, , on 10 June 2025, and multiple targets in 's Anbar province on 25 February 2025, maintaining pressure on cells capable of external plotting. Unlike open-ended occupations lacking exit criteria, Shader's framework ties drawdown to sustained ISIS incapacity, with recent announcements signaling a phased transition to bilateral Iraqi capacity-building by 2025, informed by threat assessments rather than indefinite engagement. Premature withdrawal risks, as modeled in analyses of post-2011 Iraq vacuums that enabled ISIS's initial rise, underscore the realism of targeted continuity over critics' calls for cessation amid documented plots from residual networks.

Reactions and Perspectives

Domestic UK Political and Public Views

The UK Parliament demonstrated cross-party consensus in authorizing Operation Shader's initial phase against ISIS in Iraq on 26 September 2014, approving airstrikes by a margin of 524 votes to 43, with support from the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, Labour leadership, and Liberal Democrats emphasizing the existential threat posed by ISIS territorial gains and attacks on minorities. Extension to Syria followed on 2 December 2015, with MPs voting 397 to 223 in favor shortly after the 13 November Paris attacks by ISIS affiliates, which heightened perceptions of direct risks to British interests including returning foreign fighters and foiled domestic plots. The Conservative-led government under David Cameron framed the action as essential for degrading ISIS capabilities and preventing safe havens for UK-targeted terrorism, maintaining operational commitment through subsequent administrations despite shifts in Middle East dynamics. Labour Party responses revealed internal divisions, as leader opposed Syrian airstrikes citing risks of escalation and civilian harm, prompting threats of shadow cabinet resignations and ultimately 66 Labour MPs defying the to support the motion, while highlighting party splits between interventionist centrists and anti-war factions. Conservatives, conversely, underscored resolute defense of , with minimal internal dissent, positioning the operation as a proportionate response to ISIS's beheadings of Western hostages and declared ambitions threatening . Public opinion polls reflected shifting support favoring military engagement, with a survey on 25 November 2015 showing 55% backing RAF airstrikes in against 28% opposition, bolstered by post-Paris attack sentiment viewing as an imminent threat warranting coalition action over . Veteran accounts and defense media outlets praised the RAF's operational professionalism, citing precise targeting that minimized errors amid high-threat environments, though pacifist critiques from groups like emphasized moral hazards of aerial campaigns without ground commitments, a stance marginalized by of 's disrupted UK-bound attacks and territorial losses. Overall, security-driven rationales prevailed in discourse, with sustained polling majorities endorsing the operation's contributions to counter-terrorism stability through 2017 territorial defeats.

International Coalition Partners

The UK's Operation Shader operated within the framework of , the US-led multinational effort involving more than 80 partner nations and organizations aimed at defeating ISIS territorially and disrupting its networks in and . British forces integrated closely with coalition commands, particularly through the Combined Joint Task Force, where shared operational data and deconfliction protocols enabled synchronized airstrikes and reconnaissance missions. This coordination leveraged UK's advanced surveillance capabilities, such as drones, to provide actionable intelligence that supported partner nations' strikes across theater boundaries. US commanders have recognized the UK's consistent operational tempo as a cornerstone of reliability, with the Royal Air Force contributing over 1,500 confirmed airstrikes by mid-2018 alongside thousands of additional sorties for , , and . Effective partnerships with extended to tactical refueling and joint patrols; for example, on August 19, 2025, an RAF Voyager aircraft refueled French Rafale fighters conducting missions against ISIS remnants, enhancing endurance for precision operations without territorial overlap. Coordination with , via its , involved reciprocal feeds that facilitated disruptions of ISIS financing networks spanning multiple countries, demonstrating multiplied impact from allied with minimal reported command frictions. These synergies extended implications for NATO's burden-sharing dynamics, as UK's expeditionary commitments in Inherent Resolve—independent of formal Article 5 invocation—highlighted European allies' capacity to distribute loads in non-European theaters, fostering standards applicable to future collective defense scenarios. Joint exercises and data-sharing protocols developed during the campaign reinforced resilience, with UK's role underscoring equitable contributions amid varying national capabilities.

ISIS and Adversary Propaganda Responses

ISIS propaganda units, such as Al-Hayat Media Center, produced videos and statements portraying British airstrikes under Operation Shader as ineffective and retaliatory targets for jihadists, often claiming tactical successes like downing drones or inflicting losses on RAF assets despite verifiable retreats from key positions. In response to the RAF's inaugural drone strike in Syria on August 21, 2015, which eliminated British ISIS operative Reyaad Khan—a figure in prior recruitment footage—ISIS outlets issued calls for vengeance against UK personnel and civilians, framing the action as justification for homefront attacks. These narratives extended to Dabiq magazine issues from 2015 onward, where editorials exhorted supporters to strike "crusader" nations like Britain for their role in the aerial campaign, correlating with heightened incitement amid intensified plots against British targets. To counter perceived coalition advances, ISIS exploited allegations of civilian casualties from airstrikes, including RAF operations, by disseminating footage and claims of indiscriminate bombings in urban areas like Raqqa, positioning these as evidence of a broader war on Muslims to fuel recruitment and radicalization. During the 2017 battle for Raqqa—ISIS's de facto capital—propaganda videos depicted fighters achieving local victories and heavy coalition losses, while attributing civilian deaths to British and allied strikes to portray the group as defenders of the faith, though independent assessments confirmed ISIS's use of human shields amplified such incidents. These efforts aimed to sustain morale and inflows, yet recruitment metrics showed a post-2015 decline, with foreign fighter arrivals peaking earlier and tapering as battlefield realities contradicted invincibility claims. Despite these countermeasures, propaganda proved empirically undermined by cascading territorial defeats, including the loss of on October 17, 2017, which exposed retreats and defections incompatible with narratives of expansionist triumph. Output from official channels plummeted—weekly video releases dropped over 70% by late 2017—as territorial contraction from 40% of and a third of at peak to near-zero eroded credibility, prompting shifts toward martyrdom glorification over governance successes and accelerating internal disillusionment. This failure manifested in reduced global resonance, with propaganda's recruitment efficacy halved by 2018 amid verifiable collapses in held areas.

Personnel and Legacy

British Casualties and Operational Losses

As of 28 February 2025, seven armed forces personnel had died in connection with Operation Shader, with four deaths occurring in and three at in . Of these, one fatality resulted from hostile action: a British killed by Iranian-backed rocket fire at , , on 11 March 2020, marking the operation's sole confirmed combat death. The other six deaths stemmed from non-combat incidents, including training accidents, natural causes, and operational mishaps such as vehicle collisions or medical events. Non-fatal casualties remained low relative to the operation's scale, which involved sustained air campaigns and ground advisory roles in contested environments. As of 31 March 2023, three personnel had sustained battle injuries, primarily from or small-arms incidents during training or base defense. Broader operational injuries, such as those from training exercises or environmental hazards like in , numbered in the dozens annually but were mitigated through robust protocols and measures. No RAF fixed-wing aircraft or drones were lost to enemy action during the operation's air strikes, which exceeded 10,000 sorties by 2020 with a safety record underscoring advanced standoff capabilities and minimal exposure to ground threats. Rare mechanical incidents, such as engine issues on Typhoon jets, were resolved without hull losses or personnel harm, reflecting high maintenance standards and redundancy in coalition basing. This asymmetry—near-zero UK fatalities from direct combat against thousands of adversary losses—highlights the operation's reliance on precision air power and partner forces to absorb ground risks, enabling UK involvement with historically low human costs compared to prior interventions like Iraq 2003.

Awards, Medals, and Recognition

The Operational Service Medal (OSM) Iraq and Syria, also known as the Operation Shader Medal, serves as the principal for British personnel involved in the operation against Daesh (ISIS). Instituted in 2017 and retroactively applicable from 1 January 2014, it is awarded to members of the UK Armed Forces, including , , and personnel, who complete qualifying operational service in or over the landmass of and , or in the airspace above those nations. Eligibility requires 30 days of continuous service or 45 days cumulative in the designated area, with qualifying via 10 sorties over or 6 over ; the medal features an "Iraq and Syria" clasp for direct theatre service. In 2018, eligibility criteria were expanded to include non-deployed contributors outside the conventional operational theatre, such as RAF Reaper remotely piloted aircraft crews operating from bases like or , recognizing their role in precision strikes and intelligence gathering despite physical distance from the . This adjustment, approved by Queen Elizabeth II, marked the first operational created since 2003 and the first to formally honor remote warfare contributions, with initial presentations made to 36 service members in July 2018. By August 2019, 56 medals had been awarded to RAF Reaper Force personnel from Nos. 39 and 54 Squadrons, including joint service recipients from the Royal Navy and . Individual gallantry and commendations under Operation Shader are processed through the standard honours system, including mentions in dispatches for acts of bravery or meritorious service during airstrikes and ground support missions, though specific tallies remain aggregated within broader operational honours lists published in The Gazette. The medal's distinct —striped in grey, , dark , and —symbolizes the multifaceted nature of the campaign, from aerial operations to drops. On 9 August 2025, marking the 11th anniversary of sustained efforts, official commemorations highlighted the enduring valor of Shader participants in degrading Daesh capabilities through over a decade of precise engagements.

References

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