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Battle of Tabqa
Battle of Tabqa
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Battle of Tabqa
Part of the American-led intervention in Syria, the International military intervention against ISIL, the Raqqa campaign (2016–17), the Syrian Civil War, and the Rojava–Islamist conflict

Map of the operation to capture the Tabqa region
Date22 March – 10 May 2017
(1 month, 2 weeks and 4 days)
Location
Tabqa District, Raqqa Governorate, Syria
35°50′12″N 38°32′53″E / 35.8367°N 38.5481°E / 35.8367; 38.5481
Result Major SDF victory
Territorial
changes
  • The SDF gains a foothold south of the Euphrates
  • The SDF captures Tabqa Airbase, Tabqa city,[3] Tabqa Dam, and more than 8 villages[4]
Belligerents

Syrian Democratic Forces
Asayish[1]
International Freedom Battalion
CJTF–OIR

Iraqi Kurdistan		 Islamic State
Commanders and leaders
Rojda Felat[5]
Qandil Manbij[6]
Unidentified YPJ commander †[6]		 Islamic State Unidentified high-ranking ISIL commander (WIA) (POW)[6]
Islamic State Abu Umar al-Almani †[7]
Islamic State Abu Zubeyir †[8]
Units involved

United Kingdom British Armed Forces

Iraqi Kurdistan

Military of ISIL

Strength
SDF: 1,000–3,000 fighters[14]
United States US: 500 Special Forces[15]		 1,300–2,000[15][16]
Casualties and losses
100 killed (U.S. claim),[17]
66+ killed (various claims),[18] 300+ wounded[6]
370 killed and wounded (ISIL claim)[19]		 133–340 killed (SDF claim)[20]
7,000+ civilians displaced[21]
Map

The Battle of Tabqa was a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) military operation against the Islamic State (IS) to capture and secure the Tabqa Dam, Tabqa (al-Thawrah), Tabqa Airbase, and the surrounding countryside during the 2016–2017 Raqqa campaign of the larger Rojava-Islamist conflict of the Syrian civil war.[22][23] The SDF assault began on 22 March 2017,[15] and resulted in the capture of Tabqa and the Tabqa Dam on 10 May 2017. The SDF was supported by the United States-led CJTF–OIR coalition during the battle.[24]

Background

[edit]
See also: Battle of Tabqa Airbase
The Tabqa Dam in 2014

The Syrian Democratic Forces, seeking to capture Raqqa city from the Islamic State, positioned themselves around the city as part of the second phase of their regional campaign. However, as part of this, they encountered ISIL forces dug in around the Tabqa Dam, west of Raqqa. Because of the dam's fragility and strategic importance, the SDF could not immediately advance on the dam, and there were concerns it could break and cause flooding.[25][26] ISIL had previously threatened to open the floodgates if the dam was attacked, which would destroy many villages downstream.[27]

Initial assault

[edit]

In late January 2017, it was reported that a number of ISIL militants were hiding inside the structure of the Tabqa Dam with senior militant leaders–who used to be "very important prisoners" wanted by the US and several other countries–in order to deter a possible CJTF–OIR coalition strike on these targets.[citation needed]

As part of a series of probing attacks in January 2017, US special forces crossed the Euphrates in amphibious raids, including a raid by a combined SDF-U.S. special forces contingent on the Tabqa Dam and the nearby city of Tabqa (al-Thawrah).[citation needed] Following the raids, ISIL counterattacked the SDF positions, but the counterattacks were largely repelled.

The offensive

[edit]

Assault on Tabqa Dam and Tabqa Airbase

[edit]
SDF fighters near Tabqa Dam

On 22 March, the SDF began an assault to capture the Tabqa Dam, Tabqa (al-Thawrah) city, and the Tabqa Airbase. Five hundred SDF fighters[28] and additional US soldiers[14] of the CJTF–OIR were airlifted by US V-22 Osprey helicopters across the Euphrates river and Lake Assad[28] and were dropped on the Shurfa Peninsula to the west of Tabqa city. US air support assets and artillery units from the United States Marines supported the assault.[15][14][29][30] SDF and US forces also landed on the Jazirat al-'Ayd Island (or Peninsula) to the west of Tabqa Dam, capturing it as well.[31] The airlift of forces behind enemy lines was described by Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon as a large high-priority offensive and announced that the advance had cut off the highway linking the Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa Governorates. He added that around 75-80% of the attacking force consisted of Arab fighters, with the rest being Kurds in the YPG and the YPJ. Four towns were also seized as part of the landings and it was believed that the dam and general area were held by hundreds of ISIL fighters, many of them foreign fighters.[32] The SDF stated that the advance was also meant to block any advance on Raqqa by the Syrian Arab Army from the west.[33][34]

On 24 March, SDF spokeswoman Jihan Sheikh Ahmed announced that they had reached the Tabqa Dam and were fighting ISIL at its entrance.[35] The assault on the dam was spearheaded by SDF fighters who were supported by US special forces personnel. It was also reported that the SDF had captured eight villages to the southwest of Tabqa city.[4] ISIL's Amaq News Agency outlet meanwhile claimed the SDF had withdrawn from the dam. Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa claimed online that the SDF had captured the Tabqa Airbase; however, Al-Masdar News stated that the SDF's open room had stated that the claim was completely fabricated.[36]

A boat carrying SDF fighters across Lake Assad

On 26 March, the SDF captured two villages to the east of Tabqa. It was also reported that ISIL was shelling the surroundings of Tabqa Dam with heavy weaponry.[37][38] On the same day, ISIL claimed that Tabqa Dam was on the verge of collapse and that all the floodgates were closed. The dam was reported to have become inoperable, which ISIL claimed was due to US-led coalition bombing and artillery strikes, though the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) stated that the actual reasons were unknown, adding that ISIL still held its main building and turbines.[39][40] That day, US aircraft had dropped three 2,000 pound bombs against the towers attached to the dam, causing critical equipment to fail and the dam to stop functioning. One of the bombs failed to detonate. The dam almost failed as the floodgates were rendered inoperable, but an emergency ceasefire coordinated between the Islamic State, Syrian government, and the United States let engineers make emergency repairs before the dam collapsed, which could have potentially killed thousands of civilians.[41]

The SDF however denied that it had been hit, while the RBSS (Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently) group stated that ISIL was informing fleeing civilians that the dam was safe.[42] Additionally, the coalition stated that the Tabqa Dam was structurally sound, and that the dam had not been targeted by any airstrikes. They also stated that the SDF controlled an emergency spillway at the northern part of the dam, which could be used in the event of an emergency.[43] On the same day, SDF spokesman Talal Silo announced that the SDF had stormed the Tabqa military airport, and had taken 60-70% of it.[44] They later announced that they had completely captured the Tabqa Airbase, following a 24-hour battle.[3][45][46] ISIL fighters stationed at Tabqa Airbase were reported to have withdrawn northward to Tabqa city. Additionally, SDF forces captured two villages near the airbase during the advance.[45][47]

ISIL was reported to have reversed an earlier evacuation order in Raqqa, stating that the dam was safe and ordered civilians to remain in the city.[48][49] A day later, however, the SDF announced they were temporarily pausing their offensive for the dam.[50][51][52] Later in the day, a spokeswoman of the SDF announced that engineers who had been permitted to check the dam and its operations did not find it was damaged or malfunctioning.[53] On 28 March, ISIL deployed an additional 900 fighters to the Tabqa District in an attempt to stop the SDF advances.[16]

Besieging Tabqa city

[edit]
Toyota Hilux and other technicals of the YPG and YPJ near Tabqa

On 29 March, the SDF cut the road between Tabqa (al-Thawrah) city and Raqqa. The SDF stated that ISIL had shelled the Tabqa Dam during the day, causing repair work to be temporarily paused.[54][55] On 31 March, SDF forces attacked the town of al-Safsafah, located east of Tabqa, nearly besieging the city.[56]

The SDF and some activists stated on 2 April that it had repelled a major ISIL counterattack to the northeast of Tabqa city, near the Tabqa Dam, and near the Tabqa airbase. They also continued to advance in villages to the east of Tabqa city.[57] On the same day, it was reported that the SDF had completely besieged Tabqah city, with Kurdish activists stating that two SDF units linked up to the east of the city.[58][59] SOHR, however, stated that they were still trying to besiege the city.[60] SDF fighters continued battling for Safsafah and Ibad on the next day while attempting to fully encircle Tabqa.[61][62] Meanwhile, on 3 April, it was reported that ISIL was possibly in the process of moving its capital from Raqqa city to Mayadin, in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. This followed months of gradual relocation of resources and senior ISIL leaders from Raqqa to Mayadin.[63] The SDF entered and besieged Safsafah on 5 April, thus also besieging Tabqa city while claiming that it had also taken control of a major part of Safsafah.[64] The village was captured by the next day, resulting in the SDF completely encircling Tabqa city.[65][66]

The SDF captured Ibad village, located east of Safsafah, on 9 April, further expanding their control in the eastern countryside of Tabqa, while more than 25 ISIL fighters were killed in the clashes.[67][68] ISIL launched unsuccessful counterattacks on Safsafah,[69] while also attacking Tabqa airbase.[70] The SDF captured another village near Tabqa on the next day.[71]

On 11 April, the US-led coalition reported that the SDF had captured 60% of Tabqa Dam, and that they were "very close" to liberating it.[72][73] On 13 April, the US military stated that CJTF-OIR had bombed an SDF fighting position near Tabqa as it was misidentified as belonging to ISIL. It added that the airstrikes resulted in the deaths of 18 SDF fighters.[74]

Battle for Tabqa city

[edit]

On 15 April, the SDF advanced within "hundreds of metres" of Tabqa, and fighting reached two suburbs of the city. Later on the same day, the SDF entered the city from the east and the west, capturing the entire Alexandria suburb in the southern sector, bringing 15% of the city under SDF control.[75][76][77] On 17 April, the SDF advanced further, bringing 20% of Tabqa city under their control.[78] On the same day, it was announced that 200 fighters from the Manbij Military Council would participate in this part of the battle, resulting in a total of 350 personnel.[79][9] On 18 April, the SDF captured the ISIL radio station in the city.[80] In the following days, the SDF accelerated their operations in Tabqa and, by 22 April, managed to secure a quarter of the city.[81]

The SDF advanced in Tabqa city again on 30 April, claiming to have captured six more districts, while ISIL only controlled the northern part of the town near Tabqa dam.[82] SOHR stated that the SDF controlled at least 40% of the city by this time, including more than half of the Old City area.[83] Later on the same day, it was reported that the SDF had captured at least 60% of the city.[84] The next day the SDF stated that it had completely captured the Old City, leaving ISIL in control of only the newer areas of the town, alongside the dam. SOHR stated that the SDF controlled about 80% of the city.[85]

On 2 May, the SDF stated that it had captured about 90% of the city[86] amid reports of negotiations between Kurdish fighters and ISIL to allow the latter to withdraw from the remaining areas under its control.[87] By 3 May, the SDF had almost captured the entire city except for a small northern area and district near the dam.[88][89] ISIL also carried out more counterattacks in and near Tabqa.[88][90] It was later reported that a deal had been reached to allow remaining ISIL fighters to withdraw from the city as well as the dam.[89][91] The SDF and its commanders however denied any deal had been reached, adding that clashes were still ongoing against ISIL in a village near Tabqa and the three northern districts of the town, including some militants who were hiding among civilians.[92][93]

  • Refugees fleeing the clashes in Tabqa
    Refugees fleeing the clashes in Tabqa
  • An SDF fighter stands in a destroyed area of Tabqa
    An SDF fighter stands in a destroyed area of Tabqa
  • Anarchist IRPGF fighters ferrying supplies across Lake Assad
    Anarchist IRPGF fighters ferrying supplies across Lake Assad
  • IRPGF fighters inside Tabqa
    IRPGF fighters inside Tabqa

By 10 May, there were still two ISIL holdouts in the Tabqa area. On one side, 14 Chechen and French African ISIL fighters, members of an elite "ingimassayeen" unit, still held the control room, the floodgates, and a number of tunnels inside Tabqa Dam. Even though they were left without light or fresh air, as the SDF had shut down all electricity to the dam, and without means to communicate with their allies due to the coalition jamming their radio frequencies, these ISIL fighters had resisted attempts to clear them out for weeks. The second, bigger holdout was in northern Tabqa city, where around 50 ISIL militants still defended a number of highly fortified apartments. In the course of 10 May, however, this last resistance was finally broken,[6] when the remaining ISIL defenders surrendered or fled. According to United States Central Command, the Islamists had acceded to the SDF's demand of dismantling the IEDs surrounding the dam. The coalition stated that it tracked those militants who fled and targeted those who could be killed without harming civilians.[94] At 16:00 on that day, SDF commander Rojda Felat stated that the Tabqa Dam had been completely captured by the SDF.[24][95][96] The SDF conducted clearance and de-mining operations after the capture and hunted for any remaining ISIL holdouts.[97] After the battle, thousands of the local Arab population joined the SDF.[28]

SDF fighters raise their flag in Tabqa

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Battle of Tabqa

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Battle of Tabqa was a military offensive launched by the , a Kurdish-led coalition including Arab militias, with air and advisory support from the US-led Combined Joint Task Force – , against the (ISIS) to seize control of the city of Tabqa, the adjacent on the River, and a nearby airfield in northern . The operation, part of the broader campaign to isolate and capture ISIS's de facto capital of , began in March 2017 with the SDF capturing the Tabqa airbase and advanced through intense urban fighting, culminating in the full liberation of the city and dam on May 10–11, 2017. The offensive aimed to sever supply lines from western to , secure the strategically vital —which had threatened to breach for tactical flooding—and establish a staging point for the subsequent assault on . SDF forces, numbering several thousand and comprising primarily the People's Protection Units (YPG) and (YPJ) alongside local Arab fighters, employed ground assaults supported by airstrikes and artillery to dislodge entrenched defenders who used the dam's infrastructure for defensive positions and booby traps. The victory marked a significant achievement in degrading territorial control, enabling the SDF to consolidate gains along the and press eastward, though it highlighted challenges in integrating diverse ethnic militias under coordination amid regional tensions with over Kurdish involvement.

Background

Strategic and Geopolitical Importance

The Tabqa Dam, Syria's largest hydroelectric facility completed in 1976, regulates the Euphrates River's flow, providing irrigation for approximately 400,000 hectares of farmland in Raqqa province and generating up to 800 megawatts of electricity critical for ISIS-held territories. ISIS seized control of the dam in early 2014 following their capture of nearby Raqqa, leveraging it as a dual-use asset for power generation and water management to sustain their caliphate's economy while weaponizing flows to disrupt downstream areas, including reducing Euphrates levels to Raqqa by diverting water toward Iraq in May 2014. This control positioned the dam as a strategic chokepoint, enabling ISIS to mitigate flood risks during wet seasons and deny resources to adversaries, thereby enhancing territorial cohesion in eastern Syria. Adjacent to the dam, the Tabqa Airbase, a former installation, served as a and staging hub after its capture in August 2014, facilitating the movement of fighters and supplies along western routes toward their de facto capital in approximately 40 kilometers east. Under control, the airbase bridged supply lines from in the southwest and potential reinforcements across crossings, allowing rapid redeployment of forces amid multi-front pressures in the . Its proximity to the dam created a fortified complex that defended as integral to maintaining operational depth and denying coalition advances into the Raqqa heartland. Within the U.S.-led , the Battle of Tabqa from March to May 2017 formed a pivotal phase of the broader campaign aimed at dismantling ISIS's by isolating its core territory. Securing Tabqa severed key River crossings, which ISIS relied upon for reinforcements from eastern strongholds like , thereby compressing their maneuver space and accelerating the of as the group's primary command and center. This maneuver exploited the geographic centrality of Tabqa, transforming it from an ISIS logistical node into a lever for causal disruption of enemy sustainment, independent of direct assaults on itself.

Involved Forces and Preparations

The led the ground offensive, consisting mainly of Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and fighters supplemented by Arab militias in the Syrian Arab Coalitions, with motivations centered on expelling from local territories while advancing Kurdish self-governance aspirations in northern . The SDF committed an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 fighters to the Tabqa operation, drawing from successes in prior campaigns such as the capture of in August 2016, which positioned forces for subsequent advances toward Tabqa from the west and north. U.S. forces provided on-ground training and advisory support to enhance SDF capabilities, without deploying large conventional units. Opposing the SDF was the Islamic State (ISIS), which garrisoned Tabqa with approximately 3,000 to 4,000 fighters, including foreign volunteers and local recruits, who fortified positions with improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), booby-trapped structures, and sniper nests to exploit the urban and dam terrain for prolonged defense. ISIS fighters demonstrated high motivation through ideological fanaticism, aiming to hold Tabqa as a key defensive node en route to their stronghold. Preparations by ISIS included entrenchment in anticipation of SDF incursions, leveraging control over the and airbase since 2014. The U.S.-led Global Coalition played a pivotal enabling role through extensive airstrikes—totaling hundreds of sorties by U.S. aircraft—and artillery barrages that degraded ISIS defenses and facilitated SDF maneuvers, marking a decisive factor in overcoming ISIS fortifications without direct coalition ground combat beyond advisors. SDF preparations involved staging from Ain Issa to the northeast, initiating probing advances in late 2016 to isolate Tabqa ahead of the main 2017 offensive. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces maintained operations distant from Tabqa, primarily in western , with no direct involvement in the battle, reflecting divergent priorities against versus regime consolidation. Turkey expressed objections to the prominent YPG role within the SDF, viewing it as an extension of the (PKK), which complicated broader anti- alliances but did not alter coalition support for the operation.

Course of the Battle

Assault on Tabqa Dam and Airbase

On March 22, 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the U.S.-led coalition, initiated the assault on the Tabqa Dam through a multi-pronged offensive that included an airborne insertion of hundreds of SDF fighters via U.S. helicopters behind Islamic State (ISIS) lines. This operation marked the first U.S. heliborne assault against ISIS in Syria, aimed at seizing the dam's perimeter without a direct frontal attack to mitigate risks of structural collapse from ISIS fortifications and potential mining. Concurrently, SDF units advanced on the adjacent Tabqa Airbase, overrunning outer defenses with support that targeted positions, depots, and improvised defenses. By March 27, 2017, the SDF captured the airbase, repelling counterattacks through precision strikes guided by drones and intelligence, which neutralized key fighters and disrupted their defensive lines. The SDF secured the dam's spillways and surrounding canals by late March, effectively cutting off ISIS escape routes via water while conducting assessments to address minimal damage and avert flooding threats from ISIS sabotage attempts. airpower provided decisive empirical advantages, enabling rapid advances against ISIS's asymmetric fortifications through targeted neutralization of approximately 200 fighters in the initial phase, highlighting technological superiority in and strikes.

Isolation and Besieging of Tabqa City

In early April 2017, the (SDF) initiated operations around Tabqa city, advancing primarily from southern and eastern approaches to isolate (ISIS) fighters while avoiding immediate urban combat. By April 6, SDF units had effectively surrounded the city on multiple sides after clearing ISIS positions in adjacent villages and leveraging control of Euphrates River islands for flanking maneuvers. Coalition airstrikes supported these efforts by targeting ISIS convoys attempting to reinforce or break out from the perimeter. ISIS responded by establishing defensive lines fortified with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), sniper positions, and reinforcements from foreign fighters drawn to the defense of the strategic city. Efforts by ISIS to coordinate with Syrian Arab Army (SAA) elements for joint operations against the SDF failed, resulting in tensions and sporadic clashes over nearby territories east and south of Tabqa. The besieging severed key supply routes, imposing severe logistical strain on ISIS forces, who resorted to food and fuel amid dwindling resources. The SDF established forward operating bases along the encirclement lines to maintain sustained pressure without fully sealing the city, allowing limited windows for civilian evacuation. This approach minimized risks to ground forces entering densely held urban areas. By May 2, SDF commanders reported control over approximately 90% of the city's perimeter, positioning forces for the subsequent assault while degrading capabilities through attrition.

Final Assault and Capture of Tabqa City

The launched the climactic phase of their urban assault on Tabqa city in early May 2017, advancing from encircled positions to breach -held defenses along multiple axes. SDF fighters, primarily from Kurdish YPG and Arab SDF units, conducted house-to-house clearances in densely built neighborhoods, encountering defenders entrenched in civilian structures who fired from windows and rooftops using and machine guns. Coalition from U.S.-led forces played a pivotal role, striking positions to suppress counterfire and enable SDF advances, though such strikes also resulted in reported civilian casualties amid the chaos of urban combat. ISIS resistance intensified with tactics including sniper fire, booby-trapped buildings, and sporadic counterattacks involving suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and small-unit assaults, aimed at disrupting SDF momentum. Despite these efforts, ISIS morale eroded under sustained pressure, leading to instances of fighters surrendering rather than fighting to the death, as coalition intelligence and SDF ground operations isolated remaining pockets. U.S. provision of advanced weaponry, training, and real-time intelligence tipped close-quarters engagements in favor of SDF forces against ISIS's improvised fortifications and limited reinforcements. By May 10, 2017, SDF commanders declared Tabqa city fully liberated from control, marking the end of major combat operations in the urban core after weeks of and attrition. Holdout elements continued to pose threats in peripheral areas, prompting ongoing sweeps and skirmishes in the following days to neutralize snipers and . This capture severed a critical supply line to , their capital, and demonstrated the effectiveness of combined SDF-coalition operations in overcoming fortified urban defenses.

Aftermath

Casualties and Humanitarian Effects

The experienced heavy military casualties during the intense urban combat of the Tabqa offensive, with fighters facing entrenched positions fortified in civilian areas, leading to close-quarters engagements that resulted in hundreds of SDF killed and wounded overall in the campaign. suffered substantial losses as well, with U.S.-led airstrikes and SDF ground advances contributing to the elimination of a significant portion of their defenders in Tabqa, though precise counts are complicated by the recovery challenges for foreign fighter remains and 's tactic of embedding among civilians to complicate targeting. No fatalities were reported among U.S. or other coalition advisory personnel embedded with the SDF. Civilian casualties were primarily attributed to coalition airstrikes supporting the SDF advance, with documenting 145 deaths in Tabqa town between March 19 and May 10, 2017, including 38 women and 58 children. A notable incident occurred on March 22, 2017, when strikes hit a crowded market and in Tabqa's Second Neighborhood, killing at least 44 civilians, including 14 children, amid reports of up to 77 bodies arriving at local hospitals; maintained an administrative presence nearby, exemplifying their practice of operating from populated sites that heightened collateral risks. Additional deaths stemmed from and 's use of human shields, as fighters deliberately positioned defenses in residential zones to deter advances and exploit civilian proximity for propaganda. The battle displaced hundreds of residents from Tabqa and surrounding areas, exacerbating Syria's amid ongoing fear from and destroyed infrastructure. Post-capture in May 2017, humanitarian organizations facilitated aid delivery via the secured Tabqa airbase, addressing acute food shortages and providing relief to returning civilians, though supply disruptions from the fighting persisted. The Tabqa Dam's structural integrity was maintained through coalition precautions and SDF control, averting potential catastrophic flooding of the valley that had threatened via sabotage; however, combat damage compounded pre-existing issues for local populations.

Immediate Military and Strategic Gains

The (SDF) achieved the full capture of Tabqa city, dam, and airbase from the (ISIS) on May 11, 2017, yielding immediate military gains by severing ISIS's critical supply and reinforcement routes along the River. This operation isolated Raqqa, ISIS's de facto capital approximately 45 kilometers to the east, by cutting off the group's last territorial link west of the , compelling reallocation of fighters and resources away from defensive preparations in . The success directly supported the SDF's subsequent encirclement and siege of launched in June 2017, reducing ISIS mobility and operational flexibility in northern . Securing the Tabqa Airbase, taken on March 27, 2017, provided the SDF with a forward and staging hub, enabling efficient resupply and troop movements bolstered by U.S.-led and advisory presence. Control of the neutralized ISIS's potential to weaponize the structure—previously used as a command node and threatened for breaching to flood downstream areas toward SDF advances—averting tactical disruptions while restoring regional water management. These assets strengthened the U.S.-SDF partnership, facilitating accelerated arms transfers and training to sustain momentum against ISIS holdouts. For , the rapid loss of these symbolic and functional strongholds inflicted measurable setbacks, undermining propaganda claims of territorial invincibility and contributing to the caliphate's contraction by mid-2017 through diminished cross-Euphrates operations. The defeats eroded appeal and forced defensive consolidations, with Tabqa's fall marking a pivotal of 's control over key in province.

Long-Term Implications and Criticisms

Territorial Control and Stability Challenges

Following the ' (SDF) capture of Tabqa on May 10, 2017, the city was incorporated into the Autonomous Administration of North and East (AANES), a Kurdish-led governing body established to administer territories held by the SDF. Local councils were formed to manage , including efforts to repair war-damaged infrastructure such as bridges and the strategically vital , which had suffered extensive damage during the conflict. However, Tabqa's predominantly Arab population—estimated at over 80% prior to the war—has created governance strains under Kurdish-dominated leadership, leading to reported local resentments over resource allocation and political representation despite the inclusion of Arab fighters within SDF ranks comprising about 68% of its forces. Persistent security threats from (ISIS) remnants have undermined stability, with sleeper cells conducting hit-and-run attacks across northeast , including areas near Tabqa, as late as 2025. estimates indicate 1,500 to 3,000 ISIS fighters remain active in and , reactivating cells for low-level tactics that continued beyond 2018. These attacks, often targeting SDF patrols and infrastructure, reflect ISIS's shift to after territorial losses, complicating full pacification of the region. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 intensified pressures on SDF-held areas, including Tabqa, as the new authorities led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham sought to consolidate control amid ongoing clashes with Turkish-backed forces, displacing over 1 million people in northeast by early 2025. While SDF control over Tabqa endured without direct recapture, these shifts exacerbated internal Arab-Kurd tensions and external threats. Security improved relative to rule, with U.S. forces maintaining a presence in northeast for counter- operations, but economic challenges persist from war-induced destruction, including damaged water infrastructure contributing to shortages. SDF territorial gains facilitated sustained anti-ISIS efforts but heightened risks of Turkish military incursions, given Turkey's designation of SDF components like the YPG as extensions of the PKK terrorist group. This dynamic contributed to operations such as the 2019 Turkish offensive into northeastern , foreshadowing recurrent border escalations that strain long-term stability in areas like Tabqa.

Controversies Over Coalition Tactics and Alliances

Human Rights Watch documented at least 224 civilian deaths from 10 US-led coalition airstrikes in and around Tabqa between March and July 2017, contending that the high toll reflected insufficient precautions, such as inadequate target verification and failure to use all feasible warnings. Coalition officials responded that fighters routinely embedded military positions among civilians and employed human shields, deliberately exploiting populated areas to deter strikes and inflate coalition casualties. Military assessments of the encompassing Raqqa campaign, including Tabqa operations, determined that most airstrikes adhered to despite acknowledged procedural lapses in some instances, prompting refinements to to mitigate risks. The alliance with the SDF, led by the YPG—viewed by as a PKK offshoot and terrorist entity—intensified diplomatic frictions during the Tabqa offensive. On May 10, 2017, coinciding with SDF capture of the city, Turkish leaders denounced the US authorization of direct arms supplies to YPG units as enabling separatism and posing a security threat, given the PKK's US terrorist designation since 1997. US policymakers defended the partnership as pragmatic and time-bound for defeat, emphasizing SDF Arab contingents to ensure local legitimacy in non-Kurdish zones like Tabqa. Skeptics dismissed SDF Arab integration as tokenistic, with YPG retaining command dominance despite nominal inclusivity, exacerbating Arab grievances in Tabqa's Euphrates-region demographics over perceived Kurdish imposition. This prioritization of SDF over moderate Arab rebels incurred opportunity costs, sidelining potential partners while risking enduring ethnic fragmentation and NATO ally alienation, even as SDF-coalition tactics empirically expedited ISIS expulsion from key Euphrates crossings by May 27, 2017.

References

  1. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/tabqah-syria-liberated-from-the-islamic-state.php
  2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/27/us-backed-forces-capture-tabqa-airbase-from-isil
  3. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39877719
  4. https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-defeated-at-tabqa-dam/3847666.html
  5. https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/May%252010.pdf
  6. https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sanctuary20Map201020MAY.pdf
  7. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/under-pressure-the-effect-of-conflict-on-the-euphrates-dam/
  8. https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3621&context=isp_collection
  9. https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp-content/uploads/reports/PAX_POC_BOOK_CASE12_SINGLE_PAGES_FINAL-1.pdf
  10. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-euphrates-dam-is-at-risk-in-the-sdf-operation-to-capture-it-from-isis/
  11. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28918792
  12. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/military-implications-syrian-regimes-defeat-raqqa
  13. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1183804/syrias-tabqa-city-liberated-key-development-for-raqqa/
  14. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/tabqa-dam-key-to-capturing-raqqa/
  15. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/u-s-backed-militias-claim-big-advance-against-islamic-state-in-syria-s-tabqa-idUSKBN17W08M/
  16. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/11/us-backed-syrian-forces-fully-capture-tabqa-from-isil
  17. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/8/14/syria-war-manbij-celebrates-liberation-from-isil
  18. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1127111/local-forces-launch-daring-assault-behind-enemy-lines-in-Syria/
  19. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-battle-for-raqqa-a-war-of-tactics-and-caution/
  20. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49963649
  21. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1127560/local-forces-launch-daring-assault-behind-enemy-lines-in-syria/
  22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/03/22/u-s-troops-syrian-fighters-insert-behind-isis-lines-to-retake-key-dam-in-syria/
  23. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/world/middleeast/us-airlift-raqqa-syria.html
  24. https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/22/politics/syria-tabqa-dam
  25. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39406923
  26. https://syriadirect.org/syria-situation-report-march-30-april-14-2017/
  27. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/kurdish-forces-take-90-percent-of-syrias-tabqa
  28. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/sanctuary/
  29. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/25/all-feasible-precautions/civilian-casualties-anti-isis-coalition-airstrikes-syria
  30. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-raqqa-and-the-challenges-after-liberation/
  31. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1127111/local-forces-launch-daring-assault-behind-enemy-lines-in-syria/
  32. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/27/c_136159446.htm
  33. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/13/05/2017/Hunger-and-fear-in-Syria-s-Tabqa-after-IS-defeat
  34. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/27/us-backed-syria-forces-resume-fighting-near-tabqa-dam
  35. https://www.facebook.com/CJTFOIR/posts/1838913283041471/
  36. https://www.army.mil/article/198599/us_led_coalition_forces_make_decisive_gains_against_isis_in_2017
  37. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/27/us-backed-syria-forces-pause-operations-near-tabqa-dam
  38. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/09/residents-without-services-at-borders-of-al-tabqa-raqqa-administrations/
  39. https://npasyria.com/en/85379/
  40. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/01/28/in-raqqa-tensions-are-rising-between-syria-s-arabs-and-kurds_6737501_4.html
  41. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/sdf_arab_majority_rank_turkey_as_biggest_threat.pdf
  42. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/islamic-state-reactivating-fighters-eying-comeback-syria-iraq-2025-06-12/
  43. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-november-1/
  44. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10161/
  45. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/
  46. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2541/RAND_RR2541.pdf
  47. https://water.fanack.com/syria-water-crisis-regime-change-2025/
  48. https://syrianobserver.com/syrian-actors/turkeys-defence-ministry-monitors-sdf-integration-file-reaffirms-commitment-to-counter-terrorism.html
  49. https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkish-escalation-northeastern-syria-amid-changes-military-strategy
  50. https://2017-2021.state.gov/update-on-the-d-isis-campaign/
  51. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/10/turkey-condemns-us-move-to-arm-syrian-kurdish-fighters
  52. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations
  53. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/10/ankara-calls-us-arming-of-kurds-fighting-isis-in-syria-a-threat-to-turkey
  54. http://warontherocks.com/2020/02/what-america-can-learn-from-its-mistakes-in-syria/
  55. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-us-played-down-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-forces-that-couldnt-last/
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