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Minsk agreements
Minsk agreements
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A map of the buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol follow-up memorandum

The Minsk agreements were a series of international agreements which sought to end the Donbas war fought between armed Russian separatist groups and Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Russian regular forces playing a central part.[1] After a defeat at Ilovaisk at the end of August 2014, Russia forced Ukraine to sign the first Minsk Protocol, or the Minsk I.[2] It was drafted by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),[3][4] with mediation by the leaders of France (François Hollande) and Germany (Angela Merkel) in the so-called Normandy Format.

After extensive talks in Minsk, Belarus, the agreement was signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of the Trilateral Contact Group and, without recognition of their status, by the then-leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). This agreement followed multiple previous attempts to stop the fighting in the region and aimed to implement an immediate ceasefire.

The agreement failed to stop fighting.[5] At the start of January 2015, Russia sent another large batch of its regular military.[2] Following the Russian victory at Donetsk International Airport in defiance of the Protocol, Russia repeated its pattern of August 2014, invaded with fresh forces and attacked Ukrainian forces at Debaltseve, where Ukraine suffered a major defeat, and was forced to sign a Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, or Minsk II,[2] which was signed on 12 February 2015.[6] This agreement consisted of a package of measures, including a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of prisoners of war, constitutional reform in Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of Donbas and restoring control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. While fighting subsided following the agreement's signing, it never ended completely, and the agreement's provisions were never fully implemented.[7] The former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested a mechanism of granting an autonomy to Eastern Donbas only after "the OSCE certified that the local elections had followed international standards", called the Steinmeier formula.[8]

Amid rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine in early 2022, Russia officially recognised the DPR and LPR on 21 February 2022.[9] Following that decision, on 22 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the Minsk agreements "no longer existed", and that Ukraine, not Russia, was to blame for their collapse.[10] Russia then launched a full invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.[11]

History

[edit]

In February 2014, the Russian military covertly attacked and occupied Ukrainian Crimea. Protests and unrest started in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which researchers characterize as "unclear to what extent [they] were initiated by local dissatisfaction with the situation in Kyiv, and to what extent they were organized and supported from Russia".[12] In spring, "DPR" and "LPR" - two unrecognized statelets - were created in Ukrainian Donbas by Russian actors. There, the Kremlin government used some of its techniques it used before during the creation of separatist enclaves in Moldova and Georgia. Russia then proceeded to establish the narrative and negotiation position in order to trap the victims of Russian aggression and involve Western states in the logic of “frozen conflict” (Umland & Essen).[2]

In summer 2014, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive, during which it initially reclaimed large parts of lost territory. Russia had been sending special forces operatives, irregulars and small groups of regular Russian forces until late August 2014, when for the first time Russia engaged large numbers of unmarked regular military forces to help its proxies in Donbas. After losing the Battle of Ilovaisk, Ukraine was forced to sign the Minsk Protocol, or Minsk I.[2]

Minsk Protocol

[edit]
Minsk Protocol
Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group with respect to the joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of Russia, V. Putin
ContextWar in Donbas
Signed5 September 2014 (2014-09-05)
LocationMinsk, Belarus
Expiry21 February 2022 (2022-02-21)
Mediators
Original
signatories
LanguageRussian

By the end of August 2014, after defeating Ukraine at Ilovaisk,[2] Russia narrowly saved its Donbas proxies from defeat and used a show of force to cement their presence. The next step for Russia was to stabilize its control, while Ukraine wanted to prevent a military defeat. Western governments feared escalation.[13]

The Minsk Protocol was drawn up by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE.[14] Meetings of the group, along with informal representatives of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, took place on 31 July, 26 August, 1 September, and 5 September 2014.

Text of the protocol

[edit]

The text of the protocol consists of twelve points:[15]

  1. To ensure an immediate bilateral ceasefire.
  2. To ensure the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire by the OSCE.
  3. Decentralisation of power, including through the adoption of the Ukrainian law "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts".
  4. To ensure the permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border and verification by the OSCE with the creation of security zones in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
  5. Immediate release of all hostages and illegally detained persons.
  6. A law preventing the prosecution and punishment of people in connection with the events that have taken place in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
  7. To continue the inclusive national dialogue.
  8. To take measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas.
  9. To ensure early local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian law "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts".
  10. To withdraw illegal armed groups and military equipment as well as fighters and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine.
  11. To adopt a programme of economic recovery and reconstruction for the Donbas region.
  12. To provide personal security for participants in the consultations.

Signatories

[edit]

The following representatives signed the document:[15]

  • Swiss diplomat and OSCE representative Heidi Tagliavini
  • Former president of Ukraine (July 1994 to January 2005) and Ukrainian representative Leonid Kuchma
  • Russian Ambassador to Ukraine and Russian representative Mikhail Zurabov

Envoys of so-called DPR and LPR, Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, also signed the protocol, without "their self-declared functions" mentioned.[2][16]

Follow-up memorandum

[edit]
English Wikisource has original text related to this article:

In the two weeks after the Minsk Protocol was signed, there were frequent violations of the ceasefire by both parties to the conflict.[17][18] Talks continued in Minsk, and a follow-up to the Minsk Protocol was agreed to on 19 September 2014. This memorandum clarified the implementation of the Protocol. Amongst some of the peacemaking measures agreed to were:[17][19][20]

  • To ban flights by combat aircraft over the security zone
  • To withdraw all foreign mercenaries from the conflict zone
  • To ban offensive operations
  • To pull heavy weaponry 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) back on each side of the line of contact, creating a 30-kilometre (19 mi) buffer zone
  • To task the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine with monitoring implementation of Minsk Protocol

Efficacy

[edit]

After the conclusion of Protocol and Memorandum, a fragile ceasefire was established. However, even although the agreement met Russian interests, the fighting has not stopped.[2] The Second Battle of Donetsk Airport broke out, and both parties continued to accuse each other of ceasefire violations.[5] In late October, DPR prime minister and Minsk Protocol signatory Alexander Zakharchenko said that his forces would retake the territory they had lost to Ukrainian forces during a July 2014 offensive, and that DPR forces would be willing to wage "heavy battles" to do so.[5][21] Subsequently, Zakharchenko said that he had been misquoted, and that he had meant to say that these areas would be taken through "peaceful means".[22]

While campaigning in the lead-up to the 2 November elections held by the DPR and LPR in violation of the Protocol, Zakharchenko said "These are historical times. We are creating a new country! It's an insane goal".[23] OSCE chairman Didier Burkhalter confirmed that the elections ran "counter to the letter and spirit of the Minsk Protocol", and said that they would "further complicate its implementation".[24]

Collapse

[edit]

The Protocol and Memorandum did not stop the war in the east of Ukraine.[2] By January 2015, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire had completely collapsed.[25] Following the Russian victory at Donetsk International Airport in defiance of the Protocol, DPR spokesman Eduard Basurin said that "the Minsk Memorandum will not be considered in the form it was adopted".[26] Later in the day, DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko said that the DPR "will not make any attempts at ceasefire talks any more", and that his forces were going to "attack right up to the borders of Donetsk region".[27] The New York Times said that the ceasefire had "all but vanished".[28] In January - February, Russia repeated its pattern of August 2014, invaded with fresh forces and attacked and defeated Ukrainian forces at Debaltseve, forcing Ukraine to sign a Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, or Minsk II.[2]

Amidst increasing violence in the combat zone, another round of Minsk talks was scheduled for 31 January.[29] Members of the Trilateral Contact Group travelled to Minsk to meet representatives of the DPR and LPR. The DPR and LPR signatories of the Protocol did not attend, and those representatives that did attend were not able to discuss the implementation of the Protocol or memorandum. These representatives asked for the revision of the Protocol and the memorandum. The meeting was adjourned with no result.[29]

Minsk II, February 2015

[edit]
The leaders of Belarus, Russia, Germany, France, and Ukraine at the 11–12 February 2015 summit in Minsk, Belarus
For other uses, see Minsk II (disambiguation).
See also: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Successive attempts to resolve the ongoing war in the Donbas region of Ukraine had seen no result by the start of February 2015.[30] While the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 did significantly reduce fighting in the conflict zone for many months, minor skirmishes continued. At the start of January 2015, Russia sent another large batch of its regular military,[2] which together[citation needed] with separatist forces of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) began a new offensive on Ukrainian-controlled areas, resulting in the complete collapse of the Minsk Protocol ceasefire.[25]

After heavy fighting, DPR forces captured the symbolically important Donetsk International Airport on 21 January, the last part of the city of Donetsk that had been under Ukrainian control. Following this victory, Russian military[2] together[citation needed] with separatist forces pressed their offensive on the important railway and road junction of Debaltseve in late January. This renewed heavy fighting caused significant concern in the international community. Ukraine suffered another "devastating" defeat.[2] French president François Hollande and German chancellor Angela Merkel put forth a new peace plan on 7 February.[31][32]

The Franco-German plan, drawn up after talks with Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and Russian president Vladimir Putin, was seen as a revival of the Minsk Protocol. President Hollande said that the plan was the "last chance" for resolution of the conflict.[31][32] The plan was put forth in response to American proposals to send armaments to the Ukrainian government, something that Chancellor Merkel said would only result in a worsening of the crisis.[31][33]

A summit to discuss the implementation of the Franco-German diplomatic plan was scheduled for 11 February at the Independence Palace in Minsk, the capital of Belarus. It was attended by Russian president Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, German chancellor Angela Merkel, French president François Hollande, DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko, and LPR leader Igor Plotnitsky. Negotiations went on overnight for sixteen hours, and were said to have been "very difficult" by the German foreign minister.[34][35]

Following the talks, it was announced on 12 February 2015 that the parties to the conflict had agreed to a new package of peacemaking measures, the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which is commonly called Minsk II.[6][36][37][38] Some of the measures agreed to were an OSCE-observed unconditional ceasefire from 15 February, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of prisoners of war, and constitutional reform in Ukraine.[39]

Text of the agreement

[edit]

The full text of the agreement is as follows:[40][41]

  1. Immediate and full ceasefire in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and its strict fulfilment as of 00:00 midnight EET on 15 February 2015.
  2. Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance with the aim of creation of a security zone on minimum 50 kilometres (31 mi) apart for artillery of 100mm calibre or more, and a security zone of 70 kilometres (43 mi) for multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) and 140 kilometres (87 mi) for MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch, and Tochka U tactical missile systems:
    • for Ukrainian troops, from actual line of contact;
    • for armed formations of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014
      The pullout of the above-mentioned heavy weapons must start no later than the second day after the start of the ceasefire and finish within 14 days.
      This process will be assisted by OSCE with the support of the Trilateral Contact Group.
  3. Effective monitoring and verification of ceasefire regime and pullout of heavy weapons by OSCE will be provided from the first day of pullout, using all necessary technical means such as satellites, drones, radio-location systems etc.
  4. On the first day after the pullout a dialogue is to start on modalities of conducting local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts," and also about the future of these districts based on the above-mentioned law.
    Without delays, but no later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution has to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, indicating the territory which falls under the special regime in accordance with the law "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts," based in the line set up by the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014.
  5. Provide pardon and amnesty by way of enacting a law that forbids persecution and punishment of persons in relation to events that took place in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.
  6. Provide release and exchange of all hostages and illegally held persons, based on the principle of "all for all". This process has to end – at the latest – on the fifth day after the pullout (of weapons).
  7. Provide safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid to the needy, based on an international mechanism.
  8. Define the modalities of a full restoration of social and economic connections, including social transfers, such as payments of pensions and other payments (income and revenue, timely payment of communal bills, restoration of tax payments within the framework of Ukrainian legal field).
    With this aim, Ukraine will restore management over the segment of its banking system in the districts affected by the conflict, and possibly, an international mechanism will be established to ease such transactions.
  9. Restore control of the state border to the Ukrainian government in the whole conflict zone, which has to start on the first day after the local election and end after the full political regulation (local elections in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts based on the law of Ukraine and Constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, on the condition of fulfilment of Point 11 – in consultations and in agreement with representatives of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.
  10. Pullout of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE supervision. Disarmament of all illegal groups.
  11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with a new constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015, the key element of which is decentralisation (taking into account peculiarities of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, agreed with representatives of these districts), and also approval of permanent legislation on the special status of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in accordance with the measures spelt out in the attached footnote,[note 1] by the end of 2015.
  12. Based on the Law of Ukraine "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts", questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.
  13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Signatories

[edit]

The document was signed by:[40]

Reactions

[edit]

The new package, commonly referred to as "Minsk II", was criticised for being "highly complicated" and "extremely fragile", and for being very similar to the failed Minsk Protocol.[6][42][43] The New York Times reported that the plan had "included some tripwires", such as not demarcating control over the city of Debaltseve, which was the site of the most fierce fighting at the time of the plan's drafting.[6][44] Following the Minsk talks, Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande, and President Poroshenko attended a European Union (EU) summit in Brussels.[45]

At the summit, the Minsk participants briefed EU leaders about the talks. During the briefing, they said that President Putin had tried to delay the implementation of a ceasefire by ten days, so as to force Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve to surrender their positions. For his part, President Putin said that the Debaltseve defenders were encircled, and that the separatists expected them "to lay down their arms and cease resistance".[45]

Kommersant reporter Andrey Kolesnikov wrote that implementation of the ceasefire in Debaltseve hinged upon whether or not Ukrainian forces were truly encircled, "Above all, does it exist or not? Vladimir Putin insisted that it [the encirclement] exists and that if a cease-fire agreement is reached, it will be odd if it isn't violated: Those in the kettle will certainly try to get out of there; those who have boiled that kettle will try to collect the foam".[46]

US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on 13 February that the Russian Armed Forces had actively deployed around Debaltseve to assist the separatists in forcing out Ukrainian troops prior to the start of the ceasefire, the 15 February. Russia denied this, and Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russia could not assist in the implementation of Minsk II because it was "not a participant" in the conflict.[47]

Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh said that he reserved the right to continue fighting, and that Minsk II was unconstitutional. He said that his Ukrainian Volunteer Corps would continue fighting "until complete liberation of Ukrainian lands from Russian occupants", and promised "death to Russian terrorist-occupiers".[48][49][50] DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko said that the ceasefire did not apply to Debaltseve, and that fighting would continue there.[51]

Efficacy

[edit]

Ceasefire and withdrawal of forces (1-2)

[edit]

Though the fighting generally subsided after the ceasefire came into effect at 0:00 EET on 15 February, skirmishes and shelling continued in several parts of the conflict zone.[52] Shelling and fighting at Debaltseve continued, as DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko said that the ceasefire did not apply to that area.[53] In the south of Donetsk Oblast, fighting between DPR forces and members of the Azov Battalion continued in villages near Mariupol.[53][54] By 16 February, Minsk II seemed on the verge of collapse.[55][56] Separatists continued a heavy assault on Debaltseve. Both sides said that they would not withdraw heavy weaponry as specified by the agreement whilst fighting in Debaltseve was ongoing.[57] Reuters described the ceasefire as "stillborn" in Debaltseve.[58] Ukrainian forces were forced to retreat from Debaltseve on 18 February, leaving separatist forces in control of the city.[59]

In the week after the fall of Debaltseve to pro-Russian forces, fighting in the conflict zone abated.[60] As of mid-February 2015 a Western journalist visiting Ukrainian side of the front line in Avdiivka reported massive incoming artillery barrages from the Russian side. Having visited cities held by separatist and Ukrainian forces, he reported that both sides placed heavy weapons and munitions in civilian areas.[61]

DPR and LPR forces began to withdraw artillery from the front lines as specified by Minsk II on 24 February, and Ukraine did so on 26 February. Ukraine reported that it had suffered no casualties during 24–26 February, something that had not occurred since early January 2015.[60][62]

Ukrainian defence minister Stepan Poltorak said on 8 June 2015 that over 100 soldiers and at least 50 civilians had been killed since Minsk II came into effect. According to him, pro-Russian forces had violated the truce more than 4,000 times.[63]

Special status of Donbas (11)

[edit]

The parliament of Ukraine approved a law on "special status" for Donbas on 17 March.[64] Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that the law was a "sharp departure from the Minsk agreements" because it demanded local elections under Ukrainian jurisdiction.[64] Representatives of the LPR and DPR said that the law was a "one-sided" modification of Minsk II, and that the agreement had been rendered void by this modification.[65] Despite this, representatives of the DPR and LPR continued to forward peace proposals to the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine.[66]

The law was also criticised by some Ukrainian politicians. Radical Party leader Oleh Lyashko said that the law was "a vote for de facto recognition of the Russian occupation in Donbas". Vice-parliamentary speaker Andriy Parubiy said that law was "not for Putin or the occupiers", but to show Europe that Ukraine was willing to adhere to Minsk II.

Later, in 2019, Ukraine's parliament voted to extend regulations giving limited self-rule to separatist-controlled eastern regions, a prerequisite for a deal to settle the five-year conflict there.[67]

Elections in the DPR and LPR (4)

[edit]

While the 2015 Ukrainian local elections had been scheduled for 25 October, DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko issued a decree on 2 July that ordered local DPR elections to be held on 18 October.[68] He said that this action was "in accordance with the Minsk agreements".[69] According to Zakharchenko, this move meant that the DPR had "independently started to implement the Minsk agreements".[69] Zakharchenko said that the elections would "take place 'on the basis of Ukraine's law on temporary self-rule status of individual districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions', in so far as they are not at variance with the constitution and laws of the DPR".[69]

On the same day, President Petro Poroshenko responded that if DPR elections went forward in this unilateral manner, it would be "extremely irresponsible and will have devastating consequences for the process of deescalation of tension in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions".[69] In addition, the OSCE said that it would only send observers to elections in the conflict zone if Ukraine invited it to do so.[70] As specified in Minsk II, local elections in DPR and LPR-held territories must be observed by the OSCE to be deemed legitimate.[41]

Amidst a great reduction in violence, following an agreement to restart the implementation of Minsk II that was agreed to on 1 September, the Normandy four held a meeting on 2 October. At the meeting, it was agreed that elections in the conflict zone would be held in accordance with Minsk II.[71] In order to do this, French President François Hollande said that the elections would need to be postponed until 2016, as three months were required to prepare for them.[71] Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to use his influence to prevent the DPR and LPR from holding early elections.[71]

Accordingly, the DPR and LPR announced on 6 October that their planned elections had been postponed until 21 February 2016.[72] Local elections in the rest of Ukraine went ahead on 25 October 2015. Following the postponement, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that if OSCE observers verified that the planned elections to be held in the separatist areas were in accordance with Ukrainian law and Minsk II, the "law on special status" for these areas would come into immediate effect.[73]

On 18 April 2016, the planned (organised by the DPR and LPR) local elections were postponed from 20 April to 24 July 2016.[74] On 22 July 2016, these DPR and LPR elections were again postponed to 6 November 2016.[75] On 2 October 2016, the DPR and LPR held "primaries" in which voters nominated candidates for the 6 November 2016 elections.[76] Ukraine denounced these "primaries" as illegal.[76] Elections for the People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic and the People's Council of the Luhansk People's Republic were organised and held by the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics on 11 November 2018.[77]

General efficacy

[edit]

American Defense Department official Michael Carpenter said on 2 March 2016 that at least 430 Ukrainian soldiers had died since the signing of Minsk II, that Russia maintained "command-and-control links" over the DPR and LPR, and that Russia was "pouring heavy weapons" into the Donbas.[78] Deputy head of the OSCE mission in Ukraine Alexander Hug said on 25 March 2016 that the OSCE had observed "armed people with Russian insignia" fighting in Donbas from the beginning of the conflict, that they had talked to prisoners who said they were Russian soldiers, and that they had seen "tire tracks, not the vehicles themselves, but the tracks of vehicles crossing the [Russo-Ukrainian] border".[79]

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on 27 March 2016 that Russia was "not a party to the Minsk agreements", and that the agreements were "devoted to two conflicting sides".[80] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe however said that the Minsk Protocol also includes the liberation of those hostages who have been abducted from the Ukrainian territory and are illegally detained in Russia, e.g. Nadiya Savchenko and Oleg Sentsov.[81]

On 27 December 2018, Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported that not a single provision of the Minsk deal had been fully implemented.[7]

2016–2022: Steinmeier formula

[edit]

In 2016, the so-called Steinmeier Formula was heralded.[82][83] Steinmeier appears to have used Russia's exclusion from the G8 as pressure.[84] Steinmeier proposal "implicitly acknowledged, and [was] explicitly based on, the Kremlin’s military achievements" of 2014 and 2015. The Formula, proposed by both Russian and European diplomats, encouraged Ukraine to carry out elections in the territory controlled by Russia and to provide Russia-occupied territories with "special status".[2]

In 2019, Ukraine signed up to the Steinmeier formula, while President Zelenskyy clarified, in light of domestic criticism, that they were not capitulating and that special status would only be possible after elections would be held, but only after regaining control of Ukraine's eastern borders.[85]

In December 2019, Ukraine and Russia agreed to implement a "full and comprehensive ceasefire." The agreement followed prisoner swaps and the withdrawal of Ukrainian military in three areas. The two sides agreed to swap the remaining prisoners and disengage military forces in three additional regions. According to Zelensky there was also progress with the issue of gas exports. Russia and Ukraine could not agree on the issues of the withdrawal of Russian-backed troops and the elections in the separatist-held regions.[86]

In July 2020, Office of The President of Ukraine announced that Leonid Kuchma will no longer take part in the work of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on resolving the situation in Ukraine's east. Leonid Kuchma met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 28 July.[87]

In June 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin "agreed to pursue diplomacy related to the Minsk agreement."[88]

A Normandy Format meeting was planned between Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in Paris on 26 January 2022.[89][90] Ukraine fulfilled Russia's condition for a meeting in Paris and decided to withdraw from Parliament the controversial draft law on the reintegration of the Crimea and Donbas region, because the law was contrary to the Minsk II.[91][92]

Russia's full-scale invasion of 2022

[edit]
Main article: Russian invasion of Ukraine

History professor Michael Kimmage criticizes the West's position for it being "the opposite of deterrence" and for its weakness. "Western policy was an invitation for Putin to go further". During 2021, Putin prepared Russia for a full-scale war within Europe.[93] On 15 February 2022, the Russian Duma voted to appeal to President Putin to recognise the self-proclaimed LPR and DPR.[94] The next day, a Russian government spokesman acknowledged that officially recognising the Donbas republics would not be in keeping with the Minsk agreements.[95] However, he also told journalists that Putin's priority in regulating the situation in Donbas is the implementation of mechanisms adopted under those agreements.[96] Russia went on to officially recognise the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people's republics on 21 February 2022.[9] Following that decision, on 22 February 2022, President Putin said that the Minsk agreements "no longer existed", and that Ukraine, not Russia, was to blame for their collapse, accusing Ukraine of genocide in Donbas in his comments[97][98][10] – a statement largely seen as baseless and factually wrong by the wider world, academics studying genocide, and the United Nations.[99][100][101][102] Russia then invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022.[11]

On 24 August 2022, after a meeting of the Crimea Platform, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy stated that current front lines in the war would not be frozen. "At the point where we are, we are not ready for a ceasefire. We explained that there will be no Minsk-3, Minsk-5, or Minsk-7. We will not play these games, we have lost part of our territories this way … it is a trap".[103]

Evaluation

[edit]

Following the fall of Debaltseve in February 2015, about one-third of the Donbas region remained in separatist control.[104] A few days before the 2022 Russian invasion, French president Emmanuel Macron and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken opined that the Minsk agreements were "the way forward" to end the conflict in Donbas. Blinken added that it was an incomplete step as there were other outstanding issues.[105] The aim of the Russian intervention in Donbas was to establish pro-Russian governments that, upon reincorporation into Ukraine, would facilitate Russian interference in Ukrainian politics.[106] The agreements were thus highly favourable to the Russian side, as their implementation would accomplish these goals.[107]

In May and June 2021, Mark Galeotti proposed "it is time to recognize that the Minsk process has run its course — and may if anything be blocking any more meaningful dialogue",[108] and suggested that as an external party, the United Kingdom might move diplomacy forward.[109] In a June 2021 interview, Vladislav Surkov, Putin's aide for Ukraine policy from 2013 to 2020, who was removed from his role in February 2020, said that Ukraine "can be reformed as a confederation, with a lot of freedom for the regions to decide things by themselves". He said the country would be severed by the "geopolitical gravity" between Russia and the West, describing the Minsk agreements as an act that "legitimized the first division of Ukraine" in a "reconquest", "the first open geopolitical counter-attack by Russia [against the West]".[110] In October 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "if the Americans are genuinely prepared to support the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, this issue can be settled very quickly."[111]

A dispute emerged over the role of the Russian Federation, with the parties understanding Minsk as an agreement between Ukraine and Russia,[112][113][114][115] but Russian officials claiming the role of mediator, insisted that Ukraine negotiate directly with representatives of the self-proclaimed separatist republics in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.[116] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he has "no intention of talking to terrorists".[117] The Russian side refused high-level talks, and the Kremlin endorsed an October 2021 Kommersant article by former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev entitled "Why It Is Senseless to Deal with the Current Ukrainian Leadership",[118][119] which some[who?] have criticized.[120]

In November 2021, the Russian foreign ministry breached diplomatic protocol by releasing confidential correspondence with negotiators Germany and France.[121][122]

In January 2022, Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, said that "The fulfillment of the Minsk agreement means the country’s destruction. When they were signed under the Russian gun barrel — and the German and the French watched — it was already clear for all rational people that it’s impossible to implement those documents."[123] Oleksii Arestovych, a former member of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine said in 2024 that Ukraine never planned to fulfill the terms of Minsk II accords.[124]

Angela Merkel said in 2022 that the agreement had been "an attempt to give Ukraine time"; Reuters reported that Ukraine used this time to strengthen its armed forces.[125] In an interview to Semen Pegov in 2024, former head of DPR Alexander Borodai explained that, in military terms, the Russian intervention in Ukraine should have started already in 2014 but Russia was not ready for that in economic, military and propaganda sense, which is why Russia entered the Minsk Agreements with no intention of complying, but it gave it time to prepare the full-scale invasion.[126]

See also

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Minsk agreements

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The Minsk agreements consisted of two diplomatic protocols signed in , —the Minsk Protocol on September 5, 2014, and the Package of Measures on February 12, 2015—aimed at halting the war in 's region between government forces and Russian-backed separatists from the self-proclaimed and People's Republics. The initial protocol, agreed by the Trilateral Contact Group comprising representatives from , , the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the separatist entities, outlined 12 points including an immediate bilateral , OSCE monitoring, of power through constitutional reform, and for conflict participants. A follow-up memorandum on September 19 detailed parameters for ceasefire enforcement and heavy weapons withdrawal. Minsk II, endorsed at a summit of the involving the leaders of , , , and , expanded to 13 measures prioritizing comprehensive verification, illegal armed groups' withdrawal, prisoner exchanges "all for all," restoration of socioeconomic links, local elections under Ukrainian , and Ukrainian control over its contingent on political settlements. While the accords facilitated partial prisoner swaps and humanitarian access, achieving temporary de-escalations after intense fighting like the , they failed to secure lasting peace due to mutual violations documented by OSCE observers and irreconcilable disputes over sequencing— insisting on measures preceding political concessions, versus 's emphasis on autonomy first. Implementation stalled as enacted limited decentralization laws without separatist elections, while separatist areas held polls under their own auspices and maintained influence without full foreign military disengagement, perpetuating a marked by low-intensity shelling that claimed thousands of lives over subsequent years. The agreements' core tension lay in their ambiguous framework, which presupposed trust absent in the post-2014 Maidan upheaval, rendering causal enforcement mechanisms—like binding penalties for breaches—ineffective amid asymmetric commitments and external backing.

Historical Context

Euromaidan Revolution and Immediate Aftermath

The protests began on November 21, 2013, in Kyiv's square after President announced the suspension of signing an association agreement with the , a move attributed to economic incentives from , including a $15 billion loan and reduced gas prices offered during Yanukovych's meeting with in earlier that month. Initially sparked by university students decrying government corruption and the pivot toward Moscow over , the demonstrations rapidly expanded to encompass hundreds of thousands of participants across , with demands broadening to include Yanukovych's resignation and early elections. A violent police crackdown on , 2013, which dispersed student protesters using batons and , galvanized further mobilization, leading to the occupation of key government buildings and sustained encampments in . The government's enactment of restrictive "anti-protest" laws on January 16, 2014, which limited assembly rights and imposed penalties for helmets or masks, intensified confrontations and drew international condemnation. Escalation peaked between February 18 and 20, 2014, with street battles involving Berkut special police and protesters, resulting in at least 107 civilian deaths and 13 fatalities from gunfire, primarily attributed to snipers whose origins remain disputed in investigations. On February 21, 2014, Yanukovych and opposition leaders signed a mediation-brokered deal with foreign ministers from , , and , stipulating a unity government, restoration of the 2004 constitution limiting presidential powers, and presidential elections by December. However, amid ongoing clashes and reports of protester advances, Yanukovych fled that evening, eventually surfacing in . The (parliament) responded on February 22 by voting 328-0 to declare Yanukovych's self-removal from office due to his abandonment of constitutional duties, appointing as acting president and scheduling snap elections for May 25. In the immediate aftermath, the interim administration, dominated by pro-European factions, released imprisoned opposition figure , dismissed security service heads implicated in protest violence, and accelerated alignment efforts, including visa liberalization talks. This shift prompted purges of Yanukovych-era officials through initial measures and heightened regional tensions, particularly in Russian-speaking eastern areas where loyalty to the ousted president persisted. The transition, while broadly supported in western and , was characterized by Russian state media and officials as an unconstitutional coup facilitated by nationalist extremists, though parliamentary records indicate broad cross-party consensus in the vote.

Annexation of Crimea and Donbas Separatism

Following the Revolution of Dignity and the ouster of President on February 22, 2014, unmarked Russian military personnel—later dubbed ""—began seizing strategic sites in , including the parliament building in on February 27. The Crimean parliament, under duress, dismissed the local government and scheduled a referendum on reunification with for March 16, 2014, after initially planning it for May. results reported 96.77% approval for joining among 83% turnout, reflecting the region's ethnic Russian majority (about 58% per 2001 ) and historical ties to , though the vote occurred amid and excluded pro-Ukrainian options. Russian President signed a incorporating as a federal subject on March 18, 2014, prompting international condemnation and non-recognition by most states, including a UN resolution affirming Ukraine's . In eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, comprising Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with significant Russian-speaking populations (over 70% identifying Russian as native language in surveys), anti-Maidan protests erupted in March 2014 against the interim Kyiv government's perceived nationalist tilt, including fears over revoked Russian language protections. On April 6–7, 2014, armed separatists seized administrative buildings in Donetsk, proclaiming the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and calling for a referendum on autonomy or independence. Similarly, in Luhansk on April 27, militants declared the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), with both entities holding "referendums" on May 11, 2014, claiming 89–96% support for sovereignty amid low verified turnout and international dismissal as illegitimate. These declarations stemmed from local grievances, including economic ties to Russia and distrust of Kyiv post-Yanukovych, but were bolstered by influxes of pro-Russian activists and weapons. Ukrainian forces launched an "anti-terrorist operation" in mid-April to reclaim , clashing with separatist militias in battles like and , where DPR leader and others coordinated defenses. Evidence emerged of Russian involvement, including of convoys, T-72B3 tanks not in Ukraine's inventory, and personnel crossings, enabling separatists to hold urban centers despite Kyiv's numerical advantages. By August , separatists controlled about one-third of , with over 2,000 deaths in the initial phase, setting the stage for Minsk negotiations amid stalemated frontline fighting. This hybrid conflict dynamic—local amplified by Moscow's covert aid—highlighted causal factors like regional identity divides and post-Maidan power vacuums, beyond unilateral aggression narratives.

Initial Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

In the aftermath of the Revolution and the ouster of President in February 2014, pro-Russian protests erupted in eastern 's region, particularly in and oblasts, fueled by opposition to the interim government's policies, including the repeal of a 2012 language law favoring Russian in official use. Demonstrators, citing fears of cultural marginalization and alignment with the , seized administrative buildings in several cities starting in late March; on April 6, 2014, protesters took control of the regional administration building, demanding federalization or autonomy. The next day, April 7, self-proclaimed leaders announced the formation of the (DPR), declaring independence from amid ongoing occupations of government facilities. A similar declaration followed in on April 27, 2014, establishing the (LPR) after militants stormed the regional security service headquarters. The Ukrainian government, viewing these actions as an armed insurgency backed by external actors, responded decisively; on April 12, 2014, the and Defence Council authorized the launch of an Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) to regain control of seized territories and neutralize what it termed terrorist groups. Initial Ukrainian military efforts faltered due to the armed forces' poor readiness—stemming from years of corruption, underfunding, and post-Soviet decay—with early assaults on occupied sites like on April 13 resulting in limited gains and Ukrainian casualties exceeding 20 in the first clashes. Separatist forces, initially comprising local militants supplemented by Russian nationals such as (a former FSB officer who led the April 12 seizure of police stations), repelled advances using captured Ukrainian weapons and improvised defenses. Evidence of early Russian involvement includes Girkin's public admissions of organizing the insurgency to prevent ' "surrender" to , alongside intercepted communications and witness accounts of cross-border arms flows, though officially denied direct military participation at this stage. By late spring 2014, fighting intensified across key fronts: Ukrainian forces recaptured on June 13 after street battles killing over 30, but separatists consolidated in urban strongholds like and , where artillery duels and caused civilian displacement numbering in the tens of thousands. The conflict's scale escalated on July 17 with Flight MH17 being shot down over separatist-held territory near Torez, killing all 298 aboard; investigations by Dutch authorities and the group attributed the missile—a Buk system—to DPR forces, with launchers traced to 's 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, marking a pivotal international flashpoint. Ukrainian offensives in July liberated on July 5 after a three-month involving over 10,000 troops, but separatist counterattacks in August—bolstered by columns of armor and personnel crossing from , as documented by and OSCE monitors—encircled Ukrainian units at , resulting in up to 1,000 deaths in a cauldron battle by late August. These events, combining local grievances with irredentist agitation and covert external support, transformed sporadic unrest into sustained warfare, with over 2,000 combatant and civilian deaths by September 2014, setting the stage for ceasefire negotiations.

Negotiation Mechanisms

Normandy Format Establishment

The Normandy Format emerged in June 2014 amid escalating violence in following the Revolution, the annexation of , and the outbreak of separatist insurgencies backed by Russian forces. French President and German Chancellor , leveraging their positions as EU leaders, initiated bilateral discussions with their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts to broker de-escalation, bypassing broader formats like the Geneva talks that had stalled. This approach reflected and Berlin's preference for a smaller, leader-level to pressure and directly, excluding the and emphasizing European despite criticisms that it implicitly recognized as a co-equal party in the intra-Ukrainian conflict. The format's inaugural meeting occurred on June 6, 2014, in Bénouville, , on the sidelines of commemorations for the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings, hence its name. Participants included Hollande, Merkel, Russian President , and Ukrainian President-elect , who had assumed office two days prior after winning the May 25 election. The gathering yielded a joint statement committing to an immediate ceasefire in , withdrawal of unauthorized armed groups, humanitarian corridors for civilian evacuations, and OSCE monitoring, while endorsing the creation of a Trilateral Contact Group comprising , , and the OSCE to handle implementation details. Subsequent meetings in (June 12) and further consultations solidified the mechanism's structure, focusing on security guarantees and political settlements without enforceable timelines. Proponents viewed it as a pragmatic response to the Trilateral Contact Group's limitations, enabling high-level accountability; however, skeptics, including Ukrainian officials, later argued it constrained by equating aggressor and victim in negotiations and sidelining allies. The format's establishment marked a shift toward sustained, albeit informal, multilateral engagement, paving the way for the Protocol signed on September 5, 2014, though early ceasefires faltered amid mutual accusations of violations.

Role of the Trilateral Contact Group and OSCE

The Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) was formed in mid-2014 as a diplomatic mechanism to facilitate dialogue on resolving the conflict in , involving senior representatives from , , and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Its inaugural meeting took place on 31 July 2014 in , following consultations within the . The TCG operated through specialized working subgroups addressing security, political, humanitarian, and economic dimensions, with representatives from the self-proclaimed and People's Republics included in these subgroups at Russia's insistence, effectively granting them indirect negotiating influence despite not being formal parties. The TCG played a central role in drafting and endorsing the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014, which outlined a 12-point ceasefire plan, and the Minsk II Agreement on 12 February 2015, which expanded on security, political, and humanitarian measures amid ongoing fighting, including the battle for . These documents were signed by TCG members, including Ukraine's Second President , Russia's Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov, and OSCE Special Representative Heidi Tagliavini, alongside separatist leaders. Post-agreement, the TCG coordinated implementation efforts, issuing joint statements recommitting to ceasefire observance and Minsk provisions, though persistent violations highlighted enforcement limitations. The OSCE's involvement extended beyond TCG mediation to operational verification, with its Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to —deployed since 21 March 2014—mandated under the Minsk agreements to observe compliance, monitor heavy weapons withdrawal, and report on measures. The SMM conducted daily patrols and unmanned aerial to document incidents, providing factual reports to TCG meetings despite restricted access in separatist-held areas and risks to personnel from shelling and mines. OSCE mediators facilitated local s and prisoner exchanges, emphasizing its neutral intermediary function, though critics noted the mission's reports often faced politicization by conflicting parties.

Challenges in Multilateral Diplomacy

The multilateral diplomatic frameworks surrounding the Minsk agreements, including the Normandy Format and Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), faced inherent structural limitations that undermined their effectiveness. The Normandy Format, comprising representatives from France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia, operated without direct involvement from the United States, a key provider of military and financial support to Ukraine, which diminished its leverage and perceived impartiality in mediating between parties with asymmetric power dynamics. Similarly, the TCG—encompassing Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE—lacked binding authority, as its decisions were non-enforceable recommendations rather than treaties, signed by mid-level officials without the legal weight of heads of state commitments. These setups fostered a environment of mutual suspicion, where Russia viewed the process as a means to legitimize its influence over Donbas separatists, while Ukraine prioritized security guarantees amid ongoing territorial losses. A core impediment was the persistent disagreement over implementation sequencing, with insisting on prior political concessions—such as granting special status to regions, local elections under separatist influence, and constitutional amendments for —before full military withdrawal and restoration to . , conversely, demanded immediate security measures, including adherence and foreign armed formations' exit, to prevent entrenching Russian proxies in its , as evidenced by stalled debates over the Steinmeier formula, which proposed conditional elections tied to OSCE oversight but faltered on border sequencing. This impasse reflected fundamentally divergent conflict interpretations: framed it as interstate aggression requiring demilitarization first, while portrayed it as an internal Ukrainian civil strife necessitating political beforehand, rendering "simultaneous" implementation clauses in II ambiguous and unenforceable. Enforcement challenges further eroded diplomatic progress, as the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), tasked with verifying compliance, encountered repeated access denials from both sides and operated without coercive powers, documenting persistent violations—such as an average of 860 per day in 2018 and over 94,000 in 2021—without halting escalations like the 2015 offensive. The TCG's sub-working groups on security, political, humanitarian, and economic issues devolved into procedural stalemates, with vague Minsk language (e.g., undefined "foreign armed formations") enabling selective interpretations and blame-shifting, as neither party risked unilateral concessions amid fears of exploitation. and Germany's mediation efforts, while facilitating limited exchanges and humanitarian pauses, lacked the unified Western backing needed to pressure , highlighting the formats' reliance on goodwill in a context of unchecked proxy support and military imbalances.

Minsk Protocol (September 2014)

Negotiation and Signing Process

The Minsk Protocol emerged from consultations within the Trilateral Contact Group, formed in mid-2014 to address the escalating conflict in eastern Ukraine through dialogue between Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE. The group's representatives—Leonid Kuchma for Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov for Russia, and Heidi Tagliavini for the OSCE—coordinated efforts amid intensifying military actions following Ukraine's anti-terrorist operation. Initial meetings occurred in Kyiv and Donetsk, but negotiations shifted to Minsk, Belarus, for neutrality under Belarusian mediation. On 1 September 2014, the group convened in to deliberate proposals for an immediate , measures, and humanitarian corridors, building on prior discussions amid battles like that underscored the urgency for de-escalation. These talks involved input from DPR leader and LPR leader , who advocated for separatist interests despite lacking international recognition. The process emphasized bilateral commitments from and as guarantors, with OSCE oversight, though Russia's role as a direct signatory reflected its influence over separatist forces rather than formal status. The 12-point protocol was signed on 5 September 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group members and the DPR and LPR representatives, marking a tentative truce without comprehensive verification mechanisms at inception. The signing occurred after four days of finalizing terms, prioritizing cessation of hostilities from that date, though immediate violations highlighted the fragility of the unmonitored commitments. This agreement laid groundwork for subsequent memoranda but exposed early tensions in enforcement due to asymmetric military positions and disputed territorial control.

Key Provisions and Text Summary

The Minsk Protocol, formally titled "Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group regarding joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan for settlement of the situation in the and regions" and signed on 5 September 2014 in , , outlined a 12-point roadmap to halt hostilities in . The document was endorsed by representatives of , the Russian Federation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the self-proclaimed (DPR) and (LPR). Its provisions emphasized an immediate , political , of irregular forces, and humanitarian measures, without specifying a strict implementation sequence or enforcement mechanisms. The core security provision mandated an "immediate bilateral " in designated areas of the and regions, effective from midnight on 5 September 2014, with strict implementation to prevent violations. Additional security elements included the withdrawal of "illegal armed groups, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from " under OSCE monitoring, alongside a renunciation of use and restoration of an OSCE monitoring mission to verify compliance. Politically, the protocol called for decentralization of power through adoption of a law granting special status to certain Donetsk and Luhansk areas, based on trilateral procedures; local elections in those regions under Ukrainian law and a preliminary self-governance statute; pardons and amnesties via legislation prohibiting prosecution related to the conflict events; and dialogue on election modalities by late September 2014. Humanitarian and socioeconomic aspects addressed the release of all hostages and illegally detained persons; establishment of a humanitarian aid corridor; provision of humanitarian status to the Donbas region; and resolution of economic, financial, and social issues to restore ties, including personal security guarantees for negotiators and intensified trilateral working groups. The text lacked detailed timelines beyond the ceasefire start and election talks deadline, contributing to interpretive disputes in subsequent implementation.

Early Violations and Short-Term Efficacy

The Minsk Protocol's ceasefire provision took effect immediately upon signing on September 5, 2014, yet violations were reported within hours, including shelling in region areas under separatist control, as noted by Ukrainian military sources and international observers. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) documented ongoing incidents on September 6, such as small-arms fire and explosions near city and , indicating non-adherence to the halt in hostilities from both Ukrainian government forces and (DPR) militants. These early breaches undermined the protocol's security measures, with separatist groups failing to withdraw heavy weaponry as required, while Ukrainian artillery responses exacerbated the cycle of escalation. By late September, DPR forces intensified assaults on , launching the second phase of the battle on September 28 despite the protocol's prohibition on offensive actions, resulting in sustained that continued into . OSCE monitors reported restricted access to contested sites and observed non-compliance with establishment around key infrastructure, attributing violations to both sides but highlighting separatist advances as primary drivers of positional shifts. United Nations assessments in mid- confirmed that the sequential implementation—starting with ceasefire and withdrawal—had stalled, with clashes preventing full OSCE verification of arms pullback. In the short term, the protocol achieved partial de-escalation by curbing the large-scale separatist offensives seen in August 2014 around , facilitating limited humanitarian corridors and swaps under OSCE facilitation, which reduced displacement rates temporarily compared to summer peaks. However, its efficacy was constrained by absent enforcement mechanisms and mutual distrust, transitioning the conflict from high-intensity maneuvers to persistent low-level artillery exchanges and sniper fire, with OSCE logs showing recurrent breaches that eroded confidence and paved the way for Minsk II amid renewed escalations. This fragile pause highlighted the protocol's role as a stopgap rather than a resolution, as neither party fully disarmed illegal groups or restored Ukrainian as stipulated.

Minsk II Agreement (February 2015)

Context of Debaltseve Battle and Urgency

The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 failed to sustain a ceasefire, with violations escalating into major offensives by (DPR) and (LPR) forces in January 2015. These advances targeted key Ukrainian-held positions, including the salient, a rail hub controlling logistics between and oblasts and serving as a defensive bulge projecting into separatist territory. DPR and LPR militias, bolstered by regular Russian army units including artillery and armor, initiated the assault on around January 22, 2015, aiming to close an ("kettle") that trapped approximately 8,000 Ukrainian troops. By early February, the battle had intensified into one of the war's bloodiest engagements, with separatist forces employing tactics to sever supply lines and bombard Ukrainian positions, resulting in heavy casualties: Ukrainian reports documented 136 soldiers killed, 331 wounded, and loss of about 30% of in the salient's defense. maintained that lay outside I's designated lines, justifying continued fighting, while and separatists insisted it fell within the protocol's scope, using the offensive to consolidate territorial gains before negotiations. The rapid separatist momentum threatened a broader of Ukrainian lines in , prompting to mobilize reserves and appeal for international intervention amid fears of and high attrition. This military crisis generated acute urgency for Minsk II, as the Debaltseve fighting undermined diplomatic efforts and risked wider escalation, including potential involvement or on Russia. leaders—Ukrainian President , Russian President , German Chancellor , and French President —convened emergency talks in Minsk on February 11-12, 2015, after 17 hours of marathon negotiations brokered by OSCE mediators. The agreement, signed February 12, aimed to halt hostilities immediately, but clashes persisted in Debaltseve until Ukrainian forces withdrew on , yielding the town as a de facto separatist victory that highlighted the accords' fragile enforcement from inception. The security-related clauses in the Minsk II Package of Measures, adopted on February 12, 2015, emphasized immediate military de-escalation through enforcement, weapons disengagement, and international monitoring, while mandating the removal of external military elements from Ukrainian territory. Clause 1 required an immediate and comprehensive in particular districts of Ukraine's and regions, to take effect at 00:00 EET on February 15, 2015, with strict adherence by all parties. Clause 2 mandated the withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distances from the contact line, creating buffer zones of no less than 50 kilometers apart for systems of 100 mm caliber or larger and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) with calibres up to 300 mm, 70 kilometers for MLRS with calibres exceeding 300 mm, and either 50 kilometers or 35 kilometers for tanks (depending on existing storage sites), with the process to commence no later than the second day of the and conclude within 14 days. These zones were to be monitored via and other technical means, with participating parties notifying the OSCE of withdrawal locations. Clause 3 tasked the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) with effective monitoring and verification of the and heavy weapons withdrawal starting from the first day of pullback, employing all necessary technology to ensure transparency and compliance; the SMM was also to receive daily reports on ceasefire incidents and weapons movements. Complementing these, Clause 4 demanded the full withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from , alongside the and disbandment of all illegal armed groups, to occur under OSCE supervision, effectively aiming to eliminate external interference in the conflict zones. These provisions applied directly to and the armed formations in and , with participating in the Trilateral Contact Group but not formally obligated as a state in the text, reflecting its role as a mediator and signatory alongside OSCE representatives from the self-proclaimed republics. The clauses prioritized sequential security measures before political steps, though implementation hinged on mutual verification amid ongoing hostilities around at the time of signing.

Political and Humanitarian Clauses

The political clauses of the Minsk II Package of Measures, adopted on February 12, 2015, emphasized constitutional reforms in to address and special status for certain areas of the and regions. Specifically, point 11 required to enact constitutional amendments by the end of 2015 that would provide for as a core element, including explicit references to a "special status" for these regions, with the reforms entering into force upon the holding of local elections there. This special status was intended to grant enhanced local autonomy, language rights, and economic ties, though interpretations diverged: Ukrainian officials viewed it as temporary and reversible, while representatives from the and regions, supported by , insisted on permanent guarantees to prevent central government overreach. Local elections in the affected areas were mandated under points 4, 9, and 12, to occur by the end of 2015 following OSCE-monitored modalities compliant with Ukrainian law and the , with preconditions including and pardon for participants in events since February 2014 (point 5). Restoration of Ukrainian control over the state in the was tied to post-election timelines (point 9), contingent on elections and constitutional changes, while point 10 called for the removal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from by the end of 2015 to facilitate political normalization. These provisions aimed to reintegrate the regions politically but presupposed security preconditions, leading to sequencing disputes where prioritized and demilitarization before elections, contrary to the document's linkage of political steps to prior ceasefires. Humanitarian clauses focused on immediate relief and releases to alleviate suffering. Point 6 stipulated the unconditional exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons on an "all for all" basis, to be completed within five days after heavy weapons withdrawal, excluding those suspected of capital crimes, with implementation coordinated via the Trilateral Contact Group. Partial exchanges occurred, such as those in December 2017 and September 2019 totaling over 200 individuals, but full compliance lagged due to verification disputes and ongoing detentions. Point 7 directed measures to improve the humanitarian situation in , including safe delivery of through international mechanisms like the International Committee of the Red Cross, with a timetable for supporting internally displaced persons. Humanitarian corridors were to be established for distribution, though blockages persisted, as documented in OSCE reports citing shelling and restrictions on both sides impeding access. These clauses prioritized civilian welfare amid the fighting that preceded the agreement, yet empirical data from subsequent monitoring indicated incomplete fulfillment, with convoys frequently delayed or denied entry.

Sequencing Disputes and Implementation Framework

The Minsk II agreement outlined a sequence of 13 measures intended to resolve the conflict, but its text provided no explicit timeline or mandatory order for implementation beyond limited linkages, fostering immediate disputes over prioritization. Security provisions, such as an immediate (point 1), withdrawal of heavy weaponry (point 2), and OSCE monitoring (point 3), were positioned early in the document, while political steps—including constitutional reforms for special status in and regions (point 11), local elections (point 7), and restoration of Ukrainian border control only after those elections (point 9)—appeared later, implying to some interpreters a conditional progression where political concessions preceded full security guarantees. This structure lacked binding enforcement mechanisms, relying instead on the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) for dialogue and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) for ceasefire verification, without authority to adjudicate sequencing conflicts. Ukraine maintained that security measures must be fully executed first to prevent separatist entrenchment, arguing that proceeding with political reforms under ongoing hostilities would legitimize de facto Russian control over territories; conditioned steps like elections and special status laws on verifiable withdrawals and ceasefires, citing persistent shelling and foreign troop presence as barriers. In contrast, and Donetsk/Luhansk representatives insisted the agreement did not prescribe a linear sequence, advocating simultaneous progress where initiate political reforms—such as adopting a special status law by March 14, 2015 (per point 11)—even amid partial ceasefires, to enable elections under local conditions before border restoration, viewing Ukrainian delays as sabotage of the "political track." These positions reflected irreconcilable views on : prioritized regaining territorial control to neutralize threats, while emphasized federalization-like reforms to embed separatist gains, exacerbating non-compliance claims from both sides. The implementation framework compounded these disputes through its vagueness and decentralized oversight, with no dedicated arbitration body or penalties for sequencing violations; follow-up efforts, such as TCG sub-groups on , political, and humanitarian issues, produced clarifying memoranda (e.g., February on pullback modalities), but these failed to resolve core ambiguities, as evidenced by stalled summits where leaders reiterated incompatible interpretations without breakthroughs. OSCE reports documented over 100,000 ceasefire violations in alone, undermining trust in sequential reciprocity, while political clauses hinged on Ukrainian legislative action contingent on progress, perpetuating a cycle where each party accused the other of bad faith—Ukraine highlighting incomplete withdrawals, and Russia decrying inaction on decentralization laws. This framework's reliance on voluntary compliance, absent coercive incentives or third-party guarantees, rendered the agreements susceptible to interpretive leverage, contributing to their suspension by 2016.

Interim Developments (2015-2021)

Follow-Up Memoranda and Partial Ceasefires

Following Minsk II, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG)—comprising representatives from , , and the OSCE—convened regularly to negotiate supplementary measures aimed at reinforcing the and facilitating localized disengagements, though these efforts yielded only intermittent reductions in hostilities. These included seasonal truces tied to agricultural or educational cycles, such as the "harvest ceasefire" and "back to school ceasefire," which were proclaimed annually from 2015 to 2019 but frequently collapsed within days due to reported shelling and sniper fire from both sides. For instance, a back-to-school ceasefire agreed on , 2017, was set to commence on but faced immediate accusations of violations, including mortar attacks, resulting in civilian injuries. Similar holiday truces for and New Year in 2015–2018, along with "bread ceasefires" in 2017–2019 to enable safe farming, provided brief lulls but failed to prevent over 10,000 ceasefire breaches recorded by OSCE monitors in 2017 alone. Efforts also focused on implementing Minsk II's provision for troop disengagement in designated pilot areas to create buffer zones, with TCG agreements in 2016 specifying sites like Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske. Partial successes occurred sporadically; for example, disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was completed in November 2019 after multiple failed attempts, allowing for infrastructure repairs and limited civilian crossings, while Zolote and Petrivske followed in late 2019 amid heightened TCG pressure. However, OSCE verification reports documented re-entries of forces and weapons into these zones, undermining the withdrawals, with full compliance never achieved across the three sites simultaneously. A notable escalation in TCG activity culminated in the July 22, 2020, agreement for a "full and comprehensive " effective from July 27, 2020, which prohibited offensive actions, sniper fire, and targeting while mandating verification by OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission. This measure initially reduced violence significantly, with OSCE data showing a tenfold drop in violations over the subsequent 103 days compared to prior baselines, enabling prisoner exchanges and humanitarian access. Yet, by early 2021, infractions resumed, including over 90 daily explosions reported in April, highlighting the fragility of these TCG-brokered pauses without broader enforcement mechanisms. Overall, these follow-up initiatives maintained a but did not resolve underlying Minsk II implementation gaps, as evidenced by persistent OSCE tallies of thousands of annual violations through 2021.

Steinmeier Formula Proposal and Debates

The Steinmeier Formula, proposed by then-German Foreign Minister in October 2016 during discussions, outlined a mechanism for sequencing the political provisions of the Minsk II agreement. It specified that local elections in the and regions would occur under Ukrainian legal frameworks and OSCE monitoring, with a special self-governance status for the territories entering into force on election day; however, the elections' validity and the status' permanence would be confirmed only after OSCE verification of the polls as free and fair. This approach aimed to resolve the impasse over whether security measures (such as troop withdrawals and border control restoration) should precede political steps like elections and , as demanded by , or follow them, as insisted by . Ukraine's government under President rejected the formula in 2016-2018, arguing it risked legitimizing Russian-backed separatist administrations by allowing elections in areas still under their control, without prior Ukrainian restoration of security and administrative authority. Ukrainian nationalists and opposition figures, including in , labeled it a potential "capitulation" that could embed veto powers for separatists over national policy, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and enabling Russian influence to persist. and the self-proclaimed and People's Republics endorsed it, viewing the formula as fulfilling Minsk II's emphasis on simultaneous political reforms to grant the regions , which they claimed would prevent from reimposing central control post-election and ensure for Russian-speaking populations. Under President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine formally endorsed the formula on October 1, 2019, in the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, prompting immediate protests in Kyiv where demonstrators accused the administration of betraying national interests by prioritizing political concessions over military disengagement. Zelenskyy clarified that endorsement did not imply constitutional changes or immediate elections, insisting on preconditions like full ceasefire verification and foreign troop withdrawal, but critics contended this acceptance still advanced Russia's narrative of equivalence between Ukrainian forces and separatists, potentially freezing the conflict without resolving underlying territorial disputes. Moscow praised the move as progress toward Minsk implementation, though subsequent Normandy summits in Paris (December 2019) yielded no breakthroughs on sequencing, highlighting persistent divergences where Russia prioritized enshrined special status to safeguard its strategic leverage in Donbas. International observers, including from the International Crisis Group, noted the formula's potential to restart dialogue but warned of risks if not paired with robust security guarantees, as separatist-held areas lacked Ukrainian administrative presence, making fair elections logistically challenging.

OSCE Monitoring Reports on Compliance

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to (SMM), deployed following the Minsk Protocol of 2014 and expanded under Minsk II in February 2015, was tasked with observing and verifying compliance with ceasefire terms, heavy weapons withdrawals, and disengagement in specified areas along the contact line in and regions. The SMM's daily and thematic reports documented ongoing violations, emphasizing that neither side fully adhered to the agreements' security provisions, with monitoring often hampered by restrictions on access imposed by both Ukrainian forces and armed formations in Russian-controlled areas. Between 2015 and 2021, the mission recorded persistent ceasefire breaches, including small-arms fire, artillery, and mortar use, without consistent attribution to specific actors to preserve neutrality, though reports noted concentrations near key hotspots like , , and . Ceasefire compliance remained elusive, as evidenced by escalating violation counts: the SMM tallied over 94,000 incidents in alone, contributing to a cumulative total exceeding 1.5 million since the Minsk agreements' inception, primarily manifested as explosions and bursts of fire incompatible with civilian safety. These reports highlighted seasonal spikes, such as intensified shelling during 2015-2016 follow-up memoranda periods, and a failure to sustain indefinite cessations despite periodic truces. Heavy weapons monitoring revealed incomplete withdrawals; while some artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems were relocated to designated storage sites, the SMM frequently observed unauthorized movements, presence beyond pullback lines, and discrepancies between declared inventories and verified positions, undermining Minsk II's point 3 requirements. Disengagement efforts in seven agreed areas, mandated by the 2016 addendum, saw partial successes but recurrent re-engagements; for instance, the SMM verified temporary halts in hostilities at Zolote and Petrivske in 2019-2020, yet reported subsequent inflows of personnel and equipment violating non-use regimes. Humanitarian monitoring under clauses, including exchanges and mine clearance, was sporadically facilitated but curtailed by ongoing fighting and access denials, with the mission noting over 1,000 impact sites from violations through 2021. Overall, OSCE assessments underscored systemic non-compliance, attributing partial efficacy to verification gaps rather than party commitments, as undefined contact lines and ambiguous violation criteria in the agreements complicated enforcement. The SMM's impartial methodology, incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles and from 2016 onward, provided empirical data but faced criticism for underreporting due to safety risks and third-party restrictions, particularly in non-government-controlled territories.

Attributions of Violations

Ceasefire and Heavy Weapons Withdrawal Failures

The Minsk II Agreement, signed on February 12, 2015, mandated an immediate ceasefire along the contact line in and regions, effective from February 15, 2015, alongside the withdrawal of heavy weapons—such as pieces over 100 mm, multiple-launch systems, and tanks—to separation lines at least 50 km apart for and 70 km for MLRS, creating monitored disengagement zones. However, the ceasefire collapsed almost immediately, with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to recording over 1,000 ceasefire violations in the first week alone, including heavy fire near despite the agreement's timing during ongoing battles there. Persistent shelling and small-arms fire undermined the truce, as neither Ukrainian forces nor and (DPR/LPR) militias fully halted offensive actions, leading to hundreds of civilian and military casualties annually through 2021. Heavy weapons withdrawal provisions fared no better, with OSCE SMM reports documenting recurrent placements of prohibited , tanks, and MLRS within designated zones on both sides of the . For instance, by March 2015, monitors verified only partial withdrawals, noting that Ukrainian forces had relocated some systems but left others in forward positions, while DPR/LPR forces similarly retained or repositioned closer to the front lines, often citing retaliatory needs. Over the following years, SMM drone footage and ground observations frequently detected violations, such as multiple 122 mm howitzers and Grad systems inside forbidden areas in region as late as 2018, exacerbating escalation risks and complicating verification due to restricted access and minefields. These lapses contributed to cycles of retaliation, as weapons intended for storage were redeployed during flare-ups, rendering the 25 km disengagement zones around hotspots like and Yuzhnoye largely ineffective. Annual violation tallies underscored systemic non-compliance: the OSCE SMM logged approximately 860 ceasefire breaches per day on average in 2018, predominantly involving gunfire and explosions from heavy arms, though numbers declined somewhat to around 94,000 total in amid partial de-escalations but still far exceeding zero-tolerance thresholds. Ambiguities in the agreements—lacking precise definitions of the contact line or violation thresholds—hindered enforcement, while mutual distrust prevented third-party verification of withdrawals, allowing both parties to claim compliance selectively. Ukrainian officials attributed DPR/LPR intransigence to Russian backing, whereas and pro-Russian sources claimed intense Ukrainian shelling in Donbas as the primary provocation and disruption to ceasefires, though these claims lack independent confirmation of Kyiv's dominant role; empirical monitoring revealed bidirectional failures without resolution mechanisms to impose accountability. By , cumulative breaches exceeded 1.5 million since Minsk I, signaling the security clauses' collapse and foreshadowing broader implementation breakdowns.

Russian Military Involvement Claims

Ukraine and Western governments repeatedly claimed that Russian regular military forces maintained a direct presence in the Donbas separatist areas after the Minsk II agreement of February 12, 2015, violating ceasefire terms by providing operational command, troops, and logistics to (DPR) and (LPR) forces. These assertions were supported by instances of captured personnel, such as two Russian paratroopers from the 98th Airborne Division apprehended by Ukrainian forces near Izvarino on August 25, 2014, who confessed to entering on orders to support separatists, though initially described the border crossing as accidental before admitting they were active-duty soldiers who had been demobilized. Similarly, in May 2015, announced the capture of two more alleged Russian soldiers fighting in , intending to try them on charges, with conceding they were former servicemen acting as volunteers rather than official forces. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reports documented recurring observations of military convoys, including heavy weapons and vehicles with Russian military markings, crossing into separatist-held territories during 2015-2021, which cited as evidence of sustained Russian logistical support undermining Minsk-mandated withdrawals. For instance, OSCE spot reports from November 2018 noted significant movements of tanks, troops, and in DPR areas, aligning with Ukrainian intelligence claims of Russian-supplied T-72B tanks and advanced communications systems not originating from Ukrainian stockpiles. Independent analyses, such as a 2021 study by Conflict Armament Research, traced separatist grenade launchers, rifles, and land mines to recent Russian production models never documented in Ukrainian army inventories, indicating cross-border transfers post-Minsk II. In December 2015, Russian President acknowledged a limited "military presence" in for unspecified purposes but denied the involvement of regular army units, framing it as non-official support amid overwhelming contrary indicators like serial-numbered equipment. Russia consistently rejected accusations of deploying active-duty troops after early 2015, asserting that any Russian nationals in were volunteers or retirees without state direction, and attributing advanced weaponry to captured Ukrainian stocks or local . This stance faced contradiction in December 2021 when a Russian ruling inadvertently referred to as "stationed" in for a compensation case involving a deceased fighter, prompting dismissal as a despite persistent OSCE-verified border incursions. Ukrainian estimates in mid-2015 placed up to 9,000 Russian soldiers among 42,500 separatist fighters, a figure echoed in later Western assessments of involving mercenaries like affiliates, though direct regular army scale diminished post-Debaltseve battle in February 2015. Critics of these claims, including Russian officials, highlighted OSCE limitations in verifying troop nationalities amid restricted access, arguing that separatist capabilities stemmed from internal mobilization rather than Moscow-orchestrated invasions.

Ukrainian Political Reforms Resistance

Ukraine's implementation of the Minsk II agreement's political clauses, particularly those requiring and special status for the and regions, encountered substantial internal opposition from the outset. Minsk II's point 11 mandated the adoption of a granting "special status" to certain districts in these regions, alongside constitutional amendments for by the end of 2015, to enable local elections under Ukrainian . Ukrainian authorities, under President , passed a temporary on the "special order of local self-government" in certain districts on March 17, 2015, but it was limited to one year, applied only to government-controlled areas, and faced immediate protests from nationalist groups in who viewed it as capitulation to Russian-backed separatists. This resistance stemmed from concerns over sovereignty erosion and the potential legitimization of armed groups without prior guarantees. Poroshenko's administration argued for a "security first" sequencing, insisting that political reforms could not precede a verifiable and restoration of , an interpretation that diverged from Russia's demand for simultaneous implementation. Constitutional reforms were proposed in but stalled in due to threats and opposition from hardline factions, with no permanent special status enshrined by the deadline. The law was renewed annually as provisional through , but never extended to separatist-held territories, effectively suspending full compliance. Under President , elected in 2019 on promises to end the Donbas war, initial steps like endorsing the Steinmeier formula in October 2019—which conditioned special status on OSCE-monitored elections—quickly unraveled amid domestic backlash, including blockades of the by veterans and far-right activists. Zelenskyy's government maintained the provisional status renewals but refused permanent autonomy guarantees, prioritizing military strengthening and integration over concessions perceived as rewarding aggression. By 2021, Ukrainian officials openly described as unviable without Russian withdrawal, reflecting entrenched political will against reforms that could embed Russian influence in Ukraine's governance. This stance, criticized by and pro-Russian sources as deliberate disruption of the Minsk agreements through failure to implement political provisions, and by some Western analysts for breaching the agreements' unconditional phrasing, aligned with polls showing over 70% opposition to special status in 2019.

Diverse Perspectives on the Agreements

Ukrainian Official and Nationalist Views

Ukrainian officials have consistently portrayed the Minsk agreements as frameworks imposed under military duress, particularly Minsk II signed on February 12, 2015, amid ongoing fighting in , emphasizing that full implementation required prior Russian fulfillment of security provisions such as ceasefire observance, heavy weapons withdrawal, and troop pullback before any political steps like or elections. President , who endorsed Minsk II, described it as a mechanism to guarantee Ukraine's and compel Russian forces' withdrawal, though he prioritized "security first" sequencing to avoid conceding leverage to without verified compliance. His administration advanced partial measures, such as a conditional special status law for passed on September 16, 2014, but tied it to Russian , reflecting a view that the accords inadequately addressed Russia's role as aggressor rather than mere mediator. Under President , elected in April 2019 on promises to resolve the conflict, official rhetoric hardened against 's viability, with admitting in a February 2023 interview that he had informed German Chancellor and French President upon taking office that could not implement the agreements "like that," instead using the pause to bolster capabilities against perceived Russian intransigence. By September 2024, labeled a "trap" that froze the conflict, enabling Russian forces to regroup and prepare for escalation without reciprocal de-escalation from , arguing it legitimized separatist entities without restoring Ukrainian . Ukrainian diplomats have insisted Russia be designated a direct party to the conflict with binding obligations, criticizing for treating DPR and LPR representatives as independent actors and lacking enforcement against violations documented in over 1.5 million OSCE breaches attributed primarily to separatist/Russian sides by 2021. Ukrainian nationalists, including far-left and far-right factions like and Azov-linked groups, have rejected Minsk as a capitulatory framework that would embed Russian influence via "special status" for , potentially granting veto power over national policy and undermining sovereignty, with protests erupting in against the Steinmeier —which proposed elections before full Ukrainian administrative restoration—as a "" for . This "anti-capitulation" campaign, amplified by figures like former Arsen Avakov's allies, framed political concessions as betrayal akin to the 2014 revolution's undoing, warning that implementation risked civil unrest or "Maidan 3.0" uprisings, as evidenced by mass demonstrations in on October 6, , following Zelenskyy's initial endorsement of the . Nationalists prioritized military fortification over , viewing Minsk's failure not as Ukrainian obstruction but as empirical proof of Russia's intent to retain hybrid control, substantiated by persistent separatist governance under Russian funding exceeding $1 billion annually by 2020 estimates.

Russian Government and Strategic Rationale

The Russian government endorsed the Minsk Protocol of September 5, , and Minsk II of February 12, 2015, as internationally mediated frameworks to halt hostilities in , involving immediate ceasefires, heavy weapons withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian access, while insisting on Ukraine's fulfillment of political obligations like constitutional and special status for and regions. President repeatedly described the agreements as viable paths to peaceful resolution, emphasizing in July 2021 that they addressed the conflict's root causes stemming from the events, which characterized as a Western-backed coup leading to against Russian-speakers through language laws and military operations in the southeast. Foreign Minister echoed this, stating in multiple forums that Minsk required parallel implementation of security and political measures, with Ukraine obligated to amend its by December 2015 to grant autonomy, enable local elections under Ukrainian law with OSCE oversight, and provide —steps claimed Kyiv systematically evaded under Western encouragement. Strategically, rationalized Minsk as a mechanism to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in , where over 14,000 deaths had occurred by 2021 per UN estimates, by freezing the conflict lines and compelling to negotiate federal-like arrangements that would preserve Russian cultural and linguistic influence in the east, thereby countering perceived encroachment and Ukrainian centralization efforts post-2014. Russian officials argued the accords bought time for self-defense forces to consolidate against Ukrainian shelling—documented in OSCE reports totaling over 1 million ceasefire violations annually from 2015-2021, disproportionately attributed to by , with pro-Russian sources claiming intense Ukrainian shelling disrupted the agreements, though lacking independent confirmation of Kyiv's dominant role—while exposing 's unwillingness to devolve power, which viewed as evidence of irredentist intent to suppress regional identities. This perspective framed Minsk not as a concession but as enforced realism: without political concessions to , military stalemate would persist, undermining 's sovereignty claims and justifying 's role as guarantor rather than , despite Western intelligence reports of Russian arms and personnel support to separatists exceeding declared of 10 billion rubles by 2017. By late 2021, Putin declared "dead" due to Ukraine's non-implementation—citing stalled elections originally slated for and unpassed special status laws—blaming Western guarantors like and for failing to pressure , as evidenced by the Normandy Format's 2019 Paris summit yielding only vague pledges without enforcement. Lavrov reinforced this in 2022, asserting that Ukraine's military buildup, including 100,000 troops near by February, violated Minsk's demilitarization clauses and reflected a Western pivot to arming over diplomacy, rendering the agreements obsolete and necessitating recognition of and independence on February 21, 2022, to protect populations from alleged —a claim Russia substantiated with references to over 3,000 civilian deaths in since 2014 per its data, though contested by OSCE figures showing mutual violations. This rationale underscored Moscow's broader causal view: Minsk's collapse validated preemptive action to secure against a fortified, NATO-aligned , prioritizing ethnic kin protection over indefinite truce.

Separatist Positions in DPR and LPR

Leaders of the self-proclaimed (DPR) and (LPR), including and for the DPR and followed by for the LPR, signed the Minsk II agreement on February 12, 2015, as direct parties alongside , , , , and the OSCE. They presented the accords as a pathway to resolving the conflict through political granting the republics special status within Ukraine, including economic , linguistic rights for Russian speakers, and veto powers over local security matters, while rejecting full without these guarantees. Separatist authorities consistently argued for a specific implementation sequence prioritizing political reforms over immediate military , contending that II's provisions—such as Ukraine's adoption of a on special status by December 31, 2015, for combatants, and local elections organized under republican —must precede heavy weapons withdrawal and Ukrainian regaining of . This interpretation stemmed from their view that without enshrined , any would expose the republics to renewed Ukrainian offensives, as experienced in 2014 battles like , where fighting continued post- I signature on September 5, 2014. DPR head Zakharchenko emphasized in March 2017 that II's full execution, starting with these political steps, represented the sole viable crisis resolution, accusing of stalling to force unilateral DPR/LPR capitulation. DPR and LPR officials repeatedly demanded direct bilateral negotiations with , which refused, classifying separatist entities as terrorist organizations and insisting on talks only via the Trilateral Contact Group. They claimed this Ukrainian stance violated Minsk's spirit of dialogue, blocking progress on issues like prisoner exchanges and economic restoration, with over 10,000 such swaps cited as partial successes amid broader impasse by 2021. In June 2021, Pushilin stated that Minsk's framework, which nominally omitted explicit recognition of the republics' , impeded even DPR-LPR unification efforts, underscoring their perception of the agreements as constraining without reciprocal Ukrainian concessions. The separatists attributed ceasefire failures primarily to Ukrainian forces, reporting thousands of shelling incidents annually on civilian areas—such as the killing 30 and ongoing suburb strikes—while maintaining their own defensive positions and limited offensives only in response. They criticized Ukraine's 2015 constitutional amendments as insufficient, lacking permanent special status and enforcement, and held unauthorized "elections" in November 2018 for Zakharchenko's successors (Pushilin in DPR, Pasechnik in LPR), arguing these fulfilled Minsk's electoral intent absent Kyiv's cooperation. By late 2021, amid escalating tensions, DPR/LPR statements framed Minsk as exhausted due to Ukraine's non-compliance, justifying appeals for Russian protection without formally abandoning the accords until Moscow's , 2022, recognition.

Western and International Analyst Critiques

Western analysts have frequently criticized the Minsk agreements for their flawed sequencing of , which required to enact constitutional reforms granting special status to regions—controlled by Russian-backed separatists—prior to regaining full control of its border with . This structure, outlined in Minsk II on February 12, 2015, positioned to negotiate from a position of vulnerability, as separatist elections and local governance under Article 11 would precede demilitarization and border restoration under Article 9 and 12, effectively legitimizing Russian influence without reciprocal security concessions. International experts, including those from the , have highlighted the agreements' inherent fragility due to unresolved ambiguities, such as the lack of precise mechanisms for heavy weapons withdrawal verification and the absence of binding enforcement tied to sanctions relief for . Steven Pifer noted in 2016 that Minsk II left "difficult issues for later," fostering ongoing disputes over interpretations, with insisting on political concessions first while prioritized security measures—a deadlock that persisted through 2021 with over 14,000 deaths attributed to non-compliance by both sides per OSCE data. Chatham House analyses underscore a core conundrum: the agreements embodied conflicting sovereignty concepts, where Western-backed Ukrainian views treated as integral territory requiring reintegration under Kyiv's authority, whereas Russian interpretations implied federalization diluting central control, rendering consensus impossible without addressing underlying disputes formalized in UN Resolution 68/262 on March 27, 2014. This mismatch, compounded by the exclusion of broader NATO-related security assurances, led experts like those at the to argue that Minsk perpetuated a , enabling Russian leverage without incentivizing full withdrawal, as evidenced by continued separatist military buildups reported in OSCE Special Monitoring Mission updates through 2021. Further critiques from realist perspectives, such as those in Beyond Intractability studies, apply spoiler theory to explain persistent ceasefire violations, attributing failures to actors exploiting the agreements' weak monitoring—OSCE observers numbered only around 1,000 by , insufficient for a 400 km frontline—allowing incremental escalations like the 2015 Debaltseve battle, where over 6,000 violations were logged post- II signing. Carnegie Endowment scholars warn that such design flaws risk entrenching hybrid control in future armistices, urging Western policymakers to prioritize verifiable sequencing and third-party guarantees absent in Minsk, which lacked provisions akin to those in Dayton Accords for Bosnia. Overall, these analyses portray Minsk as a hasty diplomatic expedient—negotiated in under 12 hours for Minsk II—overlooking causal drivers like mutual distrust rooted in the 2014 annexation, thus prioritizing tactical pauses over sustainable resolution.

Collapse and Relation to 2022 Invasion

Escalating Tensions Pre-2022

Despite the Minsk II agreement's provisions for a and heavy weapons withdrawal, violations persisted throughout the late , with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) documenting 320,130 ceasefire violations in 2016 alone, including heavy fire near the contact line. By 2018, the SMM recorded 312,554 violations, often involving fire, though numbers declined to 93,902 in 2021 amid partial de-escalation efforts but still reflecting entrenched mutual distrust. These incidents, concentrated around hotspots like and , resulted in sporadic casualties and underscored the agreements' failure to enforce disengagement, as both Ukrainian forces and (DPR) militants frequently positioned prohibited weapons within withdrawal zones. Ukrainian authorities resisted implementing Minsk-mandated political reforms, such as granting special status to regions, citing security risks from unwithdrawn Russian-backed forces; a 2019 bill on passed but omitted explicit autonomy provisions, stalling talks. This impasse fueled separatist grievances and Russian accusations of Ukrainian non-compliance, while Ukraine reported over 400 breaches by DPR/LPR forces monthly in 2020, often involving sniper fire and drone incursions. Concurrently, both sides fortified positions, with Ukrainian military rotations increasing near the and DPR/LPR conscripting fighters, perpetuating a low-intensity that claimed hundreds of lives annually despite exchanges and occasional truces. Tensions sharply escalated in with Russia's unprecedented troop deployments, amassing approximately 100,000-150,000 soldiers along Ukraine's borders by April, including exercises in and near , prompting alerts and Ukrainian mobilization. Russia framed these as defensive responses to alleged Ukrainian preparations for a offensive, though no evidence of large-scale Ukrainian incursions materialized; a second buildup of around 90,000 troops occurred in October-November, coinciding with intensified shelling that killed over 50 in the final months of . OSCE reports noted a uptick in violations, with mutual accusations exacerbating the deadlock, as Minsk's —security followed by politics—collapsed under reciprocal non-fulfillment, eroding prospects for .

Russian Recognition of DPR/LPR Independence

On February 21, 2022, Russian President signed two executive orders formally recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the (DPR) and (LPR), entities that had declared independence from in May 2014 following referendums not recognized internationally. In a televised address preceding the signing, Putin justified the decision by alleging systematic violations of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine, including failure to grant special status to Donbas regions, conduct local elections, and ensure , which he claimed had rendered the accords "stillborn" and ineffective since their . He further asserted that the recognition addressed an ongoing "" against Russian-speaking populations in , a claim echoed in Russian state narratives but contested by international observers for lacking independent verification amid restricted access to the regions. The move effectively repudiated the Minsk framework, which presupposed DPR and LPR reintegration into under autonomy rather than sovereign separation, as outlined in Protocol I (September 2014) and Minsk II (February 2015). Russian officials, including Foreign Minister , maintained that 's refusal to implement political provisions—such as constitutional amendments for autonomy—had long undermined the agreements, positioning recognition as a protective measure rather than a breach. However, Ukrainian authorities and Western analysts viewed it as Russia's deliberate withdrawal from Minsk commitments, accelerating the diplomatic crisis; 's Foreign Ministry stated the act nullified any legal basis for the accords and invited military escalation. Immediately following recognition, established diplomatic relations with DPR and LPR leaders, signing treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance on , , which included provisions for military support and , further solidifying their de facto alignment with . These pacts invoked collective self-defense clauses, later cited by Putin on February 24 to authorize 's "special military operation" across , framing it as intervention to protect the recognized republics from alleged . Prior to 2022, had avoided formal recognition to preserve Minsk negotiations, providing indirect via proxies, but escalating border incidents and stalled talks in the prompted the shift, as evidenced by DPR/LPR appeals for recognition in December 2021. No other UN member states recognized the entities at the time, with the and imposing sanctions on , deeming the recognition a violation of 's territorial integrity under the 1994 and UN Charter. The protracted failure of the Minsk agreements to achieve either a sustainable or political resolution in created a causal pathway to escalation by entrenching a hybrid war dynamic, where low-level hostilities persisted amid disputed implementation sequences—Ukraine insisting on Russian withdrawal of heavy weapons and foreign forces before political concessions, while demanded constitutional for the separatist regions as a prerequisite. OSCE monitoring reported over 14,000 violations in 2021 alone, with causing and casualties that numbered in the hundreds annually, sustaining narratives of existential threat on both sides and eroding any diplomatic momentum. Russia's official position framed Ukraine's inaction on Minsk II's political elements—such as special status for and oblasts, local elections under Ukrainian law, and for separatist fighters—as a deliberate that necessitated protective measures for ethnic facing alleged , with cumulative deaths in exceeding 14,000 since 2014 cited as evidence of unaddressed aggression. This interpretation gained traction in as justification for abandoning the framework, particularly after stalled talks in 2021 yielded no breakthroughs despite French and German efforts. On February 21, 2022, President formally recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed (DPR) and (LPR), declaring the Minsk agreements effectively defunct due to Kyiv's non-compliance and signing treaties of and mutual assistance that committed to their defense. This step directly unraveled the accords' provisions, as the DPR and LPR claimed control over significant portions of and oblasts—approximately 40% and 30% respectively—transforming the frozen conflict into a recognized dispute and providing a legal pretext for military intervention. The full-scale invasion launched on February 24, 2022, was causally linked to this collapse, with Russian military doctrine invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter for collective self-defense of the allied republics, while operations extended beyond to and , ostensibly to neutralize NATO-aligned threats exacerbated by the unresolved eastern front. Empirical assessments indicate that Minsk's structural impasse—lacking enforcement mechanisms or third-party guarantees—allowed Russia to leverage the for broader geopolitical aims, including in , rather than mere stabilization, as evidenced by pre-invasion troop buildups exceeding 190,000 personnel along Ukraine's borders by early 2022. Critiques from Western analysts, while attributing primary agency to Moscow's revanchist ambitions, acknowledge that Ukraine's domestic political resistance to Minsk's devolution clauses—viewed as concessions to Russian proxies—contributed to the deadlock, perpetuating a cycle where partial security compliance (e.g., limited heavy weapons pullbacks) failed to build trust for political steps. This mutual intransigence, unmitigated by guarantors like and , empirically heightened invasion risks by signaling to that diplomatic coercion had exhausted its leverage without yielding federalization or neutrality commitments from .

Overall Assessment

Limited Achievements and Empirical Outcomes

The Minsk II agreement, signed on February 12, 2015, achieved a temporary reduction in the intensity of fighting in , with large-scale battles subsiding after the initial months, though sporadic clashes persisted. exchanges occurred intermittently, totaling several thousand detainees released between 2015 and 2021, facilitated through the Trilateral Contact Group framework. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) was expanded to oversee implementation, providing daily reports on the and enabling some humanitarian access corridors. Despite these measures, the ceasefire regime failed to hold comprehensively, with the OSCE SMM documenting over 1.5 million violations since Minsk II's entry into force, including 94,000 in 2021 alone. In the week prior to February 21, 2022, the SMM recorded 2,158 violations in region, comprising 1,100 explosions. Empirical data indicate contributed to breaches, though access restrictions—82 instances by Russian-separatist forces versus 54 by Ukrainian in May 2017—hindered impartial verification. Casualty figures underscore the agreements' inability to prevent ongoing lethality: between April 2014 and February 2022, the conflict claimed over 14,000 lives, with estimates specifying 3,404 civilian deaths through December 2021, including impacts from the MH17 downing. Of these, approximately 10,900 were combatants, reflecting sustained military engagements rather than . Politically, none of Minsk II's core provisions—such as constitutional amendments for special status in and regions, local elections under Ukrainian law, or full withdrawal of foreign armed formations—were implemented by 2022. conditioned political steps on security guarantees, including , which rejected, resulting in a where separatist entities consolidated administrative control under Russian oversight. This stasis preserved territorial divisions without resolving underlying sovereignty disputes, yielding no durable .

Structural Flaws from First-Principles Analysis

The Minsk agreements, particularly Minsk II signed on February 12, 2015, exhibited inherent structural deficiencies that rendered sustainable implementation improbable, independent of parties' . At their core, effective peace accords require unambiguous terms, a verifiable sequence of reciprocal concessions that builds mutual trust, symmetric obligations on controlling actors, and robust enforcement mechanisms to deter . Minsk II deviated from these principles by embedding contradictions that perpetuated a : could not cede political concessions without risking permanent loss of control, while Russia-backed entities retained leverage through territorial occupation, creating an irresolvable deadlock. A primary flaw lay in the faulty sequencing of measures, which inverted the logical order needed for . Minsk II's 13-point package stipulated local elections and constitutional amendments granting "special status" to and —encompassing autonomy in , policing, and cross-border ties with —prior to Ukraine's restoration of and full territorial (points 9 and 11). This demanded Ukraine legitimize separatist administrations under Russian influence before disarming foreign-backed forces, fostering unfree elections and entrenching external leverage rather than enabling genuine reintegration. Empirically, this "sequencing trap" stalled progress from inception, as Ukraine prioritized security withdrawals (point 4) before political steps, while insisted on the reverse to secure power over Kyiv's decisions. Compounding this was the agreements' pervasive vagueness, which invited divergent interpretations and eroded enforceability. Terms such as "foreign armed formations" (point 10) were undefined, allowing to identify troops—estimated at thousands supporting separatists—as the target, while framed the conflict as internal Ukrainian , denying direct involvement despite of command integration. Without precise definitions or processes, compliance became subjective, enabling serial violations: over 14,000 breaches recorded by OSCE monitors by 2021, including the offensive immediately post-signing. Such ambiguity precluded causal progress toward demilitarization, as parties could plausibly deny obligations without third-party arbitration. Asymmetric obligations further undermined the framework's viability, placing disproportionate burdens on Ukraine while exempting de facto belligerents. Russia signed as a guarantor via the Trilateral Contact Group but faced no explicit commitments to withdraw forces or cease proxy support, positioning itself as mediator despite controlling Donetsk and Luhansk entities. Ukraine, conversely, was compelled to enact sovereignty-compromising reforms, such as decentralization that risked institutionalizing Russian influence via passportization—over 200,000 Donbas residents naturalized by 2020. This imbalance misaligned incentives: occupied territories gained de facto veto power without reciprocal disarmament, perpetuating Russia's strategic aim of a frozen conflict to constrain Kyiv's NATO alignment, rather than resolving underlying territorial disputes. Absent enforcement mechanisms, the accords lacked deterrence against , relying on goodwill amid existential stakes. The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission provided observation but possessed no coercive , as evidenced by its inability to halt arms flows or verify withdrawals amid contested access. Without penalties—such as sanctions triggers or phased incentives—the structure incentivized minimal compliance: separatists retained heavy weapons, and avoided politically toxic concessions amid domestic opposition, including 2015 parliamentary clashes over amendments. Causally, this rendered Minsk II a fragile truce at best, incapable of addressing the conflict's roots— versus Ukrainian centralization—yielding empirical stagnation: no full , partial laws unenforced, and escalating hybrid tactics by 2022.

Implications for Conflict Resolution Realism

The failure of the Minsk agreements exemplifies realist principles in , where diplomatic accords endure only insofar as they reflect and reinforce the prevailing balance of power and address existential imperatives of the involved states, rather than presuming goodwill or institutional norms suffice. Minsk II, formalized on February 12, 2015, prescribed a , heavy weapons withdrawal, and a roadmap for political reintegration of territories under Ukrainian , yet it unraveled due to inherent asymmetries: Russia's military leverage enabled it to retain control via proxies, while Ukraine prioritized border before granting , creating an irresolvable sequencing . This dynamic underscores how agreements that demand concessions without reciprocal safeguards—such as Russia's unfulfilled troop withdrawal or Ukraine's neutral status assurances—degenerate into tools for the stronger party to consolidate gains, as evidenced by Moscow's use of the to exert ongoing influence over Kyiv's . Empirical data from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reveals the causal inefficacy of unenforced pacts: in 2016 alone, monitors documented 320,130 ceasefire violations and 3,099 instances of prohibited heavy weapons deployment, with hostilities persisting amid mutual recriminations and no progress on constitutional reforms for Donbas special status. Violations spiked post-signing, including intensified fighting around Debaltseve before the February 15, 2015, deadline, as spoilers on both sides—bolstered by external patrons like Russia and Western arms flows—pursued tactical advantages over compliance. Such outcomes affirm that in proxy conflicts entangled with great-power rivalry, ceasefires without third-party verification empowered to impose costs (beyond passive OSCE observation) merely mask underlying contests for territorial and strategic dominance, allowing the aggressor to rearm and probe weaknesses, as Russia did leading to the 2022 escalation. Realist analysis of thus cautions against overreliance on multilateral mediation formats like the Normandy group, which excluded pivotal actors such as the and failed to incentivize behavioral change through deterrence or linkage to broader architectures. Absent mechanisms tying to mutual vulnerabilities—such as phased contingent on verifiable demilitarization or neutrality pledges—the agreements devolved into a commitment trap, where rational actors withheld moves that could expose them to exploitation. This empirical pattern implies that effective resolution in analogous disputes requires prioritizing power stabilization, including robust external guarantees or to offset imbalances, over procedural optimism; otherwise, pacts risk entrenching stalemates that favor revisionist powers capable of sustaining low-level indefinitely.

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