Hubbry Logo
Three NoesThree NoesMain
Open search
Three Noes
Community hub
Three Noes
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Three Noes
Three Noes
Three Noes
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
China Airlines Flight 334, whose hijacking led to the end of the policy

The Three-Noes Policy (Chinese: 三不政策; pinyin: Sān Bù Zhèngcè) was a policy established in April 1979 and maintained by President Chiang Ching-kuo of the Republic of China, commonly known as Taiwan, in response to the People's Republic of China's attempts to have direct contact with the ROC (see Three Links). When the United States broke diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1979, the PRC believed that it had complete leverage in convincing the ROC government to talk. President Chiang Ching-kuo refused, reiterating that there were to be "no contact, no negotiation and no compromise" (不接觸，不談判，不妥協) with the Chinese Communists.[1]

The hijacking of a China Airlines cargo plane on May 3, 1986, shattered the "Three Noes" policy. The pilot Wang Shi-chuen subdued the two other members of the flight crew and commandeered the plane to Guangzhou, forcing the ROC government to publicly send unofficial envoys to negotiate in Hong Kong with PRC officials over the return of the plane and the flight crew. The pilot, credited by the PRC for reestablishing contact between mainland China and Taiwan, received a hero's welcome in mainland China and became a senior PRC aviation official as well as serving as a so-called "Taiwanese delegate" to PRC government institutions.

During this time, many mainland China-born ROC armed forces veterans pressed President Chiang Ching-kuo to allow family reunions between the mainland Chinese who settled in Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War and their relatives in mainland China. President Chiang relented in 1987, authorizing the ROC Red Cross to issue permits allowing people from Taiwan to travel to mainland China only for family reunions. This started the ongoing regular civilian and unofficial exchanges between the PRC and the ROC.

In July 1987, Chiang ended martial law in Taiwan, and residents of Taiwan were able to visit relatives in China that November. From June 1988, mail from Taiwan sent to Chinese addresses were routed through Hong Kong. Phone calls were routed through the United States, Japan and Singapore until 10 June 1989. Among the first direct calls placed to China were Taiwanese journalists asking about the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[2]

The new Three Noes

[edit]

President Ma Ying-jeou later established a new "three noes" policy as part of his foreign policy towards the PRC:[3]

  • No unification with the PRC in the short-term
  • No declaration of independence
  • No use of force

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Three Noes

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Three Noes policy (三不政策) was a foreign policy position adopted by the Republic of China government under President on April 4, 1979, committing to no contact, no , and no with the in response to overtures for establishing the —direct postal services, transportation, and trade—across the . Announced amid Beijing's post-reform push for economic reconnection following Deng Xiaoping's initiatives, the policy reaffirmed Taiwan's rejection of the PRC's legitimacy and its adherence to the goal of recovering the mainland under the , while safeguarding against perceived communist subversion. It symbolized the height of cross-strait antagonism during Taiwan's period, forgoing potential economic gains to prioritize ideological and security imperatives, though it faced internal pressures from business interests advocating pragmatism. The policy endured until late , when Chiang authorized indirect trade and family visits to the mainland, marking the onset of Taiwan's and a shift toward managed cross-strait engagement without formal .

Background

Origins of THAAD Deployment

The decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in stemmed from escalating North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear threats in the mid-2010s. North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, , followed by multiple launches, including failed Musudan tests in April, May, and June , which demonstrated Pyongyang's advancing capabilities to strike Korean territory and U.S. assets in the region. These provocations, amid North Korea's repeated assertions of readiness, prompted Korean President Park Geun-hye's administration to accelerate discussions with the on enhanced . On July 7, , the and formally agreed to deploy one THAAD battery to U.S. Forces Korea as a defensive measure specifically tailored to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from . The system was intended to protect population centers, critical infrastructure, and U.S. military installations, particularly around , which lies within range of artillery and missiles. publicly endorsed the deployment on July 8, stating it was necessary due to 's "continuous nuclear and threats," emphasizing its role in bolstering the U.S.- alliance's deterrence posture without offensive capabilities. Initial talks on THAAD had occurred as early as following Scud-class launches, but the agreement marked the concrete commitment under alliance consultations. The deployment site was selected on July 13, 2016, as a former in Seongju County, , chosen for its optimal coverage of northern threats while minimizing population exposure, according to South Korea's Defense Ministry. The THAAD battery, consisting of six launchers, 48 interceptors, an AN/TPY-2 , and supporting fire control units, was operated by U.S. forces and aimed to integrate with South Korea's existing Patriot systems for layered defense. This decision reflected a strategic shift from South Korea's prior reluctance to host advanced U.S. defenses, driven by the immediacy of North Korean advancements rather than broader regional dynamics.

China's Economic Retaliation

In response to South Korea's July 8, 2016, announcement of deploying the U.S. (THAAD) system, employed informal economic targeting South Korean businesses and sectors reliant on the Chinese market. These measures, which denied were official sanctions, escalated from late 2016 into 2017 and included heightened regulatory scrutiny, consumer boycotts, and restrictions on cultural and tourism exchanges. The actions aimed to pressure into reconsidering or limiting the deployment, leveraging 's position as South Korea's largest trading partner. A primary vector was the sharp curtailment of Chinese tourism to , with Chinese authorities instructing travel agencies to suspend group tours starting in March 2017. This led to a 48.3% drop in Chinese tourist arrivals in 2017, equating to over 4.5 million fewer visitors compared to 2016 levels and causing an estimated revenue loss of approximately 7.4 trillion (about $6.5 billion USD at contemporaneous exchange rates) for 's tourism sector. Individual travel persisted but at reduced volumes; for instance, Chinese visitors in 2017 plummeted by two-thirds year-over-year, severely impacting duty-free retail, hotels, and entertainment venues concentrated in areas like and . Retaliation intensified against after its board approved a land-swap deal on February 27, 2017, ceding a in Seongju for the THAAD site. Chinese regulators responded by suspending Lotte's retail expansions, subjecting its 112 hypermarkets and 13 malls to inspections that resulted in closures, and blocking online sales platforms. Lotte's revenue fell by 88% in the first quarter of 2017 alone, forcing the shutdown of dozens of stores and contributing to an overall operational crisis that prompted the conglomerate to divest assets. Broader sectors faced selective pressure, including bans on South Korean entertainment products like concerts and dramas, alongside informal boycotts of cosmetics, automobiles, and semiconductors from firms such as Hyundai, , and . While aggregate South Korean exports to China rose 15% in 2017 due to strong demand in unaffected areas, targeted industries incurred losses estimated at $7.5 billion USD, with ripple effects including reduced bilateral cultural exchanges and heightened scrutiny of Korean investments. These measures, though not uniformly applied, demonstrated China's use of for coercive , sparing overall trade growth but inflicting asymmetric pain on South Korean entities perceived as complicit in the THAAD decision.

Formulation and Announcement

Political Context under Moon Jae-in

Moon Jae-in assumed the presidency on May 10, 2017, inheriting a foreign policy crisis stemming from the July 2016 decision under his predecessor, Park Geun-hye, to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea as a countermeasure to North Korean missile threats. China's subsequent economic retaliation, beginning in March 2017, included informal bans on South Korean tourism, cultural exports, and Lotte Group operations, resulting in estimated losses of up to 7.5 billion USD for South Korean firms by mid-2017. This coercion intensified bilateral tensions, as Beijing viewed THAAD's radar capabilities as encroaching on its strategic interests, prompting Moon's administration to prioritize relational repair amid South Korea's economic dependence on China, its largest trading partner accounting for roughly 25% of exports in 2017. Moon's progressive Democratic Party government pursued a "balanced diplomacy" strategy, emphasizing inter-Korean engagement inspired by prior Sunshine Policies while seeking China's cooperation for peninsula stability, given Beijing's influence over . However, THAAD's operationalization in early 2017—despite Moon's initial review and partial suspension of environmental assessments—sustained Chinese distrust, complicating his goals of hosting the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics as a diplomatic platform and advancing summits. Domestically, Moon faced pressure from business lobbies affected by the and from his party's base favoring economic over hardline security postures, contrasting with conservative opposition critiques of any perceived concessions. To normalize ties, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha announced the "Three Noes" on October 30, 2017, during a joint press statement following talks with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, committing South Korea to no additional THAAD deployments, no integration into a U.S.-led regional missile defense system, and no trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan. This verbal pledge, framed by Seoul as a clarification of longstanding positions rather than a new concession, aimed to alleviate Beijing's security concerns and unlock frozen economic exchanges, leading to a gradual easing of Chinese restrictions by early 2018. Yet, analysts noted the announcement's asymmetry, as it unilaterally addressed Chinese demands without reciprocal commitments from Beijing on North Korean denuclearization, reflecting Moon's prioritization of short-term relational stabilization over long-term alliance robustness with Washington. The move aligned with Moon's broader vision of strategic autonomy, but it drew internal debate, with security experts warning of eroded deterrence credibility amid ongoing North Korean provocations.

Specific Commitments of the Three Noes

The Three Noes policy, publicly articulated by South Korean Foreign Minister on October 31, 2017, during a audit, comprised three explicit security assurances extended to to alleviate Beijing's concerns over the 2017 deployment of the U.S. (THAAD) system in . These commitments were framed as 's sovereign policy decisions, not concessions extracted under duress, though they followed 's economic measures against South Korean firms, which reportedly caused losses exceeding $7.5 billion by mid-2017. The first commitment pledged no additional THAAD deployments beyond the single battery installed at Seongju County, despite initial plans under the prior Park Geun-hye administration for up to seven batteries to enhance defenses against North Korean ballistic missiles. This limitation was intended to address China's contention that expanded THAAD coverage could undermine its own strategic missile capabilities, including monitoring of second-strike assets. The second assurance renounced participation in a U.S.-led regional network, rejecting integration of South Korean systems into broader architectures like those potentially linking ships or ground-based interceptors across . Moon's administration emphasized that South Korea's defenses would remain focused solely on North Korean threats, avoiding offensive implications perceived by as encroaching on its . The third commitment disavowed the formation of a trilateral with the and , halting any evolution of bilateral U.S.- and U.S.- alliances into a formal multilateral pact that could facilitate joint exercises or sharing targeting . This pledge reflected Moon's balancing act amid domestic conservative advocacy for deeper trilateral ties to counter and regional coercion, while prioritizing economic stabilization with , South Korea's largest trading partner.

Official Rationale

Diplomatic and Economic Objectives

The Three Noes policy was articulated by South Korean President during his state visit to on October 31, 2017, with the primary diplomatic objective of restoring bilateral trust eroded by the July 2016 decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. South Korean officials emphasized that the commitments—no further THAAD deployments beyond the single battery at Seongju, no integration into a broader U.S.-led network, and no trilateral military alliance with the and —served to reassure that the system targeted only North Korean missile threats, thereby mitigating perceptions of encirclement and facilitating normalized diplomatic engagement. This approach aligned with Moon's broader strategy of engaging as a key player in Korean Peninsula stability, including support for inter-Korean dialogue amid North Korea's nuclear tests in 2017. Economically, the policy aimed to counteract China's unofficial sanctions imposed since March 2017, which included bans on group tours to , restrictions on Korean entertainers and media, and boycotts of retail outlets following the company's land donation for THAAD. These measures inflicted estimated losses exceeding $7.5 billion, with Chinese tourist arrivals plummeting from 8 million in 2016 to 4.17 million in 2017, severely impacting sectors reliant on China, 's largest trading partner accounting for over 25% of exports. By framing the Three Noes as a clarification of longstanding policy rather than a concession, the Moon administration sought to expedite the lifting of these restrictions and safeguard , including resuming cultural exchanges and stability in industries like semiconductors and automobiles.

Assurances to China

The Three Noes assurances were publicly articulated by South Korean President on October 31, 2017, during a with Chinese President on the sidelines of the forum in , . These commitments aimed to alleviate 's security apprehensions regarding the deployment of the High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which viewed as encroaching on its strategic interests by potentially enabling and capabilities directed toward its territory. Specifically, the assurances pledged that would not deploy additional THAAD batteries beyond the initial four-launcher unit at Seongju, refrain from integrating into a broader -led regional architecture, and avoid establishing a formal trilateral with the and targeted at . From the Moon administration's perspective, these verbal pledges served as a diplomatic concession to de-escalate bilateral tensions exacerbated by China's economic measures following the July 2016 announcement of THAAD's deployment under the prior Park Geun-hye government. Foreign Minister later clarified in November 2017 testimony to the that the Three Noes represented a reiteration of South Korea's longstanding positions rather than new binding obligations, emphasizing their role in restoring mutual trust and facilitating the resumption of normal economic exchanges. The assurances directly countered Chinese narratives framing THAAD as an offensive tool undermining regional stability, by affirming Seoul's intent to limit the system's scope to defensive countermeasures against North Korean ballistic missile threats originating from the Korean Peninsula. China responded positively to the assurances, with and officials describing them as a constructive step toward resolving the , leading to a gradual easing of unofficial sanctions on Korean tourism, retail, and entertainment sectors by early 2018. However, has since invoked the Three Noes in diplomatic exchanges to press for ongoing adherence, interpreting them as political commitments that constrain Korea's defense autonomy, particularly amid evolving regional security dynamics involving U.S. extended deterrence commitments. This framing underscores the assurances' function in 's calculus as a mechanism to mitigate perceived encirclement by U.S.-aligned missile defenses, though maintained that the pledges aligned with its non-aggressive strategic posture without formal treaty status.

Criticisms and Domestic Debate

Security and Autonomy Concerns

Critics of the Three Noes policy, particularly conservative figures and security analysts, contended that the commitments severely constrained 's defensive options against North Korean threats, as the pledge against additional THAAD deployments limited the expansion of high-altitude intercept capabilities despite escalating provocations from , including over 30 tests in 2017 alone. The prohibition on joining a U.S.-led network further undermined with allied forces, even though the single THAAD battery already integrated into aspects of U.S. systems, creating inconsistencies that prioritized over operational readiness. These restrictions were viewed as eroding sovereignty by preemptively ceding decision-making authority to , establishing a veto over South Korea's security choices without reciprocal formal agreements or consultations with the , which strained the alliance and exposed to Beijing's economic tactics that inflicted approximately $7.5 billion in losses and $15 billion in declines following the initial THAAD announcement. The no-trilateral-alliance commitment similarly hampered potential cooperation with the U.S. and , reducing collective deterrence against regional aggressors and fostering dependency on unilateral measures amid China's buildup. In domestic debates, conservatives such as incoming President Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022 decried the policy as a submissive concession that sacrificed long-term for short-term economic relief, arguing it illustrated a broader pattern of under the administration that compromised national interests by avoiding clear alignment with democratic allies. Skeptics emphasized that such self-imposed limits, absent enforceable reciprocity from , not only weakened South Korea's position in Northeast Asian power dynamics but also risked catastrophic security gaps, as evidenced by ongoing North Korean advancements in hypersonic and solid-fuel missiles post-2017.

Accusations of Appeasement

Critics, primarily from South Korea's conservative opposition and allied think tanks, accused the Three Noes policy of constituting appeasement toward by yielding to economic coercion imposed after the July 2016 deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system at Seongju. The policy's commitments—no additional THAAD batteries beyond the one deployed, no integration into a broader U.S. network, and no trilateral with the U.S. and —were formalized in an October 31, 2017, parliamentary statement by Foreign Minister , ostensibly to normalize bilateral ties strained by 's retaliatory measures, which included bans on group and restrictions on cultural exports, resulting in estimated losses of up to 18.7 trillion (approximately $16.5 billion USD at the time) in alone by September 2017. Conservative lawmakers and analysts contended that these unilateral pledges rewarded Beijing's "unofficial sanctions" and undermined 's strategic autonomy, effectively capping defensive capabilities against North Korean missile threats in exchange for uncertain diplomatic gains that failed to fully lift the economic pressures. They argued the concessions sowed mistrust within the U.S.- , as they limited Seoul's ability to enhance integrated deterrence without prior consultation with Washington, prioritizing short-term economic relief over long-term security amid 's growing regional assertiveness. U.S.-based critics, such as those at , described the administration's approach as "acquiescence to Chinese intimidation," contrasting it with subsequent efforts under President to reaffirm commitments and pursue additional enhancements. Further accusations highlighted the policy's role in exacerbating South Korea's economic vulnerability to , which accounted for about 25% of exports in , without reducing dependency or deterring future ; instead, it was viewed as a "disgraceful abnegation" of independence that emboldened to demand adherence even years later. Despite assurances from the Moon government that the Noes were not binding promises but restatements of existing positions, detractors maintained they functioned as concessions, eroding deterrence credibility and signaling weakness to adversaries like . This perspective gained traction during domestic debates, with conservatives decrying it as forfeiting "security " to appease a revisionist power, though proponents countered that it pragmatically balanced alliances without altering core U.S. ties.

Opposition from Conservatives

Conservative figures and parties in South Korea, including members of the Liberty Korea Party (predecessor to the People Power Party), condemned the Three No's as a capitulation to Chinese pressure that eroded national sovereignty and defense capabilities. They argued that the pledges—forgoing additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, integration into a US-led missile defense network, and a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan—imposed self-restrictive limits during a period of heightened North Korean missile threats, prioritizing short-term economic appeasement over long-term security. Yoon Suk-yeol, a leading conservative critic and future president, lambasted the administration during his 2022 presidential campaign for secretly negotiating the Three No's with , including concessions on US missile defenses, without consulting Washington, which he described as a betrayal of the -South Korea alliance forged during the . Conservatives contended this reflected a progressive tilt toward , evidenced by Moon's administration issuing the assurances in October 2017 amid China's economic retaliation—such as boycotts costing South Korean firms an estimated $7.5 billion—that followed the July 2016 THAAD deployment under the prior conservative government. Opposition intensified with claims that the policy signaled weakness, inviting further Chinese interference in South Korean affairs, as continued to demand adherence despite the assurances. Conservative analysts highlighted how the Three No's constrained responses to regional threats, such as China's deployment of a THAAD-like system in , underscoring a causal imbalance where South Korea's concessions yielded no reciprocal restraint from . Upon Yoon's election in March 2022, his administration explicitly rejected binding adherence to the Three No's, framing it as an informal statement rather than a , though cautious implementation avoided overt violations to prevent renewed economic coercion. This shift aligned with broader conservative advocacy for bolstering ties, including joint missile defense exercises announced in 2023, which Beijing labeled as breaching the 2017 pledges.

Implementation and Compliance

Immediate Aftermath and Partial Resolutions

Following the public announcement of the Three Noes on October 31, 2017, by South Korean Foreign Minister during a parliamentary , responded positively, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang stating that the policy addressed Beijing's security concerns regarding the U.S. THAAD deployment. This led to an informal resolution of the ongoing economic dispute, as began lifting unofficial sanctions imposed since March 2017, including restrictions on South Korean , , and retail sectors that had caused an estimated $7.5 billion in losses during 2017. By November 2017, bilateral talks resumed, and approved the resumption of group tours to , signaling a partial thaw in relations. Implementation of the Three Noes proceeded as a unilateral statement rather than a formal , with the Moon administration emphasizing it as a clarification of existing intentions to avoid further escalation. In December 2017, President met with Chinese President at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, , where both sides agreed to normalize ties, leading to increased high-level exchanges and a modest rebound in trade volumes—South Korea's exports to China rose by 7.7% year-on-year in early 2018. However, compliance remained partial, as lingering informal barriers persisted in sectors like and , with full economic recovery incomplete due to unresolved trust issues and China's continued scrutiny of THAAD operations. Domestically, the policy faced immediate backlash from conservative politicians and security experts, who argued it constrained South Korea's defense autonomy without reciprocal concessions from , prompting parliamentary debates and calls for retraction. Partial resolutions emerged through diplomatic clarifications, such as the government's insistence that the Noes were not binding commitments but aspirational guidelines, allowing flexibility for future adjustments amid North Korean missile threats. This ambiguity facilitated short-term de-escalation but sowed seeds for later reinterpretations, as evidenced by ongoing Chinese demands for adherence into 2018.

Adherence under Subsequent Administrations

Under President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took office on May 10, 2022, the South Korean government distanced itself from the Three Noes as a binding commitment, asserting that the 2017 pledges were not formal agreements but rather verbal assurances lacking legal force. Yoon's administration emphasized prioritizing the alliance and needs over deference to China's interpretations, rejecting Beijing's demands for explicit reaffirmation during bilateral talks in August 2022. Despite this rhetorical rejection, avoided actions that would overtly violate the pledges, such as deploying additional THAAD batteries, to mitigate economic retaliation risks given China's status as South Korea's largest trading partner. Yoon expressed intent to expand capabilities, including soliciting further THAAD deployments from the , signaling a potential departure from the "no additional THAAD" element, though no such expansions occurred by late 2023. The administration's Strategy, released in December 2022, reinforced alignment with US-led frameworks like the Quad without naming as a , indirectly challenging the "no military alliance" pledge by deepening trilateral cooperation with the and . On the "no US missile defense network" commitment, Yoon's government pursued indigenous systems like the and Missile Defense (KAMD) while maintaining ambiguity on integration with US networks to preserve deterrence flexibility. Following Yoon's impeachment in December 2024 and removal by the on April 4, 2025, the interim administration under and the subsequent election outcome under President-elect [as of October 2025, assuming continuity or shift based on available data] have not formally repudiated the Three Noes but continued Yoon-era , with no reported additional THAAD deployments or explicit alliance formations against . This approach reflects ongoing domestic debates over balancing with —evident in stabilized trade volumes post-2017 sanctions—against heightened North Korean threats and alliance imperatives, without verifiable breaches of the original pledges as of mid-2025. Critics from conservative circles argue this de facto adherence perpetuates self-imposed limits, while progressive voices warn against escalation that could provoke anew.

Impact and Consequences

On South Korea-China Relations

The Three Noes policy, articulated by South Korean Foreign Minister on October 30, 2017, as comprising no additional (THAAD) deployments, no participation in a broader -led network, and no trilateral military alliance with the and aimed at , initially served to de-escalate bilateral tensions exacerbated by 's economic retaliation against the 2017 THAAD installation at Seongju. , which had imposed informal sanctions including bans on South Korean cultural exports, restrictions on (reducing Chinese visitors from 8 million in to under 4 million in 2017), and heightened customs scrutiny on imports like cosmetics and automobiles—costing South Korean firms an estimated $7.5 billion in losses—responded positively by signaling an end to these measures. This led to a gradual normalization, with Chinese group tours resuming in late 2017 and bilateral trade rebounding from a 7.9% dip in 2017 to growth rates exceeding 10% annually by 2019, underscoring South Korea's economic dependence on as its largest trading partner, accounting for over 25% of exports. Strategically, the policy reinforced a pattern of South Korean selective cooperation with to mitigate adversarial dynamics amid U.S.-China rivalry, allowing Seoul to prioritize economic ties while maintaining its with Washington. However, it established a for 's influence over South Korean decisions, as evidenced by China's subsequent demands for adherence during disputes over additional THAAD activations in 2022, framing deviations as violations of the 2017 understandings. Analysts have argued that this concession, driven by domestic economic pressures and China's leverage as a neighbor sharing a with , compromised South Korea's defense autonomy without yielding reciprocal restraint from on issues like North Korean support or territorial assertiveness in the . Over time, the policy's impact waned as adapted to 's reinforced U.S. alignment under subsequent administrations, yet it perpetuated asymmetries in bilateral expectations, with viewing the Noes as enduring commitments rather than situational assurances. Trade volumes continued to expand, reaching $328 billion in 2022, but persistent frictions—such as 's 2022 economic warnings against 's involvement in U.S.-led initiatives—highlighted the fragility of the thaw, where masked underlying strategic mistrust. This dynamic has prompted to diversify export markets, reducing 's share from 27% in 2017 to around 20% by 2023, reflecting a pragmatic recalibration rather than full rupture.

On South Korea-US Alliance

The Three Noes policy, articulated by President on October 31, 2017, during a summit with Chinese President , committed to forgoing additional (THAAD) deployments, refraining from integration into a -led system, and avoiding a targeting a third party (implicitly ). This assurance, extended to mitigate 's economic retaliation over the initial 2017 THAAD installation, elicited concerns within the and n conservative circles that it undermined the credibility of the -Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance by prioritizing accommodation of over deterrence against . officials, including then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, publicly reaffirmed alliance commitments but privately expressed unease over perceived concessions that could embolden to exploit fissures in extended deterrence. Despite these tensions, empirical indicators of alliance robustness persisted, including sustained joint military exercises like and Key Resolve, which resumed in full scale by 2018 after a temporary North Korea-induced pause, and the 2018 revision of the -ROK Special Measures Agreement increasing South Korea's host-nation support to $920 million annually. Analyses from security experts contend that the Three Noes had negligible effects on core alliance functions, as South Korea's security posture remained anchored by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 and the overriding North Korean threat, with no observable degradation in extended deterrence commitments. Nonetheless, the policy fueled domestic ROK debates on autonomy, with critics arguing it signaled alliance unreliability to Washington, potentially complicating trilateral cooperation with amid shared concerns over Chinese assertiveness. The policy's constraints became more evident under subsequent administrations, particularly President Yoon Suk-yeol, who assumed office on May 10, 2022, and explicitly rejected adherence to the Three Noes as an informal, reversible pledge lacking binding legal force. Yoon's administration pursued enhanced interoperability, including discussions for additional THAAD batteries and integration with systems, culminating in the August 2023 Camp David trilateral summit with the and that formalized real-time warning data sharing. These steps alleviated prior strains, bolstering interoperability against North Korean threats while signaling a pivot away from Moon-era hedging toward firmer alignment, though Yoon's on December 14, 2024, introduced interim uncertainties without altering foundational treaty obligations. Overall, while the Three Noes temporarily eroded perceptual trust in alliance resolve, quantifiable military cooperation metrics—such as over 20,000 troops stationed in and annual combined exercises involving 30,000 personnel—demonstrated resilience driven by shared strategic imperatives.

Broader Geopolitical Ramifications

The Three Noes policy, by conceding to Chinese economic pressure following the 2017 THAAD deployment, demonstrated the efficacy of Beijing's coercive tactics in extracting assurances from a key US ally, thereby potentially emboldening similar strategies against other regional partners such as and . This approach aligned with China's broader "" doctrine—encompassing public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare—which seeks to undermine adversaries without kinetic conflict, as evidenced by sustained retaliatory measures like bans and cultural content restrictions despite the concessions. Analysts from conservative policy circles argue that such outcomes erode the deterrence credibility of the US-led order, signaling to authoritarian actors that alliances can be pried apart through asymmetric leverage rather than military confrontation. In the Indo-Pacific theater, the policy constrained South Korea's integration into multilateral frameworks aimed at countering Chinese influence, such as enhanced trilateral US-Japan-South Korea defense coordination, by self-imposing limits on and alliance structures. Conducted without prior consultation with Washington, the assurances exacerbated alliance frictions, fostering perceptions of Seoul's hedging between great powers and delaying unified responses to North Korean missile advancements, which tested regional defenses over 20 times in alone. This fragmentation indirectly benefited China's regional ambitions, including in the and , by diluting collective bargaining power among US partners and complicating efforts to operationalize concepts like the Quad's security architecture. Critics contend that the Three Noes exemplified a broader pattern of economic dependencies undermining strategic autonomy, with South Korea's exports to China—peaking at 25% of total exports in 2017—serving as a vulnerability that Beijing exploited to advance its buffer-state preferences vis-à-vis North Korea and the US presence on the peninsula. While some assessments downplay long-term effects, noting minimal alterations to Seoul's indigenous missile developments or economic diversification post-2018, the policy nonetheless contributed to a temporary tilt in power dynamics, encouraging Beijing's adaptive coercion tactics that prioritize gray-zone pressures over outright confrontation. Over-reliance on such concessions risks cascading effects, as allied hesitancy could amplify North Korean provocations—evidenced by over 1,000 artillery pieces positioned near the DMZ—and hinder the US's extended deterrence commitments across Asia.

Recent Developments

Shifts under Yoon Suk-yeol

Upon taking office on May 10, 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol pivoted South Korea's foreign policy toward deeper alignment with the , implicitly abandoning the Three No's pledges of the prior administration by prioritizing alliance enhancement over deference to Chinese sensitivities. Yoon explicitly rejected the Three No's framework, affirming the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system's indispensability for national defense and signaling readiness to deploy additional batteries should evolving threats—such as North Korean missile advancements—necessitate it, directly contravening the commitment against further THAAD expansions. This shift manifested in bolstered military cooperation with Washington, including the April 2023 Washington Declaration, which established a bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group to coordinate extended deterrence strategies involving nuclear assets, thereby intensifying integration with defense architectures in ways that challenged the pledges against joining an American-led network or trilaterally targeting militarily. Yoon's administration framed these moves within a "value-based" emphasizing democratic norms and regional stability, joining the -initiated in September 2022 as a counterweight to Chinese economic influence, further eroding the non-alignment implied by the third No. Beijing responded sharply, with Chinese officials demanding South Korea uphold the Three No's in July 2022 amid fears of eroded , though Yoon maintained dialogue channels to preserve while subordinating relational concessions to security imperatives. These actions, while not a formal , crossed Beijing's "red lines" through pragmatic alignment, yielding short-term successes in fortifying the alliance but straining ties with , as evidenced by public opinion shifts and retaliatory rhetoric from state media. The policy endured until Yoon's impeachment and removal in April 2025 following a failed martial law declaration, leaving a legacy of overt prioritization over the Moon-era equilibrism.

Responses to North Korean Threats

Under President Yoon Suk-yeol, who assumed office on May 10, 2022, adopted a policy of "," emphasizing robust deterrence and immediate retaliation against North Korean provocations, marking a departure from the prior administration's engagement-oriented approach. This shift included revitalizing the "three-axis" defense system—comprising preemptive strikes (Kill Chain), missile interception (Korea Air and Missile Defense), and massive retaliation (Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation)—to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile advancements. Yoon directed the military to prepare for swift responses, stating in December 2022 that provocations would trigger immediate counteraction without hesitation. In response to North Korea's escalating missile tests, South Korea intensified joint military exercises with the United States and conducted its own launches to demonstrate resolve. Following North Korea's barrage of over 20 missiles on November 2, 2022—including one crossing the Northern Limit Line—South Korea fired ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, with Yoon ordering forces to ensure Pyongyang "pays a clear price." Similarly, after North Korea's June 5, 2022, tests, U.S. and South Korean forces executed a large-scale missile exercise, launching 48 missiles to signal interoperability and readiness. Yoon warned in November 2022 of an "unprecedented" allied response, including potential preemptive action, should North Korea conduct a nuclear test. Beyond missiles, responses addressed other threats like drones and border incursions. In December 2022, after North Korean drones breached South Korean airspace multiple times, Yoon's government scrambled fighter jets and enhanced air defenses, later achieving successful interceptions in following incidents. To deter artillery fire and psychological warfare, South Korea resumed loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts along the demilitarized zone in June 2024 after North Korea's trash balloon campaign carrying waste and propaganda leaflets. This escalation prompted North Korea to destroy inter-Korean liaison offices and install anti-propaganda speakers, but South Korea maintained the broadcasts as a calibrated countermeasure. The administration's moves have strengthened trilateral deterrence with the U.S. and Japan, including real-time missile warning data-sharing formalized in December 2023, enhancing early detection of North Korean launches. In October 2024, South Korea unveiled the Hyunmoo-5, a 8-tonne ballistic missile capable of destroying hardened underground facilities, with Yoon asserting it would compel North Korea to abandon nuclear delusions. These actions, coupled with U.S. extended deterrence commitments reaffirmed in the 2023 Washington Declaration, aim to impose denial-based deterrence, reducing North Korea's confidence in coercive gains. Despite criticisms of escalation risks, Yoon's framework prioritizes credible threats over dialogue until denuclearization preconditions are met.

References

  1. https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=9223A12B5B31CB37&sms=35FA2C4073CF4DFB&s=25E0B5C0E91BFCE1
  2. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=ceas_student_work
  3. https://www.keranews.org/2019-01-02/xi-urges-peaceful-unification-of-china-and-taiwan-but-wont-rule-out-using-force
  4. https://hir.harvard.edu/how-america-is-waging-a-futile-war/
  5. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/02/15/2003773132
  6. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/04/28/2003817044
  7. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-thaad-missile-defence-system
  8. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-missile-defense-system.html
  9. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/south-koreas-thaad-decision-neither-a-surprise-nor-a-provocation/
  10. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12645
  11. https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Newsroom/News/Article/831175/rok-us-joint-statement-rok-us-alliance-agrees-to-deploy-thaad/
  12. https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/asia/north-korea-thaad-missile-deploy
  13. https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary058e.pdf
  14. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/south-korea-chooses-site-of-thaad-us-missile-system-amid-protests-idUSKCN0ZT03C/
  15. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html
  16. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-response-us-south-korean-missile-defense-system-deployment-and-its-implications
  17. https://theasanforum.org/chinese-economic-coercion-during-the-thaad-dispute/
  18. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-waning-leverage-over-south-korea-lessens-chances-of-retaliation-against-thaad-experts-say-/7161323.html
  19. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2095339/south-korean-tourist-numbers-plummet-two-thirds-after-china
  20. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/south-koreas-lotte-approves-land-swap-for-missile-defence-ministry-idUSKBN1660P0/
  21. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=53632
  22. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2021.1918746
  23. https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/18/thaad-bad-seoul-beijing-relations-under-moon/
  24. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseih/2020/11/30/seoul-beijing-relations-from-the-cold-war-to-thaad-deployment/
  25. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2021.1965283
  26. https://www.heritage.org/china/commentary/south-korea-cant-let-china-push-them-around-missile-defense
  27. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/30/south-korea-china-agree-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-fallout.html
  28. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817213.html
  29. https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/South_Koreas_Three_Nos_for_China_How_Sustainable_Are_They
  30. https://csds.vub.be/publication/who-taught-whom-a-lesson/
  31. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171031000837
  32. https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/did-south-koreas-three-noes-matter-not-so-much/
  33. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1054414.html
  34. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2923628
  35. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-05-09/China-wary-of-U-S-Japan-S-Korea-s-inciting-of-bloc-confrontation-1jFmMNbVE2s/index.html
  36. https://www.dw.com/en/south-korea-confronts-chinese-pressure-over-anti-missile-weapons-system/a-62921470
  37. https://ips-dc.org/south-koreas-new-foreign-policy-of-one-yes-and-two-nos/
  38. https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/moon-jae-in-s-visit-to-us-tinged-by-promises-to-china
  39. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2941885
  40. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/chinas-rapprochement-south-korea
  41. https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-and-south-korea-examining-the-resolution-of-the-thaad-impasse/
  42. https://www.38north.org/2017/11/abrahamianson110917/
  43. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/BG3728.pdf
  44. https://www.apln.network/news/member_activities/controversy-over-three-noes-on-thaad-and-national-interest
  45. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20171031020300038
  46. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170915000631
  47. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/817693.html
  48. https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/moon-jae-in-south-koreas-merkel/
  49. https://index.go.kr/smart/mbl/chart_view.do?idx_cd=5010
  50. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20220810/seoul-reiterates-that-3-nos-policy-is-not-commitment-to-china
  51. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/foreign-policy-cheat-sheet-south-korea-s-presidential-election
  52. https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-knight-board-impact-south-koreas-presidential-election
  53. https://ilomata.org/index.php/ijss/article/download/1787/912/
  54. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/the-future-of-k-power-what-south-korea-must-do-after-peaking?lang=en
  55. https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-president-yoons-state-visit-white-house
  56. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rising-anti-china-sentiment-in-south-korea-offers-opportunities-to-strengthen-us-rok-relations/
  57. https://jamestown.org/program/back-normal-end-thaad-dispute-china-south-korea/
  58. https://koreapro.org/2022/09/yoon-suk-yeol-rejects-three-nos-deal-with-china-in-words-but-not-actions/
  59. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/south-koreas-evolving-indo-pacific-strategy
  60. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/11/south-koreas-surprisingly-successful-china-policy.html
  61. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-south-korea-relations-under-south-koreas-new-yoon-administration-challenge-defining
  62. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/07/south-korean-foreign-policy-innovation-amid-sino-us-rivalry/03-south-korea-between-china
  63. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393059812_Dynamics_of_South_Korea%27s_Three_No%27s_Policy_Terminal_High_Altitude_Area_Defense_THAAD_Deployment_and_China_Relations_Analysis
  64. https://theasanforum.org/double-allegiance-moon-jae-ins-strategy-amid-us-china-rivalry/
  65. https://www.38north.org/2021/06/as-the-dust-settles-how-healthy-is-the-rok-us-alliance/
  66. https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/iar-web/a-year-in-review
  67. https://www.38north.org/2025/01/impeachment-of-yoon-suk-yeol-impact-on-us-japan-rok-cooperation/
  68. https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/com/fileupload/FileDownloadView.do%3Bjsessionid=PTr0kAEuYOh10NPW004GXxPS.public12?storgeId=c61b04e5-0182-4c75-ad21-828ecacfb855&uploadId=39885397825846558&fileSn=1
  69. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA500/PEA524-1/RAND_PEA524-1.pdf
  70. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200606_china_south_korea_pak_v2.pdf
  71. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/south-korea-as-a-global-pivotal-state/
  72. https://fpif.org/south-koreas-new-foreign-policy-of-one-yes-and-two-nos/
  73. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-025-00698-6
  74. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-china-us.html
  75. https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-martial-law-yoon-constitutional-court-8cdcf4944c2e3cd9edf723bc29ba51ff
  76. https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/what-to-expect-from-yoon-suk-yeols-policy-on-north-korea/
  77. https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-koreas-revitalized-three-axis-system
  78. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3030835
  79. https://abcnews.go.com/International/north-south-korea-test-missiles-off-coasts-raising/story?id=92527361
  80. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/news/north-and-south-korea-exchange-missile-tests
  81. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-says-china-can-change-north-koreas-behaviour-if-it-wants-2022-11-28/
  82. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/not-every-north-korean-missile-needs-a-response-south-korea-and-the-us-should-focus-more-on-readiness-and-deterrence/
  83. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/south-koreas-retaliation-doctrine-can-seoul-handle-north-koreas-escalations/
  84. https://www.nknews.org/2024/08/yoon-orders-rok-military-to-deter-north-korea-from-communizing-south/
  85. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/01/south-korea-unveils-its-most-powerful-missile-00181809
  86. https://quincyinst.org/research/from-punishment-to-denial-stabilizing-deterrence-on-the-korean-peninsula/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.