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The Three Links or Three Linkages (Chinese: 三通; pinyin: sān tōng) was a 1979 proposal from the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to open up postal, transportation (especially airline), and trade links between mainland China and Taiwan,[1] with the goal of unifying Mainland China and Taiwan.[2]

Before the establishment of the "Three Links", communication between the two sides were routed through intermediate destinations, primarily Hong Kong; Macau; Jeju, South Korea and Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. The "Three Links" were officially established on 15 December 2008, with the commencement of direct flights, shipping and post.

History

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Proposal

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In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his supporters won the 3rd plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, starting China's economic reform. This also began a new direction in the PRC's foreign policy.[3] On January 1, 1979, Beijing proposed the Three Links of postal, commercial and transportation.[3] It was also proposed together with the Four flows/Four exchanges which included relatives, tourists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports representatives.[2][3] This was greeted in Taiwan by Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Ching-kuo's Three Noes.

Lead-up to liberalization

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See also: Cross-straits relations

While the PRC and ROC agreed in principle on opening the Three Links, there were overriding concerns. According to the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the ROC, the major obstacle resided in the PRC's One-China position which does not recognize the sovereignty of the ROC. The Council stated that the Three links would only be considered when the PRC stopped its animosity against ROC sovereignty and improved the cross-strait relationship.[4] The PRC government considers the cross-strait flights as domestic flights, according to the One China Policy. However, the ROC's Democratic Progressive Party government in Taiwan regarded this position the same as recognizing Taiwan (ROC) as a part of the PRC and thus would compromise the ROC sovereignty.

The previous administration led by President Chen Shui-bian, who was in power from 2000 to 2008, was keen to establish direct links under his "four noes and one without" pledge. China reacted with caution however, and was eventually infuriated when Chen spoke of "Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country", and the Taiwanese administration believed establishment of the links would not be possible. However, China eventually shifted its position when it realized that the three links may be an opportunity to hold on to Taiwan, with its Minister of Transport and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen declaring that the "one China" principle would no longer be necessary during talks to establish the links, which would be labelled merely as "special cross-strait flights" and not "international" nor "domestic" flights.[5]

In 2004, Beijing proposed a cross-strait controlled-access highway project linking Beijing to Taipei connecting the two sides of the Taiwan Straits together. However, due to the potential technical difficulties, some people in Taipei consider this move as political propaganda.[6]

The Three Links are mentioned in the Anti-Secession Law of the People's Republic of China.

Limited liberalization

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Main article: Cross-strait charter
On January 29, 2005, China Airlines flight CAL581 landed in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
The mainland China terminal for the Quanzhou-Kinmen ferry, in Shijing Town

Under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, gradual steps were taken to lift restrictions on the three links. The so-called Little Three Links, also referred to as Mini Three Links or Three Small Links (小三通; xiǎo sān tōng)[7] allows for limited postal, transportation, and trade links between the People's Republic of China's Fujian province cities of Xiamen, Mawei and Quanzhou, and the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which are administered by the Republic of China. When introduced in January 2001, they allowed only those with household registrations in Kinmen and Matsu to use the trade links, as well as China-based Taiwan businessmen. Travels must be done in groups. Restrictions were lifted to allow individual travelers, as well as to open the routes to former residents and relatives of Kinmen and Matsu. Quanzhou was also added to the list in the same year.[8]

The ferry trip, which takes at least 30 minutes, involved regular routes connecting Kinmen to the ports of Xiamen and Quanzhou, and Matsu to Mawei. Occasional trips were also made between Kinmen and Meizhou, a popular religious site.[9] The routes saw 21,377 entries and exits in 2001. It ballooned to 341,152 in 2006,[10] but still represents a small part of overall trade.

In early 2002 a China Airlines flight to Hong Kong crashed into the Taiwan strait killing all 225 people on board. The majority of the passengers were intending to transfer at Hong Kong for flights to mainland China. Relatives of the victims advocated for direct cross-strait flights.[11]

In early 2003, the Republic of China (ROC) government permitted its air carriers to ferry Chinese New Year passengers back and forth across the Strait by way of "indirect charter flights" that touched down briefly in Hong Kong or Macau. The ROC and People's Republic of China (PRC) did not repeat the charter flights during the 2004 Chinese New Year, in part because the two sides could not agree on the terms for meetings to discuss how PRC carriers might also participate.

The two sides agreed to permit cross-strait flights for the Chinese New Year of Rooster in 2005. Unlike the 2003 flights, the 2005 flights did not have to touch down in Hong Kong or Macau, but still must enter its airspace. The first direct commercial flights from China (from Guangzhou) to Taiwan since 1949 arrived in Taipei on January 29, 2005. Shortly afterwards, a China Airlines carrier landed in Beijing. Airports on both sides saw ceremonial displays on the arrival of the first passengers, with dancing lions and dragons, and officials making speeches. For the three-week holiday period, 48 flights were scheduled.

On 19 July 2006, the first direct chartered all-cargo flight since 1949 operated by China Airlines landed in Shanghai from Taipei.[12] Four other flights were operated on 25 July, 30 July, 8 August, and 10 August 2006.[13]

Further liberalization

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In the lead-up to the 2008 presidential elections in Taiwan, the Kuomintang candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, pledged opening the Three Links at an accelerated rate should he be elected president. The ruling DPP has traditionally been reluctant to implement this, citing the PRC's refusal to negotiate unless the Taiwanese counterparty accepts the one-China principle under the 1992 consensus. In June 2007, DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh criticised Ma's plans as a reflection of his lack of experience in handling cross-strait affairs. He also stressed that while the direct links may benefit Taiwan economically, Taiwan's values must not be compromised as a result.[14]

On 29 February 2008, Ma announced plans to commence weekend charter flights by 1 July 2008, which will be expanded to daily charters by the end of the year. Regular scheduled flights may commence by June 2009.[15] The airports of Taoyuan, Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Hualien, Taitung, and Penghu will be open for these cross-strait flights, while the seaports of Keelung, Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Hualien, Chiayi, and Tainan will be open to direct shipping routes. All restrictions limiting the scope of the "mini three links" will be lifted, including allowing all Taiwanese to use them. Hsieh responded by promising to expand cross-strait charter flights within three months after taking office, including increased flight frequencies and the addition of destinations on the Chinese which may be flown to.[16] Both liberalization plans were greeted by enthusiasm amongst Taiwanese airlines.[17]

Formal agreements to launch regular weekend charter flights were signed on 13 June 2008, allowing for an initial 36 return flights per weekend from Friday to Monday, divided equally to allow 18 return flights amongst up to six China-based and six Taiwan-based airlines respectively. The agreement will involve five airports from China, including those in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen and Nanjing, and eight airports in Taiwan,[18] namely Taipei Taoyuan International Airport, Kaohsiung International Airport, Taichung Airport, Taipei Songshan Airport, Makung Airport, Hualien Airport, Kinmen Airport and Taitung Airport. Flights to China cities of Chengdu, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Dalian, Guilin and Shenzhen may be added later.[19] The first flights are scheduled to commence on 4 July 2008, and flight frequencies may be increased on demand, with expectations to increase to 72 each weekend after the 2008 Olympic Games.[20] For the first time, the flights will be open to anyone holding valid travel documents, and will no longer be restricted to Chinese and Taiwanese residents only, and no longer required to fly through the Hong Kong FIR. There are also frequency caps on certain sectors: flights from Shanghai to Taiwan are capped at nine return trips each week, while those from China to Taichung must not exceed six return flights each week. There will be no restrictions out of Nanjing.[21]

On 17 June 2008, the Civil Aviation Administration of China announced that the 18 return flights available to Chinese airlines will be apportioned such that Air China and Hainan Airlines will fly to Taiwan from Beijing with four return flights and two return flights respectively; China Eastern Airlines and Shanghai Airlines will fly from Shanghai to Taiwan with four return flights and two return flights respectively; China Southern Airlines fly depart for Taiwan from Guangzhou for four return flights per week, and Xiamen Airlines will connect Xiamen with Taiwan with two weekly return flights.[22]

Allocation amongst Taiwanese carriers was adjusted from six airlines to five after the suspension of Far Eastern Air Transport. A rotating allocation system was adopted, whereby in the first week, Mandarin Airlines, TransAsia Airways and UNI Air would fly four return flights each and China Airlines and EVA Airways will fly three flights each, and in the second week, four flights will be operated by TransAsia Airways, UNI Air and China Airlines, while EVA Airways and Mandarin Airlines will fly three flights. The rights will be rotated through in subsequent weeks such that each airline will fly in aggregate the same number of flights every five weeks.[23] On the Taiwan-Shanghai route, three airlines will be allocated two roundtrip flights each week, and another airline one weekly flight, to be cycled through the five airlines.[24] China Airlines and its subsidiary Mandarin Airlines would fly seven round-trips a week, with four to Shanghai, two to Beijing and one to Guangzhou from Kaohsiung, Makung, Taichung and Taipei. Eva Air and subsidiary UNI Air would fly from Taiwan Taoyuan, Songshan and Kaohsiung to Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou, while TransAsia Airways will operate from Songshan to Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xiamen.[citation needed] China Airlines and its Mandarin Airlines subsidiary would offer 29 return flights in the month of July to Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Xiamen,[25] while Eva Air would offer 7 flights per week initially from Taiwan Taoyuan and Songshan airports.[26]

Announced routes so far are as follows:

Announced Cross-straits flights[27][28]
Airline Chinese airport Taiwanese airport Flights per week
(Week commencing
4 July 2008)		 Aircraft Remarks
China Air China Beijing Capital International Airport Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport 2 (Fridays and Sundays)
China Air China Shanghai Pudong International Airport Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport 2 (Fridays and Sundays)
Taiwan China Airlines Beijing Capital International Airport Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport
Taiwan China Airlines Shanghai Pudong International Airport Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport
China China Eastern Airlines Shanghai Pudong International Airport Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport 1 (Sundays) Airbus A321
China China Eastern Airlines Shanghai Pudong International Airport Taipei Songshan Airport 2 (Mondays and Fridays) Airbus A321
China China Eastern Airlines Nanjing Lukou International Airport Taipei Songshan Airport 1 (Fridays) Airbus A321
Taiwan Mandarin Airlines Xiamen Gaoqi International Airport Makung Airport Embraer 190
Taiwan Mandarin Airlines Xiamen Gaoqi International Airport Taichung Airport Embraer 190
China Shanghai Airlines Shanghai Pudong International Airport Taipei Songshan Airport 2 (Fridays and Sundays) Boeing 767-300ER First flight to commence[29]
China Eastern aircraft in Taiwan in 2017

Negotiators are expected to meet again in Taiwan to tackle outstanding issues, including revisiting the issue of introducing cross-strait charter cargo flights within three months,[30] the introduction of direct flight routes without the need to fly via Hong Kong airspace[19] and subsequent addition of destinations and frequencies.[31]

On 19 June 2008, the "Little Three Links" between the islands of Kinmen and Matsu and Fujian was greatly liberalised, allowing any Taiwanese to use the ferry services by travelling to either island on their onward journey into Fujian province and beyond. In response, several Taiwanese airlines increased flights to Kinmen, including Mandarin Airlines (increased Taipei-Kinmen flights), Trans Asia Airways (an additional weekly Taipei-Kinmen flight) and UNI Airways Corporation (increase Taipei-Kinmen flights by one or two each week, for a total of 24 weekly flights). Still, the sudden surge in travellers caused flights to become overbooked in the immediate aftermath of liberalization.[32] There were calls for further relaxation on travel restrictions of Chinese travelling into the islands so as to enable them to also travel onwards to the main island.[33] Work was also needed to correct the current trade and movement imbalance, where 300,000 Taiwanese travel via the route to reach China, compared to 37,000 Chinese who travel in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the volume of Chinese goods using the route was significantly higher compared to Taiwanese goods. The MAC Minister Lai Shin-yuan remarked that the Straits Exchange Foundation will negotiate with Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits to allow the Chinese to travel to Taiwan via the route, and to lift a US$100,000 trade value ceiling imposed by the Chinese on Taiwanese goods using the route.[34]

Full restoration

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Audio of Taipei Control requesting TransAsia flight 332 to change frequency to Shanghai Control

Full restoration of the Three Links officially commenced on 15 December 2008, with inaugural direct shipping, direct flights, and direct mail.[35]

On August 31, 2009, the number of flights between China and Taiwan increased to 270. They no longer had to bypass Hong Kong airspace and also were no longer all operating as chartered flights; i.e., a large number of regular scheduled flights began to cross the Taiwan Strait out of 25 Chinese airports.[36]

Controversies

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During the period of the direct charter flights, the PRC state media stressed that they were domestic flights, whereas the ROC government stressed that they were international flights.[citation needed]

In reaction to 13 June 2008 agreements, the DPP criticized the government of "yielding to China", and accused Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung of "defying the legislature", saying the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area stipulates that legislative resolutions are required before any direct cross-strait links are opened", which was not carried out. Chiang dismissed the accusations, saying he followed the precedent set by former SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, and would "report to the legislature's Home and Nations Committee instead of the legislative caucuses".[37]

The DPP and the Pan-Green Coalition has routinely claimed there was a potential compromise on Taiwan's national security should there be liberal three links, suggesting the PRC could disguise troop carriers as commercial aircraft to invade Taiwan, a charge met by criticism from both the PRC and the Pan-Blue Coalition. In the wake of 13 June 2008 agreements, the DPP raised the issue of national security again, criticising its plans to open up to eight airports when China would open only five. The eight airports included Hualien and Taitung, which also operate as military airfields, thus creating a security threat. They also expressed concern over the possibility of absconding Chinese tourists.[37] A defense ministry report on 18 May 2008 concluded that direct charter flights would be a national security threat, and the air force has reportedly expressed concern that six of the airports except the Taiwan Taoyuan and Kaohsiung airports have military installations and aircraft. The Vice Minister of National Defense Lin Chen-yi has further recommended to maintain indirect flight routes via a third party's air space on 23 May 2008. But on 18 June 2008, the Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min declared that direct flights without the involvement of any third party air space would not pose a threat to national security, saying "The final routes for direct charter flights shall be decided by the Mainland Affairs Council and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. We will submit recommendations to the MOTC that take national security into consideration, but I do not foresee any problems if the flights travel directly between Taiwan and China".[38]

The DPP gave itself credit for having "laid the groundwork" for opening weekend charter flights and allowing Chinese tourists into Taiwan, both of which did not occur under KMT rule, and criticised the current negotiators as being "inexperienced and ill-prepared".[37]

Impact

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Chinese Mainland visitors in Taiwan

Visitor data from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council indicates that the China-Taiwan aviation market is about 8 million passengers annually just prior to the June 2008 agreements, and may be expected to immediately increase to 10 million as a result of liberalization. IATA's figures puts the market figure at about 6 million passengers annually based on number of air tickets issued, with the Shanghai-Taipei pair accounting for 40% of the entire market. The ten biggest markets are as follows:

Top ten city-pairs on the cross-Strait aviation market
(one-way China to Taiwan traffic figures)[39]
Chinese port Taiwanese port 2005 2006 2007
Shanghai Taipei 1,056,000 1,179,000 1,249,000
Beijing Taipei 227,000 257,000 274,000
Shanghai Kaohsiung 167,000 183,000 198,000
Xiamen Taipei 149,000 141,000 134,000
Hangzhou Taipei 65,000 100,000 104,000
Nanjing Taipei 61,000 92,000 84,000
Fuzhou Taipei 71,000 74,000 72,000
Guangzhou Taipei 70,000 61,000 69,000
Shenzhen Taipei 81,000 99,000 55,000

Transit points

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The enforcement of the ban on direct trade links has benefited third party transit points, in particular Hong Kong, since 1988. Current[when?] China-Taiwan traffic channels about 60% of its traffic via Hong Kong, 30% via Macau, and the rest via other points such as Jeju. In 1997, the Taipei-Hong Kong air route alone constituted one-sixth of the passengers handled at the Hong Kong Airport with five million passengers,[40] and by 2001, this figure has jumped to 6.7 million. In the fiscal year 2006–07, the Taipei-Hong Kong air route accounted for 18% of Hong Kong's 45 million passengers, making it one of the busiest international air routes by passenger numbers in the world.[41]

1.6 million air travelers flew into China from Hong Kong in 1996,[42] and in 2000, 18% of Hong Kong's 2.4 million tourists came from Taiwan, out of which 36% of them traveled on to China with or without staying in Hong Kong.[43] In the five-year period from 2003 to 2007 there were an average of 3.68 million passengers annually who travel through Hong Kong between the two locations. Today, about 60% of Taiwan-Hong Kong traffic connects onwards to flights into the Chinese, and for the Macau-Taiwan sector, about 80%.[39]

Currently, over 3,000 flights offering nearly one million seats are operated every month by five airlines, namely China Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Dragonair, EVA Air and Thai Airways International, between Hong Kong and Taipei. In addition, flights are operated between Hong Kong and Kaohsiung by China Airlines, Dragonair and Mandarin Airlines, and between Hong Kong and Taichung by Dragonair, Hong Kong Express Airways, Mandarin Airlines and Uni Air. Summary of flights through Hong Kong and Macau are as follows:

Cross-straits flights between Taiwan and Hong Kong/Macau[44][45]
Airline Third destination airport Taiwanese airport Flights per week
(Week commencing
16 June 2008)		 Remarks
Cathay Pacific Hong Kong International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 108
China Airlines Hong Kong International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 93
Dragonair Hong Kong International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 28
EVA Air Hong Kong International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 56
Thai Airways International Hong Kong International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 7 Through-traffic from Bangkok only
China Airlines Hong Kong International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 12
Dragonair Hong Kong International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 35
Mandarin Airlines Hong Kong International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 17
Dragonair Hong Kong International Airport Taichung Airport 7
Hong Kong Express Airways Hong Kong International Airport Taichung Airport 7
Mandarin Airlines Hong Kong International Airport Taichung Airport 14
Uni Air Hong Kong International Airport Taichung Airport 11
Air Macau Macau International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 56
EVA Air Macau International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 28
TransAsia Airways Macau International Airport Taipei Taoyuan International Airport 42
Air Macau Macau International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 18
EVA Air Macau International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 14
TransAsia Airways Macau International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport 14

Conversely, liberation of the three links may have adverse economic consequences on Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Airport Authority's chairman Victor Fung Kwok-king estimated up to 6% reduction in air travel through Hong Kong as a result of direct China-Taiwan flights.[46] The city's tourism operators estimated losses of over HK$3 billion annually should the three links be liberated in 2008.[47] A possible 6.6% reduction in tourism in Hong Kong may be limited in economic impact as transit passengers typically spend far less during transit, but it may have significant impact on Hong Kong-based airlines, in particular Cathay Pacific and its affiliate Dragonair.[43] It was reported on 18 May 2008 that Taiwan's China Airlines intents to trim its Taiwan-Hong Kong flights by two to three flights per day once direct flights resume in July 2008,[46] but the airline denied this, saying "when cross-strait relations improve and market trends are clearer, then we'll make a specific plan".[48] Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao believes Hong Kong will not be affected as the increased economic exchange may benefit the city too.[49] In the immediate aftermath of the announcements for 4 July direct flights, shares of Cathay Pacific fell by 1.8% over fears of its negative impact on the airline, which derives significant profits from the route.[50] Shares of Xiamen Gaoqi International Airport and Shanghai Airlines gained 1.18% and 1.27% respectively over expectations of possible gains from the deal.[51]

Air services

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Air China – the flag carrier of the PRC — is required to cover the PRC flag painted on the body of their aircraft when flying to Taiwan.

Gradual liberalization has paved the way for direct cooperation between airlines from both sides. China Southern Airlines and China Airlines announced their intention to seal a strategic cooperation contract on 23 June 2008 for cooperation on the weekend chartered flights, soon after the announcement of their liberalization.[52] Officials from each of the three largest Chinese airlines also flew to Taiwan with attempts to negotiate with Taiwanese airlines on cooperation deals, with likely cooperation between all parties in areas including marketing, ground services, maintenance and airline catering.[53]

The impending competition also prompted the main Chinese airlines to embark on a publicity blitz, highlighting their intentions to provide their best aircraft, crew and service to passengers, including customized in-flight meals to suit tastes from both sides.[54]

Announced ticket prices for the first flights were shown to be almost similar to those requiring a stopover, negating expectations of the direct flights depressing ticket prices except on the Xiamen-Taipei route. This was due to high fuel costs, but prices were not expected to rise further.[55]

Ship routes

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In December 2015, the Huangqi-Matsu ship route was introduced as part of the Mini Three Links.[56][57]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Three Links

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Three Links refer to direct postal, transportation, and trade connections across the between the (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on . These links were prohibited by the ROC government after its retreat to in 1949 amid the , as part of a broader policy to isolate the Chinese Communist Party-controlled mainland. Partial implementation began in 2001 through "mini-three links" allowing limited direct exchanges between Taiwan's outlying and and adjacent PRC coastal areas in province, aimed at boosting local economies without broader political concessions. Full direct links were established on December 15, 2008, under ROC President , inaugurating regular charter flights, sea shipping routes, and postal services, which expanded to scheduled operations and significantly increased cross-strait interactions. The policy has driven , with bilateral trade reaching hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars annually and remaining Taiwan's top trading partner, facilitating efficiencies in sectors like but raising concerns over dependency and vulnerability to . Politically, the links represent a pragmatic amid unresolved disputes, yet they have sparked debates in Taiwan about , with critics arguing they enable PRC influence operations and economic leverage, while proponents highlight mutual prosperity and people-to-people ties. Despite heightened tensions under subsequent DPP administrations, the persists, underscoring the enduring causal pull of geographic proximity and economic incentives over ideological barriers.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Core Components

The Three Links, also known as the "Three Direct Links" (Chinese: 三通; pinyin: sān tōng), constitute a framework for establishing direct postal, transportation, and commercial exchanges across the between the (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, ). This concept emerged as a proposed normalization of cross-strait interactions severed after the concluded in 1949, when the ROC government retreated to and imposed bans on direct contacts to prevent PRC influence and maintain separation. The links aim to facilitate unrestricted people-to-people, economic, and logistical flows without reliance on third-country intermediaries, such as or , which had previously routed indirect exchanges. The core components of the Three Links are explicitly defined as follows:
  • Direct Postal Services (通邮, tōng yóu): This enables seamless mail exchange between the PRC mainland and , eliminating delays and inspections associated with indirect routing through foreign postal systems.
  • Direct Transportation (通航, tōng háng): Encompassing air and maritime routes, this component allows scheduled passenger and cargo flights as well as shipping directly between ports and airports on both sides, reducing transit times and costs compared to circuitous paths.
  • Direct Trade (通商, tōng shāng): This permits commercial transactions, including goods shipment and business dealings, without third-party involvement, fostering bilateral while addressing and regulatory barriers.
Implementation of these components has historically been asymmetric, with the PRC advocating full reciprocity as a step toward political unification under its "" principle, while the ROC has prioritized safeguards against economic dependency and security risks. Partial measures, such as "mini-three links" via outlying islands like and Matsu, preceded broader adoption to test feasibility and mitigate geopolitical tensions.

Origins and Initial Proposals

The suspension of direct postal, transportation, and trade links across the originated from the Chinese Civil War's conclusion, when the Republic of China (ROC) government relocated to in December 1949 and implemented bans on such interactions to avoid legitimizing the newly established on the mainland. These measures, formalized through ROC in the early 1950s, required all cross-strait exchanges to route indirectly via third countries or territories, such as or , imposing significant logistical costs and delays estimated at up to 30% higher than direct routes by the . This policy reflected the ROC's claim to represent all of and its strategy to isolate the diplomatically amid ongoing hostilities, including the and periodic Strait crises in 1954-1955 and 1958. The PRC first formally proposed resuming the "three direct links"—direct mail, sea and air transportation, and trade—as part of broader overtures for peaceful reunification shortly after initiating economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping. On January 1, 1979, following the PRC's establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, Beijing announced readiness to negotiate these links without preconditions, framing them as practical steps to foster economic cooperation and reduce tensions. This initiative built on Ye Jianying's September 30, 1979, Nine-Point Proposal, which emphasized ending military confrontation, promoting mutual visits, and expanding exchanges in economy, culture, and technology to pave the way for unification under "one country, two systems." PRC officials, including Deng, reiterated the offer in subsequent years, such as Deng's 1981 statement prioritizing links over immediate political talks, aiming to leverage Taiwan's export-oriented economy against the mainland's growing industrial base. In response, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the "Three Principles Policy" (commonly known as the Three Noes) on April 10, 1979, committing to no official contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise with the PRC to safeguard Taiwan's de facto independence and democratic development. This stance, maintained until Chiang's death in 1988, rejected direct links as a potential vector for PRC political influence and unification propaganda, prioritizing indirect "mini-links" experiments later in the 1980s for humanitarian visits while preserving sovereignty concerns. Despite occasional PRC concessions, such as allowing Taiwan-flagged ships limited access in 1987, the initial proposals stalled, with both sides citing the absence of mutual recognition as the core impasse—PRC viewing links as internal affairs, ROC as requiring parity in negotiations.

Historical Evolution

Following the and the retreat of the Republic of China (ROC) government to in December 1949, the ROC authorities imposed a comprehensive ban on direct postal, transportation, and trade links with under rule. This suspension aimed to isolate the Communist regime economically and militarily, preventing resource flows that could bolster the war effort or enable infiltration. In January 1979, shortly after the PRC's "Message to Compatriots in " issued by , the PRC's proposed resuming the Three Links—direct mail, trade, and shipping—as a means to foster cross-strait short of immediate political unification. The ROC rejected direct links, adhering to a policy of minimal contact to safeguard de facto amid mutual non-recognition and periodic military tensions. However, the PRC unilaterally established ordinary and registered postal services to that year, enabling mail dispatch without mandatory third-party routing, though volumes remained limited due to Taiwan's restrictions on acceptance. Indirect trade emerged despite the bans, driven by economic complementarities: Taiwan's export-oriented industries sought mainland markets for , while the PRC's reforms under Deng attracted Taiwanese capital via proxies. Transactions routed through intermediaries like , , and , with goods relabeled to obscure origins. By 1980, indirect trade totaled around $200 million in Taiwanese exports to the mainland, with two-way exchanges reaching $330 million—all unofficial and subject to risks and higher costs from . Shipping and air links operated exclusively indirectly, with vessels and flights stopping at third-country ports or airports, adding 20-50% to transport expenses and extending transit times by days or weeks. No direct maritime or aviation routes existed, enforcing physical separation that aligned with Taiwan's security doctrine under (1949-1987), which viewed direct access as a vector for or economic . These arrangements, while inefficient, laid groundwork for later expansion as market pressures eroded strict enforcement, with indirect comprising a growing share of both economies by the mid-1980s.

Preparatory Liberalizations (1987-2007)

In November 1987, the Republic of China (ROC) government on lifted a 38-year ban on Taiwanese residents visiting relatives on the mainland, marking the initial step toward easing cross-strait restrictions after the . This policy change, announced by the ruling party, was framed as a humanitarian measure to facilitate family reunions amid mounting public pressure following the end of in July 1987. Over the subsequent months, more than 400,000 Taiwanese traveled to the mainland, fostering indirect economic contacts and highlighting the impracticality of prolonged isolation. The travel liberalization indirectly spurred trade growth, as Taiwanese businesses leveraged third-country intermediaries like for commerce with the mainland. Taiwan's exports to the mainland, routed indirectly, expanded from approximately $1.2 billion in 1987 to $19.4 billion by 1995, driven by investments in sectors such as and plastics. In January 1990, the ROC promulgated "Measures on Indirect and Technical Cooperation with the Mainland," permitting limited capital outflows through overseas subsidiaries, which by the early had channeled substantial Taiwanese funds into mainland . These arrangements maintained political separation while enabling , with cross-strait indirect trade reaching significant volumes despite official prohibitions on direct exchanges. Further preparatory steps included selective allowances for transportation and postal services. In May 1995, authorized foreign-flagged vessels to conduct between its ports and mainland facilities, reducing logistical costs for indirect shipping. Postal exchanges remained routed through or other intermediaries, supporting the rising volume of personal and commercial mail. These measures reflected 's cautious approach, balancing economic pragmatism against concerns, as articulated by successive administrations wary of mainland political influence. By the mid-2000s, cumulative Taiwanese on the mainland exceeded US$100 billion via indirect channels, underscoring the scale of integration. A milestone in came during the 2005 Lunar New Year holiday, when temporary direct charter flights operated between and select mainland cities for the first time since , involving eight airlines and carrying over 13,000 passengers across 78 flights from January 29 to February 20. These non-scheduled, holiday-only services bypassed third-country stops, testing infrastructure and protocols but excluding general passengers to limit political symbolism. They presaged fuller liberalization, demonstrating feasibility amid growing business demands, though imposed restrictions like no flights to politically sensitive mainland cities. This period's reforms, initiated under KMT rule and continued under the (DPP) from 2000, prioritized controlled engagement over comprehensive direct links, which remained barred until 2008.

Full Direct Implementation (2008-2010)

Following the election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of the Republic of China on March 22, 2008, and his inauguration on May 20, 2008, Taiwan pursued a policy of engaging mainland China on economic issues while maintaining political separation. This shift facilitated the resumption of institutionalized cross-strait talks between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), dormant since 1999. On June 12, 2008, SEF and ARATS signed the first agreement since the thaw, establishing regular charter flights between and select mainland cities on weekends and Chinese holidays, limited to eight mainland and three Taiwanese airlines operating 36 round-trip flights weekly. These direct passenger and cargo charter flights commenced on July 4, 2008, marking the initial step toward fuller aviation connectivity and reducing transit times compared to prior indirect routes via third countries. The second round of talks occurred in from November 3-4, 2008, resulting in : expansion of direct air transport to 108 weekly passenger flights and 60 monthly cargo flights across 21 mainland and five Taiwanese cities; initiation of direct sea transport between 15 pairs of ports (five Taiwanese and ten mainland); establishment of direct postal services; and a framework for agricultural . These pacts were ratified swiftly, with full implementation launching on December 15, 2008, ending the 59-year prohibition on direct links imposed since 1949. Inaugural direct flights included arriving at Taipei's at 8:45 a.m., alongside Taiwanese carriers like . Direct shipping services began concurrently, with 63 cargo vessels (33 Taiwanese, 30 mainland) operationalized, slashing transit times from up to three weeks via or to approximately four days. Postal exchanges were routed directly through designated facilities, bypassing intermediaries and enabling faster mail delivery. By 2009, these links stabilized, with flight volumes adhering to quotas and shipping routes expanding flows, though restrictions persisted on sensitive political or cargo. Through 2010, the direct links operated without major disruptions, supporting increased cross-strait economic activity under the Ma administration's framework, which emphasized mutual non-denial of while prioritizing practical exchanges. Quotas for flights and shipping were monitored jointly, with data indicating steady utilization rates that laid groundwork for subsequent trade agreements like the 2010 . Implementation faced no significant technical hurdles, though imposed caps on mainland visitors and investments to manage inflows.

Adjustments and Continuations (2011-Present)

Following the full implementation of direct trade, transportation, and postal links in 2008-2010, cross-Strait economic exchanges under President Ma Ying-jeou's administration saw incremental expansions through 2016. Direct passenger flights increased to 616 per week by 2013, accommodating growing and , while cargo shipping and mail services operated without interruption. Trade volumes surged, with Taiwan's exports to the mainland reaching a peak of $91.105 billion in , driven by and machinery sectors. These developments reflected mutual economic incentives overriding political frictions, as mainland ports handled increasing Taiwanese vessel calls under flag-of-convenience arrangements to bypass residual restrictions. The election of President in 2016 introduced adjustments amid heightened political tensions, as suspended official inter-party communications and pressured for adherence to the , which Tsai's rejected. Taiwan responded by tightening controls on mainland —banning group tours in 2019—and Chinese investments in sensitive sectors, yet direct flights, shipping, and postal services persisted uninterrupted to sustain supply chains, particularly for semiconductors. Passenger flights declined from pre-2016 levels due to reduced tourist inflows, dropping to around 200-300 weekly by the late , though links expanded to support bilateral trade that reached over $300 billion annually by 2022 despite diversification efforts like Taiwan's . The prompted temporary suspensions, including mini-Three Links between outlying islands like and mainland ports from February 2020, but these resumed post-2022 with enhanced biosecurity protocols. Under President from 2024, links have continued amid escalated military rhetoric from , including new unilateral air routes near in 2024, which criticized for lacking consultation and encroaching on its airspace. approved an increase to 209 weekly passenger flights in March 2023 as a goodwill gesture, prioritizing economic stability over full severance, while mainland authorities promoted integration via Province initiatives, recording $11.86 billion in regional trade with through November 2024. Empirical underscores interdependence: 's exports to the mainland comprised roughly 40% of its total by the early , with no evidence of enacting threatened full cuts to the links, likely due to reciprocal reliance on Taiwanese technology exports. Postal exchanges have remained routine, facilitating growth without reported disruptions.

Economic Dimensions

Trade Expansion and Quantitative Growth

The establishment of direct trade links as part of the Three Links policy in December 2008, allowing regular cargo shipping between designated ports in Taiwan and mainland China, markedly accelerated the quantitative expansion of bilateral commerce by eliminating reliance on indirect third-country routes, which previously added 20-30% to logistics costs and extended transit times by days or weeks. This shift lowered barriers for perishable goods, just-in-time manufacturing components, and high-volume shipments, directly contributing to post-implementation growth amid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis. Empirical data from Taiwan's authorities indicate that cross-strait trade, already rising due to prior indirect liberalization, experienced compounded annual increases averaging 5-7% in the ensuing years, driven by enhanced supply chain integration in electronics and machinery sectors. Quantitative metrics underscore this trajectory: bilateral trade volume stood at US$130.2 billion in 2007, prior to direct links, comprising 27.9% of Taiwan's total foreign trade. By 2014, it had expanded to US$198 billion, reflecting the policy's facilitation of deeper economic interdependence. Volumes peaked in the mid-2010s before stabilizing amid trade diversification efforts and external shocks, reaching US$150.5 billion in 2018 and US$165.97 billion in 2023, consistently accounting for 20-25% of Taiwan's overall foreign trade. These figures, drawn from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and customs data, highlight China's role as Taiwan's dominant trading partner, with exports to the mainland—primarily semiconductors, machinery, and chemicals—driving surpluses exceeding US$100 billion annually in peak years.
YearTrade Volume (US$ billion)Share of Taiwan's Total Trade (%)
2007130.227.9
2014198~22
2018150.5~20
2023165.97~22
Note: Data reflect Taiwan-reported figures; mainland China sources often report higher volumes due to differing methodologies on indirect inclusion. The post-2008 growth, while partly attributable to global demand recovery, correlates with direct links' logistical efficiencies, as evidenced by a 15-20% reduction in average shipping costs for direct routes versus pre-policy indirect paths. Sustained expansion has raised concerns over economic , with Taiwan's deficit in services and vulnerability to mainland market fluctuations, though attributes 10-15% of incremental volume directly to policy-enabled direct access.

Transportation and Logistics Enhancements

The resumption of direct air transportation under the on December 15, 2008, initiated with passenger and flights on weekends and holidays, evolving into daily scheduled services by mid-2009 across eight Taiwanese destinations and 21 cities. This expansion tripled weekly passenger flights to 108, circumventing indirect routing through third countries like and reducing fuel consumption by 40-50% due to shorter paths. Direct flights stabilized at 60 monthly between key hubs such as Taoyuan, , , and , streamlining just-in-time delivery for time-sensitive electronics components integral to cross-strait supply chains. These air links yielded annual cost savings exceeding NT$3 billion for businesses and travelers by minimizing transit delays previously averaging several hours via intermediate stops. Mainland Chinese visitors to reached 1 million in 2009, bolstering for tourism-related goods and services, while overall volume, facilitated by faster connectivity, rose from US$105 billion in 2008—comprising US$74 billion in Taiwanese exports—to sustain high interdependence in inputs. Direct maritime shipping, authorized under the 2008 agreement connecting 11 Taiwanese ports to 63 mainland ports, slashed freight costs by 15-30% and shortened voyage durations by up to 27 hours compared to transshipment via or . Documentation fees alone generated annual savings of at least NT$1.2 billion, enabling denser scheduling and lower inventory holding costs for exporters reliant on frequent small-batch shipments. Container throughput via direct cross-strait routes at Taiwanese ports, such as , handled millions of TEUs by 2020, reflecting integrated logistics for semiconductors and machinery. Passenger services, building on pre-existing "mini-links" for offshore islands, expanded significantly; by 2024, routes including Xiamen-Kinmen, Quanzhou-Kinmen, and Fuzhou-Matsu operated over 200 trips weekly, transporting hundreds of thousands annually and supporting localized in perishables and daily necessities. These enhancements collectively reduced overall friction, with empirical data indicating accelerated growth in bilateral exchanges post-implementation, though vulnerabilities to geopolitical tensions persist in route reliability.

Risks of Over-Dependence and Mitigation Efforts

Taiwan's implementation of the Three Links has deepened economic interdependence with , heightening risks of over-dependence that could enable to exert coercive pressure through trade restrictions or investment controls. As of 2024, and together accounted for 31.7% of Taiwan's exports, a decline from the historical peak of 43.9% in 2020, yet still representing a substantial given 's ability to impose targeted bans or tariffs as demonstrated in prior episodes of economic retaliation. This reliance extends to , where Taiwanese firms' operations in risk "hollowing out" of domestic industries, potential asset during tensions, or firms being leveraged to influence Taiwan's politics toward unification advocacy. Such dynamics amplify concerns, including infiltration via increased cross-strait flows, as evidenced by reports of smuggled drugs, firearms, and undocumented migrants arriving through direct shipping and air routes post-2008. Broader systemic risks include disruptions from geopolitical escalation, where a conflict could sever links critical to global semiconductors, given Taiwan's dominance in advanced chip production intertwined with Chinese assembly. Empirical assessments indicate that while interdependence may deter overt aggression by raising mutual costs, asymmetric dependence favors , which holds leverage over Taiwan's export-driven growth without equivalent reciprocal exposure. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, Taiwan has pursued diversification strategies, notably the (NSP) initiated in August 2016 under President , targeting enhanced trade, investment, and talent exchanges with 18 countries in , , and . The NSP contributed to a sharp decline in export dependence on China, with shipments to the mainland falling 18.1% year-on-year in 2023 amid Beijing's economic slowdown and Taiwan's redirected flows, reducing China's share from over 40% pre-2022 to approximately 35% by 2023. Complementary measures include expanding production footprints abroad, such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's () investments in U.S. and Japanese facilities to hedge against cross-strait risks, alongside bilateral trade pacts and supply chain resilience initiatives with allies like the and . These efforts, continued under President since May 2024, emphasize "friend-shoring" to democratic partners, though challenges persist in fully decoupling high-tech dependencies without incurring short-term economic costs.

Security and Sovereignty Implications

Espionage and Infiltration Risks

The direct resumption of postal, transportation, and trade links between and since 2008 has expanded opportunities for physical infiltration and intelligence operations by the (PRC), as these channels enable streamlined entry for personnel, materials, and communications that were previously routed through monitored third-country hubs. Taiwanese security assessments highlight that direct sea and air connections, including ferries to and operational since the early 2000s mini-links, facilitate the covert movement of agents using falsified documents or legitimate business covers, bypassing indirect transit screenings that historically deterred such activities. PRC espionage in Taiwan relies on hybrid tactics such as exploiting family reunions, , and commercial exchanges enabled by these links to initiate , with agents often posing as traders or visitors to cultivate assets in and civilian sectors. The National Security Bureau (NSB) of Taiwan documented five primary infiltration methods in early 2025, including leveraging cross-strait economic ties for "" influence and direct handler-agent meetings, which have proliferated amid annual passenger flows exceeding 5 million via direct flights and shipping post-2008. In outlying areas like , proximate sea links have raised specific alarms over smuggling of operatives, as evidenced by pre-full-links warnings of PLA infiltration via falsified papers, a vulnerability persisting despite enhanced border checks. Empirical data underscores the scale: Taiwan's NSB estimated over 5,000 PRC spies operating domestically as of 2025, with prosecutions surging threefold since 2021 to 64 charged cases in 2024 alone, including 28 active-duty military personnel tasked with leaking defense intelligence—many cases tracing initial contacts to cross-strait travel or business networks. While not all incidents directly invoke the links, security officials attribute the uptick to reduced barriers on direct routes, enabling sophisticated operations like the 2023-2024 bust of a 10-person ring led by a retired businessman who utilized commercial channels for coordination. Countermeasures, including NSB-led vetting of travelers and amended anti-espionage laws, aim to mitigate these risks, but the inherent openness of and conduits sustains vulnerabilities to and .

Interdependence as Deterrent or Coercion Tool

Economic interdependence fostered by the Three Links—direct mail, transport, and trade—has been advanced as a potential deterrent to cross-strait conflict, on the grounds that the high costs of disruption to bilateral would impose mutual harm. Taiwan's exports to , which reached approximately 42% of its total exports by value in recent years, include critical semiconductors underpinning 's sector, while mainland firms rely on Taiwanese and supply chains. This theoretically raises the threshold for aggression, as a conflict or could trigger global economic fallout, including shortages in and spikes, deterring from invasion by amplifying domestic and international repercussions. Conversely, the same ties have enabled China to wield economic coercion as a non-kinetic instrument of pressure, exploiting Taiwan's asymmetric dependence to influence political decisions without overt warfare. Beijing has repeatedly suspended tariff concessions or imposed outright bans on Taiwanese goods under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which built upon the Three Links' trade liberalization; examples include the 2021 pineapple import halt—valued at over $60 million annually—and subsequent restrictions on wax apples, grouper fish, and stone fruits in 2022–2023, timed to coincide with Taiwan's diplomatic outreach or domestic elections. These measures, often justified as phytosanitary or quality issues, targeted politically sensitive sectors like agriculture in pro-independence strongholds, aiming to erode public support for Taipei's policies. Such leverages the direct channels established post-2008, which surged cross-strait volumes from under 1 million tons annually to over 10 million by 2010, embedding vulnerabilities that exploits selectively to signal resolve or punish perceived provocations. Analyses of these episodes reveal mixed efficacy: while short-term economic pain pressures businesses and local governments, Taiwan's countermeasures—like product redirection to and subsidies—have blunted impacts, with banned exports often finding alternative markets within months. Nonetheless, repeated applications underscore interdependence's dual-edged nature, where deterrence weakens if normalizes pressure without provoking unification. Empirically, the framework has preserved a tenuous since implementation, with no despite heightened rhetoric, suggesting some deterrent value amid mutual stakes; yet, rising gray-zone tactics indicate coercion's precedence over stabilization, as calibrates economic pain to test resolve without crossing kinetic thresholds. This dynamic aligns with broader patterns where economic leverage substitutes for military action in asymmetric rivalries, though Taiwan's ongoing diversification—reducing China-bound exports from 44% in 2008 to under 35% by 2023—seeks to erode this tool's potency.

Empirical Evidence on Stability Outcomes

Following the full implementation of the Three Links in December 2008, cross-strait relations experienced a period of relative from 2008 to 2016, marked by the absence of major military crises or blockades, in contrast to earlier tensions such as the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Bilateral agreements, including the (ECFA) signed in June 2010, facilitated direct transportation, trade, and communication, resulting in bilateral trade volume surging from approximately $8 billion in 1991 to $198 billion by 2014. This economic expansion, coupled with the resumption of direct flights and sea links, supported increased people-to-people exchanges, with 4.3 million tourists visiting in 2015 alone, contributing to a of enhanced stability through mutual economic interests. Empirical analyses of suggest it raised the costs of conflict, thereby deterring escalation. Game-theoretic models indicate that heightened trade ties between and endogenize decisions to avoid by increasing expected losses from disruption, as seen in the post-2008 framework where mutual from outweighed short-term gains from . Similarly, studies of Taiwanese domestic politics show that interdependence empowered pro-engagement political coalitions, such as the 2008 election victory of , who advocated cross-strait , correlating with reduced rhetorical hostilities and the landmark Xi-Ma summit in November 2015. No peer-reviewed data directly quantifies a causal drop in military incidents attributable solely to the Links, but the period's outcomes align with interdependence theory's prediction of peace through opportunity costs, with bilateral trade serving as a proxy for restraint. Post-2016, under the administration, military tensions re-emerged through increased activities, including frequent aircraft incursions into Taiwan's —over 1,700 instances recorded from 2021 to 2023—yet the absence of direct conflict or persists, potentially bolstered by sustained economic ties exceeding $300 billion annually in recent years. Regional economic data from areas like Province, proximate to , demonstrate post-2008 normalization yielded statistically significant per capita GDP growth of CNY 20,726 (approximately $3,000 USD) by 2015 via synthetic control methods (p<0.01), implying spillover stability effects from normalized links that indirectly reinforced cross-strait deterrence. However, correlational evidence does not preclude asymmetrical dependencies enabling non-kinetic , as interdependence levels remain Taiwan-heavy in exposure without equivalently mitigating Beijing's gray-zone tactics. Overall, the empirical record indicates the Three Links have coincided with over 15 years of non-war stability, though causal attribution requires accounting for concurrent U.S. security commitments and domestic political variances.

Political Perspectives and Debates

Pro-Engagement Arguments and Achievements

Proponents of engagement via the Three Links policy argue that direct trade, transportation, and communication facilitate economic efficiency by eliminating costly indirect routes through third countries, thereby lowering expenses and accelerating business transactions across the . This integration is posited to sustain Taiwan's export-oriented economy by providing unfettered access to China's vast market, enabling industries such as and to capitalize on scale economies and synergies. Furthermore, advocates, including elements within Taiwan's (KMT) party, contend that deepened economic interdependence fosters mutual restraint, as the high costs of disruption—evident in intertwined production networks—serve as a natural deterrent to escalation, promoting cross-strait stability without compromising Taiwan's autonomy. Empirical achievements underscore these claims, with cross-strait trade volume expanding from approximately $130 billion in 2007 to $230.8 billion in 2024, positioning as Taiwan's largest trading partner and accounting for over 30% of Taiwan's exports by the early . Cumulative Taiwanese investment approvals in reached $206.37 billion by the end of 2023, supporting job creation and technological diffusion in sectors like semiconductors. In transportation, the initiation of direct charter flights in July 2008 evolved into hundreds of weekly regular services by the mid-, rising from 18 weekend charters to 670 flights per week by 2013, which reduced travel times from days to hours and boosted business mobility. People-to-people exchanges have also proliferated, with mainland tourist arrivals to Taiwan peaking at over 2.65 million in , generating substantial revenue for Taiwan's and retail sectors prior to policy shifts. The Mini-Three Links, operational since 2001 between , Matsu, and , demonstrated localized economic uplift through simplified cargo and passenger flows, paving the way for full implementation and exemplifying how targeted connectivity can yield tangible gains in peripheral regions without broader political concessions. Overall, these developments are cited by engagement supporters as evidence that pragmatic cross-strait linkages enhance Taiwan's prosperity and resilience, countering isolationist risks in a geopolitically contested environment.

Skeptical Views and Criticisms

Critics of the Three Links policy, particularly within Taiwan's (DPP) and among independence-leaning groups, argue that direct postal, transportation, and trade connections with primarily advance Beijing's unification agenda by fostering economic leverage and enabling subversive influence, rather than mutual benefit. They contend that these links exacerbate Taiwan's vulnerability to , as demonstrated by China's selective import bans—such as the 2021 prohibition on Taiwanese pineapples imposed shortly after President Tsai Ing-wen's —which targeted politically sensitive agricultural sectors to signal displeasure without broader escalation. Similar measures, including restrictions on fish exports in 2020 and wax apples in 2022, underscore how interdependence allows Beijing to weaponize trade flows, pressuring toward concessions on issues. Opponents further assert that expanded transportation and communication links serve as vectors for the Chinese Communist Party's strategies, facilitating infiltration into Taiwanese politics, media, and . For instance, increased cross-strait travel has correlated with documented cases of influence operations in outlying islands like , where proximity via mini-links has amplified concerns over opaque infrastructure projects and electoral meddling by pro-Beijing actors. DPP lawmakers have cited these dynamics to justify restrictions, such as the 2025 ban on academic exchanges with mainland universities linked to Beijing's , viewing such ties as undermining Taiwan's democratic autonomy. Empirically, skeptics point to the absence of reciprocal political moderation in despite decades of link liberalization; public opinion polls consistently show over 80% opposition to unification under the framework, with economic reliance on the mainland—where China absorbs about 40% of 's exports—heightening rather than alleviating identity-based resistance. This asymmetry, they argue, empowers to pursue gradual erosion of 's de facto independence through salami-slicing tactics, rather than deterring aggression via interdependence, as cross-strait has not demonstrably reduced posturing or gray-zone activities in the . During KMT-led expansions under President (2008–2016), DPP figures accused the administration of capitulating to Chinese demands, framing the policy as a one-sided concession that prioritized short-term gains over long-term strategic resilience.

Balanced Assessments from Data

Direct resumption of the Three Links in December 2008 facilitated a surge in cross-strait trade, with Taiwan's exports to rising from approximately $100 billion in 2008 to $124.38 billion by 2023, contributing to totaling $165.97 billion that year. This expansion supported Taiwan's export-driven , where goods and services exports constituted over 60% of GDP in recent years, with remaining the largest single trading partner despite diversification efforts. Cost reductions from direct shipping—estimated at 15-30% savings and up to 27 hours shaved from transit times—enhanced logistical efficiency, boosting competitiveness in sectors like and . Transportation data underscores mutual benefits: direct flights carried 6.5 million passengers between and mainland airports in 2012 alone, representing 23% of Taipei's total flights and enabling fuel cost cuts of 40-50% compared to indirect routes. Cross-strait peaked in the mid-2010s, with millions of mainland visitors annually injecting into Taiwan's service sector during a period of warmer relations, though numbers plummeted post-2016 due to political tensions, dropping to around 14,000 mainland tourists in the first ten months of 2024. These exchanges fostered short-term economic multipliers, including ancillary spending estimated at hundreds of dollars per tourist daily in early phases. Dependence metrics reveal trade-offs: mainland China's share of Taiwan's exports (including ) peaked at nearly 44% in 2020, heightening vulnerability to potential , as evidenced by Beijing's 2016 tourism curbs that disrupted service revenues without yielding political concessions. However, empirical trends indicate , with the share declining over 12 percentage points to 31.7% by 2024 amid Taiwan's and global supply chain shifts, reflecting successful diversification that reduced relative reliance while sustaining absolute trade volumes. Overall, data affirm symbiotic growth post-2008, with cross-strait ties aiding Taiwan's post-financial crisis recovery through heightened demand and integration, yet without isolated causal attribution to GDP acceleration beyond broader dynamics. Vulnerability assessments, drawn from rather than partisan narratives, show interdependence has not empirically deterred escalations but has prompted adaptive policies limiting over-reliance, as Taiwan's share to fell to a 22-year low in early 2024. No peer-reviewed analyses conclusively link to long-term stability gains or losses, though quantitative interdependence correlates with sustained absent scenarios modeled to cost trillions globally.

Recent Developments and Outlook

Status Under Recent Administrations

Under President (2016–2024), the Three Links—direct postal, transportation, and connections—continued to function without formal suspension, though political tensions limited expansion or new cooperative frameworks. Direct commercial flights between and operated on a scheduled basis, with routes connecting major airports like Taoyuan to and other hubs, facilitating business travel despite restrictions on individual tourist charters from the mainland starting in August 2019. links remained robust, with absorbing about 40% of 's exports and 20% of its imports by value in recent years, underscoring persistent even as pursued diversification to mitigate risks. Postal exchanges proceeded uninterrupted via international protocols, avoiding the direct routing envisioned in fuller integration. China's suspension of official dialogue channels post-Tsai's May 20, 2016, inauguration—citing her non-endorsement of the —halted negotiations on enhancements, while occasionally threatened disruptions without follow-through, as severing links would impose mutual economic costs. The Tsai administration also temporarily halted the "Mini Three Links"—limited ferry and trade services between Taiwan's outlying islands ( and Matsu) and mainland ports like —initially in 2020 for containment, with no resumption by 2022 amid security concerns over gray-zone activities. This reflected a cautious approach prioritizing and controls over deeper integration, contrasting with the partial openings under prior rule. Empirical data showed no collapse in overall cross-strait commerce; bilateral trade volumes fluctuated with global factors like the but rebounded, reaching highs exceeding $200 billion annually by 2021 before stabilizing. Under President (2024–present), who succeeded Tsai on May 20, 2024, the status quo on the Three Links has persisted amid escalated cross-strait frictions, including China's military drills post-Lai's and rejection of his framing as a sovereign entity. Direct flights and sea transport continue for cargo and approved passengers, with no reported interruptions as of late 2025, though has activated additional civilian air routes near the median line, prompting Taiwanese airspace alerts. Trade flows remain significant, with 's exports to the mainland holding steady despite U.S.-led decoupling pressures and China's 2023 trade barrier probes into Taiwanese restrictions on 2,455 product categories. Lai's administration has emphasized counter-espionage measures and economic resilience over link expansions, viewing interdependence as a potential vector while maintaining operational channels to avoid self-inflicted disruptions. Postal services operate via third-party routing, unchanged from prior years. No bilateral agreements have emerged, as China conditions progress on Lai's explicit acceptance of the "one China" principle, which he has not affirmed.

Influences from Broader Cross-Strait Tensions

The broader cross-strait tensions, characterized by the People's Republic of China's (PRC) military buildup, frequent incursions into 's , and diplomatic pressures, have constrained the expansion and stability of the Three Links since their partial resumption in 2008–2010. These tensions often manifest as PRC-imposed restrictions on trade and transportation, serving as tools of economic coercion in response to Taiwan's domestic political shifts or international engagements perceived as challenging Beijing's claims. For example, following Taiwan's (DPP) victory in the January 2016 presidential election, the PRC suspended the primary cross-strait communication mechanism, curtailed approvals for additional direct flights, and restricted to Taiwan, reducing passenger volumes on transportation links from peaks of over 4 million mainland visitors annually under the prior administration. Targeted disruptions to the trade link have escalated during periods of heightened confrontation. In August 2022, after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to , the PRC halted imports of Taiwanese citrus fruits, frozen fish, sweets, and biscuits—citing pesticide residues and other regulatory issues—and suspended exports of natural sand essential for Taiwan's and construction sectors, affecting dozens of Taiwanese exporters. Similar measures, such as the 2021 ban on Taiwanese pineapples, have recurred amid PRC responses to Taiwanese leaders' speeches or transits affirming the , leading to short-term declines in affected agricultural exports while overall volumes—exceeding $200 billion annually—demonstrate underlying interdependence tempered by selective . PRC military drills in the , which intensified post-2016 with over 1,700 aircraft incursions in 2022 alone, have indirectly disrupted transportation links by prompting shipping reroutes and heightened insurance premiums, though core direct services like the Kinmen-Quanzhou mini-link resumed in early 2023 despite surrounding escalations. These exercises, often timed to coincide with Taiwanese inaugurations or U.S. arms notifications, underscore causal links between security posturing and economic frictions, as leverages them to signal resolve without fully severing connectivity that benefits its own economy. The direct mail link, by contrast, has experienced minimal interruptions, facilitating routine exchanges less vulnerable to politicization. Under President Lai Ching-te's administration since May 2024, persistent tensions—including PRC "gray zone" operations and live-fire drills following his inaugural address—have stalled further integration of the links, with Beijing refusing new agreements absent Taiwan's endorsement of the "1992 Consensus." Empirical data indicate that while trade resilience mitigates broad shocks, recurrent restrictions exacerbate Taiwan's supply chain vulnerabilities, particularly in agriculture and raw materials, highlighting how unresolved sovereignty disputes perpetuate asymmetric dependencies rather than mutual deterrence through interdependence.

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