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Rojava–Islamist conflict
Rojava–Islamist conflict
Rojava–Islamist conflict
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Rojava–Islamist conflict
Part of the Rojava conflict of the Syrian civil war

Territories held by the SDF (yellow), IS (black), the SAA (red), the Syrian National Army and Turkey (light green), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (white), and the Revolutionary Commando Army (teal) as of December 2024
Date16 July 2013 – present
(12 years, 3 months, 2 weeks and 5 days)
Location
Northern Syria
Result

Ongoing

Belligerents

Syrian Democratic Forces And allied groups

CJTF-OIR (airstrikes, arms, and ground troops) (from 2014)

Russia (until 2024)[9][10][11]
Ba'athist Syria (until 2024)[12][13][14]

Islamic State[15]

al-Nusra Front (2013–17)[15]
Ahrar ash-Sham[16]
Jaysh al-Islam
Syrian opposition Free Syrian Army factions

Fatah Halab (2015–17)

Supported by
Commanders and leaders
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria Salih Muslim Muhammad (PYD leader)
Sipan Hemo (YPG general commander)
Cemşîd Osman (YPG commander of Ras al-Ayn)
Nujin Derik (YPG commander of Aleppo)
Roshna Akeed (YPG Ras al-Ayn commander)
Syrian oppositionDemocratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria Alaa Ajabu †
(Jabhat al-Akrad general commander)
Syrian oppositionDemocratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria Abu Layla (DOW) (Jabhat al-Akrad and Northern Sun Battalion commander)		 Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (leader of IS)
Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi †
Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi †
Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi †
[28][29]
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi †
[30]
Islamic State Abu Alaa Afri †
(Deputy Leader of IS)[31]
Islamic State Abu Mohammad al-Adnani † (Spokesperson)
Abu Ayman al-Iraqi † (Head of Military Shura)[32]
Abu Muslim al-Turkmani † (Deputy Leader, Iraq)[33]
Abu Ali al-Anbari † (Deputy Leader, Syria)
Abu Omar al-Shishani † (Field commander in Syria)[34][35]
Abu Musab[citation needed] (IS emir of Tell Abyad)		 Unknown
Units involved

Syrian Democratic Forces

Foreign volunteers
Anarchist and antifascist units
Arab tribes
Security forces
 IS Military Unknown
Strength

YPG: 65,000[54]
Jabhat al-Akrad: 7,000[55]
Syriac Military Council 2,000+ (2015)[56]

Kurdistan Workers' Party: 600[57]		 IS: Over 15,140[58][59][60] al-Nusra Front: 5,000–6,000[61]
Casualties and losses
11,000 fighters killed
21,000 fighters wounded[62]		 By YPG/SDF:
25,336 killed, 2,127 captured (YPG claim; 2013–2017 total)[63][64][65][66][67]
By US-led airstrikes:
9,145+ killed (SOHR claim, minimum, as of March 2019)[68]		 Unknown
Dozens of Syrian and 4 Turkish[69][70] civilians killed and 100,000[71] Syrian Kurds fleeing to Turkey

The Rojava–Islamist conflict, a major theater in the Syrian civil war, started after fighting erupted between the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Islamist rebel factions in the city of Ras al-Ayn. Kurdish forces launched a campaign in an attempt to take control of the Islamist-controlled areas in the governorate of al-Hasakah and some parts of Raqqa and Aleppo governorates after al-Qaeda in Syria used those areas to attack the YPG. The Kurdish groups and their allies' goal was also to capture Kurdish areas from the Arab Islamist rebels and strengthen the autonomy of the region of Rojava.[72] The Syrian Democratic Forces would go on to take substantial territory from Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic State (IS), provoking Turkish involvement in the Syrian Civil War.

Background

[edit]

Since the end of the Battle of Ras al-Ayn, the city was divided between an Arab-controlled western part and a Kurdish-controlled eastern part.[73] On 16 July, members of the al-Nusra Front attacked a Women's Protection Units (YPJ) patrol. They detained the driver; two female fighters managed to escape. In response to this attack, the People's Protection Units (YPG) brought reinforcements from al-Derbasiya while al-Nusra had sent 200 fighters as reinforcements a few days before.[74]

Conflict

[edit]
Further information: YPG–FSA relations
See also: Inter-rebel conflict during the Syrian Civil War

2013

[edit]

On 28 January, Arab tribesmen attacked the homes of Christian Armenians and Assyrians in the village of ad-Dalawiyah (25 kilometres (16 mi) south of Qamishli) and attempted to steal their harvest. The Assyrian Democratic Organization condemned the attacks, characterising them as "foreign deeds". Islamist rebels repeatedly called for Christians in the province to leave.[75]

Kurdish capture of Ras al-Ayn and spread of fighting

[edit]

On 16 July, the Kana'is street (where the YPG was positioned) and the al-Mahatta neighborhood (where al-Nusra was positioned) witnessed clashes.[74] A few hours later, the YPG took control of the headquarters of al-Nusra and released the fighter al-Nusra had kidnapped.[76]

On 17 July, Kurdish fighters expelled the jihadists from the town of Ras al-Ayn after a night of fighting[77] and soon after took control of the border crossing with Turkey.[78] Islamist forces retreated from Ras al-Ayn to Tal Half, Asfar and Najar which were under rebel control.[79] Eleven people were killed during the fighting, including nine jihadist and two Kurdish fighters.[80]

On 19 July, the YPG captured the village of Tal A'lo.[81] Fighting was still continuing in Karhouk and A'li Agha.[82] The next day, Kurdish fighters captured an al-Nusra checkpoint near the contested villages. By this point, 35 jihadist and 19 YPG fighters had been killed in the fighting.[83]

By the end of July 2013, IS and al-Nusra expelled Jabhat al-Akrad and the YPG from the border town of Tell Abyad after weeks of fighting which displaced thousands of civilians.[84]

August–September fighting and Kurdish advances

[edit]

On 1 August, IS declared the start of the siege of Kobanî, or Ayn al-Arab where the headquarters of the YPG is located. The area surrounding Kobani was then blocked on all sides by IS and the Turks.[85]

By August 28, Islamist and Kurdish forces were battling for control of the town of Yarubiya on the Iraq–Syria border. Islamists had captured further territory from the Kurds in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces; while in Aleppo, Islamists alongside rebel forces were ethnically cleansing Kurds from towns in the countryside and massacring them, leading to a mass migration of civilians to the town of Afrin.[86]

On 17 September, in the Al-Hasakah Governorate, Fighting broke out between Kurdish fighters and Islamist fighters in A'louk village that lies east of Ras al-A'in while fighting still took place near the town of al-Ya'rubiya. On 18 September, YPG took control of A'louk after four days of fighting that killed 20 people.[87]

On 26 September, rebels from the Free Syrian Army and Trotskyists of the Leon Sedov Brigade[88] joined IS in clashes with YPG forces around the town of Atma, on the Turkish border. FSA units were said to have brought heavy artillery to the battle to push back Kurdish snipers while Kurdish tanks were firing at Atma. Arab rebel artillery was launched at the town of Jindires.[89]

On 29 September, multiple bombers attacked Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. Six people were killed and more than 40 were injured. The IS later claimed responsibility and stated the attacks were retaliation for Masoud Barzani's stated intention of intervening in Syria on behalf of the Syrian Kurds.[90]

October Kurdish offensive

[edit]

On 26 October the YPG took control of the al-Yaarubiyah border crossing with Iraq[91] as well as the town itself.[92]

On 28 October, IS front in the oil-rich Çil Axa region completely collapsed. The YPG captured the villages of Girhok, Yusufiyê, Sefa, Cinêdiyê, Girê Fatê, Ebû Hecer and Mezraa Kelem while remnants of IS forces fled to Tal Hamis and Tal Brak.[93]

November Kurdish offensive

[edit]

On 2 November, Kurdish forces launched an offensive called the "Serekeniye Martyrs' Offensive", with the aim of consolidating their control of Hasaka province by pushing jihadist forces out of the area surrounding Ras al-Ayn.[94]

On 6 November, in Hasakah province, the YPG took over two villages west of Tall Tamer, on the highway to Aleppo, after clashes with IS, Jabhat Al-Nusra and allied rebel groups. The towns the YPG had taken over were Ghebesh and Tal Shemarin, which are inhabited by Assyrians.[95] By this point, YPG forces had captured a total of 40 towns and villages in the offensive.[96]

On 13 November, following major gains by the YPG, the PYD announced plans to create an autonomous transitional government to run the Kurdish-majority northeast of Syria. The plans were announced after a meeting in Qamishli that also involved Christian and Arab groups. The plan called for the creation of a parliament of 82 members elected from three cantons across the region. Kurdish officials also stated that the region would continue to be managed autonomously regardless of events elsewhere. In Raqqa province, rebel fighters launched domestically manufactured rockets on the villages of Kandar and Abdi Kawi which were under the control of the YPG.[97]

On 28 November, in Al-Hasakah province, YPG fighters took of three villages (Rokoba, A'wja, and Tal Maghas) which lie on the Tal Tamer-Hasaka road after violent clashes with IS, al-Nusra and several rebel battalions.[98]

December Kurdish offensive

[edit]

During the night of 26/27 December, the YPG launched an offensive on jihadist-controlled areas between Hasakah and Qamishli, during which they took Tell Brak District.

On 1 January 2014, the YPG battled the Islamists in Tell Brak, but were not able to capture the town. The battle caused 39 YPG and 21 Islamist fatalities.[99]

2014

[edit]

January–February Islamist offensive and Kurdish counter-offensive

[edit]

On 24 January, jihadist forces attacked the YPG-held town of Manajeer in the Al-Hasakah Governorate. However, after four days of fighting, their attack was repelled. Twenty-three Islamist and three Kurdish fighters were killed. During the fighting, the YPG also captured at least one tank from the jihadists.[100]

On 1 February, it was reported that the YPG launched an offensive against IS bases in Tell Abyad.[101]

On 3 February, the YPG claimed to have killed 8 IS fighters, including a commander, during clashes in Girê Spî.[102]

On 15 February, the YPG (supported by the Shammar tribe) launched an offensive against IS in the Tell Hamis area. Two days later, the YPG claimed to have killed "many" IS fighters and captured 30 of them, in addition to capturing five military vehicles and a large amount of weaponry during the operation.[103]

On 23 February, a predawn raid by the YPG captured Tell Brak, which lies in a strategic position between Al-Hasakah and Qamishli.[99]

On 26 February, the YPG announced it had halted all its military operations in the Kurdish-controlled regions but warned its enemies that it would respond to every hostile action on Kurdish soil.[104] The next day, IS launched an attack on Til Merûf which was eventually repelled by the YPG. According to the YPG, 16 IS fighters were killed in the clashes.[105]

March–April fighting at Tell Abyad and Kobanê

[edit]

On 1 March, IS attacked villages around Tell Abyad but the attack was repelled and left one IS fighter killed, according to the YPG.[106] On 6 March, the YPG claimed to have killed 16 IS fighters and destroyed a "military vehicle" in Tell Abyad.[107]

On 11 March, IS captured the town of Sîrîn[108] and attacked the Al-Hadaya Hotel in the city of Qamishli with suicide bombs, killing nine Kurdish civilians.[109] SOHR also reported that IS executed 25 Kurds (including 14 fighters) in the Al-Sheyokh area, near Jarabulus.[110] On 13 March, IS (according to local sources) captured the Qereqozak Bridge and some strategic areas near the Tomb of Suleyman Shah in Kobanê after clashes with Kurdish fighters.[111] On 14 March, Kurdish sources claimed that the YPG and allied forces killed 35 IS fighters in clashes in the countryside of southern Kobanî Canton, which erupted after IS launched an unsuccessful attack towards the Serriin silos.[112]

On 17 March, heavy clashes erupted between the YPG and IS near the Qereqozak Bridge in Kobanê. The YPG claimed to have killed 40 IS fighters.[113] On 19 March, the YPG captured Tell Henzir village.[114] The next day, the YPG also took control of Tell Henzir, Tell Xezal Miço, Ferisa Şerabiyan, Ferisa Sofiyan, Ferisa Dişo, Tell Boğan and Tell Meha. It was also stated that 32 IS fighters were killed in the clashes.[115]

On 22 March, SOHR reported heavy clashes between IS and the YPG around many villages in the western countryside of Tell Abyad, which resulted in the fleeing of mainly Kurdish refugees from the western countryside of Tell Abyad and surrounding areas to Turkey.[110]

On 1 April, IS laid siege to Kobanê from three flanks, and launched an artillery attack from Zor Mughar. The YPG ambushed IS forces at Kendal, east of Kobanê, killing 12 Azeri IS fighters and their Kurdish commander.[116] Fighting raged in Zor Mughar and Kharab Atto while YPG fighters cut off all the roads leading to Kobanê from the western side, starting from the villages of Ta'lk, Derbazin and al-Qanaya, to prevent potential attacks by IS fighters against the city.[117] Despite YPG control of the hills around Sirrin, IS forces, backed up by tanks, captured two grain silos and seized the village of Tal al-Bawgha.[116]

The YPG, the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, Liwa Ahrar Souriya and the Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa worked together against IS in Kobanê.[118] The YPG also co-operated with the Farouq Brigades and the Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa in Raqqa Governorate in operations against IS.[118]

May kidnappings

[edit]

On 29 May, it was reported that IS killed dozens of civilians in raids on several villages in the Ras al-Ayn region of Al-Hasakah province, with the retrieval of at least 15 bodies, including seven children.[119]

On 30 May, IS kidnapped 193 Kurdish civilians between the ages of 17 and 70 from the village of Qabasin near al-Bab. On the same day, they seized up to 186 Kurdish students who had been traveling from the Kobani region to Aleppo to complete exams.[120] The teenagers were reportedly sent to religious schools in Minjeb where they were subjected to Salafist indoctrination.[121]

July Kobanî offensive

[edit]

On 4 July, using weapons captured in Iraq, IS seized the villages of Zor Maghar, Al-Zyara, and Bayadiyah, near the city of Kobanî, after three days of fighting with YPG forces.[122]

On 9 July, IS advanced towards Kobanî from the east, forcing the YPG to withdraw from the villages of Abdi, Kwi, Kendal, Kri and Sor.[123] The clashes led to the deaths of 18 Kurdish fighters.[124]

On 14 July, the PYD issued a regional call to arms for all Kurds to assist in defending Kobanî. Kurdish militants from the PKK crossed from Turkey to reinforce YPG defensive positions. By this time, at least 10 villages had fallen to IS, who had begun to lob mortars at Kobanî. At least two PKK fighters were killed while defending the canton.[125]

By the end of July, according to the PYD, IS offensive against Kobanî had been repelled, with 685 IS fighters being killed.[126]

September Kobanî offensive

[edit]
Main article: Siege of Kobanî
Frontline situation near Kobanî from March–September 2014
Kurdish demonstration against IS in Vienna, Austria, 10 October 2014

On 17 September, following the capture of a strategic bridge over the Euphrates,[127] IS launched a large offensive using tanks, rockets and artillery in the direction of Kobanî, and within 24 hours captured 21 Kurdish villages. The advance left Kobanî encircled by IS forces.[128]

On 19 September, IS captured 39 more villages,[129] bringing their forces within 20 kilometers of Kobanî.[130] Forty-five thousand refugees crossed into Turkey, fearing the region would become part of IS,[131] while a number of refugees were stopped at the border and ordered to return to Kobanî by Turkish authorities.[132]

By 21 September, IS captured 64 villages[133] as their forces came within 10 kilometers of the city, and continued to advance[134] with fighting concentrated on the southern and eastern suburbs of Kobanî, 13 kilometers from the town.[135]

On 28 September, after violent clashes with the Kurdish forces of the YPG, IS militants captured the villages of Kenana, Qadaa, and Hamadaneh in the Tel Kocher (Yarubiyah) countryside.[136]

Merger with Iraqi campaign

[edit]

Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, with the aid of troops from the Syria-based Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), took control of the Rabia border crossing between the two countries,[137] marking the first major battle to straddle both. On 31 October, Iraq-based Peshmerga troops crossed into Syria via Turkey to aid in the defense of the border city of Kobane.[138]

2015

[edit]

January–December

[edit]
Rojava territory controlled by the YPG in June 2015
See also: Eastern al-Hasakah offensive and Western al-Hasakah offensive

The war dragged on, as both IS and the YPG gained and lost territory to each other, other rebel groups and loyalists. YPG successes alarmed the Turks, who threatened invasion.[139] In June, militants attacked Kobanî, killing over 200 people in gun battles.

Nusra-YPG clashes

[edit]

On 31 July 2015, clashes erupted between YPG and al-Nusra forces in the south of the Efrin Canton, targeting the town of Cindires.[140]

On 26 September 2015, clashes erupted between YPG and al-Nusra forces in the YPG-held district of Sheikh Maqsood. The clashes resulted in YPG forces advancing and capturing Castello Road, a key rebel supply line in the rebel-held Eastern Areas of Aleppo city. Tensions continued after the YPG allegedly violated clauses of a truce with the rebels concerning Castello Road. On 1 October Nusra forces again attacked YPG positions in Sheikh Maqsood; however this was repelled, with the YPG remaining in control of the key rebel supply route.[141][142][143]

Clashes between YPG-Al Nusra were renewed in the vicinity of Sheikh Maqsood on 3 October, with Al Nusra suffering 15 casualties.[144]

Map of the territory changes during the YPG-led Northern Syria offensive (2015)

Al-Hawl offensive

[edit]
Main article: 2015 al-Hawl offensive
YPG female fighters during the Al-Hawl offensive, December 2015

During November 2015, the YPG and its allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces captured the town of al-Hawl, along with more than 200 villages and towns from IS in the surrounding areas in Al-Hasakah Governorate near the border with Iraq in the month-long offensive.

Tishrin Dam offensive

[edit]
Main article: Tishrin Dam offensive

In the week-long offensive, the SDF captured Tishrin Dam and surrounding villages from IS.

2016

[edit]

Northern Aleppo offensive

[edit]
Main article: Northern Aleppo offensive (February 2016)

During February 2016, Syrian government forces and allied militias, backed by Russian and Syrian airstrikes, launched an offensive to capture areas in Northern Aleppo. The YPG-led SDF followed their advances and captured the city of Tell Rifaat and the Menagh Military Airbase.

Al-Shaddadi offensive

[edit]
Main article: Al-Shaddadi offensive (2016)

On 16 February 2016, the SDF, supported by airstrikes from the US-led coalition, launched an offensive to capture the strategic city of al-Shaddadi from IS.

Manbij offensive

[edit]
Main article: Manbij offensive (2016)
SDF fighters during the Battle of Raqqa against IS in 2017

On 31 May 2016, the SDF, supported by airstrikes from the US-led coalition, launched an offensive to capture the strategic city of Manbij from IS.

Afrin Canton

[edit]

On 11 September 2016 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the renamed al-Nusra Front, fired over 20 mortar shells at the town of Jindires in the southwestern Afrin Canton, destroying several residential buildings and causing a number of casualties, mostly women and children.[145]

Raqqa offensive

[edit]
Main article: Raqqa campaign (2016–2017)
See also: Battle of Raqqa (2017)

Turkish intervention (2015-present)

[edit]
Main article: Turkish involvement in the Syrian Civil War § Plans to invade or interfere in Syria
See also: Turkish military operation in Afrin
Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army during the Turkish military operation in Afrin in January 2018

During the summer of 2015, Turkey began bombing YPG and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq.[146]

On 13 February 2016, Turkey began shelling the Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria.[147]

2017

[edit]
Main article: Eastern Syria insurgency

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the US, launched the Second Battle of Raqqa against the Islamic State on 6 June 2017 and declared victory in the city on 17 October 2017. Bombardment by the US-led coalition led to the destruction of most of the city, including civilian infrastructure.[148][149][150] Some 270,000 people were said to have fled Raqqa.[151]

2018

[edit]

On 20 January 2018, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch alleging that the Government ruling in Afrin were terrorists. The operation was to be spearheaded by the Turkish Armed Forces and their allies in the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army.[152] On the same day, the Turkish Air Force bombed more than 100 targets in Afrin.[153] On 28 January 2018, Syria's antiquities department and the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that Turkish shelling had seriously damaged the ancient temple of Ain Dara at Afrin. Syria called for international pressure on Turkey "to prevent the targeting of archaeological and cultural sites".[154][155][156] On 20 February 2018, a Syrian army convoy consisting of 50 vehicles had arrived in Afrin through the Ziyarat border crossing and were deployed to different areas. Five vehicles reached the center of the city of Afrin.[157]

A demonstration in Afrin in support of the Kurdish YPG against the Turkish invasion, 19 January 2018
SDF-controlled territory (green) and Turkish-occupied territory (red) in October 2019

On 14 March 2018, Redur Xelil, the senior official of the Syrian Democratic Forces accused Turkey of settling Arab and Turkmen families in the villages captured by Turkish army. A senior Turkish official denied the accusations.[158]

On 18 March 2018, on the 58th day of Operation Olive Branch, the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces captured Afrin from the YPG and the YPJ.[159] Shortly after its capture, SNA fighters looted parts of the city and destroyed numerous Kurdish symbols, including a statue of Kāve, as Turkish Army troops solidified control by raising Turkish flags and banners over the city.[160][161] In areas which were captured by the Olive Branch forces, the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has provided population with help which covered the basic needs between 15 February and 15 March 2018.[162]

After the capture of Afrin by the Turkish led forces, the city came under the control of the Government of Turkey, which provides the administration.[163]

On 12 April 2018, a Turkish-backed interim council was elected in Afrin, consisting of 20 "elders from the city" – 11 Kurds, eight Arabs, and one Turkmen, Turkish state media reported.[164] The council is headed by a Kurd named Zuhair Haider who, in an interview with the state-run Anadolu Agency, expressed his gratitude to Turkey and vowed to "serve" the local citizens.[165]

In June 2018, the United Nations published a report stating that the security situation under Turkish-backed rebel control remains volatile. The OHCHR had received reports of lawlessness and rampant criminality, such as theft, harassment, cruel treatment and other abuse, and murders committed by several Turkish-backed armed groups, especially by the Sultan Murad and Hamza Divisions. The OCHR stated that civilians, particularly ethnic Kurds from Afrin, are being targeted for discrimination by the same Turkish-backed fighters.[166]

On 2 August 2018, Amnesty International reported that the Turkish forces were giving Syrian armed groups free rein to commit serious human rights abuses against civilians in the northern city of Afrin.[167] The research had found the Turkish-backed fighters have involved in arbitrary detentions, torture, forced displacement, enforced disappearances, confiscation of property, and looting.[167]

2019

[edit]

2020

[edit]

2021

[edit]

2022

[edit]
See also: Battle of al-Hasakah (2022)

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Rojava–Islamist conflict

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

The Rojava–Islamist conflict comprises the armed struggles between the Kurdish-led People's Protection Units (YPG) and the multi-ethnic , administering the Autonomous Administration of North and East (AANES or Rojava), and jihadist organizations such as the and Salafi-jihadist elements within Turkey-backed Syrian opposition groups, occurring primarily in northeastern since 2012 amid the . The YPG initially clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra over border areas like in 2012–2013, but the conflict escalated with ISIS's territorial expansion, culminating in the 2014–2015 Siege of , where YPG forces, bolstered by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes and small arms airdrops, decisively defeated an ISIS assault after months of intense urban combat, preventing the group's consolidation in Kurdish territories. Formed in 2015, the SDF spearheaded the ground offensive that liberated key strongholds including in 2016, in 2017, and the final pocket at Baghuz in 2019, achieving the territorial defeat of with international coalition support while incorporating Arab and other local fighters to broaden its base. Parallel hostilities arose with , which designates the YPG as a terrorist extension of the PKK, launching incursions like in 2018—capturing Afrin from SDF control using proxies including —and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, displacing SDF forces along the border through alliances with the (SNA), whose factions encompass ex-jihadists and Salafi groups such as . Despite these setbacks, the SDF maintains control over most oil-rich eastern territories, contending with persistent guerrilla attacks and emerging threats from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led advances post-2024 regime change in , underscoring Rojava's precarious autonomy secured through battlefield successes against ideological extremists.

Background

Kurdish political and military organization in Syria

The Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded on September 20, 2003, emerged as the leading Kurdish political entity in , modeled after the (PKK) and led initially by figures like Salah Muslim. Its ideology centers on , a framework derived from PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's writings, which prioritizes , ecological sustainability, women's liberation, and multi-ethnic coexistence without pursuing state independence. The PYD operated clandestinely under Ba'athist repression until the 2011 Syrian uprising, during which it capitalized on regime withdrawals to establish de facto control over Kurdish-majority areas in northern , often termed Rojava, while maintaining tacit non-aggression pacts with Assad's forces. Rival Kurdish groups, such as those in the (KNC), accused the PYD of monopolizing power and suppressing opposition through arrests and electoral manipulations, though the PYD dominated local governance structures like the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM). Militarily, the PYD's armed component, the People's Protection Units (YPG), traces its origins to informal self-defense groups formed after the , where Kurdish protests against regime forces resulted in over 30 deaths and prompted PKK-trained militants to organize protection squads. By July 2004, these evolved into structured units under PYD oversight, but the YPG formalized as a in 2011 amid the civil war's onset, rapidly growing to tens of thousands of fighters by absorbing defectors and volunteers. The YPG's command structure parallels the PKK's hierarchical model, with battalions (taburs) organized into brigades under regional commands, emphasizing ideological indoctrination and mandatory service in controlled areas. Parallel to the YPG, the , established around 2012, integrated female combatants—comprising up to one-third of forces—aligned with the PYD's doctrine promoting gender parity in combat roles. These organizations consolidated authority in three interconnected cantons—Afrin, Kobanî, and Jazira—by 2012, leveraging the power vacuum from Syrian Arab Army retreats to administer civil affairs, including education in Kurdish language and , while clashing with non-PYD Kurdish factions and Islamist rebels over territorial control. The PYD/YPG's PKK affiliations, including cross-border cadre movements and shared symbols, underpin Turkey's of both as terrorist extensions, despite U.S. tactical alliances with the YPG from 2014 onward for anti-ISIS operations that temporarily obscured these ties.

Rise of Islamist factions during the Syrian civil war

The Syrian civil war commenced in March 2011 amid widespread protests against President Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian rule, which the regime suppressed violently, prompting the formation of armed opposition groups. Initially dominated by defectors organizing under the (FSA) banner in July 2011, the opposition fragmented due to poor coordination, ideological differences, and limited resources. Islamist factions capitalized on these weaknesses, emerging as disciplined forces with superior tactics, including suicide bombings and , attracting recruits disillusioned with the FSA's inefficacy. Jabhat al-Nusra, established in late 2011 by operatives dispatched from under Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, publicly announced its presence on , 2012, via a video claiming responsibility for attacks on Assad's . The group rapidly expanded through high-impact operations, such as the bombing of a intelligence headquarters in May 2012, establishing itself as a leading jihadist entity by controlling swathes of territory in and provinces. Concurrently, coalesced in January 2012 from Salafi networks of imprisoned Islamists released by the regime, growing to encompass thousands of fighters across northern by mid-2012 through mergers with smaller brigades and emphasis on local Syrian identity blended with Salafi ideology. These factions received financial and logistical support from private donors in Gulf states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who funneled funds to Sunni opposition groups amid sectarian motivations against Assad's Alawite-led regime, though official state involvement remained deniable. Foreign jihadists, numbering in the thousands by 2013, bolstered their ranks, enhancing combat capabilities against both regime forces and rival rebels. Tensions within the jihadist spectrum culminated in 2013 when al-Nusra's rift with its Iraqi parent led to the formal declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which seized Raqqa in early 2013 and imposed brutal governance, further eclipsing moderate elements. By 2014, Islamists controlled approximately 60% of opposition-held territory, setting the stage for direct confrontations with autonomous Kurdish forces in Rojava as they vied for border regions and resources.

Ideological clashes between secular Kurdish forces and jihadists

The secular governance model of Rojava, inspired by , prioritizes decentralized, multi-ethnic assemblies, women's co-leadership, and separation of religion from state affairs, fostering policies like mandatory in institutions and protection of religious minorities such as and . This framework, articulated by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and implemented by the People's Protection Units (YPG), rejects hierarchical theocracies in favor of communal self-management, viewing religious extremism as a tool of patriarchal control that undermines individual and collective liberation. In contrast, Salafi-jihadist groups like the (ISIS) advocate a transnational governed by rigid interpretation, demanding submission to divine law over human autonomy and deeming secular experiments as innovations (bid'ah) warranting (declaration of ). Kurdish leaders and YPG spokespersons have framed jihadists as ideological fascists who impose medieval subjugation, particularly on women, whose roles in YPJ units symbolize defiance against enforced veiling and under ISIS rule; for instance, Rojava's administration enabled and participation denied in adjacent ISIS-held areas, where girls faced systematic denial of schooling beyond basic levels. This opposition extends to jihadist intolerance for ethnic pluralism, as ISIS targeted Kurdish communities for perceived disloyalty and alliances with Western forces, displacing over 200,000 from areas like in 2015 while destroying non-Sunni religious sites. PYD ideology, drawing from Abdullah Öcalan's writings, critiques Salafi-jihadism as a reactionary force perpetuating tribal and sectarian divisions, incompatible with ecological and democratic principles aimed at transcending through confederal ties. ISIS doctrinal materials, including Dabiq magazine issues from 2014, portray and as shirk () and infidelity, equating YPG governance with un-Islamic parliamentary systems and alliances with "crusaders," justifying offensive against them as religious duty. Internal ISIS documents, such as a 2016 Al-Bab security report, classify Kurdish villages as inherent threats due to "hatred" toward the and support for secular forces, invoking Quranic interpretations of grave sinners akin to to rationalize extermination campaigns. A 2013 ISIS video explicitly vowed to "defeat you just as we have defeated the apostates of the PKK," framing the conflict as existential warfare against heretics who pervert Islamic history by invoking figures like while embracing . These mutual condemnations fueled irreconcilable hostilities, with jihadists viewing Rojava's model as a polluting influence on Muslim lands and Kurds seeing Salafi ideology as barbaric regression antithetical to modern .

Origins and Early Engagements (2011–2013)

Withdrawal of Syrian regime forces and power vacuums

In mid-2012, as the intensified, the Assad regime prioritized combating opposition forces in major urban centers and Arab-majority regions, leading to a strategic withdrawal of Syrian Arab Army units from Kurdish-populated areas in northern , collectively known as Rojava. This pullout began in early July 2012, with regime forces evacuating key positions in cities such as , (Ayn al-Arab), Afrin, , and (Serekaniye) by July 19, allowing local Kurdish militias affiliated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People's Protection Units (YPG) to assume control without significant resistance. The regime retained a limited presence in select security installations, such as intelligence outposts in , but largely ceded administrative and military authority over these territories to focus resources elsewhere. The abrupt departure created immediate power vacuums across Rojava's three cantons, where state institutions collapsed, leaving , , and public services in limbo amid ongoing nationwide unrest. Kurdish political factions, including the PYD, rapidly filled much of this void by establishing , declaring self-administration on July 19, 2012, and implementing local councils to manage civilian affairs. However, rival Kurdish groups like the contested PYD dominance, resulting in sporadic internal tensions that further destabilized the region. These vacuums also presented opportunities for Islamist factions within the Syrian opposition, such as early precursors to Jabhat al-Nusra and other Salafist militias, to probe Kurdish-held areas from adjacent fronts, exploiting the lack of centralized authority to advance their territorial ambitions. The regime's withdrawal inadvertently shifted the conflict dynamics in northern , pitting emerging Kurdish self-defense forces against jihadist elements seeking to impose Islamic governance, thereby laying the groundwork for direct confrontations in border towns like .

Initial skirmishes in Ras al-Ayn and surrounding areas

The initial skirmishes in Ras al-Ayn (Kurdish: Serêkaniyê), a strategically important border town in al-Hasakah Governorate, began on November 8, 2012, when Syrian opposition forces, including Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions, advanced into the area to confront retreating Syrian Arab Army units following their partial withdrawal from Kurdish-majority regions earlier that year. Syrian government forces had lost control of key positions amid broader rebel offensives, allowing the People's Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to secure Kurdish neighborhoods without direct opposition from the regime. These early encounters primarily pitted rebels against regime holdouts, resulting in at least 20 Syrian soldiers killed during the initial assault on government facilities. Tensions escalated into direct YPG-rebel clashes by November 19, 2012, after opposition groups demanded the YPG remove their flags and checkpoints from the town, viewing Kurdish self-administration as a challenge to unified rebel control over liberated areas. Islamist factions, including the Salafi-jihadist Ghuraba al-Sham Brigade, played a prominent role in these attacks on YPG positions, such as the al-Sina'a checkpoint, marking one of the first overt confrontations between secular Kurdish militias and hardline Sunni Islamist elements amid the power vacuum. Moderate FSA commanders publicly criticized these Islamist-led incursions for proceeding without broader coordination, highlighting fractures within the opposition over territorial priorities and ideological differences with the PYD's leftist autonomy project. Fighting in surrounding areas, including villages near such as al-Darbasiyah and , saw parallel skirmishes as YPG forces, bolstered by local Kurdish volunteers, repelled rebel probes into adjacent Kurdish enclaves on , 2012, capturing remaining regime outposts to consolidate defenses. These engagements involved small-scale assaults with small arms and mortars, displacing hundreds of civilians and underscoring the rapid shift from anti-regime cooperation to inter-opposition rivalry, driven by rebels' intent to dominate border crossings for logistics and funding. By late November, the skirmishes had resulted in dozens of combatants killed on both sides, with the YPG maintaining control of eastern Kurdish districts while rebels held western Arab-majority sectors, setting the stage for protracted into 2013.

Expansion of fighting to other Kurdish-majority towns

In the wake of initial skirmishes in , hostilities between the People's Protection Units (YPG) and Islamist-linked factions of the (FSA) and other opposition groups spread to 's Kurdish-majority neighborhoods, including Ashrafiyeh, in October 2012. FSA fighters, numbering around 200, advanced into Ashrafiyeh on 26 October, prompting defensive clashes with YPG militias that left at least 30 combatants dead and led to the capture of approximately 200 by rebels. These engagements reflected Islamist rebels' efforts to counter YPG consolidation in urban Kurdish enclaves amid the broader Battle of Aleppo. By early 2013, fighting extended westward to the , a predominantly Kurdish area where YPG forces repelled incursions by FSA units and emerging Salafist groups aiming to seize control from local Kurdish authorities. Clashes in Afrin involved exchanges and ground assaults, contributing to a pattern of territorial disputes that heightened sectarian tensions between secular Kurdish militias and jihadist elements within the opposition. Eastward expansion reached towns in , such as , Tel Temir, and areas near Hasakah city, where and other jihadists targeted YPG positions to disrupt Kurdish autonomy efforts. In mid-2013, these groups launched coordinated attacks, including bombardments from bases in neighboring locales, resulting in dozens of Kurdish casualties and forcing YPG reinforcements to secure oil-rich peripheries like Rumeilan. By July 2013, such operations had escalated, with al-Qaeda affiliates like the and al-Sham (ISIS) and exploiting border proximity to intensify pressure on multiple fronts.

Major Conventional Phase (2014–2016)

Siege and liberation of Kobanî

The siege of Kobanî commenced in mid-September 2014, when () forces launched a coordinated offensive against the town, a Kurdish-majority enclave in northern 's Rojava region situated along the Turkish border. aimed to capture the strategically vital location to consolidate control over a contiguous territory spanning and , deploying up to 4,000 fighters supported by captured tanks, artillery, and foreign suicide bombers. The town's defenders, primarily the People's Protection Units (YPG) with around 1,500-2,000 fighters, mounted a tenacious urban defense amid severe ammunition shortages, as rapidly overran surrounding villages and encircled the city by late September. The intensity of the assault prompted an exodus of approximately 130,000-200,000 civilians into by early October 2014, exacerbating a and drawing international attention. On September 27, 2014, the U.S.-led coalition under initiated airstrikes targeting convoys and positions near Kobanî, marking the first such intervention in against the group; these strikes, involving precision-guided munitions from U.S. aircraft, proved decisive in halting advances by destroying armored vehicles and command nodes. Ground fighting persisted through October, with YPG forces reclaiming some eastern suburbs amid house-to-house combat, bolstered by limited resupplies airdropped by coalition forces. On October 29, around 150 fighters from Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government crossed into Kobanî via with heavy weapons, reinforcing the defenders and enabling counteroffensives. By mid-October 2014, the reported over 600 deaths in the fighting, including 374 ISIS militants, though subsequent estimates indicated thousands more casualties on both sides as the siege dragged into winter. ISIS employed mass suicide bombings and foreign fighters, including and , but sustained heavy losses from airstrikes and YPG ambushes, which degraded their ability to hold captured ground. The battle exposed ISIS vulnerabilities to combined air-ground operations, shifting momentum despite initial gains that saw the group control up to 40% of the town at peak. Kobanî was liberated on January 26, 2015, when YPG-led forces, supported by airstrikes exceeding 700 strikes in the campaign, expelled remaining elements from the city center and eastern districts. retreated after planting mines and booby traps, leaving behind executed captives and destroyed infrastructure; the victory, achieved at the cost of hundreds of YPG deaths and widespread devastation, marked a pivotal reversal for territorial ambitions and validated YPG resilience in . The outcome underscored the efficacy of targeted aerial support in enabling local forces to counter superior numbers, influencing subsequent strategies against .

Offensives at Tell Abyad, Al-Hawl, and Tishrin Dam

In late May 2015, the People's Protection Units (YPG), alongside Arab rebel allies including elements of Liwa Shams al-Shamal, initiated an offensive to dislodge the from (also known as Gire Spi), a strategically vital town on the Syria- border in northern . The operation, supported by intensive U.S.-led coalition airstrikes, enabled rapid advances that severed a primary supply route linking ISIS forces in Tal Abyad to their de facto capital in . By June 15, 2015, the coalition had seized most of the town, securing the border crossing and facilitating the flow of weapons and fighters from to Kurdish-led forces while disrupting jihadist logistics. This victory consolidated YPG control over a contiguous stretch of territory connecting the Kobanî and Jazira cantons, though it drew Turkish concerns over expanded Kurdish influence along the border. Building on momentum from , (SDF)—comprising YPG as the core with integrated Arab units—extended operations southward into Hasakah province, capturing Al-Hawl and surrounding villages from in November 2015 as part of broader efforts to clear jihadist pockets east of the . Al-Hawl's fall disrupted ISIS command nodes and oil extraction sites in the region, contributing to the group's loss of over 240 localities in the Hasakah-Raqqa theater during the campaign. These gains enhanced SDF security over displacement routes and resource infrastructure, though the area later became associated with the notorious Al-Hawl camp housing ISIS affiliates. To the west, SDF forces launched the Tishrin Dam offensive in October 2015, crossing the River in a maneuver that defied Turkish threats of retaliation and positioned them to threaten ISIS supply lines from Aleppo province. Amid coalition airstrikes providing , the operation culminated on December 26, 2015, with the full capture of the Tishrin Dam (Baath Dam), a critical hydroelectric facility supplying electricity to northern and serving as a transport hub for ISIS reinforcements to . Control of the dam not only denied ISIS a key asset but also enabled SDF expansion toward , bridging isolated Kurdish enclaves and accelerating the erosion of the caliphate's in 2015.

Battles for Manbij, Al-Shaddadi, and Raqqa integration


In February 2016, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), primarily composed of Kurdish YPG fighters alongside Arab allies, initiated an offensive against Islamic State (ISIS) positions in Al-Shaddadi, a key southern gateway town in Hasakah Governorate that controlled supply routes toward Deir ez-Zor. Supported by U.S. special operations advisers and coalition airstrikes, SDF forces advanced rapidly from Al-Hawl, encircling the town and prompting many ISIS fighters to flee southward. By February 27, 2016, SDF units had fully captured Al-Shaddadi, eliminating remaining ISIS pockets and securing the town, which severed critical ISIS logistics lines and expanded SDF control southward from Rojava's core areas. The victory at Al-Shaddadi, achieved with minimal reported SDF casualties but significant ISIS losses estimated in the hundreds, positioned the SDF to disrupt ISIS movements between Raqqa and eastern Syria, facilitating future operations by denying the group a major refueling and resupply hub. U.S. forces provided on-ground advisory support without direct combat involvement, emphasizing the SDF's role in ground maneuvers while coalition airpower targeted ISIS reinforcements. This battle marked an early success in broadening SDF territorial contiguity beyond Kurdish-majority regions, incorporating Arab-populated areas under SDF administration. Shifting westward, the SDF launched the Manbij offensive in late May 2016, crossing the River from positions near to assault -held , a strategically vital city linking to the valley and serving as an command node. With U.S.-led coalition airstrikes providing —conducting over 200 strikes in the initial phase—SDF fighters, including the Manbij Military Council, methodically cleared defenses amid urban fighting and suicide bombings. By early August 2016, after two months of intense combat that reportedly killed over 2,000 militants according to SDF claims, the group fully expelled remaining fighters, who fled using civilians as shields, allowing SDF forces to declare liberated on August 12. The Manbij campaign resulted in heavy civilian tolls from coalition strikes, with reports of dozens killed in July airstrikes alone, though U.S. officials attributed many to tactics like booby-trapping buildings. SDF losses numbered in the dozens, bolstered by U.S. embeds for intelligence and artillery coordination. Capturing connected SDF-held Kobanî to the west bank of the , creating a contiguous that isolated from western reinforcements and supply corridors. These victories at Al-Shaddadi and enabled the SDF to integrate province into their operational theater by late 2016, forming a semi-encircled perimeter around ISIS's capital. Al-Shaddadi's southern flank complemented 's western isolation, allowing the SDF to launch preparatory operations like Euphrates Wrath in November 2016, which further constricted ISIS mobility and paved the way for the full assault in 2017. This territorial linkage, achieved through U.S.-enabled advances, transformed fragmented Rojava enclaves into a unified anti-ISIS corridor spanning over 200 kilometers, prioritizing empirical disruption of jihadist infrastructure over ideological alignments.

Waning of Territorial Control and Insurgency (2017–2019)

Fall of ISIS caliphate and shift to guerrilla tactics

The (SDF), primarily Kurdish-led militias controlling Rojava in northeastern , intensified operations against the (ISIS) following the liberation of in October 2017, targeting remaining ISIS strongholds along the River valley. In December 2018, the SDF launched Operation Roundup to dislodge ISIS from its final pockets in and Baghuz Fawqani, facing entrenched defenses including improvised explosive devices, sniper fire, and tactics employed by ISIS fighters. These offensives, supported by U.S.-led airstrikes, progressively shrank ISIS territory despite high casualties on both sides, with the SDF reporting over 11,000 ISIS combatants killed across the campaign by early 2019. By mid-February 2019, ISIS forces were confined to a shrinking enclave in Baghuz Fawqani, the last remnant of their self-proclaimed , prompting mass surrenders and evacuations of civilians and fighters. On March 23, 2019, the SDF declared the total defeat of ISIS's territorial control in after capturing Baghuz, marking the effective end of the caliphate established in 2014; U.S. officials corroborated this milestone, noting the physical caliphate's collapse amid internal ISIS fractures and sustained coalition pressure. The SDF subsequently detained approximately 5,000 ISIS foreign fighters and over 10,000 family members in facilities like Al-Hol and Al-Sina'a prisons, straining resources in Rojava-controlled areas. In the immediate aftermath, ISIS leadership urged a pivot from to , dispersing fighters into sleeper cells across SDF-held territories to conduct hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, and vehicle-borne (VBIED) strikes. This shift was evident by mid-2019, with ISIS claiming responsibility for ambushes on SDF patrols and bombings in province, exploiting local Sunni Arab grievances and porous desert borders to rebuild networks. U.S. troop reductions in late 2019 facilitated this resurgence, as SDF forces faced divided attention amid Turkish incursions, allowing ISIS to launch over 100 attacks in northeastern within the first year post-Baghuz. Despite these tactics yielding no territorial gains, they inflicted steady attrition on SDF security, underscoring ISIS's adaptation to rooted in prior insurgent doctrines from .

Clashes with Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist groups

As the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) consolidated gains against the Islamic State following the 2017 liberation of Raqqa, direct confrontations with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) remained limited, with HTS primarily focused on consolidating control in Idlib province rather than expanding eastward into Rojava-held territories. No major battles between SDF forces and HTS were recorded during 2017–2019, though ideological hostilities persisted, rooted in prior clashes during the early Syrian civil war phases. In contrast, clashes intensified with other Salafist groups integrated into Turkish-backed (SNA) proxies. During , launched by on January 20, 2018, to dislodge YPG from Afrin canton, SNA components comprising Salafist and jihadist factions—including elements aligned with and ultra-extremist groups—engaged in ground assaults alongside Turkish artillery and air support. These forces captured key positions, culminating in the fall of Afrin city to SNA fighters on March 18, 2018, after two months of fighting that displaced over 100,000 civilians and resulted in hundreds of YPG casualties. Similar dynamics played out in Operation Peace Spring, initiated October 9, 2019, targeting SDF positions along the Turkish border from Tel Abyad to . SNA units, incorporating Salafist-leaning factions such as remnants of (Army of Islam), advanced against YPG defenses, capturing significant territory including by October 20, 2019, before a U.S.-brokered . These engagements underscored the role of Salafist militias as Turkish auxiliaries, exacerbating Rojava's multi-front challenges amid the drawdown of territorial threats. , a prominent Salafist coalition, had relocated elements northward post the 2018 fall of eastern Ghouta, integrating into anti-Kurdish operations. These proxy-driven clashes highlighted tactical alliances between and Salafist groups, motivated by shared opposition to Kurdish autonomy, despite occasional intra-rebel frictions such as Ahrar al-Sham's internal splits with HTS in early 2018. Casualty figures from these operations remain disputed, with SDF reporting over 500 SNA fighters killed in Afrin alone, while Turkish sources emphasized minimized losses through tactics.

Turkish-backed operations intersecting with Islamist threats

Turkish-backed forces, including the (SNA), engaged directly with remnants during the extension of into early 2017, particularly in the . Turkish artillery, airstrikes, and ground support enabled SNA precursors to advance against defenses, culminating in the capture of on February 23, 2017, after months of intense fighting that resulted in hundreds of casualties and the destruction of jihadist command nodes. This operation cleared a significant -held area near the Turkish border, reducing immediate cross-border threats from the group, though it also positioned Turkish proxies adjacent to Kurdish-held territories, heightening tensions with Rojava forces. Operation Olive Branch, launched in January 2018 to dislodge YPG from Afrin, indirectly benefited by diverting SDF resources and attention from eastern fronts where the group retained pockets of resistance. As Turkish forces and SNA factions focused on Kurdish positions, exploited the resulting strain on counterterrorism efforts, launching opportunistic attacks in and provinces that SDF units could no longer prioritize. Afrin itself saw minimal presence, but the offensive's emphasis on territorial gains against over jihadist threats underscored a divergence in priorities, with Turkish officials prioritizing PKK-linked groups despite ongoing guerrilla activities elsewhere. The 2019 Operation Peace Spring further intersected with Islamist threats by compelling the SDF to abandon final assaults on holdouts in eastern , such as Baghuz, to defend against SNA advances along the border. This redirection enabled to intensify prison break attempts and sleeper cell activations, including coordinated attacks on SDF detention facilities holding thousands of foreign fighters, amid the chaos of the Turkish incursion. SNA forces encountered sporadic resistance during their push into Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, but reports indicated inadequate vetting among proxies allowed some jihadist elements to infiltrate or evade scrutiny, complicating post-offensive security. Overall, these operations, while occasionally neutralizing local cells, primarily weakened the SDF's capacity to suppress broader Islamist insurgencies, creating opportunities for the group's resurgence in Rojava-adjacent areas.

Persistent Low-Intensity Conflict (2020–2025)

Ongoing ISIS attacks and prison break attempts

Following the territorial defeat of the () in March 2019, the group shifted to an insurgency strategy emphasizing guerrilla attacks, ambushes, and targeted operations against (SDF) positions in northeastern , including repeated efforts to liberate imprisoned fighters from facilities like al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah. These prison break attempts exploit the SDF's detention of approximately 10,000 suspects, straining resources amid competing threats from Turkish-backed forces and economic pressures. A notable early attempt occurred on January 20, 2021, when ISIS-affiliated groups launched an assault on al-Sina'a prison using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and fire, aiming to free hundreds of detained militants; the SDF repelled the attack with minimal escapes reported. The most significant operation followed on January 20, 2022, involving coordinated suicide bombings, gun battles, and infiltration tactics that breached the prison perimeter, allowing an estimated 300-500 ISIS fighters to escape temporarily before SDF counteroffensives, supported by U.S. coalition airstrikes, resecured the facility after ten days of fighting. This clash resulted in over 500 deaths, including 346 ISIS combatants, SDF guards, and civilians, marking ISIS's largest coordinated action since the caliphate's fall and highlighting vulnerabilities in SDF detention infrastructure. Such attempts persisted into later years, with ISIS sleeper cells probing SDF perimeters at al-Sina'a and related sites through smaller-scale raids and bombings, though none matched the 2022 scale by mid-2025; for instance, U.S.-enabled SDF operations in January 2025 neutralized ISIS elements near suspected of planning disruptions at detention centers. Broader activities complemented these efforts, including 27 documented ISIS attacks in SDF-held areas during November 2024 alone—primarily ambushes on patrols and checkpoints in Hasakah and —reflecting a tactical focus on attrition to erode SDF control and facilitate future breaks. By 2025, ISIS continued prioritizing prison raids, with cells active in adjacent camps like al-Hol serving as and planning hubs, though SDF fortifications and coalition intelligence mitigated major successes.

SDF detentions of ISIS fighters and internal security challenges

The hold approximately 8,950 ISIS fighters and affiliates in detention facilities across northeastern as of mid-2025, many of whom are combat-experienced and pose ongoing risks due to their ideological commitment and operational knowledge. These include high-security prisons such as Al-Sina'a in Hasakah and others in , where foreign fighters from , the , and beyond are segregated from Syrian detainees to mitigate coordination risks. In parallel, SDF-administered camps like Al-Hol (housing over 40,000 individuals, predominantly ISIS family members) and Roj serve as internment sites for suspected supporters, low-level operatives, and unverified civilians, straining guard rotations and infrastructure amid chronic underfunding. Security challenges intensified following ISIS's territorial defeat in 2019, with the group launching coordinated assaults aimed at mass extractions; a January 2022 attack on Al-Sina'a Prison involved hundreds of ISIS militants using bombings and gunfire, killing over 500 people including guards and inmates before SDF forces, backed by U.S. airstrikes, quelled the uprising. Subsequent attempts persisted, including a foiled breakout at Dêrik Prison in 2023 and the capture in September 2024 of an ISIS facilitator linked to planning foreign fighter escapes from SDF sites. By late 2024, U.S. officials assessed over 9,000 detainees as a "ticking ," citing SDF's lightly armed Kurdish-led units—diverted by Turkish incursions and tribal clashes—as vulnerable to exploitation if support wanes. In camps, ISIS remnants enforce hisba (morality policing) through vigilante killings, with documented murders of over 100 residents in Al-Hol between 2020 and 2024 for perceived or collaboration with authorities, fostering a parallel governance structure that undermines SDF control. Internal dynamics exacerbate these issues: overcrowding and inadequate conditions in facilities promote , with ISIS recruiters targeting youth and exploiting grievances to rebuild networks, as evidenced by intercepted communications and camp-based attack cells. SDF responses include tribal sponsorship releases—transferring over 10,000 Syrians to Arab clans since 2021 for monitoring—but these carry risks, as returnees have rejoined ISIS operations in . Resource constraints limit vetting and intelligence, with SDF reliant on U.S.-funded programs like the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, which allocated millions annually through 2025 yet face congressional scrutiny over sustainability amid delays from Western states. Persistent low-intensity ISIS attacks, totaling 27 in SDF areas in November 2024 alone, divert personnel from perimeter security, heightening fears of cascading failures if external pressures like post-Assad Syrian transitions further erode focus. Overall, these detentions represent a fragile strategy, with experts warning that without accelerated prosecutions or returns—fewer than 5,000 repatriated globally by 2025—ISIS could regenerate from within, leveraging detained cadres for revival.

Emerging tensions with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham post-Assad fall

Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), under leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, established the Syrian transitional government, asserting centralized authority over former regime territories and demanding the dissolution of autonomous entities like the (SDF)-controlled Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava). HTS viewed Rojava's secular, decentralized model—rooted in Kurdish-led —as incompatible with its vision of a unified Syrian state under Islamist-influenced governance, leading to immediate rhetorical and diplomatic frictions. HTS publicly called for SDF integration into a national army, rejecting or resource-sharing autonomy over oil-rich fields in and Hasakah, which generate significant revenue for the SDF. Initial post-Assad engagements involved mediated talks, with U.S. diplomats facilitating discussions in early 2025 to avert confrontation, but core disputes persisted: HTS insisted on full subordination of SDF forces, while the SDF sought guarantees for local governance and . By mid-2025, HTS escalated pressure through border closures and proxy mobilizations, including alliances with Arab tribal elements opposed to Kurdish dominance in mixed areas. These moves reflected HTS's strategic imperative to consolidate power amid economic strains, as Rojava's control of approximately 90% of Syria's oil production undermined Damascus's legitimacy. Tensions were compounded by HTS's historical antipathy toward , linked to past clashes during the , though HTS had pragmatically distanced itself from global to court international recognition. Clashes erupted in October 2025 in Aleppo's Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, SDF-held enclaves within government-controlled areas, when HTS-aligned forces imposed a on October 6, blocking roads and supplies to roughly 100,000-500,000 residents. Syrian government forces accused SDF elements of firing mortars into civilian areas, killing at least one security personnel, while SDF reported attacks on protesters and civilian infrastructure; the triggered humanitarian alerts over food and medical shortages. Heavy fighting lasted one day, involving small arms and alleged SDF disguises among civilians, before a U.S.-brokered on October 7 halted hostilities and reopened some crossings. The truce included preliminary agreements for SDF security roles in certain cities and phased integration, but implementation stalled amid mutual distrust, with the siege partially persisting into late October despite de-escalation pledges. HTS leveraged the incident to assert dominance, deploying forces near SDF frontlines in northeast , while the SDF reinforced positions and appealed for U.S. against perceived . As of October 2025, no broader has occurred, but unresolved demands for continue to fuel low-level standoffs, with analysts warning of risks to counter-ISIS efforts if HTS prioritizes unification over compromise.

Strategic Dimensions and Alliances

Kurdish reliance on U.S. support against Islamists


The (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition primarily composed of the People's Protection Units (YPG), established a critical partnership with the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat in 2015, relying heavily on American airpower, intelligence, training, and special operations advisors to combat Islamist groups, particularly the (). This collaboration proved essential in battles where SDF ground forces faced numerically superior enemies but lacked independent aerial and logistical capabilities, enabling territorial gains that would have been unattainable otherwise. From 2014 onward, U.S. support began with airstrikes during the YPG's defense of against ISIS encirclement, where coalition bombings disrupted jihadist advances and supplied ammunition drops, marking the inception of Kurdish dependence on external intervention to offset deficiencies in heavy weaponry and air defense. By 2015, the formal SDF structure integrated Arab and other local militias under U.S. auspices, facilitating operations like the liberation of in 2016, where American neutralized ISIS defenses, allowing SDF forces to capture the city after weeks of fighting. The 2017 campaign, ISIS's de facto capital, further underscored this reliance, as U.S. artillery, embeds, and over 30,000 airstrikes supported SDF assaults, resulting in the caliphate's territorial collapse by March 2019 despite high civilian costs from urban combat. Post-caliphate, U.S. presence sustained SDF control over northeastern , with approximately 2,000-2,500 American troops providing training, logistics, and overwatch against remnants and other Salafist threats like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham affiliates, detaining around 9,000 fighters by mid-2025. , launched in 2014, coordinated this aid through the Combined Joint Task Force, funding partner forces via the Counter- Train and Equip Fund exceeding $5 billion, which bolstered SDF capacities amid ongoing low-intensity Islamist attacks. Kurdish leaders have repeatedly emphasized that without sustained U.S. backing, resurgence by or clashes with Turkey-backed proxies could erode hard-won territories, as evidenced by vulnerabilities exposed during the 2019 U.S. partial withdrawal under President Trump. By , amid Syria's post-Assad transition following his ouster in late 2024, U.S. troop levels drew down from about 2,000 to under 1,000, closing bases while maintaining a reduced footprint to prevent revival and monitor emerging tensions with HTS, which had delisted its al-Qaeda ties but retained terrorist designations until July 2025. This scaling back heightened SDF anxieties over Islamist threats, prompting integration talks with , yet U.S. officials affirmed continued partnership to ensure the enduring defeat of through vetted local forces. The asymmetry in capabilities—SDF's ground expertise paired with U.S. technological superiority—remains a of Kurdish strategy against persistent jihadist insurgencies.

Betrayals and temporary pacts among rebel factions

In the , various Islamist and opposition rebel factions opposing the Kurdish-led in Rojava frequently formed temporary alliances driven by shared enmity toward Kurdish and the Assad regime, only to fracture amid ideological disputes, resource competition, and personal vendettas. These pacts, often coordinated under Turkish auspices, included operations rooms like the , established in January 2018 as a coalition of groups such as , , and the to consolidate Turkish-backed efforts against SDF-held territories in Afrin and . However, internal betrayals undermined these coalitions, diverting resources from anti-SDF campaigns and allowing SDF consolidations in contested areas like northern . A notable example of betrayal occurred in July 2017 when Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, attacked positions in province, issuing fatwas accusing rivals of and seizing control of key border crossings for revenue, despite prior joint operations against Syrian government forces. This clash, which killed over 100 fighters in days, stemmed from HTS's bid to monopolize foreign fighter networks and smuggling routes, eroding a fragile 2016 merger attempt into broader Islamist fronts and exemplifying how jihadist groups prioritized dominance over unity. Similar tensions extended to Aleppo's northern countryside, where HTS dissolved the Syrian Liberation Front—a pact including and Nour al-Din al-Zenki—in January 2018 through arrests and forced disbandments, labeled as by affected factions. Within the SNA, temporary pacts proved equally unstable, with infighting erupting in October 2022 after the murder of an commander by a member of the Hamza Division in , sparking revenge clashes that killed dozens and required Turkish mediation to restore cohesion ahead of offensives toward . By October 2024, further SNA factional clashes in northern and Afrin over land seizures and extortion rackets—such as disputes between the Sultan Suleiman Shah and Samarkand brigades—escalated, weakening coordinated assaults on SDF positions and prompting condemnations from Syrian opposition leaders for undermining anti-Kurdish objectives. These betrayals, often fueled by competition for looted resources in SDF-contested zones, highlight the opportunistic nature of rebel alliances, where ideological Salafism clashed with pragmatic Turkish directives, ultimately benefiting SDF defensive efforts by fragmenting opposition unity.

Turkish interventions as a complicating factor

Turkey has conducted multiple military operations in northern Syria since 2016, primarily targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) due to their affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which Ankara designates as a terrorist organization. These interventions, including Operation Euphrates Shield (August 2016–March 2017), Operation Olive Branch (January–March 2018), and Operation Peace Spring (October–November 2019), aimed to prevent the establishment of a contiguous Kurdish-controlled corridor along the Turkish border while also confronting Islamic State (ISIS) elements in some cases. Euphrates Shield cleared ISIS from areas west of the Euphrates River, such as Jarablus and al-Bab, but simultaneously blocked SDF advances, creating friction with U.S.-backed anti-ISIS efforts. Subsequent operations like focused more explicitly on displacing SDF forces from Afrin, resulting in the capture of the region by Turkish-backed (SNA) factions without significant involvement, leading to mass displacement of over 100,000 civilians and reports of SDF withdrawal from anti- patrols to defend against Turkish advances. Peace Spring, launched after a partial U.S. troop withdrawal, enabled SNA incursions east of the , prompting SDF commanders to suspend counter- operations; this shift allowed cells to exploit the distraction, with incidents including the escape of families from SDF-held camps and heightened attacks in . The SNA, comprising Turkish-supported Arab and Turkmen militias, has engaged in recurrent clashes with the SDF, diverting SDF resources from Islamist containment; for instance, SNA offensives in (December 2024) and around Tishrin Dam (January 2025) coincided with ambushes and prison break attempts, as SDF forces split attention across fronts. SNA groups have faced accusations of harboring ex- fighters or tolerating jihadist remnants to bolster numbers against , though Ankara maintains these proxies aid border security against all . This dynamic forces the SDF into a multi-front war, weakening detention of over 10,000 fighters and enabling low-intensity Islamist resurgence, as noted by SDF leader , who linked Turkish escalations directly to spikes in activity. Post-Assad regime collapse in December 2024, Turkish threats of further incursions have intensified, with SNA advances isolating SDF-held areas and potentially aligning indirectly with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) pressures from the west, though direct HTS-SDF clashes remain limited. U.S. officials have warned that such interventions risk territorial gains by eroding SDF capacity, underscoring how Turkey's prioritization of the Kurdish threat over unified anti-Islamist fronts perpetuates instability in Rojava.

Casualties, Humanitarian Impact, and Atrocities

Documented losses on both sides

The , the primary military arm of the Rojava administration, have faced persistent casualties from (ISIS) guerrilla attacks and ambushes in northeastern since the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019. The (SOHR), a UK-based monitoring group relying on activist networks, documented 266 ISIS-claimed attacks in SDF-controlled areas throughout 2024, contributing to nearly 680 total fatalities from various violence, including SDF fighters killed in combat and bombings. These low-intensity operations often involve ISIS sleeper cells targeting SDF patrols and checkpoints, with specific incidents such as the April 2019 bombing in killing seven SDF fighters and another attack days later claiming three more. A major documented spike occurred during the January 2022 assault on Ghwayran prison in Hasakah province, where militants sought to free thousands of detained fighters; initial reports indicated at least 120 deaths in the ensuing clashes, including SDF personnel and attackers, though subsequent tallies by monitors raised the toll to hundreds on both sides amid house-to-house fighting and SDF counteroffensives. By September 2025, SOHR and affiliated reports noted 185 fatalities from attacks in SDF areas since January of that year, underscoring the ongoing toll on SDF ranks amid resource strains and U.S. troop drawdowns. Islamist losses, predominantly ISIS fighters, have been higher due to SDF ground engagements supported by coalition airstrikes, though independent verification remains partial given the chaotic reporting environment. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) tracked 153 ISIS-claimed attacks across and from January to June 2024 alone, many thwarted with militant casualties during SDF-led clearances. The SDF detains approximately 9,000 ISIS suspects as of 2023, reflecting captures from operations that also inflicted unreported kills, while earlier major battles like the 2018 offensive saw hundreds of ISIS dead per SOHR tallies in specific clashes. Direct confrontations with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) remain limited post-2020, with no large-scale documented losses, though post-Assad tensions in late 2024 raised risks of future engagements without verified casualties to date. Overall, SDF claims of over 25,000 ISIS killed from 2013–2017 lack full corroboration but align with estimates of tens of thousands eliminated through combined efforts, where ground forces bore disproportionate risks.

Civilian suffering and displacement

Civilians in areas controlled by the (SDF) have faced ongoing risks from () sleeper cell attacks, including ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and assassinations targeting perceived collaborators, resulting in dozens of deaths annually since 2020. In province, a focal point of persistent activity, 174 documented attacks by September 2025 killed 13 civilians alongside combatants and injured 15 others, often in rural areas where militants exploit tribal divisions to strike patrols and villages. These incidents, concentrated in the eastern , have included bombings in markets and roadside explosives near civilian routes, contributing to a pattern of low-level but lethal violence that erodes daily security. In Turkish-occupied areas of Rojava such as Afrin, Kurdish civilians have continued to experience abductions by Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, with 87 cases reported since early 2025, often involving home invasions, looting, and ransom demands. Clashes in January 2026 in Aleppo's predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud between SDF and Syrian transitional government forces displaced over 150,000 civilians and resulted in at least 24 deaths and 104 injuries. The al-Hol displacement camp, housing over 40,000 individuals primarily from -affiliated families, exemplifies compounded suffering, with internal violence linked to Islamist enforcers imposing ideological control and retaliatory killings amid SDF security sweeps. Annual fatalities in the camp exceed 200, including stabbings and shootings tied to remnants targeting "apostates" or suspected informants, exacerbating , disease outbreaks, and in an environment of restricted movement and aid shortages. Displacement remains acute, with northeast sheltering more than 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), roughly half in camps and informal settlements, where threats hinder returns to home areas like and . Sporadic offensives, such as the 105 operations recorded in SDF-held territories from January to June 2025, have prompted localized evacuations and reinforced reluctance to repatriate, as families cite fear of ambushes and reprisals. This insecurity, intertwined with broader conflict dynamics, sustains a humanitarian burden where IDPs face limited access to services, with camps like al-Hol reporting heightened risks from both external attacks and internal radicalization.

Verified war crimes by YPG/SDF and Islamist groups

The YPG and affiliated have committed acts classified as war crimes, including the deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure and of non-Kurdish populations during operations against . In northern Syria's Tal Abyad district between and October 2015, Kurdish forces razed hundreds of buildings in at least 12 Arab-majority villages, displacing over 100,000 civilians—predominantly Sunni Arabs—without evident military justification, actions determined amounted to war crimes under . Similar demolitions occurred in areas like Husseiniya and Haj Haj, where homes were leveled post- expulsion, exacerbating ethnic tensions and demographic shifts despite YPG claims of countering sabotage risks. SDF detention practices have involved systematic , arbitrary arrests, and deaths in custody, particularly targeting suspected affiliates and their families. A 2024 Amnesty International investigation documented over 1,000 deaths in SDF-run facilities in northeast since 2019, including from , medical neglect, and suffocation in overcrowded cells holding foreign suspects; conditions included beatings, , and denial of food, violating prohibitions against cruel treatment. The UN has verified arbitrary detentions of women and children related to , with reports of enforced disappearances and family separations as young as age 1. Recruitment and use of child soldiers by YPG/SDF-affiliated groups constitutes a grave violation under the . reported in 2024 that the , linked to SDF authorities, continues recruiting children as young as 12 for military training in northeast , with at least 40 cases verified since 2021 despite pledges to end the practice; UN monitoring verified 221 child recruitments by YPG in 2021 alone, including abductions and coercion of minors into combat roles against ISIS remnants. Islamist groups, particularly , have perpetrated extensive war crimes against Kurdish civilians and fighters in Rojava, including mass executions, sexual enslavement, and indiscriminate attacks. During the 2014-2015 siege, forces executed dozens of captured YPG fighters and civilians via beheading and shooting, with UN-documented cases of summary killings and use of human shields; the group also displaced thousands of from province through forced evictions and targeted killings to consolidate territorial control. 's broader campaign involved attacks on Kurdish positions, confirmed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in incidents near in 2015, resulting in civilian casualties. Other Islamist factions, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (later HTS), conducted suicide bombings and targeted assassinations against YPG/SDF targets, contributing to civilian deaths in mixed areas. In 2013-2014 clashes near , al-Nusra fighters executed Kurdish prisoners and shelled civilian neighborhoods, acts documented by as violating , though HTS has since distanced itself from peak-era brutality amid post-2024 shifts. These violations reflect ideological motivations framing as apostates, with limited accountability due to fragmented control.

Controversies and Criticisms

YPG ties to PKK terrorism and forced recruitment

The (PKK) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the since 1997, the since 2002, and since its founding in 1978, due to its campaign of bombings, assassinations, and attacks killing thousands of civilians and security personnel. The People's Protection Units (YPG), the primary Kurdish militia in Rojava, maintains organizational, ideological, and personnel ties to the PKK, including shared leadership structures and the presence of PKK commanders in YPG ranks, as documented in analyses of command overlaps and cross-border operations. The U.S. State Department has acknowledged these connections, noting Turkey's view of the YPG as the PKK's Syrian extension, though the U.S. has not designated the YPG itself as terrorist while partnering with it against . Evidence of PKK integration into YPG includes the transfer of PKK fighters to post-2014, bolstering YPG capabilities during battles like , and the use of PKK training camps for YPG recruits, per reports from U.S. congressional testimonies and think tanks. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), YPG's political wing, espouses PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan's ideology of , with PYD leaders historically affiliated with PKK activities in and . These links have fueled operations against YPG-held areas, citing PKK threats, including cross-border attacks from Syrian territory. The YPG has implemented mandatory conscription for males aged 18-30 in controlled areas since 2014, enforced through checkpoints and arrests, affecting both and , with exemptions rare and often requiring bribes. documented over 60 cases of child recruitment by YPG between 2015 and 2018, including abductions from displacement camps like al-Hol, where minors as young as 11 were coerced into combat roles or support functions. A 2024 report confirmed ongoing recruitment by YPG-linked youth groups, such as the Revolutionary Youth, transferring children to military training despite pledges to end the practice in 2019. monitoring verified 116 grave violations involving YPG child recruitment in 2020 alone, including killing and maiming of children resisting enlistment. has reported broader abuses under YPG conscription, including arbitrary detentions of draft evaders, contributing to internal displacement in northeast .

Rojava governance: Democratic claims vs. authoritarian practices

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly known as Rojava, promotes a model rooted in , which emphasizes decentralized, bottom-up decision-making through local communal assemblies, co-presidency systems requiring male-female leadership pairs, and inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities alongside mandates for and ecological sustainability. This framework, inspired by Abdullah Öcalan's reinterpretation of libertarian municipalism, claims to reject hierarchical state structures in favor of , with formal structures like the (SDC) purportedly representing diverse groups. In practice, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People's Protection Units (YPG), dominate AANES institutions via the Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM) alliance, centralizing authority despite decentralization rhetoric and appointing loyalists to key positions, such as in the local council post-2016 liberation from . PYD forces, including the Asayish internal security, have conducted arbitrary arrests of political opponents from parties like the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS) and Yekîti, often without warrants or , with dozens of cases documented between 2012 and 2014 targeting peaceful activism. For instance, on June 27, 2013, YPG forces killed three protesters and arrested around 50 Yekîti members during an demonstration against PYD policies, with some detainees reporting beatings. At least nine unsolved killings or disappearances of opposition figures have occurred since 2012, alongside convictions in flawed trials, such as the April 2014 Afrin court sentencing of 13 individuals, including five KDPS members, based on coerced confessions amid ignored claims. Elections intended to legitimize the system have faced boycotts and postponements, undermining claims of pluralism; municipal polls scheduled for May 2024 in northeast were delayed indefinitely amid opposition from non-PYD Kurdish factions deeming them unrepresentative and illegal, with earlier attempts criticized for lacking transparency and free competition. Media control further erodes democratic pretense, as AANES authorities impose licensing requirements, suspend outlets like Kurdistan 24 in 2021 for critical coverage, and enforce new 2022 rules restricting expression, prompting condemnations from for proliferating curbs on journalists since March 2022. Compulsory military service, including persistent recruitment of children into YPG/SDF ranks despite 2019 bans— with documenting ongoing cases as of October 2024—exemplifies coercive practices conflicting with voluntary, inclusive ideals.

Demographic engineering and suppression of non-Kurdish groups

In the wake of capturing territories from the (IS) in 2015, Kurdish-led forces under the People's Protection Units (YPG) and later the (SDF) engaged in systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure in predominantly Arab and Turkmen villages, displacing thousands of non-Kurdish residents. A fact-finding mission by documented the razing of entire villages near Tal Abyad (captured in June 2015), including the demolition of up to 95% of buildings in some areas like al-Hammam al-Turki and Abdi Kawi, affecting an estimated 100,000 people mostly from Arab and Turkmen communities. These actions, described as amounting to war crimes, involved explosives and heavy machinery to level homes, schools, and mosques, preventing the return of original inhabitants and facilitating the settlement of Kurdish families from other regions. Similar patterns emerged in other SDF-controlled areas, such as Shadadi and , where non-Kurdish populations faced forced evictions and barriers to repatriation, including checkpoints and residency requirements favoring . Reports indicate that YPG/SDF authorities prioritized Kurdish settlement in confiscated properties, altering local demographics in favor of in regions historically dominated by , who comprised over 60% of the pre-war in areas like the Jazira. This included the destruction of over 200 buildings across nine villages in the Tal Abyad district alone, with no equivalent reconstruction efforts for displaced non-Kurds. Suppression of non-Kurdish groups extended beyond displacement to include arbitrary detentions and restrictions on cultural expression. reported widespread arbitrary arrests by PYD/YPG security forces in Kurdish-controlled enclaves from 2012 onward, targeting Arab and Assyrian political opponents, with over 200 cases documented involving beatings, enforced disappearances, and denial of . Assyrian Christian communities, in particular, faced forced into SDF ranks and seizures of church properties for military use, exacerbating tensions in mixed areas like . While SDF officials attributed such measures to countering IS sympathizers, the disproportionate impact on non-Kurds—evidenced by the near-absence of similar actions in Kurdish-majority zones—suggests ethnic targeting to consolidate control. United Nations investigations in 2017 concluded that while displacements occurred, they were primarily for military necessity rather than systematic , though the UN Commission of Inquiry noted ongoing risks of inter-ethnic reprisals in SDF areas. Independent analyses, however, highlight that these practices contributed to a Kurdish demographic shift, with Arab return rates remaining below 20% in affected districts as of , per field assessments.

Islamist motivations: Jihad against "apostate" Kurds

Salafi-jihadist groups, foremost the (ISIS), ideologically justify their assaults on -held territories in Rojava as against apostates, invoking —the doctrinal declaration of fellow Muslims as unbelievers—to sanction violence. This stems from viewing Rojava's secular , influenced by Abdullah Öcalan's leftist reinterpretations of , as a rejection of governance and an embrace of heretical ideologies akin to or . ISIS propaganda explicitly frames forces like the YPG as extensions of the PKK's "apostasy," distinguishing ethnic from those tainted by nationalist deviations that prioritize territorial autonomy over Islamic unity. In a November 2013 video titled "A Message to the Kurds and a Martyrdom Operation," ISIS urged resistance against "apostates of the PKK," portraying their secular militancy as a betrayal of monotheism. Similarly, an August 2016 production, "The Kurds – Between Monotheism and Atheism," lauds historical Kurdish Muslims like Salah al-Din while condemning modern nationalists for heretical alliances and ideologies that subordinate faith to politics. These narratives motivate jihad by equating Rojava's promotion of women's combat roles, co-governance without religious hierarchy, and pacts with "Crusader" coalitions—such as the U.S.-backed SDF—as acts of kufr (disbelief) warranting eradication. Internal directives reinforce this: a June 2015 Raqqa province order mandated Kurdish evacuation due to collaboration with the anti-ISIS coalition, branding compliant individuals apostates subject to displacement or combat. This underpinned operations like the October 2014 Kobani offensive, where ISIS deployed thousands to seize the town, killing over 1,000 civilians and fighters in a bid to dismantle what it deemed an apostate enclave. While Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, successor to al-Nusra Front) clashed with Kurds in Aleppo and Idlib—such as the February 2016 Sheikh Maqsoud offensive—its motivations blend territorial pragmatism with Salafi disdain for Rojava's irreligiosity, though less overtly takfiri than ISIS. Shared jihadist aversion to Rojava's empirical rejection of caliphal authority sustains intermittent fighting, with groups like Ahrar al-Sham echoing calls to uproot "infidel" systems defying Islamic primacy.

International Perspectives and Long-Term Implications

U.S. and Western views: Anti-ISIS ally vs. terrorist affiliates

The has viewed the (SDF), dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), as its primary ground partner in the campaign against the (ISIS), providing extensive military assistance including air support, training, and weapons since 2014. This partnership proved decisive in key operations, such as the defense of Kobanî in 2014–2015, the capture of in 2017, and the final defeat of ISIS's territorial at Baghouz in March 2019, where SDF forces, backed by U.S.-led airstrikes, eliminated the group's last stronghold. As part of , the U.S. maintained approximately 900 troops in northeastern as of 2024 to support SDF counter-ISIS efforts and prevent resurgence, despite periodic withdrawals threatened under President Trump in 2019. Despite this alliance, U.S. officials have acknowledged the YPG's organizational and ideological ties to the (PKK), designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department since 1997 for its attacks on Turkish civilians and security forces. The PKK has conducted over 40,000 deaths in its insurgency since 1984, primarily targeting , though U.S. policy pragmatically distinguishes the Syrian YPG/SDF—focused on —as a tactical necessity rather than endorsing PKK separatism. In July 2025, U.S. envoy explicitly described the SDF as a "derivative" of the YPG/PKK, ruling out support for an independent SDF-led state while emphasizing the anti- partnership's value amid Syrian fragmentation. Critics within U.S. policy circles, including congressional reports, highlight risks of arming PKK affiliates, which could embolden cross-border threats to NATO ally , yet the alliance persists due to the SDF's effectiveness against jihadist remnants. Western allies, including , the , and coalition partners under , have echoed the U.S. stance, designating the PKK as a terrorist entity while treating the SDF as a legitimate anti- force without separate terrorist listings for the YPG or SDF. France contributed special forces and airstrikes alongside SDF operations in and the Middle Valley, viewing Rojava's forces as bulwarks against Islamist extremism despite PKK ideological overlaps. The has provided training and intelligence support to SDF units, prioritizing ISIS defeat over Turkey's objections to Kurdish militancy. European think tanks and officials note the tension: the SDF's democratic rhetoric and role in containing ISIS align with Western values, but PKK links raise long-term concerns about sustaining aid to groups with terrorist pedigrees, potentially complicating cohesion. This duality—ally against shared jihadist foes versus affiliates of a designated terrorist group—has fueled policy debates in Washington and European capitals, with some analysts arguing the partnership's short-term gains against outweigh risks, while others warn of blowback from empowering PKK-linked entities amid Turkey's cross-border operations since 2016. As of 2025, Western support continues amid SDF vulnerabilities post-Assad regime changes, but without formal delinking from PKK structures, the alliance remains a pragmatic expedient rather than a strategic endorsement.

Turkish and regional Arab critiques of Kurdish separatism

Turkey regards the Rojava administration as a manifestation of Kurdish separatism directly linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization whose insurgency has claimed over 40,000 lives in Turkey since 1984. Turkish authorities argue that the People's Protection Units (YPG), the primary militia in Rojava, functions as the PKK's Syrian branch, using autonomous governance to establish a contiguous "terror corridor" along Turkey's 911-kilometer border with Syria, thereby exporting separatism and threatening national security. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly framed Rojava's de facto as incompatible with 's , stating in October 2019 that Turkey's military operations aim to prevent such a corridor and ensure peace in border areas. In April 2025, he rejected Kurdish proposals for Syrian as illusory, insisting that "we will not allow any forced structure right beyond our borders other than a unified ." Turkish critiques emphasize that Rojava's model, despite claims of multi-ethnic inclusion, prioritizes Kurdish nationalist ideology, evidenced by the YPG's ideological ties to PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan and the adoption of as a veiled path to . Regional Arab states and Syrian Arab factions critique Kurdish separatism in Rojava as a destabilizing force that fragments the Arab-majority Syrian state and risks broader ethnic , potentially inspiring minority across the . , while pragmatically engaging Kurdish forces to counter Iranian influence, maintains a cautious approach to Rojava's , wary of its separatist implications for regional stability and Syria's post-Assad reconstruction under a unitary framework. Syrian Arab communities in northeastern , represented in opposition councils, have protested YPG control as an imposition that marginalizes Arab populations—comprising over 40% of the region's pre-war demographics—and advances de facto partition through exclusive administrative structures. These views align with broader emphases on preserving sovereign borders, portraying Rojava's experiment as a U.S.-enabled anomaly that prioritizes ethnic division over inclusive Syrian governance.

Prospects for resolution amid Syrian fragmentation

Following the collapse of the regime in December 2024, Syria's transitional government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammed al-Jolani of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS), has pursued integration of the Kurdish-led (SDF) controlling Rojava in northeastern , potentially resolving longstanding hostilities with Islamist factions by subordinating SDF structures to central authority. On March 10, 2025, SDF and government representatives signed an agreement stipulating the gradual integration of SDF civil and military institutions into state frameworks by year's end, including handover of oil fields and border crossings, amid U.S. pressure to stabilize the region post-ISIS. This framework addressed prior SDF demands for , with Sharaa signaling openness to federal-like arrangements on October 11, 2025, contrasting Assad-era centralism. However, implementation has faltered due to sporadic clashes, underscoring persistent fragmentation. Exchanges of and small-arms fire erupted in areas like Dayr Hafir, , and Sheikh Maqsoud () as of October 2025, with a ceasefire in on October 6, 2025, halting escalations but not resolving underlying territorial disputes over SDF-held urban enclaves. These incidents reflect HTS-aligned forces' reluctance to cede control, as the transitional regime prioritizes unifying disparate militias under a national army, potentially diluting Rojava's autonomy. SDF delegations met Damascus counterparts in October 2025 to discuss integration amid these tensions, but analysts note that HTS's Islamist governance model—emphasizing Sharia-influenced economics and security—clashes with Rojava's secular, claims, risking coerced assimilation rather than equitable resolution. External actors exacerbate uncertainties, particularly Turkey's opposition to SDF/YPG due to perceived PKK terrorist affiliations. has monitored integration talks closely, reaffirming commitments to dismantle YPG structures through potential cross-border operations, as stated by Turkish defense officials in October 2025, viewing SDF persistence as a threat. This stance aligns with Turkish-backed incursions, which HTS tolerates to pressure , complicating Damascus's unification efforts. U.S. support for SDF, once pivotal against , has waned under shifting priorities favoring ties with the Sharaa regime, leaving Rojava vulnerable; experts anticipate that full SDF military integration could bolster Syria's forces but risks eroding Kurdish leverage without guaranteed decentralization. Prospects hinge on balancing these dynamics: successful could mitigate Islamist-Kurdish ideological rifts by preserving Rojava's administrative gains within a unified , averting renewed jihadist incursions into Kurdish areas. Yet, causal factors like HTS's expansionist history and Turkish veto power suggest fragility; failure risks escalated fragmentation, with SDF potentially fragmenting or aligning ad hoc with remnants of Assad loyalists or militias in Suwayda, perpetuating low-level conflict. As of late 2025, integration advances offer cautious optimism, but without enforceable power-sharing—envisaged in ongoing and talks—resolution remains elusive amid 's tripartite division (HTS core, SDF northeast, Turkish north).

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