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Social mobility
Social mobility
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Illustration from a 1916 advertisement for a vocational school in the back of a US magazine. Education has been seen as a key to social mobility and the advertisement appealed to Americans' belief in the possibility of self-betterment as well as threatening the consequences of downward mobility in the great income inequality existing during the Industrial Revolution.

Social mobility is the movement of individuals, families, households or other categories of people within or between social strata in a society.[1] It is a change in social status relative to one's current social location within a given society. This movement occurs between layers or tiers in an open system of social stratification. Open stratification systems are those in which at least some value is given to achieved status characteristics in a society. The movement can be in a downward or upward direction.[2] Markers for social mobility such as education and class, are used to predict, discuss and learn more about an individual or a group's mobility in society.

Typology

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Mobility is most often quantitatively measured in terms of change in economic mobility such as changes in income or wealth. Occupation is another measure used in researching mobility which usually involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis of data, but other studies may concentrate on social class.[3] Mobility may be intragenerational, within the same generation or intergenerational, between different generations.[4] Intragenerational mobility is less frequent, representing "rags to riches" cases in terms of upward mobility. Intergenerational upward mobility is more common where children or grandchildren are in economic circumstances better than those of their parents or grandparents. In the US, this type of mobility is described as one of the fundamental features of the "American Dream" even though there is less such mobility than almost all other OECD countries.[5]

Mobility can also be defined in terms of relative or absolute mobility. Absolute mobility measures a person’s progress in areas such as education, health, housing, income, and job opportunities, comparing it to a starting point—usually the previous generation. As technological advancements and economic development increase, so do income levels and living conditions for most people. In absolute terms, people around the world, on average, are living better today than in the past and, in that sense, have experienced absolute mobility.

Relative mobility examines a person’s movement compared to others within the same cohort. In more advanced economies and OECD countries, there is generally more room for absolute mobility than for relative mobility. This means a person from an average-status background may remain average relative to their peers (showing no relative mobility) but still experience a gradual increase in living standards as the overall social average rises over time.

There is also an idea of stickiness concerning mobility. This is when an individual is no longer experiencing relative mobility and it occurs mostly at the ends. At the bottom end of the socioeconomic ladder, parents cannot provide their children with the necessary resources or opportunity to enhance their lives. As a result, they remain on the same ladder rung as their parents. On the opposite side of the ladder, the high socioeconomic status (SES) parents have the necessary resources and opportunities to ensure that their children also remain in same ladder rung as them.[6] In East Asian countries this is exemplified by the concept of familial karma.[1][clarification needed]

Social status and social class

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Social mobility is highly dependent on the overall structure of social statuses and occupations in a given society.[7] The extent of differing social positions and the manner in which they fit together or overlap provides the overall social structure of such positions. Add to this the differing dimensions of status, such as Max Weber's delineation[8] of economic stature, prestige, and power and we see the potential for complexity in a given social stratification system. Such dimensions within a given society can be seen as independent variables that can explain differences in social mobility at different times and places in different stratification systems. The same variables that contribute as intervening variables to the valuation of income or wealth and that also affect social status, social class, and social inequality do affect social mobility. These include sex or gender, race or ethnicity, and age.[9]

Education provides one of the most promising chances of upward social mobility and attaining a higher social status, regardless of current social standing. However, the stratification of social classes and high wealth inequality directly affects the educational opportunities and outcomes. In other words, social class and a family's socioeconomic status directly affect a child's chances for obtaining a quality education and succeeding in life. By age five, there are significant developmental differences between low, middle, and upper class children's cognitive and noncognitive skills.[10]

Among older children, evidence suggests that the gap between high- and low-income primary- and secondary-school students has increased by almost 40 percent over the past thirty years. These differences persist and widen into young adulthood and beyond. Just as the gap in K–12 test scores between high- and low-income students is growing, the difference in college graduation rates between the rich and the poor is also growing. Although the college graduation rate among the poorest households increased by about 4 percentage points between those born in the early 1960s and those born in the early 1980s, over this same period, the graduation rate increased by almost 20 percentage points for the wealthiest households.[10]

Average family income, and social status, have both seen a decrease for the bottom third of all children between 1975 and 2011. The 5th percentile of children and their families have seen up to a 60% decrease in average family income.[10] The wealth gap between the rich and the poor, the upper and lower class, continues to increase as more middle-class people get poorer and the lower-class get even poorer. As the socioeconomic inequality continues to increase in the United States, being on either end of the spectrum makes a child more likely to remain there and never become socially mobile.

A child born to parents with income in the lowest quintile is more than ten times more likely to end up in the lowest quintile than the highest as an adult (43 percent versus 4 percent). And, a child born to parents in the highest quintile is five times more likely to end up in the highest quintile than the lowest (40 percent versus 8 percent).[10]

This may be partly due to lower- and working-class parents, where neither is educated above high school diploma level, spending less time on average with their children in their earliest years of life and not being as involved in their children's education and time out of school. This parenting style, known as "accomplishment of natural growth" differs from the style of middle-class and upper-class parents, with at least one parent having higher education, known as "cultural cultivation".[11]

More affluent social classes are able to spend more time with their children at early ages, and children receive more exposure to interactions and activities that lead to cognitive and non-cognitive development: things like verbal communication, parent-child engagement and being read to daily. These children's parents are much more involved in their academics and their free time; placing them in extracurricular activities which develop not only additional non-cognitive skills but also academic values, habits, and abilities to better communicate and interact with authority figures. Enrollment in so many activities can often lead to frenetic family lives organized around transporting children to their various activities. Lower class children often attend lower quality schools, receive less attention from teachers and ask for help much less than their higher class peers.[12]

The chances for social mobility are primarily determined by the family a child is born into. Today, the gaps seen in both access to education and educational success (graduating from a higher institution) is even larger. Today, while college applicants from every socioeconomic class are equally qualified, 75% of all entering freshmen classes at top-tier American institutions belong to the uppermost socioeconomic quartile. A family's class determines the amount of investment and involvement parents have in their children's educational abilities and success from their earliest years of life,[12] leaving low-income students with less chance for academic success and social mobility due to the effects that the common parenting style of the lower and working-class have on their outlook on and success in education.[12]

Class cultures and social networks

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These differing dimensions of social mobility can be classified in terms of differing types of capital that contribute to changes in mobility. Cultural capital, a term first coined by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu distinguishes between the economic and cultural aspects of class. Bourdieu described three types of capital that place a person in a certain social category: economic capital; social capital; and cultural capital. Economic capital includes economic resources such as cash, credit, and other material assets. Social capital includes resources one achieves based on group membership, networks of influence, relationships and support from other people.[13]

Cultural capital is any advantage a person has that gives them a higher status in society, such as education, skills, or any other form of knowledge. Usually, people with all three types of capital have a high status in society. Bourdieu found that the culture of the upper social class is oriented more toward formal reasoning and abstract thought. The lower social class is geared more towards matters of facts and the necessities of life. He also found that the environment in which a person develops has a large effect on the cultural resources that a person will have.[13]

The cultural resources a person has obtained can heavily influence a child's educational success. It has been shown that students raised under the concerted cultivation approach have "an emerging sense of entitlement" which leads to asking teachers more questions and being a more active student, causing teachers to favor students raised in this manner.[14] This childrearing approach which creates positive interactions in the classroom environment is in contrast with the natural growth approach to childrearing. In this approach, which is more common amongst working-class families, parents do not focus on developing the special talents of their individual children, and they speak to their children in directives.[14]

Due to this, it is rarer for a child raised in this manner to question or challenge adults and conflict arises between childrearing practices at home and school. Children raised in this manner are less inclined to participate in the classroom setting and are less likely to go out of their way to positively interact with teachers and form relationships. However, the greater freedom of working-class children gives them a broader range of local playmates, closer relationships with cousins and extended family, less sibling rivalry, fewer complaints to their parents of being bored, and fewer parent-child arguments.[14]

In the United States, links between minority underperformance in schools have been made with a lacking in the cultural resources of cultural capital, social capital and economic capital, yet inconsistencies persist even when these variables are accounted for. "Once admitted to institutions of higher education, African Americans and Latinos continued to underperform relative to their white and Asian counterparts, earning lower grades, progressing at a slower rate and dropping out at higher rates. More disturbing was the fact that these differentials persisted even after controlling for obvious factors such as SAT scores and family socioeconomic status".[15]

The theory of capital deficiency is among the most recognized explanations for minority underperformance academically—that for whatever reason they simply lack the resources to find academic success.[16] One of the largest factors for this, aside from the social, economic, and cultural capital mentioned earlier, is human capital. This form of capital, identified by social scientists only in recent years, has to do with the education and life preparation of children. "Human capital refers to the skills, abilities and knowledge possessed by specific individuals".[17]

This allows college-educated parents who have large amounts of human capital to invest in their children in certain ways to maximize future success—from reading to them at night to possessing a better understanding of the school system which causes them to be less deferential to teachers and school authorities.[16] Research also shows that well-educated black parents are less able to transmit human capital to their children when compared to their white counterparts, due to a legacy of racism and discrimination.[16]

Markers

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Health

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The term "social gradient" in health refers to the idea that the inequalities in health are connected to the social status a person has.[18] Two ideas concerning the relationship between health and social mobility are the social causation hypothesis and the health selection hypothesis. These hypotheses explore whether health dictates social mobility or whether social mobility dictates quality of health. The social causation hypothesis states that social factors, such as individual behavior and the environmental circumstances, determine an individual's health. Conversely, the health selection hypothesis states that health determines what social stratum an individual will be in.[19]

There has been a lot of research investigating the relationship between socioeconomic status and health and which has the greater influence on the other. A recent study has found that the social causation hypothesis is more empirically supported than the health selection hypothesis. Empirical analysis shows no support for the health selection hypothesis.[20] Another study found support for either hypotheses depends on which lens the relationship between SES and health is being looked through. The health selection hypothesis is supported when people look at SES and health through the labor market lens. One possible reason for this is that health dictates an individual's productivity and to a certain extent if the individual is employed. While, the social causation hypothesis is supported when looking at health and socioeconomic status relationship through an education and income lenses.[21]

Education

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The systems of stratification that govern societies hinder or allow social mobility. Education can be a tool used by individuals to move from one stratum to another in stratified societies. Higher education policies have worked to establish and reinforce stratification.[22] Greater gaps in education quality and investment in students among elite and standard universities account for the lower upward social mobility of the middle class and/or low class. Conversely, the upper class is known to be self-reproducing since they have the necessary resources and money to afford, and get into, an elite university. This class is self-reproducing because these same students can then give the same opportunities to their children.[23] Another example of this is high and middle socioeconomic status parents are able to send their children to an early education program, enhancing their chances at academic success in the later years.[6]

Housing

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Mixed housing is the idea that people of different socioeconomic statuses can live in one area. There is not a lot of research on the effects of mixed housing. However, the general consensus is that mixed housing will allow individuals of low socioeconomic status to acquire the necessary resources and social connections to move up the social ladder.[24] Other possible effects mixed housing can bring are positive behavioral changes and improved sanitation and safer living conditions for the low socioeconomic status residents. This is because higher socioeconomic status individuals are more likely to demand higher quality residencies, schools, and infrastructure. This type of housing is funded by profit, nonprofit and public organizations.[25]

The existing research on mixed housing, however, shows that mixed housing does not promote or facilitate upward social mobility.[24] Instead of developing complex relationships among each other, mixed housing residents of different socioeconomic statuses tend to engage in casual conversations and keep to themselves. If noticed and unaddressed for a long period of time, this can lead to the gentrification of a community.[24]

Outside of mixed housing, individuals with a low socioeconomic status consider relationships to be more salient than the type of neighborhood they live to their prospects of moving up the social ladder. This is because their income is often not enough to cover their monthly expenses including rent. The strong relationships they have with others offers the support system they need in order for them to meet their monthly expenses. At times, low income families might decide to double up in a single residency to lessen the financial burden on each family. However, this type of support system, that low socioeconomic status individuals have, is still not enough to promote upward relative mobility.[26]

Income

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Social connectedness to people of higher income levels is a strong predictor of upward income mobility.[27] However, 2022 data shows substantial social segregation correlating with economic income groups.[27]

Economic and social mobility are two separate entities. Economic mobility is used primarily by economists to evaluate income mobility. Conversely, social mobility is used by sociologists to evaluate primarily class mobility. How strongly economic and social mobility are related depends on the strength of the intergenerational relationship between class and income of parents and kids, and "the covariance between parents' and children's class position".[28]

Economic and social mobility can also be thought of as following the Great Gatsby curve. This curve demonstrates that high levels of economic inequality fosters low rates of relative social mobility. The culprit behind this model is the Economic Despair idea, which states that as the gap between the bottom and middle of income distribution increases, those who are at the bottom are less likely to invest in their human capital, as they lose faith in their ability and fair chance to experience upward mobility. An example of this is seen in education, particularly in high school drop-outs. Low income status students who no longer see value in investing in their education, after continuously failing to upgrade their social status.

Race

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Race as an influencer on social mobility stems from colonial times.[29] There has been discussion as to whether race can still hinder an individual's chances at upward mobility or whether class has a greater influence. A study performed on the Brazilian population found that racial inequality was only present for those who did not belong to the high-class status. Meaning race affects an individual's chances at upward mobility if they do not begin at the upper-class population. Another theory concerning race and mobility is, as time progresses, racial inequality will be replaced by class inequality.[29] However, other research has found that minorities, particularly African Americans, are still being policed and observed more at their jobs than their white counterparts. The constant policing has often led to the frequent firing of African Americans. In this case, African Americans experience racial inequality that stunts their upward social mobility.[30]

Gender

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A 2019 Indian study found that Indian women, in comparison to men, experience less social mobility. One possible reason for this is the poor quality or lack of education that females receive.[31] In countries like India it is common for educated women not use their education to move up the social ladder due to cultural and traditional customs. They are expected to become homemakers and leave the bread winning to the men.[32]

A 2017 study of Indian women found that women are denied an education, as their families may find it more economically beneficial to invest in the education and wellbeing of their males instead of their females. In the parent's eyes the son will be the one who provides for them in their old age while the daughter will move away with her husband. The son will bring an income while the daughter might require a dowry to get married.[32]

When women enter the workforce, they are highly unlikely to earn the same pay as their male counterparts. Women can even differ in pay among each other due to race.[33] To combat these gender disparities, the UN has made it one of their goals on the Millennium Development Goals reduce gender inequality. This goal is accused of being too broad and having no action plan.[34]

Patterns of mobility

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Social mobility is lower in more unequal countries, 2009.[35]

While it is generally accepted that some level of mobility in society is desirable, there is no consensus agreement upon "how much" social mobility is good for or bad for a society. There is no international benchmark of social mobility, though one can compare measures of mobility across regions or countries or within a given area over time.[36] While cross-cultural studies comparing differing types of economies are possible, comparing economies of similar type usually yields more comparable data. Such comparisons typically look at intergenerational mobility, examining the extent to which children born into different families have different life chances and outcomes.

The Great Gatsby Curve, 2012. Higher equality of wealth correlates with higher social mobility for countries.[37]

In a 2009 study, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, Wilkinson and Pickett conducted an exhaustive analysis of social mobility in developed countries.[35] In addition to other correlations with negative social outcomes for societies having high inequality, they found a relationship between high social inequality and low social mobility. Of the eight countries studied—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, the UK and the US, the US had both the highest economic inequality and lowest economic mobility. In this and other studies, the US had very low mobility at the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, with mobility increasing slightly as one goes up the ladder. At the top rung of the ladder, mobility again decreases.[38]

A 2006 study comparing social mobility between developed countries[39][40][41] found that the four countries with the lowest "intergenerational income elasticity", i.e. the highest social mobility, were Denmark, Norway, Finland and Canada with less than 20% of advantages of having a high income parent passed on to their children.[40]

Nations compared: The fraction of children from poor families growing up to be poor adults, 2006

A 2012 study found "a clear negative relationship" between income inequality and intergenerational mobility.[42] Countries with low levels of inequality such as Denmark, Norway and Finland had some of the greatest mobility, while the two countries with the high level of inequality—Chile and Brazil—had some of the lowest mobility.

In Britain, much debate on social mobility has been generated by comparisons of the 1958 National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1970 Birth Cohort Study BCS70,[43] which compare intergenerational mobility in earnings between the 1958 and the 1970 UK cohorts, and claim that intergenerational mobility decreased substantially in this 12-year period. These findings have been controversial, partly due to conflicting findings on social class mobility using the same datasets,[44] and partly due to questions regarding the analytical sample and the treatment of missing data.[45] UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has famously said that trends in social mobility "are not as we would have liked".[46]

Along with the aforementioned "Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults?" study, The Economist also stated that "evidence from social scientists suggests that American society is much 'stickier' than most Americans assume. Some researchers claim that social mobility is actually declining."[47][48] A 2006 German study corroborates these results.[49]

In spite of this low social mobility, in 2008, Americans had the highest belief in meritocracy among middle- and high-income countries.[50] A 2014 study of social mobility among the French corporate class found that social class influences who reaches the top in France, with those from the upper-middle classes tending to dominate, despite a longstanding emphasis on meritocracy.[51]

In 2014, Thomas Piketty found that wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in low economic growth countries, similar to what he calls the "classic patrimonial" wealth-based societies of the 19th century, where a minority lives off its wealth while the rest of the population works for subsistence living.[52]

Social mobility can also be influenced by differences that exist within education. The contribution of education to social mobility often gets neglected in social mobility research, although it really has the potential to transform the relationship between people's social origins and destinations.[53] Recognizing the disparities between strictly location and its educational opportunities highlights how patterns of educational mobility are influencing the capacity for individuals to experience social mobility. There is some debate regarding how important educational attainment is for social mobility. A substantial literature argues that there is a direct effect of social origins (DESO) which cannot be explained by educational attainment.[54]

Other evidence suggests that, using a sufficiently fine-grained measure of educational attainment, taking on board such factors as university status and field of study, education fully mediates the link between social origins and access to top class jobs.[55]

In the US, the patterns of educational mobility that exist between inner-city schools versus schools in the suburbs is transparent. Graduation rates supply a rich context to these patterns. In the 2013–14 school year, Detroit Public Schools had a graduation rate of 71%. Grosse Pointe High School, a whiter Detroit suburb, had an average graduation rate of 94%.[56]

In 2017, a similar phenomena was observed in Los Angeles, California as well as in New York City. Los Angeles Senior High School (inner city) observed a graduation rate of 58% and San Marino High School (suburb) observed a graduation rate of 96%.[57] New York City Geographic District Number Two (inner city) observed a graduation rate of 69% and Westchester School District (suburb) observed a graduation rate of 85%.[58] These patterns were observed across the country when assessing the differences between inner city graduation rates and suburban graduation rates.

The economic grievance thesis argues that economic factors, such as deindustrialisation, economic liberalisation, and deregulation, are causing the formation of a 'left-behind' precariat with low job security, high inequality, and wage stagnation, who then support populism.[59][60] Some theories only focus on the effect of economic crises,[61] or inequality.[62] Another objection for economic reasons is due to the globalization that is taking place in the world today. In addition to criticism of the widening inequality caused by the elite, the widening inequality among the general public caused by the influx of immigrants and other factors due to globalization is also a target of populist criticism.

The evidence of increasing economic disparity and volatility of family incomes is clear, particularly in the United States, as shown by the work of Thomas Piketty and others.[63][64][65] Commentators such as Martin Wolf emphasize the importance of economics.[66] They warn that such trends increase resentment and make people susceptible to populist rhetoric. Evidence for this is mixed. At the macro level, political scientists report that xenophobia, anti-immigrant ideas, and resentment towards out-groups tend to be higher during difficult economic times.[63][67] Economic crises have been associated with gains by far-right political parties.[68][69] However, there is little evidence at the micro- or individual level to link individual economic grievances and populist support.[63][59] Populist politicians tend to put pressure on central bank independence.[70]

Influence of intelligence and education

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Social status attainment and therefore social mobility in adulthood are of interest to psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, epidemiologists and many more. The reason behind the interest is because it indicates access to material goods, educational opportunities, healthy environments, and economic growth.[71][72][73][74][75][76]

In Scotland, a long range study examined individuals in childhood and mid-adulthood. Most Scottish children born in 1921 participated in the Scottish Mental Survey 1932, conducted by the Scottish Council for Research in Education (SCRE)[77] It obtained the data of psychometric intelligence of Scottish pupils. The number of children who took the mental ability test (based on the Moray House tests) was 87,498. They were between age 10 and 11. The tests covered general, spatial and numerical reasoning.[71][72]

At midlife period, a subset of the subjects participated in one of the studies, which were large health studies of adults and were carried out in Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s.[71] The particular study they took part in was the collaborative study of 6022 men and 1006 women, conducted between 1970 and 1973 in Scotland. Participants completed a questionnaire (participant's address, father's occupation, the participant's own first regular occupation, the age of finishing full-time education, number of siblings, and if the participant was a regular car driver) and attended a physical examination (measurement of height). Social class was coded according to the Registrar General's Classification for the participant's occupation at the time of screening, his first occupation and his father's occupation. Researchers separated into six social classes were used.[78]

A correlation and structural equation model analysis was conducted.[71] In the structural equation models, social status in the 1970s was the main outcome variable. The main contributors to education (and first social class) were father's social class and IQ at age 11, which was also found in a Scandinavian study.[79] This effect was direct and also mediated via education and the participant's first job.[71]

Participants at midlife did not necessarily end up in the same social class as their fathers.[71] There was social mobility in the sample: 45% of men were upwardly mobile, 14% were downward mobile and 41% were socially stable. IQ at age 11 had a graded relationship with participant's social class. The same effect was seen for father's occupation. Men at midlife social class I and II (the highest, more professional) also had the highest IQ at age 11.

Height at midlife, years of education and childhood IQ were significantly positively related to upward social mobility, while number of siblings had no significant effect. For each standard deviation increase in IQ score at the age 11, the chances of upward social mobility increases by 69% (with a 95% confidence). After controlling the effect of independent variables, only IQ at age 11 was significantly inversely related to downward movement in social mobility. More years of education increase the chance that a father's son will surpass his social class, whereas low IQ makes a father's son prone to falling behind his father's social class.

A 2005 structural equation model of the direct and indirect influence of childhood position and IQ upon social status attainment at mid-life. All parameters significant (p<.05)[71]

Higher IQ at age 11 was also significantly related to higher social class at midlife, higher likelihood car driving at midlife, higher first social class, higher father's social class, fewer siblings, higher age of education, being taller and living in a less deprived neighbourhood at midlife.[71] IQ was significantly more strongly related to the social class in midlife than the social class of the first job.

Height, education and IQ at age 11 were predictors of upward social mobility and only IQ at age 11 and height were significant predictors of downward social mobility.[71] Number of siblings was not significant in either of the models.

Another research[73] looked into the pivotal role of education in association between ability and social class attainment through three generations (fathers, participants and offspring) using the SMS1932[72] (Lothian Birth Cohort 1921) educational data, childhood ability and late life intellectual function data. It was proposed that social class of origin acts as a ballast[73] restraining otherwise meritocratic social class movement, and that education is the primary means through which social class movement is both restrained and facilitated—therefore acting in a pivotal role.

It was found that social class of origin predicts educational attainment in both the participant's and offspring generations.[73] Father's social class and participant's social class held the same importance in predicting offspring educational attainment—effect across two generations. Educational attainment mediated the association of social class attainments across generations (father's and participants social class, participant's and offspring's social class). There was no direct link between social classes across generations, but in each generation educational attainment was a predictor of social class, which is consistent with other studies.[80][81]

Participant's childhood ability moderately predicted their educational and social class attainment (.31 and .38). Participant's educational attainment was strongly linked with the odds of moving downward or upward on the social class ladder. For each SD increase in education, the odds of moving upward on the social class spectrum were 2.58 times greater. The downward ones were .26 times greater. Offspring's educational attainment was also strongly linked with the odds of moving upward or downward on the social class ladder. For each SD increase in education, the odds of moving upward were 3.54 times greater. The downward ones were .40 times greater. In conclusion, education is very important, because it is the fundamental mechanism functioning both to hold individuals in their social class of origin and to make it possible for their movement upward or downward on the social class ladder.[73]

In the Cohort 1936 it was found that regarding whole generations (not individuals)[74] the social mobility between father's and participant's generation is: 50.7% of the participant generation have moved upward in relation to their fathers, 22.1% had moved downwards, and 27.2% had remained stable in their social class. There was a lack of social mobility in the offspring generation as a whole. However, there was definitely individual offspring movement on the social class ladder: 31.4% had higher social class attainment than their participant parents (grandparents), 33.7% moved downward, and 33.9% stayed stable. Participant's childhood mental ability was linked to social class in all three generations. A very important pattern has also been confirmed: average years of education increased with social class and IQ.

There were some great contributors to social class attainment and social class mobility in the twentieth century: Both social class attainment and social mobility are influenced by pre-existing levels of mental ability,[74] which was in consistence with other studies.[80][82][83][84] So, the role of individual level mental ability in pursuit of educational attainment—professional positions require specific educational credentials. Educational attainment contributes to social class attainment through the contribution of mental ability to educational attainment. Mental ability can contribute to social class attainment independent of actual educational attainment, as in when the educational attainment is prevented, individuals with higher mental ability manage to make use of the mental ability to work their way up on the social ladder.[84]

This study made clear that intergenerational transmission of educational attainment is one of the key ways in which social class was maintained within family, and there was also evidence that education attainment was increasing over time. Finally, the results suggest that social mobility (moving upward and downward) has increased in recent years in Britain. Which according to one researcher is important because an overall mobility of about 22% is needed to keep the distribution of intelligence relatively constant from one generation to the other within each occupational category.[84]

In 2010, researchers looked into the effects elitist and non-elitist education systems have on social mobility. Education policies are often critiqued based on their impact on a single generation, but it is important to look at education policies and the effects they have on social mobility. In the research, elitist schools are defined as schools that focus on providing its best students with the tools to succeed, whereas an egalitarian school is one that predicates itself on giving equal opportunity to all its students to achieve academic success.[85] When private education supplements were not considered, it was found that the greatest amount of social mobility was derived from a system with the least elitist public education system. It was also discovered that the system with the most elitist policies produced the greatest amount of utilitarian welfare. Logically, social mobility decreases with more elitist education systems and utilitarian welfare decreases with less elitist public education policies.[85]

When private education supplements are introduced, it becomes clear that some elitist policies promote some social mobility and that an egalitarian system is the most successful at creating the maximum amount of welfare. These discoveries were justified from the reasoning that elitist education systems discourage skilled workers from supplementing their children's educations with private expenditures.[85]

The authors of the report showed that they can challenge conventional beliefs that elitist and regressive educational policy is the ideal system. This is explained as the researchers found that education has multiple benefits. It brings more productivity and has a value, which was a new thought for education. This shows that the arguments for the regressive model should not be without qualifications. Furthermore, in the elitist system, the effect of earnings distribution on growth is negatively impacted due to the polarizing social class structure with individuals at the top with all the capital and individuals at the bottom with nothing.[85]

Education is very important in determining the outcome of one's future. It is almost impossible to achieve upward mobility without education. Education is frequently seen as a strong driver of social mobility.[86] The quality of one's education varies depending on the social class that they are in. The higher the family income the better opportunities one is given to get a good education. The inequality in education makes it harder for low-income families to achieve social mobility. Research has indicated that inequality is connected to the deficiency of social mobility. In a period of growing inequality and low social mobility, fixing the quality of and access to education has the possibility to increase equality of opportunity for all Americans.[87]

"One significant consequence of growing income inequality is that, by historical standards, high-income households are spending much more on their children's education than low-income households."[87] With the lack of total income, low-income families cannot afford to spend money on their children's education. Research has shown that over the past few years, families with high income has increased their spending on their children's education. High income families were paying $3,500 per year and now it has increased up to nearly $9,000, which is seven times more than what low income families pay for their kids' education.[87] The increase in money spent on education has caused an increase in college graduation rates for the families with high income. The increase in graduation rates is causing an even bigger gap between high income children and low-income children. Given the significance of a college degree in today's labor market, rising differences in college completion signify rising differences in outcomes in the future.[87]

Family income is one of the most important factors in determining the mental ability (intelligence) of their children. With such bad education that urban schools are offering, parents of high income are moving out of these areas to give their children a better opportunity to succeed. As urban school systems worsen, high income families move to rich suburbs because that is where they feel better education is; if they do stay in the city, they often enroll their children in private schools.[88] Low income families do not have a choice but to settle for the bad education because they cannot afford to relocate to rich suburbs. The more money and time parents invest in their child plays a huge role in determining their success in school. Research has shown that higher mobility levels are perceived for locations where there are better schools.[88]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
Social mobility refers to the movement of individuals or groups between different socioeconomic positions within a , encompassing shifts in , occupation, , or , either across generations (intergenerational) or within a single lifetime (intragenerational). It is typically assessed through absolute measures, which track improvements in living standards regardless of relative position, and relative measures, which evaluate changes in rank within the distribution of resources or status. Empirical analyses reveal substantial cross-national variation in mobility rates, with advanced economies like the displaying lower intergenerational mobility—where adult children's earnings correlate strongly with parental —compared to , indicating persistent transmission of economic advantage or disadvantage. A key empirical regularity, illustrated by the Great Gatsby curve, demonstrates that higher levels of income inequality are associated with reduced upward mobility, as greater disparities amplify the stickiness of socioeconomic origins. Determinants of social mobility include familial investments in , institutional factors such as educational access, and , but genetic endowments, particularly heritable cognitive abilities like (IQ), exert a profound influence by shaping and occupational success across generations. Controversies persist regarding the relative weight of environmental policies versus innate traits in constraining mobility, with evidence suggesting that interventions aimed at redistributing opportunities often fail to fully counteract the effects of inherited capabilities, challenging assumptions of malleability through alone.

Conceptual Foundations

Definitions and Distinctions

Social mobility denotes the capacity of individuals, families, or groups to alter their socioeconomic position within a society's stratification system, typically measured by changes in , occupation, , or . This movement can reflect broader or structural shifts, but it fundamentally involves transitions across class boundaries or status levels. A primary distinction lies between absolute and relative mobility. Absolute mobility evaluates whether offspring attain higher absolute levels of socioeconomic attainment—such as greater income or educational credentials—than their parents, irrespective of peers' outcomes; for instance, widespread post- elevated many families' living standards in Western nations. Relative mobility, conversely, gauges the persistence of inequality in positional rankings, focusing on the between parental and child socioeconomic ranks; high relative mobility implies low intergenerational transmission of advantage or disadvantage. Social mobility is further differentiated by timeframe: intergenerational mobility tracks status changes from parents to children, often using metrics like the income elasticity between generations, where a value near zero indicates strong mobility. Intragenerational mobility, by contrast, assesses status shifts within a single lifetime, such as career progression from low-wage labor to managerial roles. In terms of direction and nature, vertical mobility encompasses upward shifts (gains in socioeconomic standing, e.g., from working-class to professional occupations) and downward shifts (losses, such as job displacement leading to ). Horizontal mobility involves lateral changes without net status alteration, like transferring between equivalent roles in different firms or sectors. These categories highlight that not all positional changes equate to substantive advancement, as horizontal moves may preserve rather than elevate resources or opportunities.

Theoretical Perspectives

Functionalist theories regard social mobility as essential for societal efficiency, arguing that unequal rewards motivate individuals to acquire skills for critical roles. In their 1945 formulation, and Wilbert E. Moore contended that stratification functions to match the most talented with positions demanding high functional importance, such as or , through competitive selection via and achievement, thereby enabling upward mobility for those demonstrating merit. This perspective assumes open and merit-based allocation, positing that mobility reinforces social stability by fulfilling societal needs. Conflict theories, influenced by , counter that social mobility is largely constrained by entrenched power imbalances, where dominant classes manipulate institutions to perpetuate inequality and limit access for subordinates. Proponents argue that apparent mobility serves ideological purposes, masking exploitation while elites control resources like capital and policy to hinder , resulting in persistent class reproduction rather than genuine opportunity. This view emphasizes antagonism over harmony, attributing low mobility rates to deliberate barriers rather than individual failings. Economic theories, particularly theory advanced by , frame social mobility as outcomes of rational investments in , training, and health that boost productivity and wages. Becker's model, extended to intergenerational contexts, posits that parents allocate resources to children's human capital development based on expected returns, with higher investments from advantaged families yielding greater mobility persistence unless offset by public policies or market dynamics. Empirical extensions highlight complementarities in skill production, where initial endowments amplify or diminish mobility prospects. Additional sociological frameworks, such as Pierre Bourdieu's theory, explain mobility limitations through non-financial assets like tastes, knowledge, and dispositions inherited via family habitus, which align with dominant institutional demands and confer unearned advantages in schooling and careers. Bourdieu argued these embodied forms reproduce class hierarchies covertly, as lower-status groups lack the subtle competencies to compete equally, challenging purely meritocratic accounts by revealing hidden reproduction mechanisms. Debates persist on whether such theories overstate structural , given evidence of agency and innate factors influencing outcomes, though academic often prioritizes environmental explanations.

Determinants

Biological and Cognitive Influences

General intelligence, often measured by IQ tests, exhibits high , estimated at 50-80% in adulthood based on twin and studies, and strongly predicts , occupational status, and , thereby influencing social mobility. A one standard deviation increase in childhood IQ is associated with significantly higher odds of upward mobility from ages 5 to 49-51, independent of level. Intergenerational correlations in IQ are approximately 0.38, indicating partial transmission of cognitive ability across generations that contributes to status persistence or change. Twin studies reveal moderate for socioeconomic outcomes, with estimates for around 40-50% and for similarly in that range, suggesting genetic factors explain a substantial portion of variance in social mobility beyond shared environmental influences. of increases in contexts of higher intergenerational mobility, as reduced social inheritance allows genetic potentials to manifest more fully. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) further support this through polygenic scores for , which predict 10-16% of variance in years of schooling and are linked to career , accumulation, and upward , even among individuals from lower-status families. Biological mechanisms extend beyond cognition to include gene-environment interactions, where genetic influences on are amplified or moderated by socioeconomic context; for instance, of may be higher in advantaged environments according to some analyses, though is mixed with other studies finding stronger genetic effects in deprived settings. Genes underlying cognitive traits also correlate with family , driving part of the parent-offspring resemblance in outcomes via direct genetic transmission rather than solely cultural . These findings underscore that while environmental factors matter, innate biological differences in cognitive capacity impose limits on equality of opportunity and contribute causally to observed mobility patterns.

Familial and Cultural Factors

Parental , particularly education and levels, exerts a substantial influence on children's intergenerational mobility. Studies indicate that children of parents with higher education attainments are more likely to achieve advanced educational credentials themselves, with causal estimates showing that an additional year of parental schooling increases by approximately 0.1 to 0.2 years. Similarly, parental during correlates strongly with adult child earnings, where a 10% increase in income in the first few years predicts up to a 0.5% rise in child income percentiles, though effects diminish over time. These patterns persist across cohorts, with background explaining around 15% of variance in adult , underscoring the role of resource transmission rather than mere . Family structure significantly shapes mobility trajectories, with children raised in stable two-parent households demonstrating higher upward mobility and lower persistence of compared to those in single-parent or disrupted families. Empirical analyses of U.S. longitudinal data reveal that individuals from intact families have 10-20% higher odds of reaching the top quintile, attributing this to greater parental , resource pooling, and stability that foster development. In contrast, single-parent households, often facing economic strain and time constraints, correlate with reduced and earnings, with children experiencing 25-50% lower mobility rates in absolute terms. This effect holds after controlling for , suggesting causal channels beyond finances, such as role modeling and . Cultural factors, including transmitted values and practices, mediate familial influences on mobility by shaping behaviors like persistence and educational prioritization. Research on cultural transmission shows that families emphasizing academic achievement and work ethic—measured via surveys on attitudes toward effort and delay of gratification—predict higher child outcomes, with intergenerational correlations of 0.3-0.4 in educational mobility. Parental investments in cognitive stimulation, such as reading and structured activities, amplify this, yielding effect sizes comparable to income boosts in randomized interventions. However, cultural capital disparities, like familiarity with institutional norms, can perpetuate advantages for higher-status families, though empirical tests reveal these operate primarily through reinforced habits rather than inherent superiority. These elements interact with biology but independently contribute via environmental reinforcement, as evidenced in adoption studies where family cultural milieu overrides genetic baselines in non-cognitive skills.

Economic and Institutional Factors

Higher levels of income inequality are associated with reduced intergenerational , as depicted in the Great Gatsby Curve, which plots cross-sectional inequality against persistence in relative positions across countries. This relationship holds in analyses spanning multiple nations and periods, where a one-standard-deviation increase in inequality correlates with heightened persistence from parents to children. Empirical studies using administrative tax records confirm that children from low- families face persistent barriers, with only about 7.5% reaching the top quintile if born to parents in the bottom quintile during the 1980-1990 birth cohorts. Family income influences mobility through mechanisms like credit constraints for investment; children from poorer households invest less in due to borrowing limits, perpetuating inequality. Rising costs of higher education exacerbate this, as tuition increases outpace wage growth, limiting access for those without familial wealth—U.S. tuition rose 213% from 1980 to 2020 after adjustment. Labor market dynamics further shape outcomes: rigid wage structures and barriers to entry-level jobs hinder low-skilled workers' advancement, while economic downturns amplify scarring effects on youth from disadvantaged backgrounds. Institutionally, equitable access to quality systems promotes mobility by equalizing skill acquisition opportunities; countries with universal and merit-based higher education admissions show higher absolute mobility rates. Labor market institutions, including flexible hiring and firing regulations, facilitate job matching and wage adjustments that benefit mobile workers, though excessive rigidity in correlates with rates exceeding 20% in some nations as of 2023. Broader institutional quality, such as and low corruption, underpins mobility by ensuring fair competition; World Bank analyses indicate that birthplace circumstances, mediated by institutional factors, explain up to 49% of income variance in developing economies. Policies fostering institutional reforms, like reducing regulatory barriers to , have been linked to 1-2 gains in mobility metrics in high-mobility nations like .

Empirical Evidence

Measurement Methods

Social mobility is quantified through absolute and relative measures, distinguishing between overall upward movement and changes in socioeconomic position relative to peers. Absolute mobility assesses the extent to which children surpass their parents' economic status, often calculated as the percentage of children whose exceeds that of their parents, adjusted for . For instance, , absolute upward mobility declined from 92% for children born in 1940 to 50% for those born in 1980, reflecting slower growth in living standards for later cohorts. Relative mobility, conversely, evaluates persistence across generations, independent of aggregate growth, using metrics like the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of , which regresses children's log on parents' log ; a value near zero indicates high mobility, while the U.S. IGE hovers around 0.4, implying moderate persistence. Common techniques for relative mobility include the rank-rank slope, which estimates the expected of a given the 's rank in the ; U.S. estimates yield a slope of approximately 0.34, where a of a at the 25th reaches the 34th on average. Transition matrices tabulate probabilities of moving between socioeconomic classes, such as from low to high quintiles, often derived from scales or data. Empirical studies leverage administrative data like tax records for precision in measurement or longitudinal surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to track families over decades, enabling robust intergenerational correlations. Educational mobility is similarly gauged by parent-child correlations in years of schooling or attainment levels, with international comparisons using standardized metrics from bodies like the . Challenges in measurement include life-cycle bias, as income fluctuates with age, necessitating observations of adults in comparable career stages—typically ages 30-40 for children and 40-50 for parents—to mitigate attenuation. Classical measurement error in self-reported surveys biases estimates downward, though administrative data reduces this issue but raises privacy concerns and limits accessibility. Heterogeneous effects by gender, race, or geography complicate aggregation, as does defining the socioeconomic unit—nuclear family versus single-parent households—affecting estimates in diverse societies. Intragenerational mobility, tracking individual progress over a lifetime, employs similar tools but faces greater data demands for long-term tracking.
MetricDescriptionInterpretationU.S. Example
Absolute Mobility% of children exceeding parents' Higher % = greater upward movement50% for 1980 cohort
IGE of log child on log parent Lower value = higher mobility~0.4
Rank-Rank Expected child rank given parent rank closer to 0 = more equality of position0.34

Historical and Global Patterns

Historical analyses of social mobility reveal limited intergenerational occupational mobility in pre-industrial societies, where inheritance systems and rigid class structures predominated, as evidenced by studies of European stratification from the medieval period through the 19th century. Industrialization in the 19th and early 20th centuries facilitated greater absolute mobility through expanded economic opportunities, particularly in occupations, though relative mobility—comparing positions within the distribution—remained constrained by familial background. In the United States, census and survey data from 1850 to 2015 indicate a long-term decline in intergenerational occupational mobility for native-born men, with persistence increasing over generations despite periods of economic expansion. In developed countries, social mobility peaked in the mid-20th century following , driven by , expanded access, and labor market dynamism, but has since stagnated or declined. For instance, in the United States, the probability of children earning more than their parents fell from about 90% for those born in 1940 to 50% for those born in the , reflecting slower wage growth at the bottom and increased income inequality. Similar patterns appear in the , where opportunities for the cohort born in the 1970s were more determined by parental background than for earlier generations, amid rising housing costs and educational barriers. Across nations, relative income mobility has shown little improvement since the 1990s, with absolute mobility hampered by slower overall growth and skill-biased technological changes. Globally, intergenerational income mobility varies significantly, with like and exhibiting high mobility—ranked top in cross-national comparisons—due to compressed distributions and robust public systems, while the and rank lower, closer to southern European nations. The World Bank's Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM) provides estimates for 87 countries, covering 84% of the , showing that absolute mobility exceeds 50% in most economies but relative persistence remains higher in unequal societies. The "Great Gatsby Curve" empirically demonstrates an inverse relationship between cross-sectional income inequality (measured by Gini coefficients) and intergenerational persistence across countries and over time, with data from panels spanning multiple nations confirming that higher inequality correlates with lower mobility opportunities. This pattern holds in peer-reviewed analyses, though causal mechanisms—such as investment in or labor market institutions—require further disaggregation beyond aggregate correlations. In the United States, absolute intergenerational income mobility has fallen markedly over recent decades, with approximately 50% of individuals born in the mid-1980s out-earning their parents in adulthood, down from over 90% for those born in 1940. This decline correlates with geographic variations, where neighborhoods featuring lower poverty rates, stable two-parent family structures, higher-quality schools, and denser exhibit stronger upward mobility. A July 2024 study by Opportunity Insights, analyzing data on 57 million children born between 1978 and 1992, documented rapid shifts in mobility patterns by race and socioeconomic class, including diverging trends for white children from different income backgrounds and persistent racial gaps despite some convergence. Globally, absolute income mobility—the probability that children exceed their parents' inflation-adjusted earnings—has declined in multiple advanced economies over the past half-century, though with heterogeneity across regions. For cohorts reaching adulthood around 2010–2020, rates hover near 50% in the , slightly higher at 55% in and , and remain more stable above 60% in like and . A July 2025 World Bank database compiling intergenerational elasticity estimates for 87 countries (covering 84% of the global population) reaffirms the inverse relationship between income inequality and mobility, consistent with the observed across diverse income levels and development stages. In , intergenerational mobility ranks highly relative to global peers, yet progress has stalled since around , with minimal gains in metrics like and access tied to parental . Low-socioeconomic-background individuals face roughly triple the odds of lower educational outcomes and sixfold lower academic performance compared to high-background peers, contributing to untapped potential estimated at 3–9% of GDP (€1.3 trillion). An August 2025 NBER analysis of across countries further validates the persistence of inequality-mobility linkages over time, with cross-national variations driven by factors like and institutional stability rather than uniform policy interventions. These trends underscore mobility's sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions, family environments, and local institutions, beyond aggregate inequality measures alone.

Policy and Interventions

Market-Oriented Approaches

Market-oriented approaches to enhancing social mobility emphasize minimizing intervention in economic activities, fostering , protecting property rights, and promoting to enable individuals to improve their economic status through personal initiative and market opportunities. These strategies, often measured via indices like the Fraser Institute's or the Heritage Foundation's , prioritize components such as sound money, , regulatory efficiency, and secure property rights, which empirical analyses link to higher rates of upward mobility. For instance, greater correlates with increased intergenerational income mobility across countries, as freer economies generate more opportunities for accumulation independent of parental status. Cross-national studies demonstrate that nations in the highest of economic freedom exhibit approximately 40% higher intergenerational mobility compared to those in the lowest , with effects persisting even after controlling for income inequality. In a of 82 countries from 1980 to 2010, economic freedom directly boosted upward mobility, while indirectly mitigating the negative impacts of inequality through growth-enhancing mechanisms like and job creation. Subnational evidence reinforces this: in Canadian provinces between 1982 and 2018, a one-standard-deviation increase in raised mobility by 0.05 to 0.10 standard deviations, driven particularly by improvements in government size and labor market regulations. Key mechanisms include business freedom, which facilitates as a mobility pathway; for example, lower barriers to starting firms in freer jurisdictions enable low-income individuals to leverage skills and ideas for income gains, as seen in high-mobility economies like and . Labor market flexibility, another pillar, reduces rigidities that trap workers in low-productivity roles, with deregulated environments showing stronger correlations to mobility than interventionist ones. These approaches contrast with dependency-inducing policies by incentivizing investment and risk-taking, though critics from interventionist perspectives argue they exacerbate short-term inequality; however, longitudinal data indicate net positive mobility effects outweigh such concerns.

Government Programs and Welfare Systems

Government programs and welfare systems are designed to mitigate barriers to social mobility by providing income support, subsidized , healthcare, and job to low-income families, with the aim of breaking cycles of and enabling upward economic progression. Empirical analyses indicate that such interventions can yield short-term benefits, such as improved child health and , but long-term effects on intergenerational mobility are often limited or negative due to work disincentives and dependency traps. For instance, in the United States, pre-1996 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) correlated with persistent welfare use across generations, with children of recipients facing 2-3 times higher odds of adult welfare participation compared to non-recipients. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which introduced time limits and work requirements under (TANF), reduced long-term dependency and increased maternal employment by approximately 10-15 percentage points, thereby enhancing family income stability and child outcomes linked to mobility. Work-promoting elements within welfare frameworks, such as the (EITC) in the , demonstrate positive impacts on mobility by subsidizing low-wage earnings without fully phasing out benefits at higher incomes, leading to increased labor force participation among single mothers by 7-10% and modest gains in children's future earnings. Conversely, unconditional cash transfers and expansive benefits cliffs—where incremental earnings trigger sharp benefit losses—create effective marginal tax rates exceeding 100%, discouraging workforce entry and skill accumulation; experimental evidence from programs like the trials in the 1970s showed reduced work hours by 5-10% among recipients. In Scandinavian countries, often cited for high mobility, comprehensive welfare states coincide with strong intergenerational income persistence mitigation, yet comparative studies attribute this more to pre-existing cultural norms of family investment and low immigration-driven inequality than to redistributive spending alone; Danish mobility rates have not significantly exceeded pre-welfare-era levels when adjusted for these factors. Early childhood interventions funded by government, such as subsidized and programs, show some efficacy in boosting and earnings potential, with returns estimated at $7-10 per dollar invested for high-quality programs like the Perry Preschool Project, which increased adult earnings by 19% for participants. However, scaling such targeted efforts through broad welfare systems often dilutes impacts due to lower-quality implementation and crowding out of private investments; state-level analyses reveal that higher per-child correlates with reduced income mobility in high-inequality contexts unless paired with market-oriented incentives. Overall, evidence underscores that welfare designs emphasizing conditionality and development outperform unconditional redistribution in fostering sustainable mobility, as unchecked generosity risks entrenching disadvantage through altered incentives for effort and family structure.

Controversies and Critiques

Genetic vs Environmental Explanations

Twin studies indicate that genetic differences account for approximately 50% of the variance in social mobility across families, with the remainder attributable to non-shared environmental factors rather than shared family environments. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have identified hundreds of genetic loci associated with socioeconomic outcomes, including 162 loci linked to an underlying genetic factor for income measures, each with small effect sizes, collectively explaining a portion of variance in educational attainment and occupational status that correlates with mobility. Polygenic scores derived from such GWAS, computed from birth, predict future socioeconomic status (SES), including income and education, independent of parental SES, underscoring a direct genetic pathway to mobility. Heritability estimates for traits underpinning mobility, such as intelligence and educational attainment, range from 40-80% in adulthood, with twin and adoption designs showing that genetic influences on SES transmission operate both directly (via individual abilities) and indirectly (via parental environments shaped by genetics). In contexts of high intergenerational mobility, heritability of education increases because reduced social inheritance diminishes the role of shared environments, allowing genetic potentials to manifest more fully; conversely, low-mobility societies amplify environmental stratification, potentially masking genetic variance. Environmental explanations, emphasizing family SES, schooling access, and cultural capital, explain intergenerational persistence but account for less within-family variance in mobility than genetics, as evidenced by discordant twin outcomes where identical twins raised apart show correlated SES despite differing environments. The debate persists due to gene-environment interactions: advantaged environments may amplify genetic effects on and achievement, while deprived ones constrain them, though overall variance in mobility remains substantially heritable even after controlling for such interplay. Sociological resistance to genetic accounts, often prioritizing nurture to support equality-of-opportunity narratives, contrasts with accumulating molecular evidence, prompting calls to integrate into mobility research to avoid overstating . Recent has further linked rare variants to household income, reinforcing that polygenic and monogenic factors contribute causally to SES disparities underlying mobility.

Equality of Opportunity Narratives

The equality of opportunity narrative posits that in meritocratic societies, individuals' socioeconomic outcomes are determined chiefly by personal abilities, efforts, and choices rather than by family origins or arbitrary circumstances. This perspective justifies intervention in outcomes, emphasizing instead the removal of formal barriers like legal to enable fair competition. Proponents, including economists like , argue that such systems reward productivity and foster innovation, with empirical support drawn from instances of rags-to-riches success stories and cross-national comparisons where market freedoms correlate with higher growth rates. However, rigorous empirical analysis of intergenerational mobility challenges the extent to which this reflects . Measures such as the intergenerational income elasticity (IGE)—the change in a child's associated with a one percent change in parental —reveal significant persistence of advantage. In the United States, IGE estimates range from 0.4 to 0.5, indicating that parental substantially shapes children's economic prospects, contrary to claims of near-complete leveling of the playing field. Similar patterns hold internationally, with the "Great Gatsby Curve" illustrating how higher income inequality (Gini coefficients above 0.3) coincides with elevated IGE values, as seen in the U.S. (Gini ~0.38, IGE ~0.47) versus (Gini ~0.25, IGE <0.2). This suggests that unequal starting endowments, including inherited and environmental factors, perpetuate disparities beyond individual merit. Critics, often from academic and progressive circles, label the a that obscures systemic advantages, such as unequal access to quality and social networks, which amplify parental influence. For instance, absolute upward mobility in the U.S. has declined sharply: approximately 90% of children born in 1940 exceeded their parents' income, but only 50% of those born in 1980 did so, adjusted for . Regional studies further undermine universality, showing that U.S. commuting zones with high mobility feature low-income neighborhoods integrated with opportunity-rich areas, while segregated locales exhibit IGEs up to twice the national average. These findings imply that the overstates policy successes in neutralizing ascriptive factors, potentially fostering complacency toward deeper causal mechanisms like family stability and gaps, which studies attribute partly to non-environmental sources. Yet, the critique itself warrants scrutiny for conflating mobility metrics with ideal equality of opportunity, ignoring that innate endowments—such as genetic variations in and —inevitably influence outcomes in any realistic framework, rendering "substantive" equality unattainable without coercive equalization. Stability in U.S. relative mobility over decades (IGE largely unchanged since the ) and comparability to peers like the (IGE ~0.5) counter exaggerated decline narratives, suggesting the story is one of persistent but non-exceptional constraints rather than outright failure. Moreover, perceptions of high mobility may sustain societal acceptance of inequality by aligning with causal realism: effort and talent do drive variance in success, even amid imperfect opportunity, as evidenced by variance decompositions where parental background explains 20-40% of outcome differences, leaving room for agency. Mainstream critiques, frequently emanating from inequality-focused institutions, risk underemphasizing these individual-level drivers to prioritize redistributive remedies, despite mixed on their for boosting mobility.

Cultural and Behavioral Realities

Cultural and behavioral factors significantly influence social mobility, with empirical data indicating that individual and familial choices in family formation, , employment, and attitudes toward work play causal roles in intergenerational outcomes. Stable two-parent family structures correlate with higher for children, as they provide dual parental resources, supervision, and modeling of achievement-oriented behaviors, reducing risks of and behavioral issues that hinder advancement. Divorce disrupts this stability, lowering relative and absolute mobility by fragmenting economic and emotional support, with longitudinal data showing persistent effects into adulthood. The "success sequence"—completing high school, obtaining full-time employment, and marrying before having children—dramatically reduces risk, with 97% of adhering to it avoiding poverty, enabling upward mobility through accumulated and . This sequence fosters delayed childbearing in stable unions, which correlates with higher in and skills, breaking cycles of dependency observed in non-adherent households. Adherence rates vary by cultural subgroup, with behavioral deviations like early nonmarital births explaining much of persistent low mobility in certain communities. Work ethic and entrepreneurial attitudes further mediate mobility, as individualistic cultural norms emphasizing and promote higher earnings and status transitions compared to collectivist or dependency-oriented mindsets. Negative psycho-social dispositions, such as low or aversion to effort, inhibit mobility independently of socioeconomic origins, with surveys linking them to reduced educational persistence and occupational ambition. Cultural devaluation of cross-class networks or high-effort pursuits can perpetuate stagnation, as evidenced by lower mobility in environments where welfare norms supplant personal agency. These realities underscore that behavioral adaptations, rather than external barriers alone, drive variance in outcomes across similar structural conditions.

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