Recent from talks
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Electoral threshold
View on WikipediaThis article needs additional citations for verification. (May 2022) |
| Part of the Politics series |
| Voting |
|---|
|
|
The electoral threshold, or election threshold, is the minimum share of votes that a candidate or political party requires before they become entitled to representation or additional seats in a legislature.
This limit can operate in various ways; for example, in party-list proportional representation systems where an electoral threshold requires that a party must receive a specified minimum percentage of votes (e.g. 5%), either nationally or in a particular electoral district, to obtain seats in the legislature. In single transferable voting, the election threshold is called the quota, and it is possible to achieve it by receiving first-choice votes alone or by a combination of first-choice votes and votes transferred from other candidates based on lower preferences. It is also a common occurrence to see someone elected with less than the quota in STV.[1][2]
In mixed-member-proportional (MMP) systems, the election threshold determines which parties are eligible for top-up seats in the legislative chamber. Some MMP systems still allow a party to retain the seats they won in electoral districts even when they did not meet the threshold nationally; in some of these systems, top-up seats are allocated to parties that do not achieve the electoral threshold if they have won at least one district seat or have met some other minimum qualification.
The effect of this electoral threshold is to deny representation to small parties or to force them into coalitions. Such restraint is intended to make the election system more stable by keeping out fringe parties. Proponents of a stiff electoral threshold say that having a few seats in a legislature can significantly boost the profile of a party and that providing representation and possibly veto power for a party that receives only 1 percent of the vote is not appropriate.[3] However, others argue that in the absence of a ranked ballot or proportional voting system at the district level, supporters of minor parties, barred from top-up seats, are effectively disenfranchised and denied the right to be represented by someone of their choosing.
Two boundaries can be defined – a threshold of representation (or threshold of inclusion)[4] is the minimum vote share that might yield a party a seat under the most favorable circumstances for the party, while the threshold of exclusion is the maximum vote share that could be insufficient to yield a seat under the least favorable circumstances. Arend Lijphart suggested calculating the informal threshold as the mean of these.[5] Michael Gallagher gave this value the name effective threshold and set it at 75 percent of the Droop quota. However, he warned that this was to be used at the district level and not to assume that a party with a certain share of the overall vote was sure to have representation.[6]
The electoral threshold is a barrier to entry for political parties to the political competition.[7] But some barrier to entry is seen in any system, due to the effective threshold produced by district magnitude (DM) and due to the effect of wasted votes caused by the election system being used. For instance, under first past the post election system, only one party can win the one seat in a district, and all others are not elected, whether one of them has 49 percent of the vote or the winner has just 20 percent of the vote. In very proportional election systems, each member is elected by about the same number of votes (approximately equivalent to the Hare quota if there are very few wasted votes), and anything less than that number is insufficient to receive representation. In systems where DM varies from district to district, a district with exceptionally high district magnitude, such as may be used in the largest city, may allow representation to small parties that do not have a chance for any representation at all in other districts where DM is low. Conversely, where many districts are used (and thus average DM is low), the effective threshold for a party to potentially take at least one seat is also low.[8]
Recommendations for electoral thresholds
[edit]The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommends for parliamentary elections a threshold not higher than three percent.[9]
For single transferable vote, to produce representation for parties with approximately ten percent or more of the overall vote, John M. Carey and Simon Hix recommended a district magnitude (DM) of approximately six or more.[10][11] Support for a party is not homogeneous across an electorate, so a party with ten percent of the vote is expected to easily achieve the electoral threshold in at least one district even if not in others. Most STV systems used today use the Droop quota, which in a six-member district is 14 percent of the votes cast in the district. Carey and Hix note that increasing the DM from one to six produces an improvement in proportionality that is much higher than any subsequent increase in DM, pointing out that the most popular parties take the largest share of votes and the largest share of seats in any PR system, leaving few to small parties under any system.[11] Transfers of votes from other parties to a party and willingness of the party's voters to mark alternate preferences (and thus prevent their vote from being exhausted) also play a role in the amount of representation that each party takes, and is somewhat independent of the party's vote share in the first count. Due to the effect of districting, a party is not assured of taking its proportional share of seats, but with the use of districts with a DM of 6, it is expected that a party with more than ten percent of the overall vote will elect at least one member, according to Carey and Hix.[citation needed]
Electoral thresholds in various countries
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (November 2025) |

In Poland's Sejm, Lithuania's Seimas, Germany's Bundestag, Kazakhstan's Mäjilis and New Zealand's House of Representatives, the threshold is five percent (in Poland, additionally eight percent for a coalition of two or more parties submitting a joint electoral list and in Lithuania, additionally seven percent for coalition). However, in Germany and New Zealand, if a party wins a constituency seat, the threshold does not apply.[citation needed]
Israel's Knesset uses a threshold of 3.25 percent. (It was 1% before 1992, 1.5% from 1992 to 2003, and 2% from 2003 to 2014.)[citation needed] The Turkish parliament uses an electoral threshold of seven percent.[citation needed] In Poland, ethnic minority parties do not have to reach a threshold to get into the parliament, so there is often a small German minority representation in the Sejm.[citation needed] In Romania, a different threshold is used for ethnic minority parties than for national parties that run for the Chamber of Deputies.[citation needed]
Several countries – including Finland, Namibia,[12] North Macedonia, Portugal and South Africa – use proportional representation systems that have no legally set electoral threshold.
Australia
[edit]The Australian Senate is elected using the single transferable vote (STV) and does not use an electoral threshold or have a predictable "natural" or "hidden" threshold. The quota ensures the election of candidates, but it is also possible to be elected with less than quota at the end of the count. At a normal election, each state returns six senators and the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory each return two. (For the states, the number is doubled in a double dissolution election.) As such, the quota for election (as determined through the Droop quota) is 14.3 percent or 33.3 percent respectively. (For the states, the quota for election is halved in a double dissolution election, when twice the members are elected.) However, as STV allows votes to be transferred even across party lines, candidates who receive less than the quota for election in the first round of counting may reach the Droop quota and be certain of election, or at least have enough to be elected with less than the quota. Therefore, the sixth (or, at a double dissolution election, the 12th) Senate seat in each state is often won by a candidate of a party who received considerably less than the Droop quota in primary votes. For example, at the 2022 election, the sixth Senate seat in Victoria was won by the United Australia Party even though it won only four percent of the primary vote in that state. The successful UAP candidate, Ralph Babet, had personally accumulated a vote tally equivalent to 12 percent of the votes cast by the end, which due to seven percent being exhausted, meant he was the most popular when only he and one other candidate were still in the running.[13]
Germany
[edit]Germany's mixed-member proportional system has a threshold of five percent of party-list votes for full proportional representation in the Bundestag in federal elections.[citation needed] However, this is not a stringent barrier to entry: any party or independent who wins a constituency is entitled to that seat whether or not they have passed the threshold. Parties representing registered ethnic minorities have no threshold and receive proportional representation should they gain the mathematical minimum number of votes nationally to do so.[14] The 2021 election demonstrated the exception for ethnic minority parties: the South Schleswig Voters' Association entered the Bundestag with just 0.1 percent of the vote nationally as a registered party for Danish and Frisian minorities in Schleswig-Holstein.[citation needed] The 5% threshold also applies to all state elections; there is none for European Parliament elections.[citation needed]
German electoral law also includes the Grundmandatsklausel ('basic mandate clause'), which grants full proportional seating to parties winning at least three constituencies as if they had passed the electoral threshold, even if they did not. This rule is intended to benefit parties with regional appeal.[15] This clause has come into effect in two elections: in 1994, when the Party of Democratic Socialism, which had significantly higher support in the former East Germany, won 4.4 percent of party-list votes and four constituencies, and in 2021, when its successor, Die Linke, won 4.9 percent and three constituencies. This clause was repealed by a 2023 law intended to reduce the size of the Bundestag. However, after complaints from Die Linke and the Christian Social Union, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled a threshold with no exceptions was unconstitutional. The court provisionally reintroduced the basic mandate clause for the 2025 federal election.[16]
Norway
[edit]In Norway, the nationwide electoral threshold of four percent applies only to leveling seats. A party with sufficient local support may still win the regular district seats, even if the party fails to meet the threshold. For example, the 2021 election saw the Green Party and Christian Democratic Party each win three district seats, and Patient Focus winning one district seat despite missing the threshold.
Slovenia
[edit]In Slovenia, the threshold was set at 3 parliamentary seats during parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996. This meant that the parties needed to win about 3.2 percent of the votes in order to pass the threshold. In 2000, the threshold was raised to 4 percent of the votes.
Sweden
[edit]In Sweden, there is a nationwide threshold of four percent for the Riksdag, but if a party reaches 12 percent in any electoral constituency, it will take part in the seat allocation for that constituency.[17] As of the 2022 election, nobody has been elected based on the 12 percent rule.
United States
[edit]In the United States, as the majority of elections are conducted under the first-past-the-post system, legal electoral thresholds do not apply. It is possible to be elected with less than half the votes in a district.
However, several states have threshold requirements for parties to obtain automatic ballot access to the next general election without having to submit voter-signed petitions. The threshold requirements have no practical bearing on the two main political parties (the Republican and Democratic parties) as they easily meet the requirements, but have come into play for the Green, Libertarian and other minor parties. The threshold rules also restrict independent candidates' access to the ballot.
List of electoral thresholds by country
[edit]Africa
[edit]| Country | Lower (or sole) house | Upper house | Other elections | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For individual parties | For other types | Other threshold | |||
| Benin | 10%[18] | ||||
| Burundi | 2%[19] | ||||
| Lesotho | None, natural threshold ~0.4% | ||||
| Mozambique | 5%[20] | ||||
| Namibia | None, natural threshold ~0.69% | 6 seats appointed by president | |||
| Rwanda | 5% | ||||
| South Africa | None, natural threshold ~0.2% | ||||
Asia and Oceania
[edit]| Country | Lower (or sole) house | Upper house | Other elections | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For individual parties | For other types | Other threshold | |||
| Australia | Single-member districts for the House of Representatives | None, natural threshold ~8.4-34% for Senate elections (1 seat equivalent), depending on the number of seats up for election | |||
| East Timor | 4%[21][22][23] | ||||
| Fiji | 5% | ||||
| Indonesia | 4%[24] | ||||
| Israel | 3.25%[25] | ||||
| Kazakhstan | 5% | ||||
| Kyrgyzstan | 5% and 0.5% of the vote in each of the seven regions | ||||
| Nepal | 3% vote each under the proportional representation category and at least one seat under the first-past-the-post voting | ||||
| New Zealand | 5%[26] | 1 constituency seat | |||
| Palestine | 2% | ||||
| Philippines | 2% | Other parties can still qualify if the 20% of the seats have not been filled up. | |||
| South Korea | 3%[27] | 5 constituency seats | 10% (local council elections)[28] | ||
| Taiwan | 5%[29] | ||||
| Tajikistan | 5%[30] | ||||
| Thailand | None, natural threshold ~0.1%[31] | ||||
Europe
[edit]| Country | Lower (or sole) house | Upper house | Other elections | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For individual parties | For other types | Other threshold | |||
| Albania | 3% | 5% for multi-party alliances to each electoral area level[32] | |||
| Andorra | 7.14% (1⁄14 of votes cast)[33] | ||||
| Armenia | 5% | 7% for multi-party alliances | |||
| Austria | 4% | 0% for ethnic minorities | |||
| Belgium | 5% (at constituency level; no national threshold) | ||||
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 3% (at constituency level; no national threshold) | ||||
| Bulgaria | 4% | ||||
| Croatia | 5% (at constituency level; no national threshold) | ||||
| Cyprus | 3.6% | 1.8% in European Parliament elections | |||
| Czech Republic | 5% | 8% for bipartite alliances, 11% for multi-party alliances; does not apply for EU elections | |||
| Denmark | 2%[34][35] | 1 constituency seat | |||
| Estonia | 5% | ||||
| Finland | None, but high natural threshold due to multiple districts | ||||
| France | Not applicable | 5% in European Parliament elections[36] and in municipal elections for cities with at least 1000 habitants[37][38] | |||
| Georgia | 5%[39] | 3% for local elections in all municipalities but Tbilisi (2.5%)[39] | |||
| Germany | 5% |
0% for ethnic minorities | 0% in European Parliament elections | ||
| Greece | 3% | ||||
| Hungary | 5% | 10% for bipartite alliances, 15% for multi-party alliances, 0.26% for ethnic minorities (for the first seat only) | |||
| Ireland | Natural threshold 8 – 12% because 3 to 5 seats in each constituency | ||||
| Iceland | 5% (only for compensatory seats)[40] | ||||
| Italy | 3% | 10% (party alliances), but a list must reach at least 3%, 1% (parties of party alliances), 20% or two constituencies (ethnic minorities) | 3% | 4% in European Parliament elections | |
| Kosovo | 5% | ||||
| Latvia | 5% | ||||
| Liechtenstein | 8% | ||||
| Lithuania | 5% | 7% for party alliances | |||
| Malta | natural threshold 12% due to district magnitude of 5 | ||||
| Moldova | 5% | 3% (non-party), 12% (party alliances) | |||
| Monaco | 5%[41] | ||||
| Montenegro | 3% | Special rules apply for candidate lists representing national minority communities.[42] | |||
| Netherlands | 0.67% (percent of votes needed for one seat; parties failing to reach this threshold have no right to a possible remainder seat)[43][44] | 3.23% for European Parliament elections (percent of votes needed for one seat; parties failing to reach this threshold have no right to a possible remainder seat) | |||
| Northern Cyprus | 5% | ||||
| North Macedonia | None, but high natural threshold due to multiple districts | ||||
| Norway | 4% (only for compensatory seats) | ||||
| Poland | 5% | 8% (alliances; does not apply for EU elections); 0% (ethnic minorities) | |||
| Portugal | None, but high natural threshold due to multiple districts | ||||
| Romania | 5% | 10% (alliances) | |||
| Russia | 5% | ||||
| San Marino | 5%[45] | ||||
| Scotland | 5% | ||||
| Spain | 3% (constituency). Ceuta and Melilla use first-past-the-post system. | None | 5% for local elections. Variable in regional elections. | ||
| Sweden | 4% (national level) 12% (constituency) |
Municipalities: 2% or 3%
Regions: 3% European parliament: 4%[17] | |||
| Switzerland | None, but high natural threshold in some electoral districts | ||||
| Serbia | 3%[46] | 0% for ethnic minorities[47][46] | |||
| Slovakia | 5% | 7% for bi- and tri-partite alliances, 10% for 4- or more-party alliances[48] | |||
| Slovenia | 4% | ||||
| Turkey | 7%[49] | 7% for multi-party alliances. Parties in an alliance not being subject to any nationwide threshold individually. No threshold for independent candidates. | |||
| Ukraine | 5%[50] | ||||
| Wales | 5% | ||||
The electoral threshold for elections to the European Parliament varies for each member state, a threshold of up to 5 percent is applied for individual electoral districts, no threshold is applied across the whole legislative body.[51]
North America
[edit]| Country | Lower (or sole) house | Upper house | Other elections | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For individual parties | For other types | Other threshold | |||
| Costa Rica | None, but high natural threshold due to its use of some multiple-member districts with less than 10 seats | ||||
| Mexico | 3% | ||||
South America
[edit]| Country | Lower (or sole) house | Upper house | Other elections | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| For individual parties | For other types | Other threshold | |||
| Argentina | 3% of registered voters[52] | 1.5% of valid votes for primaries | |||
| Bolivia | 3% | ||||
| Brazil | No national electoral threshold, for parties threshold is 80% of the natural threshold in the district; for candidates 20% of the natural threshold in the district.[53][54] | threshold for financial contributions is 2% at constituency level or 11 deputies in 9 states,[55][56][57] increasing 2026 to 2.5% and 2030 to 3% | |||
| Chile | None, but high natural threshold due to its use of multiple-member districts with less than 10 seats | ||||
| Colombia | 3% | ||||
| Ecuador | None, but high natural threshold due to its use of multiple-member districts with less than 10 seats | ||||
| Paraguay | None, but high natural threshold due to its use of multiple-member districts with less than 10 seats | ||||
| Peru | 5%[58] | ||||
| Uruguay | 1% | 3% | |||
Legal challenges
[edit]The German Federal Constitutional Court rejected an electoral threshold for the European Parliament in 2011 and in 2014 based on the principle of one person, one vote.[59] In the case of Turkey, in 2004 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared the threshold of 10 percent to be manifestly excessive and asked Turkey to lower it.[60] On 30 January 2007 the European Court of Human Rights ruled by five votes to two and on 8 July 2008, its Grand Chamber by 13 votes to four that the former 10 percent threshold imposed in Turkey does not violate the right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR).[61] It held, however, that this same threshold could violate the Convention if imposed in a different country. It was justified in the case of Turkey in order to stabilize the volatile political situation over recent decades.[62][63]
Natural threshold
[edit]
The number of seats in each electoral district creates a "hidden" natural threshold (also called an effective, or informal threshold). The number of votes that means that a party is guaranteed a seat can be calculated by the formula () where ε is the smallest possible number of votes. That means that in a district with four seats slightly more than 20 percent of the votes will guarantee a seat. Under more favorable circumstances, the party can still win a seat with fewer votes.[64] The most important factor in determining the natural threshold is the number of seats to be filled by the district. Other factors are the seat allocation formula (Saint-Laguë, D'Hondt or Hare), the number of contestant political parties and the size of the assembly. Generally, smaller districts leads to a higher proportion of votes needed to win a seat and vice versa.[65] The lower bound (the threshold of representation or the percentage of the vote that allows a party to earn a seat under the most favorable circumstances) is more difficult to calculate. In addition to the factors mentioned earlier, the number of votes cast for smaller parties are important. If more votes are cast for parties that do not win any seat, that will mean a lower percentage of votes needed to win a seat.[64]
In some elections, the natural threshold may be higher than the legal threshold. In Spain, the legal threshold is three percent of valid votes—which included blank ballots—with most constituencies having less than 10 deputies, including Soria with only two. Another example of this effect are elections to the European Parliament. In the Cyprus EU constituency, the legal threshold is 1.8 percent,[66] explicitly replacing the threshold for national election which is 3.6 percent.[67] Cyprus only has 6 MEPs, raising the natural threshold. An extreme example of this was in the 2004 EU Parliament elections, where For Europe won 36,112 votes (10.80%) and EDEK won 36,075 votes (10.79%); despite both parties crossing the threshold by a high margin and a difference of only 37 votes, only "For Europe" returned an MEP to the European Parliament.[68]
Other examples include:
- Lithuania EU constituency (2004): LLRA–KŠS–LRS won 5.37 percent despite a threshold of 5 percent[69]
- Austria EU constituency (2009): BZÖ won 4.6 percent[70] despite a threshold of 4 percent;[71] after the Treaty of Lisbon, Ewald Stadler (BZÖ) became MEP
- Croatia EU constituency (2014): Alliance for Croatia won 6.88 percent despite a threshold of 5 percent[72]
- Latvia EU constituency (2019): ZZS won 5.34 percent[73] despite a threshold of 5 percent[74]
- Croatia EU constituency (2024): "Fair Play List 9" won 5.54 percent[75] despite a threshold of five percent;[76] in 2019, its predecessor, Amsterdam Coalition, won a MEP with just 5.19 percent[77]
- Lithuania EU constituency (2024): LRP won 5.15 percent despite a threshold of 5 percent[78]
In Moldova, each independent politician needs 2% to be elected despite the fact that there are 101 seats in total (so worth 2.02 seats).[79]
Notable cases
[edit]An extreme example occurred in Turkey following the 2002 Turkish general election, where almost none of the 550 incumbent MPs were returned. This was a seismic shift that rocked Turkish politics to its foundations. None of the political parties that had passed the threshold in 1999, passed it again: DYP received only 9.55 percent of the popular vote, MHP received 8.34 percent, GP 7.25 percent, DEHAP 6.23 percent, ANAP 5.13 percent, SP 2.48 percent and DSP 1.22 percent. The aggregate number of wasted votes was an unprecented 46.33 percent (14,545,438). As a result, Erdoğan's AKP gained power, winning more than two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament with just 34.28 percent of the vote, with only one opposition party (CHP, which by itself failed to pass threshold in 1999) and 9 independents.
Other dramatic events can be produced by the loophole often added in mixed-member proportional representation (used throughout Germany since 1949, New Zealand since 1993): there the threshold rule for party lists includes an exception for parties that won 3 (Germany) or 1 (New Zealand) single-member districts. The party list vote helps calculate the desirable number of MPs for each party. Major parties can help minor ally parties overcome the hurdle, by letting them win one or a few districts:
- 2008 New Zealand general election: While New Zealand First received only 4.07 percent of the list vote (so it was not returned to parliament), ACT New Zealand won 3.65 percent of the list vote, but its leader won an electorate seat (Epsom), which entitled the party to list seats (4). In the 2011 election, leaders of the National Party and ACT had tea together before the press to promote the implicit alliance (see tea tape scandal). After their victories, the Nationals passed a confidence and supply agreement with ACT to form the Fifth National Government of New Zealand.
- In Germany, the post-communist PDS and its successor Die Linke often hovered around the 5 percent threshold: In 1994, it won only 4.4 percent of the party list vote, but won four districts in East Berlin, which saved it, earning 30 MPs in total. In 2002, it achieved only 4.0 percent of the party list vote, and won just two districts, this time excluding the party from proportional representation. This resulted in a narrow red-green majority and a second term for Gerhard Schröder, which would not have been possible had the PDS won a third constituency. In 2021, it won only 4.9 percent of the party list vote, but won the bare minimum of three districts (Berlin-Lichtenberg, Berlin-Treptow-Köpenick, and Leipzig II), salvaging the party, which received 39 MPs.
The failure of one party to reach the threshold not only deprives their candidates of office and their voters of representation; it also changes the power index in the assembly, which may have dramatic implications for coalition-building.
- Slovakia, 2002. The True Slovak National Party (PSNS) split from Slovak National Party (SNS), and Movement for Democracy (HZD) split from the previously dominant People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. All of them failed to cross the 5 percent threshold with PSNS having 3.65 percent, SNS 3.33 percent and HZD 3.26 percent respectively, thus allowing a center-right coalition despite having less than 43 percent of the vote.
- Norway, 2009. The Liberal Party received 3.9 percent of the votes, below the 4 percent threshold for leveling seats, although still winning two seats. Hence, while right-wing opposition parties won more votes between them than the parties in the governing coalition, the narrow failure of the Liberal Party to cross the threshold kept the governing coalition in power. It crossed the threshold again at the following election with 5.2 percent.
- In the 2013 German federal election, the FDP, in Parliament since 1949, received only 4.8 percent of the list vote, and won no single district, excluding the party altogether. This, along with the failure of the right-wing eurosceptic party AfD (4.7%), gave a left-wing majority in Parliament despite a center-right majority of votes (CDU/CSU itself fell short of an absolute majority by just 5 seats). As a result, Merkel's CDU/CSU formed a grand coalition with the SPD.
- Poland, 2015. The United Left achieved 7.55 percent, which is below the 8 percent threshold for multi-party coalitions. Furthermore, KORWiN only reached 4.76 percent, narrowly missing the 5 percent threshold for individual parties. This allowed the victorious PiS to obtain a majority of seats with 37 percent of the vote. This was the first parliament without left-wing parties represented.
- Israel, April 2019. Among the three lists representing right-wing to far-right Zionism and supportive of Netanyahu, only one crossed the threshold the right-wing government had increased to 3.25 percent: the Union of the Right-Wing Parties with 3.70 percent, while future Prime Minister Bennett's New Right narrowly failed at 3.22 percent, and Zehut only 2.74 percent, destroying Netanyahu's chances of another majority, and leading to snap elections in September.
- Czech Republic, 2021. Přísaha (4.68%), ČSSD (4.65%) and KSČM (3.60%) all failed to cross the 5 percent threshold, thus allowing a coalition of Spolu and PaS. This was also the first time that neither ČSSD nor KSČM had representation in parliament since 1992.
Memorable dramatic losses due to electoral threshold
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (November 2025) |
- In the 1990 German federal election, the Western Greens did not meet the threshold, which was applied separately for former East and West Germany. The Greens could not take advantage of this, because the "Alliance 90" (which had absorbed the East German Greens) ran separately from "The Greens" in the West. Together, they would have narrowly passed the 5.0 percent threshold (West: 4.8%, East: 6.2%). The Western Greens returned to the Bundestag in 1994.
- Israel, 1992. The extreme right-wing Tehiya (Revival) received 1.2 percent of the votes, which was below the threshold which it had itself voted to raise to 1.5 percent. It thus lost its three seats.
- In Bulgaria, the so-called "blue parties"[80] or "urban right"[81] which include SDS, DSB, Yes, Bulgaria!, DBG, ENP and Blue Unity frequently get just above or below the electoral threshold depending on formation of electoral alliances: In the EP election 2007, DSB (4.74%) and SDS (4.35%) were campaigning separately and both fell below the natural electoral of around 5 percent. In 2009 Bulgarian parliamentary election, DSB and SDS ran together as Blue Coalition gaining 6.76 percent. In 2013 Bulgarian parliamentary election, campaigning separately DGB received 3.25 percent, DSB 2.93 percent, SDS 1.37 percent and ENP 0.17 percent, thus all of them failed to cross the threshold this even led to a tie between the former opposition and the parties right of the centre. In the EP election 2014, SDS, DSB and DBG ran as Reformist Bloc gaining 6.45 percent and crossing the electoral threshold, while Blue Unity campaigned separately and did not cross the electoral threshold. In 2017 Bulgarian parliamentary election, SDS and DBG ran as Reformist Bloc gaining 3.06 percent, "Yes, Bulgaria!" received 2.88 percent, DSB 2.48 percent, thus all of them failed to cross the electoral threshold. In the EP election 2019, "Yes, Bulgaria!" and DBG ran together as Democratic Bulgaria and crossed the electoral threshold with 5.88 percent. In November 2021, electoral alliance Democratic Bulgaria crossed electoral threshold with 6.28 percent.
- Slovakia, 2010. Both the Party of the Hungarian Community which (including their predecessors) hold seats in parliament since the Velvet Revolution and the People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which dominated in the 1990s, received 4.33 percent and thus failed to achieve the 5 percent threshold.
- Slovakia, 2016. The Christian Democratic Movement achieved 4.94 percent missing only 0.06 percent votes to reach the threshold which meant the first absence of the party since the Velvet Revolution and the first democratic elections in 1990.
- Slovakia, 2020. The coalition between Progressive Slovakia and SPOLU won 6.96 percent of votes, falling only 0.04 percent short of the 7 percent threshold for coalitions. This was an unexpected defeat since the coalition had won seats in the 2019 European election and won the 2019 presidential election less than a year earlier. In addition, two other parties won fewer votes but were able to win seats due to the lower threshold for single parties (5%). This was also the first election since the Velvet Revolution in which no party of the Hungarian minority crossed the 5 percent threshold.
- Lithuania, 2020. The LLRA–KŠS won only 4.80 percent of the party list votes.
- Madrid, Spain, 2021. Despite achieving 26 seats with 19.37 percent of the votes in the previous election, the liberal Ciudadanos party crashed down to just 3.54 percent in the 2021 snap election called by Isabel Díaz Ayuso, failing to get close to the 5 percent threshold.
- Slovenia, 2022. Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia only achieved 0.62 percent of the vote. This was the first time when DeSUS did not reached the 4 percent since 1996 which was part of almost every coalition since its foundation.
- Germany, 2022 Saarland state election. Alliance 90/The Greens fell 23 votes or 0.005 percent short of reaching representation. The Left fell from 12.8 percent to below the electoral threshold with 2.6 percent in their only western stronghold. Total percentage of votes not represented was 22.3 percent.[82]
- Israel, 2022 Israeli legislative election. Meretz fell to 3.16 percent thus failed to cross the threshold for the first time.
- Germany, 2025. Both the Free Democratic Party (FDP) – part of the previous government coalition – and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) – formed by a recent party split – fell just short of the threshold, with the FDP on 4.33% and BSW on 4.97%, just 0.03% short.
Coalitions due to electoral thresholds
[edit]There has been cases of attempts to circumvent thresholds:
- Slovakia, 1998. Slovak Democratic Coalition ran as a single political party to help its component parties get over the threshold.
- Turkey, 2007 and 2011. The DTP/BDP-led Thousand Hope Candidates and Labour, Democracy and Freedom Bloc only gained 3.81 percent (2007) and 5.67 percent (2011) of the vote not crossing the 10 percent threshold but because they ran as independents they won 22 and 36 seats.
- Poland, 2019. After the United Left and KORWiN failed to cross the thresholds in 2015 both of them with their new alliances bypassed the coalition threshold by either running under SLD label (Lewica) or registering their alliance as a party itself (Confederation). Similarly to Lewica, the Polish Coalition ran under Polish People's Party label. Lewica and Polish Coalition would have crossed the coalition threshold of 8 percent with 12.56 percent and 8.55 percent respectively while Confederation only gained 6.81 percent of the vote.
- Czechia, 2021. The Tricolour–Svobodní–Soukromníci alliance tried to bypass the coalition threshold by renaming Tricolour to include the names of their partners but they only received 2.76 percent, failing to cross the usual five percent threshold.
Number of wasted votes
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (June 2025) |
Electoral thresholds can sometimes seriously affect the relationship between the percentages of the popular vote achieved by each party and the distribution of seats. The proportionality between seat share and popular vote can be measured by the Gallagher index while the number of wasted votes is a measure of the total number of voters not represented by any party sitting in the legislature.[citation needed]
The failure of one party to reach the threshold not only deprives their candidates of office and their voters of representation; it also changes the power index in the assembly, which may have dramatic implications for coalition-building.[citation needed]
The number of wasted votes changes from one election to another, here shown for New Zealand.[83] The wasted vote changes depending on voter behavior and size of effective electoral threshold,[84] for example in 2005 New Zealand general election every party above 1 percent received seats due to the electoral threshold in New Zealand of at least one seat in first-past-the-post voting, which caused a much lower wasted vote compared to the other years.
In the Russian parliamentary elections in 1995, with a threshold excluding parties under 5 percent, more than 45 percent of votes went to parties that failed to reach the threshold. In 1998, the Russian Constitutional Court found the threshold legal, taking into account limits in its use.[85]
After the first implementation of the threshold in Poland in 1993 34.4 percent of the popular vote did not gain representation.[citation needed]
There had been a similar situation in Turkey, which had a 10 percent threshold, easily higher than in any other country.[86] The justification for such a high threshold was to prevent multi-party coalitions and put a stop to the endless fragmentation of political parties seen in the 1960s and 1970s. However, coalitions ruled between 1991 and 2002, but mainstream parties continued to be fragmented and in the 2002 elections as many as 45 percent of votes were cast for parties which failed to reach the threshold and were thus unrepresented in the parliament.[87] All parties which won seats in 1999 failed to cross the threshold, thus giving Justice and Development Party 66 percent of the seats.[citation needed]
In the Ukrainian elections of March 2006, for which there was a threshold of 3 percent (of the overall vote, i.e. including invalid votes), 22 percent of voters were effectively disenfranchised, having voted for minor candidates. In the parliamentary election held under the same system, fewer voters supported minor parties and the total percentage of disenfranchised voters fell to about 12 percent.[citation needed]
In Bulgaria, 24 percent of voters cast their ballots for parties that would not gain representation in the elections of 1991 and 2013.[citation needed]
In the 2020 Slovak parliamentary election, 28.47 percent of all valid votes did not gain representation.[88] In the 2021 Czech legislative election 19.76 percent of voters were not represented.[89] In the 2022 Slovenian parliamentary election 24 percent of the vote went to parties which did not reach the 4 percent threshold including several former parliamentary parties (LMŠ, PoS, SAB, SNS and DeSUS).
In the Philippines, elections to the House of Representatives are via parallel voting, with party-list seats always 20% of seats, with 80% of the seats elected from congressional districts under first-past-the-post voting. Under this system, no party under the party-list system can win more than three seats, no matter how many votes it garnered. With more than a hundred parties participating in each election since 1998, the electoral threshold of 2% saw few parties surpass that, and led to few seats being awarded, which led to not all of the party-list seats being filled. The low number of parties surpassing the threshold also meant a majority of votes were wasted to losing parties. The three-seat cap also led to wasted vote on parties that were entitled to more than three seats. For example, in the 2004 election, more than 35% of the vote was wasted to losing parties, and only 28 out of the supposed 55 seats were allocated. A Philippines Supreme Court decision in 2009 allowed parties with less than 2% of the vote to win a seat each until all party-list seats have been allocated. This has led to all seats reserved for party-lists being allocated for, and decreased the wasted vote on parties that did not win a seat. This led to the wasted votes to decrease just over 30% in the 2010 election, then further to over 26% in in 2025.[citation needed]
Electoral thresholds can produce a spoiler effect, similar to that in the first-past-the-post voting system, in which minor parties unable to reach the threshold take votes away from other parties with similar ideologies. Fledgling parties in these systems often find themselves in a vicious circle: if a party is perceived as having no chance of meeting the threshold, it often cannot gain popular support; and if the party cannot gain popular support, it will continue to have little or no chance of meeting the threshold. As well as acting against extremist parties, it may also adversely affect moderate parties if the political climate becomes polarized between two major parties at opposite ends of the political spectrum. In such a scenario, moderate voters may abandon their preferred party in favour of a more popular party in the hope of keeping the even less desirable alternative out of power.
On occasion, electoral thresholds have resulted in a party winning an outright majority of seats without winning an outright majority of votes, the sort of outcome that a proportional voting system is supposed to prevent. For instance, the Turkish AKP won a majority of seats with less than 50 percent of votes in three consecutive elections (2002, 2007 and 2011). In the 2013 Bavarian state election, the Christian Social Union failed to obtain a majority of votes, but nevertheless won an outright majority of seats due to a record number of votes for parties which failed to reach the threshold, including the Free Democratic Party (the CSU's coalition partner in the previous state parliament). In Germany in 2013 15.7 percent voted for a party that did not meet the five percent threshold.
In contrast, elections that use the ranked voting system can take account of each voter's complete indicated ranking preference. For example, the single transferable vote redistributes first preference votes for candidates below the threshold. This permits the continued participation in the election by those whose votes would otherwise be wasted. Minor parties can indicate to their supporters before the vote how they would wish to see their votes transferred. The single transferable vote is a proportional voting system designed to achieve proportional representation through ranked voting in multi-seat (as opposed to single seat) organizations or constituencies (voting districts).[90] Ranked voting systems are widely used in Australia and Ireland. Other methods of introducing ordinality into an electoral system can have similar effects.
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ A Report on Alberta Elections, p. 39, p. 45
- ^ Irish Times "Election 2020 Dublin Bay South" https://www.irishtimes.com/election2020/dublin-bay-south
- ^ Reynolds, Andrew (2005). Electoral system design : the new international IDEA handbook. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. p. 59. ISBN 978-91-85391-18-9. OCLC 68966125.
- ^ Taagepera, Rein (December 1998). "Nationwide inclusion and exclusion thresholds of representation". Electoral Studies. 17 (4): 405–417. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(97)00054-1.
- ^ Lijphart, Arend (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems. pp. 25–56. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273479.001.0001. ISBN 0-19-827347-9.
- ^ Trinity College Dublin, "Effective threshold in electoral systems" https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/about/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/effthresh.php#:~:text=Political%20Science%20home,where%20m%20equals%20district%20magnitude. Accessed August 10, 2025
- ^ Tullock, Gordon (1965). "Entry Barriers in Politics". The American Economic Review. 55 (1/2): 458–466. JSTOR 1816288.
- ^ "Effective threshold in electoral systems" https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/about/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/effthresh.php#:~:text=Political%20Science%20home,where%20m%20equals%20district%20magnitude. Accessed August 10, 2025
- ^ Resolution 1547 (2007), para. 58
- ^ Carey and Hix, The Electoral Sweet Spot, p. 7
- ^ a b Carey, John M; Hix, Simon (April 2011). "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems". American Journal of Political Science. 55 (2): 383–397. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00495.x.
- ^ "Namibia | Election Passport".
- ^ Green, Antony (4 June 2022). "2022 Victorian Senate election". Antony Green's Election Blog. Retrieved 18 April 2025.
- ^ "Germany passes law to shrink its XXL parliament". Deutsche Welle.
- ^ Kornmeier, Claudia (17 March 2023). "Was das neue Wahlrecht vorsieht". tagesschau.de (in German). Archived from the original on 8 June 2023. Retrieved 8 June 2023.
- ^ Schwartz, Kolja; Bräutigam, Frank. "Bundesverfassungsgericht kippt das neue Wahlrecht in Teilen". tagesschau.de (in German). Retrieved 30 July 2024.
- ^ a b "Distribution of seats". Valmyndigheten. 29 March 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2024.
- ^ Benin Country Report 2022, Bertelsmann Stiftung
- ^ Electoral system IPU
- ^ Electoral system IPU
- ^ Electoral system Inter-Parliamentary Union
- ^ [1] Archived 19 June 2018 at the Wayback Machine Fourth amendment to the Law on Election of the National Parliament. Article 13.2
- ^ Timor Agora: PN APROVA BAREIRA ELEISAUN PARLAMENTAR 4%, 13 February 2017, retrieved 23 March 2017.
- ^ "New election bill, new hope for democracy".
- ^ "Electoral Threshold". The Knesset. Retrieved 10 July 2024.
- ^ Electoral Commission: What is MMP?
- ^ "Election Districts and Representation System | Elections for Public Office | Elections | NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION". nec.go.kr.
- ^ "Local Council Elections | Elections for Public Office | Elections | NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION". nec.go.kr.
- ^ "Legislative Yuan Elections – Central Election Commission". Archived from the original on 9 April 2014. Retrieved 20 June 2014.
- ^ "Tajikistan ruling party to win polls, initial count shows". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 2 March 2020.
- ^ "Thailand's New Electoral System". 21 March 2019. Retrieved 4 September 2022.
- ^ The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania Archived 31 March 2010 at the Wayback Machine, Artikel 162; vor der Wahl 2009 waren es bei völlig anderem Wahlsystem 2,5% bzw. 4% der gültigen Stimmen auf nationaler Ebene (nur für die Vergabe von Ausgleichssitzen; Direktmandate wurden ohne weitere Bedingungen an den stimmenstärksten Kandidaten zugeteilt)
- ^ OSCE (19 February 2020). "PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 7 April 2019 ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report". Retrieved 19 February 2020.
- ^ "Folketingsvalgloven". Retrieved 24 February 2014.
- ^ Bille, Lars; Pedersen, Karina (2004). "Electoral Fortunes and Responses of the Social Democratic Party and Liberal Party in Denmark: Ups and Downs". In Mair, Peter; Müller, Wolfgang C.; Plasser, Fritz (eds.). Political parties and electoral change. SAGE Publications. p. 207. ISBN 0-7619-4719-1.
- ^ "Projet de loi relatif à l'élection des représentants au Parlement européen (INTX1733528L)". Légifrance. 3 January 2018. Retrieved 7 January 2018.
- ^ "Les municipales, une élection pour profs de maths". Slate FR. 30 March 2014. Retrieved 21 April 2023.
- ^ "Quel est le mode de scrutin pour les élections municipales dans les communes de 1 000 habitants et plus ?". Vie Publique. 9 February 2021. Retrieved 21 April 2023.
- ^ a b "Election code of Georgia". Legislative Herald of Georgia. 27 December 2021. Retrieved 2 September 2023.
- ^ [2], Election to Altthingi Law, Act no. 24/2000, Article 108
- ^ "Election Profile". IFES. Retrieved 11 February 2013.
- ^ "These rules apply to lists representing a minority nation or a minority national community with a share of the total population of up to 15 per cent countrywide or 1.5 to 15 per cent within each municipality. If no minority list passes the 3 per cent threshold, but some lists gain 0.7 per cent or more of the valid votes, they are entitled to participate in the distribution of up to 3 mandates as a cumulative list of candidates based on the total number of valid votes. Candidate lists representing the Croatian minority are entitled to 1 seat if they obtain at least 0.35 per cent of the valid votes." Source: OSCE, 2016, Montenegro Parliamentary Elections 2016: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
- ^ "Who can vote and for whom? How the Dutch electoral system works". DutchNews.nl. 30 January 2017. Retrieved 18 November 2019.
- ^ "Election result". www.houseofrepresentatives.nl (in Dutch). Retrieved 19 June 2024.
- ^ "OSCE report on 2019 parliamentary elections".
- ^ a b "Parliament agrees to 3% electoral threshold". Serbian Monitor. 10 February 2020. Retrieved 5 March 2020.
- ^ OSCE. "REPUBLIC OF SERBIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS Spring 2020 ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report".
- ^ Slovak law number 180/2014 § 66, in Slovak
- ^ "Turkey lowers national threshold to 7% with new election law". Daily Sabah. 31 March 2022. Retrieved 31 March 2022.
- ^ Electoral Code becomes effective in Ukraine
- ^ The European Parliament: electoral procedures
- ^ Código Electoral Nacional, Article 160
- ^ New rule complicates distribution of vacancies of Deputies, Jairus Nicholas May 3,2022
- ^ Brazil Law No. 14,211, of October 1, 2021
- ^ Oliveira, José Carlos (30 June 2018). "Eleições deste ano trazem cláusulas de desempenho para candidatos e partidos". Chamber of Deputies of Brazil (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 10 August 2021.
- ^ "Sem votação mínima, 14 partidos ficarão sem recursos públicos". R7 (in Brazilian Portuguese). 9 October 2018. Retrieved 11 August 2021.
- ^ "Com dura cláusula de barreira, metade das siglas corre risco de acabar". O Tempo (in Brazilian Portuguese). 12 July 2021. Retrieved 9 November 2021.
- ^ "Peru's small political parties scramble to survive". April 2016.
- ^ "Karlsruhe vs. EU electoral reform could go into the third round". EURACTIV MEDIA NETWORK BV. 18 May 2022.(in German)
- ^ "Council of Europe Resolution 1380". Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 22 June 2004.
- ^ Turkish Daily News, 31 January 2007, European court rules election threshold not violation
- ^ Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, no. 10226/03.
- ^ Negating Pluralist Democracy: The European Court of Human Rights Forgets the Rights of the Electors, KHRP Legal Review 11 (2007)
- ^ a b "Report on Thresholds and other features of electoral systems which bar parties from access to Parliament (II)". venice.coe.int. 2010. Retrieved 26 August 2018.
- ^ "Report on Thresholds and other features of electoral systems which bar parties from access to Parliament". venice.coe.int. 2008. Retrieved 26 August 2018.
- ^ Ο Περί της Εκλογής των Μελών του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου Νόμος του 2004 (10(I)/2004) [The 2004 Law on the Election of Members of the European Parliament (10(I)/2004)] (10 (I), 23) (in Cypriot Greek). 2004 – via Cyprus Bar Association.
- ^ Ο περί Εκλογής Μελών της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων Νόμος του 1979 (72/1979) [The Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law of 1979 (72/1979)] (72, 33) (in Cypriot Greek). 1979 – via Cyprus Bar Association.
- ^ "Cyprus News Agency: News in English, 04-06-13". Hellenic Resources Network. 4 June 2013. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ "Elections to the European Parliament, 13 June 2004". 18 June 2004. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ "Österreich, Endergebnis (inklusive aller Wahlkartenergebnisse)" (in Austrian German). Archived from the original on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ 117. Bundesgesetz über die Wahl der von Österreich zu entsendenden Abgeordneten zum Europäischen Parlament [117. Federal Law on the Election of Members of the European Parliament to be sent by Austria] (PDF) (117, 77 (1)) (in Austrian German). 1996 – via Bundesgesetzblatt.
- ^ "IZBORI ČLANOVA U EUROPSKI PARLAMENT IZ REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE" (PDF) (in Croatian). 9 June 2014. Retrieved 16 June 2024.
- ^ "Eiropas Parlamenta vēlēšanas 2019" (in Latvian). Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ Eiropas Parlamenta vēlēšanu likums [Election to the European Parliament Law] (44 (1)). 2019.
- ^ "REZULTATE IZBORA ČLANOVA U EUROPSKI PARLAMENT IZ REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE PROVEDENIH 9. LIPNJA 2024. GODINE" (PDF) (in Croatian). 10 June 2024. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ Oelbermann, Kai Friederike; Pukelsheim, Friedrich (July 2020). "The European Elections of May 2019" (PDF). europarl.europa.eu. p. 14.
- ^ "REZULTATE IZBORA ČLANOVA U EUROPSKI PARLAMENT IZ REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE PROVEDENIH 26. SVIBNJA 2019. GODINE" (PDF) (in Croatian). 27 May 2019. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ "2024 m. birželio 9 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą" (in Lithuanian). 15 June 2024. Retrieved 15 June 2024.
- ^ CODUL ELECTORAL (CE 325/2022, 122 (2c) and 106 (2)) (in Romanian). 23 December 2022.
- ^ "Prowestliche Parteien sind Bulgariens große Wahlverlierer". Weser-Kurier. 28 March 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
- ^ "Bulgaria election: All you need to know about country's fourth vote in just 18 months Access to the comments". Euronews. 2 October 2022. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
- ^ "Results 2022 Saarland state election". German State Statistical Officer.(in German)
- ^ "2020 GENERAL ELECTION – OFFICIAL RESULTS AND STATISTICS". ElectionResults.govt.nz. Electoral Commission. 30 November 2020.
- ^ Chang, Eric C.C.; Higashijima, Masaaki (2023). "The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies". Government and Opposition. 58: 106–128. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.17. S2CID 235667437.
- ^ Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 17 ноября 1998 г. № 26-П – см. пкт. 8(in Russian) Archived 21 April 2008 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Toker, Cem (2008). "Why Is Turkey Bogged Down?" (PDF). Turkish Policy Quarterly. Turkish Policy. Retrieved 27 June 2013.
- ^ In 2004 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared this threshold to be manifestly excessive and invited Turkey to lower it (Council of Europe Resolution 1380 (2004)). On 30 January 2007 the European Court of Human Rights ruled by five votes to two (and on 8 July 2008, its Grand Chamber by 13 votes to four) that the 10 percent threshold imposed in Turkey does not violate the right to free elections, guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. It held, however, that this same threshold could violate the Convention if imposed in a different country. It was justified in the case of Turkey in order to stabilize the volatile political situation which has obtained in that country over recent decades. The case is Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, no. 10226/03. See also B. Bowring Negating Pluralist Democracy: The European Court of Human Rights Forgets the Rights of the Electors // KHRP Legal Review 11 (2007)
- ^ "Results 2020 Slovak parliamentary election". Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
- ^ "Results 2021 Czech legislative election". Czech Statistical Office.
- ^ "Single Transferable Vote". Electoral Reform Society.
External links
[edit]Electoral threshold
View on GrokipediaCore Concepts
Definition and Purpose
The electoral threshold, also known as the election threshold, refers to the minimum percentage of valid votes that a political party or candidate must secure in a given election to qualify for any allocation of seats in a legislature. This mechanism is most commonly applied in proportional representation (PR) systems, where seats are distributed based on vote shares, but it can manifest in various forms, including explicit legal requirements or implicit barriers derived from electoral rules such as district magnitude.[1][2] For instance, a typical legal threshold might mandate at least 5% of the national vote for parliamentary entry, as seen in numerous European democracies.[8] The primary purpose of the electoral threshold is to curb excessive fragmentation of party systems by excluding minor parties with negligible support, thereby enhancing governmental stability in parliamentary democracies reliant on coalition formations.[9] Without such barriers, PR systems could allocate seats to parties garnering as little as 1-2% of votes, resulting in highly splintered legislatures that complicate majority-building and policy execution, as evidenced by historical cases of coalition instability in low-threshold environments.[5] By design, thresholds incentivize voter coordination toward viable parties, reduce the effective number of legislative actors, and prioritize broader electoral mandates over niche representation, though this comes at the cost of potentially higher wasted votes for excluded groups.[3] Empirical analyses confirm that higher thresholds correlate with fewer parties gaining seats, fostering more decisive outcomes in seat-vote proportionality trade-offs.[5]Legal Thresholds
Legal electoral thresholds constitute explicit statutory minima, expressed as percentages of valid votes, that political parties or coalitions must surpass to qualify for proportional allocation of legislative seats in systems employing list proportional representation or mixed-member proportional setups. These provisions, enshrined in national constitutions or electoral laws, aim to curtail excessive multipartism by disqualifying parties with negligible support from gaining representation.[1] Thresholds typically range from 3% to 5% but exhibit variation; for instance, they may apply uniformly at the national level or incorporate exceptions such as winning direct constituency seats.[10] In Turkey, the threshold was reduced from 10% to 7% nationwide for parties in March 2022 via amendments to the electoral law, applicable to parliamentary elections under the D'Hondt method for seat distribution.[11] Germany's Basic Law and Federal Electoral Act stipulate a 5% barrier on party list votes across the country, though parties can circumvent this by securing at least three single-member district seats, a clause intended to preserve local representation.[12] Israel's Knesset Elections Law sets the threshold at 3.25% of total valid votes since 2014, up from 2%, requiring parties or joint lists to meet this for any seat entitlement in the 120-member unicameral body.[13] Sweden's electoral system imposes a 4% national threshold for Riksdag seats, with an additional 12% requirement in a single constituency for parties failing the nationwide mark, balancing proportionality with regional viability under modified Sainte-Laguë allocation.[14] Higher thresholds persist in select nations; Turkey's 7% remains among the most stringent, potentially excluding parties with broad but shallow support, while countries like the Netherlands forgo formal legal thresholds beyond the effective minimum derived from district magnitudes.[10] Adjustments to thresholds, often debated for impacts on minority representation, require legislative or constitutional processes and reflect trade-offs between inclusivity and governability.[1]| Country | Threshold (%) | Scope and Exceptions |
|---|---|---|
| Turkey | 7 | National; applies to parties for PR seats |
| Germany | 5 | National list votes; waived with 3 district wins |
| Israel | 3.25 | Nationwide; for parties or joint lists |
| Sweden | 4 | National; or 12% in one constituency |
Natural and Effective Thresholds
All electoral systems impose thresholds of representation, encompassing both explicit legal requirements and implicit barriers arising from systemic design. Natural thresholds, sometimes termed hidden thresholds, emerge as a mathematical consequence of electoral mechanics, particularly district magnitude—the number of seats allocated per district—without reliance on statutory provisions. In systems with low district magnitudes, such as single-member plurality, the natural threshold approximates 50% of votes, as only the leading candidate secures representation, effectively excluding smaller parties. Higher magnitudes lower this barrier, enabling more proportional outcomes, though allocation methods like the d'Hondt formula can further elevate it by favoring larger parties. The effective threshold refines this concept into a quantifiable estimate of the vote share affording a party a roughly equal chance of gaining its first seat, averaging across districts or the national level. Developed by Arend Lijphart in 1994 and building on prior work by Rein Taagepera and others, it is computed as 75% divided by (effective district magnitude plus one), where effective magnitude adjusts raw district sizes for factors like legal thresholds or upper-tier compensations in mixed systems. This 75% factor derives from empirical simulations of seat allocation, approximating the typical vote share of the smallest represented party relative to the Hare quota. For a uniform five-seat district, the effective threshold thus equals 75%/6 ≈ 12.5%, contrasting with nationwide list PR systems where large magnitudes yield thresholds below 1%.[15][16] In practice, effective thresholds influence party system fragmentation by weeding out minor contenders, akin to legal thresholds but tuned to institutional parameters. For instance, in fragmented systems like Israel's pre-2015 setup with low effective thresholds around 3.25% (driven by a 120-seat national district minus exemptions), small parties proliferated, complicating coalitions; reforms raised it to mitigate this. Empirical validation comes from post-election data, where parties below the calculated threshold rarely secure seats, underscoring the measure's utility in cross-system comparisons despite variations from vote distribution or formula specifics.[15][17]Historical Development
Origins in Proportional Representation
The electoral threshold originated as a deliberate modification to proportional representation (PR) systems, which inherently favor broad representation but risk producing fragmented legislatures unable to form stable governments. Early PR implementations, beginning with Belgium's nationwide adoption of the d'Hondt method in 1899, operated without formal legal thresholds, relying instead on district magnitudes to create natural barriers to entry for minor parties. This approach often yielded dozens of parties securing seats, as seen in Belgium's initial elections where up to 10 parties routinely gained representation, complicating coalition-building and policy execution.[18] The absence of thresholds amplified PR's tendency toward atomization, where even parties with minimal support—sometimes under 1% of the national vote—could claim parliamentary seats, eroding governability.[1] The Weimar Republic's experience (1919–1933) exemplified these challenges, employing a pure list PR system with 35 multi-member districts and no national threshold beyond a nominal local requirement equivalent to roughly 0.6–1% nationally. This resulted in extreme fragmentation, with the Reichstag featuring 28–32 parties in key elections (e.g., 32 parties in 1924 and 1930), fostering chronic instability, frequent government collapses (20 cabinets in 14 years), and reliance on emergency decrees.[19] Such outcomes, partly blamed for enabling extremist rises amid coalition paralysis, prompted reformers to view unmitigated PR as causally linked to democratic vulnerability. Postwar reconstructions thus incorporated legal thresholds to impose an artificial minimum vote share, elevating the effective threshold above natural levels determined by district size and formula.[20] West Germany's Federal Republic pioneered the modern legal threshold in its 1953 electoral law, mandating a 5% national vote share (or three direct constituency wins) for Bundestag representation, explicitly to avert Weimar-style splintering and ensure viable majorities.[20] This innovation, rooted in the 1949 Basic Law's emphasis on party system stability (Article 21), reflected first-hand lessons from PR's role in interwar collapse, prioritizing causal mechanisms for governability over absolute proportionality. Subsequent adoptions across Europe—such as Denmark's 2% threshold in 1953 and Sweden's adjustments in the 1960s—followed suit, adapting thresholds to national contexts while preserving PR's core vote-seat proportionality for qualifying parties. These developments marked thresholds not as ancillary features but as essential correctives to PR's foundational logic, balancing inclusivity against the empirical risks of over-fragmentation.[1]Postwar Innovations and Spread
The introduction of explicit legal electoral thresholds in postwar proportional representation systems represented a deliberate innovation aimed at curbing the multiparty fragmentation that had contributed to political instability in interwar Europe, particularly the Weimar Republic's experience with over 30 parties in 1930 leading to governmental paralysis.[20] West Germany pioneered this mechanism with a 5% national threshold for parties to enter the Bundestag, formalized in the electoral law effective for the 1953 federal election, though rooted in the 1949 Basic Law's provisions to exclude extremist splinter groups and foster two-party or effective multiparty dynamics conducive to stable coalitions.[9] This threshold applied unless a party won at least three direct constituency seats, a clause designed to allow regional strongholds representation while prioritizing national vote shares to prevent the proliferation of small, ideologically extreme parties that had enabled authoritarian rises pre-1945.[20] The German model influenced the rapid adoption of similar thresholds across Western Europe and beyond, as newly democratizing or reforming states sought to balance proportionality with governability amid reconstruction and Cold War pressures. Denmark implemented a 2% national threshold in the early 1960s to reduce the number of parliamentary parties from double digits, addressing chronic coalition instability in its PR system.[9] Israel, establishing its Knesset in 1949, set an initial 1% threshold for the 1951 elections to limit extreme factions in a fragmented society of immigrants and ideological groups, later raising it stepwise to 3.25% by 2015 to consolidate governance.[9] In Italy, thresholds evolved from minimal postwar levels to 4% by 1993, reflecting efforts to manage chronic fragmentation in a system prone to dozens of parties.[9] By the 1960s and 1970s, thresholds spread to other PR-adopting nations, including the Netherlands adjusting to an effective 0.67% in 1956 following seat expansions, and variations in countries like Turkey (10% since 1982, though postwar roots in 1946 multiparty transitions).[9] This diffusion was driven by empirical observations of threshold effects in reducing effective party numbers—Germany's post-1953 elections stabilized around 4-6 major parties compared to Weimar's volatility—while causal analyses linked thresholds to fewer government collapses by incentivizing pre-electoral alliances over post-electoral horse-trading.[21] Outside Europe, adoption lagged until democratization waves in Latin America and Eastern Europe post-1989, but postwar innovations established thresholds as a standard tool for engineering party system concentration without abandoning PR core tenets.[22]Theoretical Rationale
Intended Mechanisms for Stability
Electoral thresholds serve as a deliberate institutional device to mitigate the risks of excessive party fragmentation in proportional representation systems, which can otherwise produce legislatures too divided to support coherent governance. By mandating a minimum national vote share—often 3% to 5%—for parties to qualify for seats, thresholds exclude marginal groups that might otherwise capture representation with limited support, thereby concentrating legislative power among broader-based parties and reducing the effective number of parties (ENP) in parliament, calculated as where are parties' seat shares.[23][24] This mechanism addresses the tendency of pure list PR to amplify multipartism, as observed in interwar Europe, where low barriers contributed to unstable coalitions and policy gridlock by increasing veto points and negotiation complexity.[25] Theoretically, thresholds promote stability by incentivizing strategic voter behavior and pre-electoral alliances, discouraging vote dispersion among ideologically similar but electorally weak factions. Voters, anticipating wasted votes below the threshold, consolidate support for viable contenders, while small parties merge or form joint lists to surpass the hurdle, effectively streamlining the party system before elections.[7] This preemptive consolidation lowers post-election bargaining costs, as fewer parties need inclusion in coalitions to achieve majorities, minimizing the frequency of government collapses— a pattern historically linked to high ENP in threshold-absent PR systems like Weimar Germany's Reichstag, where over 30 parties vied in 1932 elections.[25][24] Furthermore, by aligning the seat-vote linkage more closely with governance efficacy, thresholds counteract PR's inherent bias toward over-representation of niches, fostering executives with sufficient legislative durability to implement policies without constant minority obstructions. Proponents, drawing from causal analyses of electoral engineering, argue this enhances causal chains from voter preferences to stable outcomes, as concentrated parliaments exhibit lower turnover rates and higher policy continuity compared to fragmented ones.[23][26] Such designs, refined post-World War II in countries like Germany (5% threshold since 1953), explicitly target the instability of multiparty excess, prioritizing decisive rule-making over exhaustive inclusivity.[24]Mathematical Underpinnings and Vote-Seat Linkages
In proportional representation systems employing list allocation, the translation of votes to seats relies on mathematical quotas that inherently impose representation thresholds. The Droop quota, calculated as where denotes total valid votes and the number of seats available, establishes the minimum votes required to guarantee at least one seat, as any entities reaching this quota exhaust the vote supply. This formula, originating from single transferable vote mechanics but applicable to list PR variants, defines a natural threshold of approximately of the vote share, below which parties face exclusion regardless of legal rules.[27] Even without explicit legal thresholds, district magnitude (equivalent to per district) generates an effective threshold , modeled by Taagepera and Shugart as , averaging the inclusion threshold (minimal share for certain seat attainment) and exclusion threshold (maximal share yielding no seat). This approximation captures the probabilistic vote share yielding a 50% chance of representation under highest averages methods like d'Hondt, with lower elevating and compressing small-party viability. Effective magnitude equivalently normalizes disparate district structures for cross-system comparison, linking higher to enhanced proportionality by mitigating threshold effects.[28] Legal electoral thresholds modify these linkages by enforcing a discontinuous function: parties with vote share receive zero seats, while those exceeding it compete for all seats based on renormalized shares . This adjustment distorts the vote-seat curve, inflating seat bonuses for supra-threshold parties and magnifying disproportionality, as quantified in stochastic models where national thresholds elevate the conditional variance in seat allocation given votes. Such mechanics predict heightened effective party system concentration, with values like 5% (common in Europe) shifting the 50% representation probability upward from natural levels.[5][28]Empirical Advantages
Evidence of Reduced Fragmentation
In the German state of Hesse, the abolition of a 5% electoral threshold for local council elections in 2001 provided a natural experiment demonstrating the threshold's role in curbing fragmentation. Prior to the reform, the threshold excluded minor parties; post-abolition, the number of parties winning seats increased significantly, with small parties gaining an average of 2-3 additional seats per council in affected municipalities, particularly those where pre-reform vote shares for fringe groups hovered near 5%. This led to greater legislative fragmentation, as measured by higher effective numbers of parties and more splintered decision-making bodies.[7][24] Turkey's imposition of a 10% national electoral threshold in 1982, following the 1980 military coup, markedly decreased party system fragmentation relative to the multiparty volatility of the 1950-1980 era, where up to 10-15 parties often contested and fragmented parliaments. In the initial post-threshold elections (1983-1991), the raw number of parliamentary parties dropped to 3-5, concentrating seats among larger blocs and stabilizing coalition formations, though subsequent adaptations like alliances partially mitigated the effect. Empirical data from 19 Turkish elections since 1950 confirm that the threshold lowered overall fragmentation indices, even as disproportionality rose for smaller vote shares.[29][30] Cross-national comparisons further substantiate the effect: systems with legal thresholds above 3% exhibit systematically lower effective numbers of legislative parties (ENP), typically 3-4, versus 5+ in low- or no-threshold proportional representation systems like the Netherlands. This pattern holds in regression analyses controlling for district magnitude and assembly size, where thresholds act as a binding constraint on small-party viability, channeling votes toward viable competitors and reducing post-election party counts.[16]Correlation with Stable Governance Outcomes
Electoral thresholds are associated with enhanced government stability in proportional representation systems by constraining the effective number of legislative parties, thereby facilitating coalition formation and reducing turnover risks. Cross-national analyses indicate that thresholds of 3-5% typically limit the effective number of parties to 3-5, compared to 6 or more in systems with lower or no thresholds, which correlates with fewer instances of premature cabinet dissolution. For example, in PR systems employing such thresholds, governments are more likely to complete their terms, as evidenced by comparative studies of European democracies where higher thresholds predict lower cabinet instability rates.[31][16] This correlation operates causally through reduced fragmentation: greater numbers of parties elevate the bargaining complexity in coalition-building, increasing the hazard of government failure. A study of Swedish local governments found that each additional parliamentary party raises the probability of a no-confidence vote unseating the executive by approximately 4 percentage points, effectively doubling the baseline risk in highly fragmented settings. Similarly, quasi-experimental evidence from Germany's Hesse state, where a 5% threshold was abolished for local elections in 2001, showed increased seat shares for small parties (3-5% gains in affected municipalities), prompting councils to shrink their sizes by 2-3 seats to mitigate emerging instability—implicitly affirming thresholds' role in preserving governability.[32][7] In practice, countries with established thresholds exhibit empirically verifiable stability gains. Germany's 5% national threshold since 1949 has sustained an average effective number of parties around 3.5, enabling grand coalitions and full-term governments in most cycles, with only rare early elections. By contrast, systems like Israel's with a 3.25% threshold have seen effective party numbers exceed 7, contributing to repeated elections (five between 2019 and 2022) and prolonged deadlock. These patterns hold across datasets, where thresholds above 3% predict 20-30% longer mean cabinet durations in multiparty PR contexts, underscoring their utility in causal pathways to durable governance despite potential representational trade-offs.[31][33]Criticisms and Drawbacks
Distortion of Voter Representation
Electoral thresholds distort voter representation by systematically excluding parties that fail to surpass the required vote percentage from obtaining any seats, thereby preventing a direct proportionality between national vote shares and legislative seat allocations. This mechanism results in "wasted votes" for supporters of sub-threshold parties, as their preferences receive zero legislative embodiment despite comprising a non-negligible portion of the electorate. Empirical analyses demonstrate that higher thresholds elevate overall disproportionality, quantified via indices such as the Gallagher least-squares index (LSq), which measures the squared differences between parties' vote and seat percentages. For instance, national thresholds induce a stochastic barrier that amplifies seat-vote mismatches, particularly harming smaller parties and favoring larger ones through surplus representation.[5][34] In practice, this distortion manifests in elections where fragmented opposition votes below the threshold consolidate power for threshold-surpassing parties. Turkey's 10% threshold, the highest globally until its partial mitigation in 2023, exemplifies severe disproportionality: in the 2002 parliamentary election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured 34.3% of votes but 66% of seats (363 out of 550), as multiple smaller parties collectively garnered over 40% of votes yet won none due to failing the barrier. Similarly, Germany's 5% threshold has repeatedly nullified representation for minor parties; in the 1990 federal election, the Green Party's 5.0% vote share initially fell short in some interpretations but ultimately qualified via overhang rules, though many regional lists were excluded, contributing to an LSq index of around 4-6 in threshold-affected systems. Israel's threshold, raised from 2% to 3.25% in 2014, wasted approximately 5-7% of votes in subsequent elections for parties like the Arab Balad faction, forcing mergers or zero seats and skewing the Knesset's composition toward larger blocs.[35] Quasi-experimental evidence from reforms underscores the representational cost: in Germany's Hesse state, abolishing the 5% local threshold in 2001 increased small parties' seat shares by 2-4 percentage points in affected municipalities, directly enhancing minority representation that the prior barrier had suppressed, without proportionally increasing overall fragmentation beyond initial surges. Such distortions not only underrepresent voter diversity but can entrench major-party dominance, as sub-threshold votes fail to influence policy formation, prompting strategic voting or abstention in future contests. While thresholds aim to curb excessive fragmentation, their exclusionary effect empirically prioritizes governability over faithful mirroring of electoral pluralism.[36][7]Incentives for Strategic Behavior and Wasted Votes
Electoral thresholds generate incentives for strategic voting by classifying votes for parties failing to meet the minimum share as wasted, denying them any proportional seat allocation and effectively nullifying voter input on legislative composition. Voters aware of polls indicating a preferred small party's sub-threshold trajectory may defect to a larger party or joint list likely to pass, aiming to maximize representation utility rather than express pure preferences; this tactical shift mirrors instrumental behavior observed in majoritarian systems but adapted to proportional contexts where thresholds impose effective exclusion barriers. Parties, in turn, respond by forming pre-electoral alliances or cartels to pool votes, as seen in Israel's recurrent joint lists designed to surmount the 3.25% hurdle, which compel ideological compromises to avoid collective wastage.[37][38] Empirical analyses of mixed-member systems like Germany's, with its 5% national threshold, reveal elevated strategic ticket-splitting and list-vote adjustments, where supporters of fringe parties reallocate to threshold-viable options to prevent total exclusion; for instance, polling proximity to the hurdle correlates with detectable vote swings toward established coalitions. In pure PR settings, such as Israel's pre-2015 adjustments, raising the threshold from 2% to 3.25% halved eligible small lists, forcing mergers like the Joint (Arab) List that captured 13.3% of votes in 2015 to secure 13 seats, averting an estimated 5-7% wastage from fragmented Arab turnout. These patterns underscore causal links between thresholds and reduced sincere voting, as rational anticipation of failure distorts aggregate outcomes toward larger entities, potentially entrenching incumbents and underrepresenting niche interests.[39][40] Critics argue this fosters a feedback loop of demobilization, where repeated small-party failures signal futility, eroding long-term mobilization and amplifying effective thresholds beyond nominal levels through self-fulfilling prophecies; studies confirm higher abstention or tactical abstention rates among marginal voters in threshold systems compared to low- or no-threshold PR variants. While proponents view such incentives as stabilizing by curbing extremism, evidence indicates they compromise voter autonomy, with wasted vote shares often exceeding 10% in high-threshold cases like pre-reform Turkey's 10% rule, where strategic abstention and bloc voting suppressed opposition diversity. Overall, thresholds thus trade fragmentation risks for behavioral distortions that prioritize survivability over electoral fidelity.[41][42]Global Variations
Thresholds in European Systems
Electoral thresholds in European national parliamentary systems serve to exclude minor parties from seat allocation under proportional representation, thereby reducing the number of parties in parliament and facilitating coalition formation for stable governments. These thresholds, typically set between 3% and 5% of valid national votes, emerged post-World War II in response to experiences of governmental instability from multiparty fragmentation, as seen in interwar Germany and Austria. While most Western European democracies adopted such mechanisms, implementation varies, with some countries incorporating exceptions for ethnic minorities or direct mandates to mitigate disproportionality. In Germany, the Federal Election Act mandates that parties obtain at least 5% of second votes cast nationwide or secure three direct constituency seats to qualify for proportional distribution of the 299 list seats in the Bundestag. This dual criterion, effective since the 1953 election and refined in subsequent reforms, addresses the Weimar Republic's paralysis from over 30 parties, as evidenced by the inability to form lasting majorities leading to repeated cabinet crises. The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed the threshold's constitutionality, ruling in 2024 that recent amendments maintaining it do not violate equality of votes under Article 38 of the Basic Law.[43][44] Sweden employs a 4% national threshold for the 349-seat Riksdag, supplemented by a 12% constituency requirement allowing localized parties limited entry without full national representation; this system, adjusted in 1970 from an earlier 4% without the regional exception, balances proportionality with stability, as small parties below 4% received no seats in 2022 elections despite garnering 2-3% support.[45] Further east, Turkey lowered its threshold from 10%—the highest in Europe—to 7% via parliamentary amendment in March 2022, applied in the May 2023 general elections where parties like the Green Left Party entered via alliances exceeding the bar. This change, prompted by criticisms of the prior level excluding over 20% of votes as wasted in 2018, still imposes a nationwide uniform hurdle across its 600-seat unicameral parliament.[11]| Country | Threshold | Key Features |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 5% national | Or 3 direct seats; applies to lists [43] |
| Sweden | 4% national | 12% in one constituency for entry [45] |
| Turkey | 7% national | Alliances count jointly; post-2022 [11] |
| Poland | 5% parties, 8% coalitions | Exemptions for ethnic parties [10] |
Thresholds in Non-European Systems
Electoral thresholds in non-European systems vary widely, with some countries adopting national percentage barriers to limit legislative fragmentation in proportional representation setups, while others rely on effective thresholds from district magnitudes or impose none. Israel maintains a 3.25% nationwide threshold for Knesset seats, elevated from 2% via a 2014 amendment to curb excessive party proliferation and promote governability, though it has drawn criticism for potentially marginalizing smaller Arab and niche parties.[13][47] Turkey's parliamentary elections feature a 7% national threshold, lowered from 10% by legislation passed on March 31, 2022, in response to long-standing debates over the prior level's exclusionary effects on ethnic minorities like Kurds and its role in sustaining dominant party alliances.[11] This adjustment aimed to enhance representation without fully dismantling barriers to entry, yet it remains among the world's highest, influencing coalition strategies and voter behavior.[48] In Latin America, explicit national thresholds are rare, with systems often featuring open-list proportional representation where effective thresholds emerge from multi-member district sizes rather than uniform vote-share minima; for instance, Brazil's framework lacks a national percentage but enforces party federation requirements and performance clauses to consolidate votes.[49] Similarly, African nations like South Africa employ pure proportional representation with no threshold, enabling even parties garnering under 1% of votes to secure seats, which has resulted in highly fragmented parliaments including over 10 represented parties in recent elections.[50]| Country | Threshold Level | System Type | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | 3.25% nationwide | Closed-list PR | Raised in 2014 to reduce small-party influence.[13] |
| Turkey | 7% nationwide | PR with alliances | Reduced from 10% in 2022 to broaden access.[11] |
| South Africa | None (0%) | Closed-list PR | Promotes inclusivity but increases fragmentation.[50] |
