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Electoral system
Electoral system
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An "electoral system" is the term for the Group decision-making procedure of a group with a common goal, which could be called "Common goal group decision-making procedure". Whereas a common goal is the goal of a group of people, who may or may not be bound together to practice and inform people not of the group of their common goal. For various reasons, it is worth mentioning, that, erroneously, a common goal might be assumed to be the same as a "shared goal". However, a common goal is not a shared goal, since the goal of an individual human is not a portion of a whole, but is completely, separately, and equally respectively part of the resources that one individual has and uses to satisfy it's basic needs. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, nonprofit organizations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices.

Some electoral systems elect a single winner to a unique position, such as prime minister, president or governor, while others elect multiple winners, such as members of parliament or boards of directors. When electing a legislature, areas may be divided into constituencies with one or more representatives or the electorate may elect representatives as a single unit. Voters may vote directly for an individual candidate or for a list of candidates put forward by a political party or alliance. There are many variations in electoral systems.

The mathematical and normative study of voting rules falls under the branches of economics called social choice and mechanism design, but the question has also engendered substantial contributions from political scientists, analytic philosophers, computer scientists, and mathematicians. The field has produced several major results, including Arrow's impossibility theorem (showing that ranked voting cannot eliminate the spoiler effect) and Gibbard's theorem (showing it is impossible to design a straightforward voting system, i.e. one where it is always obvious to a strategic voter which ballot they should cast).

Types

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The most common categorizations of electoral systems are: single-winner vs. multi-winner systems and proportional representation vs. winner-take-all systems vs. mixed systems.

Map showing the main types electoral systems used to elect candidates to the lower or sole (unicameral) house of national legislatures in 2022:
  Majoritarian representation (winner-take-all)
  Proportional representation
  Mixed-member majoritarian representation
  Mixed-member proportional representation
  Semi-proportional representation (non-mixed)
  Indirect elections
  In transition
  No election (e.g. monarchy)

Single-winner and winner-take-all systems

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In all cases, where only a single winner is to be elected, the electoral system is winner-take-all. The same can be said for elections where only one person is elected per district. Since district elections are winner-take-all, the electoral system as a whole produces dis-proportional results. Some systems where multiple winners are elected at once (in the same district), such a plurality block voting are also winner-take-all.

In party block voting, voters can only vote for the list of candidates of a single party, with the party receiving the most votes winning all seats, even if that party receives only a minority of votes. This is also described as winner-take-all. This is used in five countries as part of mixed systems.[1]

Plurality voting - first past the post and block voting

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Countries that use exclusively first-past-the-post for lower house or unicameral legislatures

Plurality voting is a system in which the candidate(s) with the largest number of votes wins, with no requirement to get a majority of votes. In cases where there is a single position to be filled, it is known as first-past-the-post. This is the second-most-common electoral system for national legislatures (after proportional representation). Altogether at least 58 countries use FPTP and single-member districts to elect all or some of the members of a national-level legislative chamber,[1] the vast majority of which are current or former British colonies or U.S. territories. It is also the second-most-common system used for presidential elections, being used in 19 countries. The two-round system is the most common system used to elect a president.[1]

In cases where there are multiple positions to be filled, most commonly in cases of multi-member constituencies, there are several types of plurality electoral systems. Under block voting (also known as multiple non-transferable vote or plurality-at-large), voters have as many votes as there are seats and can vote for any candidate, regardless of party, but give only one vote to each preferred candidate. The most-popular candidates are declared elected, whether they have a majority of votes or not and whether or not that result is proportional to the way votes were cast. Eight countries use this system.[1]

Cumulative voting allows a voter to cast more than one vote for the same candidate, in multi-member districts. Its effect may be proportional to the same degree that single non-transferable voting or limited voting is, thus it is often called semi-proportional.

Approval voting is a choose-all-you-like voting system that aims to increase the number of candidates that win with majority support.[2] Voters are free to pick as many candidates as they like and each choice has equal weight, independent of the number of candidates a voter supports. The candidate with the most votes wins.[3]

Runoff systems

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Countries by electoral system used to (directly) elect their Head of State (President):
  Election by Legislature
  Election by electoral college
  Not elected (mostly monarchies)

A runoff system is one in which a candidates receives a majority of votes to be elected, either in a runoff election or final round of vote counting. This is sometimes referred to as a way to ensure that a winner must have a majority of votes, although usually only a plurality is required in the last round (when three or more candidates move on to the runoff election), and sometimes even in the first round winners can avoid a second round without achieving a majority. In social choice theory, runoff systems are not called majority voting, as this term refers to Condorcet-methods.

There are two main groups of runoff systems, those in one group use a single round of voting achieved by voters casting ranked votes and then using vote transfers if necessary to establish a majority, and those in the other group use two or more rounds of voting, to narrow the field of candidates and to determine a winner who has a majority of the votes. Both are primarily used for single-member constituencies or election of a single position such as mayor.

If a candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round, then the system is simple first past the post voting. But if no one has a majority of votes in first round, the systems respond in different ways.

Under instant-runoff voting (IRV), when no one wins a majority in first round, runoff is achieved through vote transfers made possible by voters having ranked candidates in order of preference, with lower preferences used as back-up preferences. This system is used for parliamentary elections in Australia and Papua New Guinea. If no candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round, the votes of the least-popular candidate are transferred as per marked second preferences and added to the totals of surviving candidates. This is repeated until a candidate achieves a majority. The count ends any time one candidate has a majority of votes but it may continue until only two candidates remain, at which point one or other of the candidates will take a majority of votes still in play.

A different form of single-winner preferential voting is the contingent vote where voters do not rank all candidates, but rank just two or three. If no candidate has a majority in the first round, all candidates except the top two are excluded. If the voter gave first preference to one of the excluded candidates, the vote is transferred to the next usable back-up preferences if possible, or otherwise put in the exhausted pile. The resulting vote totals are used to determine the winner by majority. This system is used in Sri Lankan presidential elections, with voters allowed to give three preferences.[4]

The other main form of runoff system is the two-round system, which is the most common system used for presidential elections around the world, being used in 88 countries. It is also used, in conjunction with single-member districts, in 20 countries for electing members of the legislature.[1] If no candidate achieves a majority of votes in the first round of voting, a second round is held to determine the winner. In most cases the second round is limited to the top two candidates from the first round, although in some elections more than two candidates may choose to contest the second round; in these cases the second-round winner is not required to have a majority of votes, but may be elected by having a plurality of votes.

Some countries use a modified form of the two-round system, so going to a second round happens less often. In Ecuador a candidate in the presidential election is declared the winner if they receive more than 50 percent of the vote or 40% of the vote and are 10% ahead of their nearest rival,[5] In Argentina, where the system is known as ballotage, election is achieved by those with majority or if they have 45% and a 10% lead.

In some cases, where a certain level of support is required, a runoff may be held using a different system. In U.S. presidential elections, when no candidate wins a majority of the United States Electoral College (using seat count, not votes cast, as is used in the majoritarian systems described above), a contingent election is held by the House of Representatives, not the voters themselves. The House contingency election sees three candidates go on to the last round and the Representatives of each state vote as a single unit, not as individuals, with the state's votes going to the plurality winner of the State members' votes.

An exhaustive ballot sees multiple rounds of voting (where no one has majority in first round). The number of rounds is not limited to two rounds, but sees the last-placed candidate eliminated in each round of voting, repeated until one candidate has majority of votes. Due to the potentially large number of rounds, this system is not used in any major popular elections, but is used to elect the Speakers of parliament in several countries and members of the Swiss Federal Council.

In some systems, such as election of the speaker of the United States House of Representatives, there may be multiple rounds held without any candidates being eliminated (unless by a candidate's own resignation) until a candidate achieves a majority.

Positional systems

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Positional systems like the Borda Count are ranked voting systems that assign a certain number of points to each candidate, weighted by position. The most popular such system is first-preference plurality. Another well-known variant, the Borda count, each candidate is given a number of points equal to their rank, and the candidate with the least points wins. This system is intended to elect broadly acceptable options or candidates, rather than those preferred by a majority.[6] This system is used to elect the ethnic minority representatives seats in the Slovenian parliament.[7][8]

The Dowdall system is used in Nauru for parliamentary elections and sees voters rank the candidates. First preference votes are counted as whole numbers, the second preferences by two, third preferences by three, and so on; this continues to the lowest possible ranking.[9] The totals for each candidate determine the winners.[10]

Multi-winner systems

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Multi-winner systems include both proportional systems and non-proportional multi-winner systems, such as party block voting and plurality block voting. A voter can cast one vote, as many votes as the number of seats to fill, or something in between (limited voting).

Proportional systems

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Countries by proportional electoral system (lower house or unicameral legislature):
  Party list (closed list)
  Party list (open list)
  Party list (partly-open list)
  Panachage party list (open list)
  Mixed-member proportional (seat linkage) type compensatory, some additional compensation for overhang seats (New Zealand)
  Mixed-member proportional (seat linkage) type compensatory, no additional compensation for overhang seats
  Personalized proportional (Germany)
  Single transferable vote

Proportional representation is the most widely used type of electoral system to elect national legislatures. All or some members of the parliaments of over a hundred countries are elected by a form of PR.[11] These systems elect multiple members in one contest, whether that is at-large, as in a city-wide election at the city level or state-wide or nation-wide at those levels, or in multi-member districts at any level.

Party-list proportional representation is the single most common electoral system and is used by 80 countries, and involves seats being allocated to parties based on party vote share.

In closed list systems voters do not have any influence over which candidates are elected to fill the party seats, but in open list systems voters are able to both vote for the party list and for candidates (or only for candidates). Voters thus have means to sometimes influence the order in which party candidates will be assigned seats. In some countries, notably Israel and the Netherlands, elections are carried out using 'pure' proportional representation, with the votes tallied on a national level before assigning seats to parties. (There are no district seats, only at-large.) However, in most cases several multi-member constituencies are used rather than a single nationwide constituency, giving an element of geographical or local representation. Such may result in the distribution of seats not reflecting the national vote totals of parties. As a result, some countries that use districts have leveling seats that are awarded to some of the parties whose seat proportion is lower than their proportion of the vote. Levelling seats are either used at the regional level or at the national level. Such mixed member proportional systems are used in New Zealand and in Scotland. (They are discussed below.)

List PR systems usually set an electoral threshold, the minimum percentage of the vote that a party must obtain to win levelling seats or to win seats at all. Some systems allow a go around of this rule. For instance, if a party takes a district seat, the party may be eligible for top-up seats even if its percentage of the votes is below the threshold.

Different methods are used to allocate seats in proportional representation systems. Party-list systems use two main methods: highest average and largest remainder. Highest average systems involve dividing the votes received by each party by a divisor or vote average that represents an idealized seats-to-votes ratio, then rounding normally. In the largest remainder system, parties' vote shares are divided by an electoral quota. This usually leaves some seats unallocated, which are awarded to parties based on which parties have the largest number of "leftover" votes.

Single transferable vote (STV) elects multiple winners in a single contest using multi-member districts. Each voter casts a ballot with first preference and optionally ranking other candidates, rather than voting for a party list or marking just one X vote, as in first past the post. In STV, the secondary marked preferences are used as contingency votes, used only if needed. STV is used in Malta, the Republic of Ireland and Australia (partially). To be certain of being elected, a candidate must achieve a quota (the Droop quota being the most common). Candidates that achieve the quota are elected. If necessary to fill seats, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the votes cast for them are redistributed to the second preferences on the ballots in question. Surplus votes held by elected candidates may also be transferred. Eventually all seats are filled by candidates who have passed the quota or by those still in the running when there are only as many remaining candidates as the number of remaining open seats.[10]

Under single non-transferable vote (SNTV), multi-member districts are used. Each voter can vote for only one candidate, with the candidates receiving the most votes declared the winners, whether any of them have a majority of votes or not. This system, often described as semi-proportional, is used in Kuwait, the Pitcairn Islands and Vanuatu and formerly in Japan.[1]

Mixed systems

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Countries using a mixed electoral system (lower house or unicameral legislature):
Compensatory
  Mixed-member proportional (seat linkage) type compensatory
  Vote linkage type partially compensatory (supermixed)
  Majority jackpot
  Two round majority jackpot
Non-compensatory
  Parallel voting (Party list + FPTP)
  Parallel voting (Party list + TRS)
  Parallel voting (Party list + BV/PBV)
  Majority bonus (fusion)

In several countries, mixed systems are used to elect the legislature. These include parallel voting, mixed-member majoritarian, and mixed-member proportional representation.

In non-compensatory, parallel voting systems, which are used in 20 countries,[1] members of a legislature are elected by two different methods; part of the membership is elected by a plurality or majoritarian election system in single-member constituencies and the other part by proportional representation. The results of the constituency contests have no effect on the outcome of the proportional vote.[10]

In compensatory mixed-member systems levelling seats are allocated to balance nation-wide or regional disproportionality produced by the way seats are won in constituency contests. The mixed-member proportional systems, in use in eight countries, provide enough compensatory seats to ensure that many parties have a share of seats approximately proportional to their vote share.[1] Most of the MMP countries use a PR system at the district level, thus lowering the number of levelling seats that are needed to produce proportional results. Of the MMP countries, only New Zealand and Lesotho use single-winner first-past-the-post voting in their districts. Scotland uses a regionalized MMP system where levelling seats are allocated in each region to balance the disproportionality produced in single-winner districts within the region. Variations of this include the Additional Member System, and Alternative Vote Plus, in which voters cast votes for both single-member constituencies and multi-member constituencies; the allocation of seats in the multi-member constituencies is adjusted to achieve an overall seat allocation proportional to parties' vote share by taking into account the number of seats won by parties in the single-member constituencies.

Some MMP systems are insufficiently compensatory, and this may result in overhang seats, where parties win more seats in the constituency system than they would be entitled to based on their vote share. Some MMP systems have mechanism (another form of top-up) where additional seats are awarded to the other parties to balance out the effect of the overhang. Germany in 2024 passed a new election law where district overhang seats may be denied, over-riding the district result in the pursuit of overall proportionality.[12]

Vote linkage mixed systems are also compensatory, however they usually use different mechanism than seat linkage (top-up) method of MMP and usually aren't able to achieve proportional representation.

Some electoral systems feature a majority bonus system to either ensure one party or coalition gains a majority in the legislature, or to give the party receiving the most votes a clear advantage in terms of the number of seats. San Marino has a modified two-round system, which sees a second round of voting featuring the top two parties or coalitions if no party takes a majority of votes in the first round. The winner of the second round is guaranteed 35 seats in the 60-seat Grand and General Council.[13] In Greece the party receiving the most votes was given an additional 50 seats,[14] a system which was abolished following the 2019 elections.

Primary elections

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Primary elections are a feature of some electoral systems, either as a formal part of the electoral system or informally by choice of individual political parties as a method of selecting candidates, as is the case in Italy. Primary elections limit the possible adverse effect of vote splitting by ensuring that a party puts forward only one party candidate. In Argentina they are a formal part of the electoral system and take place two months before the main elections; any party receiving less than 1.5% of the vote is not permitted to contest the main elections.

In the United States, there are both partisan and non-partisan primary elections. In non-partisan primaries, the most-popular nominees, even if only one party, are put forward to the election.

Indirect elections

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Some elections feature an indirect electoral system, whereby there is either no popular vote, or the popular vote is only one stage of the election; in these systems the final vote is usually taken by an electoral college. In several countries, such as Mauritius or Trinidad and Tobago, the post of President is elected by the legislature. In others like India, the vote is taken by an electoral college consisting of the national legislature and state legislatures. In the United States, the president is indirectly elected using a two-stage process; a popular vote in each state elects members to the electoral college that in turn elects the President. This can result in a situation where a candidate who receives the most votes nationwide does not win the electoral college vote, as most recently happened in 2000 and 2016.

Proposed and lesser-used systems

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In addition to the current electoral systems used for political elections, there are numerous other systems that have been used in the past, are currently used only in private organizations (such as electing board members of corporations or student organizations), or have never been fully implemented.

Winner-take-all systems

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Among the Ranked systems these include Bucklin voting, the various Condorcet methods (Copeland's, Dodgson's, Kemeny-Young, Maximal lotteries, Minimax, Nanson's, Ranked pairs, Schulze), the Coombs' method and positional voting.

Among the Cardinal electoral systems, the most well known of these is range voting, where any number of candidates are scored from a set range of numbers. A very common example of range voting are the 5-star ratings used for many customer satisfaction surveys and reviews. Other cardinal systems include satisfaction approval voting, highest median rules (including the majority judgment), and the D21 – Janeček method where voters can cast positive and negative votes.

Historically, weighted voting systems were used in some countries. These allocated a greater weight to the votes of some voters than others, either indirectly by allocating more seats to certain groups (such as the Prussian three-class franchise), or by weighting the results of the vote. The latter system was used in colonial Rhodesia for the 1962 and 1965 elections. The elections featured two voter rolls (the 'A' roll being largely European and the 'B' roll largely African); the seats of the House Assembly were divided into 50 constituency seats and 15 district seats. Although all voters could vote for both types of seats, 'A' roll votes were given greater weight for the constituency seats and 'B' roll votes greater weight for the district seats. Weighted systems are still used in corporate elections, with votes weighted to reflect stock ownership.

Proportional systems

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Dual-member proportional representation is a proposed system with two members elected to represent each constituency, one with the most votes cast in the district and one to ensure proportionality of the combined results using votes cast in the district and elsewhere. Biproportional apportionment is a system where the total number of votes is used to calculate the number of seats each party is due, followed by a calculation of the constituencies in which the seats should be awarded in order to achieve the total due to them.

Proportional systems that use ranked choice voting include STV and STV variants, such as CPO-STV, Schulze STV and the Wright system.

Among the proportional voting systems that use rating are Thiele's voting rules and Phragmen's voting rule. A special case of Thiele's voting rules is Proportional Approval Voting. Some proportional systems that may be used with either ranking or rating include the Method of Equal Shares and the Expanding Approvals Rule.

Rules and regulations

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In addition to the specific method of electing candidates, electoral systems are also characterised by their wider rules and regulations, which are usually set out in a country's constitution or electoral law. Participatory rules determine candidate nomination and voter registration, in addition to the location of polling places and the availability of online voting, postal voting, and absentee voting. Other regulations include the selection of voting devices such as paper ballots, machine voting or open ballot systems, and consequently the type of vote counting systems, verification and auditing used.

Compulsory voting, enforced
Compulsory voting, not enforced
Compulsory voting, enforced (only men)
Compulsory voting, not enforced (only men)
Historical: the country had compulsory voting in the past.

Electoral rules place limits on suffrage and candidacy. Most countries's electorates are characterised by universal suffrage, but there are differences on the age at which people are allowed to vote, with the youngest being 16 and the oldest 21. People may be disenfranchised for a range of reasons, such as being a serving prisoner, being declared bankrupt, having committed certain crimes or being a serving member of the armed forces. Similar limits are placed on candidacy (also known as passive suffrage), and in many cases the age limit for candidates is higher than the voting age. A total of 21 countries have compulsory voting, although in some there is an upper age limit on enforcement of the law.[15] Many countries also have the none of the above option on their ballot papers.

In systems that use constituencies, apportionment or districting defines the area covered by each constituency. Where constituency boundaries are drawn has a strong influence on the likely outcome of elections in the constituency due to the geographic distribution of voters. Political parties may seek to gain an advantage during redistricting by ensuring their voter base has a majority in as many constituencies as possible, a process known as gerrymandering. Historically rotten and pocket boroughs, constituencies with unusually small populations, were used by wealthy families to gain parliamentary representation.

Some countries have minimum turnout requirements for elections to be valid. In Serbia this rule caused multiple re-runs of presidential elections, with the 1997 election re-run once and the 2002 elections re-run three times due insufficient turnout in the first, second and third attempts to run the election. The turnout requirement was scrapped prior to the fourth vote in 2004.[16] Similar problems in Belarus led to the 1995 parliamentary elections going to a fourth round of voting before enough parliamentarians were elected to make a quorum.[17]

Reserved seats are used in many countries to ensure representation for ethnic minorities, women, young people or the disabled. These seats are separate from general seats, and may be elected separately (such as in Morocco where a separate ballot is used to elect the 60 seats reserved for women and 30 seats reserved for young people in the House of Representatives), or be allocated to parties based on the results of the election; in Jordan the reserved seats for women are given to the female candidates who failed to win constituency seats but with the highest number of votes, whilst in Kenya the Senate seats reserved for women, young people and the disabled are allocated to parties based on how many seats they won in the general vote. Some countries achieve minority representation by other means, including requirements for a certain proportion of candidates to be women, or by exempting minority parties from the electoral threshold, as is done in Poland,[18] Romania and Serbia.[19]

History

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Pre-democratic

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In ancient Greece and Italy, the institution of suffrage already existed in a rudimentary form at the outset of the historical period. In the early monarchies it was customary for the king to invite pronouncements of his people on matters in which it was prudent to secure its assent beforehand. In these assemblies the people recorded their opinion by clamouring (a method which survived in Sparta as late as the 4th century BCE), or by the clashing of spears on shields.[20]

Early democracy

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Voting has been used as a feature of democracy since the 6th century BCE, when democracy was introduced by the Athenian democracy. However, in Athenian democracy, voting was seen as the least democratic among methods used for selecting public officials, and was little used, because elections were believed to inherently favor the wealthy and well-known over average citizens. Viewed as more democratic were assemblies open to all citizens, and selection by lot, as well as rotation of office.

Generally, the taking of votes was effected in the form of a poll. The practice of the Athenians, which is shown by inscriptions to have been widely followed in the other states of Greece, was to hold a show of hands, except on questions affecting the status of individuals: these latter, which included all lawsuits and proposals of ostracism, in which voters chose the citizen they most wanted to exile for ten years, were determined by secret ballot (one of the earliest recorded elections in Athens was a plurality vote that it was undesirable to win, namely an ostracism vote). At Rome the method which prevailed up to the 2nd century BCE was that of division (discessio). But the system became subject to intimidation and corruption. Hence a series of laws enacted between 139 and 107 BCE prescribed the use of the ballot (tabella), a slip of wood coated with wax, for all business done in the assemblies of the people. For the purpose of carrying resolutions a simple majority of votes was deemed sufficient. As a general rule equal value was made to attach to each vote; but in the popular assemblies at Rome a system of voting by groups was in force until the middle of the 3rd century BCE by which the richer classes secured a decisive preponderance.[20]

Most elections in the early history of democracy were held using plurality voting or some variant, but as an exception, the state of Venice in the 13th century adopted approval voting to elect their Great Council.[21]

The Venetians' method for electing the Doge was a particularly convoluted process, consisting of five rounds of drawing lots (sortition) and five rounds of approval voting. By drawing lots, a body of 30 electors was chosen, which was further reduced to nine electors by drawing lots again. An electoral college of nine members elected 40 people by approval voting; those 40 were reduced to form a second electoral college of 12 members by drawing lots again. The second electoral college elected 25 people by approval voting, which were reduced to form a third electoral college of nine members by drawing lots. The third electoral college elected 45 people, which were reduced to form a fourth electoral college of 11 by drawing lots. They in turn elected a final electoral body of 41 members, who ultimately elected the Doge. Despite its complexity, the method had certain desirable properties such as being hard to game and ensuring that the winner reflected the opinions of both majority and minority factions.[22] This process, with slight modifications, was central to the politics of the Republic of Venice throughout its remarkable lifespan of over 500 years, from 1268 to 1797.

Development of new systems

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Jean-Charles de Borda proposed the Borda count in 1770 as a method for electing members to the French Academy of Sciences. His method was opposed by the Marquis de Condorcet, who proposed instead the method of pairwise comparison that he had devised. Implementations of this method are known as Condorcet methods. He also wrote about the Condorcet paradox, which he called the intransitivity of majority preferences. However, recent research has shown that the philosopher Ramon Llull devised both the Borda count and a pairwise method that satisfied the Condorcet criterion in the 13th century. The manuscripts in which he described these methods had been lost to history until they were rediscovered in 2001.[23]

Later in the 18th century, apportionment methods came to prominence due to the United States Constitution, which mandated that seats in the United States House of Representatives had to be allocated among the states proportionally to their population, but did not specify how to do so.[24] A variety of methods were proposed by statesmen such as Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Daniel Webster. Some of the apportionment methods devised in the United States were in a sense rediscovered in Europe in the 19th century, as seat allocation methods for the newly proposed method of party-list proportional representation. The result is that many apportionment methods have two names; Jefferson's method is equivalent to the D'Hondt method, as is Webster's method to the Sainte-Laguë method, while Hamilton's method is identical to the Hare largest remainder method.[24]

The single transferable vote (STV) method was devised by Carl Andræ in Denmark in 1855 and in the United Kingdom by Thomas Hare in 1857. STV elections were first held in Denmark in 1856, and in Tasmania in 1896 after its use was promoted by Andrew Inglis Clark. Over the course of the 20th century, STV was subsequently adopted by Ireland and Malta for their national elections, in Australia for their Senate elections, as well as by many municipal elections around the world.[25]

Party-list proportional representation began to be used to elect European legislatures in the early 20th century, with Belgium the first to implement it for its 1900 general elections. Since then, proportional and semi-proportional methods have come to be used in almost all democratic countries, with most exceptions being former British and French colonies.

Single-winner innovations

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Perhaps influenced by the rapid development of multiple-winner STV, theorists published new findings about single-winner methods in the late 19th century. Around 1870, William Robert Ware proposed applying STV to single-winner elections, yielding instant-runoff voting (IRV). Soon, mathematicians began to revisit Condorcet's ideas and invent new methods for Condorcet completion; Edward J. Nanson combined the newly described instant runoff voting with the Borda count to yield a new Condorcet method called Nanson's method. Charles Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll, proposed the straightforward Condorcet method known as Dodgson's method. He also proposed a proportional representation system based on multi-member districts, quotas as minimum requirements to take seats, and votes transferable by candidates through proxy voting.[26]

Ranked voting electoral systems eventually gathered enough support to be adopted for use in government elections. In Australia, IRV was first adopted in 1893 and STV in 1896 (Tasmania). IRV continues to be used along with STV today.

In the United States, during the early 20th-century progressive era some municipalities began to use supplementary voting and Bucklin voting. However, a series of court decisions ruled Bucklin to be unconstitutional, while supplementary voting was soon repealed in every city that had implemented it.[27]

The use of game theory to analyze electoral systems led to discoveries about the effects of certain methods. Earlier developments such as Arrow's impossibility theorem had already shown the issues with ranked voting systems. Research led Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn to formally define and promote the use of approval voting in 1977.[28] Political scientists of the 20th century published many studies on the effects that the electoral systems have on voters' choices and political parties,[29][30][31] and on political stability.[32][33] A few scholars also studied which effects caused a nation to switch to a particular electoral system.[34][35][36][37][38]

Recent reform efforts

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A new push for electoral reform occurred in the 1990s, when proposals were made to replace plurality voting in governmental elections with other methods. New Zealand adopted mixed-member proportional representation for the 1996 general elections, having been approved in a 1993 referendum.[39] After plurality voting was a factor in the contested results of the 2000 presidential elections in the United States, various municipalities in the United States have begun to adopt instant-runoff voting. In 2020 a referendum adopting approval voting in St. Louis passed with 70% support.[40]

In Canada, three separate referendums on the single transferable vote have been held but producing no reform (in 2005, 2009, and 2018). The 2020 Massachusetts Question 2, which attempted to expand instant-runoff voting into Massachusetts, was defeated by a 10-point margin. In the United Kingdom, a 2011 referendum on IRV saw the proposal rejected by a two-to-one margin.

Repeals and backlash

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Some cities that adopted instant-runoff voting subsequently returned to first-past-the-post. Studies have found voter satisfaction with IRV falls dramatically the first time a race produces a result different from first-past-the-post.[41] The United Kingdom used a form of instant-runoff voting for local elections prior to 2022, before returning to first-past-the-post over concerns regarding the system's complexity.[42] Ranked-choice voting has been implemented in two states and banned in 10 others[43] (in addition to other states with constitutional prohibitions on the rule).

In November 2024, voters in the U.S. decided on 10 ballot measures related to electoral systems. Nine of the ballot measures aimed to change existing electoral systems, and voters rejected each proposal. One, in Missouri, which banned ranked-choice voting (RCV), was approved. Voters rejected ballot measures to enact ranked-choice voting and other electoral system changes in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon, as well as in Montana and South Dakota. In Alaska, voters rejected a ballot initiative 50.1% to 49.9% to repeal the state's top-four primaries and ranked-choice voting general elections, a system that was adopted via ballot measure in 2020.[44]

Comparison

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Electoral systems can be compared by different means:

  1. Define criteria mathematically, such that any electoral system either passes or fails. This gives perfectly objective results, but their practical relevance is still arguable.
  2. Define ideal criteria and use simulated elections to see how often or how close various methods fail to meet the selected criteria. This gives results which are practically relevant, but the method of generating the sample of simulated elections can still be arguably biased.
  3. Consider criteria that can be more easily measured using real-world elections, such as the Gallagher index, political fragmentation, voter turnout,[45][46] wasted votes, political apathy, complexity of vote counting, and barriers to entry for new political movements[47] and evaluate each method based on how they perform in real-world elections or evaluate the performance of countries with these electoral systems.
  4. A 2019 peer-reviewed meta-analysis based on 1,037 regressions in 46 studies finds that countries with majoritary kind of electoral rules would be more "fiscally virtuous" since they would exhibit better fiscal balances in the pre-electoral period, which may be explained by less spending distortion.[48] The meta-analysis also notes that countries with proportional kind of electoral rules would have bigger pre-electoral revenue cuts than other countries.[49]

Gibbard's theorem, built upon the earlier Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, to prove that for any single-winner deterministic voting methods, at least one of the following three properties must hold:

  1. The process is dictatorial, i.e. there is a single voter whose vote chooses the outcome.
  2. The process limits the possible outcomes to two options only.
  3. The process is not straightforward; the optimal ballot for a voter "requires strategic voting", i.e. it depends on their beliefs about other voters' ballots.

According to a 2005 survey of electoral system experts, their preferred electoral systems were in order of preference:[50]

  1. Mixed member proportional
  2. Single transferable vote
  3. Open list proportional
  4. Alternative vote
  5. Closed list proportional
  6. Single member plurality
  7. Runoffs
  8. Mixed member majoritarian
  9. Single non-transferable vote

Systems by elected body

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Head of state

Lower house or unicameral legislature

Upper house
  Election by legislature
  Election by electoral college
  Not elected (mostly monarchies)
  In transition
  No information
Single-member constituencies:

Multi-member constituencies, majoritarian:

  Block voting (BV) or mixed FPTP and BV
  Party block voting (PBV) or mixed FPTP and PBV
  Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) or mixed FPTP and SNTV
  Modified Borda count

Multi-member constituencies, proportional:

  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, closed list)
  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, open list for some parties)
  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, open list)
  Panachage (party-list PR, free list)
  Personalised proportional representation (party-list PR and FPTP)

Mixed majoritarian and proportional:

  Additional member system (party-list PR and FPTP seat linkage mixed system) (less proportional implementation of MMP)
  Parallel voting / mixed member majoritarian (party-list PR and FPTP)
  Parallel voting (party-list PR and TRS)
  Parallel voting (party-list PR and BV or PBV)
  Vote linkage mixed system or limited Seat linkage mixed system (party-list PR and FPTP) ((partially compensatory semi-proportional implementation of MMP) (party-list PR and FPTP)
  Majority bonus system (non-compensatory)
  Majority jackpot system (compensatory)

No relevant electoral system information:

  No elections
  Varies by state
  No information
Single-member constituencies:

Multi-member constituencies, majoritarian:

  Block voting (BV) or mixed FPTP and BV
  Party block voting (PBV) or mixed FPTP and PBV
  Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) or mixed FPTP and SNTV
  Mixed BV and SNTV

Multi-member constituencies, proportional:

  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, closed list)
  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, open list)
  Party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, partially-open list)
  Partially party-list proportional representation (party-list PR, closed list)

Mixed majoritarian and proportional:

  Parallel voting / Mixed-member majoritarian (party-list PR and FPTP)
  Parallel voting (party-list PR and BV or PBV)
  Parallel voting (party-list PR and SNTV)

Other:

  Varies by federal states, or constituency

Indirect election:

  Election by electoral college or local/regional legislatures
  Partly elected by electoral college or local/regional legislatures and appointed by head of state
  Partly elected by electoral college or local/regional legislatures, partly elected in single-member districts by FPTP, and partly appointed by head of state

No relevant electoral system information:

  No elections
  Appointed by head of state
  No information / In transition

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
An electoral system is the institutional framework specifying the procedures for voter participation, vote aggregation, and the conversion of votes into seats or offices, fundamentally shaping how electoral competition translates public preferences into governing authority. These systems encompass rules on districting, ballot structure, formulas, and seat allocation mechanisms, with major variants including majoritarian systems—such as first-past-the-post (FPTP), where candidates winning pluralities in single-member districts secure representation—and (PR) systems, which apportion seats according to parties' vote shares within multi-member districts. Mixed systems combine elements of both, allocating some seats majoritarian-style and others proportionally. Electoral systems exert causal influence on political outcomes through incentives they create for parties, voters, and candidates; empirical analyses demonstrate that majoritarian systems, per , systematically foster two-party competition and decisive majorities conducive to stable single-party governments, albeit often at the expense of representational proportionality, as evidenced by frequent disparities where parties garner disproportionate seat bonuses or penalties relative to votes. In contrast, PR systems promote multiparty fragmentation, enhancing minority representation and policy diversity but risking governmental instability via coalition dependencies, with cross-national data showing higher effective numbers of parties and greater legislative proportionality yet elevated veto player counts that can impede policy decisiveness. Scholarly consensus, drawn from comparative datasets spanning decades, underscores that no system universally maximizes democratic goods like and inclusivity, as trade-offs persist: majoritarian formats excel in legislative cohesion but amplify "wasted votes" and , while PR mitigates these via lower thresholds yet invites extremist party entry absent effective barriers. Debates over highlight systemic controversies, including vulnerabilities in district-based systems and threshold manipulations in PR that can exclude viable challengers, with causal evidence linking system choice to variance in —PR correlating with 5-10% higher participation rates—and , though interpretations vary due to factors like cultural norms. Proponents of reform often cite empirical regularities, such as PR's association with more equitable and ethnic representation, yet critics note elevated risks in fragmented systems lacking clear chains, urging designs balancing proportionality with effective thresholds informed by historical performance rather than ideological priors.

Fundamentals and Definitions

Core Components and Mechanisms

Electoral systems encompass the procedural rules that aggregate individual votes into collective decisions, primarily for selecting legislative representatives or executives. At their core, these systems hinge on three interrelated mechanisms: district magnitude, ballot structure, and . District magnitude specifies the number of seats allocated per , influencing whether outcomes favor concentration of power in single winners or broader representation across multiple seats. Ballot structure defines how voters express preferences, such as selecting candidates, parties, or options, which shapes the conveyed in votes. The electoral formula then processes these votes to apportion seats, employing methods ranging from simple plurality to complex proportional algorithms. District magnitude determines the scale of representation within a constituency. In systems with a magnitude of one, as in first-past-the-post elections, the candidate with the most votes claims the sole seat, often amplifying geographic majorities into legislative dominance. Multi-member districts with higher magnitudes, typically used in proportional representation systems, allow multiple winners, fostering outcomes closer to vote shares but potentially diluting direct voter-candidate links. Empirical analysis across democracies indicates that increasing magnitude correlates with greater party system fragmentation and enhanced minority representation, though it can complicate accountability by expanding the voter-to-representative ratio. For instance, national list systems effectively operate with nationwide magnitude, maximizing proportionality in countries like Israel, where the Knesset allocates all 120 seats proportionally. Ballot structure governs the form and flexibility of voter input. Categorical ballots restrict choices to a single candidate or party mark, prevalent in plurality systems for simplicity and speed in tallying. Preference ballots enable ranking multiple options, as in , allowing voters to indicate sequential choices and mitigate vote-splitting among similar candidates. Open-list structures in proportional systems permit voters to influence candidate order within parties by allocating votes to individuals, contrasting closed lists where party elites control sequencing. This component affects intraparty and personal vote cultivation; studies show open lists incentivize candidates to build individual reputations over party loyalty, evident in Brazil's flexible-list PR where voter preferences override party nominations for up to 70% of seats in some cycles. Electoral formula operationalizes vote-to-seat conversion, embodying the system's distributive logic. Plurality formulas award seats to vote-plurality holders, yielding disproportional results that favor large parties, as seen in the UK's where the 2019 election delivered Conservatives 56% of seats on 43% of votes. Proportional formulas, such as the , divide seats by vote quotients adjusted for party size, promoting seat-vote proportionality; Spain's uses d'Hondt with effective thresholds around 3-5% per district, balancing representation against extremism. Majority formulas, like two-round systems, require outright majorities via runoffs, enhancing legitimacy but increasing costs, as in France's 2024 legislative elections where 38% of races proceeded to second rounds. These formulas interact with magnitude and type; low-magnitude districts paired with plurality exacerbate disproportionality, while high-magnitude PR minimizes it, per cross-national from over 100 .

First-Principles Analysis of Electoral Design

Electoral systems fundamentally serve to aggregate diverse individual preferences into collective choices for , aiming to confer legitimacy on rulers through the while ensuring effective . From basic causal mechanisms, rules that determine winners from votes influence not only who holds power but also how politicians behave and voters strategize, as electoral incentives shape entry, positioning, and turnout. An optimal design would maximize accurate representation of voter distributions, enforce by linking outcomes to voter approval, and produce stable majorities capable of decisive action, yet these goals conflict due to the inherent heterogeneity of preferences and the need for simple, manipulable rules. A core challenge arises from : no voting procedure can simultaneously satisfy basic fairness axioms—such as (where unanimous preference for one option over another must be respected), (where adding a losing option does not reverse rankings of others), and non-dictatorship (no single voter decides alone)—across all possible preference profiles. Kenneth Arrow's 1951 impossibility theorem demonstrates this mathematically, proving that aggregating ordinal preferences into a social ordering inevitably fails one or more criteria when at least three options exist, implying that electoral designs must sacrifice perfect fairness for practicality. This theorem underscores why systems prioritize certain properties, like simplicity in , over comprehensive preference capture, leading to outcomes where minority views are systematically underrepresented. In single-member district plurality systems, causal incentives favor convergence toward the median voter: assuming single-peaked preferences along a policy spectrum, competing parties position platforms near the median to maximize votes, as predicted by Duncan Black's median voter theorem formalized in 1948. Empirical analyses confirm this moderation effect, with parties in such systems often adopting centrist policies to avoid vote-splitting, though deviations occur under high polarization or weak ideological constraints. However, this distorts proportionality, as votes for non-viable candidates yield no representation, incentivizing strategic abstention or defection per Duverger's law, which posits that plurality rules mechanically and psychologically foster two-party dominance by discouraging third-party viability—evidenced in U.S. congressional elections where effective parties rarely exceed two per district. Proportional representation (PR) systems address disproportionality by allocating seats roughly matching vote shares, enabling better reflection of voter diversity and reducing wasted votes, but they introduce trade-offs in accountability and stability. Larger districts dilute local ties, making it harder for voters to attribute policy failures to specific representatives, as coalitions often form post-election among ideologically disparate parties, obscuring responsibility. Studies of reforms, such as Italy's shift from mixed to PR-heavy systems in the 1990s, show increased legislative fragmentation—rising effective parties from around 3 to over 5—correlating with shorter government durations and policy gridlock, though PR enhances minority inclusion, as seen in higher women's representation in PR legislatures averaging 30% versus 20% in majoritarian ones. Conversely, majoritarian systems enhance vertical accountability, with single-member districts linking MPs directly to constituencies, evidenced by greater responsiveness to local economic shocks in first-past-the-post versus PR districts. Hybrid designs attempt to balance these by combining elements, such as mixed-member proportional systems allocating constituency seats alongside list seats for proportionality, but they often amplify complexities like dual candidacies that favor larger parties. Ultimately, no system escapes incentive misalignments: majoritarian rules risk unrepresentative majorities that ignore pluralistic demands, while PR courts multiparty volatility that undermines causal chains from voter intent to policy execution. Empirical cross-national data, spanning over 50 democracies since 1946, reveal that effective number of parties averages 2.1 under plurality but 3.5 under PR, with the latter correlating to 20-30% more frequent government collapses, highlighting the causal realism that design choices embed trade-offs between descriptive fidelity and governmental efficacy.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Ancient Systems

In ancient , following the reforms of in 508 BC, the democratic system combined elections with for selecting officials, emphasizing randomization to prevent and ensure broad participation among male citizens over 18. Most administrative roles, such as the 500-member Council of 500 (Boule) and archons, were filled by lot from pre-selected nominees, with only about 10% of positions—like the ten strategoi (generals)—elected by majority vote in the Ecclesia assembly, where eligible male citizens voted by show of hands or pebbles. This hybrid approach aimed to balance merit-based selection for military leadership with egalitarian randomization for routine governance, though participation was restricted to roughly 30,000-40,000 adult male citizens out of a population exceeding 300,000, excluding women, slaves, and metics. In Sparta, the electoral system featured annual selection of five ephors by the popular assembly (Apella) of male citizens over 30, using acclamation or shouting contests to gauge support, granting them oversight over kings and the elder council (Gerousia). Ephors handled executive, judicial, and fiscal duties, including declaring war on helots and prosecuting officials, reflecting a mixed oligarchic-democratic structure where elections checked hereditary monarchy but were limited to full Spartiates, a shrinking citizen class amid demographic decline. The Gerousia, comprising 28 elders over 60 plus two kings, was similarly selected by acclamation, prioritizing age and perceived wisdom over broad competition. The (509-27 BC) employed assemblies for electing magistrates, with the voting for higher offices like consuls and praetors in weighted blocks favoring wealthier centuries, while the handled lower magistrates such as quaestors via majority in geographic tribes. Elections occurred annually in July, using voice votes or later written tablets after 139 BC, under magisterial supervision, but was confined to freeborn male citizens, and procedural rigging by patrons (clientela) often skewed outcomes toward elites. Legislative power resided in these assemblies, passing laws (plebiscita) binding on all, though senatorial influence dominated. Pre-modern Europe saw limited electoral mechanisms amid feudal hierarchies, notably in the where, after 962 AD, secular and ecclesiastical princes elected the king-emperor, formalized by the into a college of seven electors (three archbishops and four lay princes) requiring a majority for coronation. This collegial system mitigated succession wars but entrenched princely autonomy, with elections often influenced by bribes or alliances rather than popular input, contrasting with hereditary monarchies elsewhere. Medieval like used complex balloting with multiple rounds and exclusions to select doges, minimizing factionalism among noble families.

Emergence in Early Democracies

The emergence of structured electoral systems in early modern democracies coincided with the transition from monarchical absolutism to representative governance in the late 18th century, beginning with the United States Constitution of 1787, which instituted direct popular elections for the every two years. This body, comprising 65 members initially apportioned by population, relied on single-member districts under plurality voting, where the candidate with the most votes won, though states initially varied in districting practices until federal laws standardized them in 1842. The presidential selection via the —538 electors allocated by congressional representation, requiring a majority of 270 for victory—served as a mediated mechanism to temper , chosen over pure popular vote or congressional appointment to balance state interests and prevent executive dependence on legislative majorities. Senators, until the 17th Amendment in 1913, were indirectly elected by state legislatures, underscoring an early preference for filtered representation to ensure elite stability. In revolutionary France, electoral innovations arose amid the upheaval, starting with the Estates-General convened on May 5, where delegates from the three estates (clergy, nobility, third estate) were chosen through local assemblies with varying property qualifications, initially voting by order rather than by head, which the third estate rejected to form the . The 1791 Constitution formalized a census excluding non-taxpaying "passive citizens," using a two-stage process: primary assemblies of active male citizens over 25 elected departmental electors, who then selected 745 deputies to the via plurality in multi-member constituencies, with one-third renewed annually. This system, applied in the October 1791 elections yielding 20,000 primary assemblies, prioritized property-holding males—about 4.3 million eligible out of 25 million population—to curb radicalism, though open ballots and indirect selection facilitated influence by local notables. Subsequent instability, including the 1792-1795 elected by universal male under plurality, highlighted the fragility of these designs amid civil unrest. Britain's path involved gradual adaptation of pre-existing practices into a more systematic framework, with the unreformed system before 1832 featuring plurality elections in 489 constituencies, including 200+ "rotten boroughs" with few voters returning two members, alongside larger county multi-member districts using open oral voting. The Reform Act of 1832, effective for the December election, enfranchised about 200,000 additional middle-class males (raising the electorate to roughly 18% of adult males), abolished pocket boroughs, and reapportioned seats proportionally to population—creating 65 new boroughs and 41 enlarged counties—while retaining first-past-the-post for single- and multi-member seats to favor stable majorities over fragmented representation. Absentee landlord influence persisted via non-resident voters, and no secret ballot existed until 1872, reflecting a causal emphasis on maintaining aristocratic checks against mass mobilization, as evidenced by the Act's passage amid 1831 riots threatening revolution. These early systems, predominantly plurality-based with restricted franchises, prioritized decisive outcomes and elite filtering over inclusivity or proportionality, driven by framers' empirical wariness of factionalism and direct popular volatility observed in ancient precedents and contemporary upheavals.

19th-Century Plurality Dominance

In the , predominated parliamentary elections throughout the , evolving from practices in multi-member constituencies to standardized single-member districts. The Great Reform Act of 1832 abolished many "rotten boroughs," redistributed seats based on population, and retained plurality as the method where candidates winning the most votes in a constituency secured , often in contests allowing voters to support multiple candidates up to the number of seats available—a form of block . This system persisted amid franchise expansions via the , which doubled the electorate to about 2 million by enfranchising urban working-class men, and the , introducing secret voting while maintaining plurality rules. The then divided all constituencies into 670 single-member districts, cementing first-past-the-post as the uniform approach, which favored major parties by rewarding concentrated vote shares without requiring absolute majorities. In the United States, plurality voting similarly defined congressional elections from the late 18th century onward, with House representatives chosen via single-member districts where the candidate with the most votes prevailed, as states implemented Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution granting them regulatory authority. Early elections, such as those in 1788-1789, employed this method across varying state timelines, and the Apportionment Act of 1842 federally mandated single-member districts for the House, standardizing plurality nationwide and eliminating at-large multi-member practices in most states. This approach accommodated rapid population growth and party competition, including third-party challenges like the Know-Nothings in the 1850s, but systematically advantaged candidates with plurality support in geographically defined areas, contributing to the two-party system's entrenchment by mid-century. Senate elections, indirect until the 17th Amendment in 1913, indirectly reinforced plurality dynamics through state-level legislatures. The dominance of plurality systems in these Anglo-American democracies arose from their administrative simplicity and compatibility with emerging representative institutions, requiring minimal infrastructure for vote tallying compared to majority-runoff or proportional methods. As electorates expanded— male reaching 60% by 1885, enfranchisement tied to and race restrictions—plurality enabled efficient contests without complex redistributions, though it often produced unrepresentative outcomes, such as the 1831 election where Whigs won 70% of seats on 57% of votes. British settler colonies like (post-1867 ) and (pre-federation colonial assemblies) adopted inherited plurality practices, extending the model's reach. Continental diverged, with employing two-round majority systems under the (1830-1848) and Second Republic (1848-1852), yet plurality's prevalence in English-speaking polities set a influencing global exports until proportional innovations gained traction post-1900.

20th-Century Proportional Innovations

Belgium enacted in 1899 establishing (PR) for national parliamentary elections, making it the first to adopt such a system at the national level; the reform took effect for the 1900 Chamber of Representatives election and utilized the of highest averages for seat allocation. The Catholic Party, then dominant, supported the change amid fears that unified socialist gains under the prior unequal plurality system could yield disproportionate left-wing majorities, allowing centrists to preserve influence through proportional seat shares rather than risk total exclusion in winner-take-all contests. introduced PR for its 1907 parliamentary elections—the first nationwide application to an entire unicameral legislature—employing multi-member districts with the to reflect the Grand Duchy's emerging multi-ethnic and ideological divisions following universal male in 1906. Following , PR spread rapidly across newly formed or reformed European democracies to accommodate fragmented electorates shaped by mass enfranchisement, ethnic pluralism, and ideological polarization. The Weimar Republic's 1919 constitution enshrined pure list PR with the and largest remainder formula for Reichstag elections, enabling representation for over a dozen parties but fostering chronic fragmentation, as evidenced by 29 parties securing seats in the 1932 election. Similar list-based systems were adopted in (1919), (1920), and (1920), often prioritizing inclusivity in multi-party contexts over stable majorities, though this contributed to coalition instability in states like where low effective thresholds permitted small extremist groups to gain legislative footholds. implemented the (), a preference-based PR variant, for its 1921 elections, allowing voters to rank candidates within multi-member districts and transferring surplus or eliminated ballots to achieve proportionality while preserving candidate-centric voting. Mid-century innovations addressed PR's tendencies toward excessive fragmentation and weak local accountability observed in interwar systems. West Germany's 1949 Basic Law established mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation for elections, blending single-member plurality constituencies (half the seats) with party lists for compensatory allocation to ensure overall proportionality, an approach designed to personalize representation amid post-Nazi aversion to pure lists. To mitigate splinter parties, added a 5% national vote threshold (or three direct seats) in 1953, reducing the effective number of parties from Weimar-era highs and stabilizing coalitions without fully abandoning proportionality. Other refinements included Sweden's 1909 adoption of modified Sainte-Laguë divisors for fairer small-party treatment compared to D'Hondt, and the ' nationwide single constituency with open lists from 1918, emphasizing pure proportionality but exposing governments to frequent shifts via small-party leverage. These developments reflected causal trade-offs: enhanced representativeness often at the expense of decisive , as empirical patterns in threshold-equipped systems showed fewer but more viable coalitions than unthresholded pure PR.

Post-2000 Reforms and Empirical Backlash

In the early , several democracies pursued electoral reforms to address perceived deficiencies in representation and stability, often shifting toward greater proportionality or alternative voting methods. enacted the Porcellum in , replacing a mixed with a predominantly closed-list (PR) framework for the , supplemented by majoritarian bonuses for coalitions exceeding 20% of votes, aiming to reduce fragmentation while maintaining party control over candidate selection. Subsequent tweaks, such as the 2015 Italicum for the , introduced runoff provisions and higher thresholds to consolidate majorities, but a 2016 constitutional to further centralize power and alter failed with 59% opposition, reflecting voter resistance to rapid changes amid ongoing instability. Other nations experimented with hybrid or ranked systems. South Korea's 2020 reform added 30 "satellite" districts allocated proportionally to nationwide party votes, increasing the National Assembly's PR component from 17% to about 27%, intended to enhance minority representation following the 2016 impeachment crisis. In the United States, states like (2018) and (2020) adopted ranked-choice voting (RCV) for federal and state elections via ballot initiatives, replacing plurality in primaries and general elections to mitigate vote-splitting and encourage broader coalitions. The United Kingdom's 2011 referendum rejected the alternative vote (AV) by 68% to 32%, preserving first-past-the-post (FPTP) after campaigns highlighted complexity and potential costs without proven benefits. Empirical analyses post-reform reveal backlash manifested in heightened government instability and voter dissatisfaction, particularly in PR-heavy systems. Cross-national studies from 2000 to 2020 indicate that PR systems average cabinet durations of 1.5–2 years, compared to 3–4 years in majoritarian systems, correlating with frequent collapses in fragmented like Italy's (nine governments from 2001–2022) and Israel's (five elections in four years, 2019–2022). This instability stems from coalition arithmetic favoring small parties, enabling vetoes and policy gridlock, as evidenced by Italy's 4.8 average effective parties in versus 2.5 in FPTP , per Gallagher indices. Voter surveys underscore representational trade-offs fueling backlash. In Pew's 2024 global poll across 24 countries, majorities prioritized for fairness, yet post-PR implementations like South Korea's saw approval ratings drop amid perceived via closed lists. Ranked systems faced legal and practical pushback; Alaska's 2022 RCV led to 2024 repeal efforts after disputes over exhausted ballots and perceived delays in results, with turnout analyses showing no significant gains in participation. Longitudinal data from 2000–2025 link PR fragmentation to populist surges—e.g., effective thresholds below 5% allowing extremes in and —contrasting majoritarian suppression of fringes, though the former amplifies causal policy volatility without proportional governance gains. These patterns affirm a first-principles tension: heightened inclusivity erodes decisive action, prompting reversion pressures in polarized eras.

Types of Electoral Systems

Single-Winner Plurality Systems

Single-winner plurality systems, also known as first-past-the-post (FPTP), determine the winner in each by awarding victory to the candidate who receives the most votes, without requiring an absolute majority over 50%. Voters select one candidate on the ballot, and the tally involves straightforward counting of first-preference votes, with the highest total securing the seat. This mechanism operates within single-member districts, where geographic boundaries define constituencies, ensuring each area elects exactly one representative. FPTP remains widely used for legislative elections in several major democracies, including the , the , Canada's House of Commons, and India's . In the UK, for example, it has governed parliamentary elections since the , with the system applied uniformly across 650 constituencies as of the 2024 general election. Similarly, the US employs it for all 435 House seats and most state legislatures, reinforcing its status as the default in Anglo-Saxon political traditions. Approximately 48 countries utilize FPTP for at least part of their national assemblies, though often alongside other methods for upper houses or local elections. The system's design promotes simplicity in both voter participation and administrative execution, requiring minimal infrastructure beyond ballot counting and minimal training for officials. It incentivizes broad geographic support within districts, as fragmented votes among competitors can lead to victories on slim pluralities—potentially as low as 30-40% in multi-candidate races. This dynamic often results in stable single-party governments, as the winner's premium amplifies leading parties' seat shares, facilitating decisive policymaking without coalition dependencies. In Canada, FPTP contributed to majority governments in 14 of 22 federal elections between 1945 and 2019, enabling swift legislative action compared to fragmented outcomes in proportional systems. However, FPTP frequently yields disproportionate representation between national vote shares and parliamentary seats, magnifying victories for front-runners while marginalizing smaller parties with dispersed support. For instance, in the UK's 2019 election, the Conservative Party secured 56% of seats with 43.6% of votes, while the Liberal Democrats gained 11% of votes but only 1.7% of seats. This discrepancy arises from the "wasted vote" effect, where support for non-viable candidates yields no representation, encouraging over sincere preferences and potentially suppressing —estimated at 5-10% lower in plurality systems versus ranked alternatives in comparative studies. Additionally, the spoiler phenomenon, where similar candidates split votes, has altered outcomes, as seen in the 2000 US presidential election where Nader's 2.7% vote share in arguably tipped the state to by 537 votes. From a causal perspective, FPTP enforces by structurally disadvantaging third parties, fostering effective two-party competition through vote concentration incentives and the fear of vote-splitting, as observed empirically across FPTP jurisdictions where third-party seat shares rarely exceed 5-10% despite higher vote totals. Proponents argue this cultivates strong constituency links, with representatives directly accountable to local majorities, reducing policy gridlock evident in multi-party proportional setups. Critics, however, contend it undermines broader democratic legitimacy by underrepresenting minorities and regional interests, prompting reforms like those piloted in (abandoned FPTP in ) and ongoing debates in the UK following the 2011 rejecting the alternative vote. Empirical analyses indicate FPTP correlates with higher government durability but lower policy responsiveness to diverse electorates, with single-party dominance sometimes entrenching incumbency advantages through district boundary adjustments.

Single-Winner Majority and Ranked Systems

Single-winner systems require the elected candidate to secure an absolute —more than 50%—of votes cast, addressing the limitations of plurality systems where winners can prevail with minimal support amid fragmented fields. These systems employ mechanisms such as sequential ballots or preference redistribution to simulate or achieve thresholds, thereby reducing the spoiler effect where similar candidates split votes. Empirical evidence from presidential contests indicates they often consolidate support behind frontrunners in runoffs, as seen in France's 2017 election where obtained 66.1% in the second round against . The , a prevalent method, conducts an initial plurality vote; if no reaches 50% plus one vote, a runoff occurs between the top two contenders, allowing voters to reassess without rankings. This approach is utilized for executive elections in over 30 countries, including and Poland, where it ensures decisive outcomes but incurs higher costs from dual voting rounds—estimated at 20-50% more than single-ballot systems in logistical expenses. For legislative seats, applies it to single-member districts in the , with 289 of 577 seats decided in the first round in 2022 when majorities were achieved, while others proceeded to runoffs favoring established parties through tactical withdrawals. Critics note that top-two runoffs can disadvantage third-place candidates with broad but non-concentrated appeal, potentially entrenching duopolies, though data from French assemblies show reduced extreme outcomes compared to pure plurality. Ranked-choice voting (RCV), also known as (IRV), enables outcomes in a single by having voters order preferences; the lowest-polling is eliminated iteratively, redistributing votes until a emerges. Implemented for Australia's since the 1919 federal election, it has facilitated preference flows that elect with 50-60% final support, as in the 2022 contest where Labor's benefited from 75% of Greens preferences in key seats, yielding a despite only 32.6% first-preference votes. In the United States, jurisdictions like (since 2018 for congressional races) and (2021 mayoral) report exhaustion rates of 3-15% where incomplete rankings discard , potentially skewing results toward higher first-preference . Academic analyses, including simulations from Yale's Institution for Social and Policy Studies, find IRV promotes platform convergence toward median voter preferences in multi- fields, though it remains susceptible to strategic ranking truncation and fails to guarantee Condorcet winners— preferred head-to-head against all others—in up to 10% of scenarios per computational models. Comparative studies of these systems reveal mixed causal impacts on representation: two-round methods correlate with higher reelection rates (e.g., 70% in French runoffs) due to advantages in second rounds, while IRV in Australian data shows increased minor-party viability without proportional seat shares, fostering coalition-like preference bargaining. under IRV remains stable or slightly elevated in non-compulsory settings like U.S. cities, with no consistent evidence of confusion reducing participation below plurality levels, though complex ballots demand higher civic literacy. Both variants prioritize decisive single-winner legitimacy over proportionality, aligning with first-past-the-post in district-level but incurring risks of non-monotonicity, where ranking a higher can paradoxically harm their chances under IRV redistribution. Usage persists in executive and unicameral contexts for its clarity in producing mandate-bearing victors, despite academic preferences for proportional alternatives in multi-party environments.

Proportional Representation Systems

Proportional representation (PR) systems allocate legislative seats to or candidates in approximate proportion to the share of votes they receive, contrasting with majoritarian systems that award seats to winners of pluralities or majorities in single-member districts. These systems typically operate in multi-member districts or nationwide constituencies, enabling smaller parties to gain representation if they surpass electoral thresholds, which range from 1% in to 5% in for national lists. PR emerged as a response to the disproportionality of first-past-the-post systems, where parties can win majorities of seats with minorities of votes, as seen in the UK's 2005 election where Labour secured 55% of seats with 35% of votes. The primary variants of pure PR include and the (STV). In , voters select a party (in closed lists) or rank candidates within lists (in open lists), with seats distributed via divisor methods such as or Sainte-Laguë. The , used in and , divides each party's vote total by successive integers (1, 2, 3, etc.) and awards seats to the highest resulting quotients, inherently favoring larger parties by making it harder for small parties to compete on later divisors. Sainte-Laguë, employed in and , uses odd-numbered divisors (1, 3, 5, etc.), which reduces bias against smaller parties compared to , as evidenced by simulations showing Sainte-Laguë allocating 1-2% more seats to parties under 10% vote share. STV, a candidate-centered PR system, requires voters to rank candidates in multi-member districts, with winners needing to meet a Droop quota calculated as votes divided by seats plus one. Surplus votes from elected candidates and votes from eliminated lowest-polling candidates are transferred at reduced values until all seats are filled, promoting proportionality while allowing voter preference sequencing to influence outcomes. Ireland has used STV for Dáil Éireann elections since 1921, resulting in effective minority party representation, such as the Green Party holding 12 seats (7% of total) with 4.4% of first-preference votes in 2020. Empirical data indicate PR systems achieve higher vote-seat proportionality, with Gallagher indices (measuring disproportionality) averaging 3.5 for PR nations versus 10.2 for majoritarian ones across 50 democracies from 1946-2017. However, PR often yields fragmented legislatures and coalition governments, correlating with shorter government durations—averaging 1.5 years in under list PR from 1948-1992—due to negotiation complexities among diverse parties. Thresholds mitigate extreme fragmentation, as in the ' shift from no threshold (leading to 12+ parties in 1977) to a 0.67% effective threshold post-1956, stabilizing party systems without fully eliminating small-party influence. Countries like (party-list with 2% threshold) and exemplify PR's balance of representation and governability, though critics note causal links to policy gridlock in highly proportional setups lacking strong majoritarian elements.

Mixed and Hybrid Systems

Mixed electoral systems combine elements of majoritarian and formulas to allocate legislative seats, typically involving voters casting separate ballots or votes for candidates and party lists. In these systems, a portion of seats—often around half—is filled by plurality or winners in geographic constituencies, providing direct local representation, while the remainder are distributed proportionally via party lists to reflect broader vote shares. This dual structure aims to mitigate the winner-take-all distortions of pure majoritarian systems while preserving constituency links absent in full list PR. Approximately 20 countries employ mixed systems for their lower houses as of 2023, including variants that achieve overall proportionality and others that do not. The primary distinction lies between compensatory mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems and non-compensatory parallel or majoritarian variants. In MMP, list seat allocations adjust to compensate for district disproportionalities, ensuring the total chamber outcome mirrors national party vote proportions, subject to thresholds like Germany's 5% nationwide or three direct seats. Germany's MMP, implemented since its 1949 , exemplifies this: in the 2021 Bundestag election, the Social Democrats secured 206 of 736 seats via a combination of 206 wins and proportional adjustments, yielding near-proportional results despite local majoritarian elements. New Zealand adopted MMP in 1996 following a 1993 rejecting first-past-the-post; it has produced governments and elevated minor parties like the Greens, with 5% thresholds preventing fragmentation, though overhang and underhang seats have expanded size to maintain proportionality. Parallel voting systems, by contrast, allocate list seats independently without compensation, resulting in dual disproportionalities that favor large parties. has used this since 1994 reforms, with 289 single-member districts and 176 proportional seats in its ; the 2021 election saw the Liberal Democratic Party gain 261 seats from 47.8% district votes but only 34% list support, amplifying majoritarian biases. Hybrid systems, sometimes overlapping with mixed, include additional member systems like Scotland's, where list seats supplement but do not fully offset constituency results, leading to moderate disproportionality. Empirical analyses indicate MMP variants deliver higher proportionality indices—Germany's averaged 2.5 from 1953-2021—compared to parallel systems' 5-10 range, yet both face challenges like voter confusion from dual votes and strategic candidate placement. Critics note that mixed systems can incentivize "gaming" behaviors, such as parties nominating weak district candidates to maximize list gains or voters splitting tickets strategically, complicating accountability. In New Zealand, post-1996 turnout initially dipped to 80% before stabilizing, attributed partly to system complexity, while Germany's stable coalitions contrast with rising small-party thresholds straining the model amid 2020s fragmentation. Proponents argue these systems empirically enhance representation without pure PR's party dominance, as district ties foster legislator responsiveness to local issues, evidenced by higher constituent contact rates in MMP districts versus list-only PR. However, causal evidence links mixed systems to moderate government stability, with New Zealand's frequent coalitions since 1996 averaging 3-year terms, balancing inclusivity against decisive majorities.

Indirect and Non-Standard Variants

Indirect electoral systems involve voters selecting an intermediate body of electors or representatives, who then cast votes for the final officeholder or legislative seats, rather than directly choosing candidates. This approach, rooted in hierarchical voting, introduces a layer of representation intended to moderate direct popular input, balance regional or institutional interests, and promote among intermediaries. A prominent modern example is the through the , created by the in 1787. States appoint electors numbering equal to their congressional delegation—538 total nationwide—with a of 270 required for victory. Voters cast ballots for slates of pledged electors in , who convene in mid-December to formally vote; this process has produced five instances where the winner lacked the national popular vote , including 2000 ( over ) and 2016 ( over ). Other indirect mechanisms persist for upper legislative chambers or heads of state in federal systems. Prior to the 17th Amendment's ratification on April 8, 1913, U.S. Senators were chosen indirectly by state legislatures, a method designed to represent state but prone to deadlocks and scandals. In contemporary contexts, India's () seats are filled indirectly via proportional voting by state assemblies, ensuring federal input; as of 2023, it comprises 245 members, with 233 elected this way. Similarly, India's President is selected by an electoral college of national and state legislators, as demonstrated in the July 2022 election of . Germany's Federal President is elected indirectly by the Federal Convention, consisting of members plus an equal number of state delegates, requiring an absolute majority; secured a second term on February 13, 2022, with 1,045 of 1,496 votes. Such systems prioritize institutional consensus over direct plebiscites. Non-standard variants encompass unconventional methods diverging from plurality, majority, or proportional norms, often tested locally to address specific representation gaps. , where voters select all acceptable candidates and the one with most approvals wins, has been adopted in , for municipal elections starting in June 2020, aiming to reduce vote-splitting without ranking. , allowing multiple votes to be concentrated on fewer candidates in multi-seat races, was used historically in U.S. locales like Chicago's school board to enhance minority voice, though largely phased out by the 1990s amid Voting Rights Act shifts toward single-member districts. These variants, implemented in over 260 U.S. jurisdictions as of 2021, reflect experimental adaptations but remain marginal globally.

Procedural Rules and Regulations

Voter Eligibility and Franchise Expansion

Voter eligibility in electoral systems typically requires individuals to meet criteria such as minimum age, or residency status, mental competency, and absence of certain criminal convictions. In most democracies, the standard voting age is 18 years, though some countries like and permit voting at 16 for certain elections. is a near-universal requirement for national elections, with residency periods varying from 30 days to several months to ensure local ties. Mental incapacity, often determined by , and active incarceration or convictions can lead to disenfranchisement in specific jurisdictions. The franchise historically expanded from restricted groups—primarily property-owning white males in early modern democracies—to broader adult populations through incremental reforms. In the United States, initial state constitutions around limited voting to white male property owners or taxpayers, comprising roughly 6-10% of the population. By the 1820s-1850s, most states eliminated property requirements, extending suffrage to nearly all white adult males via Jacksonian-era reforms. Racial barriers persisted until the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 prohibited denial of voting rights based on race, though enforcement was weak until the , which targeted discriminatory practices like literacy tests. Women's suffrage marked a major expansion, beginning with New Zealand granting women the vote in 1893, the first self-governing country to do so. In the United States, the Nineteenth Amendment ratified on August 18, 1920, secured women's right to vote nationwide, following state-level adoptions starting with in 1869. Globally, full women's enfranchisement occurred in (1906), the (1918 for those over 30, fully in 1928), and (1944), with as the last nation to grant it in 2015. These changes doubled eligible electorates in many nations, correlating with increased turnout but also shifts in policy outcomes toward expanded welfare states, as documented in empirical studies of suffrage extensions. The voting age was lowered to 18 in many countries during the mid-20th century, driven by youth involvement in and drafts. In the United States, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified July 1, 1971, set the national minimum at 18 following the Supreme Court's decision, which had partially enabled it for federal elections. Prior to this, the age was 21 in most places; post-amendment, youth turnout initially rose but stabilized lower than older cohorts. Internationally, countries like (1947) and (1946) preceded this trend, while some retain 21 for certain offices. Criminal disenfranchisement varies widely, with the imposing the most severe restrictions: as of 2022, over 4.4 million individuals—mostly felons—were barred from voting across states, including permanent loss in 11 states for certain crimes. Globally, only about 45% of surveyed countries automatically disenfranchise imprisoned individuals, and most restore rights post-sentence; nations like and members generally permit prisoner voting, viewing it as a fundamental right under frameworks. Reforms in places like (2018 4) have restored rights to over 1.4 million ex-felons, though subsequent laws added fees or requirements. Verification of eligibility often involves voter ID laws, enacted in 36 U.S. states requiring photo or non-photo identification to prevent , with strict photo ID in 18 states. These measures ensure compliance with criteria like , as non-citizen voting remains illegal federally, though rare instances occur without robust checks. Expansions continue debated, with proposals for non-citizen local voting in some municipalities, but national systems prioritize citizen-only franchises to maintain .

Districting, Apportionment, and Boundary Manipulation

Districting refers to the process of dividing geographic areas into electoral districts for legislative representation, typically adjusted decennially to account for population shifts revealed by . In systems, such as first-past-the-post, each district elects one representative, requiring boundaries that ideally ensure equal population sizes to uphold the principle of "one person, one vote," as affirmed by the in Baker v. Carr (1962) and subsequent rulings like Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), which mandated districts with no more than a 10-15% deviation in population for congressional seats. Internationally, districting varies; for instance, in the , the Boundary Commissions redraw constituencies based on population data every eight to twelve years, aiming for parity within 5% while preserving local ties. Apportionment precedes or accompanies districting by allocating a fixed number of seats among larger units, such as states or provinces, proportional to their populations. , the mandates apportioning the 435 seats among states using the equal proportions method (Huntington-Hill), applied after each decennial ; for example, following the 2020 , gained two seats (to 38 total) while New York lost one (to 26), reflecting migration-driven growth. This method prioritizes states by a priority value derived from population divided by the of current and next seat allocations, minimizing relative disparities. Other nations employ similar formulas; Germany's uses a for party-list seats atop constituencies, while Japan's combines single-member districts with proportional allocation via the . Historically, U.S. evolved from the 1790 , which allocated seats based on the for enslaved persons, to the , capping membership at 435. Boundary manipulation, commonly termed , exploits districting to favor incumbents or parties by concentrating (packing) opponents into few districts or dispersing (cracking) them across many to dilute influence. The term originated in 1812 , where Elbridge Gerry's party redrew lines to resemble a , securing Democratic-Republican control despite slim statewide majorities. Empirically, such tactics distort outcomes: analysis of U.S. state legislatures post-2010 redistricting showed Republican-drawn maps yielding 10-15% more seats than vote shares warranted in states like and , per efficiency gap metrics measuring "wasted" votes. Conversely, Democratic-controlled processes, as in (2011), packed Republicans into one district, flipping three seats. Cross-partisan studies confirm gerrymandering reduces electoral competition, with affected districts 20-30% less likely to flip parties, entrenching polarization by rewarding extremes over voters. Mitigation efforts include independent commissions, which empirical data indicate enhance competitiveness without eliminating all bias. California's Citizens Redistricting Commission, established by Proposition 11 (2008), produced 2021 maps correlating with 52% fewer incumbent-party wins and districts twice as likely to be competitive (within 5% vote margin) compared to legislative-drawn alternatives. Similar bodies in (2018) and (2000) yielded maps closer to proportional outcomes, though partisan litigation persists; for instance, New York's 2022 court rejection of a Democratic-favoring plan underscored judicial oversight's role. Mathematical criteria like (Polsbky score) or core retention (preserving voting blocs) guide neutral algorithms, but implementation varies, with commissions outperforming legislatures in reducing seats-votes divergence by 5-10% on average. Despite reforms, manipulation risks endure in non-commission states, where controlling parties hold de facto power, as evidenced by 2021 battles in 15 U.S. states delaying maps via lawsuits.

Ballot Design, Voting Methods, and Administration

Ballot design encompasses the layout, , and instructional elements of voting forms to facilitate accurate voter intent expression. Core principles emphasize through lowercase lettering, consistent alignment of candidates with selection marks, and of races to prevent errors. Poor designs, such as ambiguous punch-card alignments or split contests separating names from vote targets, elevate residual vote rates—undervotes or overvotes—by up to 2-4% in affected jurisdictions, potentially swaying close races. The 2000 U.S. presidential election in Palm Beach County exemplified this, where a "butterfly" ballot's offset chads led to approximately 3,000-5,000 unintended votes for Reform Party Pat instead of Democrat Al , amid a statewide margin of 537 votes. Voting methods determine how preferences are recorded, ranging from manual paper ballots marked with ovals or checkboxes to electronic interfaces like direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines or ballot-marking devices (BMDs) that produce verifiable paper trails. Optical-scan systems, used in over 80% of U.S. jurisdictions as of , scan hand-marked paper ballots for tabulation, offering auditability if paper records are retained. Administration integrates these with modalities such as in-person voting at precincts, periods (available in 47 U.S. states by 2024), and absentee or ballots, which comprised 46% of votes in the U.S. but require secure chain-of-custody protocols to mitigate risks. Voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), mandated in 35 U.S. states post-Help America Vote Act of 2002, enable post- audits, reducing unverifiable electronic-only risks. Electoral administration oversees implementation by designated officials, often state-level chief election officers in federal systems like the U.S., where 33 states vest authority in the secretary of state. Best practices, per international standards, include transparent procurement of certified equipment adhering to guidelines like the U.S. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 adopted in , which prioritize software independence and resilience against cyber threats. Polling site management demands sufficient machines (e.g., one per 400-500 voters to limit waits under 30 minutes), multilingual instructions, and accessibility for disabled voters under laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act. Globally, bodies like the OSCE recommend observer access and real-time discrepancy reporting to uphold integrity, as residual votes from administrative lapses averaged 1.5% in observed European elections from 2015-2020.

Certification, Recounts, and Integrity Safeguards

Election certification represents the culminating step in validating results, wherein electoral management bodies (EMBs) or jurisdictional officials aggregate precinct-level tallies, reconcile voter records against ballots issued and counted, and formally declare winners. This process, governed by statutory deadlines to ensure orderly power transitions, requires public announcement of certified outcomes and provision of tally sheets to candidates, parties, and observers. International guidelines stipulate secure ballot storage post-certification to facilitate legal challenges, with results effective upon official promulgation. Recounts provide a targeted verification mechanism, entailing re-tabulation—often manual for ballots or re-scanning for optical systems—triggered by statutory margins (e.g., under 0.5% to 2% of votes in various jurisdictions) or petitions filed within fixed periods, typically 3 to 10 days post-initial count. Procedures must delineate responsibilities, observer access, and resolution of variances, such as through by EMBs or courts; full recounts occur rarely, as partial sampling or audits often suffice, and historical data show they alter outcomes in fewer than 1% of cases due to low tabulation errors in robust systems. Globally, standards emphasize expeditious handling to avoid disenfranchisement, with appeals integrated into dispute frameworks. Integrity safeguards form multilayered protections against manipulation, encompassing pre-vote voter eligibility checks via registration databases, in-person biometric or ID verification to curb impersonation, and randomized assignment of polling officials from diverse parties. During tabulation, chain-of-custody logs track ballots, while transparent aggregation posts disaggregated results publicly at each level to enable cross-verification. Post-election, risk-limiting audits statistically extrapolate from hand-counted samples to affirm electronic tallies with high confidence (e.g., 95%+), complemented by forensic reviews in disputes; paper ballots or verifiable voter-marked records underpin these, as electronic-only systems risk unverifiable discrepancies. Empirical assessments across democracies reveal fraud incidence below 0.0001% of votes where such protocols prevail, underscoring causal efficacy in causal realism terms—deterring opportunism through observability and verifiability—though implementation varies, with lapses in oversight correlating to isolated irregularities.

Comparative Evaluation

Criteria for Assessing System Effectiveness

Assessing the effectiveness of electoral systems involves evaluating their performance against empirical benchmarks derived from political outcomes, voter behavior, and governance quality. Core criteria include proportionality, which quantifies the alignment between vote shares and seat allocations using metrics like the ( deviation); governmental stability, measured by government duration and legislative coherence; , encompassing both collective (party/government) and individual (local representative) linkages; and representativeness, covering substantive policy reflection and descriptive inclusion of demographic groups. These criteria often entail trade-offs, as systems optimizing for proportionality, such as list , may fragment legislatures and prolong negotiations, whereas majoritarian systems like first-past-the-post enhance decisiveness but distort representation. Proportionality gauges how equitably votes translate into seats, minimizing wasted votes and bias toward larger parties. In proportional systems, district magnitudes exceeding five seats typically yield lower disproportionality, with thresholds (e.g., Germany's 5% national hurdle) curbing fragmentation while preserving fairness; empirical data from post-1990 transitions show list PR achieving Gallagher indices below 5 in nations like , versus over 10 in plurality systems like the UK's 2019 election (18.9 index). This criterion prioritizes empirical vote-seat congruence over geographic linkage, though critics note it can entrench parties disconnected from local concerns. Governmental stability and efficiency assesses the capacity to form durable executives aligned with electoral majorities, often favoring systems producing clear winners. Majoritarian systems correlate with longer government tenures—averaging 1,200 days in single-member plurality setups versus 800 in pure PR across democracies from 1946–2010—due to reduced coalition veto points, though PR with high thresholds (e.g., New Zealand's MMP since 1996) mitigates instability by limiting effective parties to four or fewer. Instability risks rise in low-threshold PR, as seen in Italy's pre-1994 average cabinet duration of 1.5 years amid 10+ parties. Accountability evaluates voter ability to sanction performers, distinguishing government-level (policy responsiveness) from representative-level (personal ties) mechanisms. Single-member foster localized accountability by enabling constituent pressure on incumbents, evidenced by higher turnover in FPTP systems during economic downturns (e.g., U.S. House midterms post-2008); PR variants like closed lists weaken this via party control, reducing individual replacement rates to under 20% in South Africa's 2004 election. Open-list PR or partially restores agency, allowing preference votes to influence rankings, as in Ireland's consistent 10–15% independent election since 1980s. Representativeness extends to descriptive and substantive dimensions, including minority inclusion and policy mirroring. PR systems outperform majoritarian ones in electing women and ethnic minorities—South Africa's list PR yielded 33% female MPs in 2004, versus 9% in India's FPTP—via larger districts and quotas, though substantive gains depend on party incentives rather than mechanics alone. Local representation in SMDs ensures geographic voice but underrepresents dispersed groups, with empirical studies showing PR reducing regional fiefdoms and enhancing cross-ethnic voting in divided societies like post-apartheid . , a proxy for perceived meaningfulness, averages 5–10% higher in PR nations (e.g., 80%+ in ) due to fewer wasted votes. Additional criteria include administrative sustainability (e.g., PR's lower boundary needs but higher counting complexity) and conflict mitigation, where inclusive systems incentivize conciliatory platforms over zero-sum appeals. Effectiveness ultimately hinges on context—societal fragmentation favors PR's inclusivity, while homogeneous polities benefit from majoritarian decisiveness—with no universal optimum, as trade-offs reflect causal tensions between inclusivity and efficacy. Empirical cross-national data underscore that hybrid systems often balance these, achieving moderate scores across indices.

Empirical Outcomes on Stability and Representation

Majoritarian electoral systems, such as first-past-the-post (FPTP), often generate seat distributions that deviate substantially from vote shares, leading to higher disproportionality as measured by indices like the least squares index (LSq). For instance, FPTP elections in countries like the and have produced LSq values exceeding 10 in multiple instances, with the 2024 UK general election yielding an LSq of approximately 12.2, where the winning party secured 63.7% of seats on 33.7% of votes. In contrast, pure (PR) systems maintain LSq values typically between 2 and 5 across elections, ensuring seats more closely mirror voter preferences and enhancing minority representation without the "wasted vote" effect prevalent in single-member districts. PR systems empirically outperform majoritarian ones in representational equity, particularly for smaller parties and diverse electorates, as quantified by lower average Gallagher indices (a squared variant of LSq emphasizing larger deviations). Data from post-1945 democracies show PR nations averaging Gallagher scores under 4, compared to over 8 in FPTP systems, reducing the exclusion of ideological minorities and fostering policy pluralism. This proportionality correlates with higher and satisfaction in PR contexts, though causal links remain debated due to confounding factors like cultural fragmentation. On stability, majoritarian systems facilitate decisive outcomes and longer cabinet durations by manufacturing artificial majorities, minimizing coalition negotiations. Arend Lijphart's analysis of 36 democracies from 1946 to 2010 found majoritarian systems averaging fewer annual government changes (0.5-1 per term) and cabinet durations exceeding 1,000 days, versus PR systems' multiparty coalitions averaging under 500 days amid higher fragmentation risks. Models incorporating electoral district magnitude and seat product further predict shorter mean cabinet durations in high-magnitude PR systems (effective parties >3), validated against historical data from and beyond, where coalition breakdowns occur 20-30% more frequently than in FPTP single-party rule. PR's coalitional nature can undermine policy continuity, with empirical evidence from fragmented systems like pre-1994 showing cabinets lasting under 1.5 years on average, though reforms raising effective thresholds (e.g., 5% in ) mitigate this, yielding durations comparable to some majoritarian cases at 800-900 days. Conversely, majoritarian stability comes at the cost of periodic "wrong winner" paradoxes, where vote-plurality losers gain legislative control, as in the UK's 34 instances since 1906. Cross-national regressions controlling for economic variables confirm the : PR enhances inclusivity but elevates veto player counts, prolonging , while majoritarian setups prioritize executiveness over broad representation.

Cross-National Case Studies

In the United States, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system for and elections has empirically reinforced a two-party duopoly, consistent with , which posits that single-member districts with discourage third-party viability through and mechanical exclusion of smaller vote shares from seat allocation. This dynamic contributed to high disproportionality in the 2020 congressional elections, where the —a least-squares measure of vote-seat deviation—exceeded 12, reflecting widespread "wasted votes" for non-viable candidates and amplifying the seat bonus for the two major parties despite fragmented voter preferences. Consequently, legislative stability has varied, with periods of unified government enabling decisive policy shifts (e.g., the 2017 under Republican control), but frequent —occurring in 20 of 36 Congresses since 1946—has led to gridlock on issues like budget reconciliation, underscoring FPTP's tendency toward majoritarian but potentially polarized outcomes. Germany's mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, operational since 1949, combines FPTP district contests with party-list compensation to achieve overall proportionality, yielding Gallagher indices typically below 3, as seen in the 2021 Bundestag election where vote shares closely mirrored seat allocations after overhang adjustments. This design has facilitated multi-party representation, enabling smaller parties like the Greens (14.8% votes, 15.1% seats in 2021) to influence governments, while maintaining local accountability through direct mandates. Empirical cross-national comparisons indicate MMP variants promote greater policy inclusiveness than pure FPTP, with Germany's cabinets averaging durations of 1,100 days from 1949-2021, supported by pre-electoral alliances that mitigate fragmentation risks inherent in proportional elements. However, rising party fragmentation—evident in the 2025 election's effective number of legislative parties nearing 5—has tested stability, prompting reforms like the 2023 tightening of list thresholds to curb overhang seats and preserve a fixed size of 630. The ' open-list (PR) system, with a low 0.67% national threshold and high district magnitude equivalent to the full 150-seat parliament, exemplifies high proportionality, producing Gallagher indices under 2 in recent elections (e.g., 1.8 in 2023) and effective numbers of parties around 5-6, allowing diverse representation including for parties like D66 (liberal) and PVV (nationalist). This has enabled minority and ideological groups to secure seats proportional to votes, enhancing descriptive representation but necessitating post-election coalitions, which formed within 71 days on average from 1946-2010 per Lijphart's dataset of 36 democracies. Comparative evidence suggests such PR systems correlate with lower voter alienation and higher satisfaction with representation compared to majoritarian setups, though they risk prolonged bargaining—e.g., the 2017 government took 225 days amid 28 parties contesting—potentially delaying responses to crises like the 2008 financial downturn. Contrasting these, the United Kingdom's FPTP system mirrors the U.S. in generating disproportionality, with a of 17.3 in the , where Labour secured 63.2% of seats on 33.7% of votes, exemplifying winner bonuses that stabilize single-party rule but exacerbate regional distortions (e.g., Scotland's SNP dominance despite national irrelevance). Cross-national analyses reveal majoritarian systems like the UK's yield quicker (averaging 10 days post-election) and decisive majorities, fostering policy continuity—e.g., 14 years of Conservative governance from 2010-—but at the cost of underrepresenting vote minorities, as evidenced by the Liberal Democrats' perennial seat-vote gaps exceeding 10% since 1950. These cases illustrate a core trade-off: FPTP enhances decisiveness and two-party moderation per Duverger's psychological effects but sacrifices proportionality, while PR and MMP variants prioritize seat-vote congruence and inclusivity, yielding more stable long-term coalitions in empirical aggregates despite occasional fragmentation.

Controversies and Theoretical Debates

Trade-Offs Between Proportionality and Decisiveness

Proportionality in electoral systems measures the alignment between parties' vote shares and their legislative seat allocations, promoting broad representation of voter preferences, while decisiveness evaluates the system's ability to generate stable, authoritative governments capable of prompt and policy execution. Majoritarian systems, such as first-past-the-post, prioritize decisiveness by design, frequently producing artificial majorities that enable single-party rule and rapid governance, but they distort proportionality through winner-take-all mechanics that marginalize minority votes. (PR) systems, conversely, emphasize proportionality via list or multi-member district formulas, yielding legislatures that closely mirror electoral diversity, yet this often fragments power among multiple parties, requiring coalition negotiations that can delay formations and dilute mandates. Empirical analyses quantify these tensions through disproportionality indices, such as the , which reveal stark contrasts: PR systems average 1-5% deviation between votes and seats (e.g., at 1.21%, at 1.71%), whereas majoritarian plurality systems exhibit 10-20% disparities (e.g., at 11.70%, House at 14.28%). This gap arises mechanistically in majoritarian setups, where district-level victories amplify leading parties' national seat hauls; Canada's 2011 federal election exemplifies this, with the Conservatives gaining a parliamentary on 39.6% of votes, enabling decisive but excluding smaller parties despite their support. In PR contexts, such as Switzerland's historical shift toward proportionality in the early , reforms enhanced alignment with median voter preferences via difference-in-differences analyses of legislative behavior, yet correlated with reduced effort and activity levels. Decisiveness advantages in majoritarian systems manifest in shorter government formation periods and unified executive authority, fostering accountability to a national plurality, but risk policy volatility from alternating manufactured majorities unresponsive to broader coalitions. PR's proportionality benefits inclusive policymaking and minority inclusion, mitigating extremism by incorporating diverse voices, though excessive fragmentation—evident in high effective number of parties—can extend coalition bargaining (e.g., averaging 50-70 days in some multiparty systems) and elevate instability risks if thresholds fail to curb micro-parties. Cross-system comparisons, including European Parliament data, indicate PR bolsters representational congruence but may incentivize less rigorous oversight, as legislators face diluted district-specific pressures compared to single-member accountability in majoritarian formats. Hybrid systems attempt to balance these by blending elements, such as in or mixed-member PR in , achieving moderate proportionality (disproportionality around 3-7%) with enhanced concentration for , though they inherit risks like dual incentives distorting party strategies. Ultimately, the trade-off hinges on contextual priorities: majoritarian decisiveness suits unitary states valuing executive strength, while PR proportionality fits plural societies prioritizing consensus, with no universal empirical superiority in outcomes like or durability, as consensus models match or exceed majoritarian performance in stability metrics despite theoretical fragmentation concerns.

Impacts on Polarization and Extremism

Electoral systems shape the incentives for party formation and competition, influencing both the degree of ideological polarization between major parties and the viability of extremist factions. Majoritarian systems, such as first-past-the-post (FPTP), typically produce two-party dominance by rewarding broad electoral coalitions, encouraging parties to converge toward the median voter and thereby limiting the representation of fringe ideologies. In contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems lower entry barriers for smaller parties, enabling greater ideological dispersion across the party system, which can amplify extremism by granting seats to outliers with narrow but intense support bases. Empirical analysis of 31 electoral democracies using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data from the early 2000s demonstrates that PR systems exhibit significantly higher party-system extremism, measured as the ideological distance of parties from the mean voter position on a 11-point scale. In these systems, parties occupy a broader spectrum, with third-ranked government parties averaging 1.1 units from the electoral center, compared to greater clustering in majoritarian setups where proportionality scores are low. This dispersion persists after controlling for district magnitude and electoral thresholds, indicating that higher proportionality causally fosters extremism by allowing niche parties to secure legislative influence without broad appeal. Majoritarian rules, by contrast, compel moderation, as evidenced by tighter ideological compactness in systems like the United Kingdom's FPTP, where extreme parties rarely exceed 5% national vote share and hold no seats. Polarization, distinct from systemic extremism, often manifests as affective distance between voters of opposing parties and can intensify under majoritarian systems due to zero-sum district contests that incentivize base mobilization over compromise. In the United States, FPTP has correlated with rising affective polarization since the 1980s, with partisan animosity exceeding ideological disagreement by the 2020s, as voters increasingly view opponents as threats rather than rivals. Cross-national comparisons reveal higher affective polarization in two-party majoritarian contexts like the US and UK relative to multiparty PR systems in Scandinavia, where coalition necessities foster cross-party collaboration and dilute inter-party hostility. However, PR's fragmentation can indirectly heighten polarization by empowering extremists who veto centrist policies, as seen in Israel's PR system, where ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties holding 10-20% of Knesset seats since 2015 have repeatedly destabilized coalitions and deepened societal divides over issues like military service exemptions. The trade-off underscores causal realism: majoritarian systems curb at the cost of potential voter alienation and primary-driven within major parties, while PR mitigates elite-driven polarization but risks mainstreaming fringe views through seat bonuses for 3-5% vote shares, as in the ' fragmented parliaments since the 2000s. Experimental evidence from simulated elections further suggests that ranked-choice variants of majoritarian systems can narrow affective gaps by rewarding consensus-oriented candidates, reducing winner-loser legitimacy disparities observed in . Overall, while PR correlates with lower bilateral polarization, its facilitation of multipolar poses risks to policy stability, particularly in ideologically diverse electorates where small parties wield disproportionate in governments.

Risks of Manipulation and Voter Disenfranchisement

Electoral manipulation encompasses tactics such as ballot stuffing, , and , which can distort outcomes even when not decisive in altering results. Empirical analyses indicate that such fraud is more prevalent in less democratic regimes, where weaker institutions facilitate misconduct, but remains infrequent in established democracies due to safeguards like audits and legal penalties. For instance, a comprehensive review of types and consequences highlights that while undermines public trust, its electoral impact is often marginal unless systemic. Globally, and persist in transitional contexts, with reports from 2024 noting their role in undermining elections across multiple countries, particularly where is lax. In the United States, documented instances of are rare relative to the scale of voting, with studies attributing low incidence to robust verification processes, though vulnerabilities persist in areas like unsecured absentee ballots or polling site irregularities. Perceptions of widespread often exceed , as surveys show partisan influences on beliefs rather than actual events driving concerns. Experimental field studies in competitive settings reveal that targeted , such as workplace pressure, can suppress turnout among specific groups, though prosecutorial deterrents mitigate broader risks. Peer-reviewed research on authoritarian-leaning contexts underscores that thrives under incumbents facing threats, a dynamic less applicable in mature systems with independent oversight. Voter disenfranchisement risks arise from administrative practices and legal restrictions, including erroneous purges from registration rolls and felony disenfranchisement laws. In the U.S., approximately 5.2 million individuals were barred from voting in 2020 due to felony convictions, representing about 2.3% of the voting-age population, though restoration efforts in some states have reduced this to 4.4 million by 2022. Voter list maintenance, intended to remove ineligible entries, carries error risks; a 2021 study found that purges based on address changes disproportionately err on minority registrants, with removal rates up to twice as high for non-whites compared to whites in certain jurisdictions. Strict voter identification requirements show mixed empirical effects on turnout, with some analyses detecting small declines (e.g., 1-2% in affected races) among low-propensity voters, while others attribute impacts to registration hurdles rather than polling-day barriers. These mechanisms, while aimed at integrity, can inadvertently exclude eligible participants if not calibrated with verification safeguards.

Evidence-Based Critiques of Reform Agendas

Reform agendas advocating (PR) systems often emphasize enhanced inclusivity and reduced wasted votes, yet empirical analyses reveal significant drawbacks in governmental stability and policy efficacy. Data from cross-national comparisons indicate that PR systems foster higher numbers of effective parties—typically 3 to 5 or more—leading to fragmented parliaments and reliance on multiparty coalitions, which prolong bargaining and increase the frequency of cabinet collapses. For example, in Italy's PR-dominant system prior to 1990s reforms, governments averaged less than one year in duration, compared to over three years in majoritarian systems like the . This fragmentation correlates with slower legislative output, as veto players in coalitions dilute decisive action, contradicting claims that PR inherently improves responsiveness without costs. Critiques grounded in implementation data further highlight PR's vulnerability to extremist influence. Systems with low electoral thresholds—such as 's 3.25%—have enabled small ultranationalist or religious parties to secure disproportionate leverage in coalitions, contributing to governmental paralysis; underwent five elections between April 2019 and November 2022 due to repeated failures to form stable majorities. Similarly, in fragmented PR environments like or the , coalition negotiations can extend months, delaying responses to economic crises, as evidenced by prolonged fiscal gridlock during the 2008-2009 recession. Reform proponents, often drawing from academic models favoring proportionality, underemphasize these dynamics, where causal links from seat-vote proportionality to effective prove tenuous amid real-world bargaining failures. Ranked-choice voting (RCV), promoted for electing with broader support and curbing negativity, faces evidence-based challenges in voter comprehension and equity. In the 2021 New York City primaries, approximately 15% of ballots were exhausted before final rounds due to incomplete rankings, effectively reducing turnout among lower-information voters, including minorities who ranked fewer . Studies of RCV implementations, such as in and , show no consistent reduction in ; candidates still prioritize first-choice mobilization over consensus-building, with attack ads persisting at similar rates to plurality systems. Moreover, historical cases like Burlington, Vermont's 2009 mayoral election under RCV elected a via strategic exhaustion of moderate preferences (the "center squeeze"), prompting voters to repeal the system in a 2010 by 72% to 28%. These outcomes suggest RCV introduces complexity that burdens participation without reliably achieving majority-preferred winners, as non-monotonicity—where ranking a higher can paradoxically harm them—undermines intuitive voting. Top-two primaries and similar semi-open reforms, intended to foster moderation, exhibit unintended disenfranchisement effects. California's top-two system, adopted in 2012, has produced same-party runoffs in over 40% of congressional districts by 2022, alienating voters whose preferred party is excluded from the general election and correlating with a 2-4 percentage point drop in partisan turnout. Empirical discontinuity designs reveal this "participation penalty" stems from reduced incentives for same-party voters when outcomes favor intra-party competition over cross-appeal. Such reforms, while aiming to dilute extremism, often amplify incumbent advantages and fail to diversify representation, as third-party candidates face steeper barriers without proportional seat allocation. Across these agendas, longitudinal data underscore that promised gains in representation seldom outweigh governability trade-offs; for instance, PR-adopting countries post-World War II experienced 20-30% higher rates of government turnover than majoritarian peers, impeding long-term continuity. Advocates frequently cite theoretical models over causal evidence from diverse contexts, where local factors like mediate outcomes, revealing reforms' limited universality.

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