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Formation (association football)
Formation (association football)
from Wikipedia

Program for an 1887 game between Blackburn Rovers and Sheffield Wednesday. The players of both teams are arranged in 2–3–5 formation.

In association football, the formation of a team refers to the position players take in relation to each other on a pitch. As association football is a fluid and fast-moving game, a player's position (with the exception of the goalkeeper) in a formation does not define their role as tightly as that of rugby player, nor are there breaks in play where the players must line up in formation (as in gridiron football). A player's position in a formation typically defines whether a player has a mostly defensive or attacking role, and whether they tend to play centrally or towards one side of the pitch.

Formations are usually described by three or more numbers in order to denote how many players are in each row of the formation, from the most defensive to the most advanced. For example, the "4–5–1" formation has four defenders, five midfielders, and a single forward. The choice of formation is normally made by a team's manager or head coach. Different formations can be used depending on whether a team wishes to play more attacking or defensive football, and a team may switch formations between or during games for tactical reasons. Teams may also use different formations for attacking and defending phases of play in the same game.

In the early days of football, most team members would play in attacking roles, whereas modern formations are generally split more evenly between defenders, midfielders, and forwards.

Terminology

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Formations are described by categorising the players (not including the goalkeeper) according to their positioning along (not across) the pitch, with the more defensive players given first. For example, 4–4–2 means four defenders, four midfielders, and two forwards.

Traditionally, those within the same category (for example the four midfielders in a 4–4–2) would generally play as a fairly flat line across the pitch, with those out wide often playing in a slightly more advanced position. In many modern formations, this is not the case, which has led to some analysts splitting the categories in two separate bands, leading to four- or even five-numbered formations. A common example is 4–2–1–3, where the midfielders are split into two defensive and one offensive player; as such, this formation can be considered a type of 4–3–3. An example of a five-numbered formation would be 4–1–2–1–2, where the midfield consists of a defensive midfielder, two central midfielders and an offensive midfielder; this is sometimes considered to be a kind of 4–4–2 (specifically a 4–4–2 diamond, referring to the lozenge shape formed by the four midfielders).

The numbering system was not present until the 4–2–4 system was developed in the 1950s.

Diagrams in this article use a "goal keeper at the bottom" convention but initially it was the opposite. The first numbering systems started with the number 1 for the goalkeeper (top of diagrams) and then defenders from left to right and then to the bottom with the forwards at the end.

Historical formations

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In the football matches of the 19th century, defensive football was not played, and the line-ups reflected the all-attacking nature of these games.

In the first international game, Scotland against England on 30 November 1872, England played with seven or eight forwards in a 1–1–8 or 1–2–7 formation, and Scotland with six, in a 2–2–6 formation. For England, one player would remain in defence, picking up loose balls, and one or two players would roam the midfield and kick the ball upfield for the other players to chase. The English style of play at the time was all about individual excellence and English players were renowned for their dribbling skills. Players would attempt to take the ball forward as far as possible and only when they could proceed no further, would they kick it ahead for someone else to chase. Scotland surprised England by actually passing the ball among players. The Scottish outfield players were organized into pairs and each player would always attempt to pass the ball to his assigned partner. Ironically, with so much attention given to attacking play, the game ended in a 0–0 draw.

Pyramid (2–3–5)

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The Pyramid formation

The first long-term successful formation was recorded in 1880.[1] In Association Football, however, published by Caxton in 1960, the following appears in Vol II, page 432: "Wrexham ... the first winner of the Welsh Cup in 1877 ... for the first time certainly in Wales and probably in Britain, a team played three half-backs and five forwards ..."

The 2–3–5 was originally known as the "Pyramid",[2] with the numerical formation being referenced retrospectively. By the 1890s, it was the standard formation in England and had spread all over the world. With some variations, it was used by most top-level teams up to the 1930s.

For the first time, a balance between attacking and defending was reached. When defending, the halfback-trio were the first facing opposing forwards; when those were surpassed, then fullbacks met forwards as the last line of defence.

The centre halfback had a key role in both helping to organise the team's attack and marking the opponent's centre forward, supposedly one of their most dangerous players.

This formation was used by Uruguay to win the 1924 and 1928 Olympic Games and also the 1930 FIFA World Cup.

It was this formation which gave rise to the convention of shirt numbers increasing from the back and the right.[3]

Danubian school

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The Danubian school of football is a modification of the 2–3–5 formation in which the centre forward plays in a more withdrawn position. As played by Austrian, Czechoslovak and Hungarian teams in the 1920s, it was taken to its peak by the Austrians in the 1930s. This school relied on short passing and individual skills, heavily influenced by the likes of Hugo Meisl and Jimmy Hogan, an English coach who visited Austria at the time.

Metodo (2–3–2–3)
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The Metodo formation

The metodo was devised by Vittorio Pozzo, coach of the Italy national team in the 1930s.[4] A derivation of the Danubian school, it can be called MM (if the goalkeeper is at the top of the diagram) or WW (if the goalkeeper is at the bottom). The system was based on the 2–3–5 formation; Pozzo realised that his half-backs would need some more support in order to be superior to the opponents' midfield, so he pulled two of the forwards to just in front of midfield, creating a 2–3–2–3 formation. This created a stronger defence than previous systems, as well as allowing effective counter-attacks. The Italy national team won back-to-back World Cups, in 1934 and 1938, using this system. It has been argued that Pep Guardiola's Barcelona and Bayern Munich used a modern version of this formation.[5] This formation is also similar to the standard in table football, featuring two defenders, five midfielders and three strikers (which cannot be altered as the "players" are mounted on axles).

WM

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WM formation

The WM formation, named after the letters resembled by the positions of the players on its diagram, was created in the mid-1920s by Herbert Chapman of Arsenal to counter a change in the offside law in 1925. The change had reduced the number of opposition players that attackers needed between themselves and the goal-line from three to two. Chapman's formation included a centre-back to stop the opposing centre-forward (who otherwise could have taken greater advantage of the changed law), and tried to balance defensive and offensive playing. The formation became so successful that by the late 1930s most English clubs had adopted the WM. Retrospectively, the WM has either been described as a 3–2–5 or as a 3–4–3, or more precisely a 3–2–2–3, reflecting the letters which symbolise it. The gap in the centre of the formation between the two wing halves ( Half backs ) and the two inside forwards allowed Arsenal to counter-attack effectively. The WM was subsequently adopted by several English sides, but none could apply it in quite the same way Chapman had. This was mainly due to the comparative rarity of players like Alex James in the English game at that time. He was one of the earliest playmakers in the history of the game, and as a midfielder was the hub around which Chapman's Arsenal revolved. In 2016, new manager Patrick Vieira, a former Arsenal player, brought the WM formation to New York City FC.[6] In Italian football, the WM formation was known as the sistema, and its use in Italy later led to the development of the catenaccio formation.[7] The WM formation was used by West Germany during the 1954 FIFA World Cup.[8] It antedates Pozzo's Metodo and made more radical changes to the widely used system of that era: the 2–3–5 formation.

WW

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The WW formation used by Hungary's Golden Team.

The WW formation (also known as the MM formation, according to the current diagram convention, that is goalkeeper at the bottom. However, it is called the WW formation if the goalkeeper is depicted at the top as was customary at the time), was a development on the WM formation. It was created by Hungarian Márton Bukovi, who turned the 3–2–2–3/WM formation into a 3–2–3–2 by effectively turning the forward "M" upside down (that is M to W).[9] The lack of an effective centre-forward in Bukovi's team necessitated moving a forward back to midfield to create a playmaker, with another midfielder instructed to focus on defence. This transformed into a 3–2–1–4 formation when attacking and turned back to 3–2–3–2 when possession is lost. This formation has been described by some as somewhat of a genetic link between the WM and 4–2–4 and was also successfully used by Bukovi's compatriot Gusztáv Sebes for the Hungarian Golden Team in the early 1950s.[9]

3–3–4

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The 3–3–4 formation was similar to the WW, with the notable exception of having an inside-forward (as opposed to centre-forward) deployed as a midfield schemer alongside the two wing-halves. This formation was commonplace during the 1950s and early 1960s. One of the best exponents of the system was Tottenham Hotspur's double-winning side of 1961, which deployed a midfield of Danny Blanchflower, John White and Dave Mackay. Porto won the 2005–06 Primeira Liga using this unusual formation under manager Co Adriaanse. Recent sides which has also been argued to use this formation include Paris Saint-Germain under Luis Enrique and Arsenal under Mikel Arteta.

4–2–4

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The 4–2–4 formation

The 4–2–4 formation attempts to combine a strong attack with a strong defence, and was conceived as a reaction to the WM's stiffness. It could also be considered a further development of the WW. The 4–2–4 was the first formation to be described using numbers.

While the initial developments leading to the 4–2–4 were devised by Márton Bukovi, the credit for creating the 4–2–4 lies with two people: Flávio Costa, the Brazilian national coach in the early 1950s, as well as another Hungarian, Béla Guttman. These tactics seemed to be developed independently, with the Brazilians discussing these ideas while the Hungarians seemed to be putting them into motion.[9][10][11] The fully developed 4–2–4 was only "perfected" in Brazil, however, in the late 1950s.

Costa published his ideas, the "diagonal system", in the Brazilian newspaper O Cruzeiro, using schematics and, for the first time, the formation description by numbers.[10] The "diagonal system" was another precursor of the 4–2–4 and was created to spur improvisation in players.

Guttmann himself moved to Brazil later in the 1950s to help develop these tactical ideas using the experience of Hungarian coaches.

The 4–2–4 formation made use of the players' increasing levels of skill and fitness, aiming to effectively use six defenders and six forwards, with the midfielders performing both tasks. The fourth defender increased the number of defensive players but mostly allowed them to be closer together, thus enabling effective cooperation among them, the point being that a stronger defence would allow an even stronger attack.

The relatively empty midfield relied on defenders that should now be able not only to steal the ball, but also hold it, pass it or even run with it and start an attack. So this formation required that all players, including defenders, are somehow skilful and with initiative, making it a perfect fit for the Brazilian players' minds. The 4–2–4 needed a high level of tactical awareness, as having only two midfielders could lead to defensive problems. The system was also fluid enough to allow the formation to change throughout play.

The 4–2–4 was first used with success at the club level in Brazil by Santos, and was used by Brazil in their wins at the 1958 World Cup and 1970 World Cups, both featuring Pelé, and Mário Zagallo, the latter of whom played in 1958 and coached in 1970. The then Indian football team manager, Syed Abdul Rahim introduced the classic 4–2–4 formation in Indian football team much before Brazil popularised it in the 1958 World Cup, which was also regarded as the golden era of Indian Football. The formation was quickly adopted throughout the world after the Brazilian success. Under the management of Jock Stein, Celtic won the 1966–67 European Cup and reached the final of the 1969–70 European Cup using this formation.

It was also used by Vladimír Mirka in Czechoslovakia's victorious 1968 UEFA European Under-18 Championship campaign. He continued to use it after its waning days.

Contemporary formations

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The following formations are used in modern football. The formations are flexible allowing tailoring to the needs of a team, as well as to the players available. Variations of any given formation include changes in positioning of players, as well as replacement of a traditional defender by a sweeper.

4–4–2

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4–4–2 formation

This formation was the most common in football in the 1990s and early 2000s, in which midfielders are required to work hard to support both the defence and the attack: typically one of the central midfielders is expected to go upfield as often as possible to support the forward pair, while the other will play a "holding role", shielding the defence; the two wide midfield players must move up the flanks to the goal line in attacks and yet also protect the full-backs.[12][13] On the European level, the major example of a team using a 4–4–2 formation was Milan, trained by Arrigo Sacchi and later Fabio Capello, which won three European Cups, two Intercontinental Cups, and three UEFA Super Cups between 1988 and 1995.

More recently, commentators have noted that at the highest level, the 4–4–2 is being phased out in favour of formations such as the 4–2–3–1.[14] In 2010, none of the winners of the Spanish, English and Italian leagues, nor the Champions League, relied on the 4–4–2. Following England's elimination at the 2010 World Cup by a 4–2–3–1 Germany side, England national team coach Fabio Capello (who was notably successful with the 4–4–2 at Milan in the 1990s) was criticised for playing an "increasingly outdated" 4–4–2 formation.[15]

One reason for the partially discontinued use of the 4–4–2 formation at the highest level of the game is its lack of central dominance against other formations like a 4–3–3, due to having only 2 central midfielders. Being outnumbered in the central area of the pitch makes it more difficult to both obtain and retain the ball against formations that utilize three or more midfielders centrally. To combat these issues, variations of the classic formation have been created, such as the 4–1–2–1–2.

However, the 4–4–2 is still regarded as the best formation to protect the whole width of the field with the opposing team having to get past two banks of four and has recently had a tactical revival having recently contributed to Diego Simeone's Atlético Madrid, Carlo Ancelotti's Real Madrid and Claudio Ranieri's Leicester City.[16][17]

4–4–1–1

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4–4–1–1 formation

A variation of 4–4–2 with one of the strikers playing "in the hole", or as a "second striker", slightly behind their partner.[18] The second striker is generally a more creative player, the playmaker, who can drop into midfield to pick up the ball before running with it or passing to teammates.[18] Interpretations of 4–4–1–1 can be slightly muddled, as some might say that the extent to which one forward has dropped off and separated from the other can be debated.

4–4–2 diamond or 4–1–2–1–2

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4–4–2 diamond formation

The 4–4–2 diamond (also described as 4–1–2–1–2) staggers the midfield. The width in the team has to come from the full-backs pushing forward. The defensive midfielder is sometimes used as a deep-lying playmaker, but needs to remain disciplined and protect the back four behind him.[19] The central attacking midfielder is the creative player, responsible for picking up the ball, and distributing the ball wide to its full-backs or providing the two strikers with through balls.[20] When out of possession, the midfield four must drop and assist the defence, while the two strikers must be free for the counter-attack.[20] Its most famous example was Carlo Ancelotti's Milan, which won the 2003 UEFA Champions League Final and made Milan runners-up in 2005. Milan was obliged to adopt this formation so as to field talented central midfielder Andrea Pirlo, in a period when the position of offensive midfielder was occupied by Rui Costa and later Kaká.[21] This tactic was gradually abandoned by Milan after Andriy Shevchenko's departure in 2006, progressively adopting a "Christmas tree" formation.

4–1–3–2

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The 4–1–3–2 is a variation of the 4–1–2–1–2 and features a strong and talented defensive centre midfielder. This allows the remaining three midfielders to play further forward and more aggressively, and also allows them to pass back to their defensive mid when setting up a play or recovering from a counterattack. The 4–1–3–2 gives a strong presence in the forward middle of the pitch and is considered to be an attacking formation. Opposing teams with fast wingers and strong passing abilities can try to overwhelm the 4–1–3–2 with fast attacks on the wings of the pitch before the three offensive midfielders can fall back to help their defensive line. Valeriy Lobanovskiy is one of the most famous exponents of the formation, using it with Dynamo Kyiv, winning three European trophies in the process. Another example of the 4–1–3–2 in use was the England national team at the 1966 World Cup, managed by Alf Ramsey.

4–3–3

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4–3–3 formation

The 4–3–3 was a development of the 4–2–4, and was played by the Brazil national team in the 1962 World Cup, although a 4–3–3 had also previously been used by the Uruguay national team in the 1950 and 1954 World Cups. The extra player in midfield allows a stronger defence, and the midfield could be staggered for different effects. The three midfielders normally play closely together to protect the defence, and move laterally across the field as a coordinated unit. The formation is usually played without wide midfielders. The three forwards split across the field to spread the attack, and may be expected to mark the opposition full-backs as opposed to doubling back to assist their own full-backs, as do the wide midfielders in a 4–4–2.

A staggered 4–3–3 involving a defensive midfielder (usually numbered four or six) and two attacking midfielders (numbered eight and ten) was commonplace in Italy, Argentina, and Uruguay during the 1960s and 1970s. The Italian variety of 4–3–3 was simply a modification of WM, by converting one of the two wing-halves to a libero (sweeper), whereas the Argentine and Uruguayan formations were derived from 2–3–5 and retained the notional attacking centre-half. The national team that made this famous was the Dutch team of the 1974 and 1978 World Cups, even though the team won neither.

In club football, the team that brought this formation to the forefront was the famous Ajax team of the early 1970s, which won three European Cups with Johan Cruyff, and Zdeněk Zeman with Foggia in Italy during the late 1980s, where he completely revitalised the movement supporting this formation. It was also the formation with which Norwegian manager Nils Arne Eggen won 15 Norwegian league titles.

Most teams using this formation now use a specialist defensive midfielder. Recent famous examples include the Porto and Chelsea teams coached by José Mourinho, as well as the Barcelona team under Pep Guardiola. Mourinho has also been credited with bringing this formation to England in his first stint with Chelsea, and it is commonly used by Guardiola's Manchester City. Liverpool manager Jürgen Klopp employed a high-pressing 4–3–3 formation with dynamic full-backs and a potent front three (Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mané, Roberto Firmino) to win the Premier League and the UEFA Champions League.[22]

4–3–1–2

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A variation of the 4–3–3 wherein a striker gives way to a central attacking midfielder. The formation focuses on the attacking midfielder moving play through the centre with the strikers on either side. It is a much narrower setup in comparison to the 4–3–3 and is usually dependent on the attacking midfielder to create chances. Examples of sides which won trophies using this formation were the 2002–03 UEFA Cup and 2003–04 UEFA Champions League winners Porto under José Mourinho's; and the 2002–03 UEFA Champions League and 2003–04 Serie A-winning Milan team, and 2009–10 Premier League winners Chelsea, both managed by Carlo Ancelotti. This formation was also adopted by Massimiliano Allegri for the 2010–11 Serie A title-winning season for Milan. It was also the favoured formation of Maurizio Sarri during his time at Empoli between 2012 and 2015, during which time they won promotion to Serie A and subsequently avoided relegation, finishing 15th in the 2014–15 Serie A season.

4–1–2–3

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Chelsea F.C. Women (right) lining up in a 4-1-2-3 at kick-off in April 2025

The 4-1-2-3 formation is a modern, dynamic system that emphasizes control in midfield, defensive stability, and attacking width. It features a traditional back four, a lone defensive midfielder (CDM), two central midfielders (CMs), and a fluid front three consisting of two wingers and a central striker. This setup allows teams to dominate possession, press effectively, and transition quickly between defense and attack.

A real-world example of a team using this system is Manchester City under Pep Guardiola, especially during the 2022–2023 season. Guardiola often deployed Rodri as the lone CDM, with De Bruyne and Gündoğan operating as advanced midfielders. Wingers like Riyad Mahrez, Jack Grealish, or Phil Foden provided width, while Erling Haaland spearheaded the attack.[citation needed]

4–3–2–1 (the "Christmas tree" formation)

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4–3–2–1 formation

The 4–3–2–1, commonly described as the "Christmas tree" formation, has another forward brought on for a midfielder to play "in the hole", so leaving two forwards slightly behind the most forward striker.

Terry Venables and Christian Gross used this formation during their time in charge of Tottenham Hotspur. Since then, the formation has lost its popularity in England.[23] It is, however, most known for being the formation Carlo Ancelotti used on-and-off during his time as a coach with Milan to lead his team to win the 2007 UEFA Champions League title.

In this approach, the middle of the three central midfielders act as a playmaker while one of the attacking midfielders plays in a free role. However, it is also common for the three midfielders to be energetic shuttlers, providing for the individual talent of the two attacking midfielders ahead. The "Christmas tree" formation is considered a relatively narrow formation and depends on full-backs to provide presence in wide areas. The formation is also relatively fluid. During open play, one of the side central midfielders may drift to the flank to add additional presence.

4–2–3–1

[edit]
4–2–3–1 formation

A flexible formation in prospects to defensive or offensive orientation, as both the wide players and the full-backs may join the attack. In defence, this formation is similar to either the 4–5–1 or 4–4–1–1. It is used to maintain possession of the ball and stop opponent attacks by controlling the midfield area of the field. The lone striker may be very tall and strong to hold the ball up as his midfielders and full-backs join him in attack. The striker could also be very fast. In these cases, the opponent's defence will be forced to fall back early, thereby leaving space for the offensive central midfielder. This formation is used especially when a playmaker is to be highlighted. The variations of personnel used on the flanks in this set-up include using traditional wingers, using inverted wingers or simply using wide midfielders. Different teams and managers have different interpretations of the 4–2–3–1, but one common factor among them all is the presence of the double pivot. The double pivot is the usage of two holding midfielders in front of the defence.[24]

At international level, this formation is used by the Belgian, French, Dutch and German national teams in an asymmetric shape, and often with strikers as wide midfielders or inverted wingers. The formation is also currently used by Brazil as an alternative to the 4–2–4 formation of the late 1950s to 1970. Implemented similarly to how the original 4–2–4 was used back then, use of this formation in this manner is very offensive, creating a six-man attack and a six-man defence tactical layout. The front four attackers are arranged as a pair of wide forwards and a playmaker forward who play in support of a lone striker. Mário Zagallo also considers the Brazil 1970 football team he coached as pioneers of 4–2–3–1.[25]

In recent[when?] years, with full-backs having ever more increasing attacking roles, the wide players (be they deep lying forwards, inverted wingers, attacking wide midfielders) have been tasked with the defensive responsibility to track and pin down the opposition full-backs. Manuel Pellegrini is an avid proponent of this formation, and frequently uses it in the football clubs that he manages.

This formation has been very frequently used by managers all over the world in the modern game. One particularly effective use of it was Liverpool under Rafael Benítez, who deployed Javier Mascherano, Xabi Alonso and Steven Gerrard in central midfield, with Gerrard acting in a more advanced role in order to link up with Fernando Torres, who acted as the central striker. Another notable example at club level is Bayern Munich under Jupp Heynckes at his treble-clinching 2012–13 season. Mauricio Pochettino, Jose Mourinho, Ange Postecoglou and Arne Slot also use this formation. A high point of the 4–2–3–1 was in the 2006 FIFA World Cup, where Raymond Domenech's France and Luiz Felipe Scolari's Portugal used it to great success, with Marcello Lippi's victorious Italy squad also using a loose variation in a 4–4–1–1.

4–2–2–2 (magic rectangle)

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4–2–2–2 formation

Often referred to as the "magic rectangle" or "magic square",[26] this formation was used by France under Michel Hidalgo at the 1982 World Cup and Euro 1984, and later by Henri Michel at the 1986 World Cup[27] and a whole generation, for Brazil with Telê Santana, Carlos Alberto Parreira and Vanderlei Luxemburgo, by Arturo Salah and Francisco Maturana in Colombia.[28] The "Magic Rectangle" is formed by combining two box-to-box midfielders with two deep-lying ("hanging") forwards across the midfield. This provides a balance in the distribution of possible moves and adds a dynamic quality to midfield play.

This formation was used by former Real Madrid manager Manuel Pellegrini and met with considerable praise.[29] Pellegrini also used this formation while with Villarreal and Málaga. The formation is closely related to a 4–2–4 previously used by Fernando Riera, Pellegrini's mentor,[30] and that can be traced back to Chile in 1962 who (may have) adopted it from the Frenchman Albert Batteux at the Stade de Reims of 50s.

It is two 6s, two 10s, two number 9s, so our fullbacks do a lot of the work up and down and create the width for us. Sometimes our 10s can sit in the halfspaces or they can pull out wide to create that width. We always need at least one player to create width for the team.

The 4–2–2–2 with a box midfield was deployed by the North Carolina Courage of the NWSL from 2017 to 2021, using a front four with freedom to fluidly switch sides and move wide while served by high-playing fullbacks.[32][31][33] The Courage won the league in three consecutive seasons using the formation and the NWSL playoff championship twice, setting season records in wins, points, and goals scored in the process.[34][35]

This formation had been previously used at Real Madrid by Vanderlei Luxemburgo during his failed stint at the club during the latter part of the 2004–05 season and throughout the 2005–06 season. This formation has been described as being "deeply flawed"[36] and "suicidal".[37] Luxemburgo is not the only one to use this although it had been used earlier by Brazil in the early 1980s.[38][39] At first, Telê Santana, then Carlos Alberto Parreira and Vanderlei Luxemburgo proposed basing the "magic rectangle" on the work of the wing-backs. The rectangle becomes a 3–4–3 on the attack because one of the wing-backs moves downfield.[40]

In another sense, the Colombian 4–2–2–2 is closely related to the 4–4–2 diamond of Brazil, with a style different from the French-Chilean trend and is based on the complementation of a box-to box with 10 classic. It emphasises the triangulation, but especially in the surprise of attack. The 4–2–2–2 formation consists of the standard defensive four (right back, two centre backs, and left back), with two centre midfielders, two support strikers, and two out and out strikers.[41] Similar to the 4–6–0, the formation requires a particularly alert and mobile front four to function. The formation has also been used on occasion by the Brazil national team,[39][42] notably in the 1998 World Cup final.[43]

4–2–1–3

[edit]

The somewhat unconventional 4–2–1–3 formation was developed by José Mourinho during his time at Inter Milan.[1] He used it in all the teams he coached, including in the 2010 UEFA Champions League final.[1] By using captain Javier Zanetti and Esteban Cambiasso in holding midfield positions, he was able to push more players to attack. Wesley Sneijder filled the attacking midfield role and the front three operated as three strikers, rather than having a striker and one player on each wing. Using this formation, Mourinho won The Treble with Inter in only his second season in charge of the club.[1]

As the system becomes more developed and flexible, small groups can be identified to work together in more efficient ways by giving them more specific and different roles within the same lines, and numbers like 4–2–1–3, 4–1–2–3 and even 4–2–2–2 occur.[1]

Many of the current systems have three different formations in each third, defending, middle and attacking. The goal is to outnumber the other team in all parts of the field but to not completely wear out all the players on the team using it before the full ninety minutes are up. So, the one single number is confusing as it may not actually look like a 4–2–1–3 when a team is defending or trying to gain possession. In a positive attack, it may look exactly like a 4–2–1–3.[1]

4–5–1

[edit]
4–5–1 formation

4–5–1 is a conservative formation; however, if the two midfield wingers play a more attacking role, it can be likened to 4–3–3. The formation can be used to grind out 0–0 draws or preserve a lead, as the packing of the centre midfield makes it difficult for the opposition to build up play.[44] Because of the "closeness" of the midfield, the opposing team's forwards will often be starved of possession. Due to the lone striker, however, the centre of the midfield does have the responsibility of pushing forward as well. The defensive midfielder will often control the pace of the game.[45]

4–6–0

[edit]

A highly unconventional formation, the 4–6–0 is an evolution of the 4–2–3–1 or 4–3–3 in which the centre forward is exchanged for a player who normally plays as a trequartista (that is, in the "hole"). Suggested as a possible formation for the future of football,[46] the formation sacrifices an out-and-out striker for the tactical advantage of a mobile front four attacking from a position that the opposition defenders cannot mark without being pulled out of position.[47] Because of the intelligence and pace required by the front four attackers to create and attack any space left by the opposition defenders, however, the formation requires a very skilful and well-drilled front four. Due to these demanding requirements from the attackers, and the novelty of playing without a proper goalscorer, the formation has been adopted by very few teams, and rarely consistently. As with the development of many formations, the origins and originators are uncertain, but arguably the first reference to a professional team adopting a similar formation is Anghel Iordănescu's Romania in the 1994 World Cup Round of 16, when Romania won 3–2 against Argentina.[48][49]

The first team to adopt the formation systematically was Luciano Spalletti's Roma side during the 2005–06 Serie A season, mostly out of necessity as his "strikerless" formation,[50] and then notably by Alex Ferguson's Manchester United side that won the Premier League and Champions League in 2007–08.[51] The formation was unsuccessfully used by Craig Levein's Scotland against Czech Republic to widespread condemnation.[52][53] At Euro 2012, Spain coach Vicente del Bosque used the 4–6–0 for his side's 1–1 group stage draw against Italy and their 4–0 win versus Italy in the final of the tournament.[54]

3–4–3

[edit]
3–4–3 formation

Using a 3–4–3, the midfielders are expected to split their time between attacking and defending. Having only three dedicated defenders means that if the opposing team breaks through the midfield, they will have a greater chance to score than with a more conventional defensive configuration, such as 4–5–1 or 4–4–2. However, the three forwards allow for a greater concentration on attack. This formation is used by more offensive-minded teams. The formation was famously used by Liverpool under Rafael Benítez during the second half of the 2005 UEFA Champions League final to come back from a three-goal deficit. It was also notably used by Chelsea when they won the Premier League under manager Antonio Conte in the 2016–17 season and when they won the 2021 UEFA Champions League final under Thomas Tuchel.[55][56][57]

3–5–2

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3–5–2 formation

This formation is similar to 5–3–2, but with some important tweaks: there is usually no sweeper (or libero) but rather three classic centre-backs, and the two wing-backs are oriented more towards the attack. Because of this, the most central midfielder tends to remain further back in order to help prevent counter-attacks. It also differs from the classical 3–5–2 of the WW by having a non-staggered midfield. There are several coaches claiming to be the inventors of this formation, like two-time European Cup winning manager and World Cup runner-up Ernst Happel and the unorthodox and controversial Nikos Alefantos, but the first to successfully employ it at the highest level was Carlos Bilardo, who led Argentina to win the 1986 World Cup using the 3–5–2.[58] The high point of the 3–5–2's influence was the 1990 World Cup, with both finalists, Bilardo's Argentina and Franz Beckenbauer's West Germany employing it.[58]

In the last years of first decade of 2000, Gian Piero Gasperini during his years at Genoa (and later in Atalanta) using this tactical system, in a modern way, with high pressure, speed, strength, one on one defense and ball possession enabling this tactical revival. Later, Italian coach Antonio Conte successfully implemented the 3–5–2 at Juventus, having won three Serie A consecutive titles between 2012 and 2014, the first unbeaten (record in a league championship with 20 contestants) and the last reaching the points record (102).[59] After coaching the Italy national team, Conte used again the 3–5–2 system at Chelsea during the 2016–17 Premier League season, leading the club to the league title and an FA Cup final. In order to properly counteract the additional forward pressure from the wing-backs in the system, other sides, including Ronald Koeman's Everton and Mauricio Pochettino's Tottenham, also used the formation against Chelsea.[60][61] At international level, Louis van Gaal utilised 3–5–2 with the Netherlands in the 2014 World Cup, in which they finished third.[62] Notably, this formation was specifically employed as a counter to the challenge of possession football used by the Spanish national side. Cesare Prandelli used it for Italy's 1–1 draw with Spain in the group stage of Euro 2012, with some commentators seeing Daniele De Rossi as a sweeper.[63] The Netherlands used it to greater effect against Spain during the group stage of the 2014 World Cup, completing a 5–1 win. This minimised the Dutch weaknesses (inexperience in defence) and maximising their strengths (world-class forwards in Robin van Persie and Arjen Robben).[64]

Simone Inzaghi, who succeeded Conte at Inter in 2021, has helped modernize and further innovate the 3–5–2. Inzaghi's system builds ball possession through the goalkeeper and defenders and uses midfielders who are quick and technical and capable of defending very well. Particularly innovative was his use of side midfielders, called Quinti ("fifths") such as Federico Dimarco. Dimarco was used in a very flexible way with defensive duties in the non-possession phase (playing in the defensive line in a 5–3–2 shape), but would shift in the offensive phase. The two midfield sidemen would go up on the line of the attackers forming a four-man attack in a 3–3–4 shape.[65] In three seasons Inter six four trophies along with an appearance in the 2023 UEFA Champions League final.[66]

3–2–4–1

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Manager Pep Guardiola used this formation at times in his time at Manchester City, using one main centre-back and two defensive midfield anchors.[67] It begins as a typical 4–2–3–1 formation, but differs in attack, with the left or right half-back sliding into a defensive midfield position, and a defensive midfielder sliding up to create the "square" in midfield. The formation helped Manchester City to win the UEFA Champions League for the first time, and the continental treble in the 2022–23 season.

3–4–1–2

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3–4–1–2 is a variant of 3–5–2 where the wingers are more withdrawn in favour of one of the central midfielders being pushed further upfield into the "number 10" playmaker position. Martin O'Neill used this formation during the early years of his reign as Celtic manager, noticeably taking them to the 2003 UEFA Cup Final. Portland Thorns used a 3–4–1–2 formation to win the 2017 NWSL championship, withdrawing forward Christine Sinclair into the playmaker role rather than moving a midfielder up. The Thorns transitioned to a 4–2–3–1 in 2018 after opposing teams countered the 3–4–1–2 with a stronger midfield presence.[68][69]

3–6–1

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3–6–1 formation

This uncommon modern formation focuses on ball possession in the midfield.[70] In fact, it is very rare to see it as an initial formation, as it is more useful for maintaining a lead or a draw. Its more common variants are 3–4–2–1 or 3–4–3 diamond, which use two wing-backs. The lone forward must be tactically gifted, not only because he focuses on scoring but also on assisting with back passes to his teammates. Once the team is leading the game, there is an even stronger tactical focus on ball control, short passes and running down the clock. On the other hand, when the team is losing, at least one of the playmakers will more frequently play on the edge of the area to add depth to the attack. Steve Sampson (for the United States at the 1998 World Cup) and Guus Hiddink (for Australia at the 2006 World Cup) are two of the few coaches who have used this formation. Hiddink used the 3–3–3–1 formation for the Socceroos as well.

3–3–1–3

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The 3–3–1–3 was formed of a modification to the Dutch 4–3–3 system Ajax had developed. Coaches like Louis van Gaal and Johan Cruyff brought it to even further attacking extremes and the system eventually found its way to Barcelona, where players such as Andrés Iniesta and Xavi were reared into 3–3–1–3's philosophy. It demands intense pressing high up the pitch especially from the forwards, and also an extremely high defensive line, basically playing the whole game inside the opponent's half. It requires extreme technical precision and rapid ball circulation since one slip or dispossession can result in a vulnerable counter-attack situation. Cruyff's variant relied on a flatter and wider midfield, but Van Gaal used an offensive midfielder and midfield diamond to link up with the front three more effectively. Marcelo Bielsa has used the system with some success with Argentina and Chile's national teams, and is currently one of the few high-profile managers to use the system in competition today. Diego Simeone had also tried it occasionally at River Plate.

3–3–3–1

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The 3–3–3–1 system is a very attacking formation and its compact nature is ideally suited for midfield domination and ball possession. It means a coach can field more attacking players and add extra strength through the spine of the team. The attacking three are usually two wing-backs or wingers with the central player of the three occupying a central attacking midfield or second striker role behind the centre forward. The midfield three consists of two centre midfielders ahead of one central defensive midfielder or alternatively one central midfielder and two defensive midfielders. The defensive three can consist of three centre backs or one centre back with a full back either side.

The 3–3–3–1 formation was used by Marcelo Bielsa's Chile in the 2010 World Cup, with three centre-backs paired with two wing-backs and a holding player, although a variation is the practical hourglass, using three wide players, a narrow three, a wide three and a centre-forward.[71]

5–2–2–1

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The 5–2–2–1 formation in football is a defensive-oriented system with a focus on counter-attacking. It utilizes five defenders, including three center-backs and two wing-backs, two central midfielders, two attacking midfielders or inside forwards, and one striker at the top. The three center-backs provide a solid defensive foundation, while the wing-backs offer width and versatility by pushing forward to support attacks or dropping back to help in defense. The two central midfielders act as both defensive shields and playmakers, controlling the tempo and transitioning the play from defense to attack. The two attacking midfielders support the lone striker, often operating in spaces between the opposition’s defense and midfield to create chances.

One of the main strengths of this formation is its defensive stability combined with the ability to launch quick counter-attacks through the wing-backs and attacking midfielders. However, it can struggle against teams that overload the midfield, as only two central midfielders are responsible for controlling this area, potentially leaving gaps in ball possession.[72]

5–3–2

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5–3–2 formation

This formation has three central defenders, possibly with one acting as a sweeper. This system merges the winger and full-back positions into the wing-back, whose job it is to work their flank along the full length of the pitch, supporting both the defence and the attack.[73] At club level, the 5–3–2 was famously employed by Helenio Herrera in his Inter Milan side of the 1960s and 1970s, influencing many other Italian teams of the era.[74] The Brazil team which won the 2002 FIFA World Cups also employed this formation with their wing-backs Cafu and Roberto Carlos two of the best known proponents of this position.[75][76]

5–3–2 with sweeper or 1–4–3–2

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A variant of the 5–3–2, this involves a more withdrawn sweeper, who may join the midfield, and more advanced full-backs. The 1990 world champion West German team was known for employing this tactic under Franz Beckenbauer, with his successor Berti Vogts retaining the scheme with some variations during his tenure.

5–4–1

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5–4–1 formation

This is a particularly defensive formation, with an isolated forward and a packed defence. Again, however, a couple of attacking full-backs can make this formation resemble something like a 3–6–1. One of the most famous cases of its use is the Euro 2004-winning Greek national team.

Incomplete formations

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When a player is sent off (i.e. after being shown a red card) or leaves the field due to an injury or other reason with no ability to be replaced with a substitute, teams generally fall back to defensive formations such as 4–4–1, 5–3–1 or even 5-4-0. Often only when facing a negative result will a team with ten players play in a risky attacking formation such as 4–3–2, 3–4–2, or even 4–2–3. If one or more players are also sent off, teams often adopt all-out attacking or all-out defensive formations, depending on the score. If two players are sent off or hurt, the common formations are a 4-4-0 hoping to block attacks until the game is over, or a 4-3-1 where the 3 man midfield & 1 man up front will slide across in defence and creating chances with long through balls hoping for the fast striker to beat the defence with speed.

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
In , a formation refers to the tactical positioning and arrangement of a team's players on the pitch, typically denoted by a numerical system such as 4-4-2, which indicates the number of defenders, midfielders, and forwards (excluding the ). This structure serves as a foundational framework for a team's overall playing style, dictating how players balance offensive pressure, defensive solidity, and transitions between phases of play. Formations are not rigid, as players often shift positions dynamically during a match to adapt to the game's flow, opponent strategies, and specific situations. The evolution of formations traces back to the late , when early systems like the 1-1-8 emphasized individual under looser s, gradually shifting toward more organized setups. A pivotal change occurred in 1925 when the was modified to require only two opponents (down from three) between an attacker and the goal line, increasing scoring opportunities and prompting a tactical shift from the already prevalent attack-oriented 2-3-5 formation toward more balanced systems in the . Subsequent innovations included Herbert Chapman's WM (3-2-2-3) at in the for better midfield control, Italy's Metodo (2-3-2-3) that secured victories in 1934 and 1938, and Brazil's 4-2-4 in the 1950s, which triumphed at the 1958 and 1970 s by incorporating attacking full-backs. By the mid-20th century, defensive considerations led to formations like the 5-4-1 "" under at in the 1960s, influencing Italy's 1970 final appearance, while the 4-4-2 emerged in the 1960s–1970s as a balanced standard, popularized by Soviet coach Viktor Maslov and English clubs. Scholarly analyses confirm this progression toward greater tactical complexity, with professional leagues showing increased use of varied formations from the onward to optimize player demands and match outcomes. Among the most prevalent modern formations, the 4-3-3 offers versatility for possession-based play and high pressing, featuring four defenders, three central , and three forwards—as exemplified by teams like under and under —though it risks exposing full-backs. The 4-4-2 provides simplicity and counter-attacking potency with two strikers to pin defenders, a compact midfield line, and balanced width, historically favored by Manchester United and . Variations like the 4-2-3-1 add an extra attacking midfielder for central overloads and support to advancing full-backs, enhancing flexibility against compact defenses, while the 3-5-2 emphasizes wing-back dynamism and a solid back three for teams seeking midfield dominance, as seen in West Germany's 1990 World Cup success. These systems are selected based on squad strengths, with research highlighting their impact on physical demands, such as higher-intensity runs in attacking formations like 4-3-3 compared to defensive ones. In contemporary football, formations are increasingly analyzed through event data and tracking to identify in-game adaptations, revealing that teams often deviate from base setups during build-up, pressing, or attacking phases to create numerical advantages. This fluidity underscores formations' role not just in static positioning but in enabling strategic social learning among managers, where successful patterns from past World Cups and leagues propagate culturally across teams.

Fundamentals

Notation system

The numerical notation system for football formations uses a sequence of numbers separated by dashes or hyphens to indicate the distribution of outfield players across defensive, midfield, and attacking lines, excluding the goalkeeper unless specified. For instance, 4–4–2 denotes four defenders, four midfielders, and two forwards, providing a concise way to describe tactical setups. This system emerged in the 1920s alongside the introduction of fixed shirt numbering by Arsenal manager Herbert Chapman, who implemented numbered jerseys in a 1928 match to clearly assign positions based on the emerging WM formation (3–2–2–3), facilitating both on-pitch organization and post-match analysis. Earlier formations, such as the 2–3–5 pyramid prevalent in the late 19th century, were retrospectively labeled numerically, but the practice became standardized with positional numbering. Variations in notation account for tactical nuances, such as the inclusion of the goalkeeper in some descriptions (e.g., 1–4–4–2) or breakdowns of midfield roles to highlight wide or advanced players (e.g., 4–3–1–2, featuring three central midfielders, one number 10, and two strikers). These adaptations reflect evolving strategies, where additional numbers distinguish between defensive screens, box-to-box roles, or supporting attackers, though the core three-number format remains dominant for simplicity. Standard notation prioritizes players to focus on , but extended versions appear in manuals and analytical tools for precision. Formations are frequently illustrated through visual diagrams, which depict a stylized pitch with symbols or icons representing players in their starting positions, often aligned in rows to mirror the numerical breakdown. These charts emphasize spatial relationships, such as defensive depth or midfield width, and may include arrows to suggest movement patterns during play. Such representations, common in tactical analyses and resources, enhance comprehension beyond text, allowing coaches and analysts to convey complex setups efficiently. The evolution of notation has been shaped by rule changes, particularly the 1925 offside law reform by the (IFAB), which reduced the required opponents for an onside position from three to two. This adjustment increased attacking space and goals per match (from an average of 2.58 in the 1924–25 season to 3.69 in the 1925–26 season in the English First Division), prompting a shift from two- to three-defender systems like the WM, which in turn influenced pyramid-style notations by emphasizing balanced lines over forward-heavy arrays. Misinterpretations of notation often stem from fluid player roles, leading to confusion between similar setups; for example, the 4–2–3–1 (with two holding , three attacking , and one striker) can resemble a 4–3–3 when the central in the latter drops deep or wingers narrow, blurring the distinction between midfield balance and attacking support. This proximity in structure makes the two formations interchangeable in some analyses, yet the 4–2–3–1 prioritizes a dedicated number 10 behind the forward, while the 4–3–3 emphasizes wide threats.

Player roles and responsibilities

The serves as the last line of defense, primarily responsible for preventing goals through shot-stopping techniques such as diving saves, parrying, and blocking attempts within the . Beyond shot-stopping, modern s handle distribution duties, initiating attacks with accurate short passes to defenders or long kicks to forwards, often acting as the 11th outfield player in possession phases. Additionally, they perform sweeping roles by advancing outside the to intercept through balls or clear loose balls behind a high defensive line, reducing vulnerability to counter-attacks. Center-backs, typically positioned centrally in a back four as denoted in notations like 4–4–2, focus on marking opposing forwards to prevent shots or passes, employing tackling and positioning to regain possession. Their responsibilities extend to intercepting passes in midfield areas and organizing the defensive line, requiring strong aerial ability and game-reading skills to cover spaces effectively. Full-backs, stationed on the flanks, balance defensive duties like tracking wingers and providing cover for center-backs with attacking contributions, including overlapping runs to support midfield advances and delivering crosses into the . Defensive midfielders act as a protective screen in front of the backline, prioritizing interceptions, tackles, and positional to disrupt opposition build-up play and shield vulnerabilities. Central midfielders encompass varied roles: dictate through precise passing and vision to create scoring opportunities, while box-to-box variants contribute defensively with recoveries and offensively by advancing into attacking zones for shots or assists. Wide midfielders or wingers on the flanks emphasize play by past defenders to deliver crosses or cut inside for shots, while also tracking back to support full-backs during defensive transitions. Strikers bear the core responsibility of goal-scoring, positioning themselves to finish chances through runs in behind defenses or in the box, often combining hold-up play to retain possession and link with midfield. Wingers, operating on the edges, focus on to beat markers, providing assists via crosses, and exploiting width to stretch defenses, with defensive tracking to maintain balance. Second strikers facilitate link-up play between midfield and forwards, dropping deeper to receive passes, hold the ball, and create space for teammates through intelligent movement. In contemporary setups, roles exhibit flexibility, such as inverted wingers who cut inside from wide positions onto their stronger foot to shoot or combine centrally, overloading midfield areas and disrupting marking schemes. The introduction of the five-substitute rule in 2020 has amplified role adaptations, enabling managers to introduce fresh players for tactical shifts—like injecting pace into wide roles or bolstering defensive screening—thus reducing fatigue on key positions and enhancing late-game dynamism. This change, initially temporary due to the , has persisted, allowing more fluid role interchanges without overexertion.

Historical evolution

Origins and early pyramid systems

The 2–3–5 formation, commonly referred to as the , originated in British association football during the 1870s and 1880s as the sport distanced itself from its rugby roots following the establishment of in 1863. Early football rules borrowed heavily from rugby, particularly the offside concept, which initially prohibited any player from being ahead of the ball when it was played forward by a teammate, effectively limiting teams to a single forward while the rest waited behind the ball in a clustered 1–1–8 or similar arrangement. A pivotal change in 1866 relaxed this to allow a player to be onside if three opposing players were between them and the goal line, enabling more fluid attacking play and the deployment of multiple forwards, which directly facilitated the 's development as teams sought balanced yet offensive structures by the 1890s. This formation consisted of two full-backs positioned to mark opposing attackers and protect the goal, three half-backs (left half, center half, and right half) serving as a transitional pivot in midfield, and five forwards arrayed across the front line, including two outside left and right wingers for width, two inside forwards for support, and a central striker to finish moves. The center half often acted as the , distributing from deep while contributing to both defense and attack, reflecting the era's emphasis on dribbling and territorial dominance rather than rigid positional play. By the late , the 2–3–5 had become the standard across English leagues, promoting an attack-oriented philosophy where half-backs fluidly shifted into midfield roles to supply the forwards, prioritizing goal-scoring over defensive solidity in an era of laxer offside enforcement. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Danubian School emerged in , particularly and , as a sophisticated adaptation of the 2–3–5 that introduced greater fluidity and collective movement. Pioneered by Austrian coach and administrator Hugo Meisl, influenced by English passing techniques from , this style featured the center forward dropping deeper into midfield to create overloads, effectively morphing the pyramid into a more dynamic 2–3–1–4 shape that emphasized short, intricate passing, technical precision, and off-the-ball runs over long balls. , the iconic Austrian playmaker known as the "Mozart of football," exemplified this approach as a withdrawn center forward who orchestrated attacks with vision and elegance, helping Vienna to victories in 1933 and 1936 while the national achieved a 14-match unbeaten streak from 1931 to 1932. The pyramid's dominance waned after the modified the in 1925, reducing the required opponents from three to two and opening up space behind defenses, which exposed the two-back setup to counterattacks and long balls. This shift forced teams to withdraw the center half into a third defensive role, gradually evolving the 2–3–5 into more balanced systems like the WM formation as a direct tactical response.

Interwar and WM innovations

The marked a pivotal shift in tactics, as teams sought greater balance between attack and defense following the dominance of the pyramid formation. , appointed manager in 1925, developed the WM formation—a 3–2–2–3 system—in response to a 7–0 defeat by Newcastle United early in the 1925–26 season, repositioning the center-half deeper to bolster defensive structure. This innovation drew from the pyramid's attacking emphasis but added a third defender by withdrawing the center-half between the two full-backs, creating a back three for improved solidity against forward lines. Central to the WM's effectiveness was the center-half's role as a deep-lying , providing cover and distributing from the back, while the two wing-halves offered defensive support in midfield and could advance wide to mark opponents or exploit flanks. The two inside-forwards operated in the gaps between the wing-halves and the front three, enabling swift counter-attacks, particularly through central channels. Arsenal's of the WM yielded immediate results, including the 1930 win and league titles in 1930–31 and 1932–33 under Chapman, followed by further championships in 1933–34 and 1937–38, establishing it as the era's benchmark for tactical discipline and nullifying opponents. Variations of the WM emphasized wider wing play, with wing-halves pushing outward to stretch defenses and facilitate crosses, as seen in Arsenal's matches and adopted by other English clubs for enhanced flank exploitation. In , the WM influenced aggressive adaptations, notably Italy's "," a direct equivalent that prioritized defensive resilience while retaining forward thrust. , Italy's coach, refined this into a fluid 2–3–2–3 for the 1934 and 1938 s, withdrawing one forward to midfield for balance and using wing-halves aggressively, securing consecutive titles through organized pressing and countering. The 1930 , dominated by pyramid-based attacks from and , intensified debates on defensive vulnerabilities, prompting European coaches like Pozzo to innovate toward solidity, as seen in the verrou system's early roots responding to WM-style threats. These developments underscored the interwar trend toward layered defenses without sacrificing offensive potential.

Postwar shifts to 4-2-4

Following , football tactics began evolving from the rigid WM formation (3-2-2-3) that had dominated the , as coaches sought greater balance between defense and attack amid improving player fitness and skill levels. Early postwar experiments with a back four emerged in the late , notably by Italian side Torino under Ernő Egri Erbstein, who employed a 4-2-4 setup that emphasized fluid attacking play and contributed to their dominance until the tragic in 1949. Similarly, Soviet club showcased a groundbreaking 4-2-4 during their 1945 , where fluid interchanges among forwards overwhelmed opponents and highlighted the formation's potential for rapid transitions, marking one of the first high-profile postwar shifts away from three-defender systems. In , the formation gained prominence through the "" under coach in the early , building on innovations by Márton Bukovi, who is credited with pioneering the 4-2-4 in the late at MTK . Sebes adapted it into a prototype emphasizing a deep-lying forward—epitomized by —who dropped into midfield to create overloads, effectively turning the shape into a 3-3-4 in possession while maintaining four defenders out of possession. This tactical fluidity powered 's unbeaten run from 1950 to 1954, including a famous 6-3 victory over at in 1953 and a runner-up finish at the , where the system exposed vulnerabilities in traditional WM setups used by teams like . The Hungarian model's success influenced global tactics, with , another Hungarian coach, exporting the 4-2-4 to after managing there in the early . Brazil's adoption of the 4-2-4, refined by national team coach with input from Guttmann, represented the formation's breakthrough on the world stage. Drawing from Hungarian and Uruguayan influences, Feola implemented it for the 1958 World Cup in , featuring two holding midfielders to shield the back four while unleashing four forwards, including a young , for dynamic attacks. Brazil's 5-2 final win over not only secured their first World Cup but also popularized the 4-2-4 worldwide through television broadcasts, inspiring clubs and national teams to prioritize width, speed, and midfield control over the WM's central focus. This shift underscored postwar football's move toward more attacking, balanced structures, setting the template for modern 4-4-2 variants.

Core modern formations

Balanced midfield setups

Balanced midfield setups in emphasize central control through three , allowing teams to dominate possession and transitions while maintaining defensive solidity with a back four. The most prominent example is the 4–3–3 formation, which consists of four defenders, three central —typically one defensive midfielder anchoring the unit and two more advanced players providing support—and three forwards, often comprising two wingers and a central striker. This structure evolved from the 4–2–4 of the by repositioning one forward deeper into midfield to enhance balance. The 4–3–3 gained prominence with Brazil's national team in the 1960s, particularly during their victory, where it enabled fluid attacking play led by stars like and . It was further revolutionized in the 1970s through , pioneered by Ajax Amsterdam under and adopted by the national team, emphasizing positional interchange among players to overwhelm opponents. A defining moment came in the , where the ' 4–3–3 showcased midfield superiority against , though they lost 2–1 after an early lead. Tactically, the 4–3–3 excels in midfield dominance, creating numerical advantages centrally to dictate and launch quick counters, while the wide forwards enable overloads on the flanks through overlaps with full-backs. However, it can expose the central defense if the defensive is bypassed or if full-backs advance too aggressively, leaving gaps for direct attacks. A key variant is the 4–1–2–3, featuring a single holding for added protection, two central attacking midfielders to link play, and three forwards for offensive thrust; this setup was notably employed by Chelsea under in the mid-2000s to blend defensive resilience with rapid transitions. Another adaptation, the 4–3–1–2, incorporates a creative number 10 behind two strikers, supported by three midfielders.

Wide attacking systems

Wide attacking systems in emphasize balance through four midfielders, typically providing width via players on the flanks while supporting dual-striker partnerships for offensive thrust. These setups prioritize territorial control on the wings and quick transitions, differing from more centralized configurations by leveraging overlapping runs and crosses to exploit spaces behind defenses. The 4–4–2 formation consists of four defenders, four midfielders arranged in two central and two wide roles, and two strikers, creating a symmetrical structure that dominated English football from the to the . This system allowed wide midfielders to deliver crosses to the forwards while central players maintained possession and defensive cover. Liverpool under exemplified its success, winning three European Cups between 1977 and 1984 through a fluid "pass-and-move" implementation that emphasized high pressing and quick interchanges. A compact variation, the 4–4–1–1, modifies the 4–4–2 by having the second striker drop deep into midfield, enhancing central congestion and support for the lone forward while retaining wide threats. This adjustment improves defensive solidity during transitions without sacrificing attacking intent. employed this shape to win the , with operating as the withdrawing second striker behind Stéphane Guivarc'h, allowing freedom in midfield and contributing to their 3–0 final victory over . The 4–4–2 diamond, or 4–1–2–1–2, features a holding at the base, two central midfielders, an advanced , and two forwards, narrowing the midfield for superior central dominance while relying on full-backs for width. This setup facilitates quick vertical passes to the forwards and overloads in the half-spaces. under utilized it effectively in the early 2000s, with anchoring and as the playmaker, helping secure the 2001–02 title through controlled possession and counter-attacks. In the 4–1–3–2, a single holding midfielder shields the back four, supported by a wide trio in midfield that feeds two strikers, promoting aggressive pressing and numerical superiority in attack. The wide s provide crossing options, while the central attacker links play. The 4–3–2–1, known as the "" for its narrow, tiered shape, deploys three central s, two advanced s close to the lone striker, emphasizing midfield control and verticality over width. Full-backs must push forward to compensate for the lack of natural wingers, creating risks on counters but enabling tight defensive blocks. AC under perfected this in the 2000s, winning the 2003 and 2007 Champions Leagues with and in advanced roles, prioritizing compactness and counter-punching efficiency. The 4–2–3–1 uses a double pivot in midfield for stability, three advanced midfielders (often with wide players tucking in), and a lone forward, blending defensive security with creative outlets ahead. The pivots allow the advanced trio to focus on chance creation, while full-backs overlap for width. Manchester United under adopted it in the early 2000s, notably in 2002–03 and 2003–04, with players like and in fluid roles, contributing to titles through adaptable pressing and transitions.

Defensive back-three variants

Defensive back-three variants in emphasize solidity at the rear with three central defenders, often complemented by wing-backs or additional midfield cover to provide width and transition support, allowing for compact defending against attacks while enabling counterattacking opportunities. These systems contrast with traditional four-back setups by prioritizing central defensive depth, which can absorb pressure from wide or central threats, though they demand disciplined positioning to avoid exposure on the flanks. Historically, such formations gained prominence in European football during periods of tactical evolution, particularly in and , where they balanced defensive resilience with offensive potential. The 3–5–2 formation deploys three central defenders, five midfielders including wing-backs who provide width, and two strikers to exploit spaces on transitions. It was notably revived by Bearzot's Italy at the , where the setup contributed to their tournament victory through a blend of defensive organization and midfield control, with players like thriving up front. In the 2000s, adapted the 3–5–2 at Juventus, using it to secure three consecutive titles from 2011 to 2014 by emphasizing wing-back overlaps and a robust midfield diamond. This formation's flexibility allows the wing-backs to tuck in defensively, forming a temporary back-five when needed. A more attacking iteration, the 3–4–3, features three defenders, four midfielders, and three forwards, prioritizing forward momentum while maintaining a back-three base for security. famously employed this at Chelsea during the season, transforming their campaign to win the title with 30 victories, as the wing-backs and wide forwards stretched defenses, enabling and to score prolifically. The system's success relied on central midfielders like providing cover, allowing the back-three to push higher up the pitch. The 3–4–1–2 variant positions a behind two strikers, supported by three defenders and four midfielders, fostering creativity in the final third. This setup enhances attacking fluidity while the back-three ensures defensive cover during possession loss. Less common is the 3–2–4–1, which includes a double pivot in midfield, wide midfielders for balance, and a lone forward, offering a niche defensive layer from the 1990s, though it saw limited widespread adoption due to its rigidity. Incorporating a sweeper, the 5–3–2 (or 1–4–3–2 in libero terms) places a libero behind a nominal back-four, creating a back-five for enhanced protection, rooted in Italian . Pioneered by coaches like and Herrera at and Inter, the libero—exemplified by or —roamed to initiate attacks, helping dominate European competitions in that era with clean sheets and efficient defending. For ultra-defensive scenarios, such as cup ties, the 5–2–2–1 employs five defenders, two central midfielders, two wingers, and a striker to prioritize containment. This shape frustrates opponents by congesting midfield spaces, enabling counters through the wingers.

Advanced and situational tactics

Hybrid and asymmetric arrangements

Hybrid formations in blend elements from traditional setups to create versatile structures that enhance attacking fluidity or midfield control, often departing from strict to exploit specific opponent weaknesses. These arrangements typically combine defensive with offensive overloads, allowing teams to adapt dynamically during matches. Unlike core symmetric systems such as the 4–3–3, hybrids prioritize positional interchange and surprise elements. The 4–2–2–2, known as the "magic rectangle," features a double pivot in defensive midfield for stability, two box-to-box inside midfielders who provide width and progression, and a pair of deep-lying strikers who drop to link play. This setup creates a balanced rectangular shape in central areas, facilitating quick transitions and overloads in the final third. It gained prominence with Brazil's national team at the 1982 World Cup, where coach deployed it to emphasize technical flair and collective movement, though the team exited in the second group stage despite its innovative design. The 3–3–1–3 arrangement employs three defenders, a midfield trio for coverage, a central to orchestrate attacks, and three forwards for direct pressure. This rare, highly attacking shape emerged in 1990s South American football, where it was experimented with to maximize forward lines against compact defenses, though its vulnerability to counters limited widespread adoption. In the 3–3–3–1, a midfield trio anchors the structure, supported by three advancing forwards and a lone player in a flexible support role, often dropping deep to aid build-up. This experimental variant, emerged in the 1990s, aimed to stretch defenses horizontally while maintaining central dominance, but its complexity restricted it to trial uses in progressive teams seeking fluid overloads. The 4–2–1–3 includes a double pivot for protection, an advanced midfielder to connect lines, and three forwards for penetration, offering a compact yet expansive attacking base. Variations of this hybrid have appeared in , where teams like under various coaches adapted it for high-pressing phases, balancing defensive cover with rapid forward surges. Asymmetric arrangements introduce lopsided elements, such as uneven midfield distribution in a base 4–3–3, to create numerical superiorities on one flank. Mourinho's in 2010 exemplified this with a one-sided setup, overloading the left via Wesley Sneijder's central pulls and Javier Zanetti's overlaps, which disrupted Barcelona's possession in the Champions League semi-final en route to . Such tactics unbalance opponents, forcing adjustments that open spaces elsewhere. Post-2010s, data analytics has profoundly influenced hybrid developments by quantifying player positioning and opponent patterns, enabling coaches to tailor asymmetric overloads based on metrics like (xG) from specific zones. Tools from firms like StatsBomb allow real-time adjustments, as seen in sides blending 4–2–3–1 with lopsided wide shifts to exploit heatmap vulnerabilities, enhancing tactical versatility without rigid . In recent years, including the 2024–25 season, teams like Manchester City have further integrated AI-driven insights for dynamic hybrids in European competitions.

Ultra-defensive and counterattacking shapes

Ultra-defensive and counterattacking shapes in emphasize numerical superiority in defense and midfield to form a compact low block, conceding possession to the opponent while preparing for rapid transitions to exploit spaces on the counter. These setups typically deploy 9 or 10 players behind the ball, creating layers of screening to limit penetration and force long-range efforts or turnovers high up the pitch. The approach sacrifices build-up play for resilience, relying on disciplined positioning and quick recovery runs to neutralize attacks before launching direct counters with long balls to isolated forwards or wingers. The 5–4–1 formation arranges five defenders across the back line—often three center-backs flanked by wing-backs—supported by a flat quartet of midfielders and a lone striker holding up play. This structure excels for underdogs facing superior sides, as the extra defender bolsters central protection while the midfield quartet forms a dense screen to disrupt passing lanes. Greece's national team epitomized this during their improbable Euro 2004 triumph under coach , employing the 5–4–1 in key matches to absorb pressure from favorites like and , ultimately securing the title through set-piece goals and counters. Similarly, the 4–5–1 deploys four defenders with five midfielders arrayed in a compact block—typically a defensive pivot, two central enforcers, and wide players tucking in—to shield the back line and crowd the central third. The lone striker acts as a release valve for transitions, often dropping deep to link with midfield runners. In the 2010s, this shape proved vital in relegation scraps, where teams like Stoke City under used it to grind out draws against top sides, maintaining survival through midfield overloads that restricted opponents to low-quality chances. An extreme variant, the 4–6–0 omits a traditional forward, packing six midfielders to maximize defensive density and enable late surges from deep-lying players. This strikerless setup prioritizes all-out resistance, with midfielders rotating to provide counter threats via speed on the overlap. The 3–6–1 pushes even further with three center-backs, six midfielders forming a "box" to dominate the middle, and one forward as the outlet. This extreme packing overwhelms central areas, forcing opponents wide where full-backs can double up. In the 1990s, such shapes appeared in high-stakes cup ties. Core tactical principles revolve around the deep block—positioning the team near the goal line to compress space—and swift transitions, where turnovers trigger immediate vertical passes to bypass pressing. from the highlight their efficacy in reducing concessions in high-pressure environments. Despite their , these shapes face as "anti-football" for prioritizing negation over spectacle, with Mourinho's "parking the bus" tactic—coined after a draw with —drawing ire for stifling open play. Yet, their effectiveness shines in stages, where underdogs like in or Mourinho's Inter in the Champions League final used them to secure upsets by minimizing concessions in high-pressure environments.

Fluid and incomplete structures

In fluid and incomplete structures, formations deviate from rigid positional assignments, allowing players to interchange roles dynamically during matches to exploit spaces and adapt to opponents. This approach emphasizes versatility over fixed hierarchies, often resulting in "incomplete" setups that lack traditional dedicated forwards, such as the false 9 in a 4–3–3 system. The false 9, where a nominal centre-forward drops deep into midfield to create overloads and disrupt defensive lines, was pioneered by Hungary's national team in the 1950s under manager , with exemplifying the role by wearing the number 9 jersey while operating as a deep-lying to counter the era's WM formations. This tactic confused opponents by pulling centre-backs out of position, enabling Hungary's fluid attacking patterns that overwhelmed 6–3 at in 1953 and 7–1 in the return fixture. The concept gained modern prominence during Barcelona's 2008–09 season under Pep Guardiola, where Lionel Messi was deployed as a false 9 for the first time in May 2009, dropping between the lines to link midfield and attack while wide forwards like Pedro and Thierry Henry exploited the resulting gaps. Messi's movement created numerical superiorities in central areas, contributing to Barcelona's 6–2 El Clásico victory over Real Madrid in May 2009 and their treble-winning campaign, as his deeper positioning allowed for quick combinations that dismantled high defensive lines. This role continued to define Barcelona's play in the 2009–10 season. These incomplete structures prioritize midfield control over a static striker presence, fostering unpredictability but requiring precise timing to maintain attacking threat. Fluid shifts represent another evolution, where teams transition formations in possession—such as advancing a full-back to convert a 4–3–3 into a 3–4–3—enabling adaptive overloads against pressing opponents. Possession-based sides like Guardiola's Manchester City, since his 2016 arrival, have epitomized this through positional rotations that fluidly alter shapes, often inverting full-backs like or into midfield to build from the back and overload half-spaces. This approach, rooted in Guardiola's emphasis on "rest defense" and quick recirculation, has sustained City's dominance, with their 2023 treble showcasing how such shifts maintain control during prolonged possession phases exceeding 65% on average. The 3–6–1 emerges as a fluid variant focused on midfield overloads, deploying three defenders, six midfielders in layered banks, and a lone forward to dominate central zones while adapting to opposition presses. This structure, rarely used in its pure form but influential in hybrid applications, allows the midfield block to shift laterally or forward, creating temporary 3–5–2 or 4–5–1 shapes to counter wide threats or exploit transitions. Teams employing it prioritize control through short passing networks, though its elasticity demands disciplined tracking to avoid exposure on flanks. In the 2020s, trends toward inverted full-backs and multi-role players have amplified fluid structures, with defenders like City's Stones or Liverpool's tucking centrally to augment midfield numbers, influenced by VAR's emphasis on offside precision and high-pressing systems that reward quick recoveries. This evolution, seen in over 40% of matches by 2024, enables multi-functional players to rotate seamlessly, but it integrates with pressing regimes like gegenpressing to mitigate risks from lost possession. Recent examples from the 2024–25 season include Arsenal's use of asymmetric fluid shifts in Champions League matches. Liverpool under Jürgen Klopp (2015–2024) exemplified positional rotation within a 4–3–3, where forwards like acted as false 9s, midfielders like pushed into half-spaces, and full-backs overlapped or inverted to form a 2–3–5 in attack. This fluidity powered 's high-intensity transitions, contributing to their 2019 Champions League and 2020 titles through relentless rotations that generated numerous goals from open play in the 2019–20 season. Implementing fluid and incomplete structures poses significant challenges, primarily demanding exceptional player fitness to sustain high pressing and rapid shifts, as seen in Klopp's gegenpressing which fatigues squads over 90 minutes. Failures in counter-pressing can expose teams to swift counters, with coordination lapses leading to defensive vulnerabilities if rotations misalign, underscoring the need for tactical intelligence and physical conditioning.

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