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Highest averages method
Highest averages method
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The highest averages, divisor, or divide-and-round methods[1] are a family of apportionment rules, i.e. algorithms for fair division of seats in a legislature between several groups (like political parties or states).[1][2] More generally, divisor methods are used to round shares of a total to a fraction with a fixed denominator (e.g. percentage points, which must add up to 100).[2]

The methods aim to treat voters equally by ensuring legislators represent an equal number of voters by ensuring every party has the same seats-to-votes ratio (or divisor).[3]: 30  Such methods divide the number of votes by the number of votes per seat to get the final apportionment. By doing so, the method maintains proportional representation, as a party with e.g. twice as many votes will win about twice as many seats.[3]: 30 

The divisor methods are generally preferred by social choice theorists and mathematicians to the largest remainder methods, as they produce more-proportional results by most metrics and are less susceptible to apportionment paradoxes.[3][4][5][6] In particular, divisor methods avoid the population paradox and spoiler effects, unlike the largest remainder methods.[5]

History

[edit]

Divisor methods were first invented by Thomas Jefferson to comply with a constitutional requirement that states have at most one representative per 30,000 people. His solution was to divide each state's population by 30,000 before rounding down.[3]: 20 

Apportionment would become a major topic of debate in Congress, especially after the discovery of pathologies in many superficially-reasonable rounding rules.[3]: 20  Similar debates would appear in Europe after the adoption of proportional representation, typically as a result of large parties attempting to introduce thresholds and other barriers to entry for small parties.[7] Such apportionments often have substantial consequences, as in the 1870 reapportionment, when Congress used an ad-hoc apportionment to favor Republican states.[8] Had each state's electoral vote total been exactly equal to its entitlement, or had Congress used Webster's method or a largest remainders method (as it had since 1840), the 1876 election would have gone to Tilden instead of Hayes.[8][9][3]: 3, 37 

Definitions

[edit]

The two names for these methods—highest averages and divisors—reflect two different ways of thinking about them, and their two independent inventions. However, both procedures are equivalent and give the same answer.[1]

Divisor methods are based on rounding rules, defined using a signpost sequence post(k), where k ≤ post(k) ≤ k+1. Each signpost marks the boundary between natural numbers, with numbers being rounded down if and only if they are less than the signpost.[2]

Divisor procedure

[edit]

The divisor procedure apportions seats by searching for a divisor or electoral quota. This divisor can be thought of as the number of votes a party needs to earn one additional seat in the legislature, the ideal population of a congressional district, or the number of voters represented by each legislator.[1]

If each legislator represented an equal number of voters, the number of seats for each state could be found by dividing the population by the divisor.[1] However, seat allocations must be whole numbers, so to find the apportionment for a given state we must round (using the signpost sequence) after dividing. Thus, each party's apportionment is given by:[1]

Usually, the divisor is initially set to equal the Hare quota. However, this procedure may assign too many or too few seats. In this case the apportionments for each state will not add up to the total legislature size. A feasible divisor can be found by trial and error.[10]

Highest averages procedure

[edit]

With the highest averages algorithm, every party begins with 0 seats. Then, at each iteration, we allocate a seat to the party with the highest vote average, i.e. the party with the most votes per seat. This method proceeds until all seats are allocated.[1]

However, it is unclear whether it is better to look at the vote average before assigning the seat, what the average will be after assigning the seat, or if we should compromise with a continuity correction. These approaches each give slightly different apportionments.[1] In general, we can define the averages using the signpost sequence:

With the highest averages procedure, every party begins with 0 seats. Then, at each iteration, we allocate a seat to the party with the highest vote average, i.e. the party with the most votes per seat. This method proceeds until all seats are allocated.[1]

Specific methods

[edit]

While all divisor methods share the same general procedure, they differ in the choice of signpost sequence and therefore rounding rule. Note that for methods where the first signpost is zero, every party with at least one vote will receive a seat before any party receives a second seat; in practice, this typically means that every party must receive at least one seat, unless disqualified by some electoral threshold.[2]

Divisor formulas
Method Signposts Rounding
of Seats
Approx. first values
Adams k Up 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Dean 2÷(1k + 1k+1) Harmonic 0.00 1.33 2.40 3.43
Huntington–Hill Geometric 0.00 1.41 2.45 3.46
Stationary
(e.g. r = 13)
k + r Weighted 0.33 1.33 2.33 3.33
Webster/Sainte-Laguë k + 12 Arithmetic 0.50 1.50 2.50 3.50
Power mean
(e.g. p = 2)
Power mean 0.71 1.58 2.55 3.54
Jefferson/D'Hondt k + 1 Down 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00

Jefferson (D'Hondt) method

[edit]

Thomas Jefferson was the first to propose a divisor method, in 1792;[1] it was later independently developed by Belgian political scientist Victor d'Hondt in 1878. It assigns the representative to the list that would be most underrepresented at the end of the round.[1] It remains the most-common method for proportional representation to this day.[1]

Jefferson's method uses the sequence , i.e. (1, 2, 3, ...),[11] which means it will always round a party's apportionment down.[1]

Jefferson's apportionment never falls below the lower end of the ideal frame, and it minimizes the worst-case overrepresentation in the legislature.[1] However, it performs poorly when judged by most other metrics of proportionality.[12] The rule typically gives large parties an excessive number of seats, with their seat share often exceeding their entitlement rounded up.[3]: 81 

This pathology led to widespread mockery of Jefferson's method when it was learned Jefferson's method could "round" New York's apportionment of 40.5 up to 42, with Senator Mahlon Dickerson saying the extra seat must come from the "ghosts of departed representatives".[3]: 34 

Adams' method

[edit]

Adams' method was conceived of by John Quincy Adams after noticing Jefferson's method allocated too few seats to smaller states.[13] It can be described as the inverse of Jefferson's method; it awards a seat to the party that has the most votes per seat before the new seat is added. The divisor function is post(k) = k, which is equivalent to always rounding up.[12]

Adams' apportionment never exceeds the upper end of the ideal frame, and minimizes the worst-case underrepresentation.[1] However, like Jefferson's method, Adams' method performs poorly according to most metrics of proportionality.[12] It also often violates the lower seat quota.[14]

Adams' method was suggested as part of the Cambridge compromise for apportionment of European parliament seats to member states, with the aim of satisfying degressive proportionality.[15]

Webster (Sainte-Laguë) method

[edit]

The Sainte-Laguë or Webster method, first described in 1832 by American statesman and senator Daniel Webster and later independently in 1910 by the French mathematician André Sainte-Lague, uses the fencepost sequence post(k) = k+.5 (i.e. 0.5, 1.5, 2.5); this corresponds to the standard rounding rule. Equivalently, the odd integers (1, 3, 5...) can be used to calculate the averages instead.[1][16]

The Webster method produces more proportional apportionments than Jefferson's by almost every metric of misrepresentation.[17] As such, it is typically preferred to D'Hondt by political scientists and mathematicians, at least in situations where manipulation is difficult or unlikely (as in large parliaments).[18] It is also notable for minimizing seat bias even when dealing with parties that win very small numbers of seats.[19] The Webster method can theoretically violate the ideal frame, although this is extremely rare for even moderately-large parliaments; it has never been observed to violate quota in any United States congressional apportionment.[18]

In small districts with no threshold, parties can manipulate Webster by splitting into many lists, each of which wins a full seat with less than a Hare quota's worth of votes. This is often addressed by modifying the first divisor to be slightly larger (often a value of 0.7 or 1), which creates an implicit threshold.[20]

Huntington–Hill method

[edit]

In the Huntington–Hill method, the signpost sequence is post(k) = k (k+1), the geometric mean of the neighboring numbers. Conceptually, this method rounds to the integer that has the smallest relative (percent) difference. For example, the difference between 2.47 and 3 is about 19%, while the difference from 2 is about 21%, so 2.47 is rounded up. This method is used for allotting seats in the US House of Representatives among the states.[1]

The Huntington-Hill method tends to produce very similar results to the Webster method, except that it guarantees every state or party at least one seat (see Highest averages method § Zero-seat apportionments). When first used to assign seats in the House, the two methods produced identical results; in their second use, they differed only in assigning a single seat to Michigan or Arkansas.[3]: 58 

Comparison of properties

[edit]

Zero-seat apportionments

[edit]

Huntington-Hill, Dean, and Adams' method all have a value of 0 for the first fencepost, giving an average of ∞. Thus, without a threshold, all parties that have received at least one vote will also receive at least one seat.[1] This property can be desirable (as when apportioning seats to states) or undesirable (as when apportioning seats to party lists in an election), in which case the first divisor may be adjusted to create a natural threshold.[21]

Bias

[edit]

There are many metrics of seat bias. While the Webster method is sometimes described as "uniquely" unbiased,[18] this uniqueness property relies on a technical definition of bias, which is defined as the average difference between a state's number of seats and its seat entitlement. In other words, a method is called unbiased if the number of seats a state receives is, on average across many elections, equal to its seat entitlement.[18]

By this definition, the Webster method is the least-biased apportionment method,[19] while Huntington-Hill exhibits a mild bias towards smaller parties.[18] However, other researchers have noted that slightly different definitions of bias, generally based on percent errors, find the opposite result (The Huntington-Hill method is unbiased, while the Webster method is slightly biased towards large parties).[19][22]

In practice, the difference between these definitions is small when handling parties or states with more than one seat.[19] Thus, both the Huntington-Hill and Webster methods can be considered unbiased or low-bias methods (unlike the Jefferson or Adams methods).[19][22] A 1929 report to Congress by the National Academy of Sciences recommended the Huntington-Hill method,[23] while the Supreme Court has ruled the choice to be a matter of opinion.[22]

Comparison and examples

[edit]

Example: Jefferson

[edit]

The following example shows how Jefferson's method can differ substantially from less-biased methods such as Webster. In this election, the largest party wins 46% of the vote, but takes 52.5% of the seats, enough to win a majority outright against a coalition of all other parties (which together reach 54% of the vote). Moreover, it does this in violation of quota: the largest party is entitled only to 9.7 seats, but it wins 11 regardless. The largest congressional district is nearly twice the size of the smallest district. The Webster method shows none of these properties, with a maximum error of 22.6%.

Jefferson Webster
Party Yellow White Red Green Purple Total Party Yellow White Red Green Purple Total
Votes 46,000 25,100 12,210 8,350 8,340 100,000 Votes 46,000 25,100 12,210 8,350 8,340 100,000
Seats 11 6 2 1 1 21 Seats 9 5 3 2 2 21
Ideal 9.660 5.271 2.564 1.754 1.751 21 Ideal 9.660 5.271 2.564 1.754 1.751 21
Votes/Seat 4182 4183 6105 8350 8340 4762 Votes/Seat 5111 5020 4070 4175 4170 4762
% Error 13.0% 13.0% -24.8% -56.2% -56.0% (100.%) (% Range) -7.1% -5.3% 15.7% 13.2% 13.3% (22.6%)
Seats Averages Signposts Seats Averages Signposts
1 46,000 25,100 12,210 8,350 8,340 1.00 1 92,001 50,201 24,420 16,700 16,680 0.50
2 23,000 12,550 6,105 4,175 4,170 2.00 2 30,667 16,734 8,140 5,567 5,560 1.50
3 15,333 8,367 4,070 2,783 2,780 3.00 3 18,400 10,040 4,884 3,340 3,336 2.50
4 11,500 6,275 3,053 2,088 2,085 4.00 4 13,143 7,172 3,489 2,386 2,383 3.50
5 9,200 5,020 2,442 1,670 1,668 5.00 5 10,222 5,578 2,713 1,856 1,853 4.50
6 7,667 4,183 2,035 1,392 1,390 6.00 6 8,364 4,564 2,220 1,518 1,516 5.50
7 6,571 3,586 1,744 1,193 1,191 7.00 7 7,077 3,862 1,878 1,285 1,283 6.50
8 5,750 3,138 1,526 1,044 1,043 8.00 8 6,133 3,347 1,628 1,113 1,112 7.50
9 5,111 2,789 1,357 928 927 9.00 9 5,412 2,953 1,436 982 981 8.50
10 4,600 2,510 1,221 835 834 10.00 10 4,842 2,642 1,285 879 878 9.50
11 4,182 2,282 1,110 759 758 11.00 11 4,381 2,391 1,163 795 794 10.50

Example: Adams

[edit]

The following example shows a case where Adams' method fails to give a majority to a party winning 55% of the vote, again in violation of their quota entitlement.

Adams' Method Webster Method
Party Yellow White Red Green Purple Total Party Yellow White Red Green Purple Total
Votes 55,000 17,290 16,600 5,560 5,550 100,000 Votes 55,000 17,290 16,600 5,560 5,550 100,000
Seats 10 4 3 2 2 21 Seats 11 4 4 1 1 21
Ideal 11.550 3.631 3.486 1.168 1.166 21 Ideal 11.550 3.631 3.486 1.168 1.166 21
Votes/Seat 5500 4323 5533 2780 2775 4762 Votes/Seat 4583 4323 5533 5560 5550 4762
% Error -14.4% 9.7% -15.0% 53.8% 54.0% (99.4%) (% Range) 3.8% 9.7% -15.0% -15.5% -15.3% (28.6%)
Seats Averages Signposts Seats Averages Signposts
1 0.00 1 110,001 34,580 33,200 11,120 11,100 0.50
2 55,001 17,290 16,600 5,560 5,550 1.00 2 36,667 11,527 11,067 3,707 3,700 1.50
3 27,500 8,645 8,300 2,780 2,775 2.00 3 22,000 6,916 6,640 2,224 2,220 2.50
4 18,334 5,763 5,533 1,853 1,850 3.00 4 15,714 4,940 4,743 1,589 1,586 3.50
5 13,750 4,323 4,150 1,390 1,388 4.00 5 12,222 3,842 3,689 1,236 1,233 4.50
6 11,000 3,458 3,320 1,112 1,110 5.00 6 10,000 3,144 3,018 1,011 1,009 5.50
7 9,167 2,882 2,767 927 925 6.00 7 8,462 2,660 2,554 855 854 6.50
8 7,857 2,470 2,371 794 793 7.00 8 7,333 2,305 2,213 741 740 7.50
9 6,875 2,161 2,075 695 694 8.00 9 6,471 2,034 1,953 654 653 8.50
10 6,111 1,921 1,844 618 617 9.00 10 5,790 1,820 1,747 585 584 9.50
11 5,500 1,729 1,660 556 555 10.00 11 5,238 1,647 1,581 530 529 10.50
Seats 10 4 3 2 2 Seats 11 4 4 1 1

Example: All systems

[edit]

The following shows a worked-out example for all voting systems. Notice how Huntington-Hill and Adams' methods give every party one seat before assigning any more, unlike Webster or Jefferson.

Jefferson method Webster method Huntington–Hill method Adams method
party Yellow White Red Green Blue Pink Yellow White Red Green Blue Pink Yellow White Red Green Blue Pink Yellow White Red Green Blue Pink
votes 47,000 16,000 15,900 12,000 6,000 3,100 47,000 16,000 15,900 12,000 6,000 3,100 47,000 16,000 15,900 12,000 6,000 3,100 47,000 16,000 15,900 12,000 6,000 3,100
seats 5 2 2 1 0 0 4 2 2 1 1 0 4 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1
votes/seat 9,400 8,000 7,950 12,000 11,750 8,000 7,950 12,000 6,000 11,750 8,000 15,900 12,000 6,000 3,100 15,667 8,000 7,950 12,000 6,000 3,100
seat seat allocation seat allocation seat allocation seat allocation
1 47,000 47,000
2 23,500 16,000
3 16,000 15,900
4 15,900 15,667
5 15,667 12,000
6 12,000 9,400
7 11,750 6,714 33,234 47,000
8 9,400 6,000 19,187 23,500
9 8,000 5,333 13,567 16,000
10 7,950 5,300 11,314 15,900

Stationary calculator

[edit]

The following table calculates the apportionment for any stationary signpost function. In other words, it rounds an apportionment if the vote average is above the selected bar.

Properties

[edit]

Monotonicity

[edit]

Divisor methods are generally preferred by mathematicians to largest remainder methods[24] because they are less susceptible to apportionment paradoxes.[5] In particular, divisor methods satisfy population monotonicity, i.e. voting for a party can never cause it to lose seats.[5] Such population paradoxes occur by increasing the electoral quota, which can cause different states' remainders to respond erratically.[3]: Tbl.A7.2  Divisor methods also satisfy resource or house monotonicity, which says that increasing the number of seats in a legislature should not cause a state to lose a seat.[5][3]: Cor.4.3.1 

Min-Max inequality

[edit]

Every divisor method can be defined using the min-max inequality. Letting brackets denote array indexing, an allocation is valid if-and-only-if:[1]: 78–81 

max votes[party]/ post(seats[party]) ≤ min votes[party]/ post(seats[party]+1)

In other words, it is impossible to lower the highest vote average by reassigning a seat from one party to another. Every number in this range is a possible divisor. If the inequality is strict, the solution is unique; otherwise, there is an exactly tied vote in the final apportionment stage.[1]: 83 

Quota rule violation

[edit]

On the negative side, divisor methods might violate the quota rule: they might give some agents less than their lower quota (quota rounded down) or more than their upper quota (quota rounded up). This can be fixed by using quota-capped divisor methods, at the cost of losing population monotonicity.

Simulation experiments show that different divisor methods have greatly different probabilities of violating quota (when the number of votes is selected by an exponential distribution):

  • The probability for Adams and D'Hondt is 98%;
  • The probability for D'Hondt with a minimum requirement of 1 is 78%;
  • The probability for Dean is about 9%, and for Huntington-Hill about 4%;
  • The probability for Webster/Sainte-Laguë is the smallest - only 0.16%.

A divisor method is called stationary if its divisor is of the form for some real number . The methods of Adams, Webster and DHondt are stationary, while those of Dean and Huntington-Hill are not.

Method families

[edit]

The divisor methods described above can be generalized into families.

Generalized average

[edit]

In general, it is possible to construct an apportionment method from any generalized average function, by defining the signpost function as post(k) = avg(k, k+1).[1]

Stationary family

[edit]

A divisor method is called stationary[25]: 68  if for some real number , its signposts are of the form . The Adams, Webster, and d'Hondt methods are stationary, while Dean and Huntington-Hill are not. A stationary method corresponds to rounding numbers up if they exceed the weighted arithmetic mean of k and k+1.[1] Smaller values of r are friendlier to smaller parties.[19]

Danish elections allocate leveling seats at the province level using-member constituencies. It divides the number of votes received by a party in a multi-member constituency by 0.33, 1.33, 2.33, 3.33 etc. The fencepost sequence is given by post(k) = k+13; this aims to allocate seats closer to equally, rather than exactly proportionally.[26]

Power mean family

[edit]

The power mean family of divisor methods includes the Adams, Huntington-Hill, Webster, Dean, and Jefferson methods (either directly or as limits). For a given constant p, the power mean method has signpost function post(k) = pkp + (k+1)p. The Huntington-Hill method corresponds to the limit as p tends to 0, while Adams and Jefferson represent the limits as p tends to negative or positive infinity.[1]

The family also includes the less-common Dean's method for p=-1, which corresponds to the harmonic mean. Dean's method is equivalent to rounding to the nearest average—every state has its seat count rounded in a way that minimizes the difference between the average district size and the ideal district size. For example:[3]: 29 

The 1830 representative population of Massachusetts was 610,408: if it received 12 seats its average constituency size would be 50,867; if it received 13 it would be 46,954. So, if the divisor were 47,700 as Polk proposed, Massachusetts should receive 13 seats because 46,954 is closer to 47,700 than is 50,867.

Rounding to the vote average with the smallest relative error once again yields the Huntington-Hill method because |log(xy)| = |log(yx)|, i.e. relative differences are reversible. This fact was central to Edward V. Huntington's use of relative (instead of absolute) errors in measuring misrepresentation, and to his advocacy for Hill's rule:[27] Huntington argued the choice of apportionment method should not depend on how the equation for equal representation is rearranged, and only the relative error (minimized by Hill's rule) satisfies this property.[3]: 53 

Stolarsky mean family

[edit]

Similarly, the Stolarsky mean can be used to define a family of divisor methods that minimizes the generalized entropy index of misrepresentation.[28] This family includes the logarithmic mean, the geometric mean, the identric mean and the arithmetic mean. The Stolarsky means can be justified as minimizing these misrepresentation metrics, which are of major importance in the study of information theory.[29]

Modifications

[edit]

Thresholds

[edit]

Many countries have electoral thresholds for representation, where parties must win a specified fraction of the vote in order to be represented; parties with fewer votes than the threshold requires for representation are eliminated.[20] Other countries modify the first divisor to introduce a natural threshold; when using the Webster method, the first divisor is often set to 0.7 or 1.0 (the latter being called the full-seat modification).[20]

Majority-preservation clause

[edit]

A majority-preservation clause guarantees any party winning a majority of the vote will receive at least half the seats in a legislature.[20] Without such a clause, it is possible for a party with slightly more than half the vote to receive just barely less than half the seats (if using a method other than D'Hondt).[20] This is typically accomplished by adding seats to the legislature until an apportionment that preserves the majority for a parliament is found.[20]

Surplus vote agreement

[edit]

Some electoral systems, such as Switzerland, Israel, and European Parliament elections in Denmark, permit surplus vote agreements, whereby two or more parties are regarded as a single bloc for the purposes of seat allocation; within this bloc, a second seat allocation takes place between the parties to the agreement.

Quota-capped divisor method

[edit]

A quota-capped divisor method is an apportionment method where we begin by assigning every state its lower quota of seats. Then, we add seats one-by-one to the state with the highest votes-per-seat average, so long as adding an additional seat does not result in the state exceeding its upper quota.[30] However, quota-capped divisor methods violate the participation criterion (also called population monotonicity)—it is possible for a party to lose a seat as a result of winning more votes.[3]: Tbl.A7.2 

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The highest averages method is a family of methods used to apportion seats in multi-member constituencies under electoral systems, allocating legislative seats to parties based on the highest quotients obtained by dividing their vote totals by a predetermined sequence of divisors. These methods, which include prominent variants such as the D'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë procedures, aim to translate vote shares into seat shares while addressing the indivisibility of seats through iterative assignment to the highest resulting averages. Developed in the late 18th and 19th centuries— with roots in Thomas Jefferson's 1792 proposal for U.S. congressional and formalized by Victor d'Hondt in the 1880s for Belgian elections—the method has become one of the most widely adopted tools for seat allocation in party-list systems across and beyond. In practice, each party's votes are divided successively by divisors starting from 1 (and increasing, e.g., by 1 for D'Hondt or by 2 for Sainte-Laguë), with seats awarded sequentially to the party producing the largest quotient until the available seats are exhausted. While effective in promoting stable majorities by favoring larger parties—ensuring that a party with an absolute majority of votes secures a majority of seats—the highest averages method exhibits a bias against smaller parties, often resulting in their underrepresentation compared to more quota-based alternatives like the largest remainder method. This characteristic has led to its use in over a dozen European Union member states for parliamentary elections, balancing proportionality with incentives for broader electoral coalitions.

Historical Development

Origins in Early Apportionment Challenges

The apportionment of seats in the United States presented one of the earliest systematic challenges in fairly distributing indivisible legislative positions based on data, as mandated by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. , which requires representatives and direct taxes to be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers, determined by an actual enumeration conducted every ten years. Following the first in , which counted a total of 3,929,214, faced the task of allocating 105 seats—a number derived from aiming for one representative per approximately 30,000 inhabitants—while grappling with fractional quotas that arose when dividing state populations by this standard divisor. This process highlighted the core tension in : ensuring integer seat assignments that approximated without systematic bias toward small or large states, a problem compounded by the constitutional prohibition on fractional representatives. Initial efforts relied on Alexander Hamilton's proposal, which calculated each state's quota as population divided by the national divisor and assigned seats via the integer part plus largest remainders to reach the total, a method akin to the later Hamilton or largest remainder approach. However, the bill embodying this method, passed by Congress in early 1792, was vetoed by President George Washington on April 5, 1792, primarily because it fixed the total seats at a level that deviated from strict constitutional ratios for taxation and representation, potentially allowing future inconsistencies. This veto, the first in U.S. presidential history, underscored the need for a method that adhered more closely to proportional principles while avoiding paradoxes like assigning more seats to states with proportionally smaller growth. In response, , serving as and responsible for implementation, advanced an alternative divisor-based approach in 1792, which allocated seats by generating successive quotients for each state—dividing its population by 1, 2, 3, and so on—and selecting the largest such quotients across all states until the total seats were filled. This highest averages method, enacted via the Apportionment Act of April 14, 1792, which set the House at 105 members, prioritized larger quotients to favor states with higher populations, ensuring no state received fewer seats than its integer quota but often granting extra seats to larger entities to fill the total. Adopted out of necessity to resolve the , Jefferson's method addressed the indivisibility issue through iterative division and ranking, marking the inaugural application of a highest averages procedure in legislative apportionment and setting a precedent for handling quota fractions via sequences rather than remainders. It remained in use for apportionments from 1792 until 1832, despite later criticisms for biasing toward larger states, as evidenced by its tendency to allocate additional seats beyond strict quotas to meet fixed totals.

Independent Inventions and Key Contributors

The highest averages method, encompassing various divisor-based techniques, emerged through independent inventions across different national contexts, primarily in the late 18th and 19th centuries, as solutions to the challenge of allocating indivisible seats proportionally to vote shares or population figures. first formalized a version of the method—now known as the Jefferson or D'Hondt procedure—in his 1791 report to on apportioning U.S. seats following the 1790 census, advocating division of state populations by successive integers starting from 1 and assigning seats based on the largest quotients to favor larger states and ensure a constitutional minimum representation. This approach was adopted for U.S. apportionments from 1792 through 1842, despite later criticisms of its bias toward populous states. Nearly a century later, Belgian and Victor D'Hondt independently reinvented an identical procedure in 1882 for allocating parliamentary seats in systems, publishing it as a mathematical formula to distribute seats by repeatedly dividing party vote totals by 1, 2, 3, and so on, then selecting the highest resulting averages until all seats are filled. D'Hondt's formulation, unaware of Jefferson's prior work, gained traction in European electoral practice, notably in Belgium's adoption of in 1899, where it addressed fragmentation in multi-party legislatures without reference to American precedents. A parallel independent development occurred with the Webster/Sainte-Laguë variant, which modifies divisors to odd numbers (1, 3, 5, etc.) for greater neutrality toward smaller parties. American statesman proposed this in 1832 during debates over equitable apportionment, emphasizing rounded quotients to balance representation without inherent bias to large or small entities; it was implemented in the U.S. from 1842 to 1852 and again from 1901 onward in modified forms. French mathematician André Sainte-Laguë separately derived the same method in 1910, applying it to graph theory-inspired models of seat allocation and advocating its use in French elections for its mathematical fairness in minimizing vote-seat disproportionality. These reinventions highlight the method's appeal as a first-principles solution to indivisibility in , converging on similar algorithms despite isolated origins in U.S. constitutional mechanics and European parliamentary reforms.

Initial Adoption and Evolution in Electoral Practice

Belgium adopted the highest averages method, specifically the D'Hondt variant, as part of its pioneering implementation of proportional representation in national elections through the electoral reform of 1899, marking the first such nationwide use globally. This reform addressed the disproportionate outcomes of the prior majoritarian system, which had favored larger parties amid rising demands for fairer representation from emerging socialist and liberal factions. The method was applied in the 1900 Belgian general election, dividing votes by successive divisors (1, 2, 3, etc.) to allocate seats to parties with the highest resulting quotients, thereby promoting greater proportionality while retaining a slight bias toward larger lists to maintain governmental stability. Following its Belgian origins, the highest averages method proliferated across Europe in the early 20th century, becoming a cornerstone of party-list proportional representation systems. Countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland incorporated D'Hondt or similar divisor approaches by the 1910s and 1920s to facilitate multi-party parliaments post-World War I, often as a response to fragmented electorates and demands for minority inclusion. The Sainte-Laguë variant, proposed by French mathematician André Sainte-Laguë in 1910 with odd-numbered divisors (1, 3, 5, etc.) to reduce bias against smaller parties, saw initial adoption in Norway in 1921 and subsequently in Sweden and New Zealand, reflecting a shift toward enhanced neutrality in seat allocation. Evolution continued through mid-century adaptations, with southern European democracies like and embedding D'Hondt in their post-1970s constitutions to balance proportionality and effective governance amid transitions from . , which employed D'Hondt until the 1983 Bundestag election, transitioned to a modified Sainte-Laguë system thereafter to mitigate advantages for major parties, incorporating a 5% threshold for additional fragmentation control. By the late , highest averages methods underpinned over half of European PR systems, with refinements like initial divisor adjustments (e.g., Denmark's 1.4 factor) addressing critiques of large-party bias while preserving mathematical simplicity and resistance to manipulation.

Mathematical Foundations

Core Principles of Divisor Methods

Divisor methods, collectively known as highest averages methods, allocate seats in multi-member constituencies by computing a series of s for each party, derived from dividing the party's total votes by an increasing sequence of positive s, and then awarding seats to the parties corresponding to the highest such s until the total number of seats is exhausted. This process ensures that each selected represents a marginal claim for an additional seat, where the quotient value approximates the average votes per seat for that allocation. The s are chosen as a non-decreasing sequence d1d2d_1 \leq d_2 \leq \cdots, often starting with d1=1d_1 = 1, such that the kk-th for a party with vv votes is v/dkv / d_k, reflecting the incremental average if the party receives its kk-th seat. [float-right] The core principle underlying this approach is to prioritize allocations that maximize the "highest averages," meaning seats are granted iteratively to the party for which adding the next seat yields the highest possible vote-to-seat at that step, equivalent to selecting the global highest quotients in batch form. This iterative equivalence holds because the quotients decrease monotonically for each party as kk increases, allowing the method to simulate a greedy assignment without recomputing averages sequentially. For instance, in the standard d'Hondt variant, divisors are the integers 1, 2, 3, ..., producing quotients that favor parties with larger vote shares by making their higher-order quotients competitive longer than for smaller parties. These methods inherently satisfy house monotonicity, as increasing a party's votes cannot decrease its seat allocation, due to the non-decreasing nature of ensuring that all its quotients rise uniformly. However, the choice of divisor sequence determines bias: linear divisors (e.g., dk=kd_k = k) advantage larger parties by compressing small-party quotients faster, while adjusted sequences like dk=2k1d_k = 2k-1 (Sainte-Laguë) mitigate this by slowing the decline for initial seats. Empirical analysis of elections from 1979 to 2014 shows divisor methods like d'Hondt yielding effective thresholds around 5-10% in larger districts, balancing proportionality with stability by under-representing fringe parties.762352_EN.pdf) The mathematical rigor of divisor methods stems from their axiomatic foundations, including anonymity (permutation invariance) and neutrality (vote scaling), though they may violate quota conditions where a party's seats deviate from its ideal vote proportion by more than one.

The Highest Averages Allocation Procedure

The highest averages allocation procedure is an iterative within the family of divisor methods used for proportional seat apportionment in multi-party elections. It assigns seats one at a time to the party whose prospective —defined as the ratio of votes received to the number of seats it would hold after allocation—is the highest among all parties at each step. This approach, equivalent to selecting the largest quotients from the set of all possible vote divisions by positive integers, ensures that seats are distributed to minimize disparities in representation while favoring parties with stronger vote shares for marginal allocations. The procedure begins with zero seats assigned to each party. For the first seat, each party's quotient is its total votes divided by 1, and the seat goes to the party with the maximum quotient. Subsequent seats follow the same principle: for a party with sis_i seats already allocated and viv_i votes, the quotient for the next potential seat is vi/(si+1)v_i / (s_i + 1). The party maximizing this value receives the seat, and its seat count increments. This continues until all seats are distributed. Mathematically, the average for the prospective allocation is given by

where the post-allocation divisor function is typically post(k)=k+1\operatorname{post}(k) = k + 1, yielding

for the standard arithmetic progression of divisors starting at 1.
This iterative process is computationally equivalent to generating the sequence of quotients vi/kv_i / k for each party ii and integer k=1,2,k = 1, 2, \dots, then selecting the hh largest values (where hh is the total seats), with the number of selected quotients per party determining its allocation. The method's efficiency allows linear-time implementations for large-scale applications, as optimized algorithms avoid exhaustive quotient generation by maintaining priority queues of current maxima. It inherently satisfies lower quota bounds but may violate upper quotas, prioritizing higher averages over strict proportionality in edge cases.

Role of Divisors and Rounding Rules

In highest averages methods, also known as divisor methods, the divisor d(1),d(2),d(1), d(2), \dots , a strictly increasing and unbounded of , plays a central role in determining allocations by computing successive averages for each or state as vi/d(k)v_i / d(k), where viv_i is the vote count or for entity ii and kk is the number. Seats are assigned to the MM highest such quotients across all entities, ensuring the total equals the house size MM. The specific form of the sequence controls the relative thresholds for awarding additional seats, thereby influencing the method's toward larger or smaller entities; for instance, sequences with lower initial divisors, such as d(k)=kd(k) = k, yield higher initial quotients for large-vote entities, favoring them in competitive allocations. The shape of the divisor sequence, often characterized by its asymptotic growth and initial values, dictates the method's proportionality properties and potential violations of criteria like the quota condition, where allocations may deviate from the exact proportional share by more than one seat. Sequences growing linearly like d(k)=k+rd(k) = k + r for some offset rr adjust the bias: r=0r = 0 (Jefferson method) biases toward larger parties, while r=0.5r = 0.5 (Webster method) aims for neutrality by aligning rounding points closer to standard arithmetic means. Empirical analysis shows that slower-growing sequences initially amplify advantages for vote-rich parties, as the first few quotients remain disproportionately high compared to smaller competitors. Rounding rules in these methods arise equivalently from selecting a global divisor DD and applying a sequence-dependent rounding function to vi/Dv_i / D, ensuring the sum of rounded quotas equals MM; this DD is chosen iteratively such that δ1(vi/D)+1=M\sum \lfloor \delta^{-1}(v_i / D) \rfloor + 1 = M, where δ\delta extends the divisor sequence. Common rounding variants include the floor function for pro-large bias (Jefferson, using divisors around 1 to MM), ceiling for pro-small (Adams), and nearest integer for balance (Webster), with the effective rounding boundaries set by midpoints derived from the sequence, such as geometric means in Huntington-Hill where d(k)=k(k+1)d(k) = \sqrt{k(k+1)}
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