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Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism
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Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being (ousia) as a compound of matter (potency) and immaterial form (act), with the generic form as immanently real within the individual.[1] The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words ὕλη (hyle: "wood, matter") and μορφή (morphē: "form").[1] Hylomorphic theories of physical entities have been undergoing a revival in contemporary philosophy.[2]

Aristotle's concept of matter

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Further information: Aristotle's biology

The Ancient Greek language originally had no word for matter in general, as opposed to raw material suitable for some specific purpose or other, so Aristotle adapted the word for "wood" to this purpose.[3] The idea that everything physical is made of the same basic substance holds up well under modern science, although it may be thought of more in terms of energy[4] or matter/energy.[5]

The Latin equivalent of the hyle concept – and later its medieval version – also emerged from Aristotle's notion. The Greek term's Latin equivalent was silva, which literally meant woodland or forest.[5] However, Latin thinkers opted for a word that had a technical sense (rather than literal meaning). This emphasized silva as that of which a thing is made, but one that remained a substratum with changed form.[5] The word materia was chosen instead to indicate a meaning not in handicraft but in the passive role that mother (mater) plays in conception.[4]

Aristotle's concept of hyle is the principle that correlates with shape and this can be demonstrated in the way the philosopher[6] described hyle, saying it is that which receives form or definiteness, that which is formed.[7] It can also be the material cause underlying a change in Aristotelian philosophy.[8] Aristotle explained that "By hyle I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined."[5] This means that hyle is brought into existence not due to its being its agent or its own actuality but only when form attaches to it.[9] It has been described as a plenum or a field, a conceptualization that opposed Democritus' atomistic ontology.[8] It is maintained that the Aristotelian concept should not be understood as a "stuff" since there is, for example, hyle that is intellectual as well as sensible hyle found in the body.[5]

For Aristotle, hyle is composed of four elements – fire, water, air, and earth – but these were not considered pure substances since matter and form exist in a combination of hot, moist, dry, and cold so that everything is united to form the elements.[10]

Aristotle defines matter as "that out of which" something is made.[11] For example, letters are the matter of syllables.[12] Thus, "matter" is a relative term:[13] an object counts as matter relative to something else. For example, clay is matter relative to a brick because a brick is made of clay, whereas bricks are matter relative to a brick house. Change is analyzed as a material transformation: matter is what undergoes a change of form.[14] For example, consider a lump of bronze that's shaped into a statue. Bronze is the matter, and this matter loses one form (morphe) (that of a lump) and gains a new form (that of a statue).[15][16] According to Aristotle's theory of perception, we perceive an object by receiving its form (eidos) with our sense organs.[17] Thus, forms include complex qualia such as colors, textures, and flavors, not just shapes.[18]

Body–soul hylomorphism

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Basic theory

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See also: On the Soul and Aristotle's biology

Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism to living things. He defines a soul as that which makes a living thing alive.[19] Life is a property of living things, just as knowledge and health are.[20] Therefore, a soul is a form—that is, a specifying principle or cause—of a living thing.[21] Furthermore, Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as form to matter.[22]

Hence, Aristotle argues, there is no problem in explaining the unity of body and soul, just as there is no problem in explaining the unity of wax and its shape.[23] Just as a wax object consists of wax with a certain shape, so a living organism consists of a body with the property of life, which is its soul. On the basis of his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, ridiculing the notion that just any soul could inhabit just any body.[24]

According to Timothy Robinson, it is unclear whether Aristotle identifies the soul with the body's structure.[25] According to one interpretation of Aristotle, a properly organized body is already alive simply by virtue of its structure.[26] However, according to another interpretation, the property of life—that is, the soul—is something in addition to the body's structure. Robinson uses the analogy of a car to explain this second interpretation. A running car is running not only because of its structure but also because of the activity in its engine.[26] Likewise, according to this second interpretation, a living body is alive not only because of its structure but also because of an additional property: the soul, which a properly organized body needs in order to be alive.[27] John Vella uses Frankenstein's monster to illustrate the second interpretation:[28] the corpse lying on Frankenstein's table is already a fully organized human body, but it is not yet alive; when Frankenstein activates his machine, the corpse gains a new property, the property of life, which Aristotle would call the soul.

Living bodies

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Some scholars have pointed out a problem facing Aristotle's theory of soul-body hylomorphism.[29] According to Aristotle, a living thing's matter is its body, which needs a soul in order to be alive. Similarly, a bronze sphere's matter is bronze, which needs roundness in order to be a sphere. Now, bronze remains the same bronze after ceasing to be a sphere. Therefore, it seems that a body should remain the same body after death.[30] However, Aristotle implies that a body is no longer the same body after death.[31] Moreover, Aristotle says that a body that has lost its soul is no longer potentially alive.[32] But if a living thing's matter is its body, then that body should be potentially alive by definition.

One approach to resolving this problem[33] relies on the fact that a living body is constantly replacing old matter with new. A five-year-old body consists of different matter than does the same person's seventy-year-old body. If the five-year-old body and the seventy-year-old body consist of different matter, then what makes them the same body? The answer is presumably the soul. Because the five-year-old and the seventy-year-old bodies share a soul—that is, the person's life—we can identify them both as the body. Apart from the soul, we cannot identify what collection of matter is the body. Therefore, a person's body is no longer that person's body after it dies.

Another approach to resolving the problem[34] relies on a distinction between "proximate" and "non-proximate" matter. When Aristotle says that the body is matter for a living thing, he may be using the word "body" to refer to the matter that makes up the fully organized body, rather than the fully organized body itself. Unlike the fully organized body, this "body" remains the same thing even after death. In contrast, when he says that the body is no longer the same after its death, he is using the word "body" to refer to the fully organized body.

Intellect

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See also: Nous, Active intellect, and Passive intellect

Aristotle says that the intellect (nous), the ability to think, has no bodily organ (in contrast with other psychological abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination).[35] Aristotle distinguishes between two types of intellect.[36] These are traditionally called the "passive intellect" and the "active (or agent) intellect".[37] He says that the "active (or agent) intellect" is not mixed with the body[38] and suggests that it can exist apart from it.[39] Hence, scholars face the challenge of explaining the relationship between the intellect and the body in Aristotle.

According to one interpretation, a person's ability to think (unlike his other psychological abilities) belongs to some incorporeal organ distinct from his body.[40] This would amount to a form of dualism.[41] However, according to some scholars, it would not be a full-fledged Cartesian dualism.[42] This interpretation creates what Robert Pasnau has called the "mind-soul problem" within Aristotelian hylomorphism: if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of the soul?[43]

Another interpretation rests on the distinction between the passive intellect and the agent intellect. According to this interpretation, the passive intellect is a property of the body, while the agent intellect is a substance distinct from the body.[44][45] Some proponents of this interpretation think that each person has his own agent intellect, which presumably separates from the body at death.[46][47] Others interpret the agent intellect as a single divine being, perhaps the unmoved mover, Aristotle's God.[48][49]

A third interpretation[50] relies on the theory that an individual form is capable of having properties of its own.[51] According to this interpretation, the soul is a property of the body, but the ability to think is a property of the soul itself, not of the body. If that is the case, then the soul is the body's form and yet thinking need not involve any bodily organ.[52]

Teleology and ethics

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See also: Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle holds a teleological worldview: he sees the universe as inherently purposeful. Basically, Aristotle claims that potentiality exists for the sake of actuality.[53] Thus, matter exists for the sake of receiving its form,[54] as an organism has sight for the sake of seeing.[53] Now, each thing has certain potentialities as a result of its form. Because of its form, a snake has the potential to slither; we can say that the snake ought to slither. The more a thing achieves its potential, the more it succeeds in achieving its purpose.

Aristotle bases his ethical theory on this teleological worldview. Because of his form, a human being has certain abilities. Hence, his purpose in life is to exercise those abilities as well and as fully as possible.[55] Now, the most characteristic human ability, which is not included in the form of any other organism, is the ability to think.[56] The ability to deliberate makes it possible to choose the course of action that reason deems best—even if it is emotionally undesirable. Contemporary Aristotelians tend to stress exercising freedom and acting wisely as the best way to live. Yet, Aristotle argued that the best type of happiness is virtuously contemplating God and the second best is acting in accord with moral virtue. Either way, for Aristotle the best human life is a life lived rationally.[57]

Legacy

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Universal hylomorphism

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The Neoplatonic philosopher Avicebron (Solomon ibn Gabirol) proposed a Neoplatonic version of this Aristotelian concept, according to which all things, including soul and intellect, are composed of matter and form.[58]

With respect to Averroes’s view, what, if only I knew, could necessitate that we not say this very thing in the case of bodies that come to be and pass away, namely, that the matter they contain is their corporeality, and their form the form that is specific to each one and serves each one as the perfection of its corporeality? Corporeality, which he calls “corporeal form,” would then function as matter with respect to its specific form. If so, the matter, even without its specific form, would be in need of a place and would exist in actuality. Behold, my witness is in heaven, since the celestial body, which is a body without matter, is one that exists in actuality. In this way, many difficult and perplexing questions regarding hylic nature as it is generally understood will be resolved. It is open, therefore, to an objector to say that it is not a specific form through which a body exists, but that the corporeal form, which is the substratum in actuality, is that which sustains the specific form

— Hasdai Crescas

Hasdai Crescas imagines that celestial-body is like Hylé but as matter in actuality, sure over the opposition about this, i.e. in potential existence. Matter and form is always presents in all but celestial-bodies are without form because of their nature; so Hasdai Crescas finds the solution also about this paradox.[59]

Medieval modifications

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Thomas Aquinas emphasized the act/potency understanding of form/matter whereby form activates the potency of matter and existence activates souls. The angels are accordingly composites of esse (potentiality) and existence (actuality) that activates immaterial souls, while God alone is per se existence, pure act without any potencies.

Medieval theologians, newly exposed to Aristotle's philosophy, applied hylomorphism to Christian doctrines such as the transubstantiation of the Eucharist's bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus. Theologians such as Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas developed Christian applications of hylomorphism.

Aristotle's texts on the agent intellect have given rise to diverse interpretations. Some following Averroes (Ibn Rushd 1126–1198) argue that Aristotle equated the active intellect with a divine being who infuses concepts into the passive intellect to aid human understanding. Others following Aquinas (1225–74) argue that the Neoplatonic interpretation is a mistake: the active intellect is actually part of the human soul.

Substantial form, accidental form, and prime matter

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See also: Substantial form

Medieval philosophers who used Aristotelian concepts frequently distinguished between substantial forms and accidental forms. A substance necessarily possesses at least one substantial form. It may also possess a variety of accidental forms. For Aristotle, a "substance" (ousia) is an individual thing—for example, an individual man or an individual horse.[60] Within every physical substance, the substantial form determines what kind of thing the physical substance is by actualizing prime matter as individualized by the causes of that thing's coming to be. For instance, the chick comes to be when the substantial form of chickens actualizes the hen's egg and that actualization is possible insofar as that egg is in potency to being actualized both as a chicken due to the receptivity of its prime matter to the substantial form of chickens and into a chick with certain colored feathers due to the individualization of the egg given by its parents. So while the individualized matter determines individualized properties, the substantial form determines essential properties. The substantial form of a substance S consists of its essence and essential properties (the properties that S needs in order to be the kind of substance that S is).[61][62] Substantial change destroys the ability of a substantial form to actualize individualized prime matter without affecting prime matter's ability to be actualized by a new substantial form;[63] e.g., when the wolf eats the chick, the chick's rearranged matter becomes part of the wolf, and is thence animated by the wolf's substantial form.

In contrast, the accidental forms of S are its non-essential properties[64]—properties that S can lose or gain without changing into a different kind of substance:[62] the chick can lose its feathers (due to, e.g., parasites or the like) without ceasing to be an individual chicken.

Plurality vs. unity of substantial form

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Many medieval theologians and philosophers followed Aristotle in seeing a living being's soul as that being's form—specifically, its substantial form. However, they disagreed about whether X's soul is X's only substantial form. Some medieval thinkers argued that X's soul is X's only substantial form animating the entire body of X.[65] In contrast, other medieval thinkers argued that a living being contains at least two substantial forms—(1) the shape and structure of its body, and (2) its soul, which makes its body alive.[66]

Thomistic hylomorphism

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Thomas Aquinas claimed that X's soul was X's only substantial form, although X also had numerous accidental forms that accounted for X's nonessential features.[67][68] Aquinas defined a substantial form as that which makes X's matter constitute X, which in the case of a human being is also able to transcend the limitations of matter and establish both the rational capacity[69] and natural immortality of human beings. Nevertheless, Aquinas did not claim that human persons were their disembodied souls because the human soul is essentially a substantial form activating matter into the body. He held that a proper human being is a composite of the rational soul and matter (both prime matter and individualized matter).[70][71] So a soul separated from its body does not become an angel but retains its orientation to animate matter, while a corpse from which the soul has departed is not actually or potentially a human being.[67]

Eleonore Stump describes Aquinas' theory of the soul in terms of "configuration". The body is matter that is "configured", i.e. structured, while the soul is a "configured configurer". In other words, the soul is itself a configured thing, but it also configures the body.[72] A dead body is merely matter that was once configured by the soul. It does not possess the configuring capacity of a human being.

Aquinas believed that rational capacity was a property of the soul alone, not of any bodily organ.[73] However, he did believe that the brain had some basic cognitive function.[74] Aquinas’ attribution of rational capacity to the immaterial soul allowed him to claim that disembodied souls could retain their rational capacity as his identification of the soul's individual act of existence allowed him to claim that personal immortality is natural for human beings. Aquinas was also adamant that disembodied souls were in an unnatural state[75] and that the perfection of heaven includes God miraculously enabling the soul to function once again as a substantial form by reanimating matter into a living body as promised by the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.

Modern physics

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The idea of hylomorphism can be said to have been reintroduced to the world when Werner Heisenberg invented his duplex world of quantum mechanics. In his 1958 text Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg states:

In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But atoms and the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts ... The probability wave ... mean[s] tendency for something. It's a quantitative version of the old concept of potentia from Aristotle's philosophy. It introduces something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.[76]

A hylomorphic interpretation of Bohmian mechanics has been suggested, in which the cosmos is a single substance that is composed of both material particles and a substantial form.[77] There is also a hylomorphic interpretation of the collapse of the wave function.[78]

Hylomorphism in contemporary anthropology

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Anthropologist Tim Ingold has critiqued the classical hylomorphic model in his article The Textility of Making (2010), arguing that form is not imposed on passive matter by an external agent but instead "emerges within the process of making". He describes this alternative as a morphogenetic approach, influenced by process philosophy and drawing on ideas from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Ingold emphasizes the active participation of materials, proposing that making is a relational and temporal unfolding rather than the execution of a predefined design.[79]

See also

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Notes

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Sources

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  • Aristotle.
    • Metaphysics
    • Nicomachean Ethics
    • On the Soul.
    • Physics
  • Caston, Victor.
    • "Aristotle's Psychology". A Companion to Ancient Philosophy. Ed. Mary Gill and Pierre Pellegrin. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006. 316–46.
    • "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal". Phronesis 44.3 (1999): 199–227.
  • Cross, Richard. The Physics of Duns Scotus. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.
  • Eberl, Jason T. "Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings." The Review of Metaphysics 58.2 (November 2004): 333–65.
  • Gilson, Étienne. The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. Trans. F. J. Sheed. NY: Sheed & Ward, 1938.
  • Irwin, Terence. Aristotle's First Principles. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990.
  • Keck, David. Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages. NY: Oxford UP, 1998.
  • Kenny, Anthony. Aquinas on Mind. London: Routledge, 1993.
  • Leftow, Brian.
    • "Souls Dipped in Dust." Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ed. Kevin Corcoran. NY: Cornell UP, 2001. 120–38.
    • "Soul, Mind, and Brain." The Waning of Materialism. Ed. Robert C. Koons and George Bealer. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 395–417.
  • McEvilley, Thomas. The Shape of Ancient Thought. NY: Allworth, 2002.
  • Mendell, Henry. "Aristotle and Mathematics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 26 March 2004. Stanford University. 2 July 2009 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-mathematics/>.
  • Normore, Calvin. "The Matter of Thought". Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy. Ed. Henrik Lagerlund. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007. 117–133.
  • Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.
  • Robinson, Timothy. Aristotle in Outline. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.
  • Simondon, Gilbert (2003). L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information [1958]. Paris: Jérôme Millon.
  • Shields, Christopher.
    • "A Fundamental Problem about Hylomorphism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. 29 June 2009 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl1.html>.
    • Aristotle. London: Routledge, 2007.
    • "Some Recent Approaches to Aristotle's De Anima". De Anima: Books II and III (With Passages From Book I). Trans. W.D. Hamlyn. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. 157–81.
    • "Soul as Subject in Aristotle's De Anima". Classical Quarterly 38.1 (1988): 140–49.
  • Stump, Eleanore.
    • "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism." Faith and Philosophy 12.4 (October 1995): 505–31.
    • "Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul." Die Menschliche Seele: Brauchen Wir Den Dualismus. Ed. B. Niederbacher and E. Runggaldier. Frankfurt, 2006. 151–72.
  • Vella, John. Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed. NY: Continuum, 2008.
[edit]
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Hylomorphism

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Hylomorphism is a foundational doctrine in metaphysics, originating with the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE), which posits that all material substances are composites of two intrinsic principles: matter (hylē), the indeterminate substrate providing potentiality, and form (morphē), the organizing structure that actualizes and specifies that potentiality into a particular kind of being. This theory, derived from the Greek words for "wood" and "shape," explains the composition and identity of objects by integrating material composition with essential structure, rejecting both pure materialism and idealism. In Aristotle's framework, as elaborated in works like Metaphysics Books VII–IX, matter serves as the underlying capacity for change and multiplicity, such as the bronze in a statue or the flesh and bones in a living organism, but it lacks definition or identity on its own. Form, conversely, is the causal-explanatory principle that determines what a thing is—its essence, function, and unity—transforming raw potential into actuality, as when the sculptor's design shapes bronze into a specific statue. Together, matter and form constitute a hylomorphic compound, or substance, which possesses emergent properties irreducible to its parts, enabling explanations of generation, corruption, and persistence in the natural world. Hylomorphism provided Aristotle with a middle path between the atomism of earlier pre-Socratics like and the idealist forms of , emphasizing that forms are immanent in particulars rather than separate entities. It profoundly shaped medieval , particularly through (1225–1274), who adapted it to to reconcile faith and reason in accounts of the soul and creation. The doctrine persisted into the and , influencing figures up to (1596–1650), before declining with the rise of mechanistic philosophies, though it has seen revival in contemporary debates on , , and the mind-body problem.

Aristotelian Foundations

Matter and Form

In Aristotle's philosophy, the doctrine of hylomorphism posits that physical substances are composed of two fundamental principles: matter (hylē) and form (morphē). The term hylē, derived from the Greek word for "" or "," refers to the underlying substrate that serves as the potentiality for change, capable of receiving form to become a determinate thing. Aristotle describes matter as that which persists through processes of and , functioning as the indeterminate base out of which something arises, without itself being a fully actualized entity. In contrast, morphē, meaning "shape" or "form" in Greek, is the actuality or that structures and actualizes the matter, determining its specific nature and identity. Form is thus the defining principle that makes matter into a particular substance, such as by imparting qualities, , or function to the substrate. Aristotle illustrates these concepts through everyday examples to clarify their roles. For instance, in the case of a bronze statue, the bronze serves as the matter (hylē), providing the potential substrate that can be shaped, while the form (morphē) is the specific arrangement or design of the statue that actualizes the bronze into a particular artwork. Similarly, for a bed, the wood acts as the matter, possessing the capacity to be formed, and the bed's structure—its arrangement as a functional piece of furniture—constitutes the form that realizes this potential. These examples highlight how matter supplies the raw potential and form the organizing principle, together producing a unified substance rather than mere aggregation. Aristotle further distinguishes between types of matter to account for different domains of substances. Sensible matter is the concrete, perceptible substrate associated with individual physical objects, such as in a living body or in an artifact, which is divisible and subject to qualitative change. , by contrast, is an abstract potentiality that underlies mathematical and scientific objects, lacking sensible qualities but serving as the substrate for forms in theoretical contexts, such as the indeterminate continuum for geometric shapes. This distinction allows hylomorphism to apply beyond tangible bodies to the structures of thought and definition. Central to hylomorphism is its explanation of generation and corruption, avoiding the infinite regress posited by earlier philosophers who struggled with how something could come from nothing or persist through change. Matter provides the enduring substrate that remains through alteration, while form is acquired or lost in the process, ensuring that substantial change involves a transition from potentiality to actuality without requiring an endless chain of prior substrates. By positing matter as pure potentiality and form as the actualizing principle, Aristotle's framework resolves these issues, with the union of matter and form yielding the hylomorphic composite as the complete substance.

Hylomorphic Composites

In Aristotle's metaphysics, hylomorphism is the doctrine that every physical substance constitutes a hylomorphic composite, a unified whole composed of matter (hylē) and form (eidos or morphē). Matter serves as the underlying substrate capable of receiving form, while form provides the structure and essence that defines the substance's nature. This composite, known as the synolon or "this something," exists as a single, indivisible entity rather than separate components. The principle of unity in hylomorphic composites arises from the form's role in actualizing the matter's potentiality, thereby producing a coherent substance distinct from a mere aggregate or juxtaposition of parts. Without form, matter remains indeterminate and lacks identity; the form organizes and perfects it into a specific kind of being, such as bronze shaped into a statue or flesh informed by a particular structure. This unification ensures that the composite functions as one teleologically directed entity, avoiding the incoherence of unrelated materials piled together. Aristotle emphasizes this in his discussion of the synolon as the primary substance, where form and matter are not independently subsisting but interdependent in the whole. Hylomorphic composites account for substantial change, wherein one substance ceases to exist and another emerges through the corruption of the old form and the imposition of a new one upon the same matter. For instance, when wood burns, its form as combustible material perishes, allowing the matter to receive the form of ash, resulting in a genuine transformation rather than mere alteration. This process differs from accidental change, which modifies non-essential qualities (e.g., a statue's color shifting without altering its bronze-form unity) or from simple juxtaposition, where parts retain their independent natures without forming a new substance. Aristotle delineates these mechanisms to explain generation and corruption in the natural world, underscoring that substantial change preserves underlying matter while effecting a profound ontological shift.

Hylomorphism in Living Beings

Body-Soul Unity

In Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, the (psychē) functions as the of the living body, actualizing the potential capacities of to sustain vital activities such as growth, , and . This form-matter composition ensures that emerges not from an independent entity but from the organized structure of the body itself, where the soul organizes and directs the body's capacities toward their natural ends. Aristotle elaborates this conception in De Anima, defining the soul as "the first entelechy (entelecheia) of a natural body that has life potentially," emphasizing its role as the complete actuality that realizes the body's inherent possibilities without being reducible to mere motion or external agency. This entelechy is not a static possession but an active principle that maintains the body's unity and functionality throughout life. For instance, just as the form of an axe actualizes wood into a tool capable of chopping, the soul actualizes biological into a living capable of self-maintenance. The souls of living beings form a , reflecting increasing complexity in vital functions. The vegetative soul, present in all including , governs basic processes like , growth, and , enabling the to preserve its material composition. Animals possess an additional sensitive soul, which includes the vegetative capacities plus sensation, desire, and locomotion, allowing interaction with the environment through and movement. In humans, the rational soul encompasses both lower levels while adding and will, directing actions toward reasoned goals; this hierarchy ensures that higher souls integrate and perfect the functions of the lower ones without supplanting them. Central to this framework is the inseparable unity of body and , rejecting any dualistic separation where the soul exists as a distinct, body-independent substance. Instead, they constitute a single hylomorphic whole, akin to how and form one spherical object; the soul cannot exercise its functions apart from the body it informs, and the body derives its essential nature from the soul. Death marks the dissolution of this unity, as the form separates from matter, rendering the body incapable of while the soul, in its lower aspects, ceases to actualize that particular matter—though allows for the intellect's potential immateriality in cases. An illustrative example is the eye: seeing is the soul's form for the eye-organ, but without the material eyeball, there is no seeing; likewise, vital functions require the embodied soul to be actualized.

The Intellect

In Aristotle's De Anima Book III, the (nous) is distinguished into two aspects: the passive intellect, which receives intelligible forms as a blank tablet receives impressions, and the (nous poietikos), which actualizes these potential forms, analogous to light illuminating colors to make them visible. The passive intellect operates by becoming like the objects it apprehends, functioning as the cause in the cognitive process, while the serves as the efficient cause, enabling the transition from potential to actual knowledge. This distinction aligns with hylomorphic principles, where the 's activity mirrors the form-matter composite, but with the active component providing the directive potency for human understanding. The immateriality of the intellect sets it apart from other soul capacities, as it thinks without reliance on bodily organs, unlike sensation which requires physical media. In De Anima III.4, Aristotle describes the intellect as "unmixed" and "separable," capable of abstracting universal forms from particular sensory data, thereby grasping essences independently of material conditions. This abstraction occurs through phantasms—sensory images derived from the body-soul unity—which serve as the indirect medium by which the intellect, though immaterial, engages with embodied particulars to inform cognition. The is characterized as impassible, divine-like, and separate from the body, acting as an eternal source that enables human cognition by illuminating the passive intellect's potentials. In De Anima III.5, posits it as "always separate, impassible and unmixed with the body... in substance," suggesting a transcendent quality akin to the in his metaphysics. This separation raises debates in De Anima III regarding the 's : while it is deemed eternal and divine, the passive intellect is perishable, leading interpreters to question whether personal applies only to the active aspect or extends to the unified human soul. Such discussions highlight the tension between the 's immaterial autonomy and its hylomorphic integration with the body.

Teleological Dimensions

Natural Teleology

In hylomorphism, natural refers to the inherent purposiveness embedded within the form of a substance, directing its development toward its natural end or perfection. posits that every natural substance possesses an internal principle of motion and rest that guides it to realize its full potential, as seen in the progression from an to a mature , where the form of the is actualized through the matter's potentiality. This teleological orientation is not imposed externally but arises immanently from the substance's own nature, ensuring that changes in the natural world are goal-directed rather than random. Central to this framework are Aristotle's , which provide a comprehensive explanation of natural phenomena within hylomorphism. The material cause is the substrate or out of which a thing is composed; the formal cause is the or form that defines what it is; the efficient cause is the agent initiating the change; and the final cause is the purpose or end toward which the process aims. In natural processes, these causes operate interdependently, with the final cause being paramount, as it explains why the substance strives for its —for instance, the efficient cause of an acorn's growth (nutrients and ) serves the final cause of becoming an . Natural motion and change exemplify this immanent teleology, distinguishing Aristotelian hylomorphism from views positing external design or chance. Heavy bodies move downward and light ones upward not by mechanical necessity alone but because their forms dictate such tendencies as their natural ends, preserving the unity of matter and form in directed activity. This internal purposiveness applies across natural kinds, from elemental motions to , underscoring that is a fundamental feature of hylomorphic substances rather than an add-on. A key example is embryonic development, where the soul as the form progressively actualizes the matter of the embryo toward its mature state. In Aristotle's account, the nutritive soul emerges first, enabling basic growth, followed by sensitive and rational capacities as the organism's potentialities are realized in sequence, all oriented by the final cause of achieving the complete form of the species. This process illustrates how teleology governs biological generation without requiring an external artisan. Aristotle critiques mechanistic alternatives, such as those of earlier philosophers like and , for reducing natural change to material and efficient causes alone, ignoring formal and final causes. In his Physics, he argues that such views fail to explain the regularity and purposiveness of natural outcomes, like why teeth are suited for grinding rather than by chance assembly, thereby affirming hylomorphism's necessity for a complete account of .

Ethical Applications

In , the human being is understood as a , a hylomorphic composite whose ethical life consists in actualizing the rational form of the through the cultivation of virtues. This actualization integrates the body's material capacities with the soul's formal principles, enabling the rational part to govern desires and actions harmoniously. As explains in the , virtues of character, such as and temperance, are enmattered forms (logoi enhuloi) that require both bodily preconditions—like a balanced of blood—and psychic direction by practical wisdom (). Eudaimonia, or human flourishing, serves as the ultimate telos in this framework, achieved by fulfilling the distinctive function (ergon) of the intellective soul through virtuous activity in accordance with reason. Aristotle argues that just as the eye's good lies in seeing, the human good lies in rational activity that perfects the soul's form over a complete life. This teleological orientation draws from natural teleology, where inherent ends guide development toward fulfillment. Virtuous practice thus realizes the human essence, distinguishing it from mere animal existence. Virtue formation occurs through habituation, whereby repeated actions aligned with the soul's rational form shape character, transforming potential into stable dispositions. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes this process as educating the appetitive part of the soul to follow reason, much like a state is formed by laws that habituate citizens to justice. External factors, such as diet and environment, influence this development by affecting bodily matter, underscoring the hylomorphic interdependence of form and matter in ethical growth. The in the exemplifies balanced actualization, where virtues represent the intermediate state between excess and deficiency, determined by reason as the formal principle guiding material inclinations. For instance, is the mean between rashness and , actualizing the rational soul's capacity to deliberate appropriately in fearful situations. This mean is not a mere arithmetic but a hylomorphic tailored to the individual's circumstances. Finally, the full hylomorphic realization of human nature extends to the political realm, where the community (polis) provides the conditions for ethical excellence by enabling cooperative practices that perfect the rational and social dimensions of the soul. Aristotle contends in the Politics that humans are political animals by nature, and the polis actualizes this form through laws and education that foster virtue across the community.

Medieval Developments

Substantial and Accidental Forms

In medieval hylomorphic theory, building on Aristotle's foundational distinction between matter and form, philosophers refined the concepts of substantial and accidental forms to explain the essence and modifications of substances. The substantial form is the principle that determines the essence and specific kind of a substance, actualizing prime matter into a unified whole with determinate properties and capacities. For instance, in a human being, the substantial form of humanity confers rationality and the capacity for intellectual activity, distinguishing the individual as a member of that species rather than, say, an animal or plant. This form is essential to the substance's identity, such that its loss results in the corruption of the substance itself, as seen in processes like death or elemental transformation. In contrast, the accidental form modifies a substance without altering its essential , inhering in the substance as a , , or relation that can change while preserving the underlying kind. Examples include tallness or whiteness in a , which enhance or describe the individual but do not transform it into a different ; such forms are contingent and can be gained or lost through natural processes like growth or . Medieval thinkers emphasized that accidental forms depend on the for their existence, serving to differentiate individuals within the same kind without affecting the core unity. Underlying both types of forms is prime matter, conceived as pure potentiality—a substrate devoid of any actual qualities or forms, incapable of independent existence, and serving solely as the receptive principle for successive actualizations. Prime matter lacks on its own and requires forms to become anything determinate, functioning as the indeterminate "stuff" that persists through changes in form. Avicenna significantly influenced medieval hylomorphism by portraying matter as a receptacle capable of receiving multiple successive forms, where substantial forms persist in mixtures but are unified by higher forms like , which act as substances rather than accidents. He argued that in composite bodies, such as living organisms, the substantial forms of elements remain alongside accidental interactions, allowing for the disunity of while maintaining overall subsistence. Averroes, critiquing and extending Avicenna, viewed matter as numerically one across changes and emphasized that substantial forms preserve diminished versions of prior forms in new composites, ensuring continuity in without full . Debates in centered on the of forms—how substantial forms distinguish one member of a kind from another—and the multiplicity of forms during change, particularly whether successive substantial forms fully replace or coexist with predecessors in processes like substantial generation. Avicenna's allowance for retained elemental forms in mixtures fueled discussions on whether arises from matter's role or the form's inherent specificity, while stressed the holistic dependence of matter's identity on the informing to resolve tensions in diachronic . These issues highlighted the challenge of balancing potentiality's receptivity with form's actuality in explaining natural transformations.

Unity and Plurality of Forms

In medieval philosophy, the debate over the unity and plurality of substantial forms centered on whether a single substance, such as a human being, possesses one or multiple substantial forms to account for its composite nature. Proponents of the plurality view, including early opponents of Thomas Aquinas like St. Bonaventure, argued that composite substances require separate substantial forms for different levels of organization, such as a form of corporeity for the body's extension, an animating form for life, and a rational soul for intellect. This position, rooted in Avicennian influences and Franciscan traditions, posited that matter's potency allows for successive substantial forms, each perfecting the previous without destroying it, as seen in Bonaventure's endorsement of light as the first substantial form providing dimensionality (Cullen 2006). However, this approach raised concerns about compositional issues, potentially rendering the substance a mere aggregate of parts rather than a unified whole. The unity view, championed by Aquinas and later becoming the dominant position in , maintained that each substance has only one , which fully actualizes the matter and unifies all its parts and operations into a single being. Aquinas argued that multiple substantial forms would undermine the substance's oneness, as each form would demand its own act of (esse), leading to a multiplicity of beings within one—such as "two souls" in a , one for the body and one rational, which contradicts the integrated nature of human activities like sensation and reason (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2017). Defenders of unity emphasized that the single form, like the in living beings, incorporates all lower perfections virtually, preserving the hylomorphic oneness essential to Aristotle's framework without needing additional forms for bodily or vegetative functions (Wippel 2000). This controversy had significant theological implications, particularly for the resurrection of the body. In the plurality view, the persistence of multiple forms after complicated the reassembly of the identical body, as the might not suffice to reinform dispersed corporeal elements without their prior forms. By contrast, the unicity ensured that the , as the sole substantial form, could reunite with individuated by dimensive quantity, maintaining in the resurrected body and aligning with (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2017). The debate influenced sacramental theology as well, where unity of form supported the coherence of in the , avoiding the notion of fragmented substances that plurality might imply (Pasnau 2011). Ultimately, the unity position gained consensus among later Scholastics, shaping Thomistic and resolving earlier tensions in hylomorphic theory.

Thomistic Hylomorphism

developed a distinctive form of hylomorphism by integrating Aristotle's metaphysical framework with Christian doctrine, particularly emphasizing the 's role in and the broader of creation. In this synthesis, the serves as the that actualizes the body's potential, making the being a unified composite rather than a mere aggregation of parts. Unlike other substantial forms in material beings, the rational is subsistent, meaning it possesses its own act of existence independent of the body, thereby ensuring personal after . However, the 's full operation—encompassing sensory and intellectual activities—requires union with the body, as its powers are naturally ordered toward bodily organs for complete functioning. Aquinas's hylomorphism extends to the doctrine of creation, where God acts as the efficient cause who brings prime matter into existence and informs it with substantial forms, originating all composite substances ex nihilo. This divine causation underscores that matter is not eternal or co-principled with God but wholly dependent on Him for its potentiality to receive form. Within this framework, Aquinas employs the analogy of being to describe a hierarchical order of hylomorphic composites, ranging from inanimate minerals (informed by basic substantial forms for mere existence) to plants and animals (with vegetative and sensitive souls, respectively), humans (with rational souls), and culminating in angels as pure forms subsisting without matter. This graded analogy reflects degrees of participation in divine being, with higher forms achieving greater actuality and unity. In addressing the unity of forms, Aquinas resolves earlier debates by affirming a single substantial form per individual substance, which unifies the composite without multiplicity of informing principles. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas leverages hylomorphism to harmonize faith and reason, demonstrating how Aristotelian principles illuminate theological truths such as the soul's and the body's role in beatitude, thus bridging with revealed doctrine. This integration is evident in his explanation of the , where involves the substantial change of bread and wine into Christ's body and , while their accidents—such as appearance and —persist without inhering in any underlying substance, sustained directly by divine power. Through these applications, Thomistic hylomorphism provides a coherent metaphysical foundation for and sacramental theology.

Modern and Contemporary Interpretations

In Physics

In the context of , hylomorphism has been invoked to interpret by drawing parallels between Aristotelian concepts of and form and quantum phenomena, particularly emphasizing potentiality over strict . , in his 1958 work Physics and Philosophy, likened the to Aristotelian potentia or potentiality, suggesting that the wave function describes a realm of possibilities akin to prime , which actualizes into definite outcomes upon , thereby bridging classical metaphysics with quantum indeterminacy. This interpretation positions quantum potentiality as a form of indeterminate , contrasting with the mechanistic of and allowing for a non-reductionist view where observed particles emerge from underlying potencies. Building on this, contemporary proposals like cosmic hylomorphism apply hylomorphic principles at a universal scale in , treating the as the cosmic form that unifies and structures the entire system, while the configuration of particles serves as the matter actualized by this form. In William M. R. Simpson's 2021 framework, this ontology integrates Bohmian mechanics, where the guiding —embodying "active information"—functions as an Aristotelian formal cause, directing particle trajectories without violating quantum predictions and ensuring the coherence of the cosmic whole as an emergent substance rather than a mere aggregate. Such views critique traditional by arguing that hylomorphism better accounts for and superposition, enabling emergent wholes with unified properties that transcend the sum of particulate parts, as explored in Robert C. Koons's analysis of . Recent scholarship further revives hylomorphic alternatives to reductionist interpretations of quantum physics, advocating for a return to classical metaphysics informed by scientific insights. William M. R. Simpson's 2021 chapter "From Quantum Physics to Classical Metaphysics" posits that and particle configurations align with Aristotelian substances, where forms impose structure on underlying , offering a coherent that resolves issues like the without invoking observer-dependent collapses. This approach echoes brief analogies to medieval notions of prime as pure potentiality, now adapted to quantum fields, emphasizing how hylomorphism supports holistic in physical systems over atomistic summation.

In Anthropology

In contemporary , particularly within and ecological studies, has offered a prominent of classical hylomorphism, arguing that it presents an overly static model where preconceived form is imposed on passive matter by an external agent. Instead, Ingold proposes that forms emerge dynamically within morphogenetic fields of force and material flows, emphasizing processes of becoming over fixed imposition. This perspective shifts focus from inert substances to ongoing correspondences between agents and their environments, influencing anthropological understandings of human development and cultural practices. Hylomorphism has been adapted in the anthropology of embodiment to conceptualize the body not as a static vessel but as a site of dynamic interplay between form and matter, continually shaped through social and sensory engagements. Drawing on this, scholars view embodied experience as emerging from rhythmic movements and material interactions within social contexts, such as craftsmanship or daily routines, where the body's form arises through correspondence with its surroundings rather than predetermined design. This approach contrasts sharply with Cartesian dualism, which posits a radical separation between mind and body, a division critiqued in anthropological studies for neglecting the integrated, relational nature of human embodiment in cultural settings. In applications to kinship and materiality, hylomorphic ideas are reframed to highlight how social forms, including kinship structures, emerge from relational practices involving material objects and interactions. Rather than viewing kinship as imposed categories on biological matter, this perspective sees it as co-constituted through ongoing flows of materials and social lines—such as shared artifacts or rituals—that bind relations in a meshwork of becoming. Recent hylomorphic approaches in the have extended to and culture, integrating the doctrine with phylogenetic models to address the unity of body and in ancestral transitions. For instance, analyses of anthropogenesis employ hylomorphism to reconcile evolutionary continuity with the distinctive emergence of rational capacities, viewing human cultural development as a form-matter compound evolving through relational and ecological dynamics. These interpretations also critique static ontologies in favor of animistic or relational alternatives, as seen in discussions of power and agency in material worlds.

In Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind

In the 21st century, hylomorphism has experienced a significant revival within metaphysics and philosophy of mind, positioning itself as a viable alternative to both Cartesian dualism and reductive materialism by emphasizing the unity of form and matter in composite substances. This resurgence draws on Aristotelian principles to address longstanding issues such as the nature of composition, mental causation, and ontological unity, without resorting to immaterial substances or eliminating emergent properties through physical reduction. As a historical precursor, Thomistic hylomorphism integrated these ideas into medieval philosophy, influencing later debates on substance and form. A key volume tracing this development highlights the gradual shift from hylomorphic explanations of natural phenomena to mechanistic views in the early modern period, particularly with Descartes' emphasis on extension and res extensa, which marginalized form as an explanatory principle. Structured hylomorphism, as articulated in contemporary accounts, conceives of objects as integrated wholes whose essential features arise from organizational imposed on components, rather than as mere aggregates of parts. This view posits that functions as a fundamental ontological category, enabling substances—especially living beings—to possess powers and capacities that transcend the sum of their elements. For instance, in biological entities, the form organizes matter into a unified capable of performing specific functions, avoiding the pitfalls of mereological composition where parts alone determine the whole. Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics has further advanced this framework by challenging standard mereology, which treats composition as unrestricted summation of parts, and instead advocates for hylomorphic composition where form plays a constitutive role in determining the identity and persistence of substances. Kathrin Koslicki's work argues that forms contribute to the structure of objects in a way that mereology cannot capture, treating formal elements as non-mereological parts essential to the object's unity. This approach resolves issues in the special composition question by requiring that only certain arrangements of matter, informed by form, yield genuine substances, thus providing a robust ontology for artifacts and natural kinds alike. Building on her 2008 analysis, Koslicki's later developments refine hylomorphism to accommodate contemporary concerns about modality and essence, emphasizing that structured wholes possess properties irreducible to their material constituents. In , hylomorphism offers a non-reductive account of mental phenomena by treating soul-like forms as organizing principles that enable mental causation without invoking separate substances or . This perspective views the mind as the form of the body, structuring neural and physiological processes to produce , , and agency, thereby solving the mind-body problem through holistic integration rather than partition. Mental states thus exert causal influence by actualizing the body's potentialities, preserving while accommodating irreducible mental features. Contemporary ontological debates continue to grapple with the concept of prime , the putative substrate underlying all material change and composition, questioning its viability in light of modern and process ontologies. Proponents argue that prime provides an indeterminate foundation necessary for substantial unity without reducing to physical parts, as seen in emergentist proposals where it ensures the coherence of composite entities across transformations. Recent analyses from 2024 explore whether prime can be reconciled with extensionless or potentialist interpretations, debating its role in avoiding both and eliminativism in substance metaphysics. Critics, however, contend that such a substrate introduces unnecessary primitives, favoring instead dynamical or relational accounts of .

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