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Impeachment
Impeachment
from Wikipedia

Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff (left) and South Korean president Park Geun-hye (right) were both impeached and removed from office in 2016 and 2017, respectively.

Impeachment is a process by which a legislative body or other legally constituted tribunal initiates charges against a public official for misconduct.[1][2] Impeachment tends to be confined to ministerial officials[3] as the unique nature of their positions may place ministers beyond the reach of the law to prosecute, or their misconduct is not codified into law as an offense except through the unique expectations of their high office. Both "peers and commoners" have been subject to the process, however.[4]

From 1990 to 2020, there have been at least 272 impeachment charges against 132 different heads of state in 63 countries.[5] In Latin America, which includes almost 40% of the world's presidential systems, ten presidents from seven countries were removed from office by their national legislatures via impeachments or declarations of incapacity between 1978 and 2019.[6]

Most democracies (with the notable exception of the United States) involve the courts (often a national constitutional court) in some way.[7][1] National legislations differ regarding both the consequences and definition of impeachment, but the intent is nearly always to expeditiously vacate the office.[3] Most commonly, an official is considered impeached after the commencement of the charges, and a trial of some kind is required to remove the official from office.[3]

Impeachment is distinct from the motion of no confidence procedure available in some countries whereby a motion of censure can be used to remove a government and its ministers from office. Such a procedure is not applicable in countries with presidential forms of government like the United States.[8] Because impeachment involves a departure from the normal constitutional procedures by which individuals achieve high office (election, ratification, or appointment) and because it generally requires a supermajority, it is usually reserved for those deemed to have committed serious abuses of their office.[9] In the United States, for example, impeachment at the federal level is limited to those who may have committed "Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors".[10][11] Under the United States Constitution, the House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachments while the Senate has the sole power to try impeachments (i.e., to acquit or convict); the validity of an impeachment trial is a political question that is nonjusticiable (i.e., is not reviewable by the courts).[12]

Etymology and history

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The word "impeachment" likely derives from Old French empeechier from Latin word impedīre expressing the idea of catching or ensnaring by the 'foot' (pes, pedis), and has analogues in the modern French verb empêcher (to prevent) and the modern English impede. Medieval popular etymology also associated it (wrongly) with derivations from the Latin impetere (to attack).

The process was first used by the English "Good Parliament" against William Latimer, 4th Baron Latimer in the second half of the 14th century.[13] Following the English example, the constitutions of Virginia (1776), Massachusetts (1780) and other states thereafter adopted the impeachment mechanism, but they restricted the punishment to removal of the official from office, in contrast to the English Parliament's broad power to punish impeachments.

In West Africa, rulers of the Ashanti Empire who violated any oaths taken during their enstoolment were destooled by Kingmakers.[14] Reasons include punishing citizens arbitrarily or being exposed as corrupt. The process involved Kingmakers forcibly removing the sandals of the guilty party, then bumping his buttocks on the ground three times. Once destooled, a king automatically lost sanctity and honours as he could not exercise royal powers such as being chief administrator, judge, and military commander. Also withdrawn from him were the Golden Stool (a throne functionally equivalent to crowns), swords, and other regalia. While a deposed king no longer held custodianship of the realm, he remained a member of the royal family from which he was elected.[14]

In Korea, the Goryeo dynasty installed Sahundae (司憲臺) in 983 AD, which oversaw the impeachment of officials.[15]

In various jurisdictions

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Brazil

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In Brazil, as in most other Latin American countries, "impeachment" refers to the definitive removal from office. The president of Brazil may be provisionally removed from office by the Chamber of Deputies and then tried and definitely removed from office by the Federal Senate. The Brazilian Constitution requires that two-thirds of the Deputies vote in favor of the opening of the impeachment process of the president and that two-thirds of the senators vote for impeachment. State governors and municipal mayors can also be impeached by the respective legislative bodies. Article 2 of Law no. 1.079, from 10 April 1950, or "The Law of Impeachment", states that "The crimes defined in this law, even when simply attempted, are subject to the penalty of loss of office, with disqualification for up to five years for the exercise of any public function, to be imposed by the Federal Senate in proceedings against the president of the republic, ministers of state, ministers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, or the attorney general."

Initiation: An accusation of a responsibility crime against the president may be brought by any Brazilian citizen; however, the president of the Chamber of Deputies holds prerogative to accept the charge, which if accepted will be read at the next session and reported to the president of the republic.

Extraordinary Committee: An extraordinary committee is established, consisting of members from each political party in proportion to their party's membership. The committee is responsible for assessing the need for impeachment proceedings. The president is given ten parliamentary sessions to present their defense. Following this, two legislative sessions are held to allow for the formulation of a legal opinion by a rapporteur regarding whether or not impeachment proceedings should be initiated and brought to trial in the Senate.

The rapporteur's opinion is subject to a vote within the committee. If the majority accepts the rapporteur's opinion, it is deemed adopted. However, if the majority rejects the rapporteur's opinion, the committee adopts an alternative opinion proposed by the majority. For instance, if the rapporteur recommends against impeachment but fails to secure majority support, the committee will adopt the opinion to proceed with impeachment. Conversely, if the rapporteur advises impeachment but does not obtain majority approval, the committee will adopt the opinion not to impeach.

If the committee vote is successful, the rapporteur's opinion is considered adopted, thereby determining the course of action regarding impeachment.

Chamber of Deputies: The chamber issues a call-out vote to accept the opinion of the committee, requiring a supermajority of two thirds in favor of an impeachment opinion (or a supermajority of two thirds against a dismissal opinion) of the committee, in order to authorize the Senate impeachment proceedings. The president is suspended (provisionally removed) from office as soon as the Senate receives and accepts from the Chamber of Deputies the impeachment charges and decides to proceed with a trial.

The Senate: The process in the Senate had been historically lacking in procedural guidance until 1992, when the Senate published in the Official Diary of the Union the step-by-step procedure of the Senate's impeachment process, which involves the formation of another special committee and closely resembles the lower house process, with time constraints imposed on the steps taken. The committee's opinion must be presented within 10 days, after which it is put to a call-out vote at the next session. The vote must proceed within a single session; the vote on President Rousseff took over 20 hours. A simple majority vote in the Senate begins formal deliberation on the complaint, immediately suspends the president from office, installs the vice president as acting president, and begins a 20-day period for written defense as well as up to 180-days for the trial. In the event the trial proceeds slowly and exceeds 180 days, the Brazilian Constitution determines that the president is entitled to return and stay provisionally in office until the trial comes to its decision.

Senate plenary deliberation: The committee interrogates the accused or their counsel, from which they have a right to abstain, and also a probative session which guarantees the accused rights to contradiction, or audiatur et altera pars, allowing access to the courts and due process of law under Article 5 of the constitution. The accused has 15 days to present written arguments in defense and answer to the evidence gathered, and then the committee shall issue an opinion on the merits within ten days. The entire package is published for each senator before a single plenary session issues a call-out vote, which shall proceed to trial on a simple majority and close the case otherwise.

Senate trial: A hearing for the complainant and the accused convenes within 48 hours of notification from deliberation, from which a trial is scheduled by the president of the Supreme Court no less than ten days after the hearing. The senators sit as judges, while witnesses are interrogated and cross-examined; all questions must be presented to the president of the Supreme Court, who, as prescribed in the Constitution, presides over the trial. The president of the Supreme Court allots time for debate and rebuttal, after which time the parties leave the chamber and the senators deliberate on the indictment. The president of the Supreme Court reads the summary of the grounds, the charges, the defense and the evidence to the Senate. The senators in turn issue their judgement. On conviction by a supermajority of two thirds, the president of the Supreme Court pronounces the sentence and the accused is immediately notified. If there is no supermajority for conviction, the accused is acquitted.

Upon conviction, the officeholder has his or her political rights revoked for eight years, which bars them from running for any office during that time.[16]

Fernando Collor de Mello, the 32nd president of Brazil, resigned in 1992 amidst impeachment proceedings. Despite his resignation, the Senate nonetheless voted to convict him and bar him from holding any office for eight years, due to evidence of bribery and misappropriation.

In 2016, the Chamber of Deputies initiated an impeachment case against President Dilma Rousseff on allegations of budgetary mismanagement, a crime of responsibility under the Constitution.[17] On 12 May 2016, after 20 hours of deliberation, the admissibility of the accusation was approved by the Senate with 55 votes in favor and 22 against (an absolute majority would have been sufficient for this step) and Vice President Michel Temer was notified to assume the duties of the president pending trial. On 31 August, 61 senators voted in favor of impeachment and 20 voted against it, thus achieving the 23 majority needed for Rousseff's definitive removal. A vote to disqualify her for five years was taken and failed (in spite of the Constitution not separating disqualification from removal) having less than two thirds in favor.[16]

Croatia

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The process of impeaching the president of Croatia can be initiated by a two-thirds majority vote in favor in the Sabor and is thereafter referred to the Constitutional Court, which must accept such a proposal with a two-thirds majority vote in favor in order for the president to be removed from office. This has never occurred in the history of the Republic of Croatia. In case of a successful impeachment motion a president's constitutional term of five years would be terminated and an election called within 60 days of the vacancy occurring. During the period of vacancy the presidential powers and duties would be carried out by the speaker of the Croatian Parliament in his/her capacity as Acting President of the Republic.[18]

Czech Republic

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In 2013, the constitution was changed. Since 2013, the process can be started by at least three-fifths of present senators, and must be approved by at least three-fifths of all members of the Chamber of Deputies within three months. Also, the President can be impeached for high treason (newly defined in the Constitution) or any serious infringement of the Constitution.[19]

The process starts in the Senate of the Czech Republic which has the right to only impeach the president. After the approval by the Chamber of Deputies, the case is passed to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, which has to decide the verdict against the president. If the Court finds the President guilty, then the President is removed from office and is permanently barred from being elected President of the Czech Republic again.[20]

No Czech president has ever been impeached, though members of the Senate sought to impeach President Václav Klaus in 2013.[21] This case was dismissed by the court, which reasoned that his mandate had expired.[22] The Senate also proposed to impeach president Miloš Zeman in 2019 [23] but the Chamber of Deputies did not vote on the issue in time and thus the case did not even proceed to the Court.

Denmark

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In Denmark the possibility for current and former ministers being impeached was established with the Danish Constitution of 1849. Unlike many other countries Denmark does not have a Constitutional Court who would normally handle these types of cases. Instead Denmark has a special Court of Impeachment (In Danish: Rigsretten) which is called upon every time a current and former minister have been impeached. The role of the Impeachment Court is to process and deliver judgments against current and former ministers who are accused of unlawful conduct in office. The legal content of ministerial responsibility is laid down in the Ministerial Accountability Act which has its background in section 13 of the Danish Constitution, according to which the ministers' accountability is determined in more detail by law. In Denmark the normal practice in terms of impeachment cases is that it needs to be brought up in the Danish Parliament (Folketing) first for debate between the different members and parties in the parliament. After the debate the members of the Danish Parliament vote on whether a current or former minister needs to be impeached. If there is a majority in the Danish Parliament for an impeachment case against a current or former minister, an Impeachment Court is called into session. In Denmark the Impeachment Court consists of up to 15 Supreme Court judges and 15 parliament members appointed by the Danish Parliament. The members of the Impeachment Court in Denmark serve a six-year term in this position.[24]

In 1995 the former Minister of Justice Erik Ninn-Hansen from the Conservative People's Party was impeached in connection with the Tamil Case. The case was centered around the illegal processing of family reunification applications. From September 1987 to January 1989 applications for family reunification of Tamil refugees from civil war-torn Sri Lanka were put on hold in violation of Danish and International law. On 22 June 1995, Ninn-Hansen was found guilty of violating paragraph five subsection one of the Danish Ministerial Responsibility Act which says: A minister is punished if he intentionally or through gross negligence neglects the duties incumbent on him under the constitution or legislation in general or according to the nature of his post. A majority of the judges in that impeachment case voted for former Minister of Justice Erik Ninn-Hansen to receive a suspended sentence of four months with one year of probation. The reason why the sentence was made suspended was especially in relation to Ninn-Hansen's personal circumstances, in particular, his health and age – Ninn-Hansen was 73 years old when the sentence was handed down. After the verdict, Ninn-Hansen complained to the European Court of Human Rights and complained, among other things, that the Court of Impeachment was not impartial. The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the complaint on 18 May 1999. As a direct result and consequence of this case, the Conservative-led government and Prime Minister at that time Poul Schlüter was forced to step down from power.[25]

In February 2021 the former Minister for Immigration and Integration Inger Støjberg at that time member of the Danish Liberal Party Venstre was impeached when it was discovered that she had possibly against both Danish and International law tried to separate couples in refugee centres in Denmark, as the wives of the couples were under legal age. According to a commission report Inger Støjberg had also lied in the Danish Parliament and failed to report relevant details to the Parliamentary Ombudsman[26] The decision to initiate an impeachment case was adopted by the Danish Parliament with a 141–30 vote and decision (In Denmark 90 members of the parliament need to vote for impeachment before it can be implemented). On 13 December 2021 former Minister for Immigration and Integration Inger Støjberg was convicted by the special Court of Impeachment of separating asylum seeker families illegally according to Danish and international law and sentenced to 60 days in prison.[27] The majority of the judges in the special Court of Impeachment (25 out of 26 judges) found that it had been proven that Inger Støjberg on 10 February 2016 decided that an accommodation scheme should apply without the possibility of exceptions, so that all asylum-seeking spouses and cohabiting couples where one was a minor aged 15–17, had to be separated and accommodated separately in separate asylum centers.[28] On 21 December, a majority in the Folketing voted that the sentence means that she is no longer worthy of sitting in the Folketing and she therefore immediately lost her seat.[29]

France

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In France the comparable procedure is called destitution. The president of France can be impeached by the French Parliament for willfully violating the Constitution or the national laws. The process of impeachment is written in the 68th article of the French Constitution.[30] Either the National Assembly or the Senate can begin the process. Then, the impeachment proposal must be transmitted to the other house, which must accept or reject the impeachment process within 15 days. After the upper and lower houses' agreement, they unite in joint session to form the High Court.

The High Court must decide whether or not to declare the removal from office of the president. The impeachment procedure in front of the National Assembly and the Senate, as well as the removal from office by the High Court require a majority of two thirds of the members of the House involved or of the High Court by secret ballot; no proxy voting is allowed.

Germany

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The federal president of Germany can be impeached both by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat for willfully violating federal law. Once the Bundestag or the Bundesrat impeaches the president, the Federal Constitutional Court decides whether the President is guilty as charged and, if this is the case, whether to remove him or her from office. The Federal Constitutional Court also has the power to remove federal judges from office for willfully violating core principles of the federal constitution or a state constitution. The impeachment procedure is regulated in Article 61 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

There is no formal impeachment process for the chancellor of Germany; however, the Bundestag can replace the chancellor at any time by voting for a new chancellor (constructive vote of no confidence, Article 67 of the Basic Law).

There has never been an impeachment against the President so far. Constructive votes of no confidence against the chancellor occurred in 1972 and 1982, with only the second one being successful.

Hong Kong

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The chief executive of Hong Kong can be impeached by the Legislative Council. A motion for investigation, initiated jointly by at least one-fourth of all the legislators charging the Chief Executive with "serious breach of law or dereliction of duty" and refusing to resign, shall first be passed by the council. An independent investigation committee, chaired by the chief justice of the Court of Final Appeal, will then carry out the investigation and report back to the council. If the Council find the evidence sufficient to substantiate the charges, it may pass a motion of impeachment by a two-thirds majority.[31]: Article 73(9) 

However, the Legislative Council does not have the power to actually remove the chief executive from office, as the chief executive is appointed by the Central People's Government (State Council of China). The council can only report the result to the Central People's Government for its decision.[31]: Article 45 

Hungary

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Article 13 of Hungary's Fundamental Law (constitution) provides for the process of impeaching and removing the president. The president enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution while in office, but may be charged with crimes committed during his term afterwards. Should the president violate the constitution while discharging his duties or commit a willful criminal offense, he may be removed from office. Removal proceedings may be proposed by the concurring recommendation of one-fifth of the 199 members of the country's unicameral Parliament. Parliament votes on the proposal by secret ballot, and if two thirds of all representatives agree, the president is impeached. Once impeached, the president's powers are suspended, and the Constitutional Court decides whether or not the President should be removed from office.[32][33]

India

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The president and judges, including the chief justice of the supreme court and high courts, can be impeached by the parliament before the expiry of the term for violation of the Constitution. Other than impeachment, no other penalty can be given to a president in position for the violation of the Constitution under Article 361 of the constitution. However, a president after his/her removal can be punished for her/his already proven unlawful activity under disrespecting the constitution, etc.[34] No president has faced impeachment proceedings. Hence, the provisions for impeachment have never been tested. The sitting president cannot be charged and needs to step down in order for that to happen.

Ireland

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The Constitution of Ireland states the President of Ireland may be impeached for "stated misbehaviour".[35] The president may not be otherwise removed from office or made answerable for his actions,[36] although if five judges of the Supreme Court rule that he has become "permanently incapacitated" then a new presidential election must be held within 60 days and the Presidential Commission will deputise in the interim.[37] Impeachment is controlled by the Oireachtas (parliament) with one house (Dáil or Seanad) preferring a charge and the other directing the ensuing investigation and final vote.[38] The charge requires a motion signed by at least thirty members and consequent resolution supported by at least two-thirds of the total membership.[39] The investigation may be made by the house itself or delegated to another "court, tribunal or body".[40] The president is removed from office only if at least two-thirds of the total membership of the investigating house support an ensuing resolution that, not only has the charge been sustained, but also the misbehaviour was serious enough to render the president "unfit to continue in office".[41][42]

As of January 2024 no impeachment of a president has ever taken place. The dignity of what is a largely ceremonial office is considered important, so it is likely that a president would resign from office long before undergoing formal conviction or impeachment. In 1976, after being criticised by a minister, Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh resigned "to protect the dignity and independence of the presidency as an institution", although there was no question of impeachment.[43]

While the Constitution also states that Comptroller and Auditor General and justices of the superior courts can be removed from office for "stated misbehaviour", it does not describe this as impeachment and the requirement in each case is simple resolution by each house of the Oireachtas.[44] The process is nevertheless informally called "impeachment".[42]

Italy

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In Italy, according to Article 90 of the Constitution, the President of Italy can be impeached through a majority vote of the Parliament in joint session for high treason and for attempting to overthrow the Constitution. If impeached, the president of the Republic is then tried by the Constitutional Court integrated with sixteen citizens older than forty chosen by lot from a list compiled by the Parliament every nine years.

Italian press and political forces made use of the term "impeachment" for the attempt by some members of parliamentary opposition to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 90 against Presidents Francesco Cossiga (1991),[45][46] Giorgio Napolitano (2014)[47][48] and Sergio Mattarella (2018).[49][50][51]

Japan

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By Article 78 of the Constitution of Japan, judges can be impeached.[52] The voting method is specified by laws. The National Diet has two organs, namely 裁判官訴追委員会 (Saibankan sotsui iinkai) and 裁判官弾劾裁判所 (Saibankan dangai saibansho), which is established by Article 64 of the Constitution.[53] The former has a role similar to prosecutor and the latter is analogous to Court. Seven judges were removed by them.

Liechtenstein

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Members of the Liechtenstein Government can be impeached before the State Court for breaches of the Constitution or of other laws.[54]: Article 62  As a hereditary monarchy the Sovereign Prince cannot be impeached as he "is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and does not have legal responsibility".[54]: Article 7  The same is true of any member of the Princely House who exercises the function of head of state should the Prince be temporarily prevented or in preparation for the Succession.[54]: Article 7 

Lithuania

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Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas was the first European head of state to have been impeached.

In the Republic of Lithuania, the president may be impeached by a three-fifths majority in the Seimas.[55] President Rolandas Paksas was removed from office by impeachment on 6 April 2004 after the Constitutional Court of Lithuania found him guilty of having violated his oath and the constitution. He was the first European head of state to have been impeached.[56]

Norway

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Members of government, representatives of the national assembly (Stortinget) and Supreme Court judges can be impeached for criminal offenses tied to their duties and committed in office, according to the Constitution of 1814, §§ 86 and 87. The procedural rules were modeled after the U.S. rules and are quite similar to them. Impeachment has been used eight times since 1814, last in 1927. Many argue that impeachment has fallen into desuetude. In cases of impeachment, an appointed court (Riksrett) takes effect.

Peru

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Peru's president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski speaks about the impeachment process against him.

The first impeachment process against Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, then the incumbent President of Peru since 2016, was initiated by the Congress of Peru on 15 December 2017. According to Luis Galarreta, the President of the Congress, the whole process of impeachment could have taken as little as a week to complete.[57] This event was part of the second stage of the political crisis generated by the confrontation between the Government of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and the Congress, in which the opposition Popular Force has an absolute majority. The impeachment request was rejected by the congress on 21 December 2017, for failing to obtain sufficient votes for the deposition.[58]

Philippines

[edit]

Impeachment in the Philippines follows procedures similar to the United States. Under Sections 2 and 3, Article XI, Constitution of the Philippines, the House of Representatives of the Philippines has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment against the president, vice president, members of the Supreme Court, members of the Constitutional Commissions (Commission on Elections, Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit), and the ombudsman. When a third of its membership has endorsed article(s) of impeachment, it is then transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines which tries and decide, as impeachment tribunal, the impeachment case.[59]

A main difference from U.S. proceedings, however, is that only one third of House members are required to approve the motion to impeach the president (as opposed to a simple majority of those present and voting in their U.S. counterpart). In the Senate, selected members of the House of Representatives act as the prosecutors and the senators act as judges with the Senate president presiding over the proceedings (the chief justice jointly presides with the Senate president if the president is on trial). Like the United States, to convict the official in question requires that a minimum of two thirds (i.e. 16 of 24 members) of all the members of the Senate vote in favor of conviction. If an impeachment attempt is unsuccessful or the official is acquitted, no new cases can be filed against that impeachable official for at least one full year.

Poland

[edit]

In Poland, referral to the State Tribunal is used instead of the process of impeachment, which is traditionally used in some other nations as a way of addressing similar allegations against persons holding analogous offices.

Romania

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The president can be impeached by Parliament and is then suspended. A referendum then follows to determine whether the suspended president should be removed from office. President Traian Băsescu was impeached twice by the Parliament: in 2007 and then again in July 2012. A referendum was held on 19 May 2007 and a large majority of the electorate voted against removing the president from office. For the most recent suspension a referendum was held on 29 July 2012; voters overwhelmingly approved Băsescu's impeachment, but the referendum was invalidated due to low turnout.[60]

Russia

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Boris Yeltsin, as president of Russia, survived several impeachment attempts.

In 1999, members of the State Duma of Russia, led by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, unsuccessfully attempted to impeach President Boris Yeltsin on charges relating to his role in the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and launching the First Chechen War (1995–96); efforts to launch impeachment proceedings failed.[61][62][63]

Singapore

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The Constitution of Singapore allows the impeachment of a sitting president on charges of treason, violation of the Constitution, corruption, or attempting to mislead the Presidential Elections Committee for the purpose of demonstrating eligibility to be elected as president. The prime minister or at least one-quarter of all members of Parliament (MPs) can pass an impeachment motion, which can succeed only if at least half of all MPs (excluding nominated members) vote in favor, whereupon the chief justice of the Supreme Court will appoint a tribunal to investigate allegations against the president. If the tribunal finds the president guilty, or otherwise declares that the president is "permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his office by reason of mental or physical infirmity", Parliament will hold a vote on a resolution to remove the president from office, which requires a three-quarters majority to succeed.[64] No president has ever been removed from office in this fashion.

South Africa

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When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the only officials who could be impeached (though the term itself was not used) were the chief justice and judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The scope was broadened when the country became a republic in 1961, to include the state president. It was further broadened in 1981 to include the new office of vice state president; and in 1994 to include the executive deputy presidents, the public protector and the Auditor-General. Since 1997, members of certain commissions established by the Constitution can also be impeached. The grounds for impeachment, and the procedures to be followed, have changed several times over the years.

South Korea

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The Constitutional Court of Korea holding a hearing in the impeachment trial for President Yoon Suk Yeol, with Yoon in attendance (on the right) as the defendant, 21 January 2025

According to the Article 65(1) of Constitution of South Korea,[65] the President, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council, heads of Executive Ministries, Justices of the Constitutional Court, judges, members of the National Election Commission, the chairperson and members of the Board of Audit and Inspection can be impeached by the National Assembly if they violate the Constitution or other statutory duties. By article 65(2) of the Constitution, proposal of an impeachment motion requires at least a third of the members, while passage needs an absolute majority of votes among the entire membership of the National Assembly. However, exceptionally, the impeachment of a president needs an absolute majority to propose and a two-thirds supermajority of votes to pass among the entire membership of the National Assembly. When the impeachment proposal is passed in the National Assembly, it is reviewed by the Constitutional Court of Korea, according to article 111(1) of the Constitution. During this process, the impeached officeholder is suspended from exercising power by article 65(3) of the Constitution.

Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the National Assembly has impeached three presidents: Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, Park Geun-hye in 2016,[66] and Yoon Suk Yeol in 2024 following his declaration of martial law.[67] Although Roh's impeachment was rejected by the Constitutional Court, Park and Yoon were later removed from office by the final Constitutional Court ruling.[66][68]

In February 2021, Judge Lim Seong-geun of the Busan High Court was impeached by the National Assembly for meddling in politically sensitive trials, the first ever impeachment of a judge in Korean history. Unlike presidential impeachments, only a simple majority is required to impeach.[69] Judge Lim's term expired before the Constitutional Court could render a verdict, leading the court to dismiss the case without ruling on it merits.[70]

Turkey

[edit]

In Turkey, according to the Constitution, the Grand National Assembly may initiate an investigation of the president, the vice president or any member of the Cabinet upon the proposal of simple majority of its total members, and within a period less than a month, the approval of three-fifths of the total members.[71] The investigation would be carried out by a commission of fifteen members of the Assembly, each nominated by the political parties in proportion to their representation therein. The commission would submit its report indicating the outcome of the investigation to the speaker within two months. If the investigation is not completed within this period, the commission's time may be renewed for another month. Within ten days of its submission to the speaker, the report would be distributed to all members of the Assembly, and ten days after its distribution, the report would be discussed on the floor. Upon the approval of two thirds of the total number of the Assembly by secret vote, the person or persons, about whom the investigation was conducted, may be tried before the Constitutional Court. The trial would be finalized within three months, and if not, a one-time additional period of three months shall be granted. The president, about whom an investigation has been initiated, may not call for an election. The president, who is convicted by the Court, would be removed from office.[citation needed]

The provision of this article shall also apply to the offenses for which the president allegedly worked during his term of office.[citation needed]

United Kingdom

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In the United Kingdom, in principle, anybody may be prosecuted and tried by the two Houses of Parliament for any crime.[72] The first recorded impeachment is that of William Latimer, 4th Baron Latimer during the Good Parliament of 1376. The latest was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville which started in 1805 and which ended with his acquittal in June 1806.[73] Over the centuries, the procedure has been supplemented by other forms of oversight including select committees, confidence motions, and judicial review, while the privilege of peers to trial only in the House of Lords was abolished in 1948 (see Judicial functions of the House of Lords § Trials), and thus impeachment, which has not kept up with modern norms of democracy or procedural fairness, is generally considered obsolete.[72]

United States

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The impeachment trial of United States president Bill Clinton in 1999, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist presiding. The House managers are seated beside the quarter-circular tables on the left and the president's personal counsel on the right, much in the fashion of United States president Andrew Johnson's trial in 1868.

In the federal system, Article One of the United States Constitution provides that the House of Representatives has the "sole Power of Impeachment" and the Senate has "the sole Power to try all Impeachments".[74] Article Two provides that "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."[75] In the United States, impeachment is the first of two stages; an official may be impeached by a majority vote of the House, but conviction and removal from office in the Senate requires "the concurrence of two thirds of the members present".[76] Impeachment is analogous to an indictment.[77]

According to the House practice manual, "Impeachment is a constitutional remedy to address serious offenses against the system of government. It is the first step in a remedial process – that of removal from public office and possible disqualification from holding further office. The purpose of impeachment is not punishment; rather, its function is primarily to maintain constitutional government."[78] Impeachment may be understood as a unique process involving both political and legal elements.[79][10][80] The Constitution provides that "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."[81] It was generally accepted that "a former President may be prosecuted for crimes of which he was acquitted by the Senate,"[82] though that standard has been challenged in a recent case which held that the president has immunity for all official acts.

As of 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives had impeached an official 22 times since 1789: four times for presidents, fifteen times for federal judges, twice for a Cabinet secretary, and once for a US senator.[83] Of the 22, the Senate voted to remove 8 officials impeached by the House of Representatives (all federal judges) from office.[83] The four impeachment trials in the Senate of presidents were: Andrew Johnson in 1868, Bill Clinton in 1998, and Donald Trump in 2019 and again in 2021.[84] All four impeachments were followed by acquittal in the Senate.[83] An impeachment process was also commenced against Richard Nixon, but he resigned in 1974 to avoid an impeachment vote.[85]

Almost all state constitutions set forth parallel impeachment procedures for state governments, allowing the state legislature to impeach officials of the state government.[86] From 1789 through 2008, 14 governors have been impeached (including two who were impeached twice), of whom seven governors were convicted.[87]

Other

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Armenia

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The process for removing a prime minister of Armenia by a vote of non-confidence (outlined in Article 115 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia) is often referred to as "impeachment",[88] despite this term not being used by the constitution itself.[89]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Impeachment is a constitutional mechanism in which a legislative body formally accuses a high-ranking public official, such as a president, , or , of serious misconduct—typically "," , or —initiating a process that may culminate in removal from office following a by another or body. Originating in medieval during the Good Parliament of 1376 as a parliamentary tool to prosecute royal favorites and ministers otherwise shielded from prosecution, the procedure evolved to curb monarchical overreach and was revived in the amid conflicts between and the Stuart kings. Adopted by the framers of the U.S. in 1787, impeachment was designed as a political rather than strictly judicial remedy to address official malfeasance without reliance on elections or criminal courts, granting the the exclusive power to impeach by majority vote and the to try cases requiring a two-thirds for conviction and removal, with disqualification from future office possible but not automatic. While rare and often partisan in application—yielding no presidential removals in U.S. history despite multiple proceedings—impeachment provisions appear in constitutions worldwide, with at least 132 heads of state facing over 270 proposals across 63 countries since the late , frequently succeeding in parliamentary systems but highlighting tensions between and political stability.

Etymology and Historical Origins

Linguistic and Conceptual Roots

The term "impeachment" entered English in the late , deriving from the empeechement, meaning "hindrance" or "obstruction," which itself stemmed from the verb empechier, "to hinder" or "impede." This form traces back to the impedicare, composed of in- ("in" or "on") and pedica ("" or "fetter"), literally connoting the act of entangling the feet, as in or ensnaring prey or a wrongdoer. The metaphor of fettering evolved in medieval legal contexts to signify binding or challenging someone, particularly in accusing them of , rather than deriving from Latin peccare ("to "), despite occasional misconceptions linking the term to transgression. By the early , adopted variants like apechen, used to mean "to accuse" or "to indict," reflecting a shift from physical impediment to verbal or legal hindrance of a person's or actions. In legal usage, "impeachment" initially denoted the obstruction of justice or , as in discrediting a , before solidifying by the 1640s into the specific sense of formal charges brought by a legislative body against high officials for abuses of power. This evolution parallels broader medieval notions of , where accusations served to "entangle" officials in their own misdeeds, emphasizing evidentiary entanglement over abstract guilt. Conceptually, impeachment roots in the principle of restraining unchecked through structured , drawing from feudal and parliamentary traditions where hindrance of justified scrutiny of ministers' conduct. Unlike criminal prosecution, which targets private wrongs, the term's core idea privileges violations, conceptualizing removal as a disentangling of the from corrupted elements—a causal mechanism to preserve institutional without dissolving . This framework, unburdened by modern egalitarian overlays, prioritizes empirical breaches of duty over subjective equity, as evidenced in early applications treating impeachment as a targeted fetter on executive overreach rather than punitive retribution.

Development in English Constitutional Law

Impeachment emerged in during the as a parliamentary mechanism to prosecute crown officials for abuses of power, particularly when the was unwilling or unable to pursue such actions through ordinary courts. The first recorded instance occurred in the Good Parliament of 1376, convened by Edward III, where the impeached William, Lord Latimer, Chamberlain of the Household, on charges including , , and military negligence in failing to defend English-held territories in . Other officials, such as , the king's mistress, and members of the royal council, faced similar proceedings for and , marking impeachment as a tool for to assert oversight over executive misconduct without direct royal consent. This involved the Commons presenting articles of impeachment to the Lords for trial, with judgments requiring , distinguishing it from criminal trials by emphasizing political accountability over strict legal proof. By the mid-15th century, impeachment had largely fallen into disuse amid shifting parliamentary dynamics and royal consolidation of power under the Lancastrians and Yorkists. It revived in the early amid escalating conflicts between and the Stuart monarchy, particularly under James I and Charles I, whose perceived absolutist tendencies prompted to deploy impeachment against royal favorites and advisors. A pivotal case was the 1626 impeachment of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, though it failed due to royal intervention; more successfully, in 1641, Thomas Wentworth, , Charles I's chief minister, was impeached for alleged treasonous abuse of authority in suppressing Irish rebellions and advising the king against parliamentary prerogatives, leading to his execution after a supplemented the process. These proceedings underscored impeachment's role in curbing executive overreach, with charges framed as "" encompassing , , and betrayal of public trust rather than solely indictable offenses. Throughout the , impeachment continued as a means to address ministerial misconduct, though successes were rare. The most protracted trial targeted , , impeached by the in 1788 on 22 articles alleging corruption, extortion, and oppression in , including the judicial murder of Nuncomar and mistreatment of the Begums of Oudh. The acquitted Hastings in 1795 after a seven-year trial marked by Edmund Burke's prosecution and intense scrutiny of governance, highlighting impeachment's potential for political theater but also its evidentiary burdens. By this era, the procedure had evolved to prioritize , yet its decline accelerated post-1800 as alternative accountability mechanisms, such as ministerial responsibility to and , rendered it obsolete; no impeachments have occurred in the since 1806. This historical trajectory cemented impeachment in English as a safeguard against arbitrary rule, influencing subsequent systems by embedding legislative checks on executive power without reliance on monarchical prosecution.

Theoretical Foundations and Principles

Purpose and Constitutional Rationale

Impeachment serves as a constitutional mechanism to remove high-ranking officials from office for grave abuses of power or violations of , thereby preserving the integrity of without relying on electoral cycles or ordinary judicial processes. Unlike criminal prosecution, which aims at punishment, impeachment prioritizes the protection of the constitutional system against officials who endanger it through actions like , , or other serious misconduct that undermines the . This process addresses offenses of a political character that harm the state as a whole, functioning as a check on executive overreach and ensuring in systems where officials hold tenure beyond popular vote. The constitutional rationale traces to English parliamentary practice, where impeachment emerged in the late as a tool for to prosecute royal ministers for political offenses damaging the realm, such as or advising the against parliamentary interests, when the king refused to act. This addressed a causal gap in monarchical accountability, allowing legislative intervention to prevent entrenched abuse without direct challenge to . By the , cases like the impeachment of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, in 1640 illustrated its role in curbing tyrannical tendencies through high political crimes, influencing framers who sought to adapt it for republican governance. In the United States , ratified in , impeachment is enshrined in Article II, Section 4, which mandates removal of the President, , and civil officers upon conviction for ", , or other ," with the holding sole impeachment power (Article I, Section 2) and the conducting trials requiring a two-thirds vote for conviction (Article I, Section 3). The Framers, drawing from English precedents but refining for , viewed it as essential to guard against executive betrayal of constitutional oaths, as explained in No. 65 (), describing it as a "method of national inquest into the conduct of public men" for offenses against the state rather than private wrongs. This rationale underscores impeachment's political essence—deliberate thresholds prevent partisan misuse while enabling removal of unfit leaders to sustain republican stability.

Definition of Impeachable Offenses

Impeachable offenses encompass serious misconduct by public officials that undermines their fitness for office, typically involving , , or betrayal of , rather than routine criminality prosecutable in ordinary courts. These offenses are inherently political judgments, assessed by legislative bodies to protect constitutional order, and are not confined to statutory crimes but extend to violations of official duties or oaths. The concept traces to English common law, where parliamentary impeachments from the onward targeted "high misdemeanors" against the realm, such as , , or advising the king unlawfully, as seen in the 1376 impeachment of Lord Latimer for and the 1640 case against Thomas Wentworth, , for abuse of authority. These were not always indictable felonies but acts eroding , emphasizing political over judicial punishment. In constitutional frameworks modeled on this tradition, such as the U.S., impeachable offenses are defined as ", , or other ," with the latter phrase denoting grave political faults like subverting elections or obstructing , even absent criminal conviction. Historical framers intended this to cover or neglect, rejecting narrower standards like "malpractice or neglect of " to ensure flexibility for threats to republican principles. Interpretations by scholars and precedents affirm that non-criminal conduct, such as intoxication on or partisan overreach, qualifies if it demonstrates unfitness, as in the 1912 impeachment of Judge Robert Archbald for ethical lapses without charges. Across non-U.S. systems, definitions vary but align on core elements of official malfeasance: Brazil's 1988 Constitution permits impeachment for violating constitutional duties, as in Dilma Rousseff's 2016 removal for fiscal manipulations; South Korea's grounds include or under its 1987 Constitution, evident in Park Geun-hye's 2017 conviction for ; and France's Fifth Republic specifies high treason or constitutional breaches. These reflect causal priorities—preserving institutional integrity over prosecutorial exactitude—though application often hinges on majority legislative will, risking partisan dilution absent rigorous evidence of betrayal.

Distinction from Criminal and Civil Proceedings

Impeachment proceedings serve primarily to safeguard the by removing officials unfit for office, rather than to impose criminal penalties such as or fines. Unlike criminal trials, which require proof beyond a and adhere to strict evidentiary rules under the , impeachment lacks a defined burden of proof and operates under looser procedural norms determined by legislative bodies. For instance, in the U.S. context, the impeaches by simple majority vote without needing to establish criminal guilt, while Senate conviction requires a two-thirds focused on political rather than judicial standards. A in impeachment does not trigger protections under the Fifth Amendment, allowing subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct, as the processes are constitutionally distinct. This separation was affirmed in cases like the impeachment trial of Judge , where the emphasized that impeachment judgments address civil removal, not criminal culpability. Impeachable offenses, often termed "," encompass non-criminal misconduct like , extending beyond statutory crimes to include breaches of fiduciary duty. In contrast to civil proceedings, which resolve disputes between private parties or seek remedies like monetary , impeachment is a , political mechanism confined to disqualifying individuals from holding . Civil suits involve preponderance of standards and judicial oversight for compensation or injunctions, whereas impeachment yields no financial redress and prioritizes institutional over individual . This remedial focus ensures impeachment remains a legislative tool, unencumbered by civil discovery mandates or appeals processes typical in courts.

Procedural Framework

General Steps in Impeachment Processes

Impeachment processes in constitutional systems worldwide generally divide into distinct phases: an initial accusation or investigation, formal impeachment by a legislative body acting as a charging authority, a subsequent by a separate adjudicating body, and a final judgment on removal from office. This structure, rooted in English parliamentary practice and adapted in numerous democracies, emphasizes by assigning indictment-like functions to one branch or chamber and trial functions to another, thereby preventing unilateral executive removal while maintaining legislative oversight. The process targets high officials, such as presidents or judges, for offenses deemed threats to the constitutional order, with conviction requiring evidentiary thresholds and votes to safeguard against partisan abuse. The process typically begins with initiation through complaints, referrals from oversight bodies, or internal legislative resolutions prompting an . A —often in a lower legislative house—conducts the investigation, subpoenaing evidence, interviewing witnesses, and compiling a report on potential impeachable conduct, such as or . This phase resembles a proceeding but remains political rather than judicial, allowing flexibility in scope without strict evidentiary rules akin to criminal trials. In many systems, this culminates in drafting articles of impeachment, which specify charges and must secure majority approval in the impeaching body to proceed; failure here ends the process without prejudice to other remedies. Upon impeachment, the case transfers to a trial body, such as an upper legislative chamber, , or plenary , where the accused receives notice, counsel, and opportunities for defense, including witness examination. The trial evaluates whether the charged offenses meet the constitutional standard for removal, often "" or equivalents like betrayal of . Proceedings may involve oaths for participants to ensure solemnity, but rules vary, with some systems permitting closed sessions for sensitive matters. demands a qualified —frequently two-thirds of attendees—to override presumptions of and effect removal, disqualification from future office, or lesser penalties; absent this threshold, the official remains in post despite impeachment. Post-, outcomes may include automatic removal and bans on reappointment, but impeachment itself does not trigger criminal liability, permitting parallel or subsequent prosecutions under exceptions for political offenses. Some jurisdictions add safeguards like preliminary parliamentary approvals or judicial oversight to filter frivolous claims, reflecting empirical patterns where lower rates correlate with higher thresholds and independent triers. These steps underscore impeachment's role as a constitutional , balancing against stability, though politicization risks persist absent rigorous procedural discipline.

Variations Across Systems

Impeachment processes exhibit substantial variation across constitutional systems, shaped by the , the nature of executive authority, and institutional checks. In presidential and semi-presidential systems, impeachment functions as a rare but potent mechanism to remove chief executives for , often requiring supermajorities to balance political with stability; historical data from 61 countries show only 15 successful presidential removals since 1990, frequently triggered by plummeting public support rather than isolated crimes. Parliamentary systems, by contrast, typically employ impeachment sparingly for judges or ceremonial heads of state, favoring no-confidence votes for prime ministers, as executive is embedded in legislative majorities. A global categorizes methods into five types: purely legislative (15 countries, e.g., bicameral processes like the U.S.), legislative impeachment with intermediate review followed by legislative removal (16 countries), legislative impeachment with court removal (29 countries, the most prevalent), court-initiated processes (4 countries), and referendum-based (2 countries), with voting thresholds ranging from simple majorities for initiation to two-thirds or higher for . Grounds for impeachment diverge markedly: U.S.-style allow broad political judgments encompassing or betrayal of trust, without mandatory criminality, whereas many systems limit to specific violations like , , or constitutional breaches (e.g., 59% of surveyed constitutions cite crimes, 46% constitutional infractions). Procedural channels split between legislative dominance and judicial integration; in the U.S., the impeaches by simple majority and the convicts by two-thirds without appellate review, emphasizing political discretion. exemplifies hybrid models, where the National Assembly's two-thirds impeachment vote yields to the Constitutional Court's six-of-nine justices' decision on removal, as in the 2017 ouster of for corruption and the 2024-2025 proceedings against for declaration, blending legislative initiative with judicial finality to enhance . requires two-thirds lower-house approval for impeachment and simple-majority conviction, with procedural oversight, as applied to Dilma Rousseff's 2016 removal for budgetary irregularities deemed fiscal responsibility violations. In parliamentary contexts, impeachment targets non-partisan officials; the United Kingdom's process, involving impeachment and Lords trial, has been dormant since , supplanted by select committees or no-confidence mechanisms. mandates two-thirds joint-assembly approval for presidential high , tried by a special , underscoring semi-presidential caution against executive overreach. Consequences vary: removal often bars future office-holding (e.g., Brazil's automatic ban unless separately overturned), triggers vice-presidential succession (U.S.), or prompts snap elections ( within 60 days); judicial models mitigate politicization but risk court capture, while pure legislative paths prioritize elected branches' judgment. Overall usage remains infrequent—e.g., one success per 72-310 years per category—reflecting design as a safeguard against systemic threats rather than routine oversight.

Impeachment in the United States

Constitutional Provisions and Original Intent

The impeachment power is outlined in three key provisions of the . Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 vests the "sole Power of Impeachment" in the . Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7 assigns to the the sole authority to try impeachments, with the presiding over trials involving the President; conviction requires a two-thirds vote of senators present, and penalties are limited to removal from office and disqualification from future federal office, without extending to further punishment unless pursued separately in ordinary courts. Article II, Section 4 specifies that the President, , and all civil officers of the "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and of, , , or other ." During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, delegates debated the scope and grounds for impeachment extensively, drawing from English precedents while adapting them to republican principles. On July 20, 1787, James Madison's notes record arguing against broad impeachability for mere incapacity or policy errors, favoring limits to "Treachery" or corruption of electors, as excessive grounds could undermine the executive's independence. invoked the ongoing in Britain as a model for addressing , proposing "maladministration" as a ground, but this was rejected in favor of the narrower "other high Crimes & Misdemeanors" to prevent legislative overreach into executive discretion. The framers settled on this phrasing after September 8, 1787, revisions, intending it to encompass political offenses serious enough to warrant removal but distinct from ordinary crimes, ensuring accountability without paralyzing governance through partisan quarrels. In , elaborated on the original design, describing impeachment in No. 65 as "a method of national inquest into the conduct of the public men, directed to the impeachment of 'any '" for abuses violating the or laws, executed by the to balance legislative and judicial elements while avoiding pure partisanship. Hamilton emphasized in No. 66 that the process was not meant to supplant elections or criminal prosecutions but to address misconduct threatening the public trust, such as betrayal of duty, without requiring judicial unanimity that might shield the guilty. This framework reflected the framers' intent to safeguard the : the House's role as accuser ensured popular representation in initiating charges, while the Senate's threshold protected against frivolous or factional removals, preserving executive stability amid a system wary of monarchical impunity yet fearful of legislative tyranny.

House Impeachment Procedures

The holds the sole constitutional authority to initiate impeachment proceedings against federal officers, as granted by Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests it with "the sole Power of Impeachment." Impeachment in the functions as an accusation akin to an , requiring only a simple majority vote to approve articles of impeachment, without necessitating proof beyond a or adherence to criminal evidentiary standards. The process typically unfolds through investigation, committee markup, and floor consideration, though it lacks rigid statutory rules and relies on House precedents, committee practices, and resolutions adopted for specific cases. Proceedings may be initiated by any House member through a simple resolution placed in the legislative hopper, referral to a standing committee such as , or as a "question of the privileges of the House," which demands consideration within two legislative days upon proper notice. External triggers, including reports from judicial bodies or independent counsels, can also prompt action, as seen in several judicial impeachments leveraging prior criminal convictions. Since the late , the House has favored structured inquiries over ad hoc floor resolutions, with the Committee conducting the vast majority of investigations—handling 16 of the 20 successful impeachments since 1789. The House Judiciary Committee assumes primary responsibility for inquiry, empowered under House Rule XI to investigate alleged misconduct through hearings, subpoenas, depositions, and witness testimony. It may incorporate evidence from external probes, such as those by the Department of Justice, to expedite proceedings; for instance, four of five judicial impeachments since 1980 drew on prior federal trials. Upon concluding its review, the committee drafts and marks up articles of impeachment—formal charges specifying offenses—within a resolution, voting to report them favorably, unfavorably, or with amendments to the full House. In modern practice, authorizing resolutions like H. Res. 660 in 2019 have outlined procedures for public hearings and elements, though such structures remain discretionary. Floor consideration of reported articles proceeds as a privileged resolution, often under a special rule from the Rules Committee governing debate time, amendment germaneness, and voting procedures, or via the hour rule allowing one hour of debate per member. The majority party controls the debate agenda, with limited opportunities for amendments typically confined to the committee stage or via structured alternatives. Adoption of each article requires a simple majority of Members present and voting—effectively 218 votes assuming full attendance—constituting impeachment regardless of the number of articles passed. Upon approval, the Speaker appoints an odd-numbered committee of "managers," usually from the Judiciary Committee, to prosecute the case before the Senate, delivering the articles and serving in a role analogous to prosecutors. Historically, the House has initiated over 60 impeachment proceedings, impeaching 21 individuals, predominantly federal judges, underscoring the procedure's evolution toward committee-led scrutiny while preserving flexibility for political judgment.

Senate Trial and Conviction Standards

The United States conducts impeachment trials as the , with sole authority to determine guilt or innocence following the ' adoption of articles of impeachment, per Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the U.S. Constitution. The Vice President of the or the presides over trials involving non-presidential officials, while the of the Supreme Court presides if the President is impeached, ensuring impartiality in such high-profile cases. Senators act as jurors, sworn to "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws," and the trial follows rules established by the Senate, including provisions for summoning witnesses, compelling evidence, and managing proceedings akin to a judicial but without binding from courts. Conviction requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present, a threshold designed to prevent partisan removal and ensure broad consensus on allegations of ", , or other ." This standard reflects the framers' intent to balance accountability with stability, as articulated in Federalist No. 65 by , emphasizing protection against "the impulse of sudden and violent passions" while addressing serious misconduct. Upon by the requisite vote, the official is automatically removed from office; the Senate then votes separately by simple majority on whether to disqualify the individual from holding any future federal office, a penalty aimed at preventing rather than personal punishment. Unlike criminal proceedings, Senate impeachment trials impose no fines, , or other direct penalties beyond removal and disqualification, distinguishing them as a constitutional mechanism for political accountability rather than retribution. The process admits no appeal to , underscoring its political character, where senators exercise discretion informed by evidence but unbound by evidentiary rules like those in Article III courts. Historical application confirms the high bar: no U.S. President has been convicted, with acquittals in all three trials (Johnson in 1868, in 1999, and Trump in 2020 and 2021) falling short of the two-thirds threshold despite presented evidence. This rarity aligns with the framers' design to reserve impeachment for egregious offenses threatening the republic, not routine policy disputes.

Notable Historical Cases

The impeachment of President in 1868 marked the first instance of a U.S. president being impeached by the . On February 24, 1868, the House voted 126–47 to impeach Johnson on eleven articles, primarily for violating the Tenure of Office Act by dismissing Secretary of War without consent, amid post-Civil War Reconstruction tensions. The trial began on March 5, 1868, and after deliberations, acquitted Johnson on the key articles by a 35–19 vote on May 16 and 26, falling one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction under Article I, Section 3 of the . President Bill Clinton became the second president impeached, on December 19, 1998, when the House approved two articles by partisan votes: 228–206 for perjury and 221–212 for obstruction of justice, stemming from his testimony in the Paula Jones sexual harassment lawsuit and the Monica Lewinsky affair investigation led by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. The Senate trial, from January 7 to February 12, 1999, resulted in acquittal, with votes of 45–55 on perjury and 50–50 on obstruction, neither reaching the two-thirds threshold. Donald Trump was impeached twice, first on December 18, 2019, when the passed articles of (230–197) and obstruction of (229–198), alleging he conditioned military aid to on investigations into political rivals, based on a July 25, 2019, call with Ukrainian President and whistleblower testimony. The acquitted him on February 5, 2020, by 52–48 on and 53–47 on obstruction. Trump's second impeachment occurred on January 13, 2021, with the voting 232–197 on a single article of incitement of insurrection, tied to his January 6, 2021, speech preceding the Capitol riot. The trial from February 9–13, 2021, ended in by 57–43, short of two-thirds, despite Trump's departure from office. No U.S. president has been removed through the impeachment .

Recent Developments and Politicization

The most recent presidential impeachments in the United States occurred during Trump's presidency. On December 18, 2019, the approved two articles of impeachment against Trump— and obstruction of —stemming from allegations that he pressured to investigate political rival by withholding , passing 230-197 and 229-198 along largely partisan lines. The acquitted Trump on February 5, 2020, with votes of 52-48 and 53-47, falling short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction. Trump became the first president impeached twice when the impeached him on , 2021, for incitement of insurrection related to the Capitol riot, passing 232-197. The trial concluded on February 13, 2021, with a 57-43 vote to convict, including seven Republicans joining Democrats, but again failing to reach 67 votes. These proceedings marked a departure from prior impeachments, which were rare and often bipartisan, as both of Trump's trials saw near-unanimous partisan divisions in the and insufficient cross-party support in the for removal. Efforts to impeach President began with a House impeachment inquiry announced on September 12, 2023, by Speaker , focusing on allegations of influence peddling involving his son Hunter Biden's business dealings. House Republicans released a report on August 19, 2024, accusing Biden of and obstruction but did not advance articles to a full House vote, citing insufficient evidence of direct involvement and internal party divisions. The inquiry effectively stalled by April 2024 without formal impeachment proceedings. These events illustrate the politicization of impeachment, transforming it from a mechanism for addressing egregious into a partisan instrument amid heightened congressional polarization. Since 2016, over 30 impeachment resolutions have targeted presidents from both parties, a sharp increase from historical norms, often filed without expectation of success to rally bases or discredit opponents. Analysts note that strict party-line voting in recent cases undermines the process's original intent as a check on executive overreach, instead enabling and eroding , with approval ratings for impeachments correlating closely with partisan affiliations rather than evidence of "." coverage, often aligned with Democratic perspectives, has amplified narratives framing Trump's impeachments as justified while downplaying Biden inquiry findings, highlighting institutional biases in .

Impeachment in Other Jurisdictions

United Kingdom

Impeachment in the United Kingdom refers to a by which the may present articles of impeachment against individuals, typically holders of public office, for high , other crimes and misdemeanours, or offences against the state, with the serving as the court of trial. The process, rooted in constitutional convention rather than statute law, allows for conviction by a simple majority vote in the Lords, potentially resulting in penalties such as fines, , or execution, distinct from parliamentary attainder as it does not automatically confiscate property. Unlike modern judicial proceedings, impeachment historically permitted the Commons to initiate charges without prior judicial , emphasizing parliamentary accountability over the executive or judiciary. The procedure emerged in the late 14th century as a tool to prosecute Crown ministers shielded by royal prerogative, with the first recorded case in 1376 against William de la Pole, 1st Duke of Suffolk, for mismanagement and treason. Over its history, fewer than 70 impeachments occurred, peaking in the 17th and 18th centuries to address ministerial corruption and abuse of power, such as the 1640 impeachment of Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford, for high treason leading to his execution in 1641, and the 1787-1788 trial of Warren Hastings for alleged misconduct in India, which ended in acquittal after a seven-year process. The last formal impeachment targeted Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville, in 1805-1806 for misuse of public funds as First Lord of the Admiralty; he was acquitted by the Lords on April 12, 1806, despite Commons approval of the articles. Impeachment declined in the early 19th century as parliamentary sovereignty strengthened, ministerial responsibility to Parliament evolved through cabinet government, and independent judicial remedies expanded, rendering the process redundant for addressing executive misconduct. In 1843, the Lords indicated reluctance to conduct further trials except potentially for peers, contributing to its obsolescence, though the Commons retains theoretical authority without formal abolition. A 2004 attempt by MP Kevin McNamara to impeach Prime Minister Tony Blair over the Iraq War failed when Speaker Michael Martin ruled on February 4, 2004, that the procedure was incompatible with modern constitutional practice. Today, accountability mechanisms such as votes of no confidence, select committee inquiries, judicial review, and criminal prosecutions under statutes like the Ministerial Code or Bribery Act 2010 have supplanted impeachment, reflecting a shift toward routinized, less adversarial oversight.

France

The impeachment process for the President of France is governed by Article 68 of the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which permits removal from office solely for "a breach of duty manifestly incompatible with the exercise of the mandate," a standard introduced by a 2007 constitutional amendment replacing the prior focus on high treason. This provision underscores the system's design to insulate the president from routine political accountability while allowing exceptional intervention for grave misconduct, reflecting the semi-presidential structure's emphasis on executive stability amid parliamentary oversight. The president enjoys broad immunity for acts performed in office, with criminal proceedings deferred until after the term ends unless removal occurs first, a safeguard intended to prevent judicial interference in governance but criticized for potentially enabling impunity. Initiation requires a resolution introduced in either the or , endorsed by at least one-tenth of that chamber's members and specifying the alleged breach. Approval demands an absolute in both chambers separately, after which the matter proceeds to a joint , comprising all parliamentarians and nine judges appointed by constitutional bodies, convened by the two chambers. Conviction requires a two-thirds majority vote by , leading to immediate mandate termination; the decision is not subject to further appeal. This multi-stage threshold—demanding supermajorities across legislative and judicial elements—prioritizes consensus, making removal improbable without cross-partisan agreement, as evidenced by the absence of any successful application since the Fifth Republic's inception in 1958. No president has been removed via this mechanism, with historical attempts failing early due to insufficient support; for instance, in October 2016, the center-right Republicans party targeted over alleged mishandling of security threats but garnered minimal backing. More recently, in September 2024, the far-left (LFI) initiated proceedings against , citing his refusal to appoint a from the left-wing Nouveau Front Populaire following legislative elections, alleging a constitutional violation; the National Assembly's bureau deemed it admissible initially, but it advanced no further and was rejected as inadmissible by the full chamber on October 8, 2025. These episodes highlight the procedure's role as a symbolic check rather than a practical tool, often invoked amid political deadlock but thwarted by the high evidentiary and barriers, which empirical patterns suggest deter frivolous use while risking entrenchment of executive overreach.

Germany

In Germany, the (Grundgesetz) establishes impeachment primarily for the Federal President under Article 61, targeting intentional violations of the or a federal statute. A motion requires a two-thirds majority of the Bundestag's members or Bundesrat's votes; if passed by both bodies, the adjudicates the case, with prosecution conducted by a representative of the impeaching body. Conviction results in immediate removal from office and disqualification from public office, with the decision published in the Federal Law Gazette. No Federal President has been successfully impeached or removed via this since the Basic Law's enactment in 1949. In 2012, amid scandals involving President Christian Wulff's financial disclosures, opposition parties considered impeachment but did not pursue it after his resignation on , 2012. The faces no formal impeachment; removal occurs through a constructive vote of no confidence under Article 67, requiring the Bundestag to elect a successor by absolute , ensuring government continuity without interim vacancy. Alternatively, under Article 68, the may seek a vote; failure by absolute prompts dissolution and new elections within 60 days, as exercised by Olaf Scholz on December 16, 2024, leading to elections on February 23, 2025. Federal judges, including those on the , may be impeached by a majority under Article 98(2) for intentional breaches of the or constitutional order, with trials before the or designated tribunals. No such impeachments have occurred, reflecting the procedure's high threshold and rarity in practice.

Brazil

In Brazil, impeachment of the president is governed by Articles 85 and 86 of the 1988 Constitution, which define impeachable offenses as "crimes of responsibility," including acts against the probity of administration, such as , budgetary violations, and failure to uphold the law. These are further detailed in Law No. 1.079 of 1950, emphasizing administrative misconduct rather than common crimes, which fall under criminal courts. The process is political: it initiates with a to the president of the , who decides admissibility; a special reviews ; the full Chamber requires a two-thirds (342 of 513 members) to authorize proceedings; the then conducts a trial presided over by the chief justice, needing another two-thirds vote (54 of 81 senators) for conviction and removal, with the assuming office. The first presidential impeachment attempt occurred against , elected in 1989 as the first directly chosen leader after military rule. Accused of , including influence peddling and via a scheme exposed by his brother Pedro Collor in May 1992, the approved impeachment proceedings on September 29, 1992, by a vote of 441-38. Collor resigned on December 29, 1992, hours before the 's scheduled verdict, but the Senate proceeded and convicted him that day by 76-3, declaring him ineligible for public office for eight years; completed the term. Collor faced subsequent criminal charges but was later acquitted in some cases, though convictions persisted into the . Dilma Rousseff, president from 2011 to 2016 and successor to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, faced impeachment over "pedaladas fiscais"—fiscal maneuvers delaying payments to state-owned banks to artificially improve budget appearances, violating the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law amid a recession with GDP contracting 3.8% in 2015. Chamber President Eduardo Cunha accepted the primary complaint on December 2, 2015; a special committee voted 38-27 to recommend impeachment in April 2016; the Chamber approved it on April 17, 2016, by 367-137 (with 7 abstentions and 2 absences). The Senate suspended Rousseff on May 12, 2016, by 55-22, installing Michel Temer as interim president for up to 180 days; after trial, the Senate convicted her on August 31, 2016, by 61-20, removing her from office and barring her from public roles for eight years. Rousseff denied wrongdoing, framing it as a partisan "parliamentary coup" tied to the Lava Jato corruption probe implicating her Workers' Party allies, though the charges centered on verifiable accounting irregularities rather than personal graft. No other Brazilian president has been successfully removed via impeachment, though attempts numbered in the dozens against figures like Jair Bolsonaro (over 1,400 requests from 2019-2022, none advanced to a vote) and earlier leaders, often dismissed for lacking evidence or exceeding constitutional thresholds. These cases highlight impeachment's role as a check on executive overreach in Brazil's presidential system, yet critics note its susceptibility to legislative majorities amid economic distress and scandals, with outcomes reinforcing fiscal accountability but sparking debates on judicial overreach versus political motivation.

Other Presidential Systems

In South Korea's presidential republic, impeachment of the president requires a majority vote in the 300-seat National Assembly for alleged violations of the Constitution or other serious misconduct, followed by review by the Constitutional Court, which must unanimously affirm the impeachment among its eight justices to effect removal. This process has been invoked multiple times, reflecting heightened political accountability but also tensions between branches. Former President Park Geun-hye was impeached on December 9, 2016, by a 234-56 vote amid a corruption scandal involving influence-peddling by her confidante, with the court upholding the removal on March 10, 2017, in a unanimous decision, leading to her arrest and 24-year prison sentence later reduced. Similarly, President Yoon Suk Yeol faced impeachment on December 14, 2024, after declaring martial law on December 3, which was quickly withdrawn amid protests; the National Assembly passed the motion 204-85, and the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld it on April 4, 2025, removing him from office and triggering a snap election. These cases underscore the mechanism's role in addressing executive overreach, though critics note its potential for partisan use given South Korea's polarized politics. Peru's empowers its unicameral to remove the president via impeachment for "permanent moral incapacity," requiring a two-thirds majority of the 130 members without a separate judicial , a provision often applied broadly to ethical or performance failures. This has contributed to frequent instability, with multiple presidents ousted since the 1993 . On October 10, 2025, impeached President Dina by a 122-3 vote (with five abstentions) amid public outrage over soaring crime rates, allegations, and her administration's handling of , installing congressional leader José Jerí as interim president. Earlier, President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned on March 21, 2018, hours before a scheduled impeachment vote over scandals tied to , avoiding formal removal but highlighting the tool's leverage in probes. Such impeachments, while constitutionally grounded, have been criticized for exacerbating Peru's cycle of short-term leadership and governance crises rather than resolving underlying institutional weaknesses. Russia's presidential framework, established post-1993 , allows the to initiate impeachment with a two-thirds vote (226 of 450 members), followed by two-thirds approval in the Federation Council and a finding of constitutionality by the , though in practice, it has served more as a political signal than effective removal. During the 1993 crisis, the impeached President on March 27 for dissolving parliament via decree, but the vote fell short at 617-283 (needing 689), prompting Yeltsin's military-backed dissolution of the legislature and a new strengthening presidential powers. A later attempt in May 1999 by Communist deputies accusing Yeltsin of treason, genocide in Chechnya, and other charges failed in the Duma with only 212 votes for the key article, falling short of 226. These episodes illustrate impeachment's limited utility in systems where executive control over security forces and electoral processes can override legislative challenges, often entrenching power imbalances. Across other presidential systems, such as those in , impeachment thresholds vary but frequently emphasize "moral" or "incapacity" grounds, enabling congresses to act as no-confidence mechanisms despite fixed terms, which can deter abuse but risks and serial ousters as seen in Peru's six presidents since 2016. In contrast to the U.S. model requiring high evidentiary bars and Senate supermajorities, these processes prioritize legislative majorities, reflecting adaptations to multiparty fragmentation but raising concerns over stability in polarized environments.

Parliamentary and Hybrid Systems

In parliamentary systems, executive accountability primarily occurs through mechanisms like votes of no confidence against the and cabinet, rendering impeachment largely obsolete for the , as the allows the to withdraw support without formal charges of misconduct. Impeachment instead targets non-partisan, fixed-term officials such as judges or ceremonial presidents, who lack direct legislative responsibility and require high thresholds for removal to preserve institutional independence. For instance, in , a federal parliamentary republic, the president—a largely symbolic role—may be impeached for violating the via a resolution initiated in either house of , requiring a two-thirds majority of the total membership in that house, followed by investigation and a similar majority in the other house. This process has never succeeded since India's 1950 took effect, reflecting its role as a safeguard rather than a routine tool. Similarly, in , another with a ceremonial president, removal requires a two-thirds joint majority vote by both houses of on charges of misconduct or inability to perform functions, as outlined in Article 47 of the 1973 ; attempts occurred in 1996 and 2022 but failed due to insufficient support. Judicial impeachment follows comparable patterns, emphasizing supermajorities to prevent partisan abuse; in , a Westminster-style , the prefers simple resolutions or addresses to the for judge removal, but the historically holds conviction power under Section 65 of the 1867 Constitution Act, with only 11 judges removed or resigned under threat since 1875, often for incapacity rather than corruption. Empirical data across systems show such processes are infrequent, with parliamentary impeachment succeeding in under 1% of attempts globally, prioritizing stability over frequent executive turnover. Hybrid or semi-presidential systems, featuring a directly elected president alongside a accountable to , employ impeachment for the president to balance dual executives, often integrating legislative votes, , and public input to mitigate power concentration. In , a semi-presidential framework under the 1993 constitution, the initiates impeachment with a three-fifths on or other , followed by two-thirds approval in the Federation Council, with mandatory review by the Constitutional and Supreme Courts; attempts against President in 1993 and 1999 failed due to procedural hurdles and lack of supermajorities, underscoring the mechanism's design to insulate against legislative overreach amid divided powers. provides another variant, where votes by three-quarters to suspend the president for constitutional violations, triggering a 30-day for removal; this occurred unsuccessfully against President Traian Băsescu in 2007 and 2012, with the process involving the to validate charges, highlighting hybrid systems' reliance on to resolve elite deadlocks. These procedures differ from pure presidential models by incorporating parliamentary dynamics, reducing impeachment frequency—successful cases average one per 200-900 constitutional years depending on judicial involvement—while enabling targeted for the president's independent functions like .

Comparative Analysis

Common Patterns and Divergences

Impeachment mechanisms in democratic systems worldwide exhibit common procedural patterns designed to balance with institutional stability. typically occurs in a , often the , via a simple or qualified vote to file charges, followed by a trial phase in an , , or requiring a —frequently two-thirds—for conviction and removal. Grounds for impeachment converge on serious executive misconduct, with constitutional provisions in 63 percent of presidential and semi-presidential democracies specifying crimes against the state, 28 percent citing constitutional violations, and similar proportions including or incapacity as triggers. These processes apply to heads of state or , aiming to address political crises beyond mere criminality, though successful removals remain rare, with only 10 out of over 210 attempts since resulting in ouster across 61 countries. Divergences emerge prominently between presidential and parliamentary systems. In presidential frameworks like the and , impeachment targets fixed-term executives for vague or broad offenses—"" in the U.S., or "crimes of responsibility" in —eschewing to preserve , with succession passing to the upon removal (e.g., 's 1992 and 2016 cases). Thresholds are stringent: two-thirds in the U.S. or Brazilian after lower-house authorization by the same margin, contributing to zero U.S. presidential removals despite multiple proceedings. Parliamentary and hybrid systems, conversely, integrate impeachment with fluid tools; the United Kingdom's archaic process, unused since 1805, yields to or no-confidence votes for ministers, while limits presidential impeachment to high treason requiring two-thirds in a joint parliamentary session, a threshold unmet historically. Germany's federal president faces removal only for intentional constitutional breaches via two-thirds votes in both houses, emphasizing judicial-like scrutiny absent in purely legislative models like the U.S. Further variations involve judicial integration and post-removal effects. Systems like South Korea's mandate validation—six of nine justices for upholding National Assembly's two-thirds impeachment vote—enhancing but extending timelines, as in Park Geun-hye's 2017 removal, which triggered snap elections unlike vice-presidential succession elsewhere. In contrast, and rely solely on legislative phases without mandatory court oversight, enabling faster but potentially partisan resolutions. Parliamentary hybrids, such as France's, rarely invoke impeachment for prime ministers, deferring to assembly confidence votes, underscoring how regime type influences frequency: fragmented presidential legislatures see more attempts (e.g., 10 in ), yet low conviction rates preserve executive tenure absent legislative majorities.

Effectiveness in Preventing Abuse vs. Enabling Gridlock

Impeachment mechanisms aim to curb executive abuse by enabling removal for or misdemeanors, yet their high evidentiary and political thresholds often result in failed proceedings that exacerbate partisan divisions without resolving underlying issues. In successful cases, such as South Korea's 2016-2017 impeachment of President , the process effectively halted documented corruption involving influence-peddling and abuse of power, leading to her conviction on 16 charges and a 24-year sentence in April 2018, which restored institutional trust and prompted snap elections yielding a . This outcome aligned with causal expectations in semi-presidential systems where constitutional courts provide impartial final review, preventing prolonged executive malfeasance that had paralyzed amid public protests exceeding 1 million participants. Conversely, in Brazil's 2016 impeachment of President for fiscal accounting manipulations constituting budgetary abuse, conviction by a 61-20 vote removed her but triggered immediate economic uncertainty, with corporate investment declining amid political turmoil and Temer administration scandals, contributing to a GDP contraction of 3.5% that year. While intended to address perceived executive overreach amid , the process amplified in a fragmented , as evidenced by subsequent instability including Temer's low approval ratings below 10% and delayed reforms until 2018 elections. In the United States, no president has been removed via impeachment, rendering it largely ineffective against abuse while fostering gridlock; the 1998-1999 Clinton proceedings over diverted congressional focus without ( 55-45 on ), and Trump's 2019-2020 and 2021 , centered on aid withholding and events, ended in acquittals (52-48 and 57-43 votes) amid heightened polarization that stalled bipartisan , such as deals postponed by partisan rancor. Empirical analyses indicate that in polarized presidential democracies, impeachment's requirements insulate executives from removal but enable opposition parties to weaponize inquiries, eroding norms without causal deterrence of future abuses, as post-impeachment executive behavior shows minimal restraint. Cross-jurisdictional patterns reveal that impeachment prevents abuse most effectively in systems with unified judicial oversight and public mobilization, yielding "hard resets" via removal and elections, but devolves into in fragmented legislatures where partisan thresholds block conviction, perpetuating cycles of accusation without resolution and undermining policy efficacy. For instance, Latin American cases like Peru's frequent "moral incapacity" impeachments since have ousted multiple presidents but correlated with chronic instability, including six leaders in eight years, contrasting Korea's singular, corruption-targeted success. This duality underscores impeachment's design as a rare safeguard—effective against egregious malfeasance when thresholds align with evidence, yet prone to enabling deadlock when invoked for political leverage absent overwhelming proof.

Criticisms, Abuses, and Reforms

Politicization as a Political

Impeachment mechanisms, designed as safeguards against executive misconduct, have increasingly been deployed as partisan instruments to destabilize opponents in polarized political environments. In presidential systems, where fixed terms insulate leaders from routine no-confidence votes, legislative majorities can leverage impeachment to circumvent electoral mandates, often blurring lines between and retribution. This politicization erodes institutional trust and fosters , as evidenced by patterns in the United States and , where proceedings frequently align with partisan divides rather than consensus on grave offenses. In the United States, the impeachments of President Bill Clinton in 1998 over and obstruction related to the scandal, and of President in 2019 for and obstruction of , as well as in 2021 for of insurrection, proceeded along strict party lines in both House impeachments and Senate trials. The Senate acquitted Clinton by votes of 55-45 and 50-50, and Trump by 52-48, 53-47, and 57-43 respectively, falling short of the two-thirds threshold in each case. Critics, including constitutional scholars, argue these episodes revived impeachment as a "partisan political weapon," diverging from the Framers' intent to limit it to "" rather than policy disputes or electoral strategies. Latin American presidential systems illustrate acute risks, with impeachment often serving as a tool for congressional majorities to oust unpopular executives amid fragmented coalitions. In , President Dilma Rousseff's 2016 removal by a 61-20 vote stemmed from fiscal accounting maneuvers deemed violations of budgetary laws, amid the Lava Jato corruption probes, but was widely characterized as a "constitutional coup" by opponents who viewed it as elite backlash against her amid economic downturn and no direct evidence of personal corruption. Similarly, Paraguay's 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo for "poor performance" following a police operation mishap occurred in mere days (76-1 in the , 39-4 in the ), prompting regional condemnation as a rushed partisan maneuver lacking . Peru exemplifies serial abuse, where between 2016 and 2021, three presidents resigned or were ousted under impeachment threats, including Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's 2018 resignation amid allegations tied to bribes, despite his prior plea deal, as —dominated by opposition—weaponized the process to consolidate power in a context of chronic deadlock. This pattern, repeated across cases like those in and , underscores how low initiation thresholds (often simple majorities) enable legislatures to exploit impeachment for self-interested gains, exacerbating instability without resolving underlying governance failures. In Asia, South Korea's processes reveal mixed dynamics but highlight politicization risks. The 2004 impeachment of President for electioneering violations was overturned by the amid public backlash, illustrating failed partisan overreach, while the 2016-2017 removal of for and abuse of power gained legitimacy from mass protests but occurred under an opposition-led assembly. More recently, President Yoon Suk Yeol's December 2024 declaration of —reversed within hours after parliamentary defiance—led to his impeachment by the opposition-controlled and unanimous upholding in April 2025, removing him from office; detractors framed it as accountability for democratic erosion, yet the timing amid Yoon's scandals and low approval suggested elements of in a hyper-polarized context. Empirical patterns indicate that politicized impeachments rarely yield convictions without broad consensus, instead serving to delegitimize executives, paralyze , and invite retaliatory cycles, as seen in Peru's revolving-door presidencies and U.S. post-impeachment partisanship. Scholars note that while genuine abuses warrant removal, vague standards and asymmetric incentives—favoring accusers in fragmented systems—facilitate misuse, undermining impeachment's role as a stabilizing check.

Empirical Outcomes and Causal Impacts

Impeachment processes in presidential systems have yielded low success rates globally, with only 10 successful removals of directly elected presidents out of approximately 213 attempts since 1990, representing a success rate of roughly 5%. These removals occurred in countries including (Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 and in 2016), ( in 1993), (Norbert Ratsirahonana in 1996), ( in 2000), the ( in 2001), ( in 2001), ( in 2004), ( in 2012), and ( in 2017). In new presidential democracies established post-1974, 45% experienced at least one impeachment attempt between 1974 and 2003, often triggered by opposition control of the , party defections, or scandals amid low public support for the executive. Causal analyses indicate that successful impeachments rarely destabilize democratic institutions, with most affected countries maintaining or improving their Polity2 democracy scores (ranging from -10 to +10, where ≥6 denotes full ) post-removal; for instance, seven cases showed no change, two improved (e.g., Peru's score rose by 8 points), and only two declined slightly. Empirical data from large-N studies across 61 countries from 1990 to 2018 reveal no systematic reduction in democratic quality following impeachment, suggesting it functions as a stabilizing mechanism for resolving systemic crises, such as ungovernability or scandals, rather than eroding . In fragmented presidential systems like Brazil's, repeated uses (e.g., Rousseff's removal amid fiscal manipulation charges) have enabled vice-presidential succession and policy resets, though they coincide with short-term legislative gridlock.
CountryPresident RemovedYearPolity2 Change Post-Removal
1992No change (stable democracy)
2000+8 (improvement)
2012+1 (slight improvement)
2017No change (stable democracy)
Economic impacts vary but show no consistent long-term disruption; uncertainty during proceedings can dampen corporate investment and growth, as observed in where Rousseff's 2016 impeachment process correlated with reduced firm investments amid , yet post-removal stabilization under anticipated economic recovery through reforms. In cases like 's 2017 removal, markets exhibited indifferent or positive responses tied to crisis resolution rather than the process itself, underscoring that impeachments often reflect pre-existing economic woes (e.g., 's commodity downturn from 2011) more than causing them. Overall, while impeachments introduce transient policy discontinuity, they have empirically facilitated without broad causal harm to institutional stability when thresholds and judicial oversight (e.g., in ) constrain partisan abuse.

Proposals for Structural Reforms

Scholars have proposed establishing a specialized Court of Impeachments composed of 24 federal appellate judges, selected by the and evenly divided between appointees of the two major parties, with none appointed by the sitting president, to conduct trials in place of the . Under this model, the would retain its role in initiating impeachment by simple majority vote, while the court would require a two-thirds for conviction and removal, leveraging judicial expertise to assess evidence of impeachable offenses such as , , or . Proponents argue this addresses the 's structural incentives for partisanship, evidenced by public polls showing only 20% of Americans viewed the as impartial during the 2020 Trump impeachment trial, and aims to restore legitimacy by drawing on the 's higher trust levels, where 69% of respondents expressed confidence in 2019. Critics, however, caution that entrenching judges in political removal could undermine , potentially politicizing the despite bipartisan selection. An alternative structural reform involves bifurcating the removal power, where the would adjudicate factual guilt and constitutional impeachability, forwarding findings to the for a separate two-thirds vote on whether removal serves the . This division separates legal fact-finding—suited to —from political judgment on fitness, potentially mitigating from unified partisan control while preserving congressional . Empirical rationale stems from observed failures in trials, such as the 1974 Nixon near-impeachment yielding to amid evidence consensus, contrasted with post-2000 partisan acquittals despite actions in four presidential cases from 1974 to 2024. Implementation would require , as current text vests trial authority solely in the , but advocates contend it aligns with Framers' intent for balanced checks without fully supplanting legislative discretion. Broader procedural reforms target interbranch dynamics to curb politicization, including codifying minority party rights in inquiries—such as equal subpoena power and witness access, eroded since the 1974 standards—and mandating executive cooperation via revised Department of Justice guidelines to expedite document release during inquiries. These changes, drawn from comparative analysis of six U.S. impeachments since Watergate, seek to enforce transparency and evidentiary rigor, with courts intervening in privilege disputes rather than deferring to , as seen in limited post-2024 rulings on executive immunity. In presidential systems beyond the U.S., such as Brazil's, where a two-thirds lower house vote authorizes trial, proposals emphasize triggering automatic snap elections upon removal to enable systemic resets, reducing incentives for opportunistic impeachments as a proxy for no-confidence votes; this mechanism, effective in some Latin American constitutions, contrasts U.S. design by linking removal to electoral renewal rather than indefinite lame-duck periods. Such reforms prioritize causal deterrence of abuse through higher barriers and independent verification, though empirical success depends on enforcement amid polarized legislatures.

References

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