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Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Saudi Arabia)
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Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Saudi Arabia)
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For the Pakistani militant group, see Haji Namdar Group.

Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice
الرئاسة العامة لهيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر
Seal of the Committee
Seal of the Committee
Common nameHai'a (Committee)
AbbreviationCPVPV
Agency overview
Formed1940; 85 years ago (1940)
Jurisdictional structure
Operations jurisdictionSaudi Arabia
General nature
Operational structure
Agency executive
  • Sheikh Abdulrahman Al Alsanad[1], President
Website
https://www.pv.gov.sa
Politics of Saudi Arabia

Arab League Member State of the Arab League

Basic Law
Monarchy
Government
Legal system
Recent elections
Administrative divisions
Foreign relations
flag Saudi Arabia portal

The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Arabic: هيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر, romanized: hayʾa al-ʾamr bil-maʿrūf wan-nahī ʿan al-munkar, abbreviated CPVPV, colloquially termed hai’a (committee), and known as the mutawa (Arabic: مطوع) and by other similar names and translations in English-language sources) is a government religious authority in Saudi Arabia that is charged with implementing the Islamic doctrine of hisbah in the country. Established in 1940, the body gained extensive powers in the 1980s and continued to function as a semi-independent civilian law enforcement agency for almost 35 years until 2016, when societal reforms driven by then-deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman led to limiting some of its authority through a royal decree by King Salman bin Abdulaziz, including the rights of pursuing, questioning, detaining, and interrogating suspects.[2][3][4]

Tracing its modern origin to a revival of the pre-modern official function of muhtasib (market inspector) by the first Saudi state (1727–1818), it was established in its best known form in 1976, with the main goal of supervising markets and public morality,[5] and was often described as Islamic religious police.[6] By the early 2010s, the committee was estimated to have 3,500–4,000 officers on the streets, assisted by thousands of volunteers, with an additional 10,000 administrative personnel.[7][8] Its head held the rank of cabinet minister and reported directly to the king.[7] Committee officers and volunteers patrolled public places, with volunteers focusing on enforcing strict rules of hijab, sex segregation, and daily prayer attendance;[5] but also non-Islamic products/activities such as the sale of dogs and cats,[9] Barbie dolls,[10] Pokémon,[11] and Valentine's Day gifts.[12]

Names

[edit]

The name of the committee has also been translated as Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Elimination of Sin, abbreviated CAVES. They are known colloquially as hai’a (literally "committee",[13] also transliterated as Haia[14] or Haya[15]).

In academic sources, committee officers or the volunteers have also been called by several Arabic terms derived from the root ṭ-w-ʿ, including mutaṭawwiʿūn (Arabic: متطوعون, volunteers),[5] muṭawwiʿ (Arabic: مطوع, one who compels obedience),[16] and muṭāwiʿa (no literal translation given).[6] These words are etymologically related to the Quranically derived terms muṭṭawwiʿa and mutaṭawwiʿa (those who perform supererogatory deeds of piety).[16] English-language press has used the names mutawa and mutaween.[17][18]

History, structure, role

[edit]

The committee's rationale is based on the classical Islamic doctrine of hisba, which is associated with the Quranic injunction of enjoining good and forbidding wrong, and refers to the duty of Muslims to promote moral rectitude and intervene when another Muslim is acting wrongly.[5][19] In pre-modern Islamic history, its legal implementation was entrusted to a traditional Islamic public official called muhtasib (market inspector), who was charged with preventing fraud, disturbance of public order and infractions against public morality.

This office disappeared in the modern era everywhere in the Muslim world, including Arabia, but it was revived by the first Saudi state (1727–1818) and continued to play a role in the second (1823–87), due to its importance within Wahhabi doctrine.

First state 1727–1818 (Emirate of Diriyah)

Following the conquest of the Hijaz in 1803 a chronicler records bonfires made from confiscated tobacco pipes and stringed instruments by enforcers of sharia (after a list had been made of the owners).[20]

According to the US Library of Congress Country Studies, mutawwiin

"have been integral to the Wahhabi movement since its inception. Mutawwiin have served as missionaries, as enforcers of public morals, and as 'public ministers of the religion' who preach in the Friday mosque. Pursuing their duties in Jiddah in 1806, the mutawwiin were observed to be 'constables for the punctuality of prayers ... with an enormous staff in their hand, [who] were ordered to shout, to scold and to drag people by the shoulders to force them to take part in public prayers, five times a day.'"[21]

Robert Lacey describes them as "vigilantes". "The righteous of every neighbourhood [that] banded themselves together into societies for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice."[22]

Second state 1823–1887 (Emirate of Nejd)

According to a study by Michael Cook,[23] based on "Wahhabi writings and rulers' decrees" the role of commanding good and forbidding wrong developed a prominent place during the second Saudi emirate, and the first "documented instance of a formal committee to enforces the duty dates to 1926", when the official Saudi newspaper in Mecca published the news of its establishment.[24] "One ruler orders his emirs to seek out people who gather together to smoke tobacco ... scholars and emirs should keep a check on the people of their towns with regard to prayer and religious instruction." Performance of hajj "is likewise to be monitored."[25]

Third state (1902–)

Under the third Saudi state, the most zealous followers of Ibn Sa'ud were appointed as muhtasibs.[5] A foreign visitor reported that in Riyāḍ in 1922-23 flogging was "commonly" administered for "smoking, non-attendance at prayer and other such offenses".[25] This severity caused conflict with the local population and foreign pilgrims when the Hijaz was conquered and Wahhabi strictness arrived.[5] In response, committees were established in Riyadh and Mecca in 1932 to check their excesses. After their establishment in the Hijaz, the committees "rapidly spread" to the rest of the kingdom.[26]

Evidence that enforcement could "swing from a soft line to hard one and back again" comes from reports from Jeddah in early 1930, and summer of 1932, during a temporary move away from Wahhabi puritanism by King Ibn Saud early in his reign.[26]

Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Hassan Al Sheikh, Head of the Committee

In 1976 the two formerly mutually independent directories in the Hijaz and Najd were united[26] under an official of ministerial rank, acting under direct royal command, and, the Al al-Sheikh director of the committee gained a seat on the Saudi cabinet, strengthening its prestige.[27] Its control extended to small towns as well as the cities.[26] The unified Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was then mainly responsible for supervising markets and public order and assisted by volunteers, who enforce attendance of daily prayers and gender segregation in public places.[5]

Following the November–December 1979 Grand Mosque Seizure, when religion became more conservative in Saudi Arabia,

"people noticed that imams and religious folk seemed to have more money to spend ... with the religious police benefiting most obviously from government injections of cash. They started to appear in imposing new GMC vans, with their once humble local committees of mutawwa ... taking on the grander, 'Big Brother' aura of their original, collective name – Al Hayah, 'the Commission'. They developed attitude to match."[28]

They were still, however, "essentially volunteers engaged in their own variety of social work."[22]

In 2002, the deaths of 15 young girls in 2002 in Mecca after the mutaween's refused to let them leave a burning school was widely publicized and damaged the mutaween's image.[29]

Beginning of restrictions on power

In May 2006 it was announced that the committee would no longer be allowed to interrogate those it arrests for behavior deemed un-Islamic. Prior to this, commission members enjoyed almost total power to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of violating the Sharia.[30][31]

In May 2006 the Interior Ministry issued a decree stating that "the role of the commission will end after it arrests the culprit or culprits and hands them over to police, who will then decide whether to refer them to the public prosecutor." In June 2007 the Saudi mutaween announced "the creation of a 'department of rules and regulations' to ensure the activities of commission members comply with the law, after coming under heavy pressure for the death of two people in its custody in less than two weeks".[32] The governmental National Society for Human Rights criticised the behaviour of the religious police in May 2007 in its first report since its establishment in March 2004.

In August of that year Time magazine ran a report about the mutaween. It noted that "a campaign using text messages sent to mobile phones is calling on a million Saudis to declare that '2007 is the year of liberation.'" Despite statements of reform, the mutaween turned down Time's request for interviews.[33]

In 2009, the committee created and formalized a special "Anti-Witchcraft Unit" to "educate the public about the evils of sorcery, investigate alleged witches, neutralize their cursed paraphernalia, and disarm their spells". The unit also had a hotline on the committee website for Saudis to report any magic to local officials.[34]

At the beginning of October 2012, during the Arab Spring, Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh announced that the powers of the mutawiyin would be significantly restricted. According to Irfan Al-Alawi,

They will be barred from making arrests, conducting interrogations, or carrying out searches without a warrant from the local governor. They will no longer stand at the entrances of shopping malls to keep women out who do not adhere to the Wahhabi dress code or who are not accompanied by "approved" men—husbands, siblings, or parents.[35]

"Community volunteers", who were the original mutaween, were forbidden from joining Hai’a men on their rounds and pursuing, chastising, and interrogating miscreants, as "a religious duty".[7] Field officers were also ordered to "approach people with a smile," and forbidden from using their "private e-mails, cellphones, or social media accounts to receive and act on anonymous tips."[7]

In January 2012, Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh was appointed head of the mutaween.[35] He "holds the rank of cabinet minister and reports directly to the king". His agency employs more than 4,000 "field officers" and reportedly has another 10,000 administrative personnel. Its 2013 budget was the equivalent of US$390 million.[7]

Loss of power under MbS

However, in 2016, Mohammed bin Salman sharply curtailed the powers of the CPVPV (the committee).[4] In a September 2019 article, Arab News (which has been described "reflecting official position" in Saudi Arabia),[36] portrayed the time period from about 1979 to 2016 as an era when CPVPV "strayed" from its "original intent" of advising and guiding Saudi Muslims. Starting around 1979, the Sahwa or Islamic Awakening era commenced, "extremism ideology" flourished, and the powers of the CPVPV went "unchecked". Then, in 2016 (Arab News states), Mohammed bin Salman took an "unprecedented, risky yet necessary move" bringing the CPVPV to heel and returning it to its correct role as "society's spiritual guide".[4]

The newspaper describes CPVPV before and after the curtailing of its power:

They destroyed musical instruments, raided beauty salons, shaved heads, whipped people, burnt books, and continued being unchecked — until an unexpected decision came out on April 11, 2016. The Saudi Cabinet issued a royal decree that stripped the religious police of its privileges, banning its members from pursuing, questioning, asking for identification, arresting and detaining anyone suspected of a crime. They are now obliged to report back to the police and security forces if need be.[4]

Ahmad bin Qasim Al-Ghamdi (head of the Hai'a in Mecca) describes the post-2016 policy as one where the

“... CPVPV has managed to defuse the strife in the relationship between its past self and society. It has prevented the distortion and weak confidence that the people had in the procedures that were followed in the past, [which] damaged the reputation of the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice as a ritual, and the reputation of the Kingdom as a state that applies the provisions of Islam.”[4]

Enforcement

[edit]

The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice enforces traditional Islamic morality by arresting or helping to secure the arrest of people who engage in conduct that violates Islamic principles and values. They are tasked with enforcing conservative Islamic norms of behavior defined by Saudi authorities. They monitor observance of the dress code and ensure that shops are closed during prayer times. In some instances, they broke into private homes on suspicion of untoward behavior, though this attracted criticism from the public and the government.[37]

Upon being appointed head of the CPVPV, Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh identified "five areas the religious police should focus on": preserving Islam, preventing blackmail, combating sorcery, fighting human trafficking, and ensuring that no one disobeys the country's rulers.[7]

Saudi mutaween are often accompanied by the regular police, but also patrol without police escort. They launched a website on which un-Islamic behavior can be reported.[38][39]

While on patrol, the duties of the Mutaween include, but are not restricted to:

  • ensuring that drugs including alcohol are not being traded.[40]
  • checking that women wear the abaya, a traditional cloak.[citation needed]
  • making sure that men and women who are spotted together in public are related.[40]
  • formerly, enforcing the ban on camera phones. This ban was enacted out of a fear that men would use them to secretly photograph women and publish them on the Internet without the consent of the subjects. The ban was enacted in April 2004 but was overturned in December that same year.[41]
  • preventing the population from engaging in "frivolous"[42] Western customs such as Valentine's Day.[12]

The punishment for such offenses is severe, often involving beatings and humiliation, and foreigners are not excluded from arrest.[43] The mutaween encourage people to inform on others they know who are suspected of acting unvirtuously, and to punish such activities.

In 2010, a 27-year-old Saudi man was sentenced to five years in prison, 500 lashes of the whip, and a SR50,000 fine after appearing in an amateur gay video online allegedly taken inside a Jeddah prison. According to an unnamed government source, "The District Court sentenced the accused in a homosexuality case that was referred to it by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (the Hai’a) in Jeddah before he was tried for impersonating a security man and behaving shamefully and with conduct violating the Islamic teachings." The case started when the Hai’a's staff arrested the man under charges of practicing homosexuality. He was referred to the Bureau for Investigation and Prosecution, which referred him to the District Court.[44]

Among the Western practices suppressed by the mutaween is the celebration of Valentine's Day. Condemning the festivities as a "pagan feast", Mutaween inspect hotels, restaurants, coffeehouses, and gift shops on 14 February to prevent Muslim couples from giving each other Valentines or other presents. The sale of red roses, red stuffed animals, red greeting cards and other red gift items is banned, according to store owners. These items are confiscated, and those selling them subject to prosecution.[45][46]

The children's game Pokémon was banned in 2001.[11] The sale of the fashion doll Barbie was banned as a consumer product for posing a moral threat to Islam,[10] stating: "Jewish Barbie dolls, with their revealing clothes and shameful postures, accessories and tools are a symbol of decadence to the perverted West. Let us beware of her dangers and be careful."[47] Fulla dolls were designed and approved as more acceptable.

In 2006 the police issued a decree banning the sale of dogs and cats, also seen as a sign of Western influence. The decree which applies to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah and the holy city of Mecca bans the sale of cats and dogs because "some youths have been buying them and parading them in public," according to a memo from the municipal affairs ministry to Jeddah's city government.[9] In 2013 two Saudi men were arrested for giving "free hugs to passersby".[48]

In December 2010 it was reported by Arab News that the Hai'a had launched a massive campaign against "sorcery" or "black magic" in the kingdom.[49] The prohibition includes "fortune tellers or faith healers".[50] (Some people executed for sorcery following the announcement include a man from Najran province in June 2012, a Saudi woman in the province of Jawf, in December 2011, and a Sudanese man executed in September 2011. A Lebanese television presenter of a popular fortune-telling programme was arrested while on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and sentenced to death, though after pressure from the Lebanese government and human rights groups, he was freed by the Saudi Supreme Court.)[50]

In May 2012, the head of the mutaween, Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, stated that anyone using social media sites, such as Twitter, "has lost this world and his afterlife".[51]

According to authors Harvey Tripp and Peter North, mutaween became involved in the city planning of the Eastern Province industrial city of Jubail sometime in the 1980s and 1990s. Halfway through the construction of that city the mutaween visited the engineering drawing office several times, first to insist that all planning maps included the direction of Mecca. On their second visit they ordered that city sewage lines (already built) not flow in the direction of Mecca. After being convinced that the curvature of the earth prevented this, the mutaween returned to insist that the drainage pipes of toilets inside the city's buildings also not violate this principle. The mutaween's demands came despite the fact that no Saudi building code mentioned their requirement and no other Saudi cities met it. While a good deal of the planners' and engineers' time was spent responding to the mutaween's concerns, the mutaween never returned to approve the contractor's solution and no pipes ended up having to be unearthed and redirected, leaving Tripp and North to conclude that Mutaween's "point" was not to protect Mecca but to demonstrate the supremacy of religion in Saudi Arabia to foreign builders.[52]

Exemptions

[edit]

As of 2012, the offices of Saudi Aramco, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, and foreign embassies are off limits to mutaween.[53] Not off limits are personnel of Saudi government agencies. Hai’a have been known to detain government officials, (A male government employee minder of American journalist Karen Elliott House was detained for mixing of the sexes, causing her to wonder that "a government employee following the instructions of his ministry runs afoul of that same government's religious police."[54])

2016 restriction of powers

[edit]

On 11 April 2016, the Saudi Council of Ministers issued a new regulation that limits the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. They were ordered to work only during office hours, be "gentle and humane", to report violations of Islamic law to the civil police, and forbidden from pursuing, arresting or detaining members of the public.[55]

The new regulation[56] has 12 clauses; most notable of them are:

"The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice is expected to uphold its duties with kindness and gentleness as decreed by the examples of Prophet Mohammed."

"The Committee has the responsibility of reporting, while on patrol, to official authorities (depending on the suspected activity) any suspected crimes witnessed. Subsequent actions from pursuit of suspect, capture, interrogation and detainment will be left to the relevant official authorities."

"Neither the heads nor members of The Committee are to stop or arrest or chase people or ask for their IDs or follow them – that is considered the jurisdiction of the police or the drug unit."[57]

Controversy

[edit]

Alleged abuses

[edit]
Further information: 2002 Mecca girls' school fire

One of the most widely criticized examples of mutaween enforcement of Sharia law came in March 2002, when 15 young girls died of burns or smoke asphyxiation by an accidental fire that engulfed their public school in Mecca. According to two newspapers, the religious police forcibly prevented girls from escaping the burning school by locking the doors of the school from the outside, and barring firemen from entering the school to save the girls, beating some of the girls and civil defense personnel in the process. Mutaween would not allow the girls to escape or to be saved because they were 'not properly covered', and the mutaween did not want physical contact to take place between the girls and the civil defense forces for fear of sexual enticement.[58] The CPVPV denied the charges of beating or locking the gates, but the incident and the accounts of witnesses were reported in Saudi newspapers such as the Saudi Gazette and Al-Iqtisaddiyya. The result was a very rare public criticism of the group.[59]

In May 2003, Al-Watan, a Saudi reform newspaper published several reports of people being mistreated by the police force, including the story of one woman from a remote southern town who had been beaten and held in solitary confinement for riding alone in the back of a taxi.[citation needed]

In May 2007, a man alleged to have alcohol in his home (Salman Al-Huraisi) was reported by Arab News to have been arrested and beaten to death in his own home by CPVPV members in the Al Oraija district of Riyadh. "The father of the deceased said that commission members continued to beat his handcuffed son, even though he was already covered in blood, until he died" at the Oraija CPVPV center in Riyadh.[60] Another man who died while in custody of the CPVPV was Ahmed Al-Bulawi. He was a driver for a woman with whom he was accused of being in a state of seclusion (when a man and an unrelated woman are together) and died after being taken to a CPVPV center in Tabuk in June 2007.[61] According to Irfan Al-Alawi, "in both cases, the families of the victims took the mutawiyin to court, and in both instances (as in others) charges against the mutawiyin were postponed indefinitely or dropped."[35]

A case of "sorcery" that led to a sentence of death which was overturned was that of Ali Hussain Sibat, the Lebanese host of the popular TV psychic call-in show aired on satellite TV across the Middle East. Sibat was arrested in Medina by the CPVPV in May 2008, while visiting Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage.[62] Sibat was charged with "sorcery" for making predictions and giving advice to the audience on his show. On 9 November 2009, after court hearings not open to the public or a defense lawyer Sibat was sentenced to death.[63] The case was upheld on appeal but after an international outcry was overturned by the Supreme Court on 11 November 2010.[64] The case was controversial in part because neither the defendant or "victims" were Saudis, and the "crime" was not committed in Saudi Arabia.[65]

Mutaween suppression of religious activity by non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia is also controversial. Asia News alleges that "at least one million" Roman Catholics in the kingdom are being "denied pastoral care ... none of them can participate in mass while they are in Saudi Arabia ... Catechism for their children – nearly 100,000 – is banned." It reports the arrest of a Catholic priest for saying mass. On 5 April 2006 a Catholic priest, "Fr. George [Joshua] had just celebrated mass in a private house when seven religious policemen (muttawa) broke into the house together with two ordinary policemen. The police arrested the priest and another person."[66]

In August 2008, a young Saudi woman who had converted to Christianity was reportedly burnt to death after having her tongue cut out by her father, a member of the committee, though it was not an officially sanctioned act of punishment.[67]

In January 2013, the CPVPV marched into an educational exhibit of dinosaurs at a shopping center, "turned off the lights and ordered everyone out, frightening children and alarming their parents". It was not clear why the exhibit—which had been "featured at shopping centres across the Gulf for decades"—was closed, and Saudis speculated irreverently as to the reason on Twitter.[15]

In September 2013 the entrance of a Saudi religious police building "was intentionally set on fire by assailants", according to the Hai'a. No one was hurt and no further information was provided by the police.[68] In early 2014, the head of Hai'a, Sheikh Abdul Latif al-Sheikh was quoted in the Okaz daily newspaper as saying that "there are advocates of sedition within the Commission" for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, and promised to remove them.[69][70]

Internal dispute

[edit]

In 2009, the head of the Hai'a in Mecca, Sheikh Ahmad Qasim al Ghamdi, stated that there was nothing wrong with men and women mixing in public places, and instructed his mutawa'a to not interfere with mixing.[71] However religious conservatives pressured the national head of the Hai'a to fire him. Hours after the firing of the Sheikh Al Ghamdi, the Hai'a issued an embarrassing retraction: "The information sent out today concerning administrative changes at some Hai'a offices, particularly those concerning Mecca and Hail, was inaccurate and the administration has requested editors not to publish it." However the firing and the retraction of the firing became "major news". "Outraged conservatives went to Sheiksh Al Ghamdi's home, demanding to 'mix' with his females ... still other outraged opponents scrawled graffiti on his home," according to journalist Karen Elliott House.[72]

Involvement in politics

[edit]

Other accusations leveled at the CPVPV include that some of its members have been involved in political subversion, and/or are ex-convicts/prisoners who became Hafiz (i.e. memorized the Quran) to reduce their prison sentences. Author Lawrence Wright has written of a conflict between the Mutaween and at least one allied imam and Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, the head of the Presidency of General Intelligence (Al Mukhabarat Al A'amah) between 1977 and 2001. After an imam denounced a female charitable organizations run by some of Turki's sisters and accused them of being whores during a Friday sermon, Turki demanded and received an apology. He then "secretly began monitoring members of the muttawa. He learned that many of them were ex-convicts whose only job qualification was that they had memorized the Quran to reduce their sentences." But Turki believed they had become "so powerful" they "threatened to overthrow the government."[73] (Another description of the social background of CPVPV members—by Ali Shihabi, "a Saudi financier and pro-Muhammed bin Salman commentator"—is that their ranks are drawn from "the losers in school" who having been ignored by "cute girls" and not invited to parties "no one wanted them at" during their time as students, then sought jobs where they could take revenge on the socially successful by harassing attractive women and breaking into parties and shutting them down.)[74]

Another instance when the CPVPV has opposed the Saudi government came in 2005 when the Minister of Labor announced a policy of staffing lingerie shops with women.[75] The policy was intended to give employment to some of the millions of adult Saudi women at home (14.6% of Saudi women work in the public and private sectors in the kingdom[76]), and to prevent mixing of the sexes in public (ikhtilat), between male clerks and women customers. Conservative Saudis opposed the policy maintaining that for a woman to work outside the house was against her fitrah (natural state).[77] The few shops that employed women were "quickly closed" by the Hai'i who supported the conservative position.[75][77]

However, in 2011, during the Arab Spring, King Abdullah issued another decree giving lingerie shops—and then shops and shop departments specializing in other products for women, such as cosmetics, abayas and wedding dresses—one year to replace men workers with women.[75] Further clashes followed between conservatives and Hai'a men on the one hand, and the ministry, women customers and employees at female-staffed stores on the other. In 2013, the Ministry and the Hai'a leadership met to negotiate new terms. In November 2013, 200 religious police signed a letter stating that female employment was causing such a drastic increase in instances of ikhtilat, that "their job was becoming impossible."[75]

Political use

[edit]

According to one journalist with many years of experience in Saudi Arabia, Karen Elliott House, the Hai’a are sometimes used to balance the policies of the government; specifically a loose rein on the Hai'a acts to calm the displeasure of the strong religious conservative forces in Saudi society. When the king dismissed a member of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars in 2009 for condemning gender mixing at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, he compensated for it by doing "nothing to curb the country's religious police from roaming the kingdom's streets and harassing ordinary Saudis mixing with anyone of the opposite genders".[78]

Other similar groups

[edit]

Outside Saudi Arabia, in Iran, the Guidance Patrol functions as the country's main public religious police, imposing Islamic dress codes and norms in most public places. The Taliban regime, or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, also has a "Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" with very similar religious policing functions. The Taliban are thought to have borrowed the Saudi policing policy not only because they also had a strict Sharia law policy, but because of alleged financial and diplomatic support from Saudi Arabia.[79] According to a Pakistani journalist who spent much time among the Taliban, the Taliban who had been to Saudi Arabia before taking power in Afghanistan "were terribly impressed by the religious police and tried to copy that system to the letter".[80]

The second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan re-established the ministry in 2021.[81]

There is a type of police in Indonesia called the religious police; they enforce Islamic laws in the Islamic majority Aceh province. They are known for being very strict.[82]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Saudi Arabia)

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The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV; Arabic: هيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر, Hay’at al-Amr bil-Ma’ruf wa an-Nahi ‘an al-Munkar), commonly referred to as the mutawa'een or religious police, is a n governmental body established in to enforce Wahhabi interpretations of law by promoting public adherence to Islamic moral codes and prohibiting perceived vices. Originally founded by King Abdulaziz Al Saud as an extension of traditional hisba institutions rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, the CPVPV expanded significantly during the , gaining semi-autonomous powers to monitor and intervene in social behaviors such as mandatory prayer observance, gender segregation, and conservative dress requirements for women. Its agents patrolled streets, malls, and public spaces, often coordinating with regular police but operating under religious authority derived from alliances between the Saudi monarchy and Wahhabi clerical establishments. The organization became defined by its rigorous enforcement tactics, which included detaining individuals for infractions like playing in vehicles or unrelated gender mingling, contributing to a societal environment of strict but also sparking domestic and international criticism for overreach and concerns. In 2016, under Crown Prince , a royal decree drastically curtailed its operational powers, prohibiting agents from making arrests, stopping vehicles, or questioning citizens without police involvement, effectively shifting its mandate toward non-coercive awareness campaigns. As of 2024, the reformed entity, now emphasizing digital and multilingual outreach, focuses on educational initiatives such as guiding pilgrims during on religious etiquette through apps and field points, devoid of former enforcement roles and aligned with Saudi Arabia's broader modernization efforts under Vision 2030. This transformation marked a pivotal reduction in clerical influence over daily policing, reflecting causal shifts toward economic diversification and reduced reliance on religious for regime legitimacy.

Names and Terminology

Official Designations

The primary official designation of the institution is الرئاسة العامة لهيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر (al-Ri'āsah al-'Āmmah li-Hay'at al-Amr bil-Maʿrūf wa al-Nahy ʿan al-Munkar), denoting the General for the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This Arabic title reflects its structure as an independent governmental body, with "هيئة" (hay'ah) signifying a commission or authority tasked with enforcing Islamic moral standards derived from the Quranic principle of amr bil-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar (). The full name is enshrined in Saudi regulatory frameworks, including the organizational regulation approved by royal decree, which establishes it as a standalone entity organizationally linked to the and headed by a General President holding ministerial rank, appointed via royal order. In English-language contexts, the institution is formally rendered as the General Presidency of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), though "Committee" approximates the earlier "لجنة" (lijnah) usage from its foundational phases, while the current "هيئة" emphasizes its elevated administrative status. Official Saudi documentation, such as the Bureau of Experts at the ' legal database, consistently employs the Arabic designation in decrees and statutes, underscoring its mandate under Sharia-based governance without equivalent English statutory naming. The General President, as the chief executive, bears the title "معالي الرئيس العام" (His Excellency the General President), with authority over branches nationwide, as codified in the 1433 AH (2012 CE) organizational amendments. Subordinate units are designated as "فرع" (furūʿ, branches) in regions like or the Eastern Province, operating under the central presidency's oversight, with no autonomous official titles deviating from the parent structure. This aligns with Saudi Arabia's unitary administrative model, where enforcement entities derive legitimacy from royal and religious edicts rather than legislative acts, distinguishing it from conventional ministries.

Colloquial and Historical Terms

The enforcers of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice are colloquially known in as mutaween (plural) or mutawa (singular), terms derived from words roughly translating to "volunteers," underscoring their traditional role as self-motivated guardians of rather than salaried officials in early iterations. This persists despite formal institutionalization, with mutaween evoking both respect among conservative adherents and apprehension among critics due to enforcement encounters. The committee itself is often shorthand as al-hay'a ("the committee" or "the authority") in everyday Saudi discourse, a neutral descriptor emphasizing its bureaucratic status over ideological connotations. In English-language reporting and expatriate communities, the group is widely termed the "religious police" or "morality police," reflecting perceptions of their mandate to patrol public spaces for Sharia compliance, such as gender segregation and dress codes, though these labels carry pejorative undertones in reformist critiques. Historically, prior to the committee's formal establishment in 1940, analogous functions were performed by informal mutaween volunteers under Wahhabi influence during the third Saudi state's consolidation (1932 onward), drawing from 18th- and 19th-century precedents in the first and second Saudi states where tribal enforcers upheld similar moral oversight without centralized naming. These early practitioners lacked distinct titles beyond generic references to amr bil-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar ("enjoining good and forbidding wrong") advocates, evolving into the modern colloquial lexicon as state apparatus expanded.

Historical Development

Establishment and Early Expansion (1919–1970s)

The precursors to the formalized Committee operated informally in the Najd region as early as 1900, enforcing Wahhabi interpretations of Islamic moral codes through local religious scholars and tribal enforcers allied with Abdulaziz Al Saud during his consolidation of power. These efforts aligned with the Al Saud-Wahhabi pact, emphasizing amr bil ma'ruf wa nahi anil munkar (enjoining good and forbidding wrong) to legitimize territorial expansion against rival tribes and Ottoman influences. Following 's conquest of the in 1924–1925, which incorporated more cosmopolitan areas like and with established Ottoman-era customs, the first official branch was established in in 1926 under Sheikh Abdullatif bin Abdulaziz Al al-Sheikh as its inaugural head, marking the Committee's recognition as an independent entity reporting to the nascent royal administration. This step institutionalized moral enforcement to suppress local resistance to Wahhabi strictures, such as prohibiting and mixed-gender interactions in public spaces, which clashed with Hijazi norms. Through the late and , the Committee expanded alongside the unification process, establishing committees in and other urban centers to oversee markets, mosques, and pilgrimages, often cooperating with regular police to impose dress codes, attendance, and bans on alcohol and . By the Kingdom's formal proclamation in 1932, these units numbered in the dozens, drawing personnel from families like Al al-Sheikh and focusing on curbing perceived vices amid rapid territorial integration from Nejd to . Expansion accelerated post-World War II with population growth and oil discovery in 1938, leading to more branches by the to manage urbanizing areas and enforce segregation in emerging schools and workplaces; however, jurisdictional tensions arose, as the Committee lacked arrest powers until later decrees and often relied on alliances with security forces. By the , amid economic boom from oil revenues, the body operated over 100 offices nationwide, with membership exceeding 1,000, preparing for the 1976 merger of Najdi and Hijazi branches into a unified structure under Royal Decree 64/10/M. This period solidified its role in , though enforcement varied regionally due to tribal and scholarly influences.

Institutionalization and Peak Authority (1980s–2010s)

In the early 1980s, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), commonly known as the Haia or mutaween, underwent significant institutionalization through Royal Decree No. 37 issued on September 5, 1980, which formalized its organizational structure, operational powers, and mandate to enforce Islamic norms in public life. This decree, enacted under King Khalid and corresponding to 1400 AH, elevated the CPVPV president's position to that of a member of the Council of Ministers, granting the body semi-autonomous status under royal oversight while defining its core mission as guiding adherence to Sharia-based duties such as prayer, dress codes, and gender segregation. The reforms followed the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca, which heightened Wahhabi clerical influence and prompted the Saudi regime to bolster religious enforcement institutions amid fears of Islamist unrest, leading to expanded provincial branches and modernized patrols integrated with the Ministry of Interior. Under King Fahd's reign (1982–2005), the CPVPV's authority peaked through aggressive territorial expansion and unchecked enforcement practices, reflecting the post-1979 Sahwa (Islamic awakening) movement's push for stricter societal controls. The agency grew its workforce to thousands, conducting routine raids on public spaces, malls, and workplaces to prohibit music, enforce veiling for women, and prevent unrelated mixing of sexes, often without requiring judicial warrants. By the , its influence permeated education, media, and daily commerce, with (religious scholars) endorsing its role in countering perceived Western cultural infiltration, resulting in the agency's immunity from regular police oversight in moral policing matters. The CPVPV exercised its zenith of power in the 2000s, exemplified by high-volume arrests— documented approximately 400,000 detentions in 2005 alone for infractions like improper attire or non-prayer attendance—and controversial incidents underscoring its operational dominance. A notorious case occurred on March 11, , during a girls' school fire in , where CPVPV members reportedly blocked fleeing students from exiting without abayas and blocked firefighters from entering to rescue them, contributing to 15 deaths and drawing rare domestic and international criticism for prioritizing doctrinal enforcement over human safety. By 2011, the agency employed over 4,389 field officers plus 1,600 administrative staff, maintaining broad latitude to interrogate, seize property, and coordinate with , though occasional royal interventions, such as a brief 1981 revocation of detention powers later reversed, highlighted tensions between the monarchy and clerical hardliners. This era solidified the CPVPV as a parallel entity, with its budget and recruitment handled independently, enforcing a rigid interpretation of Wahhabi norms amid Saudi Arabia's oil-funded stability.

Reforms and Adaptation Under Vision 2030 (2016–Present)

In April 2016, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved new regulations that stripped the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice of its independent arrest powers, prohibiting members from detaining suspects, chasing individuals, or using force to enforce compliance. Instead, committee officers were required to report observed violations—such as public consumption of alcohol or non-segregated mixing—to regular police forces for handling, while adhering to guidelines emphasizing "kindness and gentleness" in interactions. These changes, effective immediately, marked a pivotal reduction in the committee's operational autonomy, following years of public complaints over aggressive interventions, including a 2013 case where officers pursued and injured a family in a . The reforms aligned with the launch of on April 25, 2016, a national strategy led by Crown Prince aimed at economic diversification, social liberalization, and cultural openness to reduce oil dependency and enhance global competitiveness. Under this framework, the committee's mandate shifted from frontline vice prevention to supportive roles in promoting Islamic virtues through non-coercive means, such as advisory counseling and community education programs, reflecting a broader governmental pivot away from Wahhabi-influenced enforcement toward moderated religious oversight. By 2017, one year after the curbs, social media surveys indicated widespread public approval, with many Saudis reporting fewer intrusive encounters and viewing the changes as enhancing personal freedoms. Further adaptations included reorienting the committee toward digital and outreach initiatives, such as launching awareness campaigns on family values and ethical conduct via social media and partnerships with mosques, rather than street patrols. This evolution supported Vision 2030's societal pillars, enabling policies like the 2018 lifting of the female driving ban, the introduction of cinemas and concerts, and relaxed guardianship rules, which previously clashed with the committee's interpretive authority on public morality. By 2022, the committee's visibility had diminished significantly, with former enforcers noting a loss of prerogatives and a redefined role centered on voluntary guidance (da'wah) amid reduced staffing and budgets, though the institution persisted under the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Critics from conservative clerical circles argued these shifts eroded religious deterrence, but government statements framed them as aligning enforcement with contemporary needs while upholding core Islamic principles.

Organizational Structure and Mandate

Leadership and Governance

The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice is headed by a president appointed by royal decree with the rank equivalent to a minister. The current president is Sheikh Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Sanad, who was appointed on February 4, 2015, by Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman. Previous presidents include Sheikh Abdullatif bin Abdul Aziz Al al-Sheikh, appointed in January 2012, who emphasized reforms to align operations with Sharia principles while reducing confrontational enforcement. As an independent governmental body established in 1926, the Commission reports directly to the , currently Al Saud, who assumed the role on September 27, 2022. Its governance is regulated by a 2016 law from the , which mandates adherence to , efficiency standards, and a shift toward advisory and educational functions over coercive measures. This framework includes oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with Islamic doctrine of hisba (), while limiting arbitrary actions. The organizational hierarchy features a central headquarters in , provincial branches, and specialized departments for supervision, research, and training, with personnel selected based on religious scholarship and administrative competence. In May 2022, the Commission initiated a project in collaboration with the Institute of Public Administration to modernize operations amid broader Vision 2030 reforms. Leadership appointments historically draw from prominent clerical families allied with the Al Saud, reflecting the body's role as an extension of state-enforced Wahhabi orthodoxy. The legal basis for the General Presidency of the Commission for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice derives from the Islamic doctrine of hisba, which obligates the state to enjoin good (amr bil ma'ruf) and forbid evil (nahi 'an al-munkar), as outlined in Quranic injunctions such as Al-Imran 3:104 and rooted in the . This principle is enshrined in Saudi Arabia's of Governance, issued by Royal Decree No. A/90 on 27 1412 AH (1 March 1992), which designates the and the Prophet Muhammad's as the and affirms the Kingdom as a sovereign Arab where law constitutes the foundation for all governance and judicial rulings. The Committee's institutional framework was formalized through successive royal decrees, with its modern structure elevated to a general presidency directly affiliated with the King, as approved by Cabinet Resolution No. 289 on 4 1437 AH (11 2016), emphasizing coordination with other state authorities while upholding enforcement. The core objectives center on fostering public adherence to Islamic moral standards by promoting virtues such as regular performance of the five daily prayers, observance of fasting, and compliance with in attire and behavior, particularly enforcing veiling for women and segregation of unrelated men and women in public venues. Simultaneously, the mandate targets the prevention of vices, including the suppression of alcohol consumption, use, , sorcery, and displays of or non-Islamic religious practices in public spaces. These aims reflect a commitment to maintaining societal order aligned with Hanbali-Wahhabi interpretations of , with post-2016 reforms shifting emphasis toward educational campaigns and awareness programs rather than direct coercive measures, though the substantive goals remain oriented toward hisba implementation. In operational terms, the objectives extend to combating emerging threats like cybercrimes that violate moral codes, such as online dissemination of immoral content, through reporting and advisory mechanisms integrated with national platforms. This evolution underscores the Committee's role as a guardian of within the framework of Vision 2030's modernization efforts, balancing traditional mandates with contemporary advisory functions to enhance public religious observance without undermining state authority.

Operational Framework

The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice operates as an independent entity headquartered in Riyadh, reporting directly to the Prime Minister and led by a president holding ministerial rank, such as Sheikh Abdullatif bin Abdulaziz al-Sheikh since his appointment in 2018. Its structure includes provincial branches overseen by the general president, with personnel required to possess religious and educational qualifications alongside a record free of significant criminal history. Operations are confined to public streets, spaces, and markets during designated official hours, emphasizing coordination with criminal investigation agencies under Articles One and Two of the Law of Criminal Procedure. Post-2016 reforms, enacted via ' Resolution No. 289 on April 11, 2016, redefined procedures to prioritize advisory and awareness roles over direct enforcement, prohibiting members from pursuing suspects, making arrests, questioning individuals, or demanding identification. Personnel must display identification during duties and intervene "kindly and gently," documenting observations and reporting violations—such as those involving drugs or —to police or relevant authorities for further action. This framework replaced prior decree No. 73 from 2013, aligning operations with broader legal standards while maintaining the core mandate of through patience and leniency. In practice, the commission deploys guidance programs and awareness campaigns as primary methods, reaching 13 million beneficiaries in 2021 via initiatives combating moral vices and promoting Islamic duties. Digital efforts include producing 1.1 million content pieces that garnered 53 million views in the same year, supplemented by training 907,000 activists for community outreach. A strategic plan, developed in collaboration with the Institute of Public Administration and launched on May 12, 2022, further structures these activities around ethical guidelines and measurable outcomes, reflecting adaptation to Vision 2030's emphasis on moderated religious enforcement.

Enforcement Practices

Methods and Procedures

Prior to the 2016 reforms, members of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, often operating in plain clothes or traditional attire, patrolled public spaces such as streets, markets, and shopping malls to monitor compliance with Islamic moral codes, including , mandatory veiling for women, attendance at times, and prohibitions on alcohol, drugs, and . Enforcement involved verbal reprimands, physical separation of unrelated individuals, and occasional use of sticks to disperse groups or compel adherence, with interventions escalating to pursuits of suspects in vehicles or on foot. The Committee held authority to conduct inspections of individuals, vehicles, homes, and businesses for evidence of vice, seize prohibited items such as alcohol or idols, and initiate investigations into reported violations. Arrest procedures historically allowed Committee members to detain suspects for up to three days during investigations, record statements and seizures in official reports, and coordinate with the Ministry of Interior's for joint raids or formal arrests in non-flagrant cases, after which detainees and evidence were transferred to regular police or judicial authorities. These operations emphasized immediate cessation of observed immoral acts, with the Committee's mandatory powers enabling direct intervention without prior warrants in public settings. Following regulations issued on April 13, 2016, the Committee's coercive methods were significantly curtailed, stripping powers to arrest, restrain, chase, demand identification, or conduct independent detections and investigations, which were reassigned to regular police and specialized units like the General Directorate for Combatting Drugs. Members must now display official identification cards detailing names, positions, branches, and operational hours, and are instructed to enforce rules "kindly and gently" in emulation of prophetic conduct, prioritizing verbal advice and counseling over physical or punitive actions. Under the revised framework, procedures shifted to advisory and reporting roles, where observed violations—such as breaches of sex segregation or public moral codes—are documented and referred to security forces for handling, with the Committee focusing on awareness campaigns, moral education, and non-coercive promotion of virtue from desk-based or coordinated positions rather than street patrols. Retained oversight includes limited enforcement of segregation in public venues, but all actions require coordination with law enforcement, emphasizing accountability through an internal advisory commission and scientific qualifications for members to ensure procedural restraint.

Primary Focus Areas

The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) historically concentrated its enforcement efforts on monitoring and regulating public behavior to align with the Kingdom's interpretation of Islamic Sharia, particularly through patrolling streets, shopping malls, and other public spaces. Key areas included compelling attendance at daily prayers by directing individuals to mosques and temporarily closing businesses during prayer times. Officers also enforced strict dress codes, such as requiring women to wear the hijab and abaya in public, and intervened against perceived immodest attire on both men and women. Gender segregation formed a central pillar of enforcement, with the CPVPV prohibiting unrelated men and women from mingling in public areas, including shops and vehicles, and addressing instances of private unauthorized contact between sexes. The committee targeted vices prohibited by , such as the production, distribution, and consumption of alcohol; gambling; drug use; and sorcery or practiced for profit, often conducting raids on suspected locations. Additional focus encompassed suppressing displays of non- religious practices, confiscating related materials, and curbing media content deemed contrary to , including and certain music. Following regulatory changes in 2016, the CPVPV's role shifted toward advisory and educational functions, emphasizing awareness campaigns on religious duties, drug prevention, and reporting violations to regular police rather than direct intervention. In 2021, it engaged 907,000 activists in guidance programs reaching 13 million beneficiaries, focusing on enjoining good and forbidding wrong through patience and leniency, while submitting violation reports to authorities. This adaptation reflects a broader mandate under the 2016 Council of Ministers regulation, linking the body to the Prime Minister and prioritizing non-coercive promotion of virtue over punitive measures.

Exemptions and Jurisdictional Limits

The Committee's has historically been confined to spaces such as streets, markets, malls, and mosques, where it monitored compliance with Islamic codes, gender segregation, and prayer observance, but it lacked authority to enter private residences without a judicial warrant or specific complaint from residents. This limitation stemmed from the body's mandate under royal decrees, which emphasized preventive moral guidance over invasive searches, though occasional overreach into semi-private areas like hotel lobbies drew internal criticism and interventions as early as the 1980s. Diplomatic personnel, foreign embassies, and consular premises were exempt from the Committee's enforcement due to under the , which ratified in 1961, prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of diplomatic missions. In practice, this extended to off-limits status for Committee patrols near or within such sites, preserving international norms amid domestic religious policing. Similarly, military installations and royal palaces fell outside its scope, reserved for state security forces. Expatriate compounds, particularly those housing non-Muslim foreign workers in oil-rich eastern provinces, operated with de facto exemptions from routine patrols, allowing private observance of non-Islamic customs like alcohol consumption or mixed-gender socializing within gated enclaves, as long as activities remained non-public and did not spill into Saudi society. These zones, developed since the for Western expatriates, reflected pragmatic economic priorities over uniform enforcement, with the government implicitly tolerating lax oversight to sustain foreign expertise in sectors like Aramco operations. Post-2016 regulatory changes imposed additional limits, stripping the Committee of independent arrest powers and restricting interventions to advisory roles, requiring coordination with Ministry of Interior police for any reported violations, thereby subordinating its jurisdiction to conventional protocols. This reform, enacted via resolution on April 11, 2016, explicitly barred physical coercion or detentions, framing the body's activities as educational rather than punitive, though it retained monitoring rights in public domains subject to these constraints.

Reforms to Powers and Operations

2016 Curtailment of Arrest Authority

In April 2016, Saudi Arabia's approved a that revoked the 's to arrest, pursue, question, or search individuals suspected of moral or religious violations. Previously empowered to detain and interrogate suspects directly, members were henceforth required to report suspected infractions to regular for handling, while limiting their role to verbal advice and guidance. The measure explicitly instructed agents to enforce Islamic norms "kindly and gently," prohibiting aggressive actions such as chasing vehicles or demanding identification documents. This curtailment followed years of public criticism over the Committee's enforcement tactics, including incidents of harassment and excessive force, which had drawn scrutiny from both domestic voices and international observers. described the changes as a "significant step" toward reining in abuses, noting that the prior broad mandate had enabled unchecked interventions in private matters. The reforms aligned with emerging modernization efforts under , though official statements emphasized preserving the Committee's advisory function to promote virtue without coercive powers. Implementation involved oversight by the Ministry of Interior, which gained authority to regulate operations and ensure compliance with the new guidelines. Reports indicated an immediate shift in practices, with agents focusing on educational outreach rather than direct intervention, though isolated complaints of non-adherence persisted in subsequent years. The changes reduced the 's operational autonomy, subordinating it more closely to state security apparatus while maintaining its mandate under Sharia-based statutes.

Shift to Advisory and Educational Roles

In April 2016, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved a royal decree that significantly curtailed the enforcement powers of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, redirecting its mandate toward advisory and educational functions. The regulation, effective from April 13, prohibited Committee members from pursuing, stopping, questioning, verifying identification, arresting, or detaining individuals suspected of violations, requiring them instead to report such matters to regular police forces. This shift emphasized "" through non-coercive means, mandating that interactions occur with "kindness and gentleness" and in coordination with other authorities to avoid disrupting public order or businesses. The decree formalized a transition to roles centered on guidance and campaigns, limiting operations to hours and prohibiting interference with commercial activities absent legal justification. Post-reform, the focused on educational initiatives, such as distributing religious literature, conducting lectures, and using digital platforms like and mobile applications to promote Islamic values without physical enforcement. By 2019, leadership described this evolution as correcting prior imbalances, with agents adopting a more advisory posture to foster voluntary compliance rather than confrontation. Further institutional changes reinforced this advisory orientation, including professionalization efforts and alignment with broader social reforms under Crown Prince , though the core emphasis remained on non-punitive promotion of virtue. Empirical observations indicate reduced street-level interventions, with the Committee's presence shifting to collaborative roles in and awareness programs on topics like family ethics and public decorum. These adjustments aimed to mitigate past perceptions of overreach while preserving the body's statutory duty to uphold religious norms through persuasion.

Recent Activities and Ongoing Relevance (2020s)

In the , the Committee's operations have emphasized awareness campaigns and advisory roles, aligning with post-2016 reforms that stripped it of and pursuit powers, shifting focus to non-coercive promotion of Islamic values. Agents, known as mutawa, now primarily develop educational programs on moral conduct, such as initiatives highlighting the importance of and , which included 33,310 targeted awareness activities. This approach reflects adaptation to Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 modernization efforts, where direct street patrols have largely ceased in favor of desk-based content creation and community guidance. Recent engagements include high-level participation in intellectual and educational forums; on August 27, 2025, Commission President Abdulrahman Al-Sanad attended a Makkah conference on universities' responsibilities in fostering values and countering extremist ideologies. The body also maintains mandates in monitoring public behavior, combating use, and enjoining good while forbidding through and counsel in commercial areas, as observed in limited field activities reported in 2022. Official directives under Vision 2030 have subordinated these efforts to broader national goals of social moderation, reducing confrontational interventions while preserving doctrinal oversight. The Committee's ongoing relevance lies in its role as a state mechanism for upholding Sharia-based norms amid rapid societal shifts, including expanded and gender mixing, without reverting to pre-reform enforcement. It contributes to intellectual security by addressing perceived moral threats like sorcery or deviance through reporting channels rather than physical coercion, though human rights monitors have alleged isolated oversteps, such as a 2023 detention of an individual suspected of . This advisory posture supports causal stability in a diversifying economy, where empirical data on reduced public complaints post-reform indicate diminished overt tensions, yet sustains cultural continuity against liberalizing influences.

Controversies and Perspectives

Specific Incidents of Enforcement Disputes

On March 11, 2002, a broke out at a girls' intermediate school in , resulting in the deaths of 15 female students aged 12 to 17 and injuries to dozens more; members of the Committee intervened by blocking rescuers from entering the building and preventing escaping girls from leaving without proper Islamic attire, such as veils and abayas, citing concerns over public decency. This action sparked widespread domestic and international , with Saudi officials initially defending the Committee's conduct before launching an inquiry that led to procedural changes in school safety and response protocols. In May 2007, members raided a private residence in suspecting the presence of alcohol, during which they allegedly beat 28-year-old Salman al-Huraisy to death while he was in custody at a Commission facility; al-Huraisy had been detained alongside family members after the search uncovered bottles claimed to contain alcohol. The incident prompted a rare by authorities, marking one of the first trials of personnel for , with the involved officers facing charges of forced entry and murder; documented the case as evidence of excessive force in enforcement actions. On , , a physical altercation erupted in the Barzan market in when two young male shoppers assaulted a Committee patrol member attempting to enforce dress and behavior codes, drawing in additional Committee personnel and escalating into a broader brawl involving sticks and other improvised weapons. Local reports indicated injuries on both sides, with the incident underscoring growing public resistance to on-the-spot interventions in commercial areas, though no arrests of Committee members were reported. In September , a Committee patrol in pursued two brothers, aged 24 and 22, in a high-speed after objecting to patriotic music playing in their vehicle during celebrations, causing their car to crash into a barrier and overturn; Nasser al-Otaibi died at the scene from injuries, while his brother Saud succumbed to a injury days later. The event ignited significant backlash on Saudi platforms, with users decrying the pursuit as disproportionate and questioning the Committee's authority to engage in vehicular chases without coordination with regular security forces.

Criticisms of Overreach and Abuses

The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, commonly known as the mutawa or Haia, has faced widespread criticism for overreach, including arbitrary interventions in private matters, excessive use of force, and actions that endangered lives. organizations and local reports have documented instances where officers harassed individuals over minor or gender segregation violations, such as detaining women for not covering their hair adequately or separating unrelated men and women in public spaces, often without legal warrants. These practices were seen as infringing on personal autonomy and escalating routine encounters into punitive measures, including and physical restraint. A prominent example of alleged overreach occurred during a fire at a girls' intermediate school in Mecca on March 11, 2002, where 15 students died and dozens were injured. Eyewitnesses and official inquiries reported that mutawa officers blocked fleeing girls from exiting the burning building without proper abayas and headscarves, physically repelling civil defense rescuers attempting to assist partially clothed victims, prioritizing modesty enforcement over immediate rescue efforts. This incident drew condemnation from Saudi media and international observers for subordinating human safety to ideological enforcement, prompting rare public debate within the kingdom about the committee's unchecked authority. Further abuses included documented cases of physical violence and torture. In 2007, eight Shiite men in the Eastern Province reported being beaten by mutawa officers during a raid on a private gathering, with injuries requiring medical attention, amid heightened sectarian tensions. A 2009 report to Saudi Arabia's Shura Council by the Saudi Society for Human Rights detailed multiple instances of mutawa officers employing mistreatment, harassment, and torture, such as prolonged detentions and beatings during interrogations for alleged moral infractions. Individual officers have also faced prosecution for excesses, as in 2018 when one was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for assaulting a suspect in custody. Critics, including affected communities and rights advocates, argued these actions reflected systemic impunity, with the committee's broad mandate enabling vigilante-like behavior rather than measured promotion of virtue. Such overreach extended to vulnerable groups, including women and religious minorities, where enforcement often involved invasive searches or public shaming. Reports highlighted routine harassment of expatriate workers and Shiite women for perceived immodesty or sectarian practices, exacerbating social divisions. These patterns contributed to the regulatory curbs on the committee's powers, which were explicitly motivated by public complaints of abuse and a need to align enforcement with legal standards rather than discretionary zeal. Despite reforms, residual criticisms persist regarding incomplete accountability for past violations.

Defenses Based on Religious and Social Necessity

Supporters of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), including Saudi religious scholars aligned with the Hanbali-Wahhabi tradition, justify its mandate through the Islamic doctrine of hisbah, which obliges the Muslim community to enjoin good (al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf) and forbid evil (al-nahy 'an al-munkar). This principle is rooted in Qur'anic verses such as Al-Imran 3:104, which states, "Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong; they are the ones to attain felicity," and Al-Imran 3:110, affirming the ummah's role as "the best nation produced for mankind" by fulfilling this duty. The CPVPV is viewed as the institutional embodiment of hisba, extending individual moral responsibility to collective enforcement in public spaces to uphold Sharia-derived norms on dress, prayer observance, and gender segregation. Medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), whose works heavily influence Saudi jurisprudence, argued that enjoining right and forbidding wrong is integral to faith, akin to prayer and fasting, and requires state-backed authority when individual efforts prove insufficient against widespread vice. Proponents contend that without such mechanisms, societal adherence to erodes, inviting corruption (fasad fi al-ard) as warned in Qur'an 5:33, where punishments are prescribed for those spreading mischief. In Saudi context, this manifests as preventing public displays of immorality, such as alcohol consumption or illicit relations, which are seen as gateways to broader ethical decay. From a social necessity perspective, defenders, including members of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta, assert that the CPVPV preserves communal harmony in a tribal-conservative society vulnerable to external cultural influences, such as promoting over collective piety. By monitoring behaviors like mandatory attendance and veiling, the committee is credited with fostering stability and reducing vices linked to family disintegration, with historical precedents in early Islamic caliphates where officials maintained market ethics and public morals to avert anarchy. Critics of efforts, such as the 2016 curtailment of arrest powers, argue that diluting hisba enforcement risks , potentially increasing youth delinquency and undermining tying state legitimacy to religious guardianship. Empirical claims include lower reported rates of certain social ills in regions with active oversight, though such assertions rely on internal metrics rather than independent verification.

Political Dimensions and Internal Conflicts

The Committee's political role has historically been intertwined with the Saudi monarchy's strategy for maintaining legitimacy through an alliance with Wahhabi clerical establishments, wherein the Hai'ah enforces strict interpretations of to underpin the regime's religious authority and . Established in 1940 under King Abdulaziz, the body served as a bulwark against potential dissent by promoting virtue and preventing vice, aligning with the Al Saud's pact with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's descendants to legitimize absolute rule via doctrinal purity. This symbiotic relationship positioned the Hai'ah as an instrument of state power, with its estimated 3,500–5,000 members patrolling public spaces to deter moral laxity that could erode theocratic foundations. Under Crown Prince (MBS), political dimensions shifted toward subordinating the Hai'ah to secular modernization goals in Vision 2030, revealing tensions between conservative religious enforcers and royal reformers seeking economic diversification and youth-oriented . MBS's 2017 consolidation of power included arresting prominent clerics and limiting the Hai'ah's , framing excessive zeal as counterproductive to attracting foreign and , as evidenced by the 2016 royal decree stripping arrest powers and mandating coordination with regular police. This reflected a broader causal dynamic: the monarchy's need to balance clerical support for stability against the risks of alienating a demographic where over 60% are under 30 and favor social reforms. Defenders of the Hai'ah, including some ulema, argued such curbs undermined Islamic governance, while state-aligned voices portrayed them as necessary to prevent the body from becoming a vector for . Internal conflicts within the Hai'ah have manifested as ideological fractures between hardline enforcers adhering to rigid Wahhabi norms and pragmatic elements advocating contextual flexibility, exacerbated by leadership purges and doctrinal disputes. In 2009, Mecca branch head Sheikh Ahmad Qasim al-Ghamdi publicly endorsed supervised male-female mixing in workplaces and malls as permissible under Sharia, sparking backlash from ultraconservatives who viewed it as heretical dilution, leading to his demotion and highlighting factional rifts over interpretation. By 2014, Hai'ah president Sheikh Abdullatif al-Sheikh admitted the presence of "extremists" within ranks—estimated at a minority but influential in field operations—and pledged their removal, amid reports of internal resistance to softening tactics like reduced street interventions. These divisions intensified post-2016 reforms, with some members decrying the shift to advisory roles as emasculation, while others aligned with state directives to preserve institutional survival, underscoring causal pressures from royal oversight on a historically semi-autonomous entity.

Impact and Evaluation

Contributions to Social Order and Moral Standards

The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), through its historical mandate to enforce public adherence to Islamic moral codes such as gender segregation, modest dress, and prayer observance, has contributed to maintaining a conservative social framework in that aligns with Wahhabi interpretations of . This enforcement, conducted via patrols and interventions in public spaces, aimed to deter visible vices and promote communal , fostering an environment where societal norms emphasize religious piety over secular individualism. Supporters, including CPVPV leadership, argue that such activities serve as a bulwark against moral erosion, with former head Abdullatif al-Sheikh stating in 2014 that the body helps "contain extremists" by directing religious zeal into state-sanctioned channels rather than unchecked . Empirical indicators of under this system include 's relatively low rates, often linked to the broader Sharia-based legal and ecosystem in which the CPVPV operated. For instance, a comparative analysis found lower incidences of , , and in than in the United States during the studied period, attributing this partly to religious teachings and their institutional that instill fear of divine and legal retribution. Historical data from 1981 recorded only 87 premeditated murders and 21 cases nationwide, alongside limited offenses, reflecting a societal deterrence effect reinforced by policing. More recently, 's index stands at 31.29 out of 100, signaling low criminality levels sustained amid strict standards. Post-2016 reforms shifted the CPVPV toward advisory and educational roles, focusing on guidance rather than arrests, yet this evolution has preserved its function in upholding standards through counseling and public awareness campaigns on values. Official documents outline its duties to "establish values and " and ensure a form of suited to Saudi society, contributing to social cohesion by reinforcing family-oriented and community-based ethical norms. In this capacity, the committee continues to monitor and report violations, indirectly supporting stability by aligning public behavior with religious expectations that prioritize collective over individual liberties. While direct causation is challenging to isolate from wider implementation, the persistence of low vice-related public incidents—such as rare reports of overt illicit mixing or non-compliance in conservative areas—suggests a lingering deterrent effect on deviations from established baselines.

Empirical Assessments of Effectiveness

Empirical evaluations of the Committee's effectiveness in preventing and promoting virtue remain limited, with few peer-reviewed studies directly quantifying its impact on societal . Available primarily derive from reports on activities and broader trends, rather than controlled assessments of deterrence or behavioral change. For instance, the Committee's interventions, such as patrols and arrests for infractions, peaked in the pre-reform era, with thousands of annual stops reported, but causal links to reduced incidence are unestablished due to underreporting of private behaviors like alcohol consumption or illicit relations. Overall crime statistics provide an indirect proxy, as moral vices often intersect with reported offenses. Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior documented a 4.5% decline in the national crime rate in —the year powers were curtailed—compared to , with no subsequent surge attributable to the . Drug seizure trends, a key vice-prevention metric, show leading global confiscations from 2013–2017, but quantities stabilized or varied without clear post-2016 escalation linked to diminished religious police authority; enforcement shifted to specialized units under regular police. Convictions for , requiring stringent evidence like four eyewitnesses, have historically been rare, with no published time-series data indicating an uptick after 2016; executions for such offenses trailed only and cases pre-reform but declined in frequency amid evidentiary hurdles. Public perception surveys offer subjective insights into perceived effectiveness. Pre-reform approval for the Committee hovered at low levels, with incidents of and overreach eroding trust by 2015. Post-reform polling on general police satisfaction, incorporating factors, indicates moderate gains in public confidence, though not disaggregated for moral enforcement roles. Recent actions, including 2025 arrests for and "immoral acts" via dedicated task forces, suggest persistent challenges but no of systemic proliferation following the shift to advisory functions. Overall, while the Committee's historical deterrence role is anecdotally cited in regime stability analyses, the absence of rigorous longitudinal studies—hampered by data opacity—precludes definitive claims of efficacy or failure.

Broader Societal and International Views

Within Saudi society, opinions on the Committee remain divided along ideological lines, with conservative elements viewing it as essential for preserving Islamic moral standards amid rapid modernization. A 2016 analysis indicated that while the mutawa (religious police) garners support in the conservative Sunni-majority population for enforcing prayer attendance, dress codes, and gender segregation, it faces widespread resentment from liberals, youth, and urban dwellers who perceive its past interventions as arbitrary and humiliating. The 2016 regulatory , which revoked powers and mandated "gentle" , elicited broad relief among younger Saudis and reform advocates, correlating with increased public activities like mixed-gender concerts and cinema reopenings by 2018. By 2022, official reports noted a sharp decline in Committee staffing and street presence, signaling societal acclimation to diminished oversight, though some religious voices expressed concerns over moral laxity. Internationally, Western groups and media have predominantly portrayed the as a symbol of authoritarian repression, citing specific abuses such as the 2002 Mecca school fire, where mutawa reportedly blocked rescuers—leading to 15 girls' deaths due to inadequate clothing—and a 2007 incident involving the fatal beating of a man for alleged immorality. Organizations like , which documented overreach in arrests without pre-2016, praised the power curbs as mitigating risks of , though they critiqued persistent informal influence. These views often frame the institution within broader condemnations of Saudi governance, emphasizing violations of personal freedoms over contextual religious rationales. In the broader Muslim world, reactions are more ambivalent, with some Sunni scholars defending analogous moral enforcement as rooted in obligations to command virtue and forbid vice, drawing from Quranic injunctions like Al-Imran 3:104. However, critics in states like and decry Saudi's version as excessively Wahhabi-influenced and culturally exportable via funding, contributing to perceptions of as a rigid guardian of orthodoxy rather than a progressive leader. Post-2016 reforms have softened some regional critiques, aligning with Saudi's Vision 2030 pivot toward economic diversification, though isolated voices in conservative circles lament the dilution of traditional authority.

Comparative Institutions

Analogous Bodies in Other Islamic States

In , the Guidance Patrol (Gasht-e Ershad), established in 2005 as a subunit of the national police, enforces Islamic dress codes and public morality standards, particularly mandating for women and prohibiting mixed-gender interactions deemed immoral. This force, rooted in post-1979 revolutionary efforts to impose theocratic norms, conducts patrols in urban areas, with authority to detain, fine, or refer violators to courts; its operations gained global attention following the in custody after an arrest for improper . Afghanistan's regime operates the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, revived in after the group's return to power, mirroring the Saudi committee's name and mandate to suppress vices like music, images of living beings, and non-segregated interactions while promoting prayer and veiling. The ministry enforces a 2024 law codifying 35 articles of prohibitions, including bans on women's public voices and photography, with enforcers conducting raids and floggings; it claims over 1,000 enforcement actions in its first year post-revival. In northern , Hisbah commissions in 12 Sharia-adopting states such as Kano, Zamfara, and Yobe—formalized since 1999—monitor compliance with Islamic penal codes, raiding against alcohol consumption, , and immodest dress, often arresting thousands annually in operations blending and state authority. For instance, Kano's Hisbah, with over 7,000 members by 2020, reported seizing 1,200 liters of alcohol in a single 2023 sweep and collaborates with federal agencies on drug enforcement. Indonesia's Aceh province maintains the Wilayatul Hisbah as its Sharia police since 2001 under special autonomy laws, tasked with caning offenders for khalwat (close proximity between unmarried opposite sexes) and gambling, conducting joint patrols with civil authorities that resulted in 150 canings in 2023 alone. This force, unique in Indonesia, enforces hudud punishments derived from provincial Qanun regulations, focusing on public order in the only region applying full Sharia penal codes nationally.

Historical Predecessors and Global Parallels

The institution of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) in traces its roots to the classical Islamic concept of hisbah, which originated in the early Muslim community under the Prophet Muhammad and was formalized during the (661–750 CE) as a state-appointed office of the muhtasib. The muhtasib served as a market inspector and moral enforcer, tasked with ensuring compliance with in public spaces, including oversight of weights and measures, prohibition of , and correction of visible vices such as public drunkenness or immodest dress, drawing from Quranic injunctions to "enjoin good and forbid wrong" (e.g., 3:104). This role expanded under Abbasid rule (750–1258 CE), where muhtasibs like those in under Caliph (r. 754–775 CE) wielded judicial authority to punish infractions, blending economic regulation with ethical policing, though their powers varied by ruler and were often limited to non-criminal matters to avoid overlapping with qadis (judges). In the Saudi context, hisbah functions were revived during the First Saudi State (1744–1818), where alliances between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab emphasized strict Wahhabi enforcement of moral codes, including informal patrols by ulama to suppress innovations (bid'ah) and enforce puritanical norms in Najd. The modern CPVPV, established in 1940 by King Abdulaziz Al Saud, formalized these practices amid the Kingdom's unification, initially as decentralized committees under Hanbali scholars to promote prayer attendance and segregate genders, reflecting a Wahhabi adaptation of hisbah rather than a direct Ottoman or colonial import. Unlike medieval muhtasibs, who focused more on commerce, the Saudi version prioritized vice prevention, evolving from tribal customs and Ikhwan militias' zealotry in the 1920s, though without the economic inspectorate emphasis of classical precedents. Globally, parallels to the CPVPV exist in other Islamist regimes enforcing hisbah-derived mandates, such as Iran's Guidance Patrols (Gasht-e Ershad), established post- to compel compliance and segregate sexes, resulting in thousands of annual arrests for moral infractions as of 2022. In under rule (1996–2001 and since 2021), the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice mirrors Saudi structures, deploying enforcers to flog violators of codes and media bans, with documented cases exceeding 100 public punishments monthly in 2022. Similar bodies operate in Sudan's Public Order Police (since 1983), Aceh Province, Indonesia's Wilayatul Hisbah (enforcing since 2001 with canings for ), and northern Nigerian states' Hisbah commissions (post-2000 Sharia adoption), where as of 2012, at least 17 countries maintained such religious enforcement units, often sparking domestic resistance over arbitrary powers. These institutions, while invoking shared hisbah theology, differ in scope—e.g., Iran's integrates with revolutionary guards, unlike Saudi's clerical autonomy—highlighting adaptations to local politics rather than uniform doctrine.

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