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Mil Mi-28
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The Mil Mi-28 (NATO reporting name "Havoc") is a Soviet all-weather, day-night, military tandem, two-seat anti-armor attack helicopter. It is an attack helicopter with no intended secondary transport capability, and is better optimized than the Mil Mi-24 gunship for the role. It carries a single gun in an undernose barbette, plus external loads carried on pylons beneath stub wings.

Key Information

Development

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Origins

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In 1972, following the completion of the Mil Mi-24, development began on a unique attack helicopter with transport capability.[5] The new design had a reduced transport capability (3 troops instead of 8) and omitted the cabin to provide better overall performance and higher top speed. Improved performance was important for its intended role fighting against tanks and enemy helicopters and covering helicopter landing operations. Initially, many different designs were considered, including an unconventional project with two main rotors, placed with engines on tips of wings (in perpendicular layout); and in one similarity with the late 1960s-era American Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne attack helicopter design, with an additional pusher propeller on the tail. In 1977, a preliminary design was chosen in a classic single-rotor layout. It lost its similarity to the Mi-24, and even the canopies were smaller, with flat surfaces.

Design work on the Mi-28 began under Marat Tishchenko in 1980.[6] In 1981, a design and a mock-up were accepted. The prototype (no. 012) first flew on 10 November 1982.[6] The second prototype (no. 022) was completed in 1983. In 1984, the Mi-28 completed the first stage of state trials, but in October 1984 the Soviet Air Force chose the more advanced Kamov Ka-50 as the new anti-tank helicopter. As per the decree of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers No. 1420-355, the Mi-28 was to continue development to meet foreign demand for Soviet attack helicopters.[7] In December 1987, Mi-28 production at Rosvertol in Rostov-on-Don was approved.

An early production Mi-24 was fitted with an air data boom as an early test for the Mi-28's technologies. Later, a few Mi-24Ds were fitted up with the Mi-28's radome mount to test the sighting-flight-navigational complex's abilities, and others had redesigned fuselages that closely resembled the future Mi-28, but with rounded cockpits.[8]

In January 1988, the first Mi-28A prototype (no. 032) flew. It was fitted with more powerful engines and an "X" type tail rotor with four blades offset at angles of 35° and 145°, instead of the three-blade version. The Mi-28A debuted at the Paris Air Show in June 1989. In 1991 the second Mi-28A (no. 042) was completed. The Mi-28A program was cancelled in 1993 because it was deemed uncompetitive with the Ka-50, in particular it was not all-weather capable.

A Mil Mi-28N on display

The Mi-28N was unveiled in 1995, the N designation meaning "night". The prototype (no. 014) first flew on 14 November 1996. Its most significant feature is a radar in a round cover above the main rotor, similar to that of the American AH-64D Apache Longbow. The Mi-28N also has improved tor vision and an aiming device under the nose, including a TV camera and FLIR. Due to funding problems, development was interrupted. A second prototype with an improved rotor design was unveiled in March 2004 at Rosvertol.[citation needed]

The first serial Mi-28N was delivered to the Army on 5 June 2006.[citation needed] By 2015, 67 Mi-28Ns were planned to be purchased, when the Mi-24 was to be completely replaced.[citation needed] The Rostvertol plant delivered about 140 Mi-28N and Mi-35M helicopters in 2012–14 to domestic and foreign customers; 28 helicopters were delivered in 2015.[9]

Mil also developed an export variant of the Mi-28N, designated Mi-28NE, and a simpler day helicopter variant, the Mi-28D, based on the Mi-28N design, but without radar and FLIR.

A fifth-generation derivative, dubbed Mi-28NM, has been in development since 2008. According to then chief executive officer at Russian Helicopters Andrey Shibitov, the criteria for the modernized helicopter include low-radar signature, extended flight range, advanced weapons control system, some capability of a fighter jet and speed up to 600 km/h.[10]

In 2016, Russian media reported a new, advanced helmet system designed to display visual information for aiming at targets in any field of view was under development for the MI-28N.[11]

Design

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A Russian Air Force Mi-28

The Mi-28 is a new-generation attack helicopter that functions as an air-to-air and air-to-ground partner for the Mi-24 Hind and Ka-50 Hokum. The five-blade main rotor is mounted above the body midsection, short, wide, tapered, weapon-carrying wings are mounted to the rear of the body midsection. Two turboshaft engines in pods are mounted alongside the top of the fuselage with downturned exhausts. The fuselage is slender and tapers to the tail boom and nose. It features tandem, stepped-up cockpits, a cannon mounted beneath the belly, and a non-retractable tricycle tail-wheel type landing gear. Due to the energy-absorbing landing gear and seats the crew can survive a vertical fall of up to 12 m/s. The Mi-28 has a fully armoured cabin, including the windshield, which withstands 7.62 and 12.7mm armor piercing bullets and 20 mm shell fragments.[12]

The helicopter design is based on the conventional pod and boom configuration, with a tail rotor. The main rotor head has elastomeric bearings and the main rotor blades are made from composite materials. The tail rotor is designed on a biplane configuration, with independently controlled blades in a non-orthogonal, X-shaped configuration with angles of 35° and 145°.[13] A new design of all-plastic rotor blades, which can sustain 30 mm shells, is installed on the Mi-28N night attack variant.

Mi-28N with radar station and new nose sensors

It is equipped with two heavily armored cockpits, a windshield able to withstand 12.7–14.5 mm caliber bullets, in-nose electronics, and a narrow-X tail rotor, with reduced noise characteristics. It is powered by two 2,200 hp Isotov TV-3-117VM (t/n 014) turboshaft engines.

While the Mi-28 is not intended for use as a transport, it does have a small passenger compartment capable of carrying three people. The planned purpose of this is the rescue of downed helicopter crews.

The Mi-28N features a helmet mounted display for the pilot. The pilot designates targets for the navigator/weapons officer, who proceeds to fire the weapons required to fulfill that particular task. The integrated surveillance and fire control system has two optical channels providing wide and narrow fields of view, a narrow-field-of-view optical television channel, and laser rangefinder. The system can move within 110 degrees in azimuth and from +13 to −40 degrees in elevation.[12]

Mil Mi-28 nose sensors

The night attack variant helicopter retains most of the structural design of the original Mi-28. The main difference is the installation of an integrated electronic combat system. Other modifications include: new main gearbox for transmitting higher power to the rotor, new high-efficiency blades with swept-shaped tips, and an engine fuel injection control.[12]

The pilot uses a helmet-mounted target designator, which allocates the target to the navigator's surveillance and fire control system. The navigator/weapons officer is then able to employ guided weapons or guns against the target. The targeting system follows the direction of the pilot's eyes.[12]

Russia's military rotary-wing aircraft fleet has been fully refitted with new night vision goggles (NVG). Mil Mi-28N attack helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) received GEO-ONV1-family NVGs.[14]

Armament

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The Mi-28 is equipped with a chin-mounted NPPU-28 turret with 30 mm automatic Shipunov 2A42 autocannon.[15] It has selective fire, and a dual-feed, which allows for a cyclic rate of fire between 200 and 800 rounds per minute.[16] Its effective range varies from 1,500 meters for ground vehicles to 2,500 meters for airborne targets. Rounds from high explosive incendiary (HEI) to armour-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) can be used. Stated penetration for the 3UBR8 round is 25 mm of RHA at 1,500 meters.

Mil Mi-28 gun mounting

The standard missile armament of the Mi-28N is the supersonic 9M120 Ataka-V missile, which uses radio beam-riding guidance. Two racks can each carry 8 Ataka missiles, giving a total of 16 missile, although 8 Atakas is a more normal load.[17] There are four variants of the Ataka missile for different tasks. The 9M120 Tandem high-explosive anti-tank (THEAT) warhead variant is used against tanks fitted with explosive reactive armor (ERA), its stated penetrative ability is 800 mm rolled homogeneous armour (RHA).[18] The 9M120F thermobaric variant is used against infantry, buildings, bunkers, and caves. The 9M120O expanding rod warhead variant is used against helicopters. All the variants have a range of 6 km. The 9M120M improved version has a longer range (8 km) and better penetration (900 mm of RHA).[19] All variants use SACLOS missile guidance.

Unguided weapons such as rockets can be carried on four pylons under the stub wings. Typical rockets carried are the 122 mm (4.8 in) S-13, fired from five-round B-13 rocket pods, and the 80 mm (3.1 in) S-8, fired from 20-round B8V-20 pods.[17] The S-8 and S-13 rockets used by the Mi-28 are usually unguided. In the most common configuration, one can expect 40 S-8 rockets or 10 S-13 rockets. Both rockets have their variants, from HEAT warheads to thermobaric warheads. The S-8 has a shorter range and smaller warhead than the S-13, but compensates with numbers. Currently, the Russian Aerospace Forces are upgrading their S-8 and S-13 rockets to laser guided missiles with the proposed Ugroza ("Menace") system. Rockets upgraded under Ugroza received the designations S-8Kor and S-13Kor, respectively.[20]

The Mi-28 can also carry the IR guided R-73 air-to-air missiles, the Kh-25 air-to-surface missiles as well as up to 500 kg aerial bombs.[21]

Operational history

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Russia

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The first production examples of the Mi-28N completed factory flight and armament tests in late May 2006, and were received by the Russian Air Force on 5 June 2006.[citation needed] The Mi-28N was officially accepted three years later, in October 2009.[3] It was assumed the Mi-28N would fully replace the older Mi-24 variant in the Russian Armed Forces by 2015.[citation needed]

In September 2011, six Mi-28Ns of the Russian Air Force took part in the 2011 Union Shield joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise at the Ashuluk training ground in Astrakhan Oblast, Russia.[3]

To improve the training of pilots for the Mi-28N, the Russian Defense Ministry announced the procurement of up to 60 Mi-28UB training-and-combat versions by 2020. Four to six Mi-28UBs would be purchased for every unit that operates the Mi-28N.[citation needed] An initial batch of 24 Mi-28UB training-and-combat helicopters was ordered in April 2016,[22] and the first two serial Mi-28UBs arrived at the Torzhok Air Base on 16 November 2017.[23]

During the Russian military intervention of the Syrian civil war, the Mi-28N had its combat debut during the 2016 Battle of Palmyra when several Mi-28Ns of the Russian Aerospace Forces supported the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in their advance towards the city.[24] During their support to SAA, Russia's Mi-28Ns targeted several Islamic State positions with S-8 unguided rockets and 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided missiles.[25][26]

Mi-28N of Berkuts aerobatic team at ARMY-2020 forum

In October 2016, a prototype of an upgraded Mi-28NM helicopter performed its maiden flight.[27] The Russian Defence Ministry ordered the first batch of Mi-28NM helicopters in December 2017, not disclosing the number of helicopters ordered.[28] In March 2019, a Mi-28NM prototype was seen accompanied by a Mi-24/Mi-35M during a combat sortie over rebel-held territory in the northern Hama.[29] It was reported the helicopter was sent to Syria to undergo testing in difficult weather and climate conditions.[30] The Russian Aerospace Forces received the first two serial Mi-28NMs on 23 June 2019.[31] A month later, during the International Military-Technical Forum ARMY-2019, the Russian Defence Ministry and Rostec signed a long-term contract for the supply of 98 Mi-28NMs by 2027.[32] A new contract was signed in August 2022.[33]

The Mi-28N was deployed by Russia during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[34] The Times reported that Ukrainian forces had successfully used a UK-made Starstreak system to shoot down a Russian Mi-28N attack helicopter in early April.[35] On 26 April, the wreck of a Mi-28 was found by Ukrainian forces outside the town of Hostomel in the Kyiv Oblast. The craft was likely destroyed during the Battle of Hostomel Airport.[36] On 9 May, one Mi-28 was destroyed in north of Kharkiv, the attack helicopter with registration number RF-13654 was the third visually reported loss of that type.[37] On 16 May, another Mi-28N with registration number RF-13628 was destroyed in Kharkiv.[38] On 12 June 2022, a Mi-28N was destroyed and its wreck recorded in video by Ukrainian troops, the crew of the helicopter died at the crash site.[39]

On 18 September 2023, the Ukrainian military intelligence claimed a raid against Chkalovsky Air Base, near Moscow, occurred. During which they claimed damaged the tail rotor of a Mi-28N. It had been used in the shooting down of Ukrainian drones, according to a statement.[40]

On 6 August 2024, the Ukrainian SBU stated that a Russian Mi-28 in Kursk Oblast was damaged by an FPV drone. The SBU claimed that it the first successful intercept of a helicopter, mid-flight, using a drone.[41]

As of 13 May 2025, twelve Mi-28s have been visually confirmed as lost and four damaged since start of 2022 Invasion by the Oryx blog.[42]

Iraq

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In October 2012, it was reported that Russia and Iraq may sign a US$4.2–$5.0 billion weapons contract, including purchase of 30 Mi-28NE helicopters.[43] The deal was confirmed on 9 October.[citation needed] The deal was reportedly cancelled due to Iraqi concerns of corruption,[44] but that concern was addressed, and the Iraqi defence minister stated that "the deal is going ahead."[45] As of December 2015, 15 Mi-28NEs had been delivered.[46]

Iraqi Mi-28s reportedly saw their first use in combat in September 2014, only several days after their arrival in the country. However, official confirmation by the Iraqi ministry of defence only came on 30 October of the same year.[47]

Algeria

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In June 2010, Algeria was expected to place an order for 42 Mi-28NE helicopters.[48] On 30 August 2016, Algeria displayed its first batch of Mi-28NE helicopters on television.[49]

Potential operators

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Bangladesh

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In late December 2021, it was reported that Bangladesh is finalizing a deal to buy eight Mi-28NEs for the Bangladesh Air Force with necessary equipment, along with operation and maintenance training. At the end of 2021, BDT 4100 crore from the Bangladesh's Bangladesh's Ministry of Finance approved approximately $520 million "At this time 1 USD equal 80 BDT" For the purchase of 8 helicopters "Attack or Transport". Bangladesh is spending around 65 million for each helicopter which is 2 times its market value and it is not sure if it is an attack or transport helicopter. The possibility of buying Mi-26 transport helicopter is much more than MI -28NEs Attack Helicopters. Bangladesh or Russian any officials do not have any statement about the deal. In 2022, Russian arms sales agency Rosoboronexport dismissed media reports that suggest Bangladesh has acquired Mil Mi-28NE attack helicopters.[50][51]

India

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The Indian Military requested a modified Mi-28 prototype fitted with French and Belgian avionics. Russian manufacturers discussed how to meet these requirements.[52] In October 2011, it was reported that the American AH-64D had emerged as the front-runner ahead of the Mi-28N to fill a requirement for 22 attack helicopters.[53] India ordered 22 AH-64Es in 2015.[54]

Iran

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In November 2023, Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Mahdi Farahi said plans have been finalized for Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters to join the combat units of the Iranian Armed Forces.[55]

Kenya

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In late 2011, Kenya began the process of acquiring 16 Mi-28s for its Embakasi based 50th Air Cavalry Division. They were set to be delivered to the 50th Air Cavalry Division in Kenya on 3 January 2012, from the Russian state owned corporation Rosoboronexport, which is an intermediary for all imports and exports of military related hardware.[56] However, in 2013, Oboronprom denied reports that the type had been accepted for service with the Kenyan military.[57]

Venezuela

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In April 2010, Venezuela agreed to order 10 Mi-28s for the Venezuelan Army.[58] However, no deal was signed after this.[citation needed][needs update]

Variants

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Mil Mi-28 weapons load
Mi-28
Prototype version; first flight in 1982.
Mi-28A
Original production anti-tank helicopter.
Mi-28N/MMW Havoc
All weather day-night version adopted by Russian military in 2009. Equipped with a top-mounted millimeter wave radar, thermographic camera-TV, and a laser rangefinder. Powered by two Russian Klimov TV3-117VMA-SB3 engines (2,500 hp each), produced by the Ukrainian Motor-Sich and replaced by Russian-made VK-2500 (2,699 hp each) engines as of 2016.[59] Max takeoff weight: 11,500 kg, max payload: 2,350 kg.
Mi-28NE
Export version of the Mi-28N. In service with the Iraqi and Algerian Air Force.[60] In August 2018, the Russian Helicopters unveiled an upgraded Mi-28NE variant. The helicopter has enhanced armor and is fitted with modern directional IR countermeasures (DIRCM) against short-range IR guided missiles. Its rotor blades made of composite materials can withstand shells up to 20–30 mm, while the fuel system is to be fire and explosion resistant.[61] It will be also capable to use the new 9M123 Khrizantema-VM anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).[62]
Mi-28NM on MAKS-2021
Mi-28NM
An upgraded version of the Mi-28N under development since 2009. It has a redesigned nose that lacks nose antenna, a new H025 radar station for all-round visibility, more powerful VK-2500P engines with FADEC and improved rotor blades to increase its maximum speed by 13% and cruise speed by 10%. It also has an upgraded fire-control system and new "Izdeliye 296" onboard radio-electronic data processing system.[63][64] It will be equipped to carry the 9M123VM Khrizantema and 9M127-1 Ataka-VM anti-tank missiles. It is also planned to be equipped with the new LMUR multipurpose missile, designed for use against air and ground targets, and fitted with inertial guidance in initial flight, with mid-course updates by an operator before the target is acquired by the missile's own seeker, giving a range of 25 km (16 mi).[65] The Mi-28NM made its maiden flight in October 2016 and the state trials of the upgraded VK-2500P engines were completed in October 2020.[27][66] A plan to upgrade existing Mi-28Ns to Mi-28NM standard has been approved.[67][68]
Mi-28D
Simplified daylight operation version. Similar to Mi-28N, but without top-mounted radar and FLIR.[citation needed]
Mi-28UB
(Uchebno-Boyevoy, training-and-combat)[69]
Mi-40
Projected utility version of the Mi-28, initiated in 1983 and announced in 1992. It was primarily intended for the "Aerial Infantry Fighting Vehicle" category as a successor to the Mil Mi-24 and Mi-8 assault helicopters. It was planned to use two 1,863 kW Klimov TV3-117 turboshaft engines, four-blade main rotor, four-blade Delta H tail rotor (both from the Mi-28), and retractable tricycle-type landing gear. It was expected to weigh 11–12,000 kg and estimated to attain a 3300 m ceiling, a 314 km/h maximum speed and a 260 km/h cruise speed. The specification required operating in day, night and poor weather conditions as well as carrying eight soldiers (the design achieved seven in practice), eight stretchers or large external loads. Emphasis was placed on survivability with a focus on redundancy, IR suppression and special shock absorbers for the crew to increase the maximum "safe" crash velocity. It incorporated a forward facing 23 mm rotary cannon (most likely GSh-23L) and a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun (most likely Yak-B) to the rear. Fuselage fairings containing fuel replaced stub wings with missiles mounted above on special hardpoints. Its design borrowed much from the Mil Mi-36 developed two years prior, and was itself soon replaced by the Mil Mi-42 project. Although the Mi-40 was briefly resurrected in the 1990s, with optimization studies being completed, it did not reach the prototype stage.[citation needed]

Operators

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 Algeria
 Iraq
 Russia
 Uganda

Notable accidents

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A Mil Mi-28 helicopter crashed on 2 August 2015 at Dubrovichi training range in Ryazan region.
  • On 2 August 2015, an Mi-28 of the Berkut squadron crashed while performing in an aerobatics display with other helicopters in Ryazan. Of the crew, the pilot Lieutenant Colonel Igor Butenko died as a result of the crash while the co-pilot Senior Lieutenant Alexander Kletnov survived. While the specific cause of the crash remains undetermined, the co-pilot indicated in his report that the aircraft suffered a hydraulics failure. As a result, the Russian military grounded all Mi-28s during the investigation.[72]
  • On 3 January 2024, a Ugandan Mi-28N crashed at Nyamisingiri Village, Kichwamba sub-county, Ntoroko district in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) while deployed on a peacekeeping mission.[73]
  • On 18 March 2025, a Mi-28 crashed in a field in near the village of Shugovitsy, Leningrad oblast. The crash occurred during a training mission and killed both crew.[74]

Specifications

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Data from RIA Novosti,[75] Russian Helicopters, JSC,[76] Jane's All The World's Aircraft 2000–2001[77]

General characteristics

  • Crew: 2 (1 pilot, 1 WSO)
  • Length: 17.01 m (55 ft 10 in) excluding rotors
  • Wingspan: 4.88 m (16 ft 0 in) stub wings
  • Height: 3.82 m (12 ft 6 in) to top of rotor head
  • Empty weight: 8,590 kg (18,938 lb) equipped
  • Gross weight: 10,700 kg (23,589 lb)
  • Max takeoff weight: 11,500 kg (25,353 lb)
  • Fuel capacity: 1,337 kg (2,948 lb) / 1,720 L (450 US gal; 380 imp gal) internal fuel + up to 445 kg (981 lb) / 571 L (151 US gal; 126 imp gal) in 4x drop tanks
  • Powerplant: 2 × Klimov VK-2500 turboshaft engines, 1,636 kW (2,194 hp) each
  • Main rotor diameter: 17.2 m (56 ft 5 in)
  • Main rotor area: 232.35 m2 (2,501.0 sq ft)

Performance

  • Maximum speed: 320 km/h (200 mph, 170 kn)
  • Cruise speed: 270 km/h (170 mph, 150 kn) max
  • Range: 435 km (270 mi, 235 nmi) with 5% reserve
  • Combat range: 200 km (120 mi, 110 nmi) 10-minute loiter with 5% reserve
  • Ferry range: 1,100 km (680 mi, 590 nmi) 4x drop tanks with 5% reserve
  • Endurance: 2 hours
  • Service ceiling: 5,700 m (18,700 ft)
  • Hover ceiling OGE: 3,600 m (11,811 ft)
  • g limits: +3 -0.5
  • Rate of climb: 13.6 m/s (2,680 ft/min) max at sea level
  • Disk loading: 49.5 kg/m2 (10.1 lb/sq ft) max
  • Power/mass: 0.31 kW/kg (0.19 hp/lb)

Armament

  • Guns: 1× chin-mounted 30 mm Shipunov 2A42 cannon with 250 rounds (±110° horizontal fire)
  • Hardpoints: Two pylons under each stub wing to mount bombs, rockets, missiles, and gun pods. Main armament configurations include:

See also

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Related development

Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Mil Mi-28

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Mil Mi-28 (NATO reporting name Havoc) is a twin-engine, tandem two-seat attack helicopter designed by the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant primarily for anti-armor roles, featuring no secondary troop transport capability unlike predecessors such as the Mi-24. Development originated in the Soviet era during the early 1980s as a dedicated gunship to complement existing platforms, with the prototype first flying in 1982, though production and service entry were delayed until the Mi-28N variant in 2009 due to competition from the Kamov Ka-50 and evolving requirements for night and all-weather operations. Equipped with two TV3-117VMA engines providing up to 2,200 horsepower each, the Mi-28 achieves a maximum speed of approximately 300 km/h and can carry up to 2,300 kg of armament, including a chin-mounted 30 mm 2A42 with 250-500 rounds, Ataka-V or Vikhr anti-tank guided missiles, and rocket pods for unguided munitions. The Mi-28N "Night Hunter" upgrade introduced , , and enhanced for adverse weather engagement, while the newer Mi-28NM variant incorporates advanced sensors like a mast-mounted and improved weaponry for superior target acquisition. These capabilities position it as a primary asset for , often operating alongside the coaxial-rotor Ka-52. The Mi-28 has been deployed in conflicts including , where technical vulnerabilities such as transmission failures were exposed under operational stress, and the ongoing , marked by significant attrition from Ukrainian air defenses despite upgrades aimed at countering drones and enhancing . Exports to nations like and underscore its international appeal, though production constraints and sanctions have impacted recent integrations on Mi-28NM models. Despite developmental hurdles and combat losses revealing limitations in electronic warfare and armor against modern threats, the platform's robust firepower and maneuverability—sustaining over 3g loads—affirm its role in high-intensity .

Development

Origins and design requirements

The initiated the Mi-28 program in the early 1980s as part of efforts to develop a dedicated anti-armor , addressing the performance trade-offs of the multi-role Mi-24 Hind, which combined and limited troop transport functions. The design prioritized a pure combat platform without cabin space for passengers, enabling higher speeds, better agility, and enhanced survivability against ground threats, in contrast to the Mi-24's compromises that diluted its attack capabilities. Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant's Mi-28 entered competition against Kamov Bureau's single-rotor Ka-50 prototype, with Soviet military requirements specifying a tandem two-seat layout—one pilot and one weapons operator—for coordinated anti-tank operations in all-weather and day-night conditions. Key stipulations included robust armor protection for vital areas, integration of anti-armor guided missiles, and a focus on destroying massed armored formations, reflecting first-principles engineering to optimize for battlefield destruction rather than versatility. Empirical data from Mi-24 operations in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) validated this approach, as the Hind's transport role often overloaded it in high-altitude, hot environments, reducing maneuverability and exposing it to man-portable air defenses and small arms fire more than a specialized would. These vulnerabilities highlighted the causal need for a unburdened by carriage to maintain offensive edge against asymmetric threats.

Prototyping, testing, and initial challenges

The first of the Mil Mi-28 conducted its on 10 November 1982, marking the start of engineering trials for the tandem-seat design. Initial factory testing focused on stability, rotor performance, and basic flight envelopes, with issues related to vertical overloads addressed through modifications to the main rotor blades and hydraulic systems. By 1984, these preliminary trials had been completed successfully, enabling the prototype to advance to the second stage of state comparative tests at the GNIKI VVS facility, where survivability features—including ballistic protection against small-arms fire and evaluations against man-portable air-defense systems—were rigorously assessed. A modernized Mi-28A variant followed, with its prototype achieving first flight in January 1988 after production approval in December 1987, incorporating enhancements to engine integration and armored cockpit resilience derived from prior test data. Development faced significant hurdles in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the Mi-28's loss in initial competitions to the due to perceived limitations in all-weather capability, prompting a shift toward night-attack upgrades. The in 1991 exacerbated these challenges through economic turmoil and funding shortfalls, which halted serial production of the baseline Mi-28A and delayed certification amid resource constraints at the . Resumed state trials in the mid-1990s, supported by renewed Russian Ministry of Defense funding announced in January 1994, extended into the early 2000s, with the Mi-28A's limitations ultimately leading to its formal acceptance only after protracted evaluations confirmed baseline viability in 2003.

Entry into production and modernization efforts

Serial production of the Mi-28N began in 2006 at the facility in , with the first production aircraft completing factory flight and armament tests in late May and being accepted by the shortly thereafter. This initiation addressed post-Cold War delays in the program, prioritizing enhancements in reliability and integration of night-capable systems derived from extensive testing data. Throughout the , production emphasized the Mi-28N configuration, incorporating empirical feedback from trials to refine and for improved operational uptime, with over 100 units delivered by 2019. Modernization efforts accelerated with the Mi-28NM variant, entering serial production in to integrate upgraded VK-2500 engines, advanced electronic warfare suites, and compatibility with precision-guided munitions such as the missile for extended-range engagements. Further upgrades included new composite main rotor blades designed to boost maximum speed to approximately 340 km/h through aerodynamic optimizations, tested and reported in operational contexts by 2021. These data-driven modifications responded to field performance metrics, enhancing and amid evolving tactical requirements. To offset attrition from intensive use, Russian output of helicopters, including Mi-28 series, surged by 55% to 296 units in 2022 compared to 134 in 2021, with rotary-wing production rising an additional 15% in 2024. This escalation incorporated combat-derived insights into survivability and weapon system reliability, prioritizing scalable manufacturing at .

Design

Airframe, propulsion, and survivability features

The Mil Mi-28 employs a conventional pod-and-boom configuration optimized for dedicated anti-armor roles, featuring a narrow with tandem seating for pilot and gunner, non-retractable , and a tail boom supporting a four-blade . The five-blade main rotor utilizes composite materials, enabling tolerance to direct impacts from 30 mm shells, which enhances operational persistence in hostile environments. Propulsion derives from two widely separated TV3-117VMA engines, each rated at 2,200 shaft horsepower for takeoff power, positioned high on the sides to minimize vulnerability to simultaneous damage from a single projectile while driving the main rotor via an intermediate gearbox. This layout supports redundant hydraulic systems and facilitates low-altitude maneuverability essential for missions, where agility at reduced speeds outweighs pursuits of higher velocities. Survivability features include a fully armored tub constructed from , ceramics, and armored glass, capable of withstanding 12.7 mm armor-piercing bullets and fragments from 20 mm shells, complemented by energy-absorbing seats rated for vertical impacts up to 12 m/s. The incorporates self-sealing fuel tanks and exceeds 3g tolerance for structural integrity under combat maneuvers. A distinctive K-37-800M ejection system, unique to helicopters, deploys explosive charges to sever the main rotor blades and canopy before launching zero-zero ejection seats, providing escape options in emergencies. These elements underscore a philosophy centered on causal resilience against ground fire, informed by empirical data from prior Soviet-era operations emphasizing armored redundancy over unarmored speed.

Avionics, sensors, and cockpit

The Mil Mi-28 features a tandem cockpit arrangement with the gunner seated in the forward position and the pilot in the rear, allowing for specialized division of responsibilities in target acquisition and flight control. Both crew members are equipped with armored seats and helmet-mounted sights and displays, such as the NSTsI-V system, which integrate target designation, night vision compatibility, and situational awareness data directly into the crew's field of view. The cockpits incorporate multifunction displays (MFDs) and compatibility with night vision goggles, enhancing low-light operations without compromising pilot attention to navigation. Central to the Mi-28N's avionics is the mast-mounted N025 Arbalet radar, providing 360-degree scanning for all-weather target detection and terrain mapping, complemented by the GOES-451 electro-optical turret housing thermal imaging, television cameras, and laser rangefinders for precision targeting up to 10 km in clear conditions. This setup enables independent operation of radar and optronic sensors, with the mast-mounted sight offering elevated, rotor-obscured views for nap-of-the-earth flight and adversary detection. Avionics integration includes digital fire control systems linked to these sensors, supporting automated threat prioritization and navigation via inertial and GPS-aided units. In the Mi-28NM upgrade, evolve toward networked warfare with enhanced digital links for real-time coordination with unmanned aerial vehicles and ground stations, including upgraded N025M Ka-band for improved resolution and anti-jamming resilience. The variant incorporates expanded MFD capabilities across both cockpits and for sustained operation, facilitating integration of external feeds for beyond-line-of-sight targeting. These enhancements, tested in prototypes by , prioritize interoperability in contested environments over legacy analog systems.

Armament and weaponry systems

![Shipunov 2A42 autocannon on Mi-28N][float-right]
The Mil Mi-28 features a chin-mounted Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon as its primary fixed armament, supplied with 250 rounds of high-explosive incendiary or armor-piercing ammunition, and capable of ±110° horizontal traverse with a rate of fire up to 600 rounds per minute.
The helicopter's stub wings support four external hardpoints, each rated for modular payloads contributing to a total external ordnance capacity of approximately 1,920 kg (4,230 lb), enabling configurations tailored to anti-tank, suppression, or self-defense missions. Anti-armor operations prioritize laser-guided missiles such as the 9M120 Ataka-V, with up to 16 missiles deployable across four underwing rails (four per rail), offering a range of 6 km and tandem warheads for penetrating reactive armor. Alternative supersonic Vikhr (9K121) missiles, with fiber-optic guidance and ranges exceeding 10 km, can substitute in certain loadouts for enhanced precision against armored targets. For area suppression, the Mi-28 accommodates unguided rocket pods, including B-8V20 units carrying 20 × 80 mm S-8 rockets per pod for high-volume fire against soft targets and infantry concentrations; larger 122 mm S-13 rockets are also compatible via B-13 pods. Self-defense provisions include Igla-V (9K38) short-range air-to-air missiles mounted on wingtip rails to counter low-flying threats.

Variants

Mi-28A baseline model

The Mi-28A represents the initial production variant of the Mil Mi-28 attack helicopter, optimized for daytime anti-armor missions with a tandem two-seat configuration and emphasis on survivability and firepower. Development of the baseline model traced back to prototypes flying in the late 1980s, but serial production and entry into Russian Air Force service occurred on October 15, 2009, following extensive testing to validate the core airframe and systems design. This version served primarily as a technology demonstrator and proof-of-concept, confirming the helicopter's tactical viability in conventional engagements before addressing operational gaps in enhanced models. Equipped with a basic electro-optical targeting suite, including television cameras and rangefinders for , the Mi-28A lacked an onboard , restricting it to line-of-sight acquisition and daytime visual conditions. Propulsion came from two TV3-117VMA engines providing 1,640 kW each, enabling a maximum speed of 320 km/h and a combat radius of approximately 200 km, with a ferry range extending to 1,100 km under optimal conditions. The design prioritized armor protection for vital areas, ejection seats, and a stub-wing configuration for mounting anti-tank guided missiles like the , alongside unguided rockets and a chin-mounted 2A42 30 mm . Production of the Mi-28A remained limited to around 10 units, reflecting transitional challenges and the rapid shift toward all-weather capabilities amid evolving doctrinal needs. Its daytime-only operational envelope exposed vulnerabilities in adverse or low-light scenarios, where reliance on external illumination or forward observers proved inadequate for independent strike roles, ultimately leading to its phase-out in favor of radar-equipped upgrades. This baseline iteration nonetheless established empirical benchmarks for maneuverability, with a service ceiling of 5,700 m and hovering capability out of ground effect up to 3,600 m, informing subsequent refinements without major redesign.

Mi-28N night-capable version

The Mi-28N variant, known as the "Night Hunter," represents the primary production model of the Mi-28 family, incorporating enhancements for day-night and all-weather combat operations. Development emphasized integration of advanced sensors to address limitations of the baseline Mi-28A, with the first flying on November 14, 1996, and serial production leading to initial service entry with the on October 15, 2009. By the early 2010s, the first operational units were deployed, forming the backbone of Russia's fleet with over 90 units in service by the mid-2020s. Central to the Mi-28N's night and adverse-weather capabilities is the mast-mounted Arbalet millimeter-wave , which provides 360-degree scanning for target detection and navigation in low-visibility conditions such as , dust, or rain, with a detection range exceeding 10 kilometers for ground targets. This , installed on later production models, enables autonomous operation without reliance on ground-based illumination, distinguishing the variant from earlier daylight-limited designs. Complementing the are electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) systems, including (FLIR) sensors and television channels integrated into the nose-mounted OPS-24N suite, allowing pilots to identify and engage armored vehicles at ranges up to 10 kilometers under darkness or smoke. The Mi-28N made its combat debut in in March 2016, conducting precision strikes against insurgent positions, including the destruction of fighting vehicles and fortified buildings using guided missiles under the gunner's direction. These operations validated the variant's night-attack proficiency, with the helicopter's tandem layout—pilot in front for flight control and gunner behind for weapons management—facilitating coordinated engagements in contested environments. Production continued into the 2020s, with delivering batches to meet Russian military demands, accumulating over 100 airframes by that decade. Export variants like the Mi-28NE, tailored for international customers, retained core night-capable features while incorporating localized adaptations.

Mi-28NM advanced upgrade

The Mi-28NM is an upgraded variant of the Mi-28N , incorporating enhancements to sensors, , and weaponry to address modern demands, including precision strikes against distant and low-observable targets such as drones. Development of the Mi-28NM began with program approval in late , leading to prototype flights around 2015 and completion of state trials for its VK-2500P engines by October 2020. The variant entered limited service with deliveries to the starting in October 2021, with serial production accelerating thereafter. Key avionics upgrades include a rotor-hub mounted Arbalet millimeter-wave for all-weather target detection and ranging up to 40 kilometers, paired with an integrated (IRST) system for enhanced night and adverse-weather operations. These sensors enable compatibility with advanced munitions, such as the (Izdeliye 305) , which features a range exceeding 10 kilometers and TV-guided precision, first documented in combat use by Mi-28NM helicopters during operations in in early 2023. The helicopter also supports Vikhr laser-guided anti-tank missiles and Khrizantema -guided variants, expanding its anti-armor and suppression roles. Propulsion improvements feature engines providing greater power output, alongside redesigned composite rotor blades that boost maximum speed to approximately 340 km/h and enhance payload capacity. enhancements include expanded use of composite materials in critical structures like rotors for better damage resistance, and integrated electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems to counter and radar-guided threats, though specific ECM details remain classified. These modifications reflect adaptations to peer conflicts, evidenced by Mi-28NM engagements downing Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles in September 2023. Post-2022, Russian helicopter production surged by over 55% year-on-year to 296 units in 2022, with Mi-28NM output ramping up at the facility to replenish attrition from ongoing conflicts and integrate the variant into frontline units. This modernization prioritizes standoff engagement capabilities, allowing operations beyond the reach of short-range man-portable air defenses prevalent in contemporary theaters.

Operational History

Russian domestic deployments pre-2014

The first production Mi-28N helicopters entered operational service with the Russian in the on April 21, 2009, comprising an initial batch of six aircraft. These deployments focused on training exercises, border patrol missions along southern frontiers, and support for counter-insurgency efforts amid ongoing militancy in the region, allowing evaluation of the helicopter's all-weather capabilities and endurance in high-altitude, mountainous environments. By mid-2009, the fleet had expanded to 12 operational Mi-28Ns, with the assignment prioritized to gather baseline reliability data under real-world conditions, including night operations via onboard electro-optical systems. Early domestic use highlighted the Mi-28N's robustness in zones, where its armored cockpit and vital components withstood small-arms fire during patrol and reconnaissance sorties, informing subsequent design validations. accelerated thereafter, from dozens of units by 2010 to approximately 97 Mi-28Ns in service by late , driven by state armament programs emphasizing modernization and integration with ground forces for rapid response roles. This growth enabled broader training regimens at bases like , establishing the type's role in routine alert duties and exercises simulating anti-terrorist scenarios without full-scale combat engagement prior to .

Combat in Syria and Chechnya

The Mil Mi-28N variants were first deployed operationally to in March 2016, arriving at the Khmeimim airbase for testing and combat missions in desert conditions against (ISIS) targets. These helicopters conducted for Syrian ground forces, focusing on precision strikes using guided missiles, unguided rockets, and the chin-mounted 30 mm 2A42 cannon to neutralize ISIS mortar positions, anti-tank guided missile teams, reinforcements, and supply convoys. Key engagements included supporting the recapture of on March 27, 2016, and operations along the River and in , where the Mi-28's ability to loiter over open terrain proved effective for engaging mobile insurgent forces in asymmetric scenarios. In Syria's permissive airspace, characterized by limited man-portable air-defense systems, the Mi-28 maintained a low loss rate, with recorded incidents limited to non-combat accidents: a crash on April 12, 2016, near due to loss of balance during a night flight over rough terrain, killing both crew members, and a on June 10, 2016. Operations through 2019 demonstrated high rates and operational tempo, with Russian rotary-wing assets—including Mi-28s—exceeding 7,000 flights during the 2017 campaign alone, supported by on-site manufacturer technicians that minimized maintenance downtime and ensured elevated aircraft serviceability under intensive use. Although designed for counter-insurgency roles, the Mi-28 saw limited deployment in the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), with advanced models like the Mi-28N entering service post-2006 amid ongoing operations; its cannon and rocket armament provided utility in engaging ground-based insurgent forces in rugged terrain, though primary helicopter combat there relied on Mi-24 variants.

Use in the Ukraine conflict

The Mil Mi-28N entered combat operations during Russia's full-scale of on February 24, 2022, primarily supporting ground advances in eastern and southern regions through and anti-armor strikes. Early deployments involved low-altitude incursions for rocket and missile attacks on Ukrainian positions, but these exposed the helicopters to man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) such as missiles, prompting a tactical shift toward standoff engagements using guided munitions like the , , and Vikhr anti-tank missiles launched from ranges exceeding 10 km. Documented successes include multiple tank and armored vehicle kills achieved with Vikhr missiles, which feature and tandem warheads capable of penetrating up to 750 mm of armor; for instance, in August 2024 footage from the region showed Mi-28s conducting nighttime strikes on Ukrainian formations, with each helicopter able to carry up to 16 such missiles. Russian Ministry of Defense reports from 2024 detail Mi-28N crews neutralizing Ukrainian strongholds and troop concentrations in using rockets and guided missiles. The upgraded Mi-28NM variant, introduced to operations in early 2023, expanded anti-armor roles with integrated Vikhr-1 missiles, as evidenced by strikes on Ukrainian military convoys in May 2025. By October 2025, tracking via Oryx has visually confirmed at least 18 Mi-28 losses in —comprising destroyed or irreparably damaged aircraft—primarily to Ukrainian MANPADS, short-range air defenses, and FPV drones, with incidents including a September 2025 downing by a low-cost drone. These vulnerabilities reflect broader challenges for rotary-wing assets in contested airspace saturated with portable threats, though Russian adaptations like increased standoff ranges mitigated some risks post-2022.

Export operations in Iraq and Algeria

Iraq signed a contract for 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters in October 2012 as part of a broader $4.2 billion arms deal with Russia. Deliveries commenced in September 2013, with initial batches arriving by August 2014 and the final batch received in June 2016. These helicopters were deployed by the Iraqi Army Aviation Command starting in 2014 for operations against ISIS, including strikes in Al Anbar Province and support for the Battle of Mosul in 2016-2017. An additional four dual-control Mi-28NE variants were ordered in 2016 specifically for pilot training. Operational use in revealed adaptation challenges in desert environments, with reports of mixed reliability due to dust and sand ingestion affecting performance despite equipped protections claiming 93% efficiency. Sustainment issues emerged, exacerbated by post-2022 Western sanctions on limiting spare parts access, reducing overall fleet readiness. Empirical data indicates losses primarily from technical failures rather than ; for instance, one Mi-28NE was written off in a non- on January 5, 2015, with no confirmed shootdowns attributed to enemy fire during anti-ISIS campaigns. Algeria contracted for 42 Mi-28NE helicopters in the early 2010s, increasing from an initial smaller order amid regional security concerns. The first deliveries occurred in June 2016, with the initial batch publicly displayed in August 2016 and full completion by late 2020. Unlike , Algerian Mi-28NE operations have emphasized training and exercises rather than deployments, including maneuvers by the First in June 2021. No significant engagements have been reported, with the fleet integrated for potential day-night anti-armor and ground support roles but focused on readiness enhancement. Algerian defense analysts have noted satisfaction with the platform's multi-purpose capabilities post-delivery.

Combat Effectiveness

Empirical performance data and successes

In Syrian operations from 2016 onward, Mi-28N helicopters executed precision strikes against ground targets, including the destruction of an and a fortified building housing militants, guided by onboard missile systems. reported extensive use of the platform for anti-armor and suppression missions, leveraging its Ataka anti-tank guided missiles to neutralize mobile threats in contested urban and rural environments. During the Ukraine conflict, Mi-28N and Mi-28NM variants conducted multiple sorties targeting fortified positions, with crews employing 30 mm cannon fire and unguided rockets to eliminate Ukrainian strongholds and personnel in the region as of early 2024. The Mi-28NM demonstrated capability in air-to-air engagements by downing a Ukrainian using its upgraded weaponry, marking the type's first confirmed such success in September 2023. These operations highlighted the helicopter's effectiveness in delivering heavy ordnance payloads—up to approximately 2.3 tons—sustaining prolonged low-altitude attacks against armored and static targets when supported by electronic countermeasures. The platform's stabilized chin-mounted 2A42 provided accurate during hovering maneuvers, contributing to reported and position neutralizations in dynamic conditions.

Vulnerabilities, losses, and tactical limitations

The Mil Mi-28 has experienced several non-combat crashes, including a March 18, 2025, incident in during a flight, where the suffered an unexpected dive, resulting in the deaths of both pilots; preliminary reports indicated a possible technical malfunction rather than enemy action. Another loss occurred on January 1, 2025, involving a Mi-28NM under unknown circumstances, with both crew members fatalities. These peacetime accidents highlight potential issues with flight control systems or engine reliability in adverse conditions, though official investigations have not publicly detailed causes beyond ruling out in some cases. In combat operations, particularly during the conflict, the Mi-28 has proven vulnerable to man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and emerging drone threats, with visual confirmation of at least 18 helicopters destroyed or damaged since February 2022. Russian sources report approximately 15 total Mi-28 losses in the , some attributed to or operational errors, underscoring limitations in electronic countermeasures against infrared-guided missiles like the , which exploit the helicopter's heat signature during low-altitude maneuvers. FPV drones have inflicted notable hits, such as an 2024 strike damaging a Mi-28's mid-flight, compromising stability, and a September 2025 incident where Ukrainian operators from the 59th Brigade downed an Mi-28 using a low-cost FPV drone, demonstrating the platform's susceptibility to small, agile unmanned threats in contested zones. Tactically, the Mi-28's design prioritizes anti-armor strikes at low altitudes, but this exposes it to proliferated short-range air defenses and FPV intercepts, limiting sustained operations without robust suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Russian upgrades in the Mi-28NM variant, including enhanced infrared countermeasures and radar, aim to mitigate MANPADS risks by improving evasion and night operations, yet empirical losses persist, as noted in Western analyses of helicopter obsolescence against integrated drone-MANPADS networks. While armored cockpits offer protection against small-arms fire up to 12.7 mm, they do not fully counter warhead detonations from MANPADS or drone payloads targeting rotors or engines. Doctrinal reliance on helicopter-centric assaults has thus required adaptations, such as standoff munitions, to reduce exposure in high-threat environments.

Comparative analysis with Western counterparts

The Mil Mi-28 demonstrates advantages in raw kinetic firepower over the AH-64 , particularly in unguided rocket capacity, where it can mount up to four B-8V20 pods carrying 80 S-8 80mm rockets total, enabling saturation suppression against soft targets, compared to the 's maximum of 76 Hydra 70mm rockets. This edge in rocket loadout aligns with empirical use in Syrian operations, where Mi-28 variants conducted strikes against insurgent positions, logging hundreds of sorties with reported successes in destroying vehicle convoys and fortifications using high-volume rocket barrages, though independent verification of kill ratios remains limited due to restricted access. In contrast, the prioritizes precision-guided munitions like Hellfire missiles, with up to 16 carried, but its rocket employment is more restrained in favoring standoff engagements. The Mi-28's VK-2500 turboshaft engines provide a maximum speed of 320 km/h, surpassing the Apache's 293 km/h, which enhances tactical maneuverability in permissive environments but offers marginal benefits against peer threats equipped with advanced air defenses. Additionally, the Mi-28 incorporates K-37 zero-zero ejection seats, a rare feature in rotary-wing aircraft that has saved crews in high-altitude ejections, absent in the Apache's armored crashworthy structure reliant on autorotation. Missile ranges are comparable, with the Mi-28's 9M120 Ataka achieving 6 km effective engagement versus early Hellfire variants at similar distances, though upgraded AGM-114R exceeds this in later Apache models.
AspectMil Mi-28NAH-64D/E
Max Speed (km/h)320293
Rocket CapacityUp to 80 S-8Up to 76
Cannon Ammo250 x 30mm1,200 x 30mm
Anti-Tank Missiles8-16 Ataka (6 km)16 Hellfire (8-11 km)
Drawbacks include limitations in pre-NM variants, lacking the 's mature datalinking for real-time battle management and via systems like TADS, which enable networked operations with ground forces and UAVs, a capability Mi-28 upgrades are retrofitting but trail in integration depth. In contested airspace, Mi-28 loss rates appear elevated; during the conflict as of mid-2023, at least 10 Mi-28s were confirmed destroyed primarily by MANPADS, against fewer losses per in and (e.g., 34 Apaches lost over 20 years despite thousands of sorties), attributable to Russian tactics exposing helicopters to shoulder-fired threats without equivalent suppression. Versus the , the Mi-28 offers superior armor and payload but inferior agility and electronic warfare suites, with the Tiger's lighter design suiting roles over dedicated anti-armor missions. Overall, while Western narratives emphasize systemic superiority in electronics and , Mi-28 performance in asymmetric Syrian engagements underscores competitive firepower in scenarios prioritizing volume over precision.

Operators and Procurement

Current active operators

The maintain the primary operator status for the Mil Mi-28, with a fleet exceeding 100 units predominantly comprising Mi-28N and upgraded Mi-28NM variants as of early 2023, utilized for dedicated attack missions including (CAS) in coordination with ground maneuver elements. The Iraqi operates over 30 Mi-28NE helicopters, fully delivered from between 2013 and 2016, integrated into joint operations for CAS against insurgent threats and armored targets. Algeria's fields 42 Mi-28NE units, with initial deliveries starting in 2016 following an expanded , employed for anti-armor strikes and in support of ground troops. Iran's armed forces have received initial Mi-28NE helicopters, with deliveries confirmed in January 2026 via visual evidence of multiple units under a 2023 procurement agreement. The Ugandan People's Defence Air Force actively employs two Mi-28N helicopters, acquired in for counter-insurgency and regional security roles after one unit was lost in a 2024 crash.

Failed or potential export deals

In 2011, India's eliminated the Mi-28N from contention in a tender for 22 attack helicopters, citing failures to meet technical specifications in 20 evaluated criteria, including integration and combat system performance, ultimately favoring the . The decision reflected preferences for proven Western and reliability over the Russian design's capabilities, despite the Mi-28N's competitive armament and night operations features. Iraq's initial effort to procure an export variant of the Mi-28A in the mid-2000s collapsed due to unspecified contractual or performance issues, predating the successful agreement for 30 Mi-28NE units. This earlier cancellation highlighted early challenges in adapting the baseline Mi-28 for foreign operators, including potential concerns over reliability and support in austere environments. Reports of potential sales to for Mi-28NE units surfaced in 2021 but were publicly downplayed by , indicating stalled or unconfirmed negotiations amid financing hurdles and competition from alternatives like the AH-64E. Similarly, expressed interest in up to 10 Mi-28N helicopters around 2008, logging tentative orders, but the deals lapsed without fulfillment, attributed to budgetary constraints and shifting priorities toward other Russian platforms like the Mi-35. and have seen intermittently reported evaluations, yet Western sanctions and the Mi-28's niche appeal—strong in low-altitude anti-armor roles but less versatile than competitors in networked warfare—have impeded progress. Overall, Mi-28 export bids have been hampered by geopolitical isolation, superior marketing of U.S. systems, and the helicopter's operational demands in non-Russian logistics chains.

Incidents and Safety Record

Peacetime and training accidents

On 18 March 2025, a Mil Mi-28 crashed near Shugovitsy in during a scheduled training flight, killing both pilots. The Russian Defense Ministry reported the incident occurred in the evening, with preliminary investigations pointing to a technical malfunction causing an uncontrolled dive. On 25 July 2024, another Mil Mi-28 crashed in , , while conducting a routine training mission, resulting in the deaths of the entire crew. The Defense Ministry confirmed the helicopter impacted an uninhabited area, with the cause under investigation but described as non-combat related. Earlier, on 11 December 2019, a Mil Mi-28UB trainer variant crashed near Korenovsk airfield in during a night training exercise, fatally injuring both crew members. The accident happened under low-visibility conditions, and subsequent probes led to the conviction of the 55th Regiment's former commander for negligence in oversight. These incidents highlight recurring challenges in Mil Mi-28 operations, including potential vulnerabilities in night and low-altitude profiles, though detailed causal analyses remain limited to official Russian inquiries. No public data specifies systemic design flaws like icing susceptibility or stalls unique to the platform in peacetime contexts. In the , tracker Oryx has visually confirmed the loss of at least 18 Mil Mi-28 helicopters (destroyed or damaged) as of late September 2025, with most occurring during low-altitude combat operations against . Early losses from 2022 onward were predominantly caused by man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) such as the Igla or Western-supplied equivalents, as evidenced by wreckage showing seeker impacts on exhausts and rotor assemblies. More recent incidents, including a September 29, 2025, destruction near Kotlyarivka in by a Ukrainian FPV drone from the 59th , highlight the evolving threat from cheap, maneuverable unmanned systems targeting hovering or evading aircraft. Russian Ministry of Defense statements attribute these battlefield losses to Ukrainian air defenses, with post-incident analyses of debris confirming strikes rather than mechanical failures or in the majority of cases. One exception involved a January 2025 Mi-28 loss where was suspected based on trajectory data and lack of enemy MANPADS signatures, though official probes did not publicly confirm this. Detailed investigations remain classified, but available evidence from serial number-matched wreckage and geolocated videos underscores direct hits from ground-launched threats as the primary causal factor. In , Mi-28 losses have been negligible; the sole notable incident was an April 11, 2016, crash of a Mi-28N near , where investigation concluded a technical malfunction in the night-vision system during a , with no indications of enemy engagement despite initial of MANPADS involvement. These documented losses reflect the inherent vulnerabilities of attack helicopters to proliferated short-range anti-air threats in peer conflicts, a pattern observed across platforms like the AH-64 in other theaters, rather than idiosyncrasies of the Mi-28 design itself.

Specifications

General characteristics (Mi-28N)

The Mil Mi-28N accommodates a of two, comprising a pilot and a weapons systems officer seated in tandem. Its length measures 17.01 meters excluding the , with an overall of 3.82 meters to the rotor hub. The main rotor diameter spans 17.20 meters, supporting a five-bladed configuration. The empty weight of the Mi-28N is 8,590 kg. It is powered by two turboshaft engines, each delivering 2,200 shaft horsepower at takeoff. Internal fuel capacity totals 1,720 liters, stored in self-sealing bladder tanks. These characteristics provide the baseline structural and propulsion framework for the Mi-28N's operational envelope.

Performance metrics

The Mil Mi-28N attains a maximum speed of 320 km/h at and a cruise speed of 270 km/h. Its service reaches 5,700 m, enabling operations at moderate altitudes typical for ground-attack missions. Ferry range extends to approximately 1,000 km with standard fuel loads, while radius measures 200 km, incorporating time for loiter and engagement. Hover performance includes an out-of-ground-effect (OGE) of around 3,600 m under loaded conditions, supporting tactical maneuvers in varied terrain. These metrics derive from manufacturer trials and export documentation, with the helicopter's twin TV3-117VMA engines providing the necessary power margin for sustained hover and climb rates exceeding 13 m/s. Operational data from Syrian deployments confirm the Mi-28N's endurance in extreme conditions, including temperatures up to +50°C and pervasive , where dustproof engine intakes and robust design maintained performance without systemic failures during extended sorties. Despite occasional technical issues reported in high-dust environments, the platform achieved reliable mission execution, validating its environmental resilience beyond controlled tests.

Armament capacity

The Mil Mi-28 features a fixed, chin-mounted 30 mm with a capacity of 250 rounds of , stabilized in two planes for firing against ground and low-flying aerial targets. The cannon supports selectable rates of fire up to 900 rounds per minute and uses types including high-explosive incendiary and armor-piercing rounds. External armament is mounted on four underwing hardpoints, each rated for up to 480 kg, providing a total ordnance capacity of approximately 1,900 kg. Primary anti-armor configurations include up to 16 9M120 Ataka radio-command guided missiles on two underwing racks, each holding eight missiles with a maximum range of 8 km and armor penetration of 950–1,000 mm. Upgraded Mi-28NM variants can alternatively carry 9K121 Vikhr laser-guided missiles, typically in loads of six to eight for extended-range engagements up to 10 km. While maximum missile loads of 16 are possible, operational doctrine often limits to eight for balanced mission profiles combining anti-tank and suppression roles. For and area suppression, the Mi-28 can equip four B8V20 launchers each with 20 S-8 80 mm unguided rockets, yielding a total of 80 rockets suitable for high-volume fire against soft targets. Alternative rocket options include S-13 122 mm types in smaller quantities of 20 across four pods. Bombing configurations support up to 500 kg free-fall or guided munitions per , such as laser-guided bombs, enabling precision strikes in mixed-threat environments.
Armament CategoryMaximum LoadoutTypical Configuration
Autocannon (2A42)250 roundsFixed chin mount
Anti-tank Missiles (Ataka/Vikhr)16 missiles8 missiles for doctrinal balance
Unguided Rockets (S-8)80 rocketsFull pod complement for suppression
Guided Bombs500 kg per pylon (up to 2,000 kg total)Anti-armor or infrastructure targets
Loadouts are selected based on mission requirements, with anti-tank setups prioritizing missiles for armored threats and suppression variants favoring rockets or bombs for and light vehicles, reflecting Russian doctrinal emphasis on versatile in operations.

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