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Punishment
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Punishment, commonly, is the imposition of an undesirable or unpleasant outcome upon an individual or group, meted out by an authority[1][2][3][4][5]—in contexts ranging from child discipline to criminal law—as a deterrent to a particular action or behavior that is deemed undesirable.[6] It is, however, possible to distinguish between various different understandings of what punishment is.[7]
The reasoning for punishment may be to condition a child to avoid self-endangerment, to impose social conformity (in particular, in the contexts of compulsory education or military discipline[8][9]), to defend norms, to protect against future harms (in particular, those from violent crime), and to maintain the law—and respect for rule of law—under which the social group is governed.[10][11][12][13][14] Punishment may be self-inflicted as with self-flagellation and mortification of the flesh in the religious setting, but is most often a form of social coercion.
The unpleasant imposition may include a fine,[15] penalty, or confinement, or be the removal or denial of something pleasant or desirable.[16] The individual may be a person, or even an animal. The authority may be either a group or a single person, and punishment may be carried out formally under a system of law or informally in other kinds of social settings such as within a family.[11] Negative or unpleasant impositions that are not authorized or that are administered without a breach of rules are not considered to be punishment as defined here.[13] The study and practice of the punishment of crimes, particularly as it applies to imprisonment, is called penology, or, often in modern texts, corrections; in this context, the punishment process is euphemistically called "correctional process".[17] Research into punishment often includes similar research into prevention.
Justifications for punishment include retribution,[18] deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The last could include such measures as isolation, in order to prevent the wrongdoer's having contact with potential victims, or the removal of a hand in order to make theft more difficult.[19]
If only some of the conditions included in the definition of punishment are present, descriptions other than "punishment" may be considered more accurate. Inflicting something negative, or unpleasant, on a person or animal, without authority or not on the basis of a breach of rules is typically considered only revenge or spite rather than punishment.[13] In addition, the word "punishment" is used as a metaphor, as when a boxer experiences "punishment" during a fight. In other situations, breaking a rule may be rewarded, and so receiving such a reward naturally does not constitute punishment. Finally the condition of breaking (or breaching) the rules must be satisfied for consequences to be considered punishment.[13]
Punishments differ in their degree of severity, and may include sanctions such as reprimands, deprivations of privileges or liberty, fines, incarcerations,[20] ostracism, the infliction of pain,[21] amputation and the death penalty. Corporal punishment refers to punishments in which physical pain is intended to be inflicted upon the transgressor. Punishments may be judged as fair or unfair[22] in terms of their degree of reciprocity and proportionality[12] to the offense. Punishment can be an integral part of socialization, and punishing unwanted behavior is often part of a system of pedagogy or behavioral modification which also includes rewards.[23]
Definitions
[edit]



There are a large number of different understandings of what punishment is.[7]
In philosophy
[edit]Various philosophers have presented definitions of punishment.[10][11][12][13][14] Conditions commonly considered necessary properly to describe an action as punishment are that
- it is imposed by an authority (single or multiple),
- it involves some loss to the supposed offender,
- it is in response to an offense and
- the human (or other animal) to whom the loss is imposed should be deemed at least somewhat responsible for the offense.
In psychology
[edit]Introduced by B.F. Skinner, punishment has a more restrictive and technical definition in psychology. Along with reinforcement, it belongs under the operant conditioning category. Operant conditioning refers to learning with either punishment that discourages the measured behavior, or a reward that encourages the behavior.[24]
In psychology, punishment is the reduction of a behavior via application of an unpleasant stimulus ("positive punishment") or removal of a pleasant stimulus ("negative punishment"). Extra chores or spanking are examples of positive punishment, while grounding a teenager or removing screen time privileges are examples of negative punishment.
The definition requires that punishment is only determined after the fact by the reduction in behavior; if the offending behavior of the subject does not decrease, it is not considered punishment. In operant conditioning terms, punishment does not need to involve any type of pain, fear, or physical actions; even a brief spoken expression of disapproval, or calmly telling a student that they answered a question incorrectly, is a type of punishment, if the result is a decrease in the behavior (e.g., a decrease in giving that wrong answer to that question).[25] There is some conflation of punishment and aversives, though an aversion that does not decrease behavior is not considered punishment in psychology.[26][27] Additionally, "aversive stimulus" is a label behaviorists generally apply to negative reinforcers (as in avoidance learning), rather than the punishers.
In socio-biology
[edit]Punishment is sometimes called retaliatory or moralistic aggression;[28] it has been observed in all[clarification needed] species of social animals, leading evolutionary biologists to conclude that it is an evolutionarily stable strategy, selected because it favors cooperative behavior.[29][30]
However, other evolutionary biologists have argued against punishment to favour cooperation. Dreber et al. demonstrate that while the availability of costly punishment can enhance cooperative behavior, it does not improve the group's average payoff. Additionally, there is a significant negative relationship between the overall payoff and the employment of costly punishment. Individuals who achieve the highest total payoffs generally avoid using costly punishment. This indicates that employing costly punishment in cooperative games may be disadvantageous and suggests that it may have evolved for purposes other than promoting cooperation.[31]
Achieving a certain proportion of trust in the population can lead to self-governance without the need for punishment.[32]
Examples against sociobiological use
[edit]There are also arguments against the notion of punishment requiring intelligence, based on studies of punishment in very small-brained animals such as insects. There is proof of honey bee workers with mutations that makes them fertile laying eggs only when other honey bees are not observing them, and that the few that are caught in the act are killed.[citation needed] This is corroborated by computer simulations proving that a few simple reactions well within mainstream views of the extremely limited intelligence of insects are sufficient to emulate the "political" behavior observed in great apes. The authors argue that this falsifies the claim that punishment evolved as a strategy to deal with individuals capable of knowing what they are doing.[33]
In the case of more complex brains, the notion of evolution selecting for specific punishment of intentionally chosen breaches of rules and/or wrongdoers capable of intentional choices (for example, punishing humans for murder while not punishing lethal viruses) is subject to criticism from coevolution issues. That punishment of individuals with certain characteristics (including but, in principle, not restricted to mental abilities) selects against those characteristics, making evolution of any mental abilities considered to be the basis for penal responsibility impossible in populations subject to such selective punishment. Certain scientists argue that this disproves the notion of humans having a biological feeling of intentional transgressions deserving to be punished.[34][35][36][37][38]
Scope of application
[edit]Punishments are applied for various purposes, most generally, to encourage and enforce proper behavior as defined by society or family. Criminals are punished judicially, by fines, corporal punishment or custodial sentences such as prison; detainees risk further punishments for breaches of internal rules.[39] Children, pupils and other trainees may be punished by their educators or instructors (mainly parents, guardians, or teachers, tutors and coaches)—see Child discipline.
Slaves, domestic and other servants were subject to punishment by their masters. Employees can still be subject to a contractual form of fine or demotion. Most hierarchical organizations, such as military and police forces, or even churches, still apply quite rigid internal discipline, even with a judicial system of their own (court martial, canonical courts).
Punishment may also be applied on moral, especially religious, grounds, as in penance (which is voluntary) or imposed in a theocracy with a religious police (as in a strict Islamic state like Iran or under the Taliban) or (though not a true theocracy) by Inquisition.
Hell as punishment
[edit]Belief that an individual's ultimate punishment is being sent by God, the highest authority, to an existence in Hell, a place believed to exist in the after-life, typically corresponds to sins committed during their life. Sometimes these distinctions are specific, with damned souls suffering for each sin committed (see for example Plato's myth of Er or Dante's The Divine Comedy), but sometimes they are general, with condemned sinners relegated to one or more chamber of Hell or to a level of suffering.
History and rationale
[edit]
Seriousness of a crime; punishment that fits the crime
[edit]A principle often mentioned with respect to the degree of punishment to be meted out is that the punishment should match the crime.[40][41][42] One standard for measurement is the degree to which a crime affects others or society.[43] Measurements of the degree of seriousness of a crime have been developed.[44] A felony is generally considered to be a crime of "high seriousness", while a misdemeanor is not.
Possible reasons for punishment
[edit]There are many possible reasons that might be given to justify or explain why someone ought to be punished; here follows a broad outline of typical, possibly conflicting, justifications.
Deterrence
[edit]Reasons given to justify punishment[19] include that it is a measure to prevent people from committing an offense — deterring previous offenders from re-offending, and preventing those who may be contemplating an offence they have not committed from actually committing it. This punishment is intended to be sufficient that people would rather choose not to commit the crime than experience the punishment. The aim is to deter everyone in the community from committing offences.
Some criminologists state that the number of people convicted for crime does not decrease as a result of more severe punishment and conclude that deterrence is ineffective.[45] Other criminologists object to said conclusion, citing that while most people do not know the exact severity of punishment such as whether the sentence for murder is 40 years or life, most people still know the rough outlines such as the punishments for armed robbery or forcible rape being more severe than the punishments for driving too fast or misparking a car. These criminologists therefore argue that lack of deterring effect of increasing the sentences for already severely punished crimes say nothing about the significance of the existence of punishment as a deterring factor.[46][47]
Some criminologists argue that increasing the sentences for crimes can cause criminal investigators to give higher priority to said crimes so that a higher percentage of those committing them are convicted for them, causing statistics to give a false appearance of such crimes increasing. These criminologists argue that the use of statistics to gauge the efficiency of crime fighting methods are a danger of creating a reward hack that makes the least efficient criminal justice systems appear to be best at fighting crime, and that the appearance of deterrence being ineffective may be an example of this.[48][49][50]
Rehabilitation
[edit]Some punishment includes work to reform and rehabilitate the culprit so that they will not commit the offence again.[19] This is distinguished from deterrence, in that the goal here is to change the offender's attitude to what they have done, and make them come to see that their behavior was wrong.
Incapacitation
[edit]Incapacitation as a justification of punishment[19] refers to the offender's ability to commit further offences being removed. Imprisonment separates offenders from the community, for example, Australia was a dumping ground for early British criminals. This was their way of removing or reducing the offenders ability to carry out certain crimes. The death penalty does this in a permanent (and irrevocable) way. In some societies, people who stole have been punished by having their hands amputated.
Crewe[51] however, has pointed out that for incapacitation of an offender to work, it must be the case that the offender would have committed a crime had they not been restricted in this way. Should the putative offender not be going to commit further crimes, then they have not been incapacitated. The more heinous crimes such as murders have the lowest levels of recidivism and hence are the least likely offences to be subject to incapacitative effects. Antisocial behaviour and the like display high levels of recidivism and hence are the kind of crimes most susceptible to incapacitative effects. It is shown by life-course studies[52] that long sentences for burglaries amongst offenders in their late teens and early twenties fail to incapacitate when the natural reduction in offending due to ageing is taken into account: the longer the sentence, in these cases, the less the incapacitative effect.[53]
Retribution
[edit]Criminal activities typically give a benefit to the offender and a loss to the victim.[54][55][56][57] Punishment has been justified as a measure of retributive justice,[19][58][59][60] in which the goal is to try to rebalance any unjust advantage gained by ensuring that the offender also suffers a loss. Sometimes viewed as a way of "getting even" with a wrongdoer—the suffering of the wrongdoer is seen as a desired goal in itself, even if it has no restorative benefits for the victim. One reason societies have administered punishments is to diminish the perceived need for retaliatory "street justice", blood feud, and vigilantism.
Restoration
[edit]Especially applied to minor offenses, punishment may take the form of the offender "righting the wrong", or making restitution to the victim. Community service or compensation orders are examples of this sort of penalty.[61] In models of restorative justice, victims take an active role in a process with their offenders who are encouraged to take responsibility for their actions, "to repair the harm they've done—by apologizing, returning stolen money, or community service."[62] The restorative justice approach aims to help the offender want to avoid future offences.
Education and denunciation
[edit]
Punishment can be explained by positive prevention theory to use the criminal justice system to teach people what are the social norms for what is correct, and acts as a reinforcement.
Punishment can serve as a means for society to publicly express denunciation of an action as being criminal. Besides educating people regarding what is not acceptable behavior, it serves the dual function of preventing vigilante justice by acknowledging public anger, while concurrently deterring future criminal activity by stigmatizing the offender. This is sometimes called the "Expressive Theory" of denunciation.[63] The pillory was a method for carrying out public denunciation.[citation needed]
Some critics of the education and denunciation model cite evolutionary problems with the notion that a feeling for punishment as a social signal system evolved if punishment was not effective. The critics argue that some individuals spending time and energy and taking risks in punishing others, and the possible loss of the punished group members, would have been selected against if punishment served no function other than signals that could evolve to work by less risky means.[64][65][page needed]
Unified theory
[edit]A unified theory of punishment brings together multiple penal purposes—such as retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation—in a single, coherent framework. Instead of punishment requiring we choose between them, unified theorists argue that they work together as part of some wider goal such as the protection of rights.[66]
Criticism
[edit]Some people think that punishment as a whole is unhelpful and even harmful to the people that it is used against.[67][68] Detractors argue that punishment is simply wrong, of the same design as "two wrongs make a right". Critics argue that punishment is simply revenge. Professor Deirdre Golash, author of The Case against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law, says:
We ought not to impose such harm on anyone unless we have a very good reason for doing so… The deliberate doing of harm in the mistaken belief that it promotes some greater good is the essence of tragedy. We would do well to ask whether the goods we seek in harming offenders are worthwhile, and whether the means we choose will indeed secure them.[69]
Golash also writes about imprisonment:
Imprisonment means, at minimum, the loss of liberty and autonomy, as well as many material comforts, personal security, and access to heterosexual relations. These deprivations, according to Gresham Sykes (who first identified them) "together dealt 'a profound hurt' that went to 'the very foundations of the prisoner's being. But these are only the minimum harms, suffered by the least vulnerable inmates in the best-run prisons. Most prisons are run badly, and in some, conditions are more squalid than in the worst of slums. In the District of Columbia jail, for example, inmates must wash their clothes and sheets in cell toilets because the laundry machines are broken. Vermin and insects infest the building, in which air vents are clogged with decades' accumulation of dust and grime. But even inmates in prisons where conditions are sanitary must still face the numbing boredom and emptiness of prison life—a vast desert of wasted days in which little in the way of meaningful activity is possible.[69]
Destructiveness to thinking and betterment
[edit]There are critics of punishment who argue that punishment aimed at intentional actions forces people to suppress their ability to act on intent. Advocates of this viewpoint argue that such suppression of intention causes the harmful behaviors to remain, making punishment counterproductive. These people suggest that the ability to make intentional choices should instead be treasured as a source of possibilities of betterment, citing that complex cognition would have been an evolutionarily useless waste of energy if it led to justifications of fixed actions and no change as simple inability to understand arguments would have been the most thrifty protection from being misled by them if arguments were for social manipulation, and reject condemnation of people who intentionally did bad things.[70] Punishment can be effective in stopping undesirable employee behaviors such as tardiness, absenteeism or substandard work performance. However, punishment does not necessarily cause an employee to demonstrate a desirable behavior.[71]
See also
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ Edwards, Jonathan (1824), The salvation of all men strictly examined: and the endless punishment of those who die impenitent : argued and defended against the objections and reasonings of the late Rev. Doctor Chauncy, of Boston; in his book entitled "The Salvation of all Men," &c, C. Ewer and T. Bedlington, 1824, p. 157
- ^ Bingham, Joseph (1712). "Volume 1 of A Scholastical History Of The Practice of the Church In Reference to the Administration of Baptism By Laymen". A Scholastical History of the Practice of the Church in Reference to the Administration of Baptism by Laymen. 1. Knaplock, 1712: 25.
- ^ Grotius, Hugo (1715). "H. Grotius of the Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes: in which are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points that Relate Either to Publick Government, Or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done Into English..., Volume 2". H. Grotius of the Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes: In Which Are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points That Relate Either to Publick Government, or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done into English by Several Hands: With the Addition of the Author's Life by the Translators: Dedicated to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Hugo Grotius. 2. D. Brown..., T. Ward..., and W. Meares, 1715: 524.
- ^ Casper, Johann Ludwig (1864). "A Handbook of the practice of forensic medicine v. 3 1864". A Handbook of the Practice of Forensic Medicine. 3. New Sydenham Society: 2.
- ^ J, Lubbock (1882). "Laws". The origin of civilisation and the primitive condition of man: Mental and social condition of savages (4th ed.). pp. 443–480. doi:10.1037/13470-010.
- ^ Lee Hansen, Marcus (1918). "Old Fort Snelling, 1819-1858". Mid-America Series. State Historical Society of Iowa, 1918: 124.
- ^ a b Gade, Christian B. N. (2020). "Is restorative justice punishment?". Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 38 (3): 127–155. doi:10.1002/crq.21293.
- ^ Navy Department, United States (1940). "Compilation of Court-martial Orders, 1916-1937, 1940-41". Compilation of Court-martial Orders, 1916-1937, 1940-41: 648.
- ^ War Department, United States (1863). Army and Navy Official Gazette. p. 346.
- ^ a b
Hugo, Adam Bedau (February 19, 2010). "Punishment, Crime and the State". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2010-08-04.
The search for a precise definition of punishment that exercised some philosophers (for discussion and references see Scheid 1980) is likely to prove futile: but we can say that legal punishment involves the imposition of something that is intended to be burdensome or painful, on a supposed offender for a supposed crime, by a person or body who claims the authority to do so.
- ^ a b c and violates the law or rules by which the group is governed.
McAnany, Patrick D. (August 2010). "Punishment". Online. Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. Archived from the original on 2017-10-19. Retrieved 2010-08-04.
Punishment describes the imposition by some authority of a deprivation—usually painful—on a person who has violated a law, rule, or other norm. When the violation is of the criminal law of society there is a formal process of accusation and proof followed by imposition of a sentence by a designated official, usually a judge. Informally, any organized group—most typically the family, in rearing children—may punish perceived wrongdoers.
- ^ a b c
Hugo, Adam Bedau (February 19, 2010). "Theory of Punishment". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2010-08-04.
Punishment under law... is the authorized imposition of deprivations—of freedom or privacy or other goods to which the person otherwise has a right, or the imposition of special burdens—because the person has been found guilty of some criminal violation, typically (though not invariably) involving harm to the innocent. (The classical formulation, conspicuous in Hobbes, for example, defines punishment by reference to imposing pain rather than to deprivations.) This definition, although imperfect because of its brevity, does allow us to bring out several essential points.
- ^ a b c d e
Peters, Richard Stanley (1966). "Ethics and Education". British Journal of Educational Studies. 20 (3): 267–68. JSTOR 3120772.
Punishment... involves the intentional infliction of pain or of something unpleasant on someone who has committed a breach of rules... by someone who is in authority, who has a right to act in this way. Otherwise, it would be impossible to distinguish 'punishment' from 'revenge'. People in authority can, of course, inflict pain on people at whim. But this would be called 'spite' unless it were inflicted as a consequence of a breach of rules on the part of the sufferer. Similarly a person in authority might give a person £5 as a consequence of his breaking a rule. But unless this were regarded as painful or at least unpleasant for the recipient it could not be counted as a case of 'punishment'. In other words at least three criteria of (i) intentional infliction of pain (ii) by someone in authority (iii) on a person as a consequence of a breach of rules on his part, must be satisfied if we are to call something a case of 'punishment'. There are, as is usual in such cases, examples that can be produced which do not satisfy all criteria. For instance there is a colloquialism which is used about boxers taking a lot of punishment from their opponents, in which only the first condition is present. But this is a metaphorical use which is peripheral to the central use of the term.
In so far as the different 'theories' of punishment are answers to questions about the meaning of 'punishment', only the retributive theory is a possible one. There is no conceptual connection between 'punishment' and notions like those of 'deterrence', 'prevention' and 'reform'. For people can be punished without being prevented from repeating the offence, and without being made any better. It is also a further question whether they themselves or anyone else is deterred from committing the offence by punishment. But 'punishment' must involve 'retribution', for 'retribution' implies doing something to someone in return for what he has done.... Punishment, therefore, must be retributive—by definition. - ^ a b
Kleining, John (October 1972). "R.S. Peters on Punishment". British Journal of Educational Studies. 20 (3): 259–69. doi:10.1080/00071005.1972.9973352. JSTOR 3120772.
Unpleasantness inflicted without authority is revenge, and if whimsical, is spite.... There is no conceptual connection between punishment, or deterrence, or reform, for people can be punished without being prevented from repeating the offence, and without being made better. And it is also a further question whether they themselves, or anyone else is deterred from committing the offence by punishment.
- ^ Amis, S. (1773). "Association for the Prosecution of Felons (WEST BROMWICH)". The British Library: 5.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ Duff, Anthony (2001). Punishment, Communication, and Community. Switzerland: Oxford University Press. pp. xiii.
- ^ Mary Stohr; Anthony Walsh; Craig Hemmens (2008). Corrections: A Text/Reader. Sage. p. 2. ISBN 978-1-4129-3773-3.
- ^ Congress. House. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, United States. Committee on Financial Services. and Government Sponsored Enterprises (2003). H.R. 2179, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 5, 2003. Purdue University: Committee on Financial Services. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-16-070942-5.
- ^ a b c d e McAnany, Patrick D. (August 2010). "Justification for punishment (Punishment)". Online. Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. Archived from the original on 2017-10-19. Retrieved 2010-09-16.
Because punishment is both painful and guilt producing, its application calls for a justification. In Western culture, four basic justifications have been given: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The history of formal punitive systems is one of a gradual transition from familial and tribal authority to the authority of organized society. Although parents today retain much basic authority to discipline their children, physical beatings and other severe deprivations—once widely tolerated—may now be called child abuse
- ^ J.M., K.M, P.H., Darley, Catsman, Robinson (2000). "Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment". Law and Human Behavior. 24 (6): 659–683. doi:10.1023/A:1005552203727. PMID 11105478.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ M., A, Frankenhaeuser, Rissler (1970). "Effects of punishment on catecholamine release and efficiency of performance". Psychopharmacologia. 17 (5): 378–390. doi:10.1007/BF00403809. PMID 5522998. S2CID 9187358.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ C., Mungan, Murat (2019). "Salience and the severity versus the certainty of punishment". International Review of Law and Economics. 57: 95–100. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2019.01.002. S2CID 147798726.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Diana Kendall (2009). Sociology in Our Times: The Essentials (7th revised ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-59862-6.
- ^ W, J.C, Furman, Masters (1980). "Affective consequences of social reinforcement, punishment, and neutral behavior". Developmental Psychology. 16 (2): 100–104. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.16.2.100.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Leaf, Justin B.; Cihon, Joseph H.; Leaf, Ronald; McEachin, John; Liu, Nicholas; Russell, Noah; Unumb, Lorri; Shapiro, Sydney; Khosrowshahi, Dara (June 2022). "Concerns About ABA-Based Intervention: An Evaluation and Recommendations". Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. 52 (6): 2838–2853. doi:10.1007/s10803-021-05137-y. ISSN 1573-3432. PMC 9114057. PMID 34132968.
Punishment, from a behavior analytic perspective, describes any context in which a response is followed by an event (i.e., stimulus change) that results in a decrease in the probability of similar responses in similar situations.... Absent from this definition are things like pain, fear, discomfort, and the like. Suppose a person parks their car taking up two spaces and a passerby comments, "That's inconsiderate." If the probability of taking up two spaces while parking subsequently decreases, we can reasonably presume that punishment occurred.
- ^ I, Lorge (1933). "The effect of the initial chances for right responses upon the efficacy of intensified reward and of intensified punishment". Journal of Experimental Psychology. 16 (3): 362–373. doi:10.1037/h0070228.
- ^ Church, R.M. (1963). "The varied effects of punishment on behavior". Psychological Review. 70 (5): 369–402. doi:10.1037/h0046499. PMID 14049776.
- ^ T.H., G.A., Clutton-brock, Parker (1995). "Punishment in animal societies". Nature. 373 (6511): 209–216. Bibcode:1995Natur.373..209C. doi:10.1038/373209a0. PMID 7816134. S2CID 21638607.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Mary Stohr; Anthony Walsh; Craig Hemmens (2008). Corrections: A Text/Reader. Sage. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-4129-3773-3.
- ^ Fehr, Gätcher, Ernst, Simon (10 January 2002). "Altruistic punishment in humans". Nature. 415 (6868): 137–140. Bibcode:2002Natur.415..137F. doi:10.1038/415137a. PMID 11805825. S2CID 4310962.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Dreber, Anna; Rand, David G.; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin A. (March 2008). "Winners don't punish". Nature. 452 (7185): 348–351. Bibcode:2008Natur.452..348D. doi:10.1038/nature06723. ISSN 1476-4687. PMC 2292414. PMID 18354481.
- ^ Battu, Balaraju; Rahwan, Talal (2023-01-21). "Cooperation without punishment". Scientific Reports. 13 (1): 1213. Bibcode:2023NatSR..13.1213B. doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y. ISSN 2045-2322. PMC 9867775. PMID 36681708.
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- ^ D, Wittman (1974). "Punishment as retribution". Theory and Decision. 4 (3–4): 209–237. doi:10.1007/BF00136647. S2CID 153961464.
- ^ Blackwood, William (1830). "The Southern Review. Vol. V. February and May, 1830". The Southern Review. 5. Michigan State University: William Blackwood: 871.
- ^ Raworth, John (1644). Buchanan, David (ed.). "The Historie of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland Containing Five Books, Together with Some Treatises Conducing to the History": 358.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ Falls, Margaret (April 1987). "Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons". Law and Philosophy. 6 (1): 25–51. doi:10.1007/BF00142639. JSTOR 3504678. S2CID 144282576.
- ^ K. M., Carlsmith (2006). "The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 42 (4): 437–451. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.06.007.
- ^ Popping, S. (1710). True Passive Obedience Restor'd in 1710. In a Dialogue Between a Country-man and a True Patriot. The British Library: S. Popping. p. 8.
- ^ "restitution". La-articles.org.uk. Retrieved 2012-08-27.
- ^ "A New Kind of Criminal Justice", Parade, October 25, 2009, p. 6.
- ^ "Theory, Sources, and Limitations of Criminal Law". Retrieved 2011-09-26.
- ^ J. Robert Lilly, Francis T. Cullen, Richard A. Ball (2014). Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences
- ^ Tim Newburn 2017 Criminology
- ^ "Thom Brooks on Unified Theory of Punishment". Retrieved 2014-09-03.
- ^ G.T, Gwinn (1949). "The effects of punishment on acts motivated by fear". Journal of Experimental Psychology. 39 (2): 260–69. doi:10.1037/h0062431. PMID 18125723.
- ^ Edgeworth, Edgeworth, Maria, Richard Lovell (1825). Works of Maria Edgeworth: Practical education. 1825. the University of California: S. H. Parker. p. 149.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ a b "The Case against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law - 2004, Page III by Deirdre Golash". Archived from the original on 2019-05-18. Retrieved 2017-09-10.
- ^ Mind, Brain and Education, Kurt Fischer, Christina Hinton
- ^ Milbourn, Gene Jr. (November 1996). "Punishment in the workplace creates undesirable side effects". Retrieved November 21, 2018.
References
[edit]- . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 22 (11th ed.). 1911. p. 653.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Legal Punishment
- Etymology Online
- Brooks, Thom (2012). Punishment. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-85051-3.
- Gade, Christian (2020). "Is restorative justice punishment?". Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 38 (3): 127–155. doi:10.1002/crq.21293.
- Lippke, Richard (2001). "Criminal Offenders and Right Forfeiture". Journal of Social Philosophy. 32 (1): 78–89. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.00080.
- Mack, Eric (2008). "Retribution for Crime". In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Cato Institute. pp. 429–431. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n263. ISBN 978-1412965804. OCLC 750831024.
- Zaibert, Leo (2006). Punishment and retribution. Hants, England: Ashgate. ISBN 978-0754623892.
External links
[edit]- Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "Punishment". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.
- Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "The Moral Permissibility of Punishment". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.
Punishment
View on GrokipediaConceptual Foundations
Philosophical Definitions
Philosophers define punishment as the intentional imposition of hardship or suffering by a legitimate authority on an individual for a past offense, distinguishing it from mere harm or revenge by requiring elements of culpability, proportionality, and institutional response.[2] This conception emphasizes four core conditions: the act must inflict a cost (such as pain, loss of liberty, or deprivation); it must respond to an offense involving wrongdoing; it must emanate from an authority with the standing to impose it; and it must be administered deliberately as retribution or consequence for the offense itself, not incidental harm.[2] These criteria exclude natural consequences, vigilantism, or therapeutic interventions lacking punitive intent, underscoring punishment's normative role in upholding social or moral order.[1] In retributivist theories, punishment is intrinsically justified by the offender's moral desert, viewing it as a backward-looking repayment of debt incurred through wrongdoing, independent of future benefits like deterrence.[2] Immanuel Kant exemplified this in his Metaphysics of Morals (1797), arguing that punishment fulfills the categorical imperative by treating offenders as ends-in-themselves through proportionate retaliation—ius talionis—such as death for murder, to annul the injustice rather than to rehabilitate or deter, as using punishment instrumentally would violate autonomy.[9] Retributivists like Kant reject consequentialist aims, insisting that the state's duty is to enforce right for its own sake, with failure to punish the guilty amounting to denying their rational agency and agency of victims.[1] This view posits punishment as a communicative act affirming moral equality, where severity matches the crime's wrongness, not empirical utility.[10] Consequentialist or utilitarian philosophies, conversely, define punishment's legitimacy through its forward-looking effects in maximizing overall welfare, treating it as a necessary evil to prevent greater harms via deterrence, incapacitation, or reformation.[2] Jeremy Bentham, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), framed punishment as an "artificial evil" annexed to offenses to outweigh the pleasures of crime, calculating its utility by balancing the pain inflicted against averted future crimes, with proportionality determined by the minimum severity needed for deterrence rather than desert.[11] Bentham prioritized secondary effects, such as discouraging imitation, over intrinsic justice, advocating parsimony in punishment to avoid net societal harm.[12] Critics of utilitarianism note its potential to justify punishing innocents if empirically beneficial, prompting hybrid theories that blend retributive limits with consequentialist aims to ensure both desert and efficacy.[1] These debates highlight philosophy's focus on punishment's moral foundations, weighing deontological constraints against empirical outcomes in justifying state coercion.[2]Psychological Definitions
In behavioral psychology, punishment is defined as any consequence delivered contingent upon a behavior that results in a decrease in the future probability of that behavior occurring. This concept is central to operant conditioning, a learning process outlined by B.F. Skinner in the mid-20th century, where behaviors are shaped by their outcomes rather than antecedent stimuli.[13][14] Punishment is distinguished from reinforcement, which increases behavior likelihood: positive reinforcement adds a rewarding stimulus, negative reinforcement removes an aversive one, whereas punishment either adds an aversive stimulus (positive punishment, e.g., an electric shock in laboratory settings) or removes a rewarding one (negative punishment, e.g., timeout from play). Empirical studies, such as those using animal models, demonstrate that punishment suppresses responding only when applied consistently and immediately after the target behavior, with response rates dropping proportionally to the intensity and schedule of the punisher.[15][16] From a functional perspective, punishment requires not just procedural application but verifiable reduction in behavior frequency; if no decrease occurs, the stimulus does not qualify as a punisher, regardless of intent. This contrasts with colloquial uses where "punishment" implies moral retribution, as psychological definitions emphasize observable behavioral change over subjective experience. Critics within the field, including Skinner himself, note that punishment often produces temporary suppression and unintended side effects like emotional conditioning or avoidance of the punishing agent, supported by data from contingency analyses in both human and non-human subjects.[17][18] In broader psychological contexts, such as social learning theory extended from operant principles, punishment can be vicarious, where observing others receive adverse consequences reduces similar behaviors in the observer through modeled inhibition. Neurobiological research links these effects to brain regions like the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, where punishment signals activate aversion pathways, reinforcing avoidance learning. However, definitions remain anchored in behaviorist empiricism, prioritizing measurable outcomes over unobservable mental states.[16][19]Evolutionary and Biological Perspectives
From an evolutionary standpoint, punishment functions as a mechanism to deter free-riding and enforce cooperation within social groups, a challenge prevalent in ancestral human environments where mutual aid enhanced survival. Altruistic punishment—inflicting costs on defectors even when the punisher derives no direct benefit—addresses the instability of cooperation by stabilizing norms against exploitation. Theoretical models demonstrate that this trait can evolve through group selection, where groups with punishers outcompete those without due to higher internal cooperation levels. Specifically, simulations involving populations divided into groups of 128 individuals, with punishers cooperating and imposing penalties on defectors (at a cost of 0.2 per punisher and benefit reduction of 0.8 to targets), showed sustained cooperation in group sizes approximating 100 members under low migration rates of 0.01, reflecting small-scale societies.[20] This asymmetry arises because punishment costs diminish as defectors become rare, allowing the trait to persist despite individual-level disadvantages.[20] Biologically, punitive actions engage distinct neural pathways that integrate aversive motivation, fairness evaluation, and behavioral execution. Impulsive, retaliatory punishment recruits the amygdala for rapid Pavlovian responses to norm violations, while perceptions of unfairness activate the anterior insula, encoding the aversive salience of infractions. More deliberate, goal-directed punishment involves the medial orbitofrontal cortex for computing retributive value and the dorsal striatum for implementing costly actions, often overriding self-interest to uphold group norms. These circuits, conserved across vertebrates, underpin punishment's role in protecting kin and reciprocal alliances, with human extensions via cultural norms amplifying third-party interventions. Neuroimaging studies confirm dorsal striatal engagement during observed norm breaches, linking punishment to reinforcement-like satisfaction despite personal costs. Genetic factors contribute to variation in punitive tendencies, though direct heritability estimates for punishment-specific attitudes remain limited. Twin studies on broader social attitudes, including those tied to norm enforcement and authoritarianism, indicate moderate heritability of 40-50%, suggesting polygenic influences on predispositions toward strong reciprocity and retaliation. Related traits like aggression show higher heritability (50-65%), implying overlapping biological bases for punitive motivations that favor group-level fitness over individual gain. Empirical models integrate these elements, positing that evolved punitive instincts, modulated by neurogenetic variation, underpin human societies' capacity for large-scale cooperation absent in other primates.[21][22]Historical Evolution
Ancient and Primitive Origins
In primitive societies, including hunter-gatherer groups, punishment functioned primarily as a low-cost mechanism to enforce social norms and prevent free-riding, with banishment serving as the most severe sanction due to the high mortality risks of isolation in harsh environments.[23][24] Capital punishment occurred for egregious violations like serial murder or sorcery, reflecting moralistic enforcement to sustain group cooperation, as evidenced by ethnographic parallels in modern forager societies.[24] Retaliatory violence, such as blood feuds, often supplanted formal punishment, rooted in kinship loyalty rather than centralized authority.[25][26] The earliest codified systems appeared in ancient Mesopotamia around 2100–2050 BCE with the Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu, which prescribed death for murder and robbery, alongside fines or restitution for lesser offenses like bodily injury, applying uniformly to free persons regardless of intent.[27][28] This evolved into the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1755–1750 BCE), comprising 282 laws inscribed on a diorite stele, emphasizing lex talionis—retaliatory equivalence such as "an eye for an eye"—with penalties scaled by social class (e.g., death for free men stealing from temples, fines for slaves).[29][30] Approximately 28 crimes, including adultery and false accusations, warranted execution, underscoring punishment's role in upholding hierarchical order and divine justice.[31] In ancient Egypt (c. 3000–30 BCE), punishment aligned with maat—the principle of cosmic balance—addressing crimes through community tribunals rather than professional courts, with sanctions ranging from fines and flogging for theft to mutilation, impalement, or burning for treason and murder.[32][33] Executions were public to deter violations of social harmony, while corporal methods like sole-beating targeted lower classes, reflecting pragmatic enforcement amid limited incarceration.[34][35] These systems prioritized restitution and proportionality over rehabilitation, embedding punishment in reciprocal tribal ethics and early state authority to curb chaos in agrarian transitions.[36]Classical and Medieval Developments
In ancient Athens, Draco's legal code, enacted around 621 BC, imposed the death penalty for a wide array of offenses including theft and idleness, with executions often by precipice, stones, or grapeshot, establishing a precedent for severity that birthed the term "draconian."[37] Solon's reforms of 594 BC mitigated this harshness by retaining capital punishment primarily for homicide and intentional wounding while introducing graduated fines based on social class for lesser crimes like theft, alongside exile (atimia) for political offenses, aiming to balance retribution with social stability.[38] Philosophically, Plato in Laws (circa 360 BC) conceptualized punishment as a corrective therapy for the criminal's soul, akin to medicine purging disease, rather than mere vengeance, with penalties scaled to deter through fear and reform through education.[39] Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics (circa 350 BC), advocated retributive proportionality in punishment, where the penalty mirrors the harm inflicted to restore equality, viewing it as essential for habituating virtue and maintaining communal order without excess. Roman law evolved from the Twelve Tables of 451–450 BC, which prescribed lex talionis equivalents for bodily injuries—such as eye-for-eye retaliation unless compensated—and capital punishment for grave public offenses like treason or false testimony, alongside enslavement for unpaid debts exceeding 30 days.[40][41] Under the Republic and Empire, punishments diversified: fines (multa) for minor delicts, corporal flogging or forced labor (servitus poenae) for slaves and provincials, exile (relegatio or aquae et ignis interdictio) for elites avoiding death, and spectacles like crucifixion or damnatio ad bestias for non-citizens convicted of serious crimes, reflecting a system prioritizing deterrence and exemplary terror over rehabilitation. By the late Empire, Christian influences under emperors like Constantine (edict of 313 AD) moderated some cruelties, substituting labor in mines for crucifixion, though gladiatorial executions persisted until Theodosius I's ban in 397 AD. Medieval European justice, decentralized under feudal lords and canon law, emphasized communal ordeals to divine guilt where evidence was scarce, including trial by hot iron—where the accused grasped heated metal and wounds were inspected after three days—or cold water immersion, with floating indicating guilt due to supposed satanic buoyancy, practices widespread until the Fourth Lateran Council's 1215 prohibition on clerical involvement, shifting toward witness testimony and royal courts.[42] Punishments focused on restitution via wergild (blood money scaled by victim status, e.g., 200 shillings for a freeman's death in Anglo-Saxon England circa 900 AD) or corporal sanctions like mutilation (hand amputation for theft) and shaming devices such as stocks and pillories to enforce social norms through public humiliation.[43] Capital sentences, executed by hanging, beheading, or burning for felonies like arson or rape, were reserved for secular authorities, with rates varying by region—e.g., England's eyre courts recorded about 1 execution per 10,000 population annually in the 13th century—prioritizing incapacitation over systematic deterrence.[44] The Medieval Inquisition, formalized by Pope Gregory IX's bull Excommunicamus in 1231, targeted heresy through inquisitorial procedures emphasizing confession over confrontation, with punishments like public penance, fasting, or property confiscation for first offenses, escalating to relaxatio ad brachium saeculare—handover to civil powers for execution by fire in unrepentant cases, though inquisitors themselves rarely tortured directly, limiting it to 130 permitted sessions per canonist guidelines and focusing on evidence from denunciations.[45] This system, operational in regions like Languedoc against Cathars by 1240, integrated retributive theology with state enforcement, executing an estimated 3,000–5,000 over centuries per archival tallies, underscoring punishment's role in preserving doctrinal unity amid fragmented polities.[46]Enlightenment and Utilitarian Shifts
The Enlightenment era introduced rational critiques of punitive practices rooted in absolutist monarchies and religious dogma, emphasizing instead principles of proportionality, deterrence, and human reason to align punishment with societal utility. Cesare Beccaria's Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) condemned torture, secret accusations, and arbitrary judicial discretion as ineffective and inhumane, arguing that such methods failed to deter crime while eroding public trust in law. Beccaria posited that punishments should be public, swift, and certain rather than severe, as the certainty of mild penalties deters more effectively than the rarity of harsh ones; for instance, he advocated fixed penalties scaled to offense gravity, rejecting capital punishment except in extreme cases where it prevents greater societal harm. This framework shifted focus from retribution—inflicting suffering as moral desert—to prevention, viewing crime as a calculable choice where expected pain must exceed anticipated gain.[47] Beccaria's ideas, disseminated rapidly across Europe via translations into French (1765) and English (1767), influenced penal reforms by prioritizing empirical deterrence over vengeance; in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Grand Duke Leopold implemented Beccaria-inspired codes in 1786, abolishing capital punishment and torture while introducing graded imprisonment terms.[48] In the American colonies, figures like Thomas Jefferson cited Beccaria in drafting Virginia's 1779 penal code, which limited death sentences to treason and murder, replacing diverse corporal sanctions with incarceration focused on restraint and reformation potential.[49] These changes reflected a causal logic: arbitrary severity bred evasion and resentment, whereas predictable, proportionate responses reinforced social contracts without excess state violence. Utilitarian philosophers like Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) extended this shift, framing punishment as an "evil" permissible only if it maximizes aggregate happiness by averting greater harms through deterrence or incapacitation.[50] In works such as An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Bentham proposed a hedonic calculus to evaluate penalties, weighing their pains against preventive benefits; he advocated prisons like the Panopticon (1791 design), a radial structure enabling constant surveillance to induce self-discipline and minimize custodial costs while deterring via visibility. Bentham critiqued retributivism as irrational sentimentality, insisting punishment's legitimacy derives from forward-looking utility, not backward-looking desert—thus, reforming offenders or preventing recidivism justifies confinement over mere suffering.[51] This perspective informed 19th-century reforms, such as Britain's 1779 Penitentiary Act, which emphasized solitary confinement and labor to foster behavioral change, though empirical outcomes later revealed mixed deterrent efficacy due to implementation flaws like overcrowding.[12] The utilitarian turn prioritized measurable outcomes over symbolic retribution, fostering institutions like graded prisons that classified inmates by risk and offense, as seen in Pennsylvania's Walnut Street Jail expansions (1790s) influenced by Enlightenment reformers.[52] However, critics noted tensions: while reducing spectacles of execution (e.g., France's 1791 penal code under Beccaria's sway limited the guillotine), the shift amplified state control through indefinite detention, raising questions about net utility when recidivism persisted absent rehabilitation.[53] Empirical data from early adopters, such as Tuscany's post-1786 crime rates showing no surge despite abolished executions, supported deterrence claims, though causation remained debated amid confounding social factors.[54]Modern and Contemporary Theories
In the early 20th century, the rehabilitative ideal emerged as a dominant paradigm in penal theory, emphasizing individualized treatment over fixed retribution, with indeterminate sentencing allowing parole boards to release offenders based on assessed reform progress.[55] This approach, rooted in progressive reforms, viewed criminality as a symptom treatable through education, therapy, and vocational training, influencing policies like probation and parole expansion in the United States and United Kingdom.[56] By mid-century, this medical model framed prisons as hospitals for behavioral correction, prioritizing offender reintegration over punishment severity.[57] The rehabilitative dominance faced empirical scrutiny in the 1970s, exemplified by Robert Martinson's 1974 analysis of 231 rehabilitation studies, which concluded that few programs reliably reduced recidivism, popularly distilled as "nothing works."[58] This critique, later partially recanted by Martinson, eroded faith in unchecked discretion and treatment efficacy, prompting a theoretical pivot toward the justice model articulated by Andrew von Hirsch in Doing Justice (1976).[59] Von Hirsch advocated proportionate penalties based on offense seriousness—termed "just deserts"—with determinate sentencing to limit judicial variability and reject rehabilitation as a sentencing rationale, emphasizing desert over predicted future behavior.[60] Late 20th-century theories integrated deterrence and incapacitation more prominently, with empirical studies affirming that perceived certainty of apprehension outweighs punishment severity in reducing crime rates, as non-legal factors like employment and social ties also moderate effects.[5] Policies reflected collective incapacitation through mandatory minimums and "three strikes" laws, aiming to warehouse high-risk offenders, though evidence showed diminishing returns beyond targeted selective incapacitation.[61] Contemporary frameworks blend retributivism with evidence-based rehabilitation, notably the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model developed by Donald Andrews and James Bonta in the 1990s, which directs intensive interventions at higher-risk offenders by targeting criminogenic needs (e.g., antisocial attitudes) via responsive, cognitive-behavioral methods.[62] Meta-analyses support RNR's efficacy in lowering recidivism by 10-20% when principles are adhered to, contrasting with generalized programs that may inadvertently increase risk for low-level offenders.[63] This evolution underscores causal mechanisms like skill-building over vague optimism, informed by randomized trials rather than ideological priors.[64]Primary Rationales
Retribution as Moral Desert
Retribution as moral desert posits that punishment is morally justified because the offender deserves to suffer in proportion to the gravity of their wrongdoing, independent of any consequentialist benefits such as deterrence or social protection. This view, central to retributivism, treats punishment as an intrinsic response to moral culpability, where the offender's violation of rights or duties creates a debt of suffering that the state enforces as a matter of justice.[65] Unlike utilitarian approaches, retributivism backward-looking, focusing on the past act's inherent wrongness rather than future utility, with the core claim that undeserved impunity would undermine moral order by allowing wrongdoers to evade accountability.[66] Immanuel Kant provided a deontological foundation for this rationale in his Metaphysics of Morals (1797), asserting that rational agents, by freely willing a crime, adopt a universalizable maxim that justifies reciprocal treatment; thus, the offender deserves punishment equivalent to the wrong inflicted, as failing to punish would treat humanity instrumentally rather than as ends in themselves. Kant rejected mercy or lesser penalties based on utility, insisting that "even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members... the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed" to uphold retributive justice.[67] This emphasis on moral desert underscores punishment as a categorical imperative, not contingent on empirical outcomes like crime reduction.[68] G.W.F. Hegel developed a dialectical conception in Philosophy of Right (1821), framing punishment as the "negation of the negation"—the criminal's act negates established right, and punishment restores equilibrium by annulling that negation, effectively affirming the criminal's own rational agency. Hegel described punishment as "the right of the criminal himself," since it honors the offender's status as a free moral subject who willed the universal law's violation, preventing the criminal from gaining superiority over victims or society through unpunished wrong.[69] This restores the substantive unity of right, making retribution not vengeance but a logical necessity for ethical life.[70] Contemporary retributivists, building on these foundations, defend "basic desert" as the idea that culpable wrongdoers inherently merit hard treatment without reference to social contracts or hypothetical consent, countering consequentialist critiques by prioritizing justice's intrinsic value. Experimental studies reveal widespread intuitive support for proportionate punishment aligned with desert judgments, as participants consistently rate deserved suffering higher when culpability is clear, though such intuitions can vary with contextual factors like offender background.[71] Critics argue this reliance on desert assumes libertarian free will, potentially incompatible with deterministic neuroscience, yet compatibilist variants maintain moral responsibility through reasons-responsiveness.[72] Retributivism's endurance stems from its alignment with causal realism in accountability: actions traceable to the agent's choices warrant responses that reflect moral reality, avoiding the moral hazard of outcome-based leniency.[73]Deterrence Through Certainty and Severity
Deterrence theory posits that punishment discourages criminal behavior by altering the expected utility calculation of potential offenders, who weigh the anticipated benefits of crime against the risks of detection and sanction. In this framework, two primary attributes of punishment influence deterrence: certainty, the perceived probability of apprehension and punishment, and severity, the magnitude of the penalty imposed. Cesare Beccaria, in his 1764 treatise On Crimes and Punishments, argued that certainty is more efficacious than severity, stating that "crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment," as uncertain but harsh penalties fail to reliably condition behavior.[74] This principle aligns with rational choice assumptions, where offenders respond to the expected cost—probability of punishment multiplied by its harshness—rather than absolute severity alone.[75] Gary Becker's 1968 economic model formalized this approach, treating crime as a rational decision where individuals maximize utility by comparing gains from offenses to expected losses from sanctions. Becker's analysis demonstrates that increasing the probability of detection (p) yields greater marginal deterrence than escalating punishment severity (f), particularly when enforcement resources are constrained, as higher certainty requires less severe penalties to achieve equivalent deterrence.[76] Empirical reviews corroborate this, finding that perceived certainty of punishment consistently correlates with reduced offending rates across offenses, whereas evidence for severity's independent deterrent effect is weaker and often insignificant after controlling for certainty.[5][61] For instance, longitudinal studies indicate that doubling sentence lengths yields minimal additional crime reduction compared to modest improvements in arrest probabilities.[77] Programs emphasizing swift and certain sanctions provide causal evidence supporting certainty's primacy. Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE), implemented in 2004, imposed immediate short jail terms (typically 2 days) for probation violations with high enforcement reliability, resulting in probationers being 55% less likely to be rearrested and 72% less likely to test positive for drugs compared to traditional supervision.[78] Replications, such as Washington's swift and certain model, similarly reduced violation rates by prioritizing predictability over prolonged incarceration, demonstrating cost-effective deterrence without relying on extreme severity.[79] However, meta-analyses note that while certainty enhances specific deterrence for supervised populations, general deterrence from severity remains empirically elusive, with some studies attributing null effects to perceptual lags or offender impulsivity that diminish rational responsiveness.[80] These findings underscore that deterrence hinges more on credible enforcement mechanisms than on punitive excess, as over-reliance on severity can erode public trust and resource efficiency without proportional crime reduction.[81]Incapacitation of Dangerous Individuals
Incapacitation serves as a primary rationale for punishment by physically preventing dangerous individuals from committing further offenses, thereby protecting society through isolation rather than reliance on behavioral change or fear of consequences. This approach operates on the principle that removing high-risk offenders from the community mechanically reduces crime opportunities, independent of deterrence effects. Empirical analyses distinguish incapacitation from deterrence by examining crime rate changes attributable to custody status, such as through variations in prison populations or sentencing policies.[8] Collective incapacitation applies uniform incarceration to all convicted offenders, yielding broad crime reductions proportional to the number of prisoners. Studies estimate that each incarcerated individual averts multiple crimes annually; for instance, early models projected up to 200 felony offenses prevented per prisoner-year, though refined estimates place the figure lower, around several serious crimes per year based on offender activity levels. Recent quasi-experimental research leveraging policy shifts, such as sentence enhancements or release delays, confirms incapacitation's role in U.S. crime declines during the 1990s, with incarceration accounting for 20-30% of the drop in some analyses. For first-time incarcerated offenders, the effect equates to approximately 0.53 averted convictions per year.[82][83][84] Selective incapacitation targets high-rate or chronic offenders identified via risk assessments, aiming to maximize crime prevention efficiency without expanding overall prison populations. RAND Corporation research from the 1980s demonstrated that predictive models based on criminal history could increase prevented crimes by 10-20% through prioritized long sentences for a small subset of offenders responsible for disproportionate violence. However, implementation faces empirical hurdles, including modest predictive accuracy—often below 70% for identifying future high-rate criminals—and risks of over-incarceration, with false positives disproportionately affecting minorities due to predictive biases in historical data.[85][86] Despite these benefits, incapacitation's limitations include high fiscal costs—U.S. prison expenditures exceed $80 billion annually—and potential crime displacement, as incapacitated offenders' roles may be filled by others. Critics argue it neglects situational crime factors, such as environmental opportunities, overemphasizing individual dispositions, though evidence supports its marginal contribution to public safety when combined with other strategies. Long-term effects remain debated, with some studies questioning sustainability as aging prisoner populations yield diminishing returns.[87][88]Secondary Rationales
Rehabilitation and Behavioral Modification
Rehabilitation in penal contexts refers to structured interventions designed to alter offenders' attitudes, skills, and behaviors to reduce future criminality, predicated on the assumption that criminal conduct stems from modifiable factors such as cognitive distortions, substance abuse, or lack of employment skills rather than immutable traits alone.[62] Behavioral modification techniques, often integrated into rehabilitation, employ principles from psychology to reinforce prosocial habits and extinguish antisocial ones, drawing on operant conditioning and cognitive restructuring to target recidivism drivers.[89] Empirical support for these approaches is conditional, with meta-analyses indicating modest recidivism reductions—typically 10-20%—only when programs adhere to evidence-based frameworks like the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model, which matches intervention intensity to offender risk level, addresses dynamic criminogenic needs (e.g., antisocial peers, impulsivity), and accounts for individual learning styles.[90] Violations of RNR principles, such as applying intensive therapy to low-risk offenders, can increase reoffending by up to 20%, as low-risk individuals may be exposed to higher-risk peers or disrupted routines without sufficient benefit.[62] Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) represents a core behavioral modification method in prisons and probation, aiming to reframe criminal-justice-involved individuals' distorted thinking patterns, such as minimization of harm or poor problem-solving, through structured sessions focusing on skill-building in anger management and moral reasoning. A 2016 analysis of U.S. Department of Justice-reviewed programs found CBT interventions yielded recidivism reductions in 53% of adult cases and 42% of juvenile ones, with stronger effects for higher-risk participants, though overall impact averaged around 15% lower reoffense rates compared to untreated controls.[89] However, a 2021 meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials in prisons reported no significant recidivism reduction from CBT-based programs (odds ratio 1.00, 95% CI 0.69-1.44), attributing null effects to implementation flaws like inadequate dosage or failure to target needs beyond general therapy.00170-X/fulltext) Vocational and educational programs, another rehabilitation staple, show variable efficacy; a 2007 meta-review estimated 10-15% recidivism drops from work-training initiatives, but only when combined with behavioral components and post-release support, as standalone education often fails to address underlying impulsivity.[91] Substance abuse treatment, frequently framed as rehabilitation, incorporates behavioral modification via contingency management—rewarding drug-free behaviors—and has demonstrated recidivism reductions of 12-18% in meta-analyses of prison-based programs, particularly for opioid-dependent offenders, though effects diminish without community aftercare.[92] Sex offender-specific interventions, using relapse-prevention models with CBT elements, yield mixed results; a 2017 Campbell review found a 25% relative recidivism reduction (from 10.9% to 8.0% absolute), but critics note high attrition rates (up to 30%) and overreliance on self-reported data, with null effects in poorly matched high-risk cases.[93] Despite these targeted successes, broader empirical limitations persist: many programs suffer from selection bias, where motivated participants skew results, and net-widening effects, where low-level offenders receive unnecessary interventions that may inadvertently foster criminal networks.[94] A 2023 meta-review highlighted that rehabilitation efficacy varies by offender type—effective for versatile criminals addressing multiple needs, but negligible or counterproductive for psychopathic or chronic violent offenders, where behavioral change resists intervention due to entrenched traits.[95] Institutional biases in academia, which often prioritize rehabilitative paradigms, may inflate reported successes by underemphasizing failed replications or long-term follow-ups beyond 2-3 years, where recidivism rebounds in 40-60% of cases absent sustained supervision.[96]Restoration and Victim-Centered Approaches
Restorative justice emerged as a framework within criminal punishment emphasizing the repair of harm inflicted on victims and communities, positioning the offender's accountability through direct involvement in restitution and reconciliation rather than isolation or retribution alone. Key principles include facilitated dialogues such as victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, and healing circles, where victims articulate impacts, offenders acknowledge responsibility, and agreements for compensation or behavioral change are negotiated voluntarily.[97][98] Modern restorative practices trace to experiments in the 1970s, including the first victim-offender reconciliation program in Kitchener, Ontario, in 1974, inspired by probation officers' informal meetings between burglars and homeowners.[99] By the 1990s, adoption expanded through initiatives like Thames Valley Police's implementation in the UK under Sir Charles Pollard, integrating restorative elements into policing and sentencing.[100] Victim-centered approaches within this paradigm shift focus from state-prosecuted punishment to empowering victims' agency, incorporating their input into offender sanctions, such as restitution orders or community service tailored to the harm experienced. These methods aim to mitigate secondary victimization from adversarial court processes by providing platforms for victims to influence outcomes, fostering perceived fairness and emotional closure. Empirical studies consistently report higher victim satisfaction with restorative processes compared to traditional trials; for instance, meta-analyses of conferencing programs indicate victims feel more heard and receive greater reparative outcomes, with satisfaction rates often exceeding 80% versus 30-50% in conventional systems.[101][102][103] On offender recidivism, evidence from meta-analyses shows modest reductions, particularly for programs involving direct victim-offender contact and adult participants, with effect sizes suggesting 10-20% lower reoffending rates in some contexts like personal offenses, though results vary by crime type and program fidelity.[104][105] However, other reviews find no significant overall recidivism drop from mediation alone, attributing inconsistencies to factors like voluntary participation and follow-through on agreements, underscoring that restorative justice supplements rather than replaces punitive measures for high-risk offenders.[106] Victim-centered integrations, such as in sentencing circles for intimate partner violence, prioritize safety protocols to prevent coercion, yet critics note potential risks of offender manipulation absent rigorous safeguards.[107] Overall, these approaches have gained traction in jurisdictions like New Zealand's youth justice system since 1989, where family group conferences reduced youth custody by emphasizing communal restoration.[108]Scope and Applications
Criminal Justice Systems
Criminal justice systems worldwide impose punishments on convicted offenders to enforce legal prohibitions, typically following processes of investigation, trial, and sentencing that emphasize due process and proportionality.[109] These sanctions range from monetary fines and community supervision for minor offenses to lengthy imprisonment and, in select jurisdictions, capital punishment for severe crimes like aggravated murder.[110] Sentencing aims to balance primary rationales such as retribution and deterrence with practical considerations like resource allocation, though empirical evidence indicates that the certainty of apprehension and conviction exerts stronger influence on crime reduction than punishment severity alone.[5] Imprisonment remains the dominant form of punishment in most systems, serving to incapacitate offenders and deter potential violations through the threat of confinement. As of 2023, the global prison population exceeds 11.5 million, yielding an average incarceration rate of 140 per 100,000 population, with significant variation across regions.[111] The United States maintains the highest rate among large democracies at approximately 531 per 100,000, reflecting policies emphasizing mandatory minimums and three-strikes laws implemented since the 1980s to address rising crime rates.[112] In contrast, European nations like Norway exhibit rates around 60 per 100,000, prioritizing shorter sentences and rehabilitative programming within normalized prison environments.[113]| Country | Incarceration Rate (per 100,000) | Year of Data |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 531 | 2023 |
| Norway | 59 | 2023 |
| Sweden | 74 | 2023 |
| El Salvador | 1,085 | 2023 |
Non-Penal Contexts
Punishment manifests in non-penal contexts through sanctions imposed by civil authorities, institutions, families, and organizations to enforce rules, deter violations, or correct behavior without invoking criminal proceedings. These measures include monetary fines, suspensions, expulsions, or terminations, often aiming at restoration of order or prevention of recurrence rather than retribution alone.[122] In civil law, penalties such as fines for regulatory violations—ranging from environmental infractions to securities breaches—serve as financial deterrents, with amounts calibrated to the violation's severity; for instance, U.S. federal statutes authorize penalties up to $100,000 per day for ongoing offenses like unauthorized fishing under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.[123] Administrative sanctions, including court-imposed contempt fines not exceeding $1,000 or brief imprisonment in some jurisdictions, target disobedience of orders without criminal intent.[124] In familial settings, parental discipline frequently employs timeouts, privilege revocation, or physical correction to instill compliance, though empirical studies indicate physical punishment correlates with increased child aggression and mental health risks rather than sustained behavioral improvement. A 2019 American Psychological Association review of longitudinal data linked spanking to higher incidences of antisocial behavior, anxiety, and cognitive deficits in children, with no evidence of long-term prosocial gains.[125] Verbal methods like reasoning predominate, used in 80% of cases, yet shouting or psychological aggression, reported in 66%, exacerbates emotional instability without reducing defiance.[126] World Health Organization analyses from 2025 further associate corporal punishment with elevated depression and low self-esteem risks, underscoring causal pathways from immediate pain to internalized harm over generations.[127] Educational institutions apply punishments such as out-of-school suspensions or expulsions for disruptions, but data reveal these exclusionary tactics fail to enhance safety and instead predict higher dropout rates and future arrests. A 2021 study tracking adolescents found school suspensions amplified within-individual offending trajectories, with suspended students 2.5 times more likely to engage in delinquency later.[128] Corporal punishment, still legal in 17 U.S. states as of 2023, yields short-term obedience via fear but correlates with diminished academic performance and psychosocial outcomes, per meta-analyses showing no net reduction in misbehavior.[129] Non-punitive alternatives, emphasizing behavioral reinforcement, demonstrate superior long-term efficacy in reducing recidivism within school contexts.[130] Workplace disciplinary actions escalate from verbal warnings to termination for infractions like tardiness or policy breaches, intended to correct performance without litigation. U.S. employers must document progressive steps—counseling, written reprimands, unpaid suspension—to establish "just cause," mitigating wrongful termination claims.[131] However, punitive approaches focusing on fault rather than skill-building prove less effective for sustained change, as evidenced by organizational psychology research indicating they foster resentment and turnover without addressing root causes like unclear expectations.[132] Effective protocols prioritize consistency and feedback, reducing misconduct recurrence by up to 40% in structured interventions.[133] In sports, penalties enforce fair play through immediate consequences like fouls, ejections, or postseason bans, as seen in NCAA protocols reprimanding athletes for eligibility violations or unsportsmanlike conduct.[134] These sanctions deter cheating—e.g., technical fouls in basketball awarding free throws to opponents—and maintain competitive integrity, with leagues imposing multi-game suspensions for repeated offenses to signal normative boundaries. Empirical reviews of athletic governance show such measures reduce infraction rates when applied certainly, though overly harsh responses risk player alienation without proportional behavioral shifts.[135] Across these domains, non-penal punishments prioritize institutional stability, yet their success hinges on proportionality and evidence-based calibration over mere severity.Supernatural and Divine Dimensions
In theological frameworks across major world religions, supernatural punishment serves as a mechanism of divine justice, enforcing moral accountability through eternal or cosmic consequences for transgressions. This dimension posits that human actions incur retribution from deities or impersonal cosmic laws, extending beyond temporal penalties to realms of afterlife judgment or karmic cycles, thereby upholding retributive principles akin to moral desert.[136][137] Christian doctrine emphasizes God's sovereign retribution, where unrepentant sin leads to eternal separation from divine presence in hell, described as "eternal punishment" in Matthew 25:46 of the New Testament. Theologians such as Augustine of Hippo argued that such punishment aligns with divine goodness, as it permits the persistence of evil wills while protecting the blessed from their influence, even if the righteous suffer temporarily alongside the wicked in this life. Biblical texts outline varying degrees of infernal torment proportional to earthly deeds, reinforcing retribution as a reflection of God's holiness rather than mere deterrence.[136][138][136] Islamic theology similarly frames divine punishment as adl (justice), with the Quran detailing Jahannam—a fiery abyss for disbelievers and grave sinners—where torments match the severity of offenses, as in Surah Al-An'am 6:65, which enumerates punishments from above, below, and sides. Retribution in the hereafter lacks direct proportionality to finite crimes yet manifests God's wisdom in recompense, distinct from human vengeance, and serves to vindicate the oppressed. Scholars like Murtadha Mutahhari underscore this as inevitable divine equity, unbound by earthly limits.[139][137][137] In contrast, Dharmic traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism conceptualize punishment through karma, an impersonal causal law where harmful actions (akusala) yield suffering across rebirths, without intervention by a punitive deity. Hindu scriptures like the Bhagavad Gita portray karma as self-regulating retribution tied to dharma violation, leading to lower births or hellish realms (naraka) as temporary expiation. Buddhism refines this by emphasizing intentionality in deeds, viewing karmic fruition as natural consequence rather than supernatural fiat, though it motivates ethical conduct via fear of dukkha (suffering) in samsara. This framework prioritizes causal realism over personal divine agency, differing from Abrahamic models.[140][140][140]Empirical Evidence
Deterrence and General Prevention Effects
General deterrence refers to the preventive effect of punishment on prospective offenders who have not yet committed crimes, operating through the public's perception of sanction risks. Empirical research supports the existence of such effects, albeit modest in magnitude, with stronger evidence for the role of perceived certainty of apprehension over severity or swiftness of punishment. Meta-analyses of cross-sectional, panel, and experimental studies consistently find inverse associations between sanction risks and crime rates, though effect sizes vary by crime type and methodology.[141][8] Certainty of punishment emerges as the primary driver in multiple reviews: a synthesis of econometric studies estimates that a 1 percentage point increase in the probability of arrest correlates with a 2-4% decline in index crimes, while sentence enhancements yield effects closer to 0.1-0.5% per additional year.[142][61] This pattern holds across jurisdictions, as demonstrated by natural experiments like police deployments, where heightened detection risks reduced burglary and theft incidents by up to 20% in affected areas.[143] Severity's limited impact stems from offenders' discounting of uncertain penalties, rendering marginal increases in harshness ineffective without baseline apprehension probabilities exceeding 20-30%.[144][81] For imprisonment specifically, longitudinal analyses of sentencing reforms indicate a small general deterrent value from incarceration threats, equivalent to 1-3 fewer crimes per 100 potential offenders per year of advertised risk, but no additional prevention from lengthening terms beyond minimum thresholds.[145] Targeted or "focused" deterrence programs, integrating swift sanctions with offender notifications, achieve larger effects; a 2021 systematic review of 24 evaluations reported a mean 23% reduction in violent crimes and 15% in drug offenses, with effects persisting 12-24 months post-intervention.[146] Challenges in causal identification persist, including selection biases in arrest data and perceptual surveys that may overestimate rational responsiveness among impulsive or low-impulsivity offenders.[147] Nonetheless, aggregate evidence from randomized field trials and instrumental variable approaches affirms that general prevention operates via experiential learning of risks, outweighing null findings in severity-focused designs.[8][141] These patterns align with first-principles expectations that prospective costs influence marginal decisions, though heterogeneous offender cognition—such as time inconsistency—tempers universality.[61]Recidivism Rates and Rehabilitation Outcomes
Recidivism, defined as the re-arrest, re-conviction, or re-incarceration of formerly punished individuals, remains persistently high across jurisdictions, with empirical data indicating limited overall declines despite varied punitive and rehabilitative efforts. In the United States, a Bureau of Justice Statistics analysis of approximately 400,000 state prisoners released in 2012 across 34 states found that 83% were rearrested at least once within nine years, with 46% reincarcerated within five years. These rates vary by offense type, with violent offenders showing rearrest rates around 71% within three years in earlier cohorts, underscoring that prior criminal history and offense severity strongly predict reoffending. Internationally, a systematic review of 33 countries reported two-year reconviction rates for released prisoners ranging from 18% to 55%, with community-sentenced individuals at 10% to 47%, though direct comparisons are complicated by definitional differences and reporting biases in self-selected national data.[148] Rehabilitation programs, intended to modify criminal behavior through education, therapy, or skills training, demonstrate modest and inconsistent reductions in recidivism, often failing to address underlying causal factors like impulsivity or low future orientation in high-risk populations. A RAND Corporation meta-analysis of correctional education programs estimated a 43% lower odds of recidivism for participants compared to non-participants, equating to a 13% absolute reduction in reincarceration risk, based on studies through 2013.[149] However, cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) interventions, frequently touted in academic reviews, yield effect sizes typically below 10% recidivism reduction in meta-analyses, with null or iatrogenic (worsening) effects in poorly implemented or mismatched programs for serious offenders.[150] Peer-reviewed critiques highlight implementation flaws, such as inadequate targeting of high-risk individuals per risk-need-responsivity principles, leading to many programs showing no significant impact or even increased reoffending due to unmet expectations or peer reinforcement of criminal norms.[96]| Program Type | Estimated Recidivism Reduction | Key Limitations | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correctional Education | 13% absolute (43% odds reduction) | Benefits concentrated in low-risk offenders; high dropout rates | [149] |
| Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy | <10% in meta-analyses | Ineffective for violent recidivism; implementation fidelity issues | [150] |
| Restorative Justice | Small reduction in general recidivism; none for violent | Limited scalability; variable adherence to protocols | [93] |
