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Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
Presented30 October 2006
Commissioned byGovernment of the United Kingdom
AuthorNicholas Stern
Media typeReport
SubjectEffect of global warming on the world economy

The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is a 700-page independent review released for the Government of the United Kingdom on 30 October 2006 by economist Nicholas Stern, chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics (LSE) and also chair of the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) at Leeds University and LSE. The report discusses the effect of global warming on the world economy. Although not the first economic report on climate change, it is significant as the largest and most widely known and discussed report of its kind.[1]

The Review states that climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen, presenting a unique challenge for economics.[2] The Review provides prescriptions including environmental taxes to minimise the economic and social disruptions. The Stern Review's main conclusion is that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change far outweigh the costs of not acting.[3] The Review points to the potential impacts of climate change on water resources, food production, health, and the environment. According to the Review, without action, the overall costs of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) each year, now and forever. Including a wider range of risks and impacts could increase this to 20% of GDP or more, also indefinitely. Stern believes that 5–6 degrees of temperature increase is "a real possibility".[4]

The Review proposes that one per cent of global GDP per annum is required to be invested to avoid the worst effects of climate change. In June 2008, Stern increased the estimate for the annual cost of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550 ppm CO2e to 2% of GDP to account for faster than expected climate change.[5]

There has been a mixed reaction to the Stern Review from economists. Several economists have been critical of the Review,[6][7] for example, a paper by Byatt et al. (2006) describes the Review as "deeply flawed".[8][needs update] Some economists (such as Brad DeLong[9] and John Quiggin)[10] have supported the Review. Others have criticised aspects of Review's analysis, but argued that some of its conclusions might still be justified based on other grounds, e.g., see papers by Martin Weitzman (2007)[11] and Dieter Helm (2008).[12]

Summary of the Review's main conclusions

[edit]

The executive summary[2] states:

  • The benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the costs.
  • The scientific evidence points to increasing risks of serious, irreversible impacts from climate change associated with business-as-usual (BAU) paths for emissions.
  • Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world—access to water, food production, health, and use of land and the environment.
  • The impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed—the poorest countries and people will suffer earliest and most. And if and when the damages appear it will be too late to reverse the process. Thus we are forced to look a long way ahead.
  • Climate change may initially have small positive effects for a few developed countries, but it is likely to be very damaging for the much higher temperature increases expected by mid-to-late century under BAU scenarios.
  • Integrated assessment modelling provides a tool for estimating the total impact on the economy; our estimates suggest that this is likely to be higher than previously suggested.
  • Emissions have been, and continue to be, driven by economic growth; yet stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere is feasible and consistent with continued growth.
  • "Central estimates of the annual costs of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550ppm CO2e are around 1% of global GDP, if we start to take strong action now. [...] It would already be very difficult and costly to aim to stabilise at 450ppm CO2e. If we delay, the opportunity to stabilise at 500–550ppm CO2e may slip away."[3]
  • The transition to a low-carbon economy will bring challenges for competitiveness but also opportunities for growth. Policies to support the development of a range of low-carbon and high-efficiency technologies are required urgently.
  • Establishing a carbon price, through tax, trading or regulation, is an essential foundation for climate change policy. Creating a broadly similar carbon price signal around the world, and using carbon finance to accelerate action in developing countries, are urgent priorities for international co-operation.
  • Adaptation policy is crucial for dealing with the unavoidable impacts of climate change, but it has been under-emphasised in many countries.
  • An effective response to climate change will depend on creating the conditions for international collective action.
  • There is still time to avoid the worst impacts of climate change if strong collective action starts now.

Background

[edit]

On 19 July 2005 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown announced that he had asked Sir Nicholas Stern to lead a major review of the economics of climate change, to understand more comprehensively the nature of the economic challenges and how they can be met, in the UK and globally.[13] The Stern Review was prepared by a team of economists at HM Treasury; independent academics were involved as consultants only. The scientific content of the Review was reviewed by experts from the Walker Institute.[14]

The Stern review was not released for regular peer-review, since the UK Government doesn't undertake peer review on commissioned reviews.[15] Papers were published and presentations held, that outlined the approach in the months preceding the release.[15]

Positive critical response

[edit]

The Stern Review attracted positive attention from several sectors. Pia Hansen, a European Commission Spokeswoman, said doing nothing is not an option, "we must act now".[16] Simon Retallack of the UK think tank IPPR said "This [Review] removes the last refuge of the 'do-nothing' approach on climate change, particularly in the US."[16] Tom Delay of The Carbon Trust said "The Review offers a huge business opportunity."[16] Richard Lambert, Director General of the Confederation of British Industry, said that a global system of carbon trading is "urgently needed".[16] Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said "Now the government must act and, among other things, invest in efficient decentralised power stations and tackle the growth of aviation."[16]

Asset managers F&C look to the business opportunities and say "this is an unprecedented opportunity to generate real value for our clients".[17] Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, was optimistic about the opportunities for industry to meet demands created by investment in technology to combat climate change.[18] The Prince of Wales' Corporate Leaders Group on Climate Change, formed by 14 of UK's leading companies shared this hope. Chairman of Shell UK, James Smith, expressed the hope of the group that business and Government would discuss how Britain could obtain "first mover advantage" in what he described as "massive new global market".[19]

On 1 November 2006, Australian Prime Minister John Howard responded by announcing that A$60 million would be allotted to projects to help cut greenhouse gas emissions[20] while reiterating that Australia would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Much of this funding was directed at the non-renewable coal industry.

British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stated that the Review demonstrated that scientific evidence of global warming was "overwhelming" and its consequences "disastrous" if the world failed to act.[21] The UK Treasury, which commissioned the report, simultaneously published a document of favourable comments on the Review. Those quoted include:[22]

Several academic economists are also quoted praising the Review (see Response of economists).

Negative critical response

[edit]

The Stern Review has received various critical responses. Some economists have argued that the Review overestimates the present value of the costs of climate change, and underestimates the costs of emission reduction. Other critics have argued that the economic cost of the proposals put forward by Stern would be severe, or that the scientific consensus view on global warming, on which Stern relied, is incorrect. By contrast, some argue that the Review emission reduction targets are too weak, and that the climate change damage estimates in the Review are too small.

General criticisms

[edit]

In an article in the Daily Telegraph (2006), Ruth Lea, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, questions the scientific consensus on climate change on which the Stern Review is based. She says that "authorities on climate science say that the climate system is far too complex for modest reductions in one of the thousands of factors involved in climate change (i.e., carbon emissions) to have a predictable effect in magnitude, or even direction." Lea questions the long-term economic projections made in the Review, commenting that economic forecasts for just two or three years ahead are usually wrong. Lea goes on to describe the problem of drawing conclusions from combining scientific and economic models as "monumentally complex", and doubts whether the international co-operation on climate change, as argued for in the Review, is really possible. In conclusion, Lea says that the real motive behind the Review is to justify increased tax on fuels.[23]

Yohe and Tol (2007) described Lea's article as a climate sceptics "scattershot approach" aiming to confuse the public by questioning the causal role of CO2, by emphasising the complexity of making economic predictions and by attributing a motive for Stern's conclusions.[24]

Miles Templeman, Director-General of the Institute of Directors, said: "Without countries like the US, China or India, making decisive commitments, UK competitiveness will undoubtedly suffer if we act alone. This would be bad for business, bad for the economy and ultimately bad for our climate."[19]

Prof. Bill McGuire of Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre said that Stern may have greatly underestimated the effects of global warming.[16] David Brown and Leo Peskett of the Overseas Development Institute, a UK think-tank on international development, argued that the key proposals in relation to how to use forests to tackle climate change may prove difficult to implement:[25]

Radical ideas are needed not only at the level of understandings but also of forward strategies. The Stern Review is much stronger on the former than the latter, and leaves a lot of questions unanswered on implementation, particularly the downstream practicalities of bringing avoided deforestation into climate mitigation efforts.

Soon after publication of the Stern Review, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson gave a lecture at the Centre for Policy Studies, briefly criticising the Review and warning of what he called "eco-fundamentalism".[26] In 2008, Lawson gave evidence before the House of Commons Treasury Select committee, criticising the Review.[27]

Environmental writer Bjørn Lomborg criticised the Stern Review in OpinionJournal:[28]

Mr. Stern's core argument that the price of inaction would be extraordinary and the cost of action modest [...] falls apart when one actually reads the 700-page tome. Despite using many good references, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is selective and its conclusion flawed. Its fear-mongering arguments have been sensationalized, which is ultimately only likely to make the world worse off.

Reason magazine's science correspondent Ronald Bailey describes the "destructive character" of the Stern Review's policy proposals, saying that "Surely it is reasonable to argue that if one wants to help future generations deal with climate change, the best policies would be those that encouraged economic growth. This would endow future generations with the wealth and superior technologies that could be used to handle whatever comes at them including climate change. [...] So hurrying the process of switching from carbon-based fuels along by boosting energy costs means that humanity will have to delay buying other good things such as clean water, better sanitation, more and better food, and more education."[29]

Commenting on the Review's suggested increases in environmental tax, the British Chambers of Commerce have pointed to the dangers to business of additional taxation.[30]

Jerry Taylor of the Cato Institute, a United States libertarian think-tank, criticised Stern's conclusion, taking a calculation by himself:[31]

Stern's investment advice makes sense only if you think that warming will hammer GDP by 10% a year. You don't gain much at all from emission cuts, however, if you think GDP will only drop by 5% a year if we do nothing. And if you think warming will only cost the global economy 2% of GDP every year, [...] then Stern's investment advice is [sheer] lunacy.

In the BBC radio programme The Investigation, a number of economists and scientists argued that Stern assumptions in the Review are far more pessimistic than those made by most experts in the field, and that the Review's conclusions are at odds with the mainstream view (Cox and Vadon, 2007).[32]

In his paper on the Jevons' Paradox, which states that improvements in energy-efficiency of technologies can potentially increase greenhouse gas emission, Steve Sorrel concludes with "A prerequisite for all the above is a recognition that rebound effects matter and need to be taken seriously. Something is surely amiss when such in-depth and comprehensive studies as the Stern(2007) review overlook this topic altogether."[33] This criticism was rejected by the authors. They noted that by recommending a comprehensive global carbon price (see Summary above) the Stern Review proposed the most powerful mechanism for staunching the rebound effect. A carbon price imposes a wedge between the supply price received by producers and demand price paid by consumers thereby prompting substitution away from carbon-intensive activities. This insures that the substitution effect offsets the income effect.

In contrast to those who argued that the Stern Review was too pessimistic or 'alarmist', others argued that it did not go far enough. John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York in The Ecological Rift (2010)[34] give considerable attention to the Stern Review, noting that the targets of 550 ppm imply a global temperature increase of at least 3 °C "well beyond what climate science consider dangerous, and which would bring the earth's average global temperature to a height last seen in the middle Pliocene around 3 million years ago" (p. 154). They posit that the basis for such high targets is "economics, pure and simple" (p. 155), that is, stronger emissions cuts were seen by the Stern Review authors as "prohibitive, destabilizing capitalism itself" (p. 155). "All of this signals that any reduction in CO2 equivalent emissions beyond around 1 per cent per year would make it virtually impossible to maintain strong economic growth—the bottom line of the capitalism economy. Consequently, in order to keep the treadmill of accumulation going the world needs to risk environmental Armageddon" (p. 156).

Stern report misused climate change study

[edit]

According to the Sunday Times article "Climate change study was 'misused'",[35] the Stern report 'misused' disaster analysts research by Robert Muir-Wood, head of research at Risk Management Solutions, a US-based consultancy. The Stern report, citing Muir-Wood, said: "New analysis based on insurance industry data has shown that weather-related catastrophe losses have increased by 2% each year since the 1970s over and above changes in wealth, inflation and population growth/movement. [...] If this trend continued or intensified with rising global temperatures, losses from extreme weather could reach 0.5%–1% of world GDP by the middle of the century." According to Muir-Wood "said his research showed no such thing and accused Stern of "going far beyond what was an acceptable extrapolation of the evidence".[35]

Response of economists

[edit]

Discounting

[edit]

One of the issues debated among economists was the discount rate used in the Review. Discounting is used by economists to compare economic impacts occurring at different times.[36] Discounting was used by Stern in his calculation of the possible economic damages of future climate change. Marginal climate change damages were calculated for a "business-as-usual" greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pathway. Residual climate change damages (at the margin) were also calculated for other emissions pathways, especially one peaking at 450 ppm CO2e GHG concentration.[37]

There are four main reasons commonly proposed by economists for placing a lower value on consumption occurring in the future rather than in the present:[10]

  • future consumption should be discounted simply because it takes place in the future and people generally prefer the present to the future (inherent discounting)
  • consumption levels will be higher in the future, so the marginal utility of additional consumption will be lower
  • future consumption levels are uncertain
  • improved technology of the future will make it easier to address global warming concerns

Using a high discount rate decreases the assessed benefit of actions designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Stern Review did not use a single discount rate, but applied a stochastic approach whereby the discount rate varied with the expected outcomes, reflecting the interaction between growth and the elasticity of marginal utility, in line with Frank Ramsey's growth model. The Stern Review's average discount rate for climate change damages is approximately 1.4%, which, at the time of the Review, was lower than that used in most previous economic studies on climate change. Accounting for risk in the stochastic framework, however, means the expected mean or certainty equivalent discount rate will be below the discount rate for the mean expected outcome (Dietz, 2008, p. 11).[38] In other words, accounting for risk means a greater weight is applied to worst case outcomes, as per the insurance market.

Inherent discounting

[edit]

Debate over the Stern Review initially focused on the first of these points. In the Review, Stern used a social discount rate based on the "Ramsey" formula, which includes a term for inherent discounting, also called the pure rate of time preference (PTP-rate):

s = γ + η g

where s is the social discount rate, γ the PTP-rate, η the marginal elasticity of utility, and g the rate of growth of per-capita consumption (Dietz, 2008, p. 10).[38] Stern accepts the case for discounting, but argues that applying a PTP-rate of anything much more than zero to social policy choice is ethically inappropriate.[39] His view is supported by a number of economists, including Geoffrey Heal,[40] Thomas Sterner,[38]William Cline,[41] and Brad DeLong.[9] Cline wrote a book on global warming, published in 1992, where he made similar ethical choices to Stern for discounting. DeLong, echoing Frank Ramsey and Tjalling Koopmans, wrote "My view—which I admit may well be wrong—of this knotty problem is that we are impatient in the sense of valuing the present and near-future much more than we value the distant future, but that we shouldn't do so." Hal Varian stated that the choice of discount rate was an inherently ethical judgement for which there was no definitive answer.[42]

William Nordhaus, of Yale University, who has done several studies on the economics of global warming, criticised the Review for its use of a low discount rate:[7]

The Review's unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are more consistent with today's marketplace real interest rates and savings rates. Hence, the central questions about global-warming policy—how much, how fast, and how costly—remain open. The Review informs but does not answer these fundamental questions.

The difference between Stern's estimates and those of Nordhaus can largely (though not entirely) be explained by the difference in the PTP-rate.[43] Previous studies by Nordhaus and others have adopted PTP-rates of up to 3 per cent, implying that (other things being equal) an environmental cost or benefit occurring 25 years in the future is worth about half as much as the same benefit today.[9] Richard Tol argues that in estimating discounting rates and the consequent social cost of carbon, the assumptions that must be made about the remote future are so uncertain that they are essentially arbitrary. Consequently, the assumptions made dominate the results and with a low discount rate the social cost of carbon is also arbitrary.[44]

In an appearance before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2008), Stern was asked about the discount rate used in the Review:[45]

Stern: [...] We are in pretty good company here in that [the distinguished economists] Solow, Sen, Keynes, Ramsey and all kinds of people have adopted the approach to pure time discounting that we have adopted. It is not particularly unusual.

John Roemer, Humberto Llavador and Joaquim Silvestre have argued that an analysis of the problem must consider both the ethical and economic issues associated with discounting. They have made the claim that high rates of discounting as the ones proposed by Nordhaus are only consistent with the infinitely-lived-representative-agent approach to economic modelling. Intergenerational justice would require more realistic assumption: one particular view is what they call the "sustainabilitarian" approach, which seeks to maximise present consumption subject to the constraint that future generations enjoy a quality of life at least as good as that enjoyed by the current generation. They support the discount factors used in the Stern analysis, particularly the view that discounting should reflect only the probability that the world will end at a given future date, and not the "impatience" of an infinitely lived representative consumer.)[46]

Treatment of uncertainty

[edit]

Uncertainty about future consumption may be addressed either through adjustments to the discount rate or by replacing uncertain flows of consumption with certainty equivalent flows.[citation needed] Stern adopted the latter approach, but was criticised by Tol and Yohe (2006) for double counting, a claim rejected by the Stern Review team (Dietz et al., 2007, pp. 138–139).[47] Whilst critical of Stern's discounting, Martin Weitzman has argued that standard discounting procedures are inherently incapable of dealing with extreme, low-probability events, such as the risk of catastrophic climate change.[11]

Future consumption will be higher

[edit]

With increasing average consumption in future, the marginal utility of consumption will decline. The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (part of the social discount rate) may be interpreted as a measure of aversion to inequality. Partha Dasgupta has criticised the Stern Review for parametric choices that, he argues, are inadequately sensitive to inequality.[48] In subsequent debate, Stern has conceded the case for a higher elasticity, but noted that this would call for much more extensive redistribution of income within the current generation (Dietz et al. 2007. pp. 135–137).[47]

Improved technology

[edit]

As far as discounting is concerned, the effects of improved technology work through increased consumption and do not need to be treated separately. However, specification of an optimal response to climate change will depend on assumptions about improvements in technology and the extent to which such improvements will be induced by policies that increase the cost of emissions.

Market rates

[edit]

Both supporters and opponents of Stern's discount rate have used comparisons with market rates of return on capital to justify their position.[10] Robert Mendelsohn of Yale University is a critic of the Review and has said:[49]

[...] investments in mitigation that cannot even earn a positive rate of return will be worth far less to future generations than those same dollars invested in the market. Placing climate change before investments in other important nonmarket services such as conservation, health, education, security, and transportation also cannot be justified in the name of future generations. From the perspective of future generations, it is in their interest that all investments earn the same rate of return. The ethical justification for intentionally overspending on selective projects with low rates of return is weak indeed.

Nordhaus has been very critical of the Ramsey zero pure time preference on the basis of utilitarian ethical stance. He takes a strictly market based view of intergenerational projects arguing that the social rate of time preference reflects the rate of return observed in the marketplace.[citation needed] Nordhaus also raised his view that the present generation will have to forgo a large amount of consumption now for the benefit of future generations who will be much richer than the present generation.

Dasgupta argues that there is some confusion in the Stern review about the underlying rationale for the selection of the Ramsey parameters.[citation needed] He states that the review mixes both market returns on investment with parameters selected on ethical grounds.

The discount rate chosen by Stern is close to the real interest rate for government bonds. The higher rates preferred by Stern's critics are closer to the weighted average cost of capital for private investment; see the extensive review by Frederick et al. (2002)[50] According to Quiggin, the difference between the two is determined by the equity premium.[10] Quiggin says that there is no generally accepted theory accounting for the observed magnitude of the equity premium and hence no easy way of determining which approach, if either, should be regarded as the appropriate market comparator.

General comments

[edit]

HM Treasury have issued a document where several economists are quoted praising the Stern Review, including[22] Robert Solow, James Mirrlees, Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, and Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs and Stiglitz have also written favourable articles on the Review.[51][52]

Richard Tol, an environmental economist at the Economic and Social Research Institute, is highly critical of the Stern Review, and has said that "If a student of mine were to hand in this report [the Stern Review] as a Masters thesis, perhaps if I were in a good mood I would give him a 'D' for diligence; but more likely I would give him an 'F' for fail (Cox and Vadon, 2007).[32] There is a whole range of very basic economics mistakes that somebody who claims to be a Professor of Economics simply should not make. [...] Stern consistently picks the most pessimistic for every choice that one can make. He overestimates through cherry-picking, he double counts particularly the risks and he underestimates what development and adaptation will do to impacts." Tol has referred to the Stern Review as "populist science."[53] In a paper published in 2008, Tol showed that the Stern Review's estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) along a "business-as-usual" emissions pathway was an outlier in the economics literature.[54]

The Stern Review differed strongly from most other estimates of climate change costs in the economics literature in 2006.[55]

Harvard economist Martin Weitzman has written a paper on the Stern Review (Weitzman, 2007).[11] In this paper, Weitzman described himself as "skeptical" in regards to the discount rate used by Stern in the Review's formal (aggregated) assessment of climate change.[56] One of Weitzman's conclusions was that Stern deserved credit for increasing public awareness on the dangers of climate change.[57] However, Weitzman also commented that:

[...] in my opinion, Stern deserves a measure of discredit for giving readers an authoritative-looking impression that seemingly objective best-available-practice professional economic analysis robustly supports its conclusions, instead of more openly disclosing the full extent to which the Review's radical policy recommendations depend upon controversial extreme assumptions and unconventional discount rates that most mainstream economists would consider much too low

According to a paper Weitzman (2007), the Stern Review is "right for the wrong reasons".[58]

At a seminar held in 2006, Cambridge economist Partha Dasgupta commented on the Stern Review.[59] Dasgupta (2006, p. 1) described the Review as "a long and impressive document", but felt that the authors had treated the issue of intergenerational equity (via the social discount rate) "cavalierly". Dasgupta (2006, pp. 6–7) accepted the Review's argument for a PTP-rate of 0.1%, but did not accept Stern's choice of 1 for the elasticity of marginal utility. He argued this point by calculating a saving rate of 97.5% based on the Review's values for the PTP-rate and elasticity of marginal utility. Dasgupta stated that "[a] 97.5% savings rate is so patently absurd that we must reject it out of hand." The calculation by Dasgupta was based on a model which had a deterministic economy, constant population, and no technological change.

Dasgupta's calculation was later cited by Berkeley economist Hal Varian.[60] Writing in The New York Times newspaper, Varian commented "Sir Partha's stripped-down model leaves out uncertainty, technological change and population growth, but even so, such a high savings rate is totally implausible." Varian also questioned whether or not it was ethical for the current generation to transfer wealth to future generations (via investment in mitigation), who, given Stern's assumptions, would be much wealthier than we presently are.

Smith (2009) responded to Dasgupta's criticism of the Stern Review's implied savings rate.[61] She showed that the rates of PTP and risk aversion in the Stern Review are consistent with saving rates of 25–32% rather than 97.5% when a macroeconomic model with the production function actually used by Stern and Nordhaus is used.

According to Dietz (2008, pp. 10–11), Varian's analysis had apparently confused the PTP-rate with the social discount rate.[38] The PTP-rate, if positive, discounts the welfare of future generations even if they are poorer than the current generation. The social discount rate used by Stern, however, accounts for the possible increased wealth (consumption) of future generations through the product ηg (see the formula cited in the section on inherent discounting).

Terry Barker of the Tyndall Centre Climate Change Research wrote a paper (Barker, 2008) supportive of the Review. Barker was critical of how some economists have applied cost-benefit analysis to climate change:[62]

[...] the Stern Review considers cost-benefit analysis as a marginal analysis inappropriately applied to a non-marginal multi-disciplinary systemic problem (p. 50). Both Stern (p. 163) and the IPCC Reports after 1995 take a multi-criteria approach rather than a narrowly monetary one and question cost-benefit analysis. This is one reason for the intemperate response from some traditional economists to the Stern Review

Eric Neumayer (2007) of the London School of Economics thought that the Review could have argued for emission reductions based on the non-substitutable loss of natural capital.[63] Neumayer argued that the real issue is the non-substitutable loss of natural capital, that is to what extent climate change inflicts irreversible and non-substitutable damage to and loss of natural capital. Economists define natural capital as the multiple and various services of nature from which humans benefit- from natural resources to pollution absorption and environmental amenities.[citation needed]

Dieter Helm (2008) of Oxford University was critical of the Review's analysis but accepted its conclusion of the urgent need to reduce emissions. Helm justified this on the grounds that future damages to the environment would probably not be fully compensated for by increases in man-made capital.[12] The draft report of the Garnaut Climate Change Review, a similar study conducted in Australia in 2008 by Ross Garnaut broadly endorsed the approach undertaken by Stern, but concluded, in the light of new information, that Stern had underestimated the severity of the problem and the extent of the cuts in emissions that were required to avoid dangerous climate change.

The Yale Symposium

[edit]

In 2007, a symposium was held at Yale University on the Stern Review, with talks by several economists, including Nordhaus and Stern (Yale Symposium, 2007).[39] Stern presented the basic conclusions of the Review, and commented on some of the criticisms of it made by other speakers. Chris Hope of Cambridge University explained how the damage estimates in the Review were calculated. Hope designed the PAGE2002 integrated assessment model that was used in the Review. Hope explained what would happen to the Stern Review's damage estimates if they were made using different assumptions, for example, a higher discount rate. Hope also pointed to the assumptions used in the model to do with adaptation.

In his talk, Nordhaus criticised the fact that the Stern Review had not been subject to a peer-review, and repeated earlier criticisms of the Review's discount rate. William Cline of the Peterson Institute supported the Review's general conclusions, but was uncomfortable about how most (greater than 90%) of the Review's monetised damages of climate change occur after 2200. Cline noted that the Review's large cost-benefit ratio for mitigation policy allows room for these long-term costs to be reduced substantially but still support aggressive action to reduce emissions.

Robert Mendelsohn was critical of the way the Stern justified his suggested mitigation policy in the Review. Mendelsohn said that rather than finding an optimal policy, the Review presented a choice of policy versus no-policy. Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University questioned some of the assumptions used in Nordhaus's integrated assessment model (DICE) of climate change. Sachs was supportive of Stern's cost estimates of climate change mitigation.

In response to these talks, Stern accepted Cline's comment about the weighting of future damages, and said that the weighting of these damages could be reduced by the increasing the size of the elasticity of marginal utility in the social discount rate. With regards to criticisms of the discount rate, Stern accepted that differences of opinion could exist on his ethical choice for the PTP-rate (Yale Symposium, 2007, p. 118).

Other comments by Stern included what he viewed as confusion over what he had suggested as a possible level for a carbon tax. According to Stern, the tax will not necessarily be the same as the social cost of carbon due to distortions and uncertainties in the economy (p. 121). His suggested tax rate was in the range of 25 to 30 dollars per ton of carbon. Stern did not accept Mendelsohn's argument that the Review presented a choice of policy versus no policy. Stern commented that the arguments for his recommended stabilisation range were included in Chapter 13 of the Review (pp. 124–125).

The costs of mitigation

[edit]

Economists have different views over the cost estimates of climate change mitigation given in the Review. Paul Ekins of King's College London (Treasury Committee, 2008) has said that Stern's central mitigation cost estimate is "reasonable",[64] but economists Robert Mendelsohn[32] and Dieter Helm[12] have commented that the estimate is probably too low. According to Mendelsohn, the Stern Review is far too optimistic about mitigation costs, stating that "[one] of the depressing things about the greenhouse gas problem is that the cost of eliminating it is quite high. We will actually have to sacrifice a great deal to cut emissions dramatically" (Mendelsohn, 2007).[citation needed]

Professor Emeritus of Economics at Pepperdine University George Reisman has said that "Any serious consideration of the proposals made in the Stern Review for radically reducing carbon technology and the accompanying calls for immediacy in enacting them makes clear in a further way how utterly impractical the environmentalist program for controlling global warming actually is. The fundamental impracticality of the program, of course, lies in its utterly destructive character."[65]

In a response to a paper by members of the Stern Review team, John Weyant of Stanford University commented on how the cost estimate of mitigation used in the Review was based on idealised models (Mendelsohn et al., 2008).[49] Weyant wrote that his own high short-run cost projection for stabilisation, of possibly 10% GDP, resulted "primarily from institutional pessimism rather than technological pessimism."

Comparison with climate damages

[edit]

Nobel prize winner Kenneth Arrow has commented on the Stern Review in the Economist's Voice (Arrow, 2007a)[66] and for Project Syndicate (Arrow, 2007b):[67]

Critics of the Stern Review don't think serious action to limit CO2 emissions is justified, because there remains substantial uncertainty about the extent of the costs of global climate change, and because these costs will be incurred far in the future. However, I believe that Stern's fundamental conclusion is justified: we are much better off reducing CO2 emissions substantially than risking the consequences of failing to act, even if, unlike Stern, one heavily discounts uncertainty and the future.

Arrow analysed the Stern Review's conclusions by looking at the Review's central estimate of GHG stabilisation costs of 1% GNP, and high-end climate damages of 20% GNP (Arrow, 2007a, pp. 4–5). As part of the Ramsay formula for the social discount rate, Arrow chose a value of 2 for the marginal elasticity of utility, while in the Review, Stern chose a value of 1. According to Arrow, Stern's recommended stabilisation target passes a cost-benefit test even when considerably higher PTP-rate (up to around 8%) than Stern's (0.1%) is used. Arrow acknowledged that his argument depended on Stern's stabilisation central cost estimate being correct.

Gary Yohe of Wesleyan University noted that Stern's estimates of business-as-usual climate damages were given in terms of per capita consumption equivalents, but Stern's costs of mitigation were given in terms of a percentage reduction in gross world product.[68] Yohe stated that the two different measures are "not really at all comparable". Yohe commented on how the Review gives the impression that all climate damages can be avoided through the investment of 1% of world GDP in mitigation. This, however, would still lead to global warming (as per the Review's 550 ppm CO2e mitigation target) of around 1.5 to 4.5 °C above pre-industrial temperatures. Significant portions of climate damages would therefore still persist with Stern's mitigation target. To measure the benefit of Stern's mitigation target, the residual climate damages from mitigation would need to be subtracted from Stern's business-as-usual climate damages.

Ecological Economic Critique

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The main criticisms cited above concern the details of calculations and modelling choices within an orthodox economic framing of the world and mostly try to argue against substantive greenhouse gas mitigation. Ecological economists accept the need for serious action but reject the reasoning of economic commensuration of costs and benefits, the probabilistic approach to uncertainty and the application of a utilitarian intergenerational calculus.[69] Their criticism applies equally to the likes of Nordhaus and Tol.[70][71][72] The orthodox economic debate is seen as a distraction from the basic ethical issues e.g. discounting instead of justice.

A more fundamental criticism of the Stern report is that it raises a series of problems which it totally fails to address because of its orthodox approach. It simultaneously ignores a range of critical literature from ecological economics and environmental ethics which challenges such orthodox thinking.[70][73][74][75] Stern as an orthodox economist squeezes all matters and concepts into a narrow mathematical formalism which heterodox economists, such as Tony Lawson, point out fails to address economic and social reality.[76]

In conventional cost-benefit analysis, biodiversity and ecosystem services that are not valued as losses are difficult to quantify. Neumayer argues that the real issue is non-substitutable loss of natural capital; to what extent climate change inflicts irreversible and non-substitutable damage to and loss of natural capital.[77] For example, it would be difficult to quantify the loss of coral reefs, biodiversity loss, or species extinction. Dietz points out that in many Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), health and ecosystem impacts are not included because the monetary valuation of these impacts is "speculative and uncertain".[78] Dasgupta (2008) also points out most models do not consider natural capital.[79] Although recent studies on ecosystem services have made gains in monetising the value of ecosystems, more recent studies on ecosystem services[80] suggest the Stern Review underestimates the need for mitigation action as it is difficult for models to quantify the collapse of ecosystem services under climate change.

Thus, ecological economist Clive Spash has questioned whether the report is nothing more than an exercise in rhetoric.[81] Spash notes that a range of serious problems challenging economic analysis is raised or mentioned in the report including: strong uncertainty, incommensurability, plural values, non-utilitarian ethics, rights, distributional inequity, poverty, and treatment of future generations. How then can this report, acknowledging so many of those aspects of climate change that render orthodox economic analysis unsuitable for generating policy recommendations, go ahead to conduct a global cost-benefit calculation based on microeconomic theory and make that the foundation for its policy recommendations? Spash has argued that issues are suppressed and sidelined in a careful and methodical manner, with the pretense they have been addressed by 'state of the art' solutions. Meanwhile, the authors maintain allegiance to an economic orthodoxy which perpetuates the dominant political myth that traditional economic growth can be both sustained and answer all our problems.[82] Besides perpetuating myths, this diverts attention away from alternative approaches, away from ethical debates over harming the innocent, the poor and future generations, and away from the fundamental changes needed to tackle the very real and serious problems current economic systems pose for environmental systems. In addition the policy recommendation of carbon trading is seen as deeply flawed for also failing to take account of social, ecological and economic reality.[83]

Response to criticisms

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The Stern Review team have responded to criticisms of the Review in a number of papers.[84] In these papers, they reassert their view that early and strong action on climate change is necessary:

The case for strong and urgent action set out in the Review is based, first, on the severe risks that the science now identifies (together with the additional uncertainties [...] that it points to but that are difficult to quantify) and, second, on the ethics of the responsibilities of existing generations in relation to succeeding generations. It is these two things that are crucial: risk and ethics. Different commentators may vary in their emphasis, but it is the two together that are crucial. Jettison either one and you will have a much reduced programme for action—and if you judge risks to be small and attach little significance to future generations you will not regard global warming as a problem. It is surprising that the earlier economic literature on climate change did not give risk and ethics the attention they so clearly deserve, and it is because we chose to make them central and explicit that we think we were right for the right reasons.[85]

Members of the Stern Review team have also given several talks that have covered criticisms of the Review. A talk given by Dimitri Zenghelis at the Tyndall Centre looked at criticisms of the Review and presented an overview of its main findings.[86] In an official letter (2008), Joan Ruddock MP of the UK Government, dismisses the criticisms of the Review made by several economists, which, in her view, show "a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of formal, highly aggregated economic modelling in evaluating a policy issue".[87]

Stern's later comments

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In April 2008 Stern said that the severity of his findings were vindicated by the 2007 IPCC report and admitted that in the Stern Review, "We underestimated the risks [...] we underestimated the damage associated with temperature increases [...] and we underestimated the probabilities of temperature increases".[88][89] In June 2008, Stern said that because climate change is happening faster than predicted, the cost to reduce carbon would be even higher, of about 2% of GDP instead of the 1% in the original report.[5]

In an interview at the 2013 World Economic Forum, Stern said "Looking back, I underestimated the risks. The planet and the atmosphere seem to be absorbing less carbon than we expected, and emissions are rising pretty strongly. Some of the effects are coming through more quickly than we thought then" in the 2006 Review. He now believes we are "on track for something like four degrees".[90]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Stern Review on the Economics of is a 700-page report commissioned by the Treasury and authored principally by economist Sir Nicholas Stern, which was released on 30 October 2006 and assessed the economic impacts of alongside policy options for . The Review estimated that unmitigated could impose ongoing global economic costs equivalent to 5% or more of annual GDP—potentially rising to 20% when including non-market impacts and risks of abrupt changes—while arguing that stabilizing concentrations could be achieved at an average annual cost of about 1% of global GDP through investments in low-carbon technologies and efficiency measures. It emphasized that the benefits of strong, early action to curb emissions outweigh the costs, framing inaction as a failure to safeguard future economic stability against risks like sea-level rise, , and ecosystem disruptions. The report's influence extended to shaping international policy discussions, including contributions to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report and advocacy for carbon pricing mechanisms such as and taxes, though its projections drew from integrated assessment models that incorporated uncertain functions and feedback loops from empirical data on temperature sensitivity and limits. However, the Stern Review provoked substantial debate among economists, with prominent critics like arguing that its effective of around 1.4%—derived from a near-zero pure rate of (0.1%) plus a low —unduly prioritized distant future over present consumption, yielding benefit-cost ratios far higher than those from conventional rates of 4-6% aligned with observed market returns and growth projections. Additional scrutiny targeted the Review's estimates as potentially overstated by aggregating high-end tail risks without sufficient probabilistic calibration, and by underemphasizing adaptive capacities in market economies, leading some analyses to conclude that optimal policy warranted more gradual abatement rather than immediate aggressive cuts. Despite these challenges, the Review catalyzed into climate-economy interactions, highlighting tensions between ethical valuations of and empirical discounting observed in financial data.

Background and Commissioning

Origins and Objectives

The Stern Review on the Economics of was commissioned in July by , then in the government, to Sir Nicholas Stern, who was then head of the Government Economic Service and chief economist at the . The initiative stemmed from growing international recognition of as an economic risk, particularly following the Gleneagles summit in , where leaders emphasized the need for integrated economic analysis of environmental challenges. Stern assembled a team of approximately 20 economists, scientists, and policy experts to conduct the independent assessment, which was overseen by the and aimed to synthesize existing evidence rather than generate primary data. The review's primary objectives, as outlined in its , were to evaluate the of transitioning to a low-carbon global economy over the medium to long term, including implications for that shift; to analyze the macroeconomic and policy challenges arising from itself and potential responses to it; and to advance analytical frameworks for designing effective policies at national and international levels. These goals focused on quantifying the costs of inaction versus , using integrated assessment models and empirical data on damages, while emphasizing market-based mechanisms and international cooperation. The government intended the review to inform domestic and global policy, bridging gaps in prior economic literature that had often understated risks due to conventional assumptions. Completed ahead of schedule, the full report—spanning over 700 pages—was published on 30 October 2006, coinciding with pre-COP12 discussions to bolster arguments for stringent emissions reductions. Its objectives reflected a precautionary approach, prioritizing and avoiding high-end risk scenarios, though subsequent critiques have questioned the selection of parameters to align with advocacy for aggressive action.

Nicholas Stern and the Review Team

Nicholas Stern, Baron Stern of Brentford, is a British with expertise in , , and . Born on April 22, 1946, he was appointed in July 2005 by UK Chancellor to lead an independent review on the economics of , leveraging his prior roles including Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank (2000–2003), where he focused on global and , and his academic positions such as of Economics at the London School of Economics (LSE). Stern's selection reflected his interdisciplinary approach, combining economic modeling with , though critics later noted his advocacy for aggressive climate policies may have influenced the review's framing. The Stern Review team comprised around 23 core members primarily from economists and officials, supported by external consultants and over 100 global experts in economics, science, and related fields, working over 16 months to synthesize on impacts and costs. Led operationally by Peters, the team included key contributors such as Vicki Bakhshi, Alex Bowen, Catherine Cameron, Sebastian Catovsky, Simon Dietz, Sam Fankhauser, Chris Hope, Cameron Hepburn, and Jim Skea, who handled modeling, damage assessments, and policy analysis. This composition drew on resources for economic rigor but incorporated inputs from institutions like the and academic collaborators, enabling a broad assessment despite limited direct involvement from skeptical economists at the time. The team's multidisciplinary nature facilitated integration of integrated assessment models and empirical data, but its heavy reliance on government-affiliated personnel raised questions about , as evidenced by parliamentary where team member Lorraine Hamid testified on methodological choices. External advisors, including figures from the and World Bank, provided specialized input, though the final report's conclusions aligned closely with Stern's pre-existing views on high-stakes climate intervention.

Methodological Framework

Choice of Discount Rate

The determines the of future costs and benefits in economic assessments of climate policy, with lower rates assigning greater weight to distant future impacts. In the Stern Review, published on October 30, 2006, the chosen rate was derived from the Ramsey formula: r=ρ+ηgr = \rho + \eta g, where ρ\rho is the pure rate of (set at 0.1% per year, reflecting minimal ethical discounting of ' welfare), η\eta is the elasticity of the of consumption (set at 1, indicating standard inequality aversion), and gg is the expected consumption growth rate (1.3% per year). This yielded an effective annual discount rate of approximately 1.4%, substantially lower than market interest rates or conventional social rates used in . Stern justified the near-zero ρ\rho on ethical grounds, arguing that future generations facing risks deserve comparable moral consideration to the present, absent for high in social welfare functions; he viewed higher ρ\rho values as implicitly accepting risks or indifference to posterity, which he deemed inconsistent with principles. The low rate amplified the present value of projected damages, estimated to equate to 5-20% of global GDP annually in the long term, thereby supporting aggressive near-term costing about 1% of GDP yearly. Critics, including William Nordhaus, contended that Stern's prescriptive approach—prioritizing ethical priors over observed behavior—deviated from descriptive economics, where ρ\rho should align with market rates (around 3-5%) reflecting opportunity costs and revealed preferences; they argued this low rate overstated mitigation benefits by factors of 10 or more, as empirical growth and saving data imply higher effective discounting. Yale economist Nordhaus specifically noted the choice's reliance on "a very low discount rate" without robust empirical backing for ρ\rho, contrasting it with integrated assessment models using 4-5% rates that yield modest optimal carbon taxes. The UK Treasury's standard rate for public projects was 3.5% at the time, highlighting the Review's departure from official practice.

Integrated Assessment Models and Damage Functions

The Stern Review employed integrated assessment models (IAMs) to integrate projections of socioeconomic development, , physical responses, and economic damages, thereby estimating the and evaluating pathways. These models aggregate data from , energy systems, and economic literature, often using simplified representations of complex interactions. The Review primarily drew on the PAGE2002 IAM, developed by Chris Hope and updated with inputs from the IPCC Third Assessment Report, which features probabilistic elements via simulations across 1,000 runs to quantify uncertainties in parameters such as (1.5–4.5°C equilibrium warming for doubled CO₂) and regional vulnerabilities. Damage functions in PAGE2002 estimate impacts as a fraction of regional GDP, scaling nonlinearly with local rise (T_R) according to the form damages ∝ (T_R / 2.5)^γ, where the exponent γ follows a between 1 and 3 (mode at 1.3 for baseline calibrations, or 2.25 in sensitivity analyses to reflect accelerating impacts). Market , encompassing sectors like (projected 15–35% yield reductions at 3–4°C) and coastal , are calibrated to yield around 5% of global GDP under central estimates, while non-market —including health effects and losses—add further losses up to 11% when equity-weighted to prioritize impacts in low-income regions. A stochastic component models catastrophic risks, with probability escalating 10% per degree above 5°C, drawing on probabilistic assessments of tipping points like collapse. These functions were parameterized using meta-analyses of empirical studies, such as those on crop yields and sea-level rise (e.g., 5% of global population at risk from 5 m rise), supplemented by sectoral bottom-up assessments rather than relying solely on historical analogies, which are limited for projections beyond 2–3°C warming. The resulting business-as-usual damage estimates equate to a mean 5% loss in global per-capita consumption (or up to 20% incorporating broader risks and distributional effects), expressed in balanced growth equivalents to compare perpetual consumption reductions with costs. Equity weighting, applying declining of income (elasticity of 1.5), amplifies damages from developing regions, where vulnerabilities like limited capacity (reducing losses by only 30–90% at high warming) prevail. While PAGE2002's structure allows for regional disaggregation (e.g., 2.5–9% GDP losses by 2100 in and at the mean), the Review noted IAM limitations, including underrepresentation of high-end risks (>4°C) due to data scarcity and exclusion of dynamic feedbacks like thaw, prompting aggregation with non-IAM evidence from sources such as the Hadley Centre and Tyndall Centre. This hybrid approach yielded estimates averaging $29 per tonne of CO₂ (range $0–$400), higher than some peer IAMs like FUND or owing to PAGE's emphasis on fat-tailed uncertainty distributions and aversion to downside risks.

Treatment of Uncertainty, Equity, and Growth Assumptions

The Stern addressed in impacts and economic damages through the use of probabilistic integrated assessment models, notably the PAGE2002 model, which employed simulations to generate distributions of outcomes across variables such as emissions trajectories, , and regional damage functions. This methodology emphasized the asymmetry of risks, particularly "fat-tailed" distributions where low-probability, high-damage events—like abrupt threshold crossings or elevated temperature responses—could yield disproportionately large expected losses, thereby justifying precautionary even under parameter ambiguity. The contended that standard expected-value approaches understate these tail risks, as higher effectively lowers the shadow price of capital and amplifies the , though subsequent analyses have debated whether such fat tails robustly alter optimal timing or if they instead warrant higher risk premia in discounting. Regarding equity, the Review framed through a prescriptive ethical lens, setting the pure rate of at 0.1 percent to reflect near-equality in moral weighting across generations, combined with Ramsey tied to expected consumption growth. This yielded a total of about 1.4 percent, prioritizing future welfare over positive (market-observed) rates that incorporate revealed preferences and opportunity costs. Within-region equity was handled via diminishing of consumption (elasticity of 1), while international equity weighting amplified in poorer regions by factors up to fourfold relative to richer ones, based on differentials. Critics, including proponents of descriptive , argued this approach embeds subjective value judgments that deviate from empirical , potentially overstating the of distant without sufficient empirical validation of the ethical priors. Growth assumptions underpinned the Review's baselines, projecting global per capita consumption growth at 1.3 percent annually under business-as-usual scenarios, derived from IPCC SRES A2 projections implying a 13- to 20-fold rise in world consumption by 2200 despite unmitigated warming. This optimistic trajectory—sustained even amid projected GDP losses of 5-20 percent from climate impacts—served to contextualize mitigation costs as low relative to avoided damages, yet relied on a single demographic-emissions pathway without sensitivity to endogenous growth feedbacks or historical precedents of slowdowns from environmental stressors. Analyses have highlighted potential inconsistencies, as assumed high future growth conflicts with the Review's own high-damage estimates that could erode productivity through channels like sea-level rise or agricultural disruptions, suggesting the baselines may understate mitigation urgency or, conversely, inflate damage ratios by anchoring against unrealistically robust counterfactuals.

Core Conclusions

Projected Economic Impacts of Unmitigated Climate Change

The Stern Review projected that unmitigated , following a business-as-usual emissions trajectory, would impose global economic damages equivalent to at least 5% of (GDP) annually, both in the present and perpetually into the future, representing a reduction in global per-capita consumption growth. Incorporating a broader array of risks—such as non-market impacts, climate-carbon cycle feedbacks, distributional inequities, and potential tipping points—these damages could escalate to 20% of global GDP or higher. These estimates derive from probabilistic simulations assuming increases of 2–3°C by mid-century and 5–6°C or more by 2100–2200 under unmitigated emissions, with damages expressed as balanced growth equivalents to capture long-term welfare losses. Projections relied on integrated assessment models (IAMs), including PAGE2002 as the primary tool, alongside FUND and DICE, which link emissions, climate dynamics, economic growth (assumed at 1.9% annually pre-2200), and convex damage functions that amplify losses at higher temperatures. PAGE2002 simulations yielded mean damages of approximately 11% of global GDP by 2100 in baseline runs, with 5th–95th percentile ranges reaching 20%, escalating to 14.4% mean (32.6% at 95th percentile) when including non-market sectors and high-climate sensitivity scenarios. FUND and DICE provided lower central estimates (0.5–2% and 9–11% at 6°C warming, respectively) but were adjusted in the Review via equity weighting—favoring poorer regions—and heightened risk aversion to emphasize tail risks, with a low pure time discount rate of 0.1% to value future generations comparably to the present. Sectoral damages under unmitigated warming encompassed market impacts like 5–20% losses in U.S. above 3°C, 15–25% reductions in yields in the / at 3°C, and 0.5–1% of world GDP from by mid-century, alongside non-market effects in , ecosystems, and amenities. Regionally, developing countries faced disproportionate burdens exceeding 10% GDP at 5–6°C due to limited , with projected at 9–13% losses by 2100 (mean 2.5–3.5%, up to 13% in high-risk scenarios) and / at 7–10%; developed nations at higher latitudes might experience initial net benefits at 2–3°C but 1–5% losses from escalating extremes thereafter. These figures assume adaptation at individual and firm levels but exclude broader responses, post-2200 persistence, or full catastrophe probabilities, potentially understating long-term costs if emissions continue rising.
ModelCentral Damage Estimate (Global GDP, BAU Scenario)High-Risk Range (e.g., 95th )Key Adjustments in Stern Review
PAGE2002~11% by 2100; 4.5% at 5°C meanUp to 23.3% at 5°C; 32.6% with non-market impactsEquity weighting, low discount rate (0.1%), damage exponent mode 2.25
FUND0.5–2% equity-weighted at higher temperaturesNot emphasizedHeightened for
DICE9–11% at 6°CNot specified in ReviewSensitivity to growth and feedbacks

Costs and Feasibility of Mitigation Strategies

The Stern Review estimated that stabilizing concentrations at 550 parts per million (ppm) CO2-equivalent, a level associated with a 63-99% probability of exceeding 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels, would require annual costs equivalent to approximately 1% of global (GDP). This figure encompassed a portfolio of strategies, including energy efficiency improvements, accelerated deployment of low- and zero-carbon technologies such as renewables, , and (CCS), alongside reduced and enhanced agricultural practices. The Review drew on both bottom-up assessments and top-down macroeconomic models like , FUND, and PAGE to derive these costs, projecting that global emissions would need to peak before and decline thereafter to meet the trajectory, with the power sector requiring at least 60% decarbonization by 2050. Feasibility was framed as high given existing or near-commercial technologies, with the Review emphasizing that inaction risks damages equivalent to 5-20% of global GDP annually, far exceeding mitigation expenses. Strategies were deemed viable through market-based incentives like carbon pricing (e.g., taxes or cap-and-trade systems starting at $85 per ton of CO2-equivalent by certain projections), which would internalize externalities and spur without requiring unattainable technological breakthroughs. R&D investments in areas like advanced biofuels, , and grid infrastructure were highlighted as complementary, potentially lowering long-term costs below 1% of GDP if scaled promptly. The analysis assumed continued at 1.9-2.5% annually, arguing that would not significantly impair development in low-income countries if supported by and . Challenges to feasibility included political and institutional barriers, such as the need for global coordination to avoid , where emissions shift to unregulated regions. The Review contended these could be addressed via agreements like expanded Clean Development Mechanisms under the , estimating that flexible, incentive-driven policies would minimize economic disruption compared to command-and-control approaches. Overall, the projected costs were presented as manageable, representing a transfer of resources from consumption to investment in low-carbon infrastructure, with benefits accruing from avoided damages and co-benefits like improved air quality and .

Policy Recommendations for Action

The Stern Review advocated for a comprehensive policy framework emphasizing immediate and coordinated global action to mitigate risks, centered on stabilizing atmospheric concentrations at 450-550 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent to limit temperature increases to 2-3°C above pre-industrial levels. This stabilization pathway required global emissions to peak within the next 10-20 years and decline by 1-3% annually thereafter, ultimately reducing emissions to three-quarters of 2000 levels by 2050 for the 550 ppm , with deeper cuts of 25-75% potentially needed depending on equity and assumptions. The Review estimated that achieving these goals would necessitate annual investments equivalent to approximately 1% of global GDP (around in 2006 terms), rising to 2% if action is delayed, arguing that such costs were outweighed by avoiding 5-20% annual GDP losses from unmitigated impacts. Central to the recommendations was the establishment of a uniform global , implemented through mechanisms such as schemes, , or regulations, to internalize the external costs of emissions and incentivize low-carbon choices across sectors. The Review proposed an initial price trajectory starting at $25-30 per tonne of CO2 equivalent, rising over time to reflect escalating marginal abatement costs, with examples like Norway's demonstrating potential for 2.3% emissions reductions. Sectoral applications included applying this pricing uniformly to minimize overall abatement expenses, while expanding and linking systems—such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme with counterparts in the and —to cover the top 20 emitters and facilitate cost-effective global reductions potentially worth $87-350 billion in traded value. Investment in technology development and deployment formed another pillar, with calls to double public energy spending to about $20 billion annually and scale up deployment incentives by 2-5 times the 2006 level of $34 billion per year, targeting low-carbon innovations like (CCS) through 10-15 demonstration projects by 2015 at additional costs of $2.5-7.5 billion. Sector-specific actions emphasized decarbonizing electricity production by at least 60% by 2050, curbing transport emissions through efficiency and low-carbon fuels, and launching large-scale pilots to halt , which could avoid up to 40 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions between 2008 and 2012 while saving 5.5 gigatonnes annually by 2050 in the land-use sector. Regulations were recommended to complement pricing by stimulating and overcoming market barriers, such as through performance standards for energy efficiency. On adaptation, the Review urged integrating resilience-building into national development policies, particularly in vulnerable developing countries, with estimated annual costs of $3-37 billion for priority needs and $15-150 billion (0.05-0.5% of GDP) for OECD infrastructure upgrades like flood defenses. This included financial safety nets for the poor, high-quality climate information as a public good, and support for National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), exemplified by $133 million for initial projects in select least-developed countries. Internationally, the Review called for enhanced multilateral frameworks under the UNFCCC and post-Kyoto agreements, with developed nations committing to 60-80% emissions cuts from 1990 levels by 2050 and providing $20-40 billion annually to developing countries for low-carbon transitions and , alongside honoring 0.7% GDP targets. Sectoral agreements and initiatives, funded at $6-10 billion yearly for collaborative R&D, were proposed to address competitiveness concerns and accelerate deployment in emerging economies.

Economic Critiques

Discounting Debates and Intergenerational Equity

The Stern Review employed a of approximately 1.4% for evaluating the of future damages and mitigation costs, derived from the Ramsey δ = ρ + ηg, where ρ is the pure rate of set at 0.1%, η is the elasticity of the of consumption at 1, and g is the expected consumption growth rate of 1.3%. This low rate reflects Stern's ethical stance that should receive nearly equal ethical weight to the present one, with primarily accounting for rather than impatience toward posterity. Critics, including William Nordhaus, contended that such a near-zero ρ undervalues empirical evidence from market interest rates and savings behavior, which imply a higher overall discount rate of 3-5% for long-term public projects. Nordhaus argued that Stern's parameterization yields a social cost of carbon exceeding $100 per ton initially, far above estimates using conventional rates under $20 per ton, potentially leading to inefficient over-investment in mitigation at the expense of current development needs. Proponents of higher rates, drawing from observed positive returns on capital (around 4-7% historically), maintain that failing to incorporate a positive time preference ignores opportunity costs and human impatience, as evidenced by low voluntary savings for distant risks in private markets. Intergenerational equity debates center on whether ρ should approximate zero on ethical grounds—treating extinction risks as minimal and future welfare as equally deserving—or reflect realism about uncertainty, including the possibility of human extinction or technological divergence that diminishes the relevance of very distant futures. Stern's approach, justified by a consequentialist ethic prioritizing aggregate welfare without strong discounting for time alone, has been critiqued for inconsistency with positive ρ implied by empirical consumption choices and for assuming persistent intergenerational continuity without discounting for non-overlapping generations' differing priorities. Empirical studies on hyperbolic discounting suggest individuals exhibit time-inconsistent preferences, challenging Stern's exponential model and supporting moderated equity weights that decline more sharply over centuries. Despite these disputes, Stern defended the low ρ as aligned with sustainable development principles, arguing that higher rates implicitly discriminate against the unborn by prioritizing present consumption.

Flaws in Damage and Cost Estimations

Critics have argued that the Stern Review's estimates, derived primarily from integrated assessment models (IAMs) such as PAGE2002, incorporate uncertain and potentially overstated projections of impacts, particularly for high warming scenarios beyond 2–3°C where empirical data is limited. These models rely on quadratic damage functions calibrated from a narrow set of studies, often emphasizing upper-bound estimates of sector-specific impacts like sea-level rise and , without robust validation against observed historical warming of approximately 0.7°C, which has shown minimal aggregate economic disruption in developed economies. For instance, the Review's business-as-usual (BAU) projection of 5–20% of global GDP by 2100 exceeds the median IAM output of around 2–3%, due to selective parameter choices that weight high-tail risks more heavily, including a 10% probability of catastrophe causing damages up to 20 times mean estimates, a figure contested for lacking probabilistic grounding in peer-reviewed . Furthermore, the Review's aggregation of damages across regions applies equity weighting that amplifies losses in developing countries, assuming uniform vulnerability despite evidence of adaptation potential and differential sectoral exposures; this leads to global estimates sensitive to assumptions about non-market damages (e.g., human life and ecosystems), which constitute a significant portion but are derived from methods prone to hypothetical bias and wide confidence intervals. Economists like have highlighted that such approaches extrapolate linearly from low-warming observations, ignoring potential nonlinearities or feedbacks that could either exacerbate or mitigate impacts, rendering the Review's central damage figure of 11% GDP under BAU (rising to 20% with ) as an outlier compared to contemporaneous IAM medians. On mitigation costs, the Stern Review estimated an annual global expenditure of 1% of GDP to stabilize atmospheric CO2-equivalent concentrations at 550 ppm by 2100, a figure critics contend understates the economic burden by assuming seamless technological transitions, full international cooperation, and negligible implementation frictions such as capital constraints or policy distortions. Robert Mendelsohn argued that this cost metric is inconsistent with the Review's damage valuation, which incorporates via declining of consumption; applying equivalent adjustments to abatement costs triples the estimate to approximately 3% of GDP, aligning it more closely with IAM simulations like that project 2–5% GDP losses for comparable stabilization paths under realistic behavioral responses. Additional flaws include the Review's optimistic portrayal of cost reductions from in low-carbon technologies, extrapolated from historical energy efficiency trends without accounting for effects or the opportunity costs of diverting R&D from other sectors; peer-reviewed analyses indicate that achieving 550 ppm would require annual emissions reductions accelerating to 4–5% post-2030, incurring short-term GDP drags of 2–4% in energy-intensive economies, far exceeding Stern's net cost framing after purported co-benefits like reduced , which are themselves uncertain and regionally variable. This discrepancy arises partly from the Review's reliance on bottom-up cost models over top-down econometric estimates, the latter revealing higher elasticities of substitution and in fuel-dependent systems.

Neglect of Adaptation, Innovation, and Market Dynamics

Critics have argued that the Stern Review's damage estimates systematically overlooked the role of human , inflating projected economic losses from . Although the report includes chapters discussing adaptation's importance, its core integrated assessment models, such as FUND and PAGE, incorporated minimal or no adaptive responses in quantifying damages, such as adjustments in , infrastructure like sea walls, or measures, potentially overstating costs by an or more. For instance, Robert Mendelsohn noted that without adaptation, the Review's models treat impacts as if societies remain passive, ignoring historical evidence of successful behavioral and technological adjustments to environmental changes. This omission fails to account for how rising incomes enable greater , as developing economies historically reduce vulnerability through growth rather than stasis. The Review has also been faulted for neglecting innovation's potential to mitigate both damages and abatement costs through endogenous technological progress driven by market incentives. Stern assumed that technological change would reduce the marginal cost of abatement from approximately 3% of GDP in 2030 to 0.5% by 2050, a six-fold decline, but provided limited empirical justification for such rapid, exogenous advancements in unproven technologies like . Critics contend this underestimates the risks of over-reliance on speculative breakthroughs while ignoring how carbon pricing could induce more gradually and cost-effectively via , rather than mandating immediate, high-cost that crowds out private investment. Moreover, the models did not fully integrate in damage sectors, such as or resilient infrastructure, which empirical studies suggest could offset a significant portion of projected agricultural losses. Regarding market dynamics, the Stern Review's analysis has been criticized for assuming static behavioral responses and perfect policy , disregarding real-world economic adjustments like resource substitution, price signals, and profit-driven efficiency gains. It portrayed as an unmitigated requiring top-down intervention, yet neglected how markets could reallocate resources—such as shifting from fossil fuels to alternatives as raises prices—without aggressive regulation, potentially at lower . For example, the Review's abatement cost projections presupposed instantaneous, universal adoption of optimal low-carbon technologies by firms, ignoring sunk costs, learning curves, and competitive delays observed in historical transitions, which could elevate actual expenses beyond the estimated 1-2% of global GDP annually. This static approach also undervalued the opportunity costs of diverting capital from high-return sectors, as evidenced by market discount rates averaging 3-7% in developed economies, far exceeding Stern's near-zero pure . By sidelining these dynamics, the Review arguably overstated the net benefits of stringent over adaptive, market-led strategies.

Reception Among Economists

Supportive Perspectives

Frank Ackerman defended the Stern Review's low of approximately 1.4%, arguing it appropriately incorporates ethical judgments about by assigning a near-zero pure rate of , thereby avoiding undue discrimination against future generations compared to critics' higher rates of 3-5%. Ackerman further contended that the Review's methodology for handling uncertainty—through simulations and equity weighting in models like PAGE—provides a more robust framework for assessing climate risks than the deterministic approaches favored by detractors, emphasizing that mitigation costs of around 1% of global GDP annually are justified against projected damages up to 20% or more. Martin Weitzman, in his analysis, endorsed the Review's implicit emphasis on "fat-tailed" uncertainty distributions for climate damages, where low-probability, high-impact catastrophes (e.g., rapid sea-level rise or ) amplify the case for immediate action, effectively lowering the shadow discount rate and outweighing abatement costs even under conservative assumptions. Similarly, Nobel laureate supported the Review's cost-benefit rationale, noting that strong mitigation remains optimal across a range of plausible discount rates when accounting for and non-market damages. Chris , who developed the PAGE integrated assessment model central to the Review's projections, co-authored reflections asserting the robustness of its findings, including sectoral analyses of impacts on , , and coastal areas, and argued in subsequent work that the Review's damage estimates for the and globally—around 5-20% of GDP by 2200 under business-as-usual scenarios—may underestimate true vulnerabilities due to omitted factors like and migration costs. and collaborators like Simon Dietz maintained that these projections hold even with sensitivity tests varying growth rates (1.3% ) and equity parameters, reinforcing the feasibility of stabilization pathways limiting warming to 2°C via carbon pricing and technology deployment. Supporters highlighted the Review's role in elevating climate economics, with Andrew Steer crediting it for marshaling evidence on costs and benefits to advance policy-relevant analysis beyond scientific discourse alone. Kate Gordon echoed this, noting its inspiration for subsequent research integrating economic modeling with empirical data on limits and potentials. These perspectives collectively underscore the Review's for urgent, coordinated action as economically rational under ethical and risk-informed frameworks.

Critical Analyses from Leading Economists

, a Nobel laureate in economics, critiqued the Stern Review in a 2007 Journal of Economic Literature article for its unusually low pure rate of of 0.1%, which yielded a of 1.4% and thereby amplified the of distant future damages beyond empirical justification. He argued this rate falls outside reasonable ethical and market-based estimates, typically ranging from 3-5%, and results in damage projections—such as up to 20% of global GDP—that exceed peer-reviewed literature by an , where standard figures hover around 2-3% of GDP for equivalent warming scenarios. Nordhaus's integrated assessment model, , recalibrated with conventional parameters, indicated that optimal entails gradual emissions starting at low levels (e.g., $20-30 per of CO2 initially) and rising over time, contrasting Stern's call for immediate, aggressive reductions that could impose annual abatement costs of 2-3% of GDP without proportional near-term benefits. Robert Mendelsohn and co-authors, in a 2006 Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies critique, faulted the Review for overestimating damages by neglecting measures—such as adjustments and agricultural shifts—which empirical studies show mitigate impacts by factors of 5-10 times in sectors like coastal protection and farming. They highlighted reliance on the IPCC's A2 demographic scenario, assuming stagnant 1.3% growth and explosive population increases to 15 billion by 2200, which inflates baseline damages compared to more balanced projections; combined with the low discount rate, this triples estimated costs relative to market-consistent 4% rates. The analysis also criticized underestimation of abatement expenses, including unproven technologies like carbon capture (assumed to scale sixfold by 2050 without evidence) and overlooked externalities such as stranding assets or vast land demands for renewables (e.g., 5-10 million hectares for solar equivalents). Richard Tol, in assessments of the Review's damage functions, contended that Stern selectively drew from the upper tail of impact studies—e.g., citing estimates implying 5-20% GDP losses while sidelining medians around 0-2% from IPCC syntheses—thus exaggerating aggregate welfare costs by factors of 2-5 times. Tol and Gary Yohe further noted inconsistencies in equity weighting, where Stern applied high aversion parameters to but inconsistently to abatement burdens, leading to overstated net benefits for stringent stabilization targets like 550 ppm CO2 by 2050. These choices, Tol argued, diverge from meta-analyses of impacts, which aggregate to modest global losses (1-3% GDP at 2-3°C warming) when accounting for regional variations and defensive expenditures.

Key Events and Symposia (e.g., Yale Symposium)

The Yale Symposium on the Stern Review, organized by the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, convened on February 15, 2007, to examine the report's economic analyses and policy implications. Chaired by , the event featured presentations from Sir Nicholas Stern, who outlined the review's core findings on climate damages equivalent to 5-20% of global GDP annually if unmitigated, contrasted with mitigation costs of about 1% of GDP. Key participants included economists such as , who critiqued the review's near-zero as deviating from standard economic practice, arguing it overstated by undervaluing present consumption; Chris Hope, who defended the PAGE integrated assessment model used for damage projections; and others like , Scott Barrett, and Robert Mendelsohn, addressing policy mechanisms, , and modeling uncertainties. Discussions centered on contentious issues, including the discounting debate—where Stern's approach implied future damages should be weighted almost equally to current ones—and the review's damage estimations, which critics contended relied on high-end assumptions and non-market impacts extrapolated beyond empirical evidence. Nordhaus, in his contribution, estimated that optimal under conventional would stabilize emissions at lower stringency than Stern advocated, projecting costs closer to 2-3% of GDP for similar outcomes. The event underscored divisions among economists, with supporters emphasizing ethical imperatives for low amid , while skeptics highlighted methodological choices that amplified alarmist conclusions without robust justification from observed data. Proceedings from the symposium were compiled into a publication featuring chapters on the review's findings, modeling critiques, and policy alternatives, available through Yale's archives, fostering further academic scrutiny. Concurrently, a February 13, 2007, panel at MIT echoed these tensions, with participants labeling the review more as a policy advocacy piece than a neutral economic assessment, prioritizing political urgency over analytical rigor. These forums highlighted the review's role in sparking rigorous debate but also exposed its vulnerabilities to alternative parameterizations yielding less aggressive policy prescriptions.

Broader Impact and Policy Reception

Influence on International Climate Policy

The Stern Review, released on 30 October 2006, provided an economic rationale that bolstered arguments for aggressive in international forums, portraying unchecked as equivalent to a 5-20% annual loss in global GDP while estimating mitigation costs at around 1% of GDP. This framing shifted emphasis from environmental to macroeconomic risks, influencing the United Kingdom's advocacy for global action and contributing to heightened urgency in UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. At the 2007 G8 Summit in , , the Review's projections informed the leaders' declaration to "seriously consider" halving global emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels, representing an early multilateral acknowledgment of the need for economy-wide transformations despite varying national commitments. Nicholas Stern's presentation of the Review's findings at the UNFCCC's COP13 in Bali later that year underscored its role in economic discourse, with conference co-facilitators citing it as a turning point that clarified the benefits of early action over delayed responses. The resulting Bali Roadmap established a negotiation track for enhanced action post-2012 , incorporating the Review's calls for , adaptation finance, and reduced emissions from —elements that echoed in later talks. Its recommended stabilization range of 450-550 ppm CO2-equivalent, implying limits on warming to avoid severe damages, aligned with emerging consensus on a 2°C threshold, though empirical validation of damage scales remains contested among economists. While the Review helped build momentum toward the 2009 Copenhagen Accord's recognition of shared responsibilities and finance for developing nations, its direct translation into binding targets was limited by disagreements over equity and verification. Elements like carbon pricing and cooperative mechanisms persisted into the Paris Agreement's nationally determined contributions framework, yet critics note that policy outcomes often prioritized political feasibility over the Review's prescribed urgency, with global emissions continuing to rise post-2006.

Political and Ideological Critiques

The Stern Review, commissioned by the Treasury under the Labour government and released on October 30, 2006, was criticized for serving political objectives rather than providing dispassionate economic analysis. , a Nobel laureate economist, described it as a political report rather than an academic one, arguing that its and conclusions were shaped to advocate for stringent policies ahead of international negotiations. Similarly, during UK parliamentary scrutiny, witnesses contended that the Review was not fully independent and faced political pressures from the commissioning body, potentially biasing its recommendations toward endorsing carbon pricing and emissions reductions as immediate imperatives. Ideologically, detractors highlighted the Review's selective handling of evidence and sources, portraying it as a vehicle for a preconceived agenda favoring aggressive intervention over adaptive or market-based responses. A dual by economists noted that the document's treatment of impacts and costs drew disproportionately from non-peer-reviewed or outlier studies while downplaying contrary empirical findings, aligning with an ethical framework that elevated long-term risks—often amplified by uncertain catastrophe scenarios—above verifiable near-term trade-offs. , a former cabinet minister and critic associated with climate-skeptical analyses, argued that the Review functioned as a public relations exercise unprecedented in , exploiting public alarm to justify policies like global carbon taxes, which he viewed as disproportionately burdening current generations and developing economies without proportional benefits. Bjørn Lomborg, in his assessments of climate economics, faulted the Review for massaging data and exaggerating peer-reviewed damage estimates to manufacture urgency, thereby advancing an ideological narrative of that prioritized symbolic international accords over pragmatic for broader human welfare issues like and . Such critiques often emanated from libertarian or conservative-leaning outlets, which contended that the Review's low discount rate and emphasis on precautionary action reflected a toward collectivist solutions, including wealth transfers via mechanisms, rather than fostering or respecting economic priorities—though mainstream academic responses frequently dismissed these as ideologically driven without engaging the underlying evidentiary disputes. Over time, these political and ideological objections contributed to skepticism about the Review's role in shaping policies like the EU Emissions Trading Scheme expansions and UN Framework Convention commitments, where empirical validation of projected damages remained contested.

Long-Term Legacy and Empirical Validation Challenges

The Stern Review's projections of damages, estimated at 5-20% of global GDP under various scenarios including tail risks, have encountered significant empirical challenges in validation due to the difficulty of isolating signals from socioeconomic trends such as rising and measures. For instance, the Review anticipated escalating economic losses from events, projecting costs equivalent to over $1.2 trillion annually by 2050 in constant dollars, yet observed global insured losses from weather-related s through remained substantially below such trajectories, averaging far lower when normalized for GDP growth and inflation. Critics, including economists like Roger Pielke Jr., attribute this discrepancy to overreliance on unadjusted historical data that failed to account for declining vulnerability as development reduces exposure, a factor empirically demonstrated in datasets showing no upward trend in normalized damages since the . Long-term legacy assessments, particularly in retrospective analyses a decade or more post-publication, highlight methodological flaws that impede robust empirical testing, such as the Review's use of a low effective discount rate (around 1.4%) which amplified distant future damages but diverged from market-observed rates used by most integrated assessment models (). Leading economists like and Richard Tol have argued that this approach yielded damage estimates inconsistent with observed economic resilience; for example, global GDP has risen approximately 50% since 2006 amid about 0.8°C of additional warming, with no evidence of the Review's forecasted slowdowns in growth rates attributable to impacts. Tol's decompositions of IAM results further indicate that Stern's figures exceeded consensus medians by factors of 2-10 for moderate warming scenarios, a gap unbridged by subsequent data on agricultural yields or sea-level rise effects, where via has mitigated projected losses. Validation challenges persist due to confounding variables and data limitations; attribution studies struggle to disentangle -driven changes from non-climatic factors like , while the Review's emphasis on irreversible tipping points lacks empirical confirmation in observed system through 2025. Despite these hurdles, the Review's legacy endures in circles for framing as an issue, though empirical outcomes underscore the need for updated models incorporating observed adaptive capacities and innovation-driven cost reductions, as critiqued in symposia and peer reviews questioning the Review's causal assumptions on unchecked warming trajectories. This has prompted calls for more falsifiable benchmarks in future assessments, revealing systemic biases in alarmist projections that prioritize worst-case scenarios over probabilistic evidence.

Responses and Later Developments

Initial Rebuttals by Stern and Supporters

In immediate responses to early critiques, such as those from William Nordhaus and Richard Tol published in late 2006, Nicholas Stern maintained that the Review's core conclusions were robust, emphasizing that divergences from prior literature stemmed from incorporating broader evidence on non-market damages, irreversible risks, and equity considerations rather than selective data. Stern argued that the Review's damage estimates, reaching up to 20% of global GDP under high-emission scenarios, reflected empirical updates from sources like the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (2007) and accounted for potential catastrophic outcomes, countering claims of exaggeration by highlighting underestimated feedbacks such as permafrost thaw and biodiversity loss in earlier models. On the contentious issue of the , Stern and co-authors Simon Dietz, Chris Hope, and Dimitri Zenghelis defended the near-zero pure rate of (set at 0.1%) as an ethical imperative, asserting that heavy of future welfare—common in conventional analyses at 1-3%—unjustly penalizes unborn generations for originating today, especially given uncertain growth rates that could amplify intergenerational inequities. They contended that this approach aligns with Ramsey principles under uncertainty, where the elasticity of (η=1) and low yield results consistent with observed market rates when adjusted for , rebutting accusations of inconsistency by noting that critics often conflate descriptive market rates with prescriptive social rates. Supporters, including government officials and environmental economists, echoed these points in contemporaneous forums, such as the February 2007 Yale Symposium on the Stern Review, where panelists like praised the integration of and urged policymakers to prioritize funding alongside , arguing that inaction costs would exceed the 1-2% GDP annual investment recommended by . In a January 2007 reflection paper, team directly addressed Tol and Yohe's critique of vulnerability assumptions, clarifying that the Review avoided equity weighting pitfalls by using consumption losses and global aggregates, while stressing that costs were front-loaded but declining due to technological learning curves evidenced in sector data. These initial defenses framed the Review not as alarmist but as a precautionary application of economic theory to existential risks, with Stern asserting in symposium remarks that updated since 2006 had only strengthened the case for urgent action, as initial models understated tail risks like multi-meter sea-level rise. Critics' focus on narrow cost-benefit parameters, supporters argued, overlooked the Review's emphasis on dynamic policy responses and international cooperation, as demonstrated by subsequent endorsements from bodies like the in early 2007 policy papers.

Stern's Subsequent Reflections (2007–2025)

In the years immediately following the 2006 publication, Stern defended the Review's core arguments in a series of reflections published in World Economics. In early 2007, he articulated a "robust case for strong action" to mitigate risks, emphasizing the Review's integration of economic modeling with ethical considerations on and the low discount rates justified by uncertainty and potential catastrophic outcomes. He addressed critics' concerns over assumptions like the and pure rate of , arguing that the evidence supported aggressive responses to avoid irreversible equivalent to 5-20% of global GDP annually under business-as-usual scenarios. A companion piece highlighted emerging international opportunities for coordinated action, including carbon pricing and technology deployment, as post-Kyoto negotiations gained momentum. Stern expanded these views in subsequent works, including his 2009 book A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, which reaffirmed the Review's framework while incorporating advancements in low-carbon technologies and global emissions trajectories. By 2015, in Why Are We Waiting? The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling , he updated assessments to conclude that climate risks and costs exceeded 2006 projections, with faster-than-expected ice melt, , and amplifying potential damages; costs, however, had declined due to cost reductions, reinforcing the economic rationale for delayed action's high opportunity costs. These reflections maintained the Review's ethical stance against high discounting of , critiquing conventional economic models for undervaluing long-term human welfare. Marking the 10-year anniversary in 2016, Stern stated in interviews that global warming's impacts were "worse than I feared," citing strengthened physical science evidence—such as accelerated sea-level rise and Arctic amplification—and improved integrated assessment models showing underestimated damages from tipping points like thaw. He noted falling solar and costs had lowered stabilization expenses to below 1% of GDP annually, making a low-carbon transition not only feasible but the sole sustainable growth path, with exemplifying rapid clean energy adoption. Stern rejected labels of , attributing such critiques to overly optimistic baselines in rival analyses. On the 15th anniversary in , Stern's LSE lecture reviewed empirical progress, observing that while emissions had not peaked as hoped by 2010, innovation in and storage had enhanced feasibility of net-zero pathways. He revised mitigation cost estimates upward to 2-3% of GDP for stabilizing at 450 ppm CO2—stricter than the Review's 550 ppm CO2e target—due to tighter timelines and residual dependencies, yet framed this as an investment yielding transformative growth via productivity gains from decarbonization. Stern criticized some economic valuations for "grossly undervaluing" future lives through high discount rates, urging faster policy implementation amid post-COVID recovery opportunities. Into 2023 and beyond, he continued emphasizing climate-finance integration for , viewing low-carbon shifts as the 21st century's primary growth engine amid futile -fuel reliance.

References

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