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Greater East Asia Conference
Greater East Asia Conference
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Member states of the Greater East Asia Conference
 : Japan and colonies
   : Other territories occupied by Japan
 : Territories disputed and claimed by Japan
Participants of the Greater East Asia Conference from left to right: Ba Maw, Zhang Jinghui, Wang Jingwei, Hideki Tōjō, Wan Waithayakon, Jose P. Laurel, and Subhas Chandra Bose
Leaders and delegations from the Greater East Asia Conference (photo taken in front of the Imperial House)
Subhas Chandra Bose giving a speech
View of the Parliament of the facade of the building and the podium decorated with flags of the participating countries of the conference, from the crowd

The Greater East Asia Conference (大東亞會議, Dai Tōa Kaigi) was an international summit held in Tokyo from 5 to 6 November 1943, in which the Empire of Japan hosted leading politicians of various component parts of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The event was also referred to as the Tokyo Conference.

The conference addressed few issues of substance, but was intended from the start as a propaganda show piece, to convince members of Japan's commitments to the Pan-Asianism ideal, with an emphasis on their role as the "liberator" of Asia from Western imperialism.[1]

Background

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Since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, people in the Asian nations ruled by the "white powers" such as India, Vietnam, etc. and those that had "unequal treaties" forced upon them like China and Korea[2] had always looked to Japan as a role model, the first Asian nation that had modernised and defeated a European nation, Russia, in modern times.[3] Throughout the 1920s-30s, Japanese newspapers had always given extensive coverage to the racist laws meant to exclude Asian immigrants such as the "White Australia" policy; the anti-Asian immigrant laws by the U.S. Congress in 1882, 1917, and 1924; and the "White Canada" policy together with reports about how Asians suffered from prejudice in the United States, Canada, Australia, and European colonies in Asia.[4] Most Japanese at the time seemed to have sincerely believed that Japan was a uniquely virtuous nation ruled over by an emperor who was a living god, and thus the font of all goodness in the world.[5] Because the emperor was worshiped as a living god who was morally "pure" and "just", the self-perception in Japan was that the Japanese state could never do anything wrong as under the leadership of the divine Emperor, everything the Japanese state did was "just".[5] For this reason, Japanese people were predisposed to view any war as "just" and "moral" as the divine Emperor could never wage an "unjust" war.[5] Within this context, many Japanese believed it was the "mission" of Japan to end the domination of "white" nations in Asia, and free the other Asians suffering under the rule of the "white powers".[6] A pamphlet titled Read this Alone-and the War Can Be Won issued to all Japanese troops and sailors in December 1941 read: "These white people may expect, from the moment they issue from their mothers' wombs, to be allotted a score or so of natives as their personal slaves. Is this really God's will?".[7] Japanese propaganda stressed the theme of the mistreatment of Asians by whites to motivate their troops and sailors.[8]

Starting in 1931, Japan had always sought to justify its imperialism under the grounds of Pan-Asianism. The war with China, which began in 1937, was portrayed as an effort to unite the Chinese and Japanese peoples together in Pan-Asian friendship, to bring the "imperial way" to China, which justified "compassionate killing" as the Japanese sought to kill the "few trouble-makers" in China who were alleged to be causing all the problems in Sino-Japanese relations.[5] As such, Japanese propaganda had proclaimed that the Imperial Army, guided by the "emperor's benevolence" had come to China to engage in "compassionate killing" for the good of the Chinese people.[5] In 1941, when Japan declared war on the United States and several European nations which possessed colonies in Asia, the Japanese portrayed themselves as engaging in a war of liberation on behalf of all the peoples of Asia. In particular, there was a marked racism to Japanese propaganda with the Japanese government issuing cartoons depicting the Western powers as "white devils" or "white demons", complete with claws, fangs, horns, and tails.[9] The Japanese government depicted the war as a race war between the benevolent Asians led by Japan, the most powerful Asian country against the Americans and Europeans, who were portrayed as sub-human "white devils".[9] At times, Japanese leaders spoke like they believed their own propaganda about whites being in a process of racial degeneration and were actually turning into the drooling, snarling demonical creatures depicted in their cartoons.[10] Thus, Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka had stated in a 1940 press conference that "the mission of the Yamato race is to prevent the human race from becoming devilish, to rescue it from destruction and lead it to the light of the world".[11] At least some people within the Asian colonies of the European powers had welcomed the Japanese as liberators from the Europeans. In the Dutch East Indies, the nationalist leader Sukarno in 1942 had created the formula of the "Three A's": Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Leader of Asia.[12]

But for all their talk about creating a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere where all the Asian peoples would live together as brothers and sisters, in reality as shown by a July 1943 planning document titled An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus, the Japanese saw themselves as the racially superior "Great Yamato race", which was naturally destined to forever dominate the other racially inferior Asian peoples.[13] Prior to the Greater East Asia Conference, Japan had made vague promises of independence to various anti-colonial pro-independence organisations in the territories it had overrun, but aside from a number of obvious puppet states set up in China, these promises had not been fulfilled. Now, with the tide of the Pacific War turning against Japan, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supporters of the Pan-Asian philosophy within the government and military pushed forward a program to grant rapid "independence" to various parts of Asia in an effort to increase local resistance to the Allies and trigger the latter's return and to boost local support for the Japanese war effort. The Japanese military leadership agreed in principle, understanding the propaganda value of such a move, but the level of "independence" the military had in mind for the various territories was even less than that enjoyed by Manchukuo. Several components of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were not represented. In early 1943, the Japanese established the Ministry of Greater East Asia to conduct relations with the supposedly independent states of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".[14]

American historian Gerhard Weinberg writes about the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry: "This step itself showed that the periodic announcements from Tokyo that the peoples of Asia were to be liberated and allowed to determine their own fate were a sham and were so intended. If any of the territories nominally declared to be independent were in fact to be so, they could obviously be dealt with by the Foreign Ministry, which existed precisely for the purpose of handling relations with independent states".[14] Korea and Taiwan had long been annexed as external territories of the Empire of Japan, and there were no plans to extend any form of political autonomy or even nominal independence. Vietnamese and Cambodian delegates were not invited for fear of offending the Vichy French regime, which maintained a legal claim to French Indochina and to which Japan was still formally allied. The issue of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was complex. Large portions were under occupation by the Imperial Japanese Army or Imperial Japanese Navy, and the organisers of the Greater East Asia Conference were dismayed by the unilateral decision of the Imperial General Headquarters to annex these territories to the Japanese Empire on May 31, 1943, rather than to grant nominal independence. This action considerably undermined efforts to portray Japan as the "liberator" of the Asian peoples. Indonesian independence leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were invited to Tokyo shortly after the close of the conference for informal meetings, but were not allowed to participate in the conference itself.[15] In the end, seven countries (including Japan) participated.

Participants

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There were six "independent" participants and one observer that attended the Greater East Asia Conference.[16] These were:

Strictly speaking, Subhas Chandra Bose was present only as an "observer"[citation needed], since India was a British colony. Furthermore, Thailand sent Prince Wan Waithayakon in place of Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram to emphasise that Thailand was not a country under Japanese domination. He was also worried that he might be ousted should he leave Bangkok.[17] Tōjō greeted them with a speech praising the "spiritual essence" of Asia, as opposed to the "materialistic civilisation" of the West.[18] Their meeting was characterised by praise of solidarity and condemnation of Western imperialism, but without practical plans for either economic development or integration.[19] As Korea had been annexed by Japan in 1910, there was no official Korean delegation to the conference, but a number of leading Korean intellectuals such as historian Choe Nam-seon, novelist Yi Gwangsu, and children's writer Ma Haesong attended the conference as part of the Japanese delegation to deliver speeches praising Japan and to express their thanks to the Japanese for colonising Korea.[20] The purpose of these speeches was to reassure other Asian peoples about their future in a Japanese-dominated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The fact that Choe and Yi had once been Korean independence activists who had been bitterly opposed to Japanese rule made their presence at the conference a propaganda coup for the Japanese government, as it seemed to show that Japanese imperialism was so beneficial to the peoples subjected to Japan that even those who once been opposed to the Japanese had now seen the errors of their ways.[21] The Korean delegates also spoke passionately against the "Western devils", describing them as the "most deadly enemies of Asian civilisation that had ever existed", and praising Japan for its role in standing up to them.[20]

Themes

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The major theme of the conference was for the need for all the Asian peoples to rally behind Japan and offer an inspiring example of Pan-Asian idealism against the evil "white devils".[22] American historian John W. Dower writes that the various delegates "...placed the war in the East-versus-the West, Oriental-versus-the Occidental, and ultimately a blood-versus-blood context."[22] Ba Maw of Burma stated: "My Asian blood has always called out to other Asians... This is not the time to think with other minds, this is the time to think with our blood, and this thinking has brought me from Burma to Japan."[22] Ba Maw later remembered: "We were Asians rediscovering Asia".[23] Hideki Tōjō of Japan stated in his speech: "It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Asia are bound in every respect by ties of an inseparable relationship".[24] Jose Laurel of the Philippines in his speech claimed that no-one in the world could "stop or delay the acquisition of one billion Asians of the free and untrammelled right and opportunity to shape their own destiny".[24] Subhas Chandra Bose of India declared: "If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years".[14] A major irony of the conference was that despite all of the vehement talk condemning the "Anglo-Saxons", English was the language of the conference as it was the only common language of the various delegates from all over Asia.[14] Bose recalled that the atmosphere at the conference was like a "family gathering" as everybody was Asian, and he felt like they belonged together.[25] Many Indians supported Japan, and throughout the conference Indian university students studying in Japan mobbed Bose like an idol.[25] The Filipino ambassador, representing the Laurel government stated "the time has come for the Filipinos to disregard Anglo-Saxon civilisation and its enervating influence... and to recapture their charm and original virtues as an Oriental people."[25]

As Japan had about two million soldiers fighting in China, making it by far the largest theatre of operations for Japan, by 1943 the Tōjō cabinet had decided to make peace with China to focus on fighting the Americans.[26] The idea of peace with China had first been raised in early 1943, but Tōjō had encountered fierce resistance with the Japanese elite to giving up any of the Japanese "rights and interests" in China, which were the only conceivable basis for making peace with China.[5] To square this circle about how to make peace with China without surrendering any of the Japanese "rights and interests" in China, it was believed in Tokyo that a major demonstration of Pan-Asianism would lead the Chinese to make peace with Japan, and join the Japanese against their common enemies, the "white devils".[26] Thus, a major theme of the conference was by being allied to the United States and the United Kingdom, Chiang Kai-shek was not a proper Asian as no Asian would ally himself with the "white devils" against other Asians. Weinberg noted that in regards to Japanese propaganda in China, "the Japanese had in effect written off any prospects for propaganda in China by their atrocious conduct in the country", but in the rest of Asia the slogan "Asia for Asians" had much "resonance" as many people in Southeast Asia had no love for the various Western powers who ruled over them.[27]

Ba Maw maintained later on the Pan-Asian spirit of the 1943 conference lived after the war, becoming the basis of the 1955 Bandung Conference.[23] Indian historian Pankaj Mishra praised the Greater East Asia Conference as the part of the coming together process of the Asian peoples against the whites as "...the Japanese had revealed how deep the roots of anti-Westernism went and how quickly Asians could seize power from their European tormentors".[23] Mishra argued that the behaviour of the "white powers" towards their Asian colonies, which according to him had been led by marked amount of racism, meant that it was natural for Asians to look to Japan as a liberator from their colonial rulers.[28]

Joint Declaration

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The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference was published as follows:

It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.

The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the recent war. The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and ensuring their self-existence and self-defence, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

  • The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.
  • The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.
  • The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilisation of Greater East Asia.
  • The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavour to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.
  • The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.[29]

Assessment

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The conference and the formal declaration adhered to on November 6 was little more than a propaganda gesture designed to rally regional support for the next stage of the war, outlining the ideals of which it was fought.[15] However, the conference marked a turning point in Japanese foreign policy and relations with other Asian nations. The defeat of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal and an increasing awareness of the limitations to Japanese military strength led the Japanese civilian leadership to realise that a framework based on cooperation, rather than one of colonial domination, would enable a greater mobilisation of manpower and resources against the resurgent Allied forces. It was also the start of efforts to create a framework that would allow for some form of diplomatic compromise should the military solution fail altogether.[15] However these moves came too late to save the empire, which surrendered to the Allies less than two years after the conference.

Embarrassed by the fact in October 1943, the United Kingdom and the United States had signed treaties giving up their extraterritorial concessions and rights in China, on 9 January 1944 Japan signed a treaty with the regime of Wang Jingwei giving up its extraterritorial rights in China.[26] Emperor Hirohito thought this treaty was so significant that he had his younger brother Prince Mikasa sign the treaty in Nanjing on his behalf.[30] Chinese public opinion was unimpressed with this attempt to put Sino-Japanese relations on a new footing, not the least because the treaty did not change the relationship between Wang and his Japanese masters.[30] Hirohito did not accept the idea of national self-determination, and never called for any changes to Japanese policies in Korea and Taiwan, where the Japanese state had a policy of imposing the Japanese language and culture on the Koreans and Taiwanese, which somewhat undercut the Pan-Asian rhetoric.[30] The emperor viewed Asia through the notion of "place", meaning that all of the Asian peoples were different races that had a proper "place" within a Japanese-dominated "co-prosperity sphere" in Asia, with the Japanese as the leading race.[30] The change to a more co-operative relationship between Japan and the other Asian peoples in 1943-45 were largely cosmetic and were made in response to a losing war as the Allied forces inflicted defeat after defeat on the Japanese on land, sea, and in the air.[30]

Dower writes that Japan's Pan-Asian claims were just a "myth", and that the Japanese were as every bit as racist and exploitive towards other Asians as the "white powers" that they were fighting against, and even more brutal as the Japanese treated their supposed Asian brothers and sisters with an appalling ruthlessness.[31] In 1944–45, the Burmese welcomed Allied forces reentering Japanese-occupied Burma as liberators from the Japanese. Moreover, the reality of Japanese rule belied the idealistic statements made at the Greater East Asia Conference. Whenever they went, Japanese soldiers and sailors had a routine habit of publicly slapping the faces of other Asians as a way of showing who were the "Great Yamato race" and who were not.[32] During the war, 670,000 Koreans and 41,862 Chinese were taken to work as slave labour under the most degrading conditions in Japan; the majority did not survive the experience.[33] About 60,000 people from Burma, China, Thailand, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies together with some 15,000 British, Australian, American, Indian, and Dutch prisoners of war died while building the "Burma Death Railway".[34] The Japanese treatment of slaves was based upon an old Japanese proverb for the proper treatment of slaves: ikasazu korasazu (do not let them live, do not let them die).[35] In China between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese were responsible for the deaths of between 8 and 9 million Chinese.[36]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Greater East Asia Conference was a diplomatic assembly organized by the and held in from November 5 to 6, 1943, gathering leaders from Japanese-aligned regimes across Asia to endorse the as a framework for regional self-sufficiency and mutual defense against Western powers. Hosted under the chairmanship of Prime Minister , the conference included delegates such as Wang Jinghui of , of the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China ( regime), of the State of Burma, José P. Laurel of the Second Philippine Republic, of the Provisional Government of Free India, and Prince representing . The attendees issued a Joint Declaration outlining principles of cooperation to prosecute the to , achieve complete from Anglo-American domination, respect national , foster , and promote cultural affinities, positioning the sphere as a counter to global . While intended to project unity and bolster morale amid escalating Allied advances, the event functioned largely as to mask Japan's exploitative control over resource extraction and military conscription in occupied territories, with participating governments lacking autonomous agency and collapsing upon Japan's surrender in 1945. The conference highlighted Japan's strategic pivot to ideological appeals for Asian liberation, yet empirical outcomes revealed persistent economic subordination and coercive alliances, underscoring the sphere's role in sustaining imperial war efforts rather than genuine regional .

Origins and Strategic Context

Conception of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

The was formally announced on August 1, 1940, by Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in a press interview, presenting it as a vision for and political among Asian nations to counter Western colonial influence and achieve self-sufficiency. Matsuoka emphasized Japan's role as the leading power in fostering mutual prosperity, framing the sphere as a defensive response to economic blockades and resource restrictions imposed by Western powers amid Japan's expansion in . The concept rooted in earlier Japanese pan-Asianist ideologies from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which advocated Asian unity against European but increasingly served to justify Japan's following the invasion of in 1931. This ideological foundation evolved amid geopolitical pressures, including the signing of the with and on September 27, 1940, which aligned Japan with and intensified perceptions of encirclement by Anglo-American interests. The subsequent U.S. oil embargo on July 26, 1941, further underscored the need for a resource-secure bloc encompassing Southeast Asia's raw materials, positioning the sphere as a strategic imperative for Japan's survival and dominance in the region. Initial policy implementations focused on within Japan's existing , such as deepening ties with —established as a in 1932—and coordinating resource extraction and industrial development in occupied Chinese territories to build the autarkic foundation envisioned by the concept. These efforts, including plans for joint ventures in , iron, and , aimed to create a vertically integrated economy under Japanese oversight, though they prioritized imperial resource flows over equitable prosperity.

Wartime Developments Prompting the Conference

The Empire of Japan's on the and Britain on December 7, 1941, initiated a series of swift conquests across , securing strategic territories essential for sustaining its war effort. Japanese forces overran Malaya and captured the British stronghold of on February 15, 1942, compelling the surrender of over 80,000 Allied troops. In the , the campaign concluded with the fall of Island on May 6, 1942, after which Japanese troops controlled the archipelago, including its key ports and airfields. These victories, alongside the seizure of the by March 1942, provided Japan with critical resources like oil and rubber, expanding its imperial footprint under the banner of the . To administer and legitimize control over occupied regions, installed governments designed to present occupations as liberations from Western . The Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China, led by , was formally established in on March 30, 1940, as a collaborationist entity nominally independent but subordinate to Japanese authority. In , following occupation in early 1942, sponsored the declaration of independence for the State of Burma on August 1, 1943, under , framing it as an anti-colonial ally despite its reliance on Japanese military support. Similar provisional regimes emerged in the and elsewhere, aiming to foster local administrative structures amid ongoing resistance. By mid-1943, Japanese military fortunes had reversed, with the ending in February 1943 after U.S. forces secured the island, forcing into a defensive posture and highlighting vulnerabilities in its overstretched supply lines. Allied counteroffensives, including advances in the Solomons, eroded Japan's offensive capabilities, prompting internal discussions within the Japanese high command on supplementing military efforts with political and ideological measures. These debates emphasized consolidating puppet states and allied territories through diplomatic symbolism to promote cohesion and counter perceptions of imperial exploitation, directly influencing the decision to convene the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943 as a means to unify Asian leaders against resurgent Allied threats.

Organization and Key Figures

Japanese Planning and Leadership

The planning for the Greater East Asia Conference originated with Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu in Prime Minister Hideki Tojo's cabinet, with the event scheduled for November 5–6, 1943, at Tokyo's Imperial Diet Building to symbolize formal imperial authority. Shigemitsu, appointed foreign minister in April 1943, advocated for the summit as a means to consolidate Japan's wartime alliances amid mounting Pacific defeats, while Tojo, as both prime minister and army minister, endorsed it to project strength and unity. Japanese organizers deliberately restricted invitations to heads of compliant puppet regimes and allied states, including of , of the Reorganized National Government of , of Burma, José P. Laurel of the Philippine Republic, and representing Indian nationalists, totaling around 46 delegates from six entities. This selection excluded non-compliant figures such as of the Republic of to prevent dissent and ensure alignment with Japanese directives. Preparatory efforts emphasized choreographed proceedings, with Japanese diplomats coordinating participant statements in advance to emphasize superficial and mutual support against Western , thereby masking Japan's prioritization of resource extraction—such as oil from the and rubber from Indochina—to fuel its military campaigns. Logistical arrangements included secure transport for delegates amid air raid threats and state-hosted banquets, all under Shigemitsu's oversight to reinforce the conference's role in sustaining domestic morale and international legitimacy for the .

Participants from Occupied and Allied Territories

The Greater East Asia Conference, held on November 5–6, 1943, in , featured representatives from Japanese puppet regimes in occupied territories and from allied . Key attendees included , president of the Reorganized National Government of China, established in in 1940 as a collaborationist entity after his defection from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in 1938 to pursue accommodation with amid the Sino-Japanese War. , prime minister of since 1935, represented the long-standing puppet state in formed after 's 1931 invasion. , head of state of the State of Burma declared independent in August 1943, attended after signing a treaty of alliance with , driven by his opposition to British colonial rule. Jose P. Laurel, installed as president of the Second on October 14, 1943, by a Japanese-influenced assembly following the 1942 occupation and U.S. surrender, participated amid the regime's formal recognition by . , leader of the Provisional Government of Free India formed in October 1943 with Japanese support, joined as an observer, motivated by his quest for Axis assistance to overthrow British rule in after escaping Allied custody in 1941. Prince Wan Waithayakon represented , an independent ally that had aligned with in December 1941 and declared war on the Allies in 1942, providing military access without full occupation. No representatives from Korea or attended, as these territories had been annexed by in 1910 and 1895, respectively, and were treated as integral parts of the empire rather than separate entities within the co-prosperity framework. The participants' motivations varied, blending ideological anti-colonialism—evident in Bose's and Ba Maw's prior anti-Western activism—with opportunism, as leaders like Wang and Laurel leveraged Japanese backing for political legitimacy and survival in contested or occupied domains. Many had earlier engaged against shared adversaries, such as British imperialism in and or rival Chinese factions.

Proceedings and Core Discussions

Opening Ceremonies and Speeches

The Greater East Asia Conference opened on November 5, 1943, in under the chairmanship of Japanese Prime Minister , who delivered the keynote address to assembled representatives from puppet states and allied territories. Tojo welcomed the delegates, expressing pleasure at the conference's realization following proposals that received approval from participating nations, and emphasized the assembly's role in advancing the War of Greater toward establishing a new order based on mutual respect and justice. In his speech, Tojo invoked themes of regional by highlighting the "inseparable relationship" binding Greater East Asian nations and their shared mission to secure stability and , framing the conflict as a collective effort to reconstruct the region free from external interference. He stressed the liberation from Anglo-American dominance, declaring Japan's determination "to deliver Greater East Asia from the fetters of America and Britain," while underscoring the superior cultural and spiritual essence inherent to the region since ancient times, urging respect for each nation's glorious traditions to foster creative development. The opening ceremonies adhered to formal protocols resembling those of international summits, featuring structured greetings and group photographs of leaders to symbolize equality among co-prosperous partners, with proceedings limited to ceremonial affirmations of mutual support against Allied powers rather than in-depth debates.

Addressed Themes of Asian Unity and Anti-Colonialism

Japanese Prime Minister , in his opening speech on November 5, 1943, underscored the inseparable ties binding the nations of , rooted in shared cultural and spiritual essence, and called for a common mission to secure regional stability through brotherly amity and mutual respect for each nation's and . He advocated close economic on the basis of reciprocity, emphasizing mutual efforts and help to foster , with resource contributions from regions like Burma's rice fields and the ' oil reserves framed within this paradigm of shared benefit rather than unilateral tribute. Tojo's prominently featured aimed at eradicating Western imperialism, denouncing Anglo-American powers for centuries of insatiable , fraud, and exploitation that had oppressed Asian peoples and disrupted regional harmony. This narrative invoked historical grievances, positioning the as a pivotal step to liberate Greater from the fetters of Britain and the , whose materialistic civilization contrasted with Asia's spiritual values. Subhas Chandra Bose, head of the Indian Provisional Government, reinforced these themes in his November 6 speech, portraying India's fight against British imperialism as inextricably linked to the broader Asian struggle for freedom and unity. Drawing on longstanding Pan-Asiatic aspirations for a united and free continent, Bose presented Indian independence as a model of uncompromising resistance, aligning it with Japan's efforts to overthrow Western colonial yokes and emphasizing cultural kinship as the foundation for collective anti-imperialist action.

Outcomes and Declarations

The Joint Declaration's Content

The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference, issued on , 1943, outlined principles for postwar regional order under the Co-Prosperity Sphere, emphasizing cooperation among participant nations to achieve stability and prosperity. It began by asserting that requires nations to occupy their proper spheres and mutually aid one another in prosperity, while attributing the ongoing conflict to Anglo-American oppression and exploitation of . The document pledged unified action to prosecute the "Greater East Asia War" and expel British-American dominance from the region. Central commitments focused on constructing a new order through five key pillars. First, participant nations would foster by respecting each other's and , providing mutual assistance to ensure regional stability and via reciprocal cooperation. Second, they vowed to honor national traditions while advancing their respective cultures and civilizations, promoting creative endeavors unhindered by external imposition. Third, economic interdependence would be pursued through close collaboration, aiming to accelerate development and mutual prosperity without specifying concrete mechanisms. Further clauses addressed broader aspirations: nations would cultivate friendly relations globally, abolish , and facilitate exchanges of resources, technology, and culture to contribute to international progress. The declaration positioned and its partners as liberators fostering self-existence and self-defense, with signatories including representatives from , Manchukuo, the Reorganized National Government of China, , , the , and the Provisional Government of Free . Notably, it contained no provisions for enforcement, verification, or among signatories.

Immediate Diplomatic and Symbolic Effects

The Greater East Asia Conference, held on November 5–6, 1943, was leveraged by Japanese authorities for immediate propaganda purposes, with Domei News Agency broadcasts and printed materials such as leaflets and booklets distributed across and occupied territories to depict a unified Asian front against Western powers. These efforts aimed to counteract declining morale after Japanese setbacks at (February 1943) and other Pacific battles, portraying the gathering as evidence of momentum in establishing the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Within the Axis-aligned and regimes, the event yielded short-term diplomatic gains, including reaffirmed commitments to mutual defense and minor upticks in local support; for instance, 's provisional government under , fresh from nominal independence in August 1943, intensified recruitment for the Burma National Army, contributing additional battalions to Japanese-led operations in through early 1944. Symbolic gestures, such as Tojo's hosting of banquets and personal addresses to delegates, fostered a brief sense of solidarity among participants from , the , and , easing immediate tensions in collaborative governance. Allied powers, convening shortly thereafter at the Cairo Conference (November 22–26, 1943), largely disregarded the Tokyo event as a hollow exercise devoid of substantive policy shifts, focusing instead on coordinated offensives against without altering their assessment of its coercive nature. This internal Axis emphasis on symbolic unity provided transient motivational value but failed to materially reverse wartime reversals.

Evaluation: Rhetoric, Realities, and Legacy

Propaganda Dimensions and Japanese Intentions

The Greater East Asia Conference, convened on November 5–6, 1943, under Prime Minister Hideki Tojo's direction, functioned principally as a mechanism to sustain Japanese domestic during a phase of intensifying , following defeats at and elsewhere that strained resources and public resolve. Japanese planners, including Foreign Minister who originated the concept, viewed the event as a symbolic spectacle to reaffirm the narrative of the "Greater East Asia War" as a crusade for Asian against Western dominance, thereby countering war fatigue at home by showcasing puppet regime leaders as voluntary partners in co-prosperity. This intent aligned with broader Tojo administration efforts to frame occupations as liberatory, using the summit to project Japanese hegemony as fraternal leadership rather than coercion. Japanese internal assessments, as reflected in policy documents and Shigemitsu's recollections, emphasized the conference's value in fostering among occupied territories' elites while prioritizing perceptual impact over substance; substantive discussions were minimal, with the focus on ceremonial unity to inspire adherence to Tokyo's directives. Tojo's opening address highlighted Asia's "spiritual essence" and mutual economic ties, deliberately avoiding material concessions to maintain hierarchical control beneath egalitarian rhetoric. Archival insights indicate planners anticipated limited long-term efficacy but sought immediate symbolic reinforcement of the Co-Prosperity Sphere's ideals to stabilize alliances amid resource shortages. In terms of messaging execution, Japanese state media and publications portrayed the gathering as a harmonious assembly of equals, with pamphlets and broadcasts depicting idyllic scenes of cross-national collaboration—such as shared industrial endeavors and cultural exchanges—to cultivate an aura of inevitable Asian resurgence under Japanese auspices, despite underlying dominance. This short-term narrative control proved effective in domestic outlets, where coverage emphasized anti-colonial triumphs and fraternal bonds, temporarily elevating public perception of strategic gains even as battlefield realities diverged. The approach extended internationally via radio addresses and joint declarations, aiming to demoralize Allied efforts by amplifying pan-Asian appeals, though Japanese records reveal a pragmatic recognition that such efforts served more to consolidate internal cohesion than to alter global war dynamics.

Disparities Between Promises and Practices

Despite the conference's emphasis on economic cooperation and mutual prosperity within the , Japanese administration in occupied territories prioritized resource extraction for the , often at the expense of local populations. In the (modern ), Japanese forces conscripted millions into forced labor programs known as romusha, with Japanese records indicating approximately 2.6 million laborers mobilized on alone by November 1944, many enduring harsh conditions including inadequate food and shelter, leading to high mortality rates estimated at over 200,000 deaths from these programs. Oil production, a primary objective of the 1942 invasion, saw the majority of output from fields in and redirected to , with refineries on alone supplying up to 35% of Japan's refined needs by 1943, contradicting pledges of equitable resource sharing as local economies were subordinated to imperial demands. Politically, the nominal granted to regimes belied tight Japanese oversight, where military advisors and garrisons effectively dictated policies, undermining the conference's rhetoric of Asian liberation. In states like the in , established in 1940, Japanese authorities retained veto power over key decisions, including military deployments and economic allocations, ensuring alignment with Tokyo's strategic goals rather than local autonomy. Similarly, in , proclaimed in 1932 but functioning as a Japanese proxy until 1945, economic planning and security forces remained under de facto imperial control, with Japanese commanders overriding nominal rulers. These practices contributed to severe humanitarian crises, including famines exacerbated by Japanese requisitions that diverted food supplies to the home islands and military use. In , the 1944–1945 famine, which killed an estimated 1–2 million Vietnamese, stemmed partly from Japanese policies confiscating rice paddies for export—over 1 million tons shipped to between 1941 and 1945—and converting grain to fuel amid Allied blockades, prioritizing wartime logistics over civilian sustenance. In the , pre-liberation occupation measures involved civilian reprisals and forced evacuations, setting precedents for later escalations like the 1945 events, where systematic killings occurred as Japanese forces implemented scorched-earth tactics framed as defensive necessities against advancing Allies. Such actions eroded the anti-colonial narrative, as local populations experienced subjugation akin to prior European colonial systems, albeit intensified by mobilization.

Historical Controversies and Diverse Viewpoints

Historians and analysts have offered divergent assessments of the Greater East Asia Conference, with interpretations spanning from a purported sincere effort at pan-Asian cooperation against Western dominance to a mere rhetorical veneer for Japanese imperial ambitions. Japanese revisionist perspectives, such as those articulated in postwar nationalist writings, posit the conference as a legitimate response to by Western powers and the looming Soviet threat, framing it as an ideological bulwark for Asian amid global . These views emphasize how the event's rhetoric of unity accelerated trajectories; for instance, Japan's nominal grants of independence to in August 1943 and the in October 1943 provided models and weakened European colonial structures, contributing to Burma's full sovereignty in 1948 and Indonesia's declaration in 1945, which leveraged Japanese-era nationalist organizations. In contrast, critical Western and Allied-aligned analyses portray the conference as a facade masking expansionist designs, evidenced by Japan's policies of extraction and demographic , such as plans to resettle over 5 million Japanese civilians in and by 1940, which prioritized imperial consolidation over equitable partnership. Suppression of local autonomies further underscores this, as Japanese authorities quashed non-aligned nationalist movements in occupied and the , retaining military oversight despite nominal sovereignties and secretly intending to annex resource-rich areas like Malaya and eastern post-victory. These critiques highlight discrepancies, including the exclusion of major occupied populations like from the conference itself, which limited representation to regimes aligned with . Scholarly debates reflect these tensions, with Jeremy Yellen's analysis framing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—embodied in the conference—as a "contested, negotiated process" of wartime envisioning rather than unadulterated propaganda, yet one rooted in Japan's "total empire" ambitions that clashed with local aspirations amid total war dynamics. This contrasts with stricter pan-Asian idealist interpretations that detect genuine anti-imperial intent in the joint declaration's anti-colonial language, though Yellen notes overlooked anti-communist dimensions, as the conference occurred against the backdrop of Soviet expansionism in Asia, which Japanese planners viewed as a greater long-term threat than articulated Western imperialism. Such debates underscore the conference's ambiguity, where rhetorical commitments to equality coexisted with hegemonic practices, influencing postwar reevaluations of Japan's wartime role in regional power shifts.

Long-Term Influence on Asian Independence Movements

The Greater East Asia Conference's proclamation of Asian co-prosperity and liberation from Western domination, though largely rhetorical, provided ideological ammunition for postwar nationalists seeking to repel recolonization efforts. In , harnessed the "Asia for the Asians" motif—echoing Japanese wartime —to frame resistance against Dutch forces intent on restoring prewar control, culminating in his on August 17, 1945, mere days after Japan's capitulation on August 15. This timing exploited the administrative vacuum and mobilized militias formed under Japanese oversight, which had trained over 500,000 Indonesian youth in roles by 1945, thereby compressing the path to amid the ensuing four-year conflict that ended with Dutch recognition in 1949. Japanese military victories over European powers from to 1942, amplified by the 1943 conference's symbolic gathering of Asian representatives, empirically correlated with accelerated across , as occupied territories witnessed the fragility of imperial structures. Burma's , who attended preparatory Japanese initiatives, leveraged similar anti-colonial narratives to secure in 1948, while the transitioned in 1946 under leaders exposed to Co-Prosperity Sphere diplomacy. These outcomes reflected a causal weakening of European resolve, with Britain and facing resource strains from reconstruction, enabling over a dozen Asian states to gain sovereignty between 1945 and 1960—timelines shortened by the demonstration that Asian forces could supplant colonial garrisons. The irony lies in Japanese expansionism's unintended catalysis of self-determination: by ousting Western administrations and convening the to legitimize puppet regimes, inadvertently politicized local elites and disseminated pan-Asianist ideas that outlived its empire, fostering postwar movements unmoored from 's control. Empirical patterns, such as the absence of full European reconquest in and despite initial attempts, underscore how the conference's rhetoric seeded enduring skepticism toward external rule, even as Allied victory marginalized Japan's model. This dynamic contributed to broader regional shifts, including Sukarno's invocation of Asian solidarity at the 1955 , where he rallied newly independent states against lingering imperialism.

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