Hubbry Logo
Speculative realismSpeculative realismMain
Open search
Speculative realism
Community hub
Speculative realism
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Speculative realism
Speculative realism
from Wikipedia

Speculative realism is a movement in contemporary Continental-inspired philosophy (also known as post-Continental philosophy)[1] that defines itself loosely in its stance of metaphysical realism against its interpretation of the dominant forms of post-Kantian philosophy (or what it terms "correlationism").[2]

Origins

[edit]

Speculative realism takes its name from a conference held at Goldsmiths College, University of London in April 2007.[3] The conference was moderated by Alberto Toscano of Goldsmiths College, and featured presentations by Ray Brassier of American University of Beirut (then at Middlesex University), Iain Hamilton Grant of the University of the West of England, Graham Harman of the American University in Cairo, and Quentin Meillassoux of the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. Credit for the name "speculative realism" is generally ascribed to Brassier,[4] though Meillassoux had already used the term "speculative materialism" to describe his own position.[4]

A second conference, entitled "Speculative Realism/Speculative Materialism", took place at the UWE Bristol on Friday 24 April 2009, two years after the original event at Goldsmiths.[5] The line-up consisted of Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and (in place of Meillassoux, who was unable to attend) Alberto Toscano.[5]

A third conference, entitled "Object Oriented Ontology: A Symposium", was held at Georgia Institute of Technology's School of Literature, Communication and Culture (now the School of Literature, Media, and Communication) on April 23, 2010.[6] This symposium was hosted by Ian Bogost and included Levi Bryant, Graham Harman, Steven Shaviro, Hugh Crawford, Carl DiSalvo, John Johnston, Barbara Maria Stafford, and Eugene Thacker.

While speculative realism's status has gained significant popularity, there are philosophical positions which some consider analogous. According to Graham Harman's forward in Maurizio Ferraris' Manifesto of New Realism,[7] contemporary writings in "new realism" are thematically parallel to speculative realism, sharing common themes and interests. Harman states that it was an "inadvertent injustice" to not include Ferraris' ideas among contemporary continental realists, as he had held this philosophical position earlier than speculative realists at a time when realism in the continental tradition was a "lonelier" commitment. However, despite analogous interests, the two perspectives of realism remain mostly separate conversations. In Hysteresis,[8] a book published in Edinburgh's Speculative Realism series, Ferraris positioned his thoughts more explicitly in relation to the works of many of the names previously mentioned. He fashions a critique similar to Meillassoux's of Kant.

Critique of correlationism

[edit]

While often in disagreement over basic philosophical issues, the speculative realist thinkers have a shared resistance to what they interpret as philosophies of human finitude inspired by the tradition of Immanuel Kant.

What unites the four core members of the movement is an attempt to overcome both "correlationism"[9] and "philosophies of access". All four of the core thinkers within speculative realism work to overturn these forms of philosophy which privilege the human being, favouring distinct forms of realism against the dominant forms of idealism in much of contemporary Continental philosophy.

In After Finitude, Meillassoux defines correlationism as "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other."[10] Philosophies of access are any of those philosophies which privilege the human being over other entities. For speculative realists, both ideas represent forms of anthropocentrism. Many critiquing correlationism and philosophies of access typically are critiquing the excessive association of ontology with human-centric phenomenology.[11][12][13] New realism, ultimately is critiquing thinking and being's association, and as such is within the same conversation. However, Ferraris approaches this problem slightly differently than Meillassoux. Ferraris structures his critique of the "thinking and being" association in relation to the areas of epistemology and ontology[14][8] respectively instead of phenomenology and ontology.

Variations

[edit]

While sharing in the goal of overturning the dominant strands of post-Kantian thought in Continental philosophy, there are important differences separating the core members of the speculative realist movement and their followers.

Speculative materialism

[edit]

In his critique of correlationism, Quentin Meillassoux (who uses the term speculative materialism to describe his position)[4] finds two principles as the focus of Kant's philosophy. The first is the "principle of correlation" itself, which claims essentially that we can only know the correlate of Thought and Being; what lies outside that correlate is unknowable. The second is termed by Meillassoux the "principle of factiality" which states that things could be otherwise than what they are. This principle is upheld by Kant in his defence of the thing-in-itself as unknowable but imaginable. We can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality. According to Meillassoux, the defence of both principles leads to "weak" correlationism (such as those of Kant and Husserl), while the rejection of the thing-in-itself leads to the "strong" correlationism of thinkers such as late Ludwig Wittgenstein[15] and late Martin Heidegger, for whom it makes no sense to suppose that there is anything outside of the correlate of Thought and Being,[citation needed] and so the principle of factiality is eliminated in favour of a strengthened principle of correlation.

Meillassoux follows the opposite tactic in rejecting the principle of correlation for the sake of a bolstered principle of factiality in his post-Kantian return to Hume. By arguing in favour of such a principle, Meillassoux is led to reject the necessity not only of all physical laws of nature, but all logical laws except the Principle of Non-Contradiction (since eliminating this would undermine the Principle of Factiality which claims that things can always be otherwise than what they are). By rejecting the Principle of Sufficient Reason, there can be no justification for the necessity of physical laws, meaning that while the universe may be ordered in such and such a way, there is no reason it could not be otherwise. Meillassoux rejects the Kantian a priori in favour of a Humean a priori, claiming that the lesson to be learned from Hume on the subject of causality is that "the same cause may actually bring about 'a hundred different events' (and even many more)."[16]

The primary foundation from which Meillassoux extends the rest of his theory by arguing for a principle: the necessity of contingency itself. That is, the only thing objectively necessary is that no thing/object is necessary to every subject. Thus, all things are contingent. Using this as an objective position, he proceeds to redevelop a metaphysics for science and technology which recovers what he calls ancestral events: materially real events which occur outside of phenomenological subjectivity. He claims that without the objectivity of contingency, a philosopher of metaphysics should reject that such events like the Big Bang are legitimate. Although, some have argued that the problem is not that these ancestral events are outside of human notions of time, since many such examples of these events in fact do have materially sensible data which places them in terms of human interpretations of time, but rather it applies more strongly to real things which are not empirically observable:[17] e.g. quarks or genetic information. While not committed entirely to speculative materialism, Yuk Hui references and uses an analogous line of reasoning in Recursivity and Contingency[18] in his development of cosmotechnics, and actively works within similar philosophical lineages.

Object-oriented ontology

[edit]

The central tenet of Graham Harman and Levi Bryant's object-oriented ontology (OOO) is that objects have been neglected in philosophy in favor of a "radical philosophy" that tries to "undermine" objects by saying that objects are the crusts to a deeper underlying reality, either in the form of monism or a perpetual flux, or those that try to "overmine" objects by saying that the idea of a whole object is a form of folk ontology. According to Harman, everything is an object, whether it be a mailbox, electromagnetic radiation, curved spacetime, the Commonwealth of Nations, or a propositional attitude; all things, whether physical or fictional, are equally objects. Sympathetic to panpsychism, Harman proposes a new philosophical discipline called "speculative psychology" dedicated to investigating the "cosmic layers of psyche" and "ferreting out the specific psychic reality of earthworms, dust, armies, chalk, and stone".[19]

Harman defends a version of the Aristotelian notion of substance. Unlike Leibniz, for whom there were both substances and aggregates, Harman maintains that when objects combine, they create new objects. In this way, he defends an a priori metaphysics that claims that reality is made up only of objects and that there is no "bottom" to the series of objects. For Harman, an object is in itself an infinite recess, unknowable and inaccessible by any other thing. This leads to his account of what he terms "vicarious causality". Inspired by the occasionalists of medieval Islamic philosophy, Harman maintains that no two objects can ever interact save through the mediation of a "sensual vicar".[20] There are two types of objects, then, for Harman: real objects and the sensual objects that allow for interaction. The former are the things of everyday life, while the latter are the caricatures that mediate interaction. For example, when fire burns cotton, Harman argues that the fire does not touch the essence of that cotton which is inexhaustible by any relation, but that the interaction is mediated by a caricature of the cotton which causes it to burn.

Transcendental materialism

[edit]

Iain Hamilton Grant defends a position he calls transcendental materialism.[21] He argues against what he terms "somatism", the philosophy and physics of bodies. In his Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, Grant tells a new history of philosophy from Plato onward based on the definition of matter. Aristotle distinguished between Form and Matter in such a way that Matter was invisible to philosophy, whereas Grant argues for a return to the Platonic Matter as not only the basic building blocks of reality, but the forces and powers that govern our reality. He traces this same argument to the post-Kantian German idealists Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, claiming that the distinction between Matter as substantive versus useful fiction persists to this day and that we should end our attempts to overturn Plato and instead attempt to overturn Kant and return to "speculative physics" in the Platonic tradition, that is, not a physics of bodies, but a "physics of the All".[22]

Eugene Thacker has examined how the concept of "life itself" is both determined within regional philosophy and also how "life itself" comes to acquire metaphysical properties. His book After Life shows how the ontology of life operates by way of a split between "Life" and "the living," making possible a "metaphysical displacement" in which life is thought via another metaphysical term, such as time, form, or spirit: "Every ontology of life thinks of life in terms of something-other-than-life...that something-other-than-life is most often a metaphysical concept, such as time and temporality, form and causality, or spirit and immanence"[23] Thacker traces this theme from Aristotle, to Scholasticism and mysticism/negative theology, to Spinoza and Kant, showing how this three-fold displacement is also alive in philosophy today (life as time in process philosophy and Deleuzianism, life as form in biopolitical thought, life as spirit in post-secular philosophies of religion). Thacker examines the relation of speculative realism to the ontology of life, arguing for a "vitalist correlation": "Let us say that a vitalist correlation is one that fails to conserve the correlationist dual necessity of the separation and inseparability of thought and object, self and world, and which does so based on some ontologized notion of 'life'.''.[24] Ultimately Thacker argues for a skepticism regarding "life": "Life is not only a problem of philosophy, but a problem for philosophy."[23]

Other thinkers have emerged within this group, united in their allegiance to what has been known as "process philosophy", rallying around such thinkers as Schelling, Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze, among others. A recent example is found in Steven Shaviro's book Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics, which argues for a process-based approach that entails panpsychism as much as it does vitalism or animism. For Shaviro, it is Whitehead's philosophy of prehensions and nexus that offers the best combination of continental and analytical philosophy. Another recent example is found in Jane Bennett's book Vibrant Matter,[25] which argues for a shift from human relations to things, to a "vibrant matter" that cuts across the living and non-living, human bodies and non-human bodies. Leon Niemoczynski, in his book Charles Sanders Peirce and a Religious Metaphysics of Nature, invokes what he calls "speculative naturalism" so as to argue that nature can afford lines of insight into its own infinitely productive "vibrant" ground, which he identifies as natura naturans.

Transcendental nihilism

[edit]

In Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, Ray Brassier defends what Michael Austin, Paul Ennis, Fabio Gironi term as transcendental nihilism.[26] He maintains that philosophy has avoided the traumatic idea of extinction, instead attempting to find meaning in a world conditioned by the very idea of its own annihilation. Thus Brassier critiques both the phenomenological and hermeneutic strands of continental philosophy as well as the vitality of thinkers like Gilles Deleuze, who work to ingrain meaning in the world and stave off the "threat" of nihilism. Instead, drawing on thinkers such as Alain Badiou, François Laruelle, Paul Churchland and Thomas Metzinger, Brassier defends a view of the world as inherently devoid of meaning. That is, rather than avoiding nihilism, Brassier embraces it as the truth of reality. Brassier concludes from his readings of Badiou and Laruelle that the universe is founded on the nothing,[27] but also that philosophy is the "organon of extinction," that it is only because life is conditioned by its own extinction that there is thought at all.[28] Brassier then defends a radically anti-correlationist philosophy proposing that Thought is conjoined not with Being, but with Non-Being.

This nihilistic trend within speculative thought has been simultaneously embraced and rejected by Drew M. Dalton. For Dalton, while Being must inevitably be acknowledged as a movement towards Non-Being, or what he calls "unbecoming," he argues that the ontological fact of annihilation does not necessarily annihilate or invalidate human attempts to derive or develop normative values or synthetic metaphysical meanings from the nature of Being.[29] Instead, he claims, it grounds the possibility of seeing in "unbecoming" another set of meanings and values all together. Hence, his suggestion that a full reckoning with the fact of annihilation should not result in "the nihilation of metaphysics," but instead the development of a "metaphysics of nihilation."[30] This is something he attempts to accomplish in his The Matter of Evil: From Speculative Realism to Ethical Pessimism.[31]

Controversy about a "philosophical movement"

[edit]

In an interview with Kronos magazine published in March 2011, Ray Brassier denied that there is any such thing as a "speculative realist movement" and firmly distanced himself from those who continue to attach themselves to the brand name:[32]

The "speculative realist movement" exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. I don't believe the internet is an appropriate medium for serious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct a philosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students. I agree with Deleuze's remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a "movement" whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity.

Further Brassier suggests that a philosophical movement cannot believably be bound to merely anti-correlationism.[33] Despite this, many of those who discuss different approaches to escape Meillassoux's correlationist cycle, suggesting active philosophical discourse on a particular topic. Ian Bogost's work, Alien Phenomenology,[13] rethinks what OOO phenomenology would be while others argue OOO rejects phenomenology outright. Similarly, Steven Shaviro actively endorses panpsychism[34] and reaffirms his earlier endorsement of process philosophy,[11] rejecting certain aspects of Harman's work and Brassier's criticisms about the existence of a movement. Additionally Jane Bennett's Vibrant Matter[25] also enables forms of phenomenology as she exemplifies through several chapters. In doing so, these authors suggest some form of phenomenology in speculative realism despite the rejection of correlationist philosophy.

As such, one of the fundamental controversies within Speculative Realism is less agreement or disagreement about correlationism as a problem, but instead is a discussion of the feasibility or need of philosophies of phenomenology and cognition after being separated from philosophies of ontology. On this debate, Meillassoux suggest there is no need for phenomenology while Shaviro, Bennett, and Bogost suggest a separation of anti-correlation of ontology and phenomenology does not render either to be empty philosophical topics.

Another controversy arises from the contents of some of the oeuvres and their questionable political impacts. For instance, the same Brassier also writes at length about how both anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are both wrong, and that one should procure means of "anthropo-cide" to promote his own version of nihilism. Therefore, philosophy should become the "organon of extinction" of humanity. Should his ideas find real applicability, many indefensible political decisions would either take place or become even more legitimized.

Another controversy is how important Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy and speculative philosophy[35] are to anti-correlationism. While Meillassoux associates anti-correlationism to "speculative materialism," he does not cite Whitehead in association in the development of After Finitude.[36] Additionally Brassier's statements above suggest he rejects the association. However, between Shaviro, Strengers, and many others, the association of Whitehead is largely consistent with anti-correlationism and thus remains a valuable inspiration.

Notable speculative realists

[edit]

Publications

[edit]

Speculative realism has close ties to the journal Collapse, which published the proceedings of the inaugural conference at Goldsmiths and has featured numerous other articles by 'Speculative Realist' thinkers; as has the academic journal Pli, which is edited and produced by members of the Graduate School of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. The journal Speculations, founded in 2010, published by Punctum Books, regularly features articles related to Speculative Realism. Edinburgh University Press publishes a book series called Speculative Realism.

In 2013, the journal Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies published a special issue on the topic in relation to anarchism.[37]

Between 2019 and 2021, the De Gruyter Open Access journal Open Philosophy published three special issues on object-oriented ontology and its critics.[38]

Internet presence

[edit]

Speculative realism is notable for its fast expansion via the Internet in the form of blogs.[39] Websites have formed as resources for essays, lectures, and planned future books by those within the speculative realist movement. Many other blogs, as well as podcasts, have emerged with original material on speculative realism or expanding on its themes and ideas.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Speculative realism is a loosely affiliated movement in contemporary that emerged from a one-day workshop held on April 27, 2007, at , organized by , , Graham Harman, and . These thinkers positioned the movement against correlationism, the prevailing post-Kantian view—epitomized in the works of phenomenologists and deconstructionists—that knowledge of reality is inescapably mediated by human thought, language, or experience, thereby rendering direct access to an absolute or mind-independent reality philosophically untenable. Meillassoux's critique in After Finitude (2006, English trans. 2008) forms a foundational challenge, arguing through the "arche-fossil" (evidence of events predating human consciousness, such as geological strata) that correlationism fails to account for the contingency of laws of nature without invoking fiat or theological necessity. The movement's defining characteristic lies in its speculative ambition to theorize in itself, beyond anthropocentric limits, fostering diverse strains such as Harman's (emphasizing withdrawn objects with irreducible relations), Grant's neo-Schellingian natura naturans (nature as productive power), Brassier's eliminative nihilism (aligning philosophy with scientific extinction of thought), and Meillassoux's hyper-chaos (absolute contingency without reason). Despite this pluralism, speculative realism has faced for lacking doctrinal unity, splintering early into incompatible positions and failing to sustain a collective program beyond the initial workshop's momentum. Its influence extends to adjacent fields like , new materialism, and , prompting renewed debates on realism's viability amid scientific advances and critiques of , though academic reception remains divided due to its rejection of entrenched correlationist paradigms in continental traditions.

Origins and Early Development

The 2007 Goldsmiths Workshop

The Speculative Realism workshop occurred on 27 April 2007 at Goldsmiths, University of London, organized in association with the Centre for the Study of Invention and Social Process. This one-day event brought together four philosophers—Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Ray Brassier—for presentations that articulated a collective resistance to correlationism, the doctrine holding that reality exists only in relation to human thought or access. The term "speculative realism" arose from this gathering not as a label for shared positive doctrines, but as a descriptor for divergent approaches united by their rejection of correlationist strictures, which confine to describing phenomena as they appear to rather than speculating on independent reality. Attendees emphasized realism's speculative dimension to denote efforts to think the absolute without reducing it to subjective correlation, drawing on pre-Kantian while critiquing post-Kantian philosophy's anthropocentric focus. In the immediate aftermath, the workshop's proceedings were transcribed and published in Collapse Volume III (2007), serving as an annex to Collapse Volume II: Speculative Realism, the inaugural collection of essays exploring the tendency's anti-correlationist orientations. These publications, edited by Robin Mackay, disseminated the event's key interventions and solidified speculative realism's identity as a nascent, non-unified philosophical current.

Precursors in Quentin Meillassoux's Work

Quentin Meillassoux's Après la finitude: Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence, published in 2006 by Éditions du Seuil, established the core anti-correlationist stance that prefigured speculative realism by asserting the absolute contingency of reality. Meillassoux contends that post-Kantian philosophy, through its "correlationist" limitation of being to its relation with thought, precludes genuine speculation about an absolute in-itself, reducing reality to finitude bound by human access. He counters this by demonstrating the "factiality" of laws— their existence without reason—via analysis of "ancestral" statements, such as the formation of the 4.56 billion years ago, which occurred prior to any human thought and thus expose correlationism's inadequacy in accounting for a reality independent of correlation. Central to Meillassoux's argument is the concept of hyper-chaos, an absolute where physical constants, laws, and entities can alter or emerge without cause or constraint, transcending any necessary becoming or underlying substrate. This radical contingency, derived as necessary rather than merely possible, rejects both strong correlationism's denial of the absolute and weak correlationism's concessions to it, positioning factiality as the sole viable absolute. Meillassoux further enables speculative access by leveraging , which he views as uniquely capable of grasping non-correlational structures—such as Cantorian infinities or physical quantities—independent of perceptual finitude, thereby mathematizing the real beyond Kantian limits. These pre-2007 formulations in After Finitude provided the absolutist rejection of correlationism that attendees of the inaugural speculative realist workshop drew upon, either extending its hyper-chaotic implications or developing divergent ontologies while retaining its critique of thought-world entanglement. The work's emphasis on deriving contingency's necessity without regress to or thus served as the intellectual catalyst, prioritizing empirical anomalies like ancestrality and mathematical formalism over hermeneutic or phenomenal constraints.

Core Critique of Correlationism

Defining Correlationism and Its Philosophical Roots

Correlationism denotes the philosophical doctrine, formalized by Quentin Meillassoux in his 2006 monograph After Finitude, according to which reality cannot be known except through the irreducible correlation between human thought and its objects, rendering any conception of being-in-itself—independent of this subjective relation—unthinkable or meaningless. This position maintains that entities exist only insofar as they are given for-us, conflating ontology with epistemology and epistemology with phenomenology, such that the absolute (mind-independent reality) becomes inaccessible by definition. Meillassoux distinguishes "weak" correlationism, which admits the in-itself in principle but deems it unknowable, from "strong" correlationism, which denies even its thinkability without reference to the correlate. The roots of correlationism trace to Immanuel Kant's "Copernican turn" in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which inverted traditional metaphysics by asserting that the structures of human cognition—space, time, and categories like causality—condition objects of experience, rather than objects dictating cognition's forms. This shift, intended to secure knowledge against skepticism, engendered post-Kantian idealisms, such as G. W. F. Hegel's dialectical absolutism (developed in works like the Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807), where Geist (spirit) unfolds through historical human consciousness, subordinating reality to subjective development. Similarly, Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, outlined in Ideas (1913), emphasized intentionality as the essence of consciousness, reducing being to phenomena constituted in lived experience, thereby entrenching the subject-object dyad. Extensions appear in twentieth-century movements like , where Jacques Derrida's analyses in texts such as (1967) tie signification to differential play within human language systems, further dissolving independent reality into interpretive correlations without origin or closure. These traditions exemplify how correlationism blocks beyond "access-for-us," privileging over transcendence. Critically, correlationism exhibits logical flaws in its anthropocentric restriction, as it cannot coherently accommodate scientific ancestral claims—statements about events predating human emergence, such as the formation of 4.54 billion years ago or fossils dating to 541 million years ago—without regressing to , wherein such facts become mere projections of current correlations rather than diachronic causal realities. Empirically, disciplines like and verify mind-independent causal chains through and stratigraphic evidence, undermining the doctrine's denial of absolute contingency and highlighting its incompatibility with realism grounded in independence. This tension reveals correlationism's foundational presupposition: that thought's limits define being's scope, a claim unsubstantiated by the causal efficacy of pre-human processes.

Speculative Realist Rejections and Alternatives

Speculative realists reject correlationism—the view that philosophical access to is inherently confined to the relation between thought and being, rendering absolute unknowable—as an undue epistemological restriction that conflates the limits of human cognition with ontological truths. This critique, spearheaded by , contends that correlationism, rooted in Kantian , illegitimately absolutizes the human-world correlation while dismissing speculative reason's capacity to discern mind-independent structures through mathematical and logical deduction. By prioritizing empirical phenomena accessible only via subjective correlation, correlationism undermines causal realism, implying that scientific laws and events lack necessity independent of observers, a position speculative realists counter by reinstating as a tool for metaphysics beyond phenomenal bounds. In its place, speculative realists propose alternatives grounded in first-principles , asserting that 's causal efficacy persists irrespective of access or interpretation. Meillassoux's principle of absolute contingency exemplifies this, maintaining that contingency itself—rather than thought or necessity—serves as the sole absolute, permitting rational access to a hyper-chaotic where laws could alter without rational cause, thus evading correlationist toward ancestral scientific claims like those of cosmology predating existence. Similarly, Graham Harman's of withdrawn objects posits entities as irreducibly autonomous, harboring real qualities that never fully translate into relational encounters, thereby establishing a realism where objects exert causal powers autonomously, unmediated by perceptual or conceptual filters. This methodological pivot emphasizes over , aligning with the independence of empirical data—such as physical constants verifiable through repeatable experiments—from observer-dependent frameworks, thereby challenging entrenched academic that privileges subjective construction over verifiable causal structures. Speculative realism's insistence on such alternatives fosters a truth-oriented metaphysics, where , informed by mathematical necessities and empirical invariance, pierces correlationist veils to affirm a causally robust world unbound by anthropocentric limits.

Major Variants

Object-Oriented Ontology

(OOO), principally developed by philosopher Graham Harman, maintains that is composed of discrete objects whose essence perpetually withdraws from all access by other entities, whether human or nonhuman. This withdrawal implies that no object—be it a rock, a theory, or an —can be fully exhausted by its relations, qualities, or components; each harbors an irreducible surplus of independent of or interaction. Harman's framework rejects both , which dismantles objects into smaller parts, and relationalism, which defines objects solely through their networks or contexts, insisting instead on a flat where all objects equally possess this autonomous depth. In his seminal 2002 work Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Harman extends Martin Heidegger's analysis of ready-to-hand tools—entities that recede from explicit awareness during smooth use—to all objects whatsoever, arguing that this "tool-being" constitutes their fundamental mode of existence as withdrawn from presence-at-hand scrutiny. Objects thus exist as unified tensions between their sensual manifestations (perceived qualities) and their real subterranean qualities (inaccessible powers), preventing any total translation between these poles. To account for interactions without violating this withdrawal, Harman proposes vicarious causation, wherein objects causally influence one another only indirectly, through sensual intermediaries that never fully capture the real object involved—much like how a evokes an object's hidden allure without direct contact. OOO's emphasis on aesthetic dimensions, such as allure (the indirect summoning of an object's withdrawn via sensual hints), positions it as a of philosophies that privilege efficient or flat processualism, advocating instead for a metaphysics where objects' indirect sustains the world's contingency. Proponents credit OOO with reinvigorating speculative realism by restoring objects' primacy against anthropocentric or holist reductions, enabling non-anthropomorphic descriptions of causation and being. Critics, however, contend that its pervasive invocation of withdrawal risks anthropomorphizing inanimate entities by analogizing their inaccessibility to human intentional opacity, potentially undermining empirical verifiability in favor of poetic speculation.

Speculative Materialism and Arche-Cosmology

Speculative materialism, articulated primarily by Iain Hamilton Grant, reconstructs a philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) from pre-Kantian dynamistic traditions, emphasizing generative principles over static substances to address the limitations of correlationist thought. Grant's approach counters the post-Kantian prioritization of subjectivity by positing nature as an autonomous domain of productive forces, where principles (arche) function as causal potencies that precede and exceed human access. This variant of speculative realism draws heavily on F.W.J. Schelling's early 19th-century works, interpreting them as compatible with empirical science's emphasis on forces rather than mere bodies. In his 2006 book Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, Grant critiques "somatism"—the reduction of reality to corporeal entities without inherent dynamism—as a flawed inheritance from Kantian and subsequent philosophies that subordinate to thought. Instead, he revives arche as non-substantial powers that iteratively produce cosmic structures, akin to how Newtonian forces (e.g., as a universal attractive potency) operate independently of observation. These principles manifest as escalating intensities of organization, from quantum fluctuations to macroscopic forms, ensuring 's self-sufficiency without reliance on anthropocentric mediation. Arche-cosmology extends this to a broad ontological scope, viewing the as a hierarchical yet unified field of causal productivity that transcends human temporal and spatial scales. Grant argues that such a framework aligns with physics' causal realism—for instance, the differential equations governing field theories—while avoiding idealism's error of deriving from subjective conditions. By prioritizing nature's generative , speculative challenges correlationism's , insisting that empirical laws reflect underlying principles operative prior to any knowing subject. This positions Grant's thought as a bridge between speculative and scientific , rejecting both vitalistic excesses and mechanistic reductions.

Transcendental Materialism and Nihilism

Ray Brassier's variant of , known as transcendental materialism, derives a commitment to realism from reason's inherent self-undermining trajectory, which dissolves anthropocentric pretensions and aligns with scientific . In his 2007 book Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, Brassier contends that reason, through its transcendental critique, exposes its own dissolution into contingency and extinction, thereby accessing a realism stripped of correlationist mediation between thought and being. This process culminates in "transcendental nihilism," where truth persists as inhuman and unbound, even as human cognition and its illusions—such as intentional agency and meaning—are revealed as fictions destined for obsolescence. Brassier rejects vitalist ontologies, which posit life or becoming as irreducible principles preserving humanist illusions of purpose, in favor of a rigorous anti-humanism grounded in . Drawing on neuroscientific advances, he endorses the eliminativist program of Paul and , which forecasts the replacement of folk-psychological categories like belief and desire with vectorial descriptions from , thereby debunking the manifest image of mind as a prescientific error. This alignment positions not as a mere descriptive tool but as a disenchanting force that enforces realism by eradicating anthropic residues, consistent with Enlightenment's rational critique extended to its nihilistic limits. Yet Brassier's framework harbors an internal tension: its realism, forged through science's anti-humanist purge, extends to speculative claims about 's cosmic inevitability—such as solar death rendering truth indifferent to observers—which risks extrapolating beyond verifiable empirical trajectories into untestable futures. While this avoids correlationism's , it invites critique for mirroring the overreach it attributes to phenomenology, as reason's self-undermining logic may privilege theoretical over observable causal processes.

Factial Speculation and Hyper-Chaos

Quentin Meillassoux's factial speculation posits an grounded in the absolute contingency of all beings and laws, where "factiality" designates the mode of existence without any reason or necessity for its persistence. This principle of factiality asserts that contingency itself is the sole absolute, rejecting any foundational reason that could necessitate the stability of entities or physical laws. In After Finitude (2006), Meillassoux argues that factiality emerges as the speculative antidote to correlationism, enabling access to the absolute in-itself beyond human thought. Central to this ontology is the of hyper-chaos, which describes a regime of absolute temporal flux wherein laws of nature and existent entities lack any intrinsic reason for endurance, permitting their arbitrary alteration without causal precursor or metaphysical constraint. Hyper-chaos transcends ordinary chaos by implying not mere disorder but the potential for the laws governing becoming themselves to mutate radically, such that "nothing constrains [time]: neither becoming, nor the substratum." Derived from factiality, this hyper-chaotic contingency undermines assumptions of stable realism, as persistence becomes a rather than a necessitated order. Meillassoux accesses this absolute through a , employing diagrammatic and formal thought to model quantities and structures independent of subjective correlation, thereby rejecting strong correlationism's denial of ancestral statements—scientific claims about pre-human events like the , dated to approximately 13.8 billion years ago. The ancestrality argument posits that such diachronic absolutes, verifiable via empirical , compel philosophy to affirm an in-itself untainted by thought, with mathematics providing the speculative vector for its conceptualization. The implications of factial speculation and hyper-chaos favor a causal realism of perpetual over invariant necessities, eroding theological proofs reliant on eternal laws or divine reason while aligning with scientific empiricism's openness to shifts, such as those in or cosmology. This framework privileges empirical data on contingency—evident in historical law-like instabilities inferred from geological records—over anthropocentric or necessitarian ontologies, though it invites critique for potentially rendering prediction untenable without probabilistic heuristics.

Internal Debates and Controversies

Disputes Over Movement Coherence

The term "speculative realism" originated with a held on April 27, 2007, at , where , , Graham Harman, and critiqued correlationism—the philosophical stance privileging the human-world correlation over independent reality. This event provided an initial point of unity, as the participants rejected post-Kantian limits on metaphysics and sought to revive speculative thought accessible to reason. Coherence as a movement fractured soon after, with key figures questioning its viability as a school. Brassier, one of the original presenters, disavowed any organized "speculative realist movement" by , dismissing it as a construct "only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever." This reflected broader unease over the label's application, as divergences in and conclusions undermined claims of shared beyond the negative of correlationism. A prominent divide pits Harman's against Brassier's . Harman's framework asserts the equal reality of all objects— and nonhuman—withdrawn from full relational access, fostering an optimistic metaphysics of inclusiveness and cosmopolitan encounters among entities. Brassier, conversely, derives eliminative from scientific naturalism in Nihil Unbound (2007), arguing that enlightenment reveals the ultimate extinction of meaning and significance, rendering anthropocentric orientations untenable. These positions lack a common positive program, as Harman's relational yet autonomous objects clash with Brassier's reduction to impersonal processes devoid of intrinsic value. Proponents like Harman view this pluralism not as fragmentation but as a core strength, allowing diverse realisms to challenge entrenched without the uniformity that plagued prior continental traditions. Such internal variety underscores speculative realism's role as a loose rather than a rigid school, prioritizing rigorous divergence over superficial consensus.

Philosophical Objections and Rigor Critiques

Critics from the tradition have accused speculative realism of , contending that its continental heritage privileges dense, jargon-laden prose over the clarity and argumentative precision valued in analytic methods. Peter Wolfendale argues that , a prominent strand of speculative realism, promotes an obscurantist evasion of rational critique by positing objects that withdraw from full conceptual access, thereby substituting mystical inaccessibility for genuine philosophical analysis. This charge echoes broader analytic reservations about continental philosophy's stylistic tendencies, which are seen as hindering verifiable progress in . Speculative realism has also faced objections for prioritizing a priori speculation over empirical evidence and falsifiability, rendering its claims akin to unfalsifiable pre-scientific metaphysics. James Ladyman and Don Ross, in their advocacy for metaphysics naturalized through scientific principles, criticize speculative posits—such as independent real objects—as lacking grounding in empirically informed structural realism, insisting that ontology must derive from the unification of scientific theories rather than autonomous conjecture. Such approaches, they argue, fail to meet standards of rigor by decoupling metaphysical claims from testable predictions, thereby undermining causal realism in favor of unanchored abstraction. Proponents of speculative realism defend as essential for accessing beyond science's empirical purview, yet critics like Ladyman counter that this results in naive object posits that ignore the constraints of scientific , such as the primacy of relational structures over isolated entities. Laureano Ralón extends this by critiquing speculative realism's overall as insufficiently rational, exacerbating disdain for evidence-based reasoning in favor of intuitive leaps. These rigor critiques highlight a perceived analytic-continental divide, where speculative realism's methods are deemed philosophically indulgent absent integration with empirical disciplines.

Tensions with Scientific Realism

Speculative realism shares with a commitment to anti-anthropocentrism, positing that exists independently of human cognition or perception, thereby aligning against idealist or constructivist views that subordinate scientific findings to social or cultural narratives. Ray Brassier's variant, drawing on , echoes Paul Churchland's neural realism by advocating the eventual supersession of folk-psychological concepts through neuroscientific advances, treating and as eliminable illusions rather than irreducible features of . This stance counters prevalent academic tendencies toward in science studies, which often attribute empirical successes to interpretive frameworks rather than objective structures, a perspective speculative realism rejects in favor of mind-independent causal processes. However, speculative realism diverges from scientific realism's emphasis on testable hypotheses and approximate truths derived from , as its metaphysical speculations—such as Meillassoux's concept of hyper-chaos, wherein physical laws could undergo absolute, reason-defying changes without necessity—prioritize absolute contingency over the stability presupposed by scientific laws. argues that such contingency, derived from the of laws (their brute existence without eternal grounding), allows access to the absolute via mathematical reasoning, yet this remains untestable, contrasting with scientific realism's requirement that unobservables, like quarks or , earn ontological commitment through predictive success and . Critics contend that hyper-chaos undermines causal predictability central to physics, as no empirical observation could confirm or refute law-alteration without prior regularities, rendering it metaphysically extravagant compared to evidence-based models. Speculative realism's object-oriented or chaotic ontologies often overlook developments within , such as ontic structural realism, which posits that fundamental reality consists in relational structures rather than independent substances or objects, as evidenced in where particles reduce to field excitations defined by interactions. This structural approach challenges Graham Harman's withdrawn objects or Meillassoux's absolute flux by deriving realism from mathematical symmetries and empirical symmetries in high-energy physics, without invoking speculative independence from relations; quantum relational interpretations further emphasize observer-relative properties without absolute chaos, aligning more closely with verified phenomena than with ungrounded postulation. Such alternatives suggest that speculative realism's rejection of correlationism need not entail hyper-speculation, as structural realism already accommodates mind-independence through empirically informed relations, avoiding the need for entities or contingencies beyond scientific reach. While speculative realism could complement by probing causal mechanisms at unobservable scales—such as cosmological origins or —its reliance on a priori reasoning risks unfalsifiable claims that evade empirical , potentially echoing pre-scientific metaphysics rather than advancing testable predictions. For instance, Brassier's nihilistic realism, while grounded in scientific scenarios like solar burnout in 5 billion years, extends to promissory enlightenment via theory-driven extinction of anthropic illusions, yet lacks criteria for verifying non-empirical corollaries, highlighting a tension between causal in science and speculative transcendence thereof. This duality underscores speculative realism's ambition to extend beyond empirical bounds but at the cost of scientific realism's methodological conservatism, where only evidential warrant justifies ontological posits.

Influence and Criticisms

Broader Impacts in Philosophy and Beyond

Speculative realism's emphasis on agency and independent realities has extended into ecological thought, particularly through object-oriented ontology's critique of anthropocentric environmental narratives. In , it challenges harmonious human-nature integration models by advocating speculation on autonomous object-relations, as explored in a dedicated to its applications in pedagogy and . Similarly, ecomedia frameworks incorporate speculative realism to affirm the independent efficacy of entities, such as ecosystems or media artifacts, beyond human interpretation, fostering pedagogies that treat environmental media as agentic participants in . In design and art, object-oriented ontology promotes object-centric approaches that undermine human exceptionalism, viewing designed artifacts and artworks as possessing withdrawn qualities irreducible to user perception. For instance, speculative realism informs socio-technical by modeling human-object assemblages without prioritizing relational over substance ontologies, as in explorations of Internet-of-Things ecosystems where devices exhibit latent capacities. In artistic practice, Graham Harman's , outlined in his 2019 work Art and Objects, posits as a tension between real objects and their sensual manifestations, influencing interpretations of media and visual forms that highlight non-correlational over anthropic narratives. This manifests in fields like bacterial art, where object-oriented frameworks attribute agency to microbial artworks independent of human viewers, reshaping curatorial and creative methodologies. Despite these interdisciplinary extensions, speculative realism's global dissemination remains confined to academic niches, with post-2010 translations of key texts and specialized conferences sustaining interest primarily in humanities-adjacent domains rather than broader cultural adoption. Journals like Speculations, launched around 2010, have facilitated open-access dissemination of object-agency ideas into and , yet the movement's abstract metaphysics limits penetration into or policy discourses. Its challenge to human-centered exceptionalism in cultural production, such as analyses of actants, underscores a persistent tension between speculative and practical applicability.

Achievements in Challenging Anthropocentrism

Speculative realism, originating from the April 27, 2007, workshop at , featuring philosophers , , Graham Harman, and , marked a pivotal shift by explicitly rejecting correlationism—the philosophical stance that is inherently tied to human thought or access. This rejection directly undermines assumptions embedded in post-Kantian traditions, positing instead a that persists independently of human cognition or , thereby restoring speculative access to mind-independent entities. By framing metaphysics as viable beyond subjective correlation, the movement has facilitated ontologies that treat non-human objects and processes as equally real, challenging the human-centric privileging prevalent in much 20th-century . A key achievement lies in the post-2007 revival of metaphysical speculation, evidenced by the proliferation of realist frameworks that integrate empirical findings from cosmology and physics, such as the radiation dating the to approximately 13.8 billion years ago—vastly predating . Meillassoux's concept of "ancestral" statements, drawn from geological and astrophysical data (e.g., Earth's formation 4.54 billion years ago), demonstrates how of pre-human events exposes the limits of correlationist thought, which struggles to account for realities without witnesses. Harman's further advances this by proposing a "flat" metaphysics where objects lack ontological priority over entities like volcanoes or photons, aligning philosophical inquiry with scientific depictions of a non-anthropocentric . This integration has spurred publications and debates emphasizing causal structures independent of interpretive access, as seen in the movement's enduring influence documented in analyses spanning 2007 to 2022. In countering relativist tendencies, speculative realism promotes causal accountability by insisting on the facticity of mind-independent laws and events, directly challenging constructivist paradigms that reduce to social or discursive narratives. For instance, arche-cosmology draws on Schellingian principles to underscore nature's productive , supported by empirical regularities in physics that operate irrespective of human observation. This stance fosters a commitment to verifiable mechanisms over subjective , as articulated in Brassier's eliminationist realism, which leverages neuroscientific and eliminativist arguments to prioritize objective processes. By doing so, the movement has contributed to philosophical discourses that prioritize empirical testability and first-order causal explanations, evident in its alliances with while maintaining speculative depth.

Shortcomings and External Critiques

Speculative realism has faced dismissal from analytic philosophers as a transient continental phenomenon, characterized by speculative assertions that evade empirical scrutiny and rigorous logical analysis. Reviews post-2010, including those in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, underscore its emphasis on unverifiable claims about reality-in-itself, contrasting with analytic preferences for testable propositions and formal methodologies. Such critiques portray the movement as hype-driven, with limited lasting impact outside niche continental circles, as its rejection of correlationism yields propositions resistant to falsification or experimental validation. The anti-anthropocentric thrust of speculative realism has been appropriated in left-leaning ecological discourses, where its motifs of nonhuman agency inform activist narratives on climate crisis and socionatural entanglements, yet this often reinstates human ethical priorities under the guise of decentering mankind. Critics argue this co-optation undermines the movement's purported anti-humanism by subordinating speculative indifference to contingency toward interventionist agendas, such as managerial responses to that presuppose anthropocentric valuations of planetary stability. Moreover, external observers from realist biological perspectives contend that speculative realism sidesteps for human exceptionalism, including neuroscientific data on advanced symbolic and evolutionary adaptations enabling beyond mere , thereby neglecting grounded accounts of human agency in natural hierarchies. Additional shortcomings include the movement's strained handling of speculation's inherent bounds, where assertions of hyper-chaos or absolute contingency outstrip evidential constraints, fostering inconsistencies between proclaimed realism and reliance on unanchored metaphysical posits. It has also drawn fire for inadequate dialogue with longstanding realist frameworks, such as Aristotelian , which integrates empirical observation of substantial forms with causal structures in a manner speculative realism overlooks in favor of withdrawn objects or . This selective perpetuates a continental-analytic divide, rendering speculative realism vulnerable to charges of insularity amid broader philosophical realism's empirical and historical depth.

Recent Developments and Legacy

Post-2020 Evolutions and Extensions

In the years following 2020, speculative realism has prompted retrospective analyses marking over fifteen years since its inception, with works such as After Speculative Realism (2025), edited by Charlie Johns and Hilan Bensusan, delineating the movement's denouement and its evolution toward successors including "new realism." This volume proposes reconceptualizing dialectics through integrations of recent scientific advancements and , critiquing prior ontologies while bolstering alternatives that emphasize contingency and process over static objects. Such reflections highlight a shift from unified opposition to correlationism toward fragmented engagements with empirical domains, including , where speculative realist frameworks reject anthropocentric priors in favor of emergent, non-human-centered realities. Extensions have incorporated hybrid ontologies blending object-oriented approaches with field theories, as proposed by Nathan Eckstrand, who argues for fields as explanatory supplements to explain experiential continuity without reverting to relational . These developments address ontological tensions by positing dynamic processes—such as and becoming—that underpin independently of , drawing on continental realism's between stasis and . Concurrently, the bibliography on speculative realism continues to catalog ongoing contributions, evidencing sustained scholarly activity amid diversification into sub-movements like process-oriented realism. Debates persist over empirical grounding, with integrations into scientific —such as quantum and systems perspectives—challenging pure contingency models by invoking causal structures irreducible to human access, though these remain contested for lacking rigorous unification. This fragmentation underscores speculative realism's legacy as a catalyst for pluralistic ontologies, yet critiques note insufficient causal mechanisms to bridge abstract with verifiable , prompting calls for hybrid methodologies that prioritize contingencies over untestable hyperstition.

Ongoing Contributions and Future Prospects

Speculative realism continues to challenge correlationism—the philosophical stance that reality is inherently tied to human —through extensions in object-oriented frameworks and systems metaphysics, as seen in recent integrations of field theory that refine ontologies to better account for relational dynamics without reducing to anthropocentric access. This sustained critique manifests in ongoing academic discourse, including symposia exploring its implications for , where it prompts reevaluations of human-object relations in ecological contexts. Such contributions foster a verifiable shift toward non-correlational realism in , evidenced by persistent publications marking milestones like the movement's 15-year retrospective in 2022. Future prospects lie in bridging speculative approaches with , particularly through alliances with empirical sciences that maintain philosophical autonomy while countering linguistic-turn reductions of reality. Proponents argue this could yield causal advancements in domains like cosmology, by speculating on pre-human realities unbound by observational correlation, or , where object-independence challenges mind-dependent models of . Yet, without firmer empirical grounding, speculative realism risks marginalization amid data-driven paradigms, potentially limiting its influence to niche extensions in or rather than broader truth-seeking impacts. Its promise endures in debunking anthropocentric biases that distort policy and science, such as overemphasizing human-centric interpretations in environmental or technological forecasting, thereby promoting causal realism attuned to independent objectivities.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.