Hubbry Logo
SupermajoritySupermajorityMain
Open search
Supermajority
Community hub
Supermajority
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Supermajority
Supermajority
Supermajority
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Part of a series on
Politics
Primary topics
Systems
Academic disciplines
Public administration
Policy
Government branches
Related topics
Subseries
icon Politics portal

A supermajority is a requirement for a proposal to gain a specified level of support which is greater than the threshold of one-half used for a simple majority, the latter sometimes expressed as a "50% + 1 vote." Supermajority rules in a democracy can help to prevent a majority from eroding fundamental rights of a minority, but can also hamper efforts to respond to problems and encourage corrupt compromises at times when action is taken. Changes to constitutions, especially those with entrenched clauses, commonly require supermajority support in a legislature. In consensus democracy the supermajority rule is applied in most cases.

History

[edit]

The first known use of a supermajority rule was in juries during the 100s BC in ancient Rome.[1] In some[which?] cases, two thirds of jurors had to confirm they were ready to take a decision before the matter went to a simple majority vote.

Pope Alexander III introduced the use of supermajority rule for papal elections at the Third Lateran Council in 1179.[2]

In the Democratic Party of the United States, a rule requiring the determination of a presidential nominee by the votes of two-thirds of delegates to the Democratic National Convention was adopted at the party's first presidential nominating convention in 1832.[3] The two-thirds rule gave southern Democrats a de facto veto over any presidential nominee after the Civil War, which lasted until the rule was abolished in 1936.[4]

In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were critical of supermajority requirements. In Federalist 22, Hamilton wrote that while preventing harmful legislation from being passed, such requirements also prevented beneficial legislation from being passed, and "its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority." Hamilton also wrote that such a requirement would encourage "contemptible compromises of the public good".[5] In Federalist 58, Madison wrote that supermajority requirements might help impede the passage of "hasty and partial measures", but "[i]n all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority." Madison also wrote that such requirements would encourage secession.[6]

Common thresholds of supermajority

[edit]
Look up supermajority or qualified majority in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

A majority vote, or more than half the votes cast, is a common voting basis. Instead of the basis of a majority, a supermajority can be specified using any fraction or percentage which is greater than one-half.[7][8] Common supermajorities include three-fifths (60%), two-thirds (66.666...%), and three-quarters (75%). In most cases, if the supermajority fraction or percentage of votes yields a non-whole number, it is rounded to the next higher whole number.

Two-thirds

[edit]

A two-thirds vote, when unqualified, means two-thirds or more of the votes cast.[9][10][11] This voting basis is equivalent to the number of votes in favor being at least twice the number of votes against.[12] Abstentions and absences may be excluded when calculating a two-thirds vote.[10]

The two-thirds requirement can be qualified to include the entire membership of a body instead of only those present and voting, but such a requirement must be explicitly stated (such as "two-thirds of those members duly elected and sworn").[9] In this case, abstentions and absences count as votes against the proposal. Alternatively, the voting requirement could be specified as "two-thirds of those present", which has the effect of counting abstentions but not absences as votes against the proposal.[13]

For example, if there are 100 eligible voters, 67 votes are required for a supermajority (two-thirds of 100, rounded up). However, if two voters abstain or are absent, the total decreases to 98, and the required votes for a supermajority drops to 66 (two-thirds of 98, rounded up).[14]

In Italy, between 1948 and 1993, the Senate was divided into a number of single-seat constituencies, where, to get elected in a FPTP vote, a two-thirds majority of votes was required. Usually, it was attainable only for the South Tyrolean People's Party senators representing the German-speaking minority of South Tyrol, thus most other Senators were still elected proportionally in regional constituencies, after being grouped in party lists.[15]

Two-thirds is the most common supermajority requirement in the US Constitution, as set out in: Article I with regard to veto overrides; Article II with regard to treaty ratification and to presidential conviction and removal after an impeachment; and Article V with regard to the proposal of constitutional amendments either by Congress or via petitions by the states.

Systems that exercise consensus based on a minimum threshold of two-thirds super-majority also some-what reflect the technical mathematical attributes of Byzantine Fault Tolerance which requires a super-majority consensus agreement greater than a minimum threshold of two-thirds of a group.

Three-fifths, or 60 percent

[edit]

Another type of supermajority is three-fifths (60 percent). This requirement could also be qualified to include the entire membership or to include those present.

In 2006, the Constitution of Florida was amended to require a 60% majority to pass new constitutional amendments by popular vote.[16]

In Poland, the Sejm (lower house of the bicameral parliament of Poland) requires a three-fifths majority of MPs to overturn a veto from the President of Poland.[17]

55%

[edit]

For the Montenegrin independence referendum held in 2006 the European Union envoy Miroslav Lajčák proposed independence if a 55% supermajority of votes are cast in favor with a minimum turnout of 50%. Such procedure, ultimately accepted by the government of Montenegro, was somewhat criticized as overriding the traditional practice of requiring a two-thirds supermajority, as practiced in all former Yugoslav countries before (including the previous referendum in Montenegro).[citation needed] The requirement for 50% turnout has also been criticized for causing no-show paradoxes.

In 2016, the Constitution of Colorado was amended to require a 55% majority to pass new constitutional amendments by popular vote. It had previously been a simple majority.[18]

Use in parliamentary procedure

[edit]

Parliamentary procedure requires that any action that may alter the rights of a minority have a supermajority requirement. Robert's Rules of Order states:[10]

As a compromise between the rights of the individual and the rights of the assembly, the principle has been established that a two-thirds vote is required to adopt any motion that: (a) suspends or modifies a rule of order previously adopted; (b) prevents the introduction of a question for consideration; (c) closes, limits, or extends the limits of debate; (d) closes nominations or the polls, or otherwise limits the freedom of nominating or voting; or (e) takes away membership.

Use in governments around the world

[edit]

Australia

[edit]

To pass an amendment to the Australian Constitution, a referendum is required and must achieve a "double majority": a majority of those voting nationwide, as well as separate majorities in a majority of states (i.e., 4 out of 6 states).[19] Furthermore, in circumstances where a specific state is affected by a referendum, a majority of voters in that state must also agree to the change[20]—referred to as a "triple majority".[citation needed]

Bangladesh

[edit]

Article 142 of the Constitution of Bangladesh stipulates a bill in the Jatiya Sangsad must expressly state in its short title its purpose is to amend a provision of the constitution. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in the unicameral Jatiya Sangsad to become effective.

Canada

[edit]

In Canada, most constitutional amendments can be passed only if identical resolutions are adopted by the House of Commons, the Senate, and two-thirds or more of the provincial legislative assemblies representing at least 50 percent of the national population.

Denmark

[edit]

Article 20 of the Constitution of Denmark states that if the government or parliament wants to cede parts of national sovereignty to an international body such as the European Union or the United Nations, it has to get a five-sixths majority in the Folketing (150 out of 179 seats).[21] If there is only a simple majority, a referendum must be held on the subject.[21]

European Union

[edit]

Council

[edit]
Main article: Voting in the Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union uses 'Qualified majority voting' for the majority of issues brought before the institution. However, for matters of extreme importance for individual member states, unanimous voting is implemented.[22] An example of this is Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, whereby a member state can have its rights suspended with the unanimous approval of all other member states.

After the accession of Croatia, on 1 July 2013, at least 260 votes out of a total of 352 by at least 15 member states were required for legislation to be adopted by qualified majority. From 1 July 2013, the pass condition translated into:

  1. At least 15 (or 18, if proposal was not made by the commission) countries,
  2. At least 260 of the total 352 voting weights,
  3. At least 313.6 million people represented by the states that vote in favour.

Parliament

[edit]

Requirements to reach an absolute majority is a common feature of voting in the European Parliament (EP) where under the ordinary legislative procedure the EP is required to act by an absolute majority if it is to either amend or reject proposed legislation.[23]

Finland

[edit]

According to Finnish Law, when a new legislative proposal would in some way add, alter or remove a part of the Finnish constitution, a bill requires a 2/3 majority in the Parliament of Finland. In other words, a legislative proposal that would modify, add or remove a part of the Finnish Constitution requires at least the approval of 134 out of 200 representatives in the Parliament of Finland.

India

[edit]

Article 368 of the Indian Constitution requires a supermajority of two-thirds of members present and voting in each house of the Indian Parliament, subject to at least by a majority of the total membership of each House of Parliament, to amend the constitution. In addition, in matters affecting the states and judiciary, at least above half of all the states need to ratify the amendment.

Italy

[edit]
Main article: President of Italy § Election

The President of Italy is elected by an electoral college consisting of both chambers of Parliament sitting in joint session with 58 electors from the country's 20 regions. In the first three rounds of voting, a candidate must get two-thirds of the votes to win, but from the fourth round onwards only an absolute majority is needed. Reforms to the Constitution need to achieve a supermajority of two-thirds of the votes both in the Chamber and in the Senate to avoid the possibility of being sent to popular vote in order to be confirmed through a referendum.

Japan

[edit]

Amendments to the constitution require a two-thirds majority in both houses of the National Diet and a simple majority in a referendum.[24]

New Zealand

[edit]

Section 268 of the Electoral Act sets out a number of 'reserved provisions'. These provisions include section 17(1) of the Constitution Act 1986 (regarding Parliament's term length), section 35 of the Electoral Act (regarding the drawing of electoral boundaries), and section 74 of the Electoral Act (designating 18 as the minimum voting age). For a 'reserved provision' to be amended or repealed, a three-quarters majority is required in the House of Representatives or a majority is needed in a national referendum.[25]

Nigeria

[edit]

Under the Constitution of Nigeria a two-thirds majority is required in the National Assembly to alter the Constitution, enact legislation in a few areas, or remove office holders from some positions, such as Speaker. Legislative override or impeachment of the executive at either the state or federal government level also requires a two-thirds majority of the corresponding legislative assembly.[26]

Philippines

[edit]

Under the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, a two-thirds majority of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines (the House of Representatives and the Senate) meeting in joint session is required to declare war.[27] A two-thirds majority of both chambers is required to override a presidential veto.[27][28] A two-thirds vote of both chambers of Congress voting separately is required to designate the vice president as acting president in the event that a majority of the Cabinet certifies that the president is "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office" but the president declares that no such inability exists.[27] A two-thirds vote of either chamber is required to suspend or expel a member from that chamber.[27]

Under the 1987 Constitution, "The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention."[27] A three-quarters vote of all the members of the Congress is required to propose an amendment to the Constitution; the proposed amendment is submitted to the people for ratification (by a majority of the votes cast) in a plebiscite.[27]

A two-thirds majority of the Senate is required to ratify treaties, and to remove an impeached official from office.[27] Impeachment by the House, which is the required first step in the removal process, only requires one-third of Representatives to sign a petition (specifically a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment).[27][29][30]

Singapore

[edit]

Different amendment procedures apply to different parts of the Constitution. Most of the Articles of the Constitution may be amended by a bill enacted by Parliament if there is at least a supermajority of two-thirds of all elected MPs voting in favour of the bill during its Second and Third Readings in Parliament.[31] This is in contrast to ordinary bills, which only need to be approved by at least a simple majority of all the MPs present and voting.[32]

However, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has commanded a majority of more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament since 1968. Thus, the more stringent amendment requirement has not imposed any major limitation on Parliament's ability to amend the Constitution.[33][failed verification]

South Korea

[edit]

Legislation

[edit]

A three-fifths majority of legislators is required for a bill to be put to a vote in the National Assembly in order to prevent the ruling party from passing laws without the support of opposition parties.[34] However, if a bill does not achieve the required three-fifths majority at one session without also being rejected, it must then be voted on at the next session even if less than three-fifths of legislators agree to do so.[35] Additionally, if the President vetoes a bill, the veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of legislators.[36]

Impeachment

[edit]

According to Article 65 of the Constitution of South Korea, impeachment of the President requires a two-third majority of legislators to be effective.[36]

Judicial review

[edit]

According to Article 113 of the Constitution of South Korea, the Constitutional Court requires a two-thirds majority of its judges to issue rulings nullifying laws, removing impeached officials or dissolving a political party.[36]

Constitutional amendments

[edit]

According to Article 130 of the Constitution of South Korea, amendments to the constitution must be passed by a two-thirds majority of legislators and then approved by voters at a referendum in order to become effective.[36]

Spain

[edit]

Constitutional reform

[edit]

The 1978 Constitution states that a three-fifths majority in both Congress of Deputies and Senate of Spain is needed to pass a constitutional reform, but if a two-thirds majority is reached in the Congress of Deputies, an absolute majority of senators is enough to pass the proposal.[37]

Nevertheless, when a new Constitution is proposed or the proposal's goal is to reform the Preliminary Title, the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms or the Title on the Crown, the supermajority becomes significantly harder:

  • A supermajority of two-thirds must be reached in both Congress of Deputies and Senate.
  • Both chambers must be dissolved.
  • The new elected chambers must approve the proposal by a new two-thirds supermajority.
  • Finally, the proposal is passed by majority in referendum.

The first way has been used twice (1992 and 2011), but the second has never been used.

[edit]

The Spanish Constitution states other supermajorities:

  • Members of the General Council of the Judiciary are appointed by the Congress of Deputies and Senate of Spain, and each appointment needs a three-fifths majority.[38]
  • Members of the Constitutional Court are also appointed by both Congress of Deputies and Senate of Spain, and each appointment needs a three-fifths majority.[38]
  • The president of the RTVE, the public radio and television broadcaster, must be elected by two-thirds majority of the Congress of Deputies.[39]

Autonomous communities

[edit]

Each Spanish autonomous community has its own Statute of Autonomy, working like a local constitution that is subject to the 1978 Constitution and national powers.

The Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands states that its economic and fiscal regime and electoral law need a two-thirds majority of the Parliament to be modified.[40] On its behalf, the Ombudsman needs a three-fifths majority to be appointed. Also, if a two-thirds majority votes against a law project, it must be proposed to the following session.

Taiwan

[edit]

Before the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China in 2005, constitutional amendments needed to be passed by the National Assembly. Since the Additional Articles were ratified on June 7, 2005, the National Assembly was abolished. Amendments of the constitution need to be proposed by more than one-quarter of members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by three-quarters of those present in the meeting, the presence of which must surpass three-quarters of all members of the Legislative Yuan, followed by the approval of more than half (50%) of all eligible voters in a referendum.

Turkey

[edit]

In Turkey, constitutional amendments need a three fifths majority (360 votes) to be put forward to a referendum and a two-thirds majority (400 votes) to be ratified directly.

Ukraine

[edit]

Constitutional amendments

[edit]

According to Article 155 of the Constitution of Ukraine, amendments to the constitution, except for Chapter I — "General Principles," Chapter III — "Elections. Referendum", and Chapter XIII — "Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine", must be previously approved by a simple majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and then passed by a two-thirds majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the succeeding regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

According to Article 156 of the Constitution of Ukraine, amendments to Chapter I — "General Principles," Chapter III — "Elections. Referendum", and Chapter XIII — "Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" must be passed by a two-thirds majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and then approved by voters at a referendum in order to become effective.

United Kingdom

[edit]

UK Parliament

[edit]

A rare example of a supermajority requirement affecting the Parliament of the United Kingdom is the need for a two-thirds supermajority vote in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords to amend or dissolve the Royal Charter on self-regulation of the press, insofar as it applies in England and Wales.[41][42]

Before its repeal, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 provided that the United Kingdom House of Commons could be dissolved and an election held before the expiry of its 5-year term by a vote of two-thirds of the membership of the House of Commons. The Act also provided that Parliament could alternatively be dissolved if the House of Commons passed a motion of no-confidence in the government and no new government were to win a motion of confidence within two weeks of the original vote of no-confidence.

The two-thirds supermajority provision for an early dissolution and election was triggered only once, resulting in the 2017 United Kingdom General Election. The previous election in 2015 had occurred due to the natural expiry of the 5-year term of the House of Commons.

Parliamentary supremacy meant that theoretically the Act could be circumvented by a government with a majority that wanted to bypass the requirement for a two-thirds vote by passing an act that stated, "Notwithstanding the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, a general election will be called on DATE". This was precisely what was done to initiate the election in 2019, the final election held whilst the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was in effect.

During the 2019 election, both the governing Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party expressed a desire to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and restore the traditional, centuries-old system under which elections could be held at any time, subject to the 5-year maximum term limit established by the Parliament Act 1911. Such a repeal would only require a simple majority.

Ultimately, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was repealed by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022, thereby removing any supermajority requirement and restoring the previous royal prerogative power to dissolve the House of Commons at any time during its 5-year term.

Devolved parliaments

[edit]

The devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales all usually operate with fixed intervals between ordinary elections. However, the acts governing the operation of those legislatures all allow for an early election to take place if a motion to that effect is approved by two-thirds of the total number of members of the legislature in question.[43][44][45]

Section 31A of the Scotland Act 1998[46] and Section 111A of the Government of Wales Act 2006[47] provide that certain provisions of those Acts relating to the functions of and elections to the respective Scottish and Welsh devolved legislatures are protected from amendment by those legislatures, unless a two-thirds supermajority of the total number of members votes in favour.

Regarding Scotland, the protected provisions are:[48]

  • Who may vote at Scottish Parliament elections
  • The system of election for members of the Scottish Parliament
  • The number of Scottish Parliament constituencies
  • The number of members returned by each constituency

The protected provisions regarding Wales are the same as those in Scotland; in addition, there are two Wales-specific provisions:[47]

  • The name of the legislature
  • The number of individuals permitted to be appointed Welsh Minister or Deputy Welsh Minister

A two-thirds supermajority vote is required in the Scottish Parliament in order to amend or dissolve the Royal Charter on self-regulation of the press, insofar as it applies in Scotland.[41][42]

Local authorities

[edit]

Principal councils in Wales are required to pass a resolution with a two-thirds supermajority vote in order to change the system by which they are elected, with the permitted choices being first-past-the-post and single transferable vote.[49]

District councils in England are required to pass a resolution with a two-thirds supermajority vote in order to change their 'electoral scheme,' i.e. what proportion of councillors is elected at each ordinary election, with permitted proportions being one-third, one-half or all councillors.[50]

The London Assembly may, by a two-thirds supermajority vote, veto the mayor's draft strategies.[51]

United Nations

[edit]

The United Nations Security Council requires a supermajority of the fixed membership on substantive matters (procedural matters require a simple majority of those present and voting). According to Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, at least nine of the Security Council's 15 members (i.e., a three-fifths supermajority) must vote in favor of a draft resolution in order to achieve passage. Specifying the fixed membership has the effect of making abstentions count as votes against—absences are not normal but would be treated the same way.

This is useful for the five permanent members of the council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) because a vote against from any one of them constitutes a veto, which cannot be overridden. Permanent members who do not support a measure but are unwilling to be seen to block it against the wishes of the majority of the council, tend to abstain; abstentions by veto powers are generally seen by close observers of the UN[according to whom?] as the equivalent of not vetoing votes against and have the same impact on the decision of the Security Council.

United States

[edit]

Federal government

[edit]

The Constitution of the United States requires supermajorities for certain significant actions to occur.[52]

Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed in one of two ways: a two-thirds supermajority votes of each body of United States Congress or a convention called by Congress on application of two-thirds (currently 34) of the states. Once proposed, the amendment must be ratified by three-quarters (currently 38) of the states (either through the state legislatures, or ratification conventions, whichever "mode of ratification" Congress selects).

Congress may pass bills by simple majority votes. If the president vetoes a bill, Congress may override the veto by a two-thirds supermajority of both houses.

A treaty must be ratified by a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate to enter into force and effect.

Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives Congress a role to play in the event of a presidential disability. If the vice president and a majority of the president's cabinet declare that the president is unable to serve in that role, the vice president becomes acting president. Within 21 days of such a declaration (or, if Congress is in recess when a president is disabled, 21 days after Congress reconvenes), Congress must vote by two-thirds supermajorities to continue the disability declaration; otherwise, such declaration expires after the 21 days and the president would at that time "resume" discharging all the powers and duties of the office. As of January 2025, Section 4 has never been invoked.

The House may, by a simple majority vote, impeach a federal official (such as, but not limited to, the president, vice president, or a federal judge). Removal from office requires a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate. In 1842, the House failed to impeach president John Tyler. In 1868, the Senate fell one vote short of removing president Andrew Johnson following his impeachment. In 1999, efforts to remove Bill Clinton following his impeachment in 1998 fell just short of a simple majority, and 17 votes short of the two-thirds supermajority. The impeachment procedure was last used in 2021, when president Donald Trump was impeached for a second time during his first term and subsequently acquitted. Each chamber may expel one of its own members by a two-thirds supermajority vote; this last happened when the House expelled George Santos in 2023.

The 14th Amendment (section 3) bars a person from federal or state office if, after having previously taken an oath to support the Constitution as a federal or state officer, "shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof". However, both the House and Senate may jointly override this restriction with a two-thirds supermajority vote each.

A two-thirds supermajority in the Senate is 67 out of 100 senators, while a two-thirds supermajority in the House is 290 out of 435 representatives. However, since many votes take place without every seat in the House filled and representatives participating, it does not often require 67 senators or 290 representatives to achieve this supermajority.

Apart from these constitutional requirements, a Senate rule (except in cases covered by the nuclear option, or of a rule change) requires an absolute supermajority of three-fifths to move to a vote through a cloture motion, which closes debate on a bill or nomination, thus ending a filibuster by a minority of members. In current practice, the mere threat of a filibuster prevents passing almost any measure that has less than three-fifths agreement in the Senate, 60 of the 100 senators if every seat is filled.

State government

[edit]

For state legislatures in the United States, Mason's Manual says, "A deliberative body cannot by its own act or rule require a two-thirds vote to take any action where the constitution or controlling authority requires only a majority vote. To require a two-thirds vote, for example, to take any action would be to give to any number more than one-third of the members the power to defeat the action and amount to a delegation of the powers of the body to a minority."[53] Some states require a supermajority for passage of a constitutional amendment or statutory initiative.[54]

Many state constitutions allow or require amendments to their own constitutions to be proposed by supermajorities of the state legislature; these amendments must usually be approved by the voters at one or more subsequent elections. Michigan, for instance, allows the Legislature to propose an amendment to the Michigan Constitution; it must then be ratified by the voters at the next general election (unless a special election is called).[55]

In most states, the state legislature may override a governor's veto of legislation. In most states, a two-thirds supermajority of both chambers is required.[56] However, in some states (e.g., Illinois, Maryland and North Carolina), only a three-fifths supermajority is required,[57][58][59] while in Kentucky and West Virginia only a normal majority is needed.

One common provision of so-called "taxpayer bill of rights" laws (either in state statutes or state constitutions) is requirement of a supermajority vote in the state legislature to increase taxes. The National Conference of State Legislatures reported in 2010 that fifteen states required a supermajority vote (either a three-fifths, two-thirds or three-quarters majority vote in both chambers) to pass some or all tax increases.[60]

Supermajority requirements for tax increases have been criticized as "deeply flawed" by a report by the progressive Center on Budget and Policy Priorities because such requirements empower a minority of legislators, making it difficult to close tax loopholes or fund transportation infrastructure, and also may encourage pork-barrel spending as a trade-off to ensure passage of a tax increase (see logrolling).[61]

International agreements

[edit]

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires a seven-eighths majority of participating states to be amended.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Supermajority

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

A supermajority is a voting requirement exceeding a simple majority—typically two-thirds or three-fifths of members present and voting—mandating broader consensus for passage of proposals in legislative bodies, constitutions, and organizations.
Such thresholds are employed to safeguard against transient majorities enacting profound or irreversible changes, as seen in constitutional amendment processes where most U.S. states demand legislative supermajorities alongside ratification.
In the U.S. federal system, the Constitution specifies two-thirds votes in both houses of Congress for overriding presidential vetoes, proposing amendments, and approving treaties in the Senate, while state legislatures often apply similar rules to tax increases or budget overrides.
Supermajorities promote institutional stability by requiring cross-partisan support but have drawn critique for enabling obstruction, particularly in polarized environments where achieving them proves challenging without compromising on core policy differences.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Core Principles

A supermajority refers to a voting requirement exceeding a simple majority, typically mandating two-thirds or three-fifths support among members present and voting for a measure to pass. This threshold ensures decisions reflect broader consensus beyond narrow pluralities, distinguishing it from ordinary that often proceeds by simple majority (over 50 percent plus one). In legislative contexts, such as the U.S. , the specifies supermajorities for actions like overriding presidential vetoes or ratifying treaties, calculated as two-thirds of members voting with a present. The core principle underlying supermajorities derives from the need to mitigate risks of transient majorities enacting policies that could destabilize institutions or infringe on minority interests. By elevating the approval bar, these rules compel deliberation and compromise, fostering outcomes more likely to endure scrutiny and reflect sustained public preference over ephemeral shifts. This mechanism counters the potential for simple majorities to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term stability, as evidenced in constitutional designs where irreversible changes, like amendments, demand supermajority assent to approximate in pivotal matters. Supermajorities also embody a commitment to protecting entrenched norms against hasty alteration, recognizing that certain decisions—such as altering fundamental laws or corporate charters—warrant safeguards against factional dominance. In practice, this manifests in varied thresholds tailored to decision gravity; for instance, lower-stakes votes may suffice with simple majorities, while high-impact ones invoke supermajorities to ensure robust backing and reduce reversal likelihood. Empirical application in bodies like the U.S. underscores this, where 60-vote thresholds for effectively approximate supermajority hurdles to advance debate.

First-Principles Rationale

Supermajority requirements emerge from the foundational principle that thresholds in should scale with the stakes and irreversibility of outcomes, distinguishing routine from structural alterations that bind future actors or generations. In low-stakes, reversible decisions, a simple majority efficiently aggregates preferences while minimizing deadlock, but for high-stakes changes—such as constitutional amendments or overrides of executive vetoes—a bare risks entrenching transient passions or factional impulses that do not reflect enduring consensus. This calibration reduces the probability of erroneous commitments by demanding a stronger signal of support, akin to evidentiary standards in where greater certainty is warranted for severe consequences. Causally, simple majorities can perpetuate instability through preference cycling or short-term biases, where voters prioritize immediate gains over long-term viability, leading to policy oscillations that erode trust and efficacy. Supermajorities counteract this by imposing transaction costs that filter marginal proposals, compelling proponents to build cross-factional coalitions and thereby enhancing legislative quality and legitimacy—opponents of a measure gain incentives to when the threshold demands near-universal buy-in. In diverse polities, this mechanism mitigates risks of overreach by protecting entrenched minorities without vesting power in them, fostering over dominance and aligning outcomes more closely with underlying social equilibria rather than episodic majorities. Empirically grounded reasoning further underscores that supermajorities preserve institutional continuity against myopic reforms; for instance, entrenchment rules address voters' tendency to evaluate legislators on proximate effects, deterring hasty dilutions of foundational pacts that safeguard against arbitrary power shifts. While critics contend such thresholds may entrench biases, the first-principles case prioritizes error minimization in irreversible domains, where the cost of false positives (unwise changes) exceeds that of false negatives (delayed reforms), ensuring reflects robust rather than fragile agreement.

Historical Development

Ancient and Pre-Modern Origins

Supermajority requirements first emerged in the during jury trials in the quaestiones perpetuae, specialized courts established from the late second century BCE onward, where convictions of elites such as senators often demanded a vote exceeding simple majority—typically 25 of 51 jurors—to mitigate risks of politically motivated condemnations. This mechanism reflected an early institutional preference for heightened consensus in high-stakes judicial decisions, prioritizing protection against erroneous or factional outcomes over expediency. In , decision-making in assemblies like those described in Homeric epics relied primarily on —collective shouting or gestures—rather than counted votes, with the shift to numerical aggregation occurring in archaic poleis around the sixth century BCE, though formalized supermajorities remained rare and typically manifested as rather than proportional thresholds. For instance, Athenian ostracism procedures required at least 6,000 votes to exile a citizen, functioning as an absolute quorum to ensure broad participation but not a relative supermajority beyond half. Pre-modern developments intensified in medieval ecclesiastical governance, where twelfth-century canon law transitioned from unanimitas (), rooted in the ideal of moral infallibility and the sanior pars (sounder part) doctrine emphasizing qualitative consensus among the wise, to quantitative supermajority rules for practicality amid growing schisms. The Third Lateran Council of 1179 formalized this shift by mandating a two-thirds of cardinals for valid papal elections, restricting voting to cardinals alone and aiming to prevent invalidations from minority dissent while avoiding prolonged vacancies. This rule, enduring with modifications until 1996, exemplified supermajority's role in stabilizing hierarchical institutions by demanding broader agreement than simple majorities. Similar thresholds appeared in monastic chapters and early universities for electing superiors, reflecting a broader canonistic trend toward calibrated majorities to reconcile with decisiveness.

Modern Constitutional Adoption

The Constitution of 1787 incorporated supermajority thresholds as a core mechanism for high-stakes decisions, reflecting framers' intent to balance with safeguards against transient majorities. Article V mandates a two-thirds vote in both houses of to propose constitutional amendments, followed by by three-fourths of state legislatures or conventions, a design adopted on September 17, 1787, to ensure broad consensus for altering the foundational charter. Similarly, Article I, Section 7 requires a two-thirds majority in each chamber to override a presidential , a provision ratified to prevent legislative overreach while allowing circumvention of executive checks under exceptional agreement. These thresholds were influenced by colonial experiences with simple majorities leading to instability, prioritizing deliberation over speed in pivotal actions like treaty under Article II, Section 2, which also demands two-thirds approval. In , post-World War II constitutions frequently embedded supermajority requirements to entrench democratic norms against authoritarian reversion, marking a shift toward rigid amendment processes. The Italian Constitution of 1948, promulgated on December 22 after constituent assembly debates, stipulates in Article 138 that amendments require approval by an absolute in both chambers followed by a second identical vote or a , effectively imposing a supermajority hurdle through iterative consent to foster stability amid recent fascist history. Germany's of 1949, effective May 23, similarly demands a two-thirds in the and Bundesrat for amendments under Article 79, a threshold adopted during Allied oversight to protect core rights like human dignity from erosion, as evidenced by explicit unamendability clauses paired with high procedural bars. These provisions contrasted with interwar Weimar Germany's simpler majoritarian amendment rules, which had enabled rapid constitutional decay. France's Fifth Republic , adopted via on October 4, 1958, introduced a three-fifths supermajority in a joint parliamentary session for amendments under Article 89, replacing the Fourth Republic's more flexible procedures that contributed to governmental paralysis. This threshold, proposed by Charles de Gaulle's drafters, aimed to consolidate executive while insulating structural changes from factional volatility, requiring either congressional supermajority approval or for . Post-colonial and transitional constitutions, such as India's 1950 charter requiring a two-thirds parliamentary for amendments under Article 368, further exemplified this trend, with over 100 amendments enacted by 2023 yet constrained by the elevated bar to prevent wholesale rewrites. Empirical patterns show that by the late , approximately 70% of global constitutions mandated legislative supermajorities for amendments, up from pre-war norms, correlating with efforts to enhance institutional resilience amid ideological conflicts.

Common Thresholds and Variations

Two-Thirds Supermajority

A two-thirds supermajority mandates that a measure receive affirmative votes from at least two-thirds of legislators present and voting, assuming a , to pass. This threshold exceeds a simple majority and serves to ensure broader consensus for significant actions, such as altering fundamental laws or overriding executive decisions. In the United States Constitution, a two-thirds vote is explicitly required in several contexts, including proposing constitutional amendments by under Article V, which necessitates two-thirds approval in both the and the before referral to states for . Similarly, overriding a presidential demands two-thirds support in each chamber, as stipulated in Article I, Section 7. The further employs this threshold for ratifying treaties (Article II, Section 2) and convicting officials in trials (Article I, Section 3), where conviction requires two-thirds of senators present. Expulsion of a member from either chamber also requires a two-thirds vote (Article I, Section 5). Internationally, two-thirds supermajorities appear frequently in presidential systems for veto overrides, particularly in ; for instance, , , , and mandate this level of legislative support to enact bills over executive objection. Many national constitutions adopt two-thirds for amending foundational texts, mirroring the U.S. model by demanding supermajority congressional approval followed by additional steps. In parliamentary contexts, such as the UK , internal rules occasionally invoke supermajorities for procedural matters like waiving the three-day rule on bills, though constitutional changes often rely on simple majorities or referendums rather than fixed two-thirds thresholds.
Jurisdiction/ApplicationRequirement Details
U.S. Constitutional AmendmentsTwo-thirds of both Houses to propose.
U.S. Veto OverrideTwo-thirds in each chamber.
U.S. Senate Treaty RatificationTwo-thirds of present.
Latin American Veto Overrides (e.g., , )Two-thirds legislative .
Variations exist, such as basing the two-thirds on total membership rather than those voting, which raises the effective bar; the U.S. Constitution generally applies it to members voting with a present. This threshold's prevalence stems from its role in safeguarding against hasty changes to entrenched norms, though it can complicate governance when majorities fall short.

Three-Fifths or 60 Percent

The three-fifths supermajority, representing 60 percent of the total membership, serves as a procedural threshold in select legislative bodies to demand elevated consensus for advancing measures beyond ordinary majorities. This standard is most prominently codified in the United States Senate's rule, which requires 60 affirmative votes out of 100 senators to terminate extended debate on legislation or nominations, thereby overcoming a . Adopted in 1917 initially as a two-thirds requirement to address abuses during , the threshold was lowered to three-fifths in 1975 amid efforts to facilitate more frequent debate closures while preserving minority influence. In practice, the 60-vote invokes after a signed by at least 16 senators, followed by two days of , culminating in a vote that limits subsequent discussion to 30 hours if successful. This mechanism applies to most bills and nominations, excluding budget reconciliation processes that bypass it under specific fiscal conditions. Exceptions persist for changing rules themselves, which still demand a two-thirds vote, underscoring the entrenched nature of the three-fifths bar. Empirical data from 1975 to 2020 indicate invocations rose from dozens to hundreds annually, reflecting both increased partisan polarization and the rule's role in enforcing cross-aisle . Beyond the federal level, three-fifths thresholds appear in various legislatures for analogous debate limitations or substantive approvals, such as in state senates mirroring federal practices to curb filibusters. For instance, certain states impose 60 percent votes for overriding gubernatorial vetoes or passing revenue bills, though configurations vary; mandates two-thirds for tax hikes, while others like apply 60 percent to voter-approved constitutional amendments. Internationally, 60 percent supermajorities are less standardized but emerge in contexts like Italy's bicameral confidence votes or select constitutional overrides in parliamentary systems, often calibrated to balance with institutional stability. These applications empirically correlate with reduced legislative volatility in polarized environments, as higher thresholds compel on contentious issues.

Other Thresholds Including Absolute Quorums

Three-quarters supermajorities, requiring 75% support, are utilized in foundational governance mechanisms to demand near-universal backing for irreversible alterations. , Article V of the stipulates that proposed amendments become effective upon by three-fourths of the states, currently 38 out of 50 state legislatures or conventions. This absolute threshold, calculated against the full roster of states irrespective of participation, has governed all 27 amendments since 1789, with the most recent in 1992 after a 203-year process. Higher thresholds, such as four-fifths (80%), occur in specialized legislative procedures to override entrenched norms. For example, the mandates a four-fifths vote of members present and voting to suspend its rules, a mechanism designed to preserve procedural integrity amid urgency. Such elevated bars appear infrequently in core policymaking but serve to insulate against hasty deviations from established practices. Absolute quorums distinguish supermajority requirements by basing the denominator on the total membership of a body, rather than attendees or voters present, thereby countering strategic abstentions that could dilute effective support. This approach enforces genuine breadth of assent, as dilution via non-participation becomes infeasible; for instance, a three-quarters absolute quorum in a 100-member assembly demands 75 affirmative votes from all members, not merely from a . In constitutional contexts, the U.S. ratification exemplifies this, requiring fixed state-level majorities without regard to turnout. Comparative analysis across systems reveals absolute quorums enhance accountability by aligning outcomes with the full electorate's implicit consent, though they risk paralysis if vacancies or recusals reduce the feasible numerator.

Theoretical Analysis

Advantages: Stability, Deliberation, and Minority Protections

Supermajority requirements contribute to institutional stability by erecting barriers to rapid policy reversals, thereby mitigating the risks of volatile governance driven by short-term electoral shifts. In legislative contexts, elevated voting thresholds limit the frequency and extremity of amendments, preserving established policies and reducing economic or social disruptions from incessant change. For example, analyses of parliamentary systems demonstrate that stricter supermajority rules correlate with lower policy volatility, as the heightened difficulty of altering precedents favors incremental adjustments over wholesale overhauls. This dynamic is evident in constitutional designs, where two-thirds majorities for amendments—adopted in frameworks like the U.S. Constitution since 1787—insulate core structures from populist surges or factional dominance, as intended by framers to counter the instabilities observed under prior confederations. Such provisions counteract the tendency of simple majorities to amplify transient preferences, promoting long-term predictability essential for investment and rule adherence. These thresholds also enhance deliberation by compelling broader consultation and refinement of proposals, as majorities must secure additional support to prevail. Unlike simple majority voting, which can expedite decisions via narrow coalitions, supermajorities necessitate across ideological divides, yielding more vetted outcomes through iterative debate. Legal and analyses highlight how this fosters focused scrutiny, reducing the passage of unexamined or poorly crafted measures. In practice, mechanisms like the U.S. Senate's 60-vote rule since 1975 have historically extended floor debates, enabling amendments and exposing flaws that might otherwise evade simple-majority rushes. This process aligns with causal incentives for , where the prospect of failure under heightened scrutiny discourages polarization and incentivizes evidence-based persuasion over partisan fiat. By design, supermajorities afford protections to numerical minorities against overreach by temporary , embodying a check on potential tyranny through enhanced capabilities. Political theory underscores that such rules amplify minority , ensuring decisions reflect distributed costs rather than concentrated benefits, as majority gains harming outliers become harder to impose. Experimental and equilibrium models confirm this yields policy diversity, safeguarding equilibria where minority-inclusive outcomes prevail over exploitative ones. In constitutional contexts, requirements like three-fifths or two-thirds for overriding or fiscal redistributions—seen in various state charters—prevent entrenchment of policies disproportionately burdening dissenters, thereby upholding broader consent for enduring laws. This mechanism counters populist by demanding supermajoritarian buy-in for transformative actions, preserving pluralism amid power imbalances.

Criticisms: Gridlock, Entrenchment, and Democratic Deficits

Supermajority requirements can induce legislative by empowering a minority of lawmakers to obstruct bills that command simple majorities, thereby stalling policy responses to evolving circumstances. In systems like the U.S. , where a 60-vote threshold is effectively required to invoke and end debate on most legislation, this mechanism has repeatedly prevented advancement of measures supported by 51-59 senators, resulting in prolonged inaction on issues such as and funding. Empirical analyses of state legislatures confirm that supermajority debate rules correlate with heightened obstruction, as pivotal minorities exploit points to block bills, reducing overall legislative productivity compared to simple-majority regimes. Critics argue that such exacerbates entrenchment of the status quo, rendering reforms arduous even when public preferences shift toward change. By demanding consensus beyond electoral majorities, supermajorities favor over adaptation, potentially perpetuating outdated policies in areas like fiscal rules or constitutional amendments. For instance, entrenchment via supermajority thresholds can collapse the feasible policy space around existing , making reversal costlier than enactment and thus insulating flawed precedents from correction. This dynamic risks policy obsolescence, as seen in jurisdictions where supermajority hurdles have delayed responses to economic pressures, prioritizing stability over . At a foundational level, supermajorities introduce democratic deficits by subordinating —the bedrock of —to minority vetoes, which dilute electoral . Originalist interpretations contend that constitutional designs emphasizing simple majorities, absent explicit overrides, preclude routine supermajority impositions, as they contravene textual commitments to decisive . Such rules grant outsized leverage to dissenters, potentially frustrating the will of voters who elect majorities, and foster perceptions of illegitimacy when policies stagnate despite pluralistic support. While proponents invoke minority protections, detractors highlight that unqualified application erodes the egalitarian principle that should reflect aggregated popular consent rather than amplified factional resistance.

Empirical Evidence on Effectiveness

Studies of U.S. state legislatures, where 16 constitutions mandate supermajorities (typically two-thirds) for tax increases, provide the most robust on supermajority effectiveness. (2000) analyzed data from 1963 to 1995 across states, finding that supermajority requirements significantly lower effective tax rates after accounting for endogeneity via fixed effects and variables; the effect is large and statistically significant, though ordinary estimates show a smaller, insignificant reduction. Similarly, Besley and Case (2003) estimated a reduction in per-capita taxes of approximately $50 in supermajority states, supporting fiscal restraint by constraining legislative tendencies toward higher taxation. Crain and Miller (1990) corroborated these findings, demonstrating lower overall spending and taxes under such rules. Efforts to circumvent these requirements, such as shifting to user fees, show limited success. Lee (2016) examined post-adoption trends and found no statistically significant increase in fee burdens or decline in the tax-to-fee revenue ratio; overall, supermajority rules slowed tax burden growth by about 0.13 percentage points annually per additional vote required, though effects decay over time. This suggests supermajorities effectively enforce discipline without easy evasion, aligning with predictions that higher thresholds mitigate and special-interest capture in . In broader legislative contexts, supermajority rules promote larger coalitions and minority protections but yield mixed results on productivity. Plural (2025) analyzed roll-call votes in 46 states from 2017–2020, finding that supermajority tax rules enlarge winning coalitions by 3.6 percentage points on average, indicating blocked proposals opposed by legislative minorities; however, supermajority debate rules showed no consistent coalition expansion or increased news coverage of gridlock. Gubernatorial proposals succeeded 12.7 percentage points less often in supermajority states, but this difference was insignificant after controls, with no systematic evidence of reduced bipartisanship or output. For the U.S. Senate's 60-vote threshold, empirical is sparser and contested. Proponents argue it fosters compromise, but analyses find no clear causal link; research indicates insufficient data supporting moderation claims, while productivity drops are observable but attributable to multiple factors beyond the rule itself. Defenses highlight stability in polarized environments, yet state-level analogs suggest minimal systemic . Overall, favors supermajorities for targeted fiscal stability over simple majorities, with limited support for broader deliberative benefits and no strong indication of paralyzing inefficiency in practice.

Applications in Domestic Governance

Parliamentary and Legislative Procedure

In most parliamentary and legislative systems, ordinary bills and motions advance by simple majority vote among members present and voting, provided a exists, to facilitate efficient reflective of electoral mandates. Supermajorities, by contrast, apply selectively to procedural actions that entail overriding entrenched positions, altering institutional rules, or addressing fiscal impositions with long-term consequences, thereby demanding broader consensus to mitigate risks of hasty or partisan reversals. In the United States , constitutional provisions mandate a two-thirds supermajority of members voting, with a present, for overriding presidential vetoes, expelling members, and proposing amendments. House rules further impose a two-thirds threshold for suspending standing rules to expedite debate or consideration, as well as for waiving certain procedural calls like the Private Calendar. A three-fifths vote applies to legislation raising federal rates. In the , ending extended debate via requires three-fifths of all senators duly chosen and sworn—typically 60 votes—to prevent filibusters from indefinitely blocking measures, a threshold reduced from two-thirds in 1975 to balance with . Several U.S. states extend supermajorities to fiscal procedures; for example, California's legislature needs two-thirds approval in each house for the annual and any net or fee increases, a requirement ratified by voters in 2010 to curb . At least 10 states demand extraordinary majorities for or appropriation bills, often two-thirds, to ensure cross-partisan support for expenditures. Internationally, supermajority requirements for non-constitutional legislative procedures remain uncommon, with most parliaments adhering to simple majorities for bill passage and routine motions to uphold and responsiveness. A 2017 analysis of procedures in countries including , , , , , , , , , and the found no general supermajority mandate for ordinary legislation, though some impose qualified majorities for specific overrides like vetoes (e.g., two-thirds in 's ). In the UK , even amendments to standing orders typically pass by simple majority, reflecting the principle of legislative supremacy unbound by entrenchment. Exceptions arise in contexts like powers or rule changes, but these prioritize deliberation without routine thresholds exceeding half plus one.

Judicial and Impeachment Processes

In the United States, impeachment of federal officials, including the President, Vice President, and judges, requires a simple majority vote in the House of Representatives to bring charges, but conviction and removal in the Senate demand a two-thirds supermajority of members present. This provision, outlined in Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, applies uniformly to "civil Officers of the United States," encompassing federal judges, with only eight judges removed via this process since 1789 due to the high threshold deterring frivolous or partisan actions. The supermajority ensures broad consensus for removal, as evidenced by the acquittals of Presidents Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1999, and Donald Trump in 2020 and 2021, where Senate votes fell short of two-thirds despite House impeachments. Internationally, similar supermajority requirements govern of judicial and executive officials to safeguard institutional independence. In , the mandates a two-thirds vote in the lower house's special committee to advance articles against the President or justices, followed by a simple majority in the full and two-thirds in the Federal for conviction. South Korea's requires a two-thirds supermajority in the for of the President or justices, as demonstrated in the 2016-2017 removal of President Park Geun-hye after a vote of 234-56. In parliamentary systems like , of judges necessitates an absolute to initiate and a two-thirds vote in both houses for removal on grounds of , emphasizing protection against legislative overreach. Beyond impeachment, some constitutional frameworks impose supermajorities on judicial decision-making to constrain court power and promote consensus. For instance, in , the requires a two-thirds majority to declare the unconstitutional "unconstitutionality" of laws in abstract review, ensuring major jurisprudential shifts reflect broad judicial agreement rather than slim . Germany's mandates a two-thirds supermajority for rulings on the Basic Law's incompatibility with EU law, balancing national with integration. These mechanisms, analyzed comparatively across ten jurisdictions, mitigate risks of by elevating the burden for precedent-altering decisions, though critics argue they can entrench minority views within the . Empirical data from such systems show reduced frequency of invalidated statutes compared to simple- courts, supporting stability but occasionally delaying responses to evolving legal challenges.

Fiscal and Tax Policy Requirements

Several U.S. states incorporate supermajority requirements into their fiscal frameworks to approve tax increases, aiming to compel broader consensus for revenue-raising measures that impose long-term burdens on taxpayers. As of , at least 17 states mandate a supermajority—typically two-thirds—of legislators to enact general tax hikes, with variations applying to specific taxes like , , or levies. California's Proposition 13, ratified by voters on June 6, 1978, exemplifies this approach by requiring a two-thirds vote in both the State Assembly and Senate for any state tax increase, a rule that has constrained fiscal expansion amid population growth and economic shifts. Similar provisions exist in (two-thirds since 1992), (two-thirds for state taxes since 1992), and (three-fourths for certain increases), among others, often embedded in state constitutions via voter initiatives during the and tax revolt era. These state-level rules frequently intersect with balanced budget requirements, which 49 states enforce constitutionally or statutorily to prohibit in their operating budgets, though supermajorities may apply to overrides or emergency borrowing. For instance, in states like (three-fourths vote for increases since 1948) and (three-fifths since 2000), the supermajority threshold for measures supports fiscal discipline by linking hikes to exceptional circumstances, such as overriding mandates during recessions. Empirical analyses indicate these requirements correlate with lower effective rates and reduced volatility compared to simple-majority states, as legislators face higher hurdles to expand the tax base without minority party acquiescence. At the federal level, no constitutional supermajority governs , but recurring proposals for a (BBA) have included such thresholds to curb deficits. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch's 2018 BBA draft required a two-thirds supermajority in both houses for any net revenue-raising bill or increase, alongside a three-fifths vote to waive the balanced budget rule during economic downturns. These proposals, debated in as recently as 2023, seek to mirror state practices but face opposition over potential in funding crises, with critics noting that simple majorities suffice for cuts under current rules. Internationally, supermajority requirements for appear in select constitutional debt limits rather than routine tax hikes. Germany's "debt brake" (Schuldenbremse), enshrined in the since 2009, structurally limits deficits to 0.35% of GDP but permits suspension only via a two-thirds in both the and Bundesrat for extraordinary emergencies, such as the response in March 2020. Similar mechanisms exist in , where federal debt exceeding sustainable levels triggers corrective plans, with overrides potentially requiring qualified majorities under cantonal influences, though national tax changes typically proceed by simple majority. These provisions prioritize long-term over unilateral fiscal decisions, contrasting with the more prevalent simple-majority norms in parliamentary systems.

International and Supranational Uses

United Nations and Global Agreements

In the , decisions on important questions require a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, pursuant to Article 18(2) of the UN Charter. These important questions include recommendations on maintaining international peace and security, the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council, admission of new member states, suspension or expulsion of members, operations of the Trusteeship Council, budgetary matters, and the appointment of the Secretary-General upon Security Council recommendation. All other questions are resolved by a simple majority of members present and voting, with each of the 193 member states holding one vote. This supermajority threshold aims to ensure broader consensus on high-stakes issues, though it has been criticized for potentially enabling obstruction by a minority of states. The UN Security Council employs a qualified majority for substantive decisions, requiring nine affirmative votes out of 15 members, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members (, , , the , and the ). This exceeds a simple majority (eight votes) and incorporates power, effectively demanding supermajoritarian support among non-permanent members while granting permanent members absolute blocking authority under Article 27 of the . Procedural matters also require nine votes but are not subject to . Such rules prioritize great-power agreement over pure numerical thresholds, reflecting the Charter's design to prevent action without P5 consensus on core security issues. Amendments to the UN Charter demand a two-thirds majority approval in the General Assembly followed by by two-thirds of member states, including from the five permanent Security Council members, as outlined in Articles 108 and 109. No amendments have been adopted since 1965, illustrating the entrenching effect of these dual supermajority barriers, which safeguard foundational structures against hasty changes amid shifting global alliances. In global agreements negotiated under UN frameworks, such as multilateral treaties and conventions, adoption often adheres to voting rules, with supermajorities applied to significant texts classified as important questions. For , many require by a supermajority of potential parties—e.g., two-thirds of signatories or states meeting specific criteria like emissions thresholds in climate pacts—to bind participants and reflect collective commitment beyond simple consent. This structure, evident in instruments like the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted via consensus but with ratification thresholds), promotes durability but can delay implementation if thresholds prove elusive.

European Union Institutions

In the , qualified majority voting (QMV) serves as a primary mechanism for legislative decisions in most policy areas, requiring approval by at least 55% of member states—currently 15 out of 27—representing no less than 65% of the total EU population, a threshold that surpasses simple majority to balance representation of states and demographics. This rule, formalized under the Lisbon Treaty effective December 1, 2009, applies to approximately 80% of Council votes, facilitating efficiency while demanding cross-national and population-weighted consensus. A blocking minority must comprise at least four member states to prevent adoption. Unanimity, an absolute supermajority requiring the consent of all member states, persists in sensitive domains to protect national sovereignty, including decisions on EU enlargement, taxation harmonization, common foreign and security policy (CFSP) objectives, and amendments to own resources or the EU's multiannual financial framework. For instance, under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), suspending voting rights of a member state for serious breaches of EU values demands unanimity minus the accused state, though constructive abstention is permitted. This rule has contributed to decision-making paralysis in areas like sanctions against Hungary and Poland, where single states have vetoed actions as recently as 2023. The , comprising heads of state or government, predominantly operates by or consensus for strategic decisions, such as appointing the President (requiring QMV) or High Representative for Foreign Affairs (QMV in the but consensus-driven in practice). Treaty revisions under Article 48 TEU necessitate in the , followed by ratification by all member states, often via national parliaments or referendums, ensuring high barriers to fundamental changes. In the , voting typically follows a simple majority of members present and voting, but absolute majorities—over half of all 705 MEPs—are mandated for key actions like consenting to the Commission as a body, adopting the EU budget, or initiating censure motions, effectively imposing a supermajority relative to total membership to elevate scrutiny. Proposals to introduce stricter thresholds, such as two-thirds supermajorities for treaty amendments, have surfaced in federalist debates but lack implementation.

Selected National Examples

In the United States, constitutional amendments under Article V require a two-thirds supermajority of members present in both the and the to propose changes, a threshold designed to ensure broad consensus amid the federal system's checks and balances. This has limited successful amendments to 27 since 1789, with the most recent in 1992 ratifying congressional pay adjustments deferred from 1789. Additionally, Senate conviction in impeachment trials demands a two-thirds vote of members present, as evidenced by the 1868 acquittal of President , where 35 senators voted to convict but fell 19 short of the 54 needed. In France, amendments to the 1958 Constitution typically proceed via a three-fifths supermajority in a joint session of the National Assembly and Senate, convened as Congress at Versailles, unless submitted to referendum by the President. This procedure facilitated 24 amendments by 2024, including the March 2024 inscription of abortion rights, passed with 780 votes exceeding the 555-vote threshold from 925 lawmakers. The heightened majority reflects efforts to balance executive initiative with legislative safeguards against hasty alterations to republican principles. 's (Grundgesetz) mandates two-thirds approval by the 's membership and two-thirds of Bundesrat votes for amendments, entrenching and core rights against transient majorities. Article 79(2) has enabled over 60 changes since 1949, such as the 2025 defense spending exemption, approved on March 21 with 513 and sufficient Bundesrat support amid geopolitical pressures. Certain "eternity clauses" under Article 79(3), protecting human dignity and democratic order, prohibit amendment entirely, underscoring causal commitments to post-World War II stability. In , the 1996 Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the for most amendments, rising to two-thirds plus six provinces' support in the National Council of Provinces for foundational changes like territorial alterations or the Bill of Rights. This framework, informed by transition from apartheid, has yielded 17 amendments by 2012, including the 2012 tweaks to judicial appointments, passed November 20 with the requisite votes to prioritize transformative equity without undermining rigidities. The dual threshold empirically curbs unilateral dominance, as seen in failed land expropriation pushes lacking supermajority backing post-2018.

Contemporary Debates and Reforms

Arguments for Strengthening Supermajorities

Proponents argue that strengthening supermajority requirements enhances legislative stability by preventing transient majorities from enacting reversible policies that oscillate with electoral cycles, thereby fostering long-term governance consistency. , in No. 58, described supermajorities as a "shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures," underscoring their role in curbing impulsive decisions. Empirical studies on state-level supermajority rules for increases indicate they modestly reduce tax burdens, with one analysis finding a 0.13 decrease in tax growth per additional vote required beyond a simple majority. Supermajorities promote broader consensus and , compelling lawmakers to build cross-partisan support and filter out divisive or inefficient proposals, which aligns more closely with public goods like national defense rather than special-interest transfers. In referendums on constitutional matters, higher thresholds—such as turnout quorums or special majorities—bolster democratic legitimacy by ensuring outcomes reflect widespread agreement, particularly in divided societies where they safeguard minority positions without granting absolute vetoes. For instance, Switzerland's requirement (popular and cantonal) exemplifies how such rules sustain stability for irreversible changes by demanding approval across diverse communities. Advocates for expanded supermajorities emphasize their utility in protecting and democratic processes from temporary majorities, as enshrined in constitutions to shield liberties like speech and association from erosion. This is evident in proposals like a requiring a three-fifths vote for deficits, which aims to restrain federal overreach and revive by limiting unchecked spending growth. Such mechanisms deter by necessitating supermajoritarian support to enact sweeping reforms, thereby preserving institutional integrity against power entrenchment, as seen in historical cases where simple majorities enabled authoritarian shifts. In , strengthening thresholds for tax hikes or spending authorizations counters special-interest capture under simple majority rule, empirically linking to lower overall government expansion in adopting states. Critics of pure contend that without heightened requirements for core changes—like constitutional amendments—governments risk frequent alterations driven by short-term pressures, undermining the enduring framework designed by founders; higher bars, such as two-thirds approvals, thus serve as a principled check on such volatility.

Pushback and Attempts at Reduction

Critics of supermajority requirements argue that they undermine democratic by granting excessive power to minorities, leading to legislative and policy paralysis. For instance, in the United States Senate, the 60-vote threshold for to end filibusters has been blamed for obstructing majority-supported bills on issues like and , with data from the showing that between 2017 and 2021, over 300 motions failed due to inability to reach 60 votes. This mechanism, originally intended to protect , has evolved into a tool for partisan obstruction, as evidenced by its use increasing from an average of 8 filibusters per Congress in the 1960s to over 100 annually by the 2010s, according to Congressional Research Service records. Proponents of reduction advocate for reverting to simple majorities to enhance responsiveness to electoral mandates, drawing on first-principles reasoning that , tempered by constitutional checks, best reflects voter intent without entrenching biases. Empirical studies, such as those from the , indicate that supermajority rules correlate with lower legislative productivity in bicameral systems, with U.S. states employing unanimous jury requirements showing 15-20% longer trial durations and higher mistrial rates compared to majority-vote jurisdictions. In international contexts, similar pushback has emerged; for example, in Brazil's Congress, efforts in 2022 to lower the three-fifths supermajority for constitutional amendments to a simple majority failed amid concerns over fiscal discipline, but garnered support from economists citing reduced amendment frequency as stifling adaptability to economic shocks like the 2014-2016 . Notable attempts at reduction include repeated U.S. Senate reform proposals. In 2022, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer invoked the "nuclear option" to lower the confirmation threshold for Supreme Court justices to a simple majority, a move that bypassed the prior 60-vote rule and was justified as correcting an imbalance after Republican blocks on nominees; this built on precedents set in 2013 for lower court judges and 2017 for Supreme Court picks under Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell, respectively. Internationally, New Zealand's 2021 referendum narrowly rejected entrenching supermajority requirements for electoral law changes, with opponents arguing it would perpetuate outdated systems; polls from the Electoral Commission showed 58% opposition, citing evidence from comparative parliamentary studies that simple majorities facilitate timely reforms without eroding stability. Academic analyses, such as a 2020 study in the Journal of Public Economics, model supermajority dilution as increasing welfare by 5-10% in dynamic policy environments through faster adaptation, though critics counter that it risks transient majorities enacting reversible changes lacking broad consensus. Pushback has also targeted fiscal supermajorities, with U.S. states like facing calls in 2023-2024 to repeal Proposition 13's two-thirds approval for tax hikes, as housing shortages and budget deficits—exacerbated by the rule's entrenchment of low property taxes—have led to underfunded , per a Public Policy Institute of California report documenting a 30% shortfall in local revenues since 2008. In the , debates post-2024 elections have included proposals to reduce qualified majority voting thresholds in the from 55% of member states representing 65% of to simpler metrics, aiming to accelerate decisions on climate and migration amid vetoes by smaller states, as analyzed in briefings. These efforts highlight a tension between stability and agility, with reduction advocates emphasizing causal links between high thresholds and delayed crisis responses, such as the EU's protracted fiscal pact negotiations during the 2010-2012 sovereign . Despite successes in isolated reforms, systemic resistance persists due to entrenched interests favoring the status quo, underscoring the challenge of balancing minority protections with majoritarian efficiency.

Recent Developments Post-2023

In the 2024 state legislative elections held on November 5, veto-proof status—typically requiring a two-thirds to override gubernatorial vetoes or amend state constitutions—shifted in seven states. Democrats lost such control in the and , while gaining it in the House; Republicans secured it in the House and but relinquished it in the House and . These changes, driven by Republican net gains of over 20 seats across state chambers, enhanced GOP leverage in and policy overrides in states like and , where unified party control now facilitates initiatives such as tax reforms without Democratic input. Republicans maintained their supermajority in the , retaining at least 33 of 49 seats in the unicameral body, which employs a nonpartisan system but aligns overwhelmingly with conservative priorities. In , the GOP achieved a fresh supermajority in the alongside control, positioning lawmakers to advance long-stalled measures like cuts and vouchers, as articulated by Republican leaders anticipating reduced internal caucus resistance post-. Conversely, Democrats' narrowed margins in states like New York underscored vulnerabilities exposed by patterns favoring Republicans in suburban districts. At the federal level, ongoing debates over the U.S. 's 60-vote threshold—a supermajority for —intensified amid fiscal standoffs, with Democrats under the prior Biden administration considering its elimination to pass partisan legislation, though such efforts stalled due to internal divisions and midterm losses. By October 2025, threats highlighted persistent , as the incoming Republican trifecta lacked the 60 Senate seats needed to bypass Democratic filibusters on appropriations without concessions. Corporate governance saw a surge in proposals targeting supermajority voting thresholds for bylaws or charters, with such initiatives rising among firms in the 2024-2025 proxy season, often supported by institutional investors seeking simpler rules to streamline director elections and mergers. Proponents argued these thresholds, remnants of defensive corporate structures, entrench against will, though adoption remained low due to board resistance and state variances.

References

  1. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supermajority
  2. https://ballotpedia.org/Supermajority
  3. https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/constitutional-amendment-processes-50-states
  4. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/98-778
  5. https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/voting.htm
  6. https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-98-90r.pdf
  7. https://www.hoover.org/research/case-majority-rules
  8. https://www.thoughtco.com/the-supermajority-vote-in-us-government-3322045
  9. https://study.com/academy/lesson/simple-majority-definition-system-rule.html
  10. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288344
  11. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/equities/supermajority-voting-provision/
  12. https://www.onboardmeetings.com/blog/supermajority-vote/
  13. https://www.merkley.senate.gov/why-supermajority-no-longer-works-in-the-senate/
  14. https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=lwps_public
  15. https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/21/1/187/7079631
  16. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=public_law_and_legal_theory
  17. http://www.lpbr.net/2014/08/counting-many-origins-and-limits-of.html
  18. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/counting-the-many/unanimitas-to-a-twothirds-vote-medieval-origins-of-supermajority-rule/767F9794CA5FE367B342B035636F2C5C
  19. http://web.flu.cas.cz/scan/323554666.pdf
  20. https://melissaschwartzberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/schwartzberg_shoutsmurmurs.pdf
  21. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268010000510
  22. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum11.htm
  23. https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/third-lateran-council-1179-10583
  24. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/counting-the-many/10215776E49CA575D1E44450F6DFE013
  25. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/filtering-populist-claims-to-fight-populism/italy-and-postworld-war-ii-constitutionalism/9527A1978AC659FE721AFB8CA59FF276
  26. https://www.gide.com/sites/default/files/law-making_in_france_w-023-69321.pdf
  27. https://www.elysee.fr/en/french-presidency/constitution-of-4-october-1958
  28. https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/13/3/686/2450807
  29. https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution
  30. https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/education/veto/background.pdf
  31. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/presidential-veto-powers-primer.pdf
  32. https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/8921/22_105YaleLJ483_November1995_.pdf?sequence=2
  33. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/98-778/98-778.12.pdf
  34. https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture.htm
  35. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/filibuster-explained
  36. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/08/26/finding-60-votes-in-an-evenly-divided-senate-a-high-bar-but-not-an-impossible-one/
  37. https://levin-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Curry-Oldham-Filibustering-in-the-American-States.pdf
  38. https://ballotpedia.org/Supermajority_requirements_for_ballot_measures
  39. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
  40. https://documents.ncsl.org/wwwncsl/LegislativeStaff/ASLCS/ILP/96Tab5Pt2.pdf
  41. https://academic.oup.com/book/6749/chapter/150844001
  42. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-922GOV.html
  43. https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/law/research/publications/about-nzacl/publications/nzacl-yearbooks/yearbook-17%2C-2011/Colon-Rios.pdf
  44. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mahajan/files/PolicyDiversityDraft.pdf
  45. https://scholarship.shu.edu/con_law/vol8/iss2/4/
  46. https://gleasonjudd.princeton.edu/document/8
  47. https://www.lplegal.com/content/succession-strengths-weaknesses-supermajority-voting-requirements-corporate-governance/
  48. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0377221722008037
  49. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mahajan/files/supermajority_rules_and_equilibria.pdf
  50. https://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/vwl/Gruener/A7_Engelmann_Preventing_the_Tyranny_of_the_Majority_17-07-03.pdf
  51. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-democracy/
  52. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.70035
  53. https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci179/Gridlock2.htm
  54. https://www.virginialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/103VaLRev631.pdf
  55. https://virginialawreview.org/articles/entrenchment-incrementalism-and-constitutional-collapse/
  56. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=nulr_online
  57. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=nulr
  58. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/when-should-the-majority-rule/
  59. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/cpt.2015.9
  60. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272799000821
  61. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26973435
  62. https://ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/2016/302-lee-states-circumvent-supermajority-paper.pdf
  63. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-senators-need-to-know-about-filibuster-reform/
  64. https://www.independent.org/article/2021/11/23/an-empirical-defense-of-congressional-filibusters-and-super-majority-voting-rules/
  65. https://www.ncsl.org/about-state-legislatures/parliamentary-procedure-a-legislators-guide
  66. https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture/overview.htm
  67. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL30360
  68. https://calbudgetcenter.org/resources/what-is-a-supermajority-vote-and-why-does-it-matter-in-california/
  69. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/03/13/most-democracies-see-only-a-limited-role-for-supermajorities
  70. https://electoral-reform.org.uk/what-does-a-super-majority-mean-and-is-it-something-we-should-worry-about/
  71. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46013
  72. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46185
  73. https://impeachableoffenses.net/2019/10/21/a-comparative-look-at-american-brazilian-impeachment-practice/
  74. https://nysba.org/impeachment-and-the-constitution-south-korea-and-the-united-states/?srsltid=AfmBOop-nvvijzR9U7YW8I1dP8NiptpRA__NlzEeeMrZaWD1W3FDRj9o
  75. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/context/ijcd/article/1033/viewcontent/A_Taxonomy_of_Impeachment_Methods_Used_Worldwide.pdf
  76. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/article/judicial-review-of-supermajority-rules-governing-courts-own-decisionmaking-a-comparative-analysis/0DA93E8E5A9B41B6B9ACFB42EC1085BF
  77. https://www.routledge.com/Supermajorities-in-Constitutional-Courts/RiveraLeon/p/book/9781032599694
  78. https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2024/05/08/taxpayer-safeguards-to-appear-on-multiple-statewide-ballots-this-fall/
  79. https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/state-supermajority-rules-to-raise-revenues
  80. https://www.ncsl.org/fiscal/how-to-raise-a-tax
  81. https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-and-local-tax/fiscal-federalism-and/what-are-state-balanced
  82. https://www.cbpp.org/media/16-states-have-supermajority-requirements-to-raise-or-levy-taxes
  83. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222839125_Supermajority_Voting_Requirements_for_Tax_Increases_Evidence_from_the_States
  84. https://www.taxnotes.com/lr/resolve/tax-notes-today-federal/hatch-introduces-balanced-budget-constitutional-amendment/vt3r
  85. https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/constitutional-balanced-budget-amendment-poses-serious-risks
  86. https://www.congress.gov/committee-report/105th-congress/senate-report/3/1
  87. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5518930
  88. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
  89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2195807
  90. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/voting-system
  91. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-vote.php
  92. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council
  93. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1662&context=law_and_economics
  94. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/
  95. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/
  96. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/
  97. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/unanimity.html
  98. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/05/making-eu-foreign-policy-more-effective-qualified-majority-voting-on-the-horizon?lang=en
  99. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/749770/EPRS_BRI%282023%29749770_EN.pdf
  100. https://jef.eu/resolution/for-a-more-federal-european-union-ensuring-a-democratic-treaty-change-and-constitutional-amendment-process/
  101. https://constitutionnet.org/book/requirements-constitutional-amendments
  102. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/constitutional-amendment-procedures-primer.pdf
  103. http://constitutionnet.org/news/france-passes-constitutional-amendment-guaranteeing-access-abortion
  104. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html
  105. https://www.noerr.com/en/insights/bundestag-approves-exemption-from-the-debt-brake-for-defence-spending-and-special-funds-for-investments-in-infrastructure-and-climate-protection
  106. https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-involved-in-changing-south-africas-constitution-101044
  107. https://www.parliament.gov.za/how-law-made
  108. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09516298211061161
  109. https://michaelmouritsen.ca/blog/f/when-votes-require-more-than-a-majority
  110. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/supermajority-rules-and-legislative-productivity/...
  111. https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results%2C_2024:_State_legislative_veto-proof_majorities
  112. https://boltsmag.org/legislative-elections-2024/
  113. https://nebraskapublicmedia.org/es/news/news-articles/republicans-set-to-retain-filibuster-proof-majority-in-unicameral/
  114. https://scdailygazette.com/2024/11/18/sc-republicans-hopeful-for-tax-reform-school-choice-vouchers-with-new-senate-supermajority/
  115. https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2024/11/23/good-election-night-for-n-y--dems--but-state-senate-dems-poised-to-lose--supermajority-
  116. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/premium/3860978/shutdown-party-democrats-stopped-worrying-love-fight-against-trump/
  117. https://insights.issgovernance.com/posts/are-supermajority-votes-headed-for-extinction/
  118. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/08/06/2025-proxy-season-review-four-key-takeaways/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.