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Aircraft hijacking
Aircraft hijacking
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Captain John Testrake of TWA Flight 847, which was hijacked by an armed Shia Islamist hijacker in Beirut, 1985

Aircraft hijacking (also known as airplane hijacking, skyjacking, plane hijacking, plane jacking, air robbery, air piracy, or aircraft piracy, with the last term used within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States) is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft by an individual or a group.[1] Dating from the earliest of hijackings, most cases involve the pilot being forced to fly according to the hijacker's demands. There have also been incidents where the hijackers have overpowered the flight crew, made unauthorized entry into the cockpit and flown them into buildings—most notably in the September 11 attacks—and in some cases, planes have been hijacked by the official pilot or co-pilot, such as with Ethiopian Airlines Flight 702.[2][3][4][5]

Unlike carjacking or sea piracy, an aircraft hijacking is not usually committed for robbery or theft. Individuals driven by personal gain often divert planes to destinations where they are not planning to go themselves.[6] Some hijackers intend to use passengers or crew as hostages, either for monetary ransom or for some political or administrative concession by authorities. Various motives have driven such occurrences, such as demanding the release of certain high-profile individuals or for the right of political asylum (notably Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961), but sometimes a hijacking may have been affected by a failed private life or financial distress, as in the case of Aarno Lamminparras in Finnair Flight 405.[7] Hijackings involving hostages have produced violent confrontations between hijackers and the authorities, during negotiation and settlement. In several cases – most famously Air France Flight 139, Lufthansa Flight 181, and Air France Flight 8969 – the hijackers were not satisfied and showed no inclination to surrender, resulting in the deployment of counterterrorist police tactical units or special forces to rescue the passengers.[8]

In most jurisdictions of the world, aircraft hijacking is punishable by life imprisonment or a long prison sentence. In most jurisdictions where the death penalty is a legal punishment, aircraft hijacking is a capital crime, including in China, India, Liberia, and the U.S. states of Georgia and Mississippi.

History

[edit]

Airplane hijackings have occurred since the early days of flight. These can be classified in the following eras: Pre-1929, 1929–1957, 1958–1979, 1980–2000, and 2001–present. Early incidents involved light planes, but this later involved passenger aircraft as commercial aviation became widespread.

Pre-1929

[edit]

One of the first accounts of an aircraft hijacking dates to 1919,[9] sometime during the short existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (21 March – 1 August). Hungarian polymath Baron Franz Nopcsa von Felső-Szilvás was a spy for Austria-Hungary in World War I, whose defeat and dissolution ceded Nopcsa's native Transylvania to Romania.[10] Under the new socialist state government, Nopcsa and Bajazid Elmaz Doda (his secretary and boyfriend) were unable to obtain a passport to leave the country.[11][12][13] To circumvent this, Nopcsa forged documents from the Ministry of War that convinced the military commander at the Mátyásföld Airport [fr; hu] on the outskirts of Budapest to provide him and Doda with a small airplane and a pilot. Somewhere over Győr, approximately halfway between Budapest and their supposed destination of Sopron, Franz pulled out a revolver, held it to the pilot's head, and demanded to be flown to Vienna (then a part of the also transitionary Republic of German-Austria (12 November 1918 – 10 September 1919)).[11][12][13] Nopcsa and Doda successfully arrived in Vienna, where they lived until Nopcsa's murder-suicide of Doda in 1933 after years of depression and financial destitution.[10][14]

1929–1957

[edit]

Between 1929 and 1957, there were fewer than 20 incidents of reported hijackings worldwide; several occurred in Eastern Europe.[15]

An early but unconfirmed account of hijacking occurred in December 1929. J. Howard "Doc" DeCelles was flying a postal route for a Mexican firm, Transportes Aeras Transcontinentales, ferrying mail from San Luis Potosí to Torreon and then on to Guadalajara. Saturnino Cedillo, the governor of the state of San Luis Potosí, ordered him to divert. Several other men were also involved, and through an interpreter, DeCelles had no choice but to comply. He was allegedly held captive for several hours under armed guard before being released.[16]

Warning posters in a Central African airport, 2012

The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21, 1931, in Arequipa, Peru. Byron Richards, flying a Ford Tri-Motor, was approached on the ground by armed revolutionaries. He refused to fly them anywhere during a 10-day standoff. Richards was informed that the revolution was successful and he could be freed in return for flying one of the men to Lima.[17]

The following year, in September 1932, a Sikorsky S-38 with registration P-BDAD, registered to Nyrba do Brasil, was seized in the company's hangar by three men, who took a hostage. Despite having no flying experience, they managed to take off. However, the aircraft crashed in São João de Meriti, killing the four men. Apparently, the hijack was related to the events of the Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo; it is considered to be the first hijack that took place in Brazil.[This paragraph needs citation(s)]

On October 28, 1939, the first murder on a plane took place in Brookfield, Missouri, US. The victim was Carl Bivens, a flight instructor, who was teaching a man named Earnest P. "Larry" Pletch. While airborne in a Taylor Cub monoplane, Pletch shot Bivens twice in the back of the head. Pletch later told prosecutors, "Carl was telling me I had a natural ability and I should follow that line", adding, "I had a revolver in my pocket and without saying a word to him, I took it out of my overalls and I fired a bullet into the back of his head. He never knew what struck him." The Chicago Daily Tribune stated it was one of the most spectacular crimes of the 20th century. Pletch pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison. However, he was released on March 1, 1957, after serving 17 years, and lived until June 2001.[16][18][19]

In 1942 near Malta, two New Zealanders, a South African, and an Englishman achieved the first confirmed in-air hijack when they overpowered their captors aboard an Italian seaplane that was flying them to a prisoner-of-war camp. As they approached an Allied base, they were strafed by Supermarine Spitfires unaware of the aircraft's true operators and forced to land on the water. However, all on board survived to be picked up by a British boat.[20][21]

In the years following World War II, Philip Baum, an aviation security expert, suggested that the development of a rebellious youth "piggybacking on to any cause which challenged the status quo or acted in support of those deemed oppressed" may have been a contributor to attacks against the aviation field.[16] The first hijacking of a commercial flight occurred on the Cathay Pacific Miss Macao on July 16, 1948.[22] After this incident and others in the 1950s, airlines recommended that flight crews comply with the hijackers' demands rather than risk a violent confrontation.[16] There were also various hijacking incidents and assaults on planes in China and the Middle East.[16] The forced landing by the Israeli Air Force of a Syrian Airlines plane in December 1954 has been described by multiple writers as a state-sponsored hijacking.[23][24][25]

On 23 July 1956, in the Hungarian People's Republic, seven passengers hijacked a domestic flight of Malév Hungarian Airlines, a Lisunov Li-2 (registration HA-LIG), to escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and flew it to West Germany. The aircraft landed safely at Ingolstadt Air Base without injuries.[26]

An aircraft belonging to the airline Lloyd Aereo Boliviano was hijacked in Bolivia on September 26, 1956. The DC-4 was carrying 47 prisoners who were being transported from Santa Cruz, Bolivia, to El Alto, in La Paz. A political group was waiting to take them to a concentration camp located in Carahuara de Carangas, Oruro. The 47 prisoners overpowered the crew and gained control of the aircraft while airborne and diverted the plane to Tartagal, Argentina. Prisoners took control of the aircraft and received instructions to again fly to Salta, Argentina, as the airfield in Tartagal was not big enough. Upon landing, they told the government of the injustice they were subjected to, and received political asylum.

On October 22, 1956, French forces hijacked a Moroccan airplane carrying leaders of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the ongoing Algerian War.[27][28][29] The plane, which was carrying Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Aït Ahmed, and Mohamed Boudiaf, was destined to leave from Palma de Mallorca for Tunis where the FLN leaders were to conference with Prime Minister Habib Bourguiba, but French forces redirected the flight to occupied Algiers, where the FLN leaders were arrested.[28]

1958–1979

[edit]
World map depicting global aircraft hijacking incidents between 1958 and 1979

Between 1958 and 1967, there were approximately 40 hijackings worldwide.[15] Beginning in 1958, hijackings from Cuba to other destinations started to occur; in 1961, hijackings from other destinations to Cuba became prevalent.[15] The first happened on May 1, 1961, on a flight from Miami to Key West. The perpetrator, armed with a knife and gun, forced the captain to land in Cuba.[16][30]

Australia was relatively untouched by the threat of hijackings until July 19, 1960. On that evening, a 22-year-old Russian man attempted to divert Trans Australia Airlines Flight 408 to Darwin or Singapore.[16] The crew were able to subdue the man after a brief struggle.

According to the FAA, in the 1960s, there were 100 attempts of hijackings involving U.S. aircraft: 77 successful and 23 unsuccessful.[30] Recognizing the danger early, the FAA issued a directive on July 28, 1961, which prohibits unauthorized persons from carrying concealed firearms and interfering with crew member duties.[30] The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was amended to impose severe penalties for those seizing control of a commercial aircraft.[30] Airlines could also refuse to transport passengers who were likely to cause danger. That same year, the FAA and Department of Justice created the Peace Officers Program which put trained marshals on flights.[30] A few years later, on May 7, 1964, the FAA adopted a rule requiring that cockpit doors on commercial aircraft be kept locked at all times.[30] One proposal the FAA had for combating the hijackings was to build a fake Havana airport in Southern Florida. However they determined that it would be too expensive.[31]

Destinations desired by U.S. hijackers, 1968–72[32]
Transport attempts
Destination Number
 Cuba 90
 Mexico 4
 Italy 3
 Canada 2
 Bahamas 1
 Egypt 1
 Israel 1
 North Korea 1
North Vietnam 1
South Vietnam
1
 Sweden 1
 Switzerland 1
 United States 1
Unknown 3
Extortion attempts
Extortion 26
Total 137

In a five-year period (1968–1972) the world experienced 326 hijack attempts, or one every 5.6 days.[32] The incidents were frequent and often just an inconvenience, which resulted in television shows creating parodies.[33] Time magazine even ran a lighthearted comedy piece called "What to Do When the Hijacker Comes".[34] Most incidents occurred in the United States. There were two distinct types: hijackings for transportation elsewhere and hijackings for extortion with the threat of harm.[32]

Between 1968 and 1972, there were 90 recorded transport attempts to Cuba. In contrast, there were 26 extortion attempts (see table on the right). The longest and first transcontinental (Los Angeles, Denver, New York, Bangor, Shannon and Rome) hijacking from the US started on 31 October 1969.[35]

The Eastern Air Lines Shuttle Flight 1320 on May 17, 1970, witnessed the first fatality in the course of a U.S. hijacking.[36]

Incidents also became problematic outside of the U.S. For instance, in 1968, El Al Flight 426 was seized by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) militants on 23 July, an incident which lasted 40 days, making it one of the longest. This record was later beaten in 1999.[37]

As a result of the evolving threat, President Nixon issued a directive in 1970 to promote security at airports, electronic surveillance and multilateral agreements for tackling the problem.[30]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) issued a report on aircraft hijacking in July 1970. Beginning in 1969 until the end of June 1970, there were 118 incidents of unlawful seizure of aircraft and 14 incidents of sabotage and armed attacks against civil aviation. This involved airlines of 47 countries and more than 7,000 passengers. In this period, 96 people were killed and 57 were injured as a result of hijacking, sabotage and armed attacks.

The ICAO stated that this is not isolated to one nation or one region, but a worldwide issue to the safe growth of international civil aviation.[38] Incidents also became notorious – in 1971, a man known as D. B. Cooper hijacked a plane and extorted US$200,000 in ransom before parachuting over Oregon. He was never identified.[39]

On August 20, 1971, a Pakistan Air Force T-33 military plane was hijacked prior the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 in Karachi. Lieutenant Matiur Rahman attacked Officer Rashid Minhas and attempted to land in India. Minhas deliberately crashed the plane into the ground near Thatta to prevent the diversion.[40]

Countries around the world continued their efforts to tackle crimes committed on-board planes. The Tokyo Convention, drafted in 1958, established an agreement between signatories that the "state in which the aircraft is registered is competent to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on board that aircraft while it is in flight".[30] While the Convention does not make hijacking an international crime, it does contain provisions which obligate the country in which a hijacked aircraft lands to restore the aircraft to its responsible owner, and allow the passengers and crew to continue their journey.[30][41] The Convention came into force in December 1969.

A year later, in December 1970, the Hague Convention was drafted which punishes hijackers, enabling each state to prosecute a hijacker if that state does not extradite them, and to deprive them from asylum from prosecution.[30]

On December 5, 1972, the FAA issued emergency rules requiring all passengers and their carry-on baggage to be screened.[42] Airports slowly implemented walk-through metal detectors, hand-searches and X-ray machines, to prohibit weapons and explosive devices.[42] These rules came into effect on January 5, 1973, and were welcomed by most of the public.[6] In 1974, Congress enacted a statute which provided for the death penalty for acts of aircraft piracy resulting in death.[43] Between 1968 and 1977, there were approximately 41 hijackings per year.[15]

In the 1970s, in pursuit of their demands for Croatia's independence from the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalists hijacked several civilian airliners, such as Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 130 and TWA Flight 355.[44]

1980–2000

[edit]

By 1980, airport screening and greater cooperation from the international community led to fewer successful hijackings; the number of events had significantly dropped below the 1968 level.[45] Between 1978 and 1988, there were roughly 26 incidents of hijackings a year.[15] A new threat emerged in the 1980s: organised terrorists destroying aircraft to draw attention. For instance, terrorist groups were responsible for the bombing of Air India Flight 182 over the Irish coast. In 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed flying over Scotland.[15] Terrorist activity which included hijack attempts in the Middle East were also a cause of concern.[46]

During the 1990s, there was relative peace in the United States airspace as the threat of domestic hijacking was seen as a distant memory.[47] Globally, however, hijackings still persisted. Between 1993 and 2003, the highest number of hijackings occurred in 1993 (see table below). This number can be attributed to events in China where hijackers were trying to gain political asylum in Taiwan.[47] Europe and the rest of East Asia were not immune either. On December 26, 1994, Air France Flight 8969 with 172 passengers and crew was hijacked after leaving Algiers. Authorities believed that the goal was to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower. On June 21, 1995, All Nippon Airways Flight 857 was hijacked by a man claiming to be a member of the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, demanding the release of its imprisoned leader Shoko Asahara. The incident was resolved when the police stormed the plane.

On October 17, 1996, the first hijacking that was brought to an end while airborne was carried out by four operatives of the Austrian special law enforcement unit Cobra on a Russian Aeroflot flight from Malta to Lagos, Nigeria, aboard a Tupolev Tu-154. The operatives escorted inmates detained for deportation to their homelands and were equipped with weapons and gloves.[48][49] On 12 April 1999, six ELN members hijacked a Fokker 50 of Avianca Flight 9463, flying from Bucaramanga to Bogotá. Many hostages were held for more than a year, and the last hostage was finally freed 19 months after the hijacking.[50][51]

Annual hijack incidents, 1993–2003[47]
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Number 50 25 8 16 12 14 12 22 5 5 7 176

2001–present

[edit]

On September 11, 2001, four airliners were hijacked by 19 Al-Qaeda extremists: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. The first two planes were deliberately crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the third was crashed into The Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia. The fourth crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after crew and passengers attempted to overpower the hijackers. Authorities believe that the intended target was the U.S. Capitol or the White House in Washington, D.C. In total, 2,996 people (2,977 if excluding the perpetrators) perished and more than 6,000 were injured in the attacks, making the hijackings the deadliest in modern history.

Following the attacks, the U.S. government formed the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to handle airport screening at U.S. airports. Government agencies around the world tightened their airport security, procedures and intelligence gathering.[52] Until the September 11 attacks, there had never been an incident whereby a passenger aircraft was used as a weapon of mass destruction. The 9/11 Commission report stated that it was always assumed that a "hijacking would take the traditional form";[53] therefore, airline crews never had a contingency plan for a suicide-hijacking.[54] As Patrick Smith, an airline pilot, summarizes:

One of the big ironies here is the success of the 2001 attacks had nothing to do with airport security in the first place. It was a failure of national security. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set – a set of presumptions based on decades-long track record of hijackings. In years past, a hijacking meant a diversion, with hostage negotiations and standoffs. The only weapon that mattered was the intangible one: the element of surprise.[55]

Throughout the mid-2000s, hijackings still occurred but there were much fewer incidents and casualties. The number of incidents had been declining, even before the September 11 attacks. One notable incident in 2006 was the hijacking of Turkish Airlines Flight 1476, flying from Tirana to Istanbul, which was seized by a man named Hakan Ekinci. The aircraft, with 107 passengers and 6 crew, made distress calls to air traffic control and the plane was escorted by military aircraft before landing safely at Brindisi, Italy. In 2007, several incidents occurred in the Middle East and Northern Africa; hijackers in one of these incidents claimed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.[56] Towards the end of the decade, AeroMexico experienced its first terror incident when Flight 576 was hijacked by a man demanding to speak with President Calderón. In 2007, a man failed to hijack a 737-200 with 103 people on board over Chad.

Between 2010 and 2019, the Aviation Safety Network estimates there have been 15 hijackings worldwide with three fatalities.[57] This is a considerably lower figure than in previous decades which can be attributed to greater security enhancements and awareness of September 11–style attacks.[58][59] On June 29, 2012, an attempt was made to hijack Tianjin Airlines Flight GS7554 from Hotan to Ürümqi in China. More recently was the 2016 hijacking of EgyptAir Flight MS181, involving an Egyptian man who claimed to have a bomb and ordered the plane to land in Cyprus. He surrendered several hours later, after freeing the passengers and crew.[58]

Countermeasures

[edit]

As a result of the large number of U.S.–Cuba hijackings in the late 1960s to early 1970s, international airports introduced screening technology such as metal detectors, X-ray machines and explosive detection tools. In the U.S., these rules were enforced starting from January 1973[6] and were eventually copied around the world. These security measures made hijacking a "higher-risk proposition" and deterred criminals in later decades.[60] Until September 2001, the FAA set and enforced a "layered" system of defense: hijacking intelligence, passenger pre-screening, checkpoint screening and on-board security. The idea was that if one layer were later to fail, another would be able stop a hijacker from boarding a plane. However, the 9/11 Commission found that this layered approach was flawed and unsuitable to prevent the September 11 attacks.[61] The U.S. Transportation Security Administration has since strengthened this approach, with a greater emphasis on intelligence sharing.[62][63]

On-board security

[edit]
Hijacking assault simulation by South African special forces

In the history of hijackings, most incidents involved planes being forced to land at a certain destination with demands. As a result, commercial airliners adopted a "total compliance" rule which taught pilots and cabin crew to comply with the hijackers' demands.[55] Crews advise passengers to sit quietly to increase their chances of survival. The ultimate goal is to land the plane safely and let the security forces handle the situation. The FAA suggested that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.[64] Although total compliance is still relevant, the events of September 11 changed this paradigm as this technique cannot prevent a murder-suicide hijacking.

After the September 11 attacks, it became evident that each hijacking situation needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Cabin crew, now aware of the severe consequences, have a greater responsibility for maintaining control of their aircraft. Most airlines also give crew members training in self-defense tactics.[65] Ever since the 1970s, crew are taught to be vigilant for suspicious behaviour. For example, passengers who have no carry-on luggage, or are standing next to the cockpit door with fidgety movements. There have been various incidents when crew and passengers intervened to prevent attacks: on December 22, 2001, Richard Reid attempted to ignite explosives on American Airlines Flight 63. In 2009, on Northwest Flight 253, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives sewn into his underwear. In 2012, the attempted hijacking of Tianjin Airlines Flight 7554 was stopped when cabin crew placed a trolley in-front of the cockpit door and asked passengers for help.[66]

Cockpit security

[edit]

As early as 1964, the FAA required cockpit doors on commercial aircraft be kept locked during flight.[30] In 2002, U.S. Congress passed the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act, allowing pilots at U.S. airlines to carry guns in the cockpit. Since 2003, these pilots are known as Federal Flight Deck Officers. It is estimated that one in 10 of the 125,000 commercial pilots are trained and armed.[67] Also in 2002, aircraft manufacturers such as Airbus introduced a reinforced cockpit door which is resistant to gunfire and forced entry.[68] Shortly afterwards, the FAA required operators of more than 6,000 aircraft to install tougher cockpit doors by April 9, 2003.[52] Rules were also tightened to restrict cockpit access and make it easier for pilots to lock the doors.[69][70] In 2015, Germanwings Flight 9525 was seized by the co-pilot and deliberately crashed, while the captain was out. The captain was unable to re-enter the cockpit, because the airline had already reinforced the cockpit door. The European Aviation Safety Agency issued a recommendation for airlines to ensure that at least two people, one pilot and a member of cabin crew, occupy the cockpit during flight.[71] The FAA in the United States enforce a similar rule.[72]

Air marshal service

[edit]

Some countries operate a marshal service, which puts members of law enforcement on high-risk flights based on intelligence.[52] Their role is to keep passengers safe, by preventing hijackings and other criminal acts committed on a plane. Federal marshals in the U.S. are required to identify themselves before boarding a plane; marshals of other countries often are not.[73] According to the Congressional Research Service, the budget for the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service was US$719 million in 2007.[52] Marshals often sit as regular passengers, at the front of the plane to allow observation of the cockpit. Despite the expansion of the marshal service, they cannot be on every plane, and they rarely face a real threat on a flight. Critics have questioned the need for them.[74]

Air traffic control

[edit]

There is no generic or set of rules for handling a hijacking situation. Air traffic controllers are expected to exercise their best judgement and expertise when dealing with the apparent consequences of an unlawful interference or hijack.[75][76][77] Depending on the jurisdiction, the controller will inform authorities, such as the military, who will escort the hijacked plane. Controllers are expected to keep communications to a minimum and clear the runway for a possible landing.[75]

Legislation for downing hijacked aircraft

[edit]
Royal Canadian Air Force and Russian Air Force fighter aircraft during a training exercise for intercepting and transferring a hijacked airliner between Russian and American airspace in 2013

Germany

[edit]

In January 2005, a federal law came into force in Germany, called the Luftsicherheitsgesetz, which allows "direct action by armed force" against a hijacked aircraft to prevent a September 11–style attack. However, in February 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court struck down these provisions of the law, stating such preventive measures were unconstitutional and would essentially be state-sponsored murder, even if such an act would save many more lives on the ground. The main reason behind this decision was that the state would effectively be killing innocent hostages in order to avoid a terrorist attack.[78] The Court also ruled that the Minister of Defense is constitutionally not entitled to act in terrorism matters, as this is the duty of the state and federal police forces.[79] President of Germany Horst Köhler urged judicial review of the constitutionality of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz after he signed it into law in 2005.

India

[edit]

India published its anti-hijacking policy in August 2005.[80] The policy came into force after approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The main points of the policy are:

  • Any attempt to hijack will be considered an act of aggression against the country and will prompt a response fit for an aggressor.
  • Hijackers, if captured alive, will be put on trial, convicted, and sentenced to death.
  • Hijackers will be engaged in negotiations only to bring the incident to an end, to comfort passengers and to prevent loss of lives.
  • The hijacked plane will be shot down if it is deemed to become a missile heading for strategic targets.
  • The hijacked plane will be escorted by armed fighter aircraft and will be forced to land.
  • A hijacked grounded plane will not be allowed to take off under any circumstance.

United States

[edit]

Prior to the September 11 attacks, countermeasures were focused on "traditional" hijackings. As such, there were no specific rules for handling suicide hijackings, where aircraft would be used as a weapon.[53] Moreover, military response at the time consisted of multiple uncoordinated units, each with its own set of rules of engagement with no unified command structure.[54] Soon after the attacks, however, new rules of engagement were introduced, authorizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the U.S. Air Force command tasked with protecting U.S. airspace, to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners if the plane is deemed a threat to strategic targets.[81] In 2003, the military stated that fighter pilots exercise this scenario several times a week.[82]

Other countries

[edit]

Poland and Russia are among other countries that have had laws or directives for shooting down hijacked planes.[83] However, in September 2008 the Polish Constitutional Court ruled that the Polish rules were unconstitutional, and voided them.[84]

International law

[edit]

Tokyo Convention

[edit]

The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, known as the Tokyo Convention, is an international treaty which entered force on December 4, 1969. As of 2015, it has been ratified by 186 parties. Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention states the following:

1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft. 2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting State in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.

The signatories agree that if there is unlawful takeover of an aircraft, or a threat of it on their territory, then they will take all necessary measures to regain or keep control over an aircraft. The captain can also disembark a suspected person on the territory of any country, where the aircraft lands, and that country must agree to it, as stated in Articles 8 and 12 of the convention.[85]

Hague Convention

[edit]

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (known as the Hague Convention) went into effect on October 14, 1971. As of 2013, the convention has 185 signatories.

Montreal Convention

[edit]

The Montreal Convention is a multilateral treaty adopted by a diplomatic meeting of ICAO member states in 1999. It amended important provisions of the Warsaw Convention's regime concerning compensation for the victims of air disasters.

[edit]
  • The 1942 Superman film Japoteurs depicts Superman saving Metropolis from a bombardier hijacked by Japanese spies during World War II.[86]
  • The 1997 Hollywood film Air Force One is based on the fictional hijacking of Air Force One.[87]
  • Hijacking is a central theme in the Turbulence movie trilogy.
  • In Mission: Impossible 2, one of the film's antagonists hijacks a plane at the start of the movie.
  • The 2006 film United 93 is based on the real events onboard United Airlines Flight 93 one of the four airlines hijacked during the September 11 attacks.
  • The 2012 film The Dark Knight Rises features an opening sequence of hijacking and crashing an aircraft for the purpose of kidnapping a man and faking his death.[88]
  • The film Con Air features a U.S. Marshals aircraft being hijacked by the maximum-security prisoners on board.
  • The Taking of Flight 847: The Uli Derickson Story was a made-for-TV film based on the actual hijacking of TWA Flight 847, as seen through the eyes of the chief flight attendant Uli Derickson.[89]
  • Passenger 57 depicts an airline security expert trapped on a passenger jet when terrorists seize control.[90]
  • Executive Decision depicts a Boeing 747 carrying 400 passengers being hijacked by Algerian terrorists, and U.S. marine and Army special forces use a reconnaissance aircraft to re-take the plane.
  • Skyjacked is a 1972 film about a crazed Vietnam War veteran hijacking an airliner, demanding to be taken to the Soviet Union.[91]
  • The 1986 film The Delta Force depicted a Special Forces squad tasked with retaking a plane hijacked by Lebanese terrorists, loosely based on the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.[92]
  • The 2004 film The Assassination of Richard Nixon, based on a true incident, depicts a disillusioned tire salesman who attempts to hijack a plane in 1974 and crash it into the White House. His attempt failed and he was mortally wounded by an airport policeman. He killed himself before police stormed the plane.
  • The 2006 film Snakes On a Plane is a fictional story about aircraft piracy through the in-flight release of venomous snakes.[93]
  • In Harold and Kumar 2, two U.S. Air Marshals subdue Harold and Kumar on board a plane after mistaking them for terrorists.
  • The 2011 film Payanam is a movie entirely based on the negotiations and rescue operations done by the Indian security forces in response to a flight hijacking incident.
  • In the 2013 video game Grand Theft Auto V the player is tasked with hijacking a cargo plane carrying a large shipment of weapons by crashing a crop duster into the cargo bay mid-flight and fighting to seize control of the aircraft. The cargo plane is later shot down by the US Air Force, requiring the player to bail out.
  • The 2014 film Non-Stop depicts an aircraft hijacking.[94]
  • The Indian film Neerja is based on the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi.
  • In 2016, German television broadcast the film The Verdict [de], in which a Bundeswehr military pilot shoots down a hijacked passenger plane with 164 people on board that was heading towards a stadium filled with 70,000 people. Following the broadcast, a public vote was called for in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and 86.9% of viewers voted that the pilot was not guilty of murder.[95]
  • The 2019 film 7500 depicts the struggle of a pilot to land an aircraft and maintain control of its cockpit during a hijacking.
  • The 2023 Apple TV+ original series Hijack stars Idris Elba as Sam, a talented business negotiator, who embarks on a mission to broker a peaceful end to a hijacking of his 7-hour flight from Dubai to London.
  • The 2024 Indian Netflix web-series IC 814: The Kandahar Hijack reconstructs the real events onboard Indian Airlines Flight 814
  • The 2025 Vietnamese movie Flight To The Death On The Air [vi] reconstructs the hijacking of Vietnam Civil Aviation Flight 501, which is considered as the first Vietnamese movie about aircraft hijacking.

See also

[edit]

References

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Aircraft hijacking, legally termed unlawful seizure of aircraft, constitutes the exercise of control over a civil in flight through force, threat, or intimidation, compelling deviation from its intended path or yielding to demands such as , political concessions, or asylum. This act, first systematically documented in the late 1930s but proliferating after , peaked during the 1960s and 1970s, with empirical records indicating over 400 incidents worldwide between 1968 and 1972 alone, many motivated by individuals seeking defection to amid tensions, where perpetrators were frequently granted political refuge rather than prosecuted. Subsequent waves involved organized , exemplified by the 1970 by the for the Liberation of , which diverted multiple Western airliners to for propaganda and prisoner exchanges, highlighting vulnerabilities in international security. The , 2001, attacks by operatives represented a lethal escalation, employing hijacked commercial jets as guided missiles against U.S. targets, causing approximately 2,977 fatalities and prompting global reinforcement of doors, passenger screening, and no-negotiation protocols that have since rendered successful hijackings exceedingly rare, with incidents dropping to near zero in subsequent decades per incident databases. Despite enhanced countermeasures, residual risks persist from insider threats or state-sponsored diversions, underscoring ongoing causal factors like ideological extremism and inadequate deterrence in certain jurisdictions.

Definition and Classification

Aircraft hijacking, also referred to as skyjacking, constitutes the unlawful or exercise of control over a civil in flight through the use of , threat of , or , typically with the intent to divert the aircraft from its scheduled route or to compel concessions from authorities, passengers, or . This act fundamentally endangers the safety of persons and property aboard while disrupting international operations. Conceptually, the offense hinges on the forcible redirection against the will of those lawfully operating the aircraft, distinguishing it from authorized diversions or mechanical failures. Under international law, the core definition derives from the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, adopted in The Hague on December 16, 1970, and entering into force on October 14, 1971, which has been ratified by over 180 states. Article 1 of the Hague Convention specifies that the offense occurs when a person on board an aircraft in flight seizes or exercises control of it by force, threat of force, or any other form of intimidation. "Aircraft in flight" is delineated as commencing from the closure of external doors following embarkation until their reopening after landing, excluding ground operations. The convention mandates states to criminalize such acts domestically, prosecute offenders or extradite them, and refrain from granting safe haven to hijackers. Preceding the Hague Convention, the established foundational principles for over crimes aboard , including hijacking, by affirming the aircraft commander's authority and requiring states to restore control of hijacked planes to lawful operators. Signed on September 14, 1963, and effective from December 4, 1969, it applies to offenses against penal law but lacks the specific anti-hijacking punitive framework, focusing instead on suppression and return protocols. Nationally, definitions align with these treaties; for instance, U.S. under 49 U.S.C. § 46502 proscribes seizing or exercising control of an in U.S. by , , or threat thereof, punishable by or death if fatalities result. These instruments collectively treat hijacking as a grave threat to global aviation security, emphasizing irrespective of the offender's nationality or motive.

Methods and Tactics Employed

Aircraft hijackers primarily board flights as ordinary passengers, concealing weapons or threat devices to avoid pre-flight security detection. Common items include small blades like box cutters or utility knives permissible under early screening rules, firearms smuggled in components, or fabricated explosives demonstrated via notes or briefcases. In the November 24, 1971, hijacking of Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305 by D.B. Cooper, the perpetrator passed a note to a flight attendant claiming possession of a bomb in his briefcase, initiating control without immediate violence. Upon signaling intent, hijackers employ sudden, coordinated assaults to overpower cabin crew and passengers, using threats of violence or actual harm to coerce compliance and secure access. Tactics involve isolating flight attendants to relay demands to pilots, subduing resistance through physical restraint or intimidation, and in some cases, lethal force against crew members to breach the flight deck. During the September 1970 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, armed hijackers seized multiple aircraft mid-flight, forcing diversions to a remote Jordanian airstrip via direct confrontation and weaponry. On September 11, 2001, hijackers on used small knives to overcome crew and passengers, stabbing or slashing to gain entry to the cockpit after exploiting lax door policies. Once in command of the aircraft, hijackers compel pilots to divert to predetermined locations, often issuing radio demands for ransom, political concessions, or safe passage while holding passengers as human shields. Psychological manipulation sustains control, with periodic demonstrations of dominance such as executions or mock executions to pressure authorities. In political hijackings like on June 14, 1985, perpetrators extended operations across multiple days and sites, beheading a passenger to escalate threats. For suicide-oriented tactics, as in the 9/11 attacks, hijackers dispensed with negotiation, directing planes into targets after neutralizing flight crews. Early hijackings to , peaking in the late with over 130 attempts from 1968-1972, often relied on simpler notes demanding diversion without weapons, exploiting pilots' reluctance to endanger lives mid-air. Post-1970s, tactics shifted toward group operations with trained operatives conducting surveillance flights to map vulnerabilities, as evidenced in al Qaeda's pre-9/11 planning.

Categorization by Motive and Outcome

Aircraft hijackings are classified by perpetrator motives, with frameworks such as Holden's delineating four primary types: escape or diversion to a non-scheduled destination, involving demands for money or concessions, to advance ideological aims, and incidents driven by mental illness exhibiting irrational objectives. In an of 1,019 global hijackings from 1948 to 2007, non-terrorist events—predominantly escape and —accounted for 897 cases (88%), reflecting individual or opportunistic drivers rather than organized . Escape-motivated hijackings surged in the 1960s and early 1970s, with over 100 U.S.-registered flights diverted to between 1961 and 1973, as perpetrators sought asylum from persecution or criminal charges in non-extradition havens. cases, aiming for financial gain, peaked around 1970, exemplified by the November 24, 1971, hijacking of Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305, where the perpetrator demanded and received $200,000 before parachuting away. Political and terrorist motives, comprising 122 incidents (12%) in the same period, often involved group actions for publicity or prisoner releases, such as the September 1970 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Outcomes hinge on motive and era-specific countermeasures; early diversions frequently succeeded due to destination countries' reluctance to return hijackers, enabling over 130 U.S. attempts between and with many achieving relocation. Post-1972 implementation of passenger screening and programs reduced global incidents from peaks of over 60 annually in the late 1960s to fewer than 10 by the 1980s. Negotiated resolutions prevailed in non-violent cases, with hijackers often granted safe passage or , though yields were short-lived as authorities traced funds. Terrorist hijackings yielded higher lethality, with 29 of 122 involving fatalities, escalating to the September 11, 2001, attacks where four diverted aircraft caused 2,977 deaths through deliberate crashes into targets. Since 2001, outcomes have overwhelmingly favored failure or prevention, with reinforced doors and rapid response protocols rendering successful seizures rare.

Historical Overview

Origins and Early Incidents (1930s–1950s)

The first documented aircraft hijacking occurred on February 21, 1931, in , , when armed revolutionaries seized a Ford Tri-Motor operated by Faucett Perú Airlines, piloted by American Byron Richards. The hijackers, supporters of a political uprising against the , surrounded the aircraft upon and demanded Richards fly them to another location to evade authorities; after initial refusal, Richards complied under duress, marking the initial recorded instance of unlawful seizure of a civilian for political ends. Throughout , such incidents remained exceedingly rare globally, confined largely to politically unstable regions in where aviation was emerging amid civil unrest. No comprehensive tally exists for the decade, but the event exemplified early patterns: hijackings driven by immediate tactical needs rather than prolonged hostage-taking or ideological spectacle, with perpetrators often leveraging the novelty of for escape or disruption. These cases typically involved small and ended without widespread , reflecting limited aircraft availability and rudimentary . The 1940s saw minimal reported hijackings, hampered by World War II's restrictions on civilian aviation, though isolated events emerged post-war, such as the July 16, 1948, hijacking of , a Consolidated Catalina flying boat off , where robbers seized the plane mid-flight, leading to a crash that killed 25 of 26 aboard. By the 1950s, incidents ticked upward slightly with tensions, including the March 12, 1950, triple hijacking of three Czechoslovakian airliners by their own crews—former pilots defecting from communist control—who flew the planes to Erding Air Base in with 26 passengers, marking the first mass defection by aircrew seizure. In the United States, the first attempted hijacking occurred on July 14, 1954, at Seattle-Tacoma Airport, when a man brandished a knife on a flight but was subdued by passengers and crew before takeoff. These pre-1960 events underscored hijacking's origins as opportunistic or desperation-driven acts, seldom escalating to international crises.

The Epidemic of Political Hijackings (1960s–1970s)

The decade from the mid- to the early marked the peak of aircraft hijackings worldwide, with political motivations driving the majority of incidents, often linked to ideologies, anti-colonial struggles, and regional conflicts. In the United States, hijacking attempts surged from sporadic events to dozens annually, with 77 successful out of 100 attempts on U.S. aircraft during the . A significant portion involved diversions to , where hijackers sought refuge under Fidel Castro's regime, viewing it as a sympathetic communist haven amid U.S. embargo hardships and revolutionary allure. Between 1961 and 1973, at least 85 U.S.-origin flights were forcibly redirected to , peaking between 1968 and 1972 when over 130 hijackings occurred globally, many targeting American carriers for political defection. This Cuban wave, initiated after the 1961 , reflected desperation among some Cuban exiles and disillusioned Americans, though Cuba's initial acceptance of hijackers—often treating them as heroes before later imprisoning many—encouraged copycat acts due to lax security and low perceived risks. In 1969 alone, 71 planes were hijacked worldwide, underscoring the epidemic's scale before countermeasures like screening emerged. Political hijackings extended beyond , fueled by leftist groups exploiting 's vulnerability for ; for instance, twenty-seven attempts targeted in 1968 alone, compared to twelve the prior year. By the early 1970s, Middle Eastern militant organizations shifted the focus toward spectacular operations for leverage in conflicts like the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) orchestrated the in September 1970, seizing four Western airliners—including , , , and BOAC flights—and diverting them to , where three were exploded after passengers were released, aiming to exchange hostages for imprisoned militants. This coordinated attack highlighted tactical evolution, using hijackings for prisoner swaps and media attention, distinct from mere defections. Similar ideologically driven incidents involved groups like the and European radicals, though the Cuban and PFLP cases exemplified the era's political epidemic, prompting bilateral pacts—such as the 1973 U.S.-Cuba anti-hijacking agreement—that curtailed diversions by criminalizing the act in .

Transition and Notable Cases (1980s–2000)

The frequency of aircraft hijackings declined markedly from the peak of the 1960s and 1970s, when over 300 incidents occurred between 1968 and 1972 alone, due to the widespread implementation of passenger and baggage screening, metal detectors at airports, and international agreements discouraging the harboring of hijackers. Annual hijackings dropped to around 20-40 globally by the 1980s, with further reductions in the 1990s as security protocols strengthened and cooperation among nations increased, including the extradition or prosecution of perpetrators rather than granting asylum. No hijackings of U.S.-registered carriers occurred from 1991 through 2000. One prominent case was the hijacking of on June 14, 1985, shortly after takeoff from Athens, , en route to Rome, . Two Lebanese Shiite militants affiliated with seized the , armed with grenades and pistols, and demanded the release of over 700 Shiite prisoners held by . The aircraft was diverted multiple times between , Lebanon, and Algiers, Algeria, over 17 days; U.S. Navy diver was murdered and his body dumped in , while passengers with Jewish-sounding names were targeted for separation and threats. The ordeal ended with the release of most hostages in after negotiations, though leader Imad Mughniyah remained at large for years. In 1988, was hijacked on April 5 during its journey from , , to . Four Lebanese Shiite militants, linked to and demanding the release of prisoners held in for prior bombings, took control of the using guns and grenades. The plane was forced to land in , , then diverted to , , and , , spanning 16 days; two Kuwaiti hostages were executed during the standoff. Algerian forces stormed the aircraft on April 20, killing two hijackers and capturing the others, amid allegations of Iranian assistance to the perpetrators. The 1990s saw fewer but still lethal incidents, such as on November 23, 1996, hijacked shortly after departing , , for , . Three Ethiopian men, seeking political asylum in Australia, overpowered the crew of the with knives and demanded redirection; lacking fuel, the plane ditched in the near the Islands, resulting in 125 fatalities out of 175 aboard due to the uncontrolled . The hijackers' amateurish actions, including failure to grasp the aircraft's range limitations, highlighted a shift toward less organized, motive-driven attempts rather than state-sponsored operations. A significant late-1990s event was the hijacking of on December 24, 1999, after takeoff from , , bound for , . Five militants from the Pakistan-based group seized the , killing one passenger during beatings and diverting the flight through , , , and finally Taliban-controlled , , over eight days. The crisis resolved when released three imprisoned terrorists in exchange for the remaining 155 hostages, underscoring vulnerabilities in regional security and the role of non-state actors in leveraging sympathetic regimes.

Post-9/11 Decline and Contemporary Incidents (2001–Present)

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, which involved the hijacking of four commercial airliners by operatives resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths, the global frequency of aircraft hijackings plummeted due to multifaceted security enhancements. Prior to 2001, hijackings averaged dozens annually during peak periods, but from 2002 onward, successful seizures of commercial passenger flights became exceedingly rare, with fewer than one verified incident per year on average worldwide. This decline stems primarily from mandated reinforced cockpit doors that lock from the inside and resist forced entry, expanded deployment of armed undercover air marshals on high-risk flights, rigorous pre-boarding screening of passengers and cargo via advanced detection technologies, and international intelligence-sharing protocols including no-fly lists. Additionally, the 9/11 events altered passenger psychology, fostering widespread resistance to hijackers—as evidenced by the passenger revolt on , which prevented its intended target and crashed in —rendering traditional hijacking tactics obsolete since groups of unarmed assailants can no longer reliably seize control. Contemporary hijackings since 2001 have been sporadic, often involving lone actors rather than organized groups, and typically motivated by personal grievances such as asylum-seeking rather than mass violence or political spectacle. One notable case occurred on February 17, 2014, when the co-pilot of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 702, a Boeing 767 en route from Addis Ababa to Rome with 202 passengers and crew, depressurized the cabin and diverted the aircraft to Geneva, Switzerland, to claim asylum; the plane landed safely after a two-hour ordeal, all aboard were unharmed, and the hijacker was arrested upon surrender. Similarly, on March 29, 2016, EgyptAir Flight 181, an Airbus A320 flying from Alexandria to Cairo with 63 passengers and crew, was seized mid-flight by a lone Egyptian man who claimed to possess explosives and demanded diversion to Larnaca, Cyprus; he released all but four hostages before surrendering peacefully after authorities confirmed his "suicide vest" was a fake, resulting in no injuries. Other post-9/11 incidents have involved smaller aircraft or non-commercial operations, particularly in regions with weaker oversight, such as attempted hijackings of regional jets in or cargo planes, but these lack the scale of prior epidemics. For instance, in , the sole recorded hijacking attempt globally targeted a small flight, underscoring the near-elimination of threats to major international carriers. While terrorist plots persist—often manifesting as onboard bombings rather than control seizures due to fortified defenses—empirical data from authorities confirm hijackings' obsolescence as a viable tactic, with zero successful diversions of large jetliners reported in major Western or Asian carriers since the early .

Motivations and Perpetrator Profiles

Ideological and Political Drivers

Ideological motivations for aircraft hijackings have historically centered on advancing revolutionary causes, seeking asylum in aligned regimes, or leveraging high-profile spectacles to publicize political grievances. during the late 1960s and early 1970s, numerous hijackers targeted flights bound for , driven by sympathy for Fidel Castro's communist revolution and dissatisfaction with American society or legal consequences. These acts reflected a broader Cold War-era attraction to socialism among some radicals, who viewed as a offering political refuge and ideological validation. From 1968 to 1972, over 130 U.S. commercial airplanes were hijacked, with a substantial portion diverted to after perpetrators forced pilots to alter course, often citing pro- sentiments or escape from perceived oppression. Cuban authorities routinely granted asylum to these hijackers, treating them as defectors and thereby encouraging further incidents until bilateral anti-hijacking agreements curbed the trend in the mid-1970s. Parallel ideological drivers emerged in nationalist and leftist militant groups, particularly in the , where hijackings served as tools for prisoner exchanges and international . The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist organization opposing 's existence, executed the Dawson's Field operation on September 6, 1970, hijacking three passenger jets from , , and —plus attempting a fourth on —and landing them in Jordan's desert to demand the release of over 50 imprisoned comrades held by , , , and Britain. The hijackers held 310 passengers hostage for weeks, released most non-Jews and non-Israelis, and detonated the emptied aircraft to symbolize their anti-Zionist struggle, thereby securing global media attention for the cause. Such tactics persisted in subsequent operations, including the July 27, 1976, hijacking of Flight 139 by PFLP-External Operations members alongside German leftist radicals, who diverted the plane to , , under Idi Amin's protection, again seeking swaps for hundreds of terrorists incarcerated in and . This event underscored transnational ideological alliances between Arab nationalists and Western far-left extremists united against perceived . In , political hijackings often involved defections from communist regimes, as pilots or passengers seized aircraft to flee toward Western democracies, motivated by rejection of and pursuit of individual freedoms. For instance, in 1969, multiple flights from were diverted to , , by crews seeking asylum amid Soviet influence. These incidents highlighted ideological rifts within the , contrasting with the outbound flights to by pro-communist actors.

Criminal and Economic Objectives

Aircraft hijackings motivated by criminal or economic objectives typically involve demands for from airlines or governments, rather than direct of passengers' valuables or aircraft resale, due to the logistical challenges of disposing of a hijacked plane. Between 1961 and 1972, approximately 130 successful hijackings occurred , with a subset—estimated at around 10-15%—driven primarily by financial rather than political diversion, often by individuals seeking personal enrichment. These acts contrasted with the more prevalent political hijackings to , reflecting opportunistic criminal intent amid lax pre-1970s . Perpetrators in such cases frequently exhibited prior criminal records, including or , and targeted domestic flights for their predictability and lower resistance potential. The paradigmatic example is the unsolved hijacking of Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305 on November 24, 1971, by a man using the alias D.B. Cooper. Cooper boarded the Boeing 727 in Portland, Oregon, claimed to possess a bomb, and demanded $200,000 in ransom along with four parachutes before diverting the flight toward Seattle, where he released 36 passengers. After refueling, the plane proceeded south, and Cooper parachuted from the rear airstair over southwestern Washington with the money, evading capture despite an extensive FBI investigation involving over 800 suspects. This incident inspired copycat attempts, such as Richard Floyd McCoy Jr.'s hijacking of United Airlines Flight 855 on April 7, 1972, where he similarly demanded $500,000, released passengers, and escaped via parachute before being apprehended days later based on aviation familiarity and physical evidence. Such cases demonstrated the viability of ransom extraction but also highlighted risks, as most perpetrators were eventually identified through forensic traces or behavioral patterns. Economic hijackings declined sharply after 1973 due to enhanced screening, including mandatory metal detectors and passenger profiling introduced by the U.S. , which reduced overall U.S. incidents from 38 in 1969 to near zero by the mid-1970s. Internationally, pure financial motives remained rare post-1980, with fewer than 5% of global hijackings from 1980-2000 attributable to ransom or , often entangled with escape from justice rather than standalone economic gain. Profiles of these hijackers typically included middle-aged males with technical skills, motivated by immediate cash needs rather than syndicates, underscoring the individualized, high-risk nature of the tactic. No verified instances of successful for resale or smuggling have been documented at scale, as the specialized nature of commercial jets limits black-market utility.

Terrorist and Extremist Agendas

Terrorist and extremist groups have employed aircraft hijackings to amplify their political messages, extract concessions from governments, and perpetrate mass violence against perceived enemies. These acts typically involve ideologically driven perpetrators seeking to disrupt aviation as a symbol of Western or targeted national power, often demanding prisoner releases or using the aircraft as weapons. From the late through the early , such hijackings were concentrated among Palestinian nationalist factions, Shiite militants, and Sunni jihadist networks, reflecting broader conflicts in the and anti-Western extremism. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist organization advocating armed struggle against , conducted multiple hijackings to publicize the Palestinian cause and pressure for the release of detained militants. On September 6, 1970, PFLP members seized four international flights—including those operated by , , and BOAC—diverting three to Dawson's Field in , where over 250 passengers and crew were held hostage for nearly two weeks. The hijackers destroyed the empty aircraft after negotiations failed to yield all demands, highlighting the tactic's role in forcing global attention to their agenda amid the Jordanian crisis. Shiite extremist groups, particularly , adapted hijackings for leverage in regional conflicts involving and Western interests. On June 14, 1985, two Lebanese Shiite militants affiliated with hijacked shortly after takeoff from , redirecting it to and over 17 days of intermittent flights. The perpetrators, demanding the release of over 700 Shia prisoners held by , murdered U.S. Navy diver by beating and shooting him, then dumping his body on the tarmac to escalate pressure. The incident ended with the release of most hostages in exchange for 39 Lebanese prisoners from Israeli custody, underscoring Hezbollah's strategy of using civilian aviation to retaliate against military occupations and secure tactical gains. The September 11, 2001, attacks marked the evolution of hijackings into suicide missions by , a Sunni Islamist network founded by to wage global against the . Nineteen operatives hijacked four U.S. domestic flights—, , , and —crashing the first two into the World Trade Center towers in New York, the third into , and the fourth into a field after passenger intervention. This coordinated operation killed 2,977 people, aiming to inflict economic devastation, symbolize vulnerability of American power, and provoke overreaction to drain U.S. resources in prolonged conflicts. Al-Qaeda's fatwas explicitly justified the attacks as retaliation for U.S. in Muslim lands, representing a shift from negotiable hostage-taking to irreversible destruction. ![9/11 attack on World Trade Center](./assets/Explosion_following_the_plane_impact_into_the_South_Tower_WTC2WTC_2 Post-9/11 countermeasures drastically reduced successful terrorist hijackings, though attempts persisted among Islamist extremists, such as the 2009 "underwear bomber" derivative or thwarted plots by groups like . These agendas consistently prioritized ideological purity over criminal gain, with perpetrators often trained in camps and motivated by religious or nationalist doctrines framing targets as extensions of broader warfare. Empirical data from security analyses indicate that between 1968 and 1972 alone, over 100 hijackings involved political extremists, predominantly from leftist and factions, before Islamist dominance emerged.

Countermeasures and Their Implementation

Ground-Based Prevention Strategies

Passenger and baggage screening constitutes the cornerstone of ground-based prevention, designed to detect prohibited items such as weapons, explosives, and other implements usable in hijackings. Following a surge of over 300 hijackings worldwide between 1968 and 1972, primarily involving firearms smuggled aboard, the U.S. required airlines to implement mandatory screening on January 5, 1973, including walk-through metal detectors for passengers and machines for carry-on luggage. This measure directly addressed the of hijackers who exploited lax pre-boarding checks, with early adoption of metal detectors occurring at New Orleans International Airport in July 1970 as a pilot program. By standardizing these technologies, screening reduced successful hijackings by interdicting metallic weapons, though initial limitations allowed non-metallic threats to persist until subsequent advancements. Post-September 11, 2001, the creation of the (TSA) via the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of November 19, 2001, centralized and intensified ground screening under federal oversight, replacing airline-contracted private screeners deemed inadequate after the attacks. Key enhancements included explosive detection systems for , mandated by 2003, and the deployment of advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners using millimeter-wave or backscatter X-rays to detect non-metallic concealed objects, rolled out progressively from 2007 onward. Passenger prescreening programs, such as Secure Flight initiated in 2009, cross-reference names against no-fly and watch lists derived from intelligence to flag high-risk individuals before checkpoint arrival, preventing boarding by approximately 99% of matched threats through denial or secondary scrutiny. Access controls and behavioral detection further fortify ground perimeters and terminals. Airports enforce credential verification for employees and restricted area access via badges and biometric systems, with TSA-mandated random screening of aviation workers since 2006 to counter insider threats. Behavioral observation programs, like TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) deployed at over 70 U.S. airports by 2011, train officers to identify suspicious indicators—such as stress or evasion—leading to referrals for additional checks; evaluations indicate these detect anomalies in about 0.25% of screened passengers, though empirical validation of hijacking-specific deterrence remains debated due to classified threat data. Perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, and canine patrols, standardized under (ICAO) Annex 17 since 1974, prevent unauthorized entry to airside areas, with U.S. airports required to maintain 8-foot barriers topped with anti-climb features post-9/11. These strategies have empirically curtailed hijackings, with global incidents dropping from a peak of 38 in to fewer than five annually by the following screening mandates, and zero successful U.S. commercial hijackings since 2001 attributable to layered ground defenses that render armed takeovers infeasible without insider complicity or non-traditional weapons. However, vulnerabilities persist in facilities lacking federal screening, prompting voluntary TSA guidelines for risk assessments and employee vetting since 2004. International alignment via ICAO standards ensures comparable measures, though enforcement varies, as evidenced by occasional breaches in less-resourced regions.

In-Flight Security Enhancements

Following the surge in hijackings during the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. (FAA) mandated that cockpit doors on large commercial aircraft be locked during flight starting in 1964, aiming to restrict unauthorized access to flight controls. This measure was a direct response to early incidents where hijackers easily gained entry to the , though doors remained relatively flimsy and could be breached with minimal force. The September 11, 2001, attacks exposed the inadequacy of these basic locks, as hijackers used box cutters to overpower crew and access cockpits on four flights. In response, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 directed the (TSA) and FAA to reinforce cockpit doors, leading to a mandate issued in January 2002 for all U.S. commercial aircraft to install intrusion-resistant doors by April 2003. These upgraded doors incorporate Kevlar-reinforced panels, electronic keypad locks requiring codes for entry, and peepholes or cameras for visual verification, significantly reducing the risk of forcible breach. Similar reinforcements were adopted internationally under (ICAO) standards, with most global carriers complying by mid-2003. To provide an active deterrent, the (FAMS), established in 1962 following a wave of Cuban-related hijackings, underwent massive expansion post-9/11, growing from fewer than 50 agents to over 3,000 by 2003, with armed undercover personnel deployed on high-risk domestic and international flights. FAMS agents receive specialized training in close-quarters combat, firearms use in confined spaces, and non-lethal restraint techniques tailored to environments, enabling rapid intervention against threats before cockpit access. Crew protocols shifted dramatically from pre-9/11 cooperation—where pilots negotiated with hijackers to ensure safe landings—to a resistance-based approach emphasizing rapid and securing the . In January 2002, the FAA issued guidance requiring flight crews to land aircraft as soon as practicable during suspected hijackings, minimizing flight time under duress and prioritizing denial of cockpit entry over compliance. Airlines implemented mandatory training programs for pilots and cabin crew, including scenario-based simulations for subduing assailants, using restraints, and communicating discreetly with ground control via codes, which have been credited with enhancing overall in-flight resilience. Additionally, the (FFDO) program, authorized by the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002, deputized volunteer pilots as officers, allowing them to carry firearms in reinforced cockpits after rigorous TSA-vetted training in marksmanship and threat response. By 2003, initial classes of pilots were armed, providing a last-line defense without relying solely on cabin crew or marshals. These layered enhancements—barriers, armed presence, and assertive protocols—correlated with a near-elimination of successful hijackings, as no U.S. commercial flight has been taken over since 2001.

Governmental Response Protocols

Governmental response protocols to hijackings emphasize rapid detection, coordinated inter-agency communication, and measured escalation to prioritize passenger safety while mitigating threats. Upon suspicion of hijacking, pilots are instructed to transmit the transponder code 7500 to (ATC), signaling unlawful interference without alerting hijackers if covert communication is possible. ATC personnel must immediately notify supervisors and higher authorities, treating the as in a with heightened vigilance to avoid provocative actions. In the United States, the (FAA) coordinates with the (NORAD) for military support, scrambling fighter jets to intercept and visually monitor the aircraft. Interceptors establish radio contact if feasible, assess the situation, and may escort the plane to a designated , with prohibiting shoot-down absent imminent threat to ground targets post-9/11 revisions. Ground operations involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leading negotiations via onboard crew or external channels, supported by crisis teams focused on de-escalation and intelligence gathering. Internationally, the (ICAO) provides guidance through Annex 17 on aviation security, urging states to establish national plans for unlawful interference, including ATC protocols for non-confrontational handling and facilitation of safe landings. Responses often invoke bilateral agreements for cross-border pursuits, as seen in joint exercises like NORAD's Vigilant Eagle, which simulate interception and handoff of hijacked flights between allied forces. Protocols universally prohibit actions endangering passengers unless overridden by imperatives, with post-incident reviews refining procedures for faster notification chains established after 2001 failures.

International Treaties and Conventions

The international legal response to aircraft hijacking has been shaped by a series of multilateral conventions negotiated under the framework of the (ICAO), established by the 1944 Chicago Convention. These treaties prioritize the suppression of unlawful interference with by criminalizing hijacking, mandating state cooperation in prosecution or , and requiring preventive measures to restore aircraft control and punish offenders. As hijackings escalated in the and , these instruments addressed gaps in jurisdiction over international flights, emphasizing to deter perpetrators regardless of nationality or location. The foundational treaty, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (), was signed on September 14, 1963, in . It applies to aircraft registered in contracting states during flight and empowers the to maintain order, including restraining hijackers, while obligating states to facilitate the return of hijacked aircraft to lawful possession and to prosecute or extradite offenders upon landing. The convention entered into force on December 4, 1969, and covers acts jeopardizing safety or good order, though its hijacking provisions were limited to onboard authority rather than extraterritorial enforcement. In response to over 300 hijackings between 1968 and 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of (Hague Convention) was signed on December 16, 1970, in , entering into force on October 14, 1971. It defines hijacking as any unlawful seizure or attempted seizure of an by force, threat, or intimidation and requires contracting states to criminalize the act with severe penalties, either prosecuting perpetrators or extraditing them to a state with , while denying safe haven to offenders. The applies during flight over international or upon landing, irrespective of the hijacker's motive, and has been ratified by over 180 states. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of (Montreal Convention), signed on September 23, 1971, in and effective from January 26, 1973, extends protections beyond to include , violence endangering , and damage to facilities. States must enact domestic laws punishing these acts with penalties commensurate to their gravity and cooperate in investigations, with the convention applying to civil in service and covering attempts or threats. Later developments include the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988 Montreal Protocol), which amends the Montreal Convention to treat airport violence as onboard offenses, and the 2010 Beijing Convention and Protocol, which update the Hague framework to address emerging threats like cyber-based seizure attempts through technology. These instruments collectively form the basis for ICAO Annex 17 standards on aviation security, ratified by nearly all 193 ICAO member states, though enforcement varies due to domestic implementation challenges.

National Legislation on Hijacking and Response

In the United States, criminalizes hijacking under 49 U.S.C. § 46502, which defines "aircraft piracy" as any seizure or exercise of control over an within U.S. jurisdiction through force, violence, threat, or interference with crew duties, punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or life; if the act results in death, the penalty may include death. This statute, rooted in amendments to the enacted in 1961, established hijacking as a federal offense with potential to deter threats amid rising incidents in the mid-20th century. Response protocols, managed by the (FAA) and Department of Defense, require air traffic controllers to notify supervisors immediately upon suspicion of hijacking, facilitating coordination with for military interception if the poses an imminent threat, though pre-2001 guidelines emphasized negotiation over force to prioritize passenger safety. The United Kingdom's Aviation Security Act 1982 defines hijacking in Section 1 as the unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight via force or threats by a person on board, carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and applicable extraterritorially if the aircraft is registered in the UK or lands there. This legislation supplemented the earlier Hijacking Act 1971, which implemented the 1970 Hague Convention domestically, and integrates with the Terrorism Act 2006 for aggravated cases involving explosives or weapons. National response involves the Civil Aviation Authority coordinating with police and military, including RAF Quick Reaction Alert fighters for escort and potential neutralization, guided by a "hostile aircraft" declaration threshold that balances escalation with minimizing civilian risk. India's Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016, expanded from the 1982 version, prohibits unlawful seizure of aircraft through physical or technological means (e.g., cyber interference), imposing or death if fatalities occur, and mandates requests for foreign perpetrators while authorizing central government forces to retake control. Enacted post the 1999 hijacking, it applies nationwide and empowers the for prevention, with protocols directing shoot-down of non-compliant hijacked aircraft as a last resort after failed negotiations, reflecting a policy shift toward decisive force. In , hijacking falls under the Criminal Code's provisions for unlawful seizure of conveyances (Section 76), treated as an indictable offense with penalties up to , supplemented by the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012, which require immediate ministerial notification of hijackings or attempts to enable coordinated federal response. protocols emphasize threat assessment, passenger evacuation prioritization, and integration with for interceptors if the aircraft endangers , drawing from joint exercises simulating hijack transfers. Other nations, such as those in the , harmonize national laws with EU Regulation 300/2008 on aviation security, mandating member states enact penalties like lengthy imprisonment for hijacking while establishing rapid response teams under national civil aviation authorities. Globally, penalties typically range from 20 years to life or , with responses favoring but authorizing lethal force against non-responsive threats, as evidenced by varying national adaptations to ICAO standards.

Controversies in Downing Hijacked Aircraft

The central controversy in downing hijacked aircraft concerns the moral, legal, and practical tensions between protecting large populations from catastrophic attacks and preserving the lives of innocent passengers and crew on board, who are not voluntary participants in the threat. This debate intensified after the , 2001, terrorist hijackings , where four commercial airliners were used as guided missiles, resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths. Proponents of shoot-down policies invoke utilitarian reasoning, positing that the state has a duty to minimize overall harm by neutralizing the aircraft if it poses an imminent danger to ground targets, treating the hijacked plane as a weapon of war rather than protected . Opponents, drawing on deontological principles, contend that intentionally killing civilians violates fundamental , as the passengers cannot be lawfully sacrificed as means to an end, regardless of potential benefits. On September 11, 2001, approximately 50 minutes after the first impact at the World Trade Center, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, acting on behalf of President George W. Bush from the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, verbally authorized U.S. military aircraft to shoot down any unidentified or hijacked civilian airliners refusing orders to divert, if deemed necessary to safeguard Washington, D.C., or other high-value targets. This directive was relayed to NORAD and the FAA, with fighter pilots scrambled from bases including Andrews Air Force Base; however, it was not executed, as three planes had already struck their targets and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, following passenger resistance against the hijackers. The authorization sparked immediate ethical scrutiny, with questions raised about the chain of command, the reliability of real-time intelligence amid chaos, and whether such an order could withstand judicial review under U.S. law, which prioritizes due process and prohibits extrajudicial killings of civilians. Post-event analyses noted that the policy aligned with emerging rules of engagement but highlighted risks of erroneous targeting, as evidenced by historical mistaken shootdowns of civilian aircraft mistaken for threats. In , the issue crystallized in Germany's 2005 Aviation Security Act, which explicitly permitted the federal government to order the military interception and destruction of hijacked passenger to avert terrorist acts endangering public safety. On February 15, 2006, the German struck down this provision as unconstitutional, ruling that it infringed Article 1 (human dignity) and Article 2 ( and physical integrity) of the . The court held that passengers, as defenseless third parties, could not be treated as "objects of protection" whose elimination served state interests, equating such action to impermissible state killing of innocents and rejecting utilitarian trade-offs in favor of absolute protections against intentional harm by authorities. This decision, upheld without appeal, influenced subsequent EU discussions on harmonized aviation security, underscoring tensions between national defense imperatives and supranational norms, with critics of the ruling arguing it hampers effective by granting hijackers leverage through human shields. Internationally, legal debates hinge on instruments like the 1944 , which prohibits the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight (Article 3bis, added post-KAL 007 shootdown), balanced against the UN Charter's Article 51 clause if the aircraft constitutes an armed attack. No international explicitly authorizes or prohibits downing hijacked planes repurposed as weapons, leaving ; some scholars assert that once hijackers seize control and direct the plane toward a target, it transitions from civil to military status, justifying forcible neutralization, while others maintain civil protections persist absent a formal . Practical concerns include technological challenges in precise without risks to populated areas, command (e.g., pilot under stress), and political repercussions, as seen in global outrage over inadvertent civilian shootdowns like U.S. Navy downing of on July 3, 1988, killing 290 amid misidentification. To date, no government has confirmed intentionally downing a hijacked commercial carrying passengers specifically to avert a ground attack, reflecting the weight of these controversies and preference for alternatives like , forced landings, or assaults.

Empirical Impact and Analysis

Aircraft hijackings surged in the late 1960s, with global incidents reaching a peak of over 300 between and , averaging more than 60 per year during this period. In the United States alone, more than 130 hijackings targeted American-registered from to , often involving diversions to or ransom demands. Prior to , incidents were infrequent, typically fewer than 10 annually worldwide. From 1973 to 2001, the annual number of hijackings stabilized at 20 to 40 globally, reflecting partial effectiveness of countermeasures like passenger screening and sky marshals introduced in the early . The events of September 11, 2001, marked a turning point, with 11 incidents that year, followed by a precipitous decline to near zero in subsequent years due to reinforced cockpit doors, enhanced intelligence, and stricter aviation security protocols. By 2021, hijackings had become exceedingly rare, with data indicating fewer than one incident per year on average post-2001. Success rates, defined as hijackers gaining control of the aircraft, were high during the peak era; for U.S. flights in the , approximately 77% of the 100 recorded attempts resulted in seizure of the plane. Early apprehension rates exceeded 80% from 1961 to 1965 when hijacking volumes were low, but dropped during the 1968-1972 surge, enabling more offenders to achieve initial control before potential or escape. Post-1970s security measures reduced both attempt rates and success, with most modern incidents foiled at the screening stage; since 2001, no hijacker has successfully breached a secured . Overall, while historical successes often ended in hijacker capture or death, the empirical decline correlates directly with layered defenses prioritizing prevention over response.

Casualties, Failures, and Effectiveness Metrics

Aircraft hijackings have historically produced limited casualties relative to the number of incidents, with most events resulting in zero fatalities due to negotiated resolutions or diversions without violence. Empirical data from the Aviation Safety Network reveal that, excluding the , global hijackings from 1968 to 2000 incurred fatalities primarily in isolated cases involving assaults, failed escapes, or security operations, totaling several hundred deaths across thousands of attempts. The outlier event of , 2001, involved four coordinated hijackings by operatives, leading to 2,977 total deaths, including 2,753 at the World Trade Center, 184 at , and 40 aboard , which crashed in after passenger resistance. Failures in hijacking attempts have stemmed from pre-boarding detection, in-flight resistance, or mechanical issues preventing hijackers' objectives. records from the document 100 attempts on U.S.-registered aircraft, of which 23% failed outright, often due to non-compliance or authorities thwarting diversions. Later failures, such as the 2001 shoe bomber attempt on Flight 63, were neutralized by and intervention before full control was gained. Historical success rates for initial takeovers peaked at 84% in 1969 but declined with improved defenses, reflecting a shift from opportunistic to more determined actors. Effectiveness metrics for countermeasures highlight substantial reductions in both incidents and casualties. Passenger screening and metal detectors implemented by the FAA in correlated with a drop in U.S. hijackings from over 30 annually in the late to near zero by the mid-1970s, a decline attributed to denying hijackers access to weapons. Globally, hijacking attempts fell from a peak of 86 in 1969 to under 10 per year by the 1990s, with post-9/11 measures—such as reinforced doors and federal deployments—yielding zero successful commercial hijackings in the United States since 2001 and only 15 worldwide from 2010 to 2019, with three fatalities. These interventions demonstrate high efficacy in preventing takeovers, though they have not eliminated insider threats or non-commercial diversions.

Causal Factors in the Decline of Hijackings

The decline in hijackings, which peaked at approximately 38 incidents worldwide in and averaged over 20 annually through the early , accelerated sharply after 1973, with successful hijackings dropping to under 10 per year globally by the mid-1980s and becoming exceedingly rare thereafter, with zero successful diversions of commercial flights since September 11, 2001. This reduction stems primarily from heightened costs and risks to potential hijackers imposed by layered aviation security protocols, which increased detection probabilities and diminished expected benefits, as modeled in rational choice analyses of hijacking behavior. A pivotal causal factor was the rapid deployment of passenger and baggage screening technologies following the surge of hijackings in the late 1960s, particularly those to and by groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In the United States, the (FAA) mandated magnetometer screening for all passengers and x-ray inspection of carry-on baggage starting in early 1973, after pilot programs in high-risk airports proved effective in intercepting weapons; this followed over 100 U.S.-involved hijacking attempts in the 1960s, 77 of which succeeded prior to widespread screening. These measures, extended internationally through bodies like the (ICAO), raised the probability of pre-boarding detection from near zero to over 90% for concealed firearms and explosives by the late 1970s, directly correlating with a U.S. hijacking rate drop from 20 attempts in 1972 to fewer than 5 annually by 1976. Complementary deterrents included the introduction of armed sky marshals and behavioral profiling systems, which targeted high-risk individuals based on observable indicators rather than demographics alone, further elevating intervention risks during boarding or in-flight. Economic analyses attribute much of the post-1972 U.S. decline to these deterrence effects, estimating that security investments averted dozens of incidents by altering the risk-reward calculus for would-be hijackers, many of whom sought political asylum or but faced swift or failure upon detection. Bilateral agreements, such as the 1973 U.S.- pact extraditing or prosecuting hijackers, also curbed specific vectors like flights diverted to , which accounted for over half of U.S. cases in the early . Post-2001 enhancements amplified this trajectory, with reinforced doors—mandated globally by ICAO standards and implemented on most commercial aircraft by 2003—preventing unauthorized access, as demonstrated by the failure of subsequent plots like the 2009 "underwear bomber" attempt, which lacked breach capability. No-negotiation policies adopted by many governments, coupled with real-time tracking via systems like ADS-B, further eroded hijackers' leverage, rendering prolonged standoffs untenable and shifting motivations toward less viable alternatives. While geopolitical shifts, such as waning state sponsorship for hijacking-linked groups, contributed marginally, empirical deterrence models emphasize security infrastructure as the dominant causal mechanism, with prevented incidents estimated at over 70 in the U.S. alone during the program's early years.

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