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Red Terror
Red Terror
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Red Terror
Part of the Russian Civil War
Propaganda poster in Petrograd, 1918: "Death to the bourgeoisie and its lapdogs – Long live the Red Terror!!"[a]
Native nameКрасный террор (post-1918 orthography)
Красный терроръ (pre-1918 orthography)
LocationSoviet Russia
DateAugust 1918 – February 1922
TargetAnti-Bolshevik groups, clergy, rival socialists, counter-revolutionaries, peasants, and dissidents
Attack type
Purge, Mass killing
DeathsMainstream estimates range between 50,000 and 600,000[1][2][3] (see below)
PerpetratorsCheka
MotivePolitical repression

The Red Terror (Russian: красный террор, romanizedkrasnyy terror) was a campaign of political repression and executions in Soviet Russia which was carried out by the Bolsheviks, chiefly through the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police force. It officially started in early September 1918 and it lasted until 1922,[4][5] though violence committed by Bolshevik soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards had been ongoing since late 1917.[6]

Decreed after assassination attempts on Vladimir Lenin along with the successful assassinations of Petrograd Cheka leader Moisei Uritsky and party editor V. Volodarsky[7] in alleged retaliation for Bolshevik mass repressions, the Red Terror was modeled on the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution,[8] and the Paris Commune.[9] The policy sought to eliminate political dissent, opposition, and any other threat to Bolshevik power.[10][better source needed]

More broadly, the term can be applied to Bolshevik political repression throughout the Russian Civil War (1917–1922).[11][12][13] Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky justified the repressive measures as a necessary response to the White Terror initiated in 1917.[14]

History

[edit]

Background

[edit]

When the Revolution took power in November 1917, many top Bolsheviks hoped to avoid much of the violence which would come to define this period.[15] Through one of its first decrees on 8 November 1917, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies abolished the death penalty. It had first been canceled by the February Revolution and then restored by the Kerensky's government. Not a single death sentence was issued in the first three months of Vladimir Lenin's government,[7] which consisted of a coalition with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, albeit terrorists in the tsarist era, were staunch opponents of the death penalty. However, as pressure mounted from the White Armies and from international intervention, the Bolsheviks moved closer to Lenin's harsher perspective.

The Bolsheviks had employed terror before the official declaration of September 5, 1918. This early phase of the terror was mainly carried out by sailors, soldiers, and Red Guards. Their methods included confiscations, fines, executions, and hostage-taking. On January 14, 1918, Bolshevik sailors from the Black Sea Fleet killed some 300 victims at Yevpatoriya by breaking their limbs and throwing them from the steamship Romania.[16]

Targets at the early period of violence were chiefly officers, cadets, and 'bourgeois'. In mid-January in Odessa sailors killed officers and junkers (officer cadets) by throwing them from the Russian cruiser Almaz. According to another account a colonel was roasted alive within the engine of a locomotive.[17]

Several unsanctioned incidents of mob violence were perpetrated by civilian supporters of the Bolsheviks. Shortly after the Bolshevik takeover of Rostov in November 1917, workers in Taganrog surrounded fifty officer cadets, who surrendered on the understanding that their lives were to be spared. They were taken to a metal factory and thrown one at a time into the blast furnace.[18]

Several prominent figures also fell victim to this phase of violence. On November 20th (December 3rd), 1917, General Nikolai Dukhonin surrendered himself to the Bolshevik Krylenko in Mogilev. Despite Krylenko's efforts to defend the general, Dukhonin was lynched by a mob of Bolshevik sailors from the Baltic Fleet.[19]

The decision to enact the Red Terror was also driven by the initial "massacre of their 'Red' prisoners by the office-cadres during the Moscow insurrection of October 1917", allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, and the large-scale massacres of Reds during the Finnish Civil War in which 10,000 to 20,000 revolutionaries had been killed by the Finnish Whites.[7]

Members of the presidium of VCheKa (left to right) Yakov Peters, Józef Unszlicht, Abram Belenky (standing), Felix Dzerzhinsky, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, 1921

In December 1917, Felix Dzerzhinsky was appointed to the duty of rooting out counterrevolutionary threats to the Soviet government. He was the director of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (aka Cheka), a predecessor of the KGB that served as the secret police for the Soviets.[20]

On 21 February 1918, the death penalty was also formally re-established, as an exceptional revolutionary instrument, with the famous decree Socialist Homeland is in Danger!.[21] In article 8, it read as follows: "Enemy agents, profiteers, marauders, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators and German spies are to be shot on the spot".[22]

Starting around April 1918, Russian anarchists were among the first revolutionary socialist victims of the precursors of Red Terror. Anarchists harshly criticized Bolsheviks' centralization of political power by creating the Bolshevik-dominated Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), nationalizing the land, subordinating the factory committees to the state-controlled network of trade unions, and creating the secret police organization Cheka; later, anarchists widely opposed the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as betrayals of revolutionary internationalism and the stateless ideal.[23] Some militant Bakuninist anarchists even advocated armed struggle against the dictatorship.[24] Meanwhile, Bolsheviks associated violent anti-Bolshevik rhetoric and such crimes as robberies, expropriations, and murders committed by nominally anarchist criminals with all anarchists and perceived the increasingly militant and resistant anarchists as legitimate threat.[24] Subsequently, the Sovnarkom decided to liquidate anarchist-associated criminal recklessness and disarm and disband all anarchist organizations.[24] In Moscow and Petrograd the Cheka largely succeeded in disbanding all anarchist organizations;[25] particularly, on 12 April 1918, the Cheka raided 26 anarchist centres in Moscow, including the Moscow Federation of Anarchist Groups' headquarters, namely House of Anarchy. In almost all cases the anarchists surrendered without a fight, yet in the Donskoi Monastery and at the House of Anarchy the anarchists fiercely resisted the Cheka; as a result a dozen Chekists were killed while 40 anarchists were killed or wounded, and approximately 500 more were imprisoned.[26]

In 1922, anarchist activists Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman recounted the Cheka raid against anarchists in April 1918 thus:

Of all the revolutionary elements in Russia it is the Anarchists who now suffer the most ruthless and systematic persecution. Their suppression by the Bolsheviki began already in 1918, when – in the month of April of that year – the Communist Government attacked, without provocation or warning, the Anarchist Club of Moscow and by the use of machine guns and artillery "liquidated" the whole organisation. It was the beginning of Anarchist hounding, but it was sporadic in character, breaking out now and then, quite planless, and frequently self-contradictory.

— Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman, "Bolsheviks Shooting Anarchists"[27]

Later, Goldman acknowledged many anarchists' opposition the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, yet drew no causal link between such opposition and later persecutions of anarchists by Bolsheviks.[28]

On 16 June 1918, more than two months prior to the events that would officially catalyze the Terror, a new decree re-established the death penalty as an ordinary jurisdictional measure by instructing the Revolutionary People's Courts to use it "as the only punishment for counter-revolutionary offences".[21]

The first and second pages of the so-called "Lenin's Hanging Order" concerning a peasant revolt in Penza governorate; the "order" was not carried out as such

Also prior to the events that would officially catalyze the Terror,[13] Lenin issued orders and made speeches which included harsh expressions and descriptions of brutal measures to be taken against the "class enemies", which, however, often were not actual orders or were not carried out as such.[29] For example, in a telegram, which became known as "Lenin's hanging order", he demanded to "crush" landowners in Penza and to publicly hang "at least 100 kulaks, rich bastards, and known bloodsuckers"[13] in response to a peasant revolt there; yet, only the 13 organizers of the murder of local authorities and the uprising were arrested, while the uprising was ended with a number of propaganda activities.[29] In 1920, having received information that in Estonia and Latvia, with which Soviet Russia had concluded peace treaties, volunteers were being enrolled in anti-Bolshevik detachments, Lenin offered to "advance by 10–20 miles (versts) and hang kulaks, priests, landowners" "while pretending to be greens",[30] but instead, Lenin's government confined itself to sending diplomatic notes. Lenin even urged to "hang" Anatoly Lunacharsky and "Communist scum". Russian historian Vladlen Loginov [ru] explains that while relatively peaceful resolutions of conflicts following Lenin's brutal declarations took place "not always and not everywhere", Lenin complained in his letters that[29] his bureaucratic "apparatus has already become gigantic — in some places excessively so — and under such conditions a “personal dictatorship” is entirely unrealizable and attempts to realize it would only be harmful."[31] Loginov explains that Lenin attempted to compensate this "lack of real power" with either with "abundance of decrees" or "simply with strong words."[29]

The Bolsheviks also used terror as a means to dissuade unrest. On August 20, 1918 Lenin wrote to Nikolai Semashko, "I congratulate you on your energetic suppression of the kulaks and White Guards in the district. We must strike while the iron's hot and not lose a minute, organize the poor of the district, confiscate all the grain and all the property of the rebellious kulaks, hang the kulak ringleaders, mobilize and arm the poor under reliable leaders out of our own unit, arrest hostages from among the wealthy and hold them."[32]

Lenin had justified the state response to the kulak revolts due to the preceding 258 uprisings that had occurred in 1918 and the threat of the White Terror. He summarised his view that either the "kulaks massacre vast numbers of workers, or the workers ruthlessly suppress the revolt of the predatory kulak minority... There can be no middle course".[33]

Beginnings

[edit]
Vladimir Pchelin's 1927 depiction of Fanny Kaplan's assassination attempt on Vladimir Lenin

On August 30, 1918, Leonid Kannegisser, a young military cadet of the Imperial Russian Army, assassinated Moisei Uritsky, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, outside the Petrograd Cheka headquarters in retaliation for the execution of his friend and other officers.[34]

On the same day, August 30, 1918, Socialist Revolutionary Fanny Kaplan unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Vladimir Lenin.[8][20]

During interrogation by the Cheka, she made the following statement:

"My name is Fanya Kaplan. Today I shot Lenin. I did it on my own. I will not say from whom I obtained my revolver. I will give no details. I had resolved to kill Lenin long ago. I consider him a traitor to the Revolution. I was exiled to Akatui for participating in an assassination attempt against a Tsarist official in Kiev [now Kyiv]. I spent 11 years at hard labour. After the Revolution, I was freed. I favoured the Constituent Assembly and am still for it".[35]

Murder of the Romanov family in 1918, Le Petit Journal

Kaplan referenced the Bolsheviks' growing authoritarianism, citing their forcible shutdown of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, the elections to which they had lost. When it became clear that Kaplan would not implicate any accomplices, she was executed in Alexander Garden, near the western walls of the Kremlin. "Most sources indicate that Kaplan was executed on 3 September, the day after her transfer to the Kremlin". In 1958 the commander of the Kremlin, the former Baltic sailor Pavel Dmitriyevich Malkov (1887–1965)[36] revealed he had personally executed Kaplan on that date upon the specific orders of Yakov Sverdlov, chief secretary of the Bolshevik Central Committee.[37]: 442  She was killed with a bullet to the back of the head.[38] Her corpse was bundled into a barrel and set alight so that her "remains [might] be destroyed without a trace", as Sverdlov had instructed.[39]

These events persuaded the government to heed Dzerzhinsky's lobbying for greater terror against opposition. The campaign of mass repressions would officially begin thereafter.[8][20] The Red Terror is considered to have officially begun between 30 August and 12 September 1918.[8][20]

Implementation

[edit]
Corpses of hostages executed by Cheka in 1918 in the basement of Tulpanov's house in Kherson, Ukrainian SSR, The Black Book of Communism
Corpses of people executed by Cheka in 1918 at a yard in Kharkiv, Ukrainian SSR, The Black Book of Communism
Corpses of victims of the winter 1918 Red Terror in Yevpatoria dumped in the Black Sea by their Bolshevik executioners, but washed ashore by tides and waves in summer days of 1919. The victims of this terror were later memorialized.
Corpses of victims of the Palermo Forest Massacre. The massacre was carried out by the Bolsheviks in late 1918 and early 1919 in the occupied Rakvere, Estonia.
Corpses of victims of the 1919 Tartu Credit Center Massacre killed by the retreating Bolsheviks

While recovering from his wounds, Lenin instructed: "It is necessary – secretly and urgently to prepare the terror."[40] In immediate response to the two attacks, Chekists killed approximately 1,300 "bourgeois hostages" held in Petrograd and Kronstadt prisons.[41]

Bolshevik newspapers were especially integral to instigating an escalation in state violence: on August 31, the state-controlled media launched the repressive campaign through incitement of violence. One article appearing in Pravda exclaimed: "the time has come for us to crush the bourgeoisie or be crushed by it.... The anthem of the working class will be a song of hatred and revenge!"[20] The next day, the newspaper Krasnaia Gazeta stated that "only rivers of blood can atone for the blood of Lenin and Uritsky."[20]

The first official announcement of a Red Terror was published in Izvestia on September 3, titled "Appeal to the Working Class": it had been drafted by Dzerzhinsky and his assistant Jēkabs Peterss and called for the workers to "crush the hydra of counter-revolution with massive terror!"; it would also make clear that "anyone who dares to spread the slightest rumor against the Soviet regime will be arrested immediately and sent to a concentration camp".[42] Izvestia also reported that, in the 4 days since the attempt on Lenin, over 500 hostages had been executed in Petrograd alone.[20]

Subsequently, on September 5, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "On Red Terror", prescribing "mass shooting" to be "inflicted without hesitation". The decree ordered the Cheka "to secure the Soviet Republic from the class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps", as well as stating that counter-revolutionaries "must be executed by shooting [and] that the names of the executed and the reasons of the execution must be made public."[20][43][44]

According to official numbers, the Bolsheviks executed 500 "representatives of overthrown classes" (kulaks) immediately after the assassination of Uritsky.[45] Soviet commissar Grigory Petrovsky called for an expansion of the Terror and an "immediate end of looseness and tenderness."[10]

In October 1918, Cheka commander Martin Latsis likened the Red Terror to a class war, explaining that "we are destroying the bourgeoisie as a class."[10]

On October 15, the leading Chekist Gleb Bokii, summing up the officially-ended Red Terror, reported that, in Petrograd, 800 alleged enemies had been shot and another 6,229 imprisoned.[40] Casualties in the first two months were between 10,000 and 15,000 based on lists of summarily executed people published in newspaper Cheka Weekly and other official press. A declaration About the Red Terror by the Sovnarkom on 5 September 1918 stated:

...that for empowering the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission in the fight with the counter-revolution, profiteering and corruption and making it more methodical, it is necessary to direct there possibly bigger number of the responsible party comrades, that it is necessary to secure the Soviet Republic from the class enemies by way of isolating them in concentration camps, that all people are to be executed by fire squad who are connected with the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and mutinies, that it is necessary to publicize the names of the executed as well as the reasons of applying to them that measure.

— Signed by People's Commissar of Justice D. Kursky, People's Commissar of Interior G. Petrovsky, Director in Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars V. Bonch-Bruyevich, SU, #19, department 1, art.710, 04.09.1918[46]

As the Russian Civil War progressed, significant numbers of prisoners, suspects and hostages were executed because they belonged to the "possessing classes". Numbers are recorded for cities occupied by the Bolsheviks:

In Kharkov there were between 2,000 and 3,000 executions in February–June 1919, and another 1,000–2,000 when the town was taken again in December of that year; in Rostov-on-Don, approximately 1,000 in January 1920; in Odessa, 2,200 in May–August 1919, then 1,500–3,000 between February 1920 and February 1921; in Kiev, at least 3,000 in February–August 1919; in Ekaterinodar, at least 3,000 between August 1920 and February 1921; In Armavir, a small town in Kuban, between 2,000 and 3,000 in August–October 1920. The list could go on and on.[47]

In Crimea, Béla Kun and Rosalia Zemlyachka, with Lenin's approval,[48] had 50,000 White prisoners of war and civilians summarily executed by shooting or hanging after the defeat of general Pyotr Wrangel at the end of 1920. They had been promised amnesty if they would surrender.[49] This is one of the largest massacres in the Civil War.[50][20] The figures related to the massacre in Crimea remain contested. Anarchist and Bolshevik Victor Serge gave a lower figure for White officers around 13,000 which he claims were exaggerated. Yet, he condemned Kun for his treacherous actions towards allied anarchists and surrendering whites.[51] According to social scientist, Nikolay Zayats, from the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus the large, “fantastic” estimates derived from eyewitness accounts and White army emigre press. A Crimean Cheka report in 1921 showed that 441 people were shot with a modern estimation that 5,000–12,000 people in total were executed in Crimea.[52]

At the same time, Lenin took measures even at the peak of the civil war to prevent the abuse of power by the Cheka. The case of Mrs. Pershikova may be symbolic: in 1919, she was arrested for defacing a picture-portrait of Lenin, but Lenin ordered to liberate her:[31]

8 March 1919, Myshkin, Chairman of the Gubernia Extraordinary

Commission, Tsaritsyn. You cannot arrest people for disfiguring a portrait. Free Valentina Pershikova at once, and if she is a counterrevolutionary,

keep an eye on her.

Kamenev says-and declares that several most prominent Cheka men confirm it-that the Chekas in the Ukraine have brought a host of evils, having been set up too early and having allowed a mass of hangers-on to get in .... It is necessary at all costs to discipline the Cheka men and throw out the alien elements.

On 16 March 1919, all military detachments of the Cheka were combined in a single body, the Troops for the Internal Defense of the Republic (a branch of the Cheka), which numbered at least 200,000 in 1921. These troops policed labor camps, ran the Gulag system, conducted prodrazverstka (requisitions of food from peasants), and put down peasant rebellions, riots by workers, and mutinies in the Red Army (which was plagued by desertions).[13]

One of the main organizers of the Red Terror for the Bolshevik government was 2nd-Grade Army Commissar Yan Karlovich Berzin (1889–1938), whose real name was Pēteris Ķuzis. He took part in the October Revolution of 1917 and afterwards worked in the central apparatus of the Cheka. During the Red Terror, Berzin initiated the system of taking and shooting hostages to stop desertions and other "acts of disloyalty and sabotage".[53][page needed] As chief of a special department of the Latvian Red Army (later the Russian 15th Army), Berzin played a part in the suppression of the Red sailors' uprising at Kronstadt in March 1921. He particularly distinguished himself in the course of the pursuit, capture, and killing of captured sailors.[53][page needed]

Affected groups

[edit]
Chinese Chekists executing an Orthodox priest in Moscow, White Russian anti-Bolshevik propaganda poster, c. 1920

Among the victims of the Red Terror were tsarists, liberals, non-Bolshevik socialists, anarchists, members of the clergy, ordinary criminals, counter-revolutionaries, and other political dissidents. Later, industrial workers who failed to meet production quotas were also targeted.[10]

The first victims of the Terror were the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR). Over the months of the campaign, over 800 SR members were executed, while thousands more were driven into exile or detained in labor camps.[10] In a matter of weeks, executions carried out by the Cheka doubled or tripled the number of death sentences pronounced by the Russian Empire over the 92-year period from 1825 to 1917.[41] While the Socialist Revolutionaries were initially the primary targets of the terror, most of its direct victims were associated with the preceding regimes.[54][20]

Peasants

[edit]
Trotsky on an anti-Soviet Polish poster titled "Bolshevik freedom" which depicts him on a pile of skulls and holding a bloody knife, during the Polish–Soviet War of 1920. Small caption in the lower right corner reads:
The Bolsheviks promised:
We'll give you peace
We'll give you freedom
We'll give you land
Work and bread
Despicably they cheated
They started a war
With Poland
Instead of freedom they brought
The fist
Instead of land – confiscation
Instead of work – misery
Instead of bread – famine.

The Internal Troops of the Cheka and the Red Army practiced the terror tactics of taking and executing numerous hostages, often in connection with desertions of forcefully mobilized peasants. According to Orlando Figes, more than 1 million people deserted from the Red Army in 1918, around 2 million people deserted in 1919, and almost 4 million deserters escaped from the Red Army in 1921.[55] According to Nicolas Werth, around 500,000 deserters were arrested in 1919 and up to 800,000 in 1920 by Cheka troops and special divisions created to combat desertions.[56] Thousands of deserters were killed, and their families were often taken hostage. Lenin's instructions prescribed:

After the expiration of the seven-day deadline for deserters to turn themselves in, punishment must be increased for these incorrigible traitors to the cause of the people. Families and anyone found to be assisting them in any way whatsoever are to be considered as hostages and treated accordingly.[57]

In September 1918, in just twelve provinces of Russia, 48,735 deserters and 7,325 brigands were arrested: 1,826 were executed and 2,230 were deported. A typical report from a Cheka department stated:

23 June 1919. 19h 30min. Telegram from Yaroslavl by battalion commander Frenkel, № 279, 22 June. The uprising of deserters in the Borovskaya and Petropavlovskaya volosts has been eliminated. During the liquidation, 23 armed deserters who offered resistance to our troops have been shot. In the southeastern part of the province, there is an unprecedented influx of deserters to the commissariats, which come with a request to enroll them in the ranks of the Red Army.[58]

Estimates suggest that during the suppression of the Tambov Rebellion of 1920–1921, around 100,000 peasant rebels and their families were imprisoned or deported and perhaps 15,000 executed.[59] During the rebellion, Mikhail Tukhachevsky (chief Red Army commander in the area) authorized Bolshevik military forces to use chemical weapons against villages with civilian population and rebels.[60] Publications in local Communist newspapers openly glorified liquidations of "bandits" with the poison gas.[61]

This campaign marked the beginning of the Gulag, and some scholars have estimated that 70,000 were imprisoned by September 1921 (this number excludes those in several camps in regions that were in revolt, such as Tambov). Conditions in these camps led to high mortality rates, and "repeated massacres" took place. The Cheka at the Kholmogory camp adopted the practice of drowning bound prisoners in the nearby Dvina river.[62] Occasionally, entire prisons were "emptied" of inmates via mass shootings prior to abandoning a town to White forces.[63][64]

Industrial workers

[edit]

On 16 March 1919, Cheka stormed the Putilov factory. Hundreds of workers who went to a strike were arrested, of whom around 200 were executed without trial during the next few days.[65][66] Numerous strikes took place in the spring of 1919 in cities of Tula, Oryol, Tver, Ivanovo, and Astrakhan. Starving workers sought to obtain food rations matching those of Red Army soldiers. They also demanded the elimination of privileges for Bolsheviks, freedom of the press, and free elections. The Cheka mercilessly suppressed all strikes, using arrests and executions.[67]

In the city of Astrakhan, a revolt led by the White Guard broke out. In preparing for this revolt, the Whites managed to smuggle more than 3000 rifles and machine guns into the city. The leaders of the plot decided to act on the night 9–10 March 1919. The rebels were joined by wealthy peasants from the villages, which suppressed the Committees of the Poor, and committed massacres against rural activists. Eyewitnesses reported atrocities in villages such as Ivanchug, Chagan, and Karalat. In response, Soviet forces led by Kirov attempted to suppress the revolt and, together with the Committees of the Poor, restore Soviet power. The revolt in Astrakhan was brought under control by 10 March, and completely defeated by the 12th. More than 184 were sentenced to death, including monarchists, and representatives of the Kadets, Left-Socialist Revolutionaries, repeat offenders, and persons shown to have links with British and American intelligence services.[68] The opposition media with political opponents like Chernov, and Melgunov, and others would later say that between 2,000 and 4,000 were shot or drowned from 12 to 14 of March 1919.[69][70]

However, strikes continued. Lenin had concerns about the tense situation regarding workers in the Ural region. On 29 January 1920, he sent a telegram to Vladimir Smirnov stating "I am surprised that you are putting up with this and do not punish sabotage with shooting; also the delay over the transfer here of locomotives is likewise manifest sabotage; please take the most resolute measures."[71]

At these times, there were numerous reports that Cheka interrogators used torture. At Odessa, the Cheka tied White officers to planks and slowly fed them into furnaces or tanks of boiling water; in Kharkiv, scalpings and hand-flayings were commonplace: the skin was peeled off victims' hands to produce "gloves";[72] the Voronezh Cheka rolled naked people around in barrels studded internally with nails; victims were crucified or stoned to death at Yekaterinoslav; the Cheka at Kremenchuk impaled members of the clergy and buried alive rebelling peasants; in Oryol, water was poured on naked prisoners bound in the winter streets until they became living ice statues; in Kiev, Chinese Cheka detachments placed rats in iron tubes sealed at one end with wire netting and the other placed against the body of a prisoner, with the tubes being heated until the rats gnawed through the victim's body in an effort to escape.[73]

Executions took place in prison cellars or courtyards, or occasionally on the outskirts of town, during the Red Terror and Russian Civil War. After the condemned were stripped of their clothing and other belongings, which were shared among the Cheka executioners, they were either machine-gunned in batches or dispatched individually with a revolver. Those killed in prison were usually shot in the back of the neck as they entered the execution cellar, which became littered with corpses and soaked with blood. Victims killed outside the town were moved by truck, bound and gagged, to their place of execution, where they sometimes were made to dig their own graves.[74]

According to Edvard Radzinsky, "it became a common practice to take a husband hostage and wait for his wife to come and purchase his life with her body".[45] During decossackization, there were massacres, according to historian Robert Gellately, "on an unheard of scale". The Pyatigorsk Cheka organized a "day of Red Terror" to execute 300 people in one day, and took quotas from each part of town. According to the Chekist Karl Lander [ru], the Cheka in Kislovodsk, "for lack of a better idea", killed all the patients in the hospital. In October 1920 alone more than 6,000 people were executed. Gellately adds that Communist leaders "sought to justify their ethnic-based massacres by incorporating them into the rubric of the 'class struggle'".[75]

Clergy

[edit]

Members of the clergy were subjected to particularly brutal abuse. According to documents cited by Alexander Yakovlev, then head of the Presidential Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, priests, monks and nuns were crucified, thrown into cauldrons of boiling tar, scalped, strangled, given Communion with melted lead and drowned in holes in the ice.[76] An estimated 3,000 were put to death in 1918 alone.[76]

Number of deaths

[edit]

There is no consensus among the Western historians on the number of deaths from the Red Terror. James Ryan writes that there were "at lowest estimates" "on average" 28,000 executions per year from December 1917 to February 1922,[77] and that the number of people shot during the initial period of the Red Terror is at least 10,000.[54] Estimates for the whole period range from of 50,000[78] executions to an upper of 140,000[78][79] to 200,000 people, plus an additional 400,000 killed in prisons or in suppressions of local rebellions.[1] The lowest among the estimates "of those who died at the hands of the Soviet government" cited by Evan Mawdsley is a figure of 12,733 executed by the Cheka between 1917 and 1920 as estimated by Martin Latsis; Mawdsley writes that "Latsis's figures seem too low, and Conquest's too high, but one can only guess", implying the figures of 50,000 victims presented by William Henry Chamberlin and 140,000 victims presented by George Leggett to be more plausible.[80] Ronald Hingley wrote that Chamberlin's estimate "must be nearer the truth" than "1,700,000, which appears to be a considerable exaggeration."[3]

Some contemporary historians present figures exceeding a million victims: Dietrich Beyrau [de] believes the number of victims of the Red Terror to be "up to 1.3 millions" compared to between 20,000 and 100,000 of the White Terror,[81] while a Russian historian V. Erlikhman, whose estimates are cited by Jonathan D. Smele, presents the figure of 1,200,000 deaths caused by the Red Terror compared to 300,000 victims of the White Terror.[82]

In 1924, Popular Socialist, Sergei Melgunov (1879–1956), published a detailed account on the Red Terror in Russia, where he cited Professor Charles Saroléa's counts of 1,766,188 executions. He questioned the accuracy of the figures, but endorsed Saroléa's "characterisation of terror in Russia", stating it "in general matches reality".[83][b] Other sources have also characterized the widely circulated claim of 1,700,000 deaths to be a "wild exaggeration" and placed estimations closer to 50,000 over the three year Civil War period.[85] British historian Ronald Hingley attributed the exaggerated claim of 1,700,000 to a quoted statement from White Army leader Anton Denikin.[3] However, according to historian W. Bruce Lincoln (1989), the best estimations for the number of executions in total put the number at about 100,000.[86]

According to Robert Conquest, a total of 140,000 people were shot in 1917–1922, but Jonathan D. Smele estimates they were considerably fewer, "perhaps less than half that many".[87] According to others, the number of people shot by the Cheka in 1918–1922 is about 37,300 people, shot in 1918–1921 by the verdicts of the tribunals – 14,200, although executions and atrocities were not limited to the Cheka, having been organized by the Red Army as well.[52][88]

Justification by Bolsheviks

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First issue of journal Krasny Terror (Red Terror) with an article by Martin Latsis justifying the Red Terror

The Red Terror in Soviet Russia was justified in Soviet historiography as a wartime campaign against counter-revolutionaries during the Russian Civil War of 1918–1922, targeting those who sided with the Whites (White Army). In his book, Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky, Trotsky also argued that the reign of terror began with the White Terror under the White Guard forces and the Bolsheviks responded with the Red Terror.[89] Kautsky pleaded with Lenin against using violence as a form of terrorism because it was indiscriminate, intended to frighten the civilian population and included the taking and executing hostages: "Among the phenomena for which Bolshevism has been responsible, terrorism, which begins with the abolition of every form of freedom of the Press, and ends in a system of wholesale execution, is certainly the most striking and the most repellent of all."[90]

Latsis, chief of the Ukrainian Cheka, stated in the newspaper Krasny Terror (Red Terror):

We are not waging war against individual persons. We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. During the investigation, do not look for evidence that the accused acted in deed or word against Soviet power. The first questions that you ought to put are: To what class does he belong? What is his origin? What is his education or profession? And it is these questions that ought to determine the fate of the accused. In this lies the significance and essence of the Red Terror

— Martin Latsis, Red Terror, no 1, Kazan, 1 November 1918, p. 2[91]

Lenin in response mildly criticized Latsis' determination:

Political distrust means we must not put non-Soviet people in politically responsible posts. It means the Cheka must keep a sharp eye on members of classes, sections or groups that have leanings towards the white guards. (Though, incidentally, one need not go to the same absurd lengths as Comrade Latsis, one of our finest, tried and tested Communists, did in his Kazan magazine, Krasny Terror. He wanted to say that Red terror meant the forcible suppression of exploiters who attempted to restore their rule, but instead, he put it this way [on page 2 of the first issue of his magazine]: "Don't search [!!?] the records for evidence of whether his revolt against the Soviet was an armed or only a verbal one") ... Political distrust of the members of a bourgeois apparatus is legitimate and essential. But to refuse to use them in administration and construction would be the height of folly, fraught with untold harm to communism.

— Lenin, A Little Picture in Illustration of Big Problems (1918–1919)[92]

The Red Terror was described succinctly from the Bolshevik point of view by Grigory Zinoviev in mid-September 1918:

To overcome our enemies we must have our own socialist militarism. We must carry along with us 90 million out of the 100 million of Soviet Russia's population. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be annihilated.

From an opposite point of view to the Bolsheviks', in November 1918, Left SR leader Maria Spiridonova, while being in prison and awaiting trial, condemned the Red Terror in her Open Letter to the Central Executive of the Bolshevik party. She wrote:

Never in the most corrupt of Parliaments, never in the most venal papers of capitalist society has hatred of opponents reached such heights of cynicism as your hatred.

[…] These nightly murders of fettered, unarmed, helpless people, these secret shootings in the back, the unceremonious burial on the spot of bodies, robbed to the very shirt, not always quite dead, often still groaning, in a mass grave – what sort of Terrorism is this? This cannot be called Terrorism. In the course of Russian revolutionary history, the word Terrorism did not merely connote revenge and intimidation (which were the very last things in its mind). No, the foremost aims of Terrorism were to protest against tyranny, to awake a sense of value in the souls of the oppressed, to rouse the conscience of those who kept silence in the face of this submission. Moreover, the Terrorist nearly always accompanied his deed by a voluntary sacrifice of his own liberty or life. Only in this way, it seems to me, could the Terrorist acts of the revolutionaries be justified. But where are these elements to be found in the cowardly Cheka, in the unbelievable moral poverty of its leaders?

… So far the working classes have brought about the Revolution under the unblemished red flag, which was red with their own blood. Their moral authority and sanction lay in their sufferings for the highest ideal of humanity. Belief in Socialism is at the same time a belief in a nobler future for humanity – a belief in goodness, truth, and beauty, in the abolition of the use of all kinds of force, in the brotherhood of the world. And now you have damaged this belief, which had inflamed the souls of the people as never before, at its very roots.

— Maria Spiridonova Open Letter to the Central Executive of the Bolshevik Party, November 1918.[93]

Interpretations by historians

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Historians such as Stéphane Courtois and Richard Pipes have argued that the Bolsheviks needed to use terror to stay in power because they lacked popular support;[13][94] Pipes is a representative of 'neo-traditionalist' historians who oppose 'revisionists', who put an emphasis on the 'popular' nature of the Bolshevik Revolution, and follow 'totalitarian' approach which continued the 'traditionalist' approach which dominated during the Cold War; for 'traditionalists' and 'neo-traditionalists', the Revolution was something imposed 'from above' by the revolutionaries with political guile and brute force.[80] Although the Bolsheviks dominated among workers, soldiers and in their revolutionary soviets, they won less than a quarter of the popular vote in elections for the Constituent Assembly held soon after the October Revolution, since they commanded much less support among the peasantry. The Constituent Assembly elections predated the split between the Right SRs, who had opposed the Bolsheviks, and the Left SRs, who were their coalition partners, consequentially many peasant votes intended for the latter went to the SRs.[95][96][97] Massive strikes by Russian workers were "mercilessly" suppressed during the Red Terror.[95]

According to Pipes, terror was inevitably justified by Lenin's belief that human lives were expendable in the cause of building the new order of communism. Pipes has quoted Marx's observation of the class struggles in 19th-century France: "The present generation resembles the Jews whom Moses led through the wilderness. It must not only conquer a new world, it must also perish in order to make room for the people who are fit for a new world"; yet, Pipes noted that neither Karl Marx nor Friedrich Engels encouraged mass murder.[94][98]

Eric Hobsbawm, despite his sympathy for the October Revolution and Communist movements, also recognized Lenin's beliefs, like his view of political struggle as a total war and a zero-sum game, as one of the reasons of the Red Terror and the mass violence carried out by the Bolsheviks, although he writes that "it was not so much the belief that a great end justifies all the means necessary to achieve it..., or even the belief that the sacrifices imposed on the present generation, however large, are as nothing to the benefits which will be reaped by the endless generations of the future", but "the application of the principle of total war to all times. Leninism, perhaps because of the powerful strain of voluntarism which made other Marxists distrust Lenin as a 'Blanquist' or 'Jacobin,' thought essentially in military terms, as his own admiration for Clausewitz would indicate, even if the entire vocabulary of Bolshevik politics did not bear witness to it."[99]

Orlando Figes' view was that Red Terror was implicit, not so much in Marxism itself, but in the tumultuous violence of the Russian Revolution. He noted that there were a number of Bolsheviks, led by Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, and Mikhail Olminsky, who criticized the actions and warned that thanks to "Lenin's violent seizure of power and his rejection of democracy," the Bolsheviks would be "forced to turn increasingly to terror to silence their political critics and subjugate a society they could not control by other means."[100] Figes also asserts that the Red Terror "erupted from below. It was an integral element of the social revolution from the start. The Bolsheviks encouraged but did not create this mass terror. The main institutions of the Terror were all shaped, at least in part, in response to these pressures from below."[101]

The Hungarian historian Tamás Krausz [hu; ru; he] supports the view that terror was rather a result of objective processes, and notes that Lenin, as Trotsky wrote earlier, formed his more differentiated position regarding terror over a period of years, and in the period of the First Russian Revolution, Lenin objected terror as a means of "expropriating private property", since the revolutionary forces were not at war with individuals, but with the system, and viewed terror only as a secondary tool of countering state violence in the moments of revolutionary upheaval, and in 1907, the Bolsheviks accepted a resolution which denounced terror and rejected it as a method in advance; Krausz writes that terror was not something rooted in revolutionary theory, but a result of a combination of Russian traditions of political violence with the cult of violence brought by World War I and the escalation of struggle into a civil war, in which both sides sought to annihilate each other, and likely with Bakunin's idea of a "collective Razin" embodied both in the popular rebellion and in the popular leader "at the head of the masses", a concept spread among Russian revolutionaries, and the Marxist concept of 'dictatorship of proletariat'; Lenin also drew the idea of a necessity of terror from his reading of the histories of the French Revolution and American Civil War.[31]

Leszek Kołakowski wrote that while Bolsheviks (especially Lenin) were very much focused on the Marxian concept of "violent revolution" and dictatorship of the proletariat long before the October Revolution, implementation of the dictatorship was clearly defined by Lenin as early as in 1906, when he argued it must involve "unlimited power based on force and not on law," power that is "absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever and based directly on violence." In The State and Revolution of 1917, Lenin once again reiterated the arguments raised by Marx and Engels calling for use of terror. Voices such as Kautsky calling for moderate use of violence met "furious reply" from Lenin in The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918). Another theoretical and systematic argument in favor of organized terror in response to Kautsky's reservations was written by Trotsky in The Defense of Terrorism (1921). Trotsky argued that in the light of historical materialism, it is sufficient that the violence is successful for it to justify its rightness. Trotsky also introduced and provided ideological justification for many of the future features characterizing the Bolshevik system such as "militarization of labor" and concentration camps.[102]

A number of historians, such as Pipes and Nicolas Werth (The Black Book of Communism), contrasted the Red and White Terrors, claiming that while Red Terror was a political strategy and a "revolutionary" means of reconstructing the world, ideological and instrumental, the White Terror was restorative, arbitrary and a temporary measure, mere "repressive violence" to re-establish a previous status quo.[99][103] Robert Conquest was convinced that "unprecedented terror must seem necessary to ideologically motivated attempts to transform society massively and speedily, against its natural possibilities",[95] while Werth wrote:

The Bolshevik policy of terror was more systematic, better organized, and targeted at whole social classes. Moreover, it had been thought out and put into practice before the outbreak of the civil war. The White Terror was never systematized in such a fashion. It was almost invariably the work of detachments that were out of control, and taking measures not officially authorized by the military command that was attempting, without much success, to act as a government. If one discounts the pogroms, which Denikin himself condemned, the White Terror most often was a series of reprisals by the police acting as a sort of military counterespionage force. The Cheka and the Troops for the Internal Defense of the Republic were a structured and powerful instrument of repression of a completely different order, which had support at the highest level from the Bolshevik regime.[104]

Such notion is refuted by Peter Holquist and Joshua Sanborn.[99] Holquist wrote that "White violence may have been less centralized and systematic, but it did not lack ideological underpinnings. [...] It is hard to imagine that the massacre of tens of thousands of Jews by the anti-Soviet armies during the civil wars... could have occurred without some form of ideology – and particularly the virulent linkage drawn between Jews and Communists."[103] According to Sanborn, the terror carried out by the Russian Imperial Army and the Whites was as 'revolutionary' as their Red counterpart:[99]

...in the case of the Jews, we see not only the development of terror practices (like hostage-taking, decimation, mass retribution, mass deportation, rape, robbery, and sadistic, spectacularly cruel violence), but of the social intent. Most notably, efforts on the part of Ianushkevich’s Stavka to gather material on Jewish behavior in the army stressed that commanders were to gather this to prove all the “harm” that Jews posed to the army and to the nation. Given the tone and exclusionary fantasies of both prewar and wartime anti-Semitic discourse, we see in the Jewish terror a facet of White Terror that cannot simply be seen as a method of military dictatorship, a requirement of wartime emergency, or even the most brutal of counter-insurgency strategies. These were processes that were justified by the war atmosphere, but whose vision extended well into the post-war period. As a result, the White Terror, like the Imperial Army's Terror campaign from 1914–1917, was revolutionary in its Terror against Jews, and who knows, might have taken this kernel even further had they prevailed in the Civil War.

James Ryan claims that Lenin never advocated for the physical extermination of the entire bourgeoisie as a class, just the execution of those who were actively involved in opposing and undermining Bolshevik rule.[105] He did intend to bring about "the overthrow and complete abolition of the bourgeoisie" through non-violent political and economic means, but he also noted that in reality the period of transition from capitalism to communism 'is a period of unprecedentedly violent class struggle in unprecedentedly acute forms, and, consequently, during this period the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and propertyless in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoise)'.[106]

Historical significance

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Memorial cross to 1919 victims of the Red Terror in Jelgava
Memorial grave of the Red Terror victims in Holy Cross Public Cemetery, Kapuvár, Hungary.
Memorial to the Chekists in Kropyvnytskyi, Ukraine

The Red Terror was significant because it was the first of numerous communist terror campaigns which were waged in Soviet Russia and many other countries.[107][page needed] It also triggered the Russian Civil War according to historian Pipes.[94] Menshevik Julius Martov wrote about the Red Terror:

The beast has licked hot human blood. The man-killing machine is brought into motion ... But blood breeds blood ... We witness the growth of the bitterness of the civil war, the growing bestiality of men engaged in it.[108][109]

The term "Red Terror" was later used in reference to other campaigns of violence which were waged by communist or communist-affiliated groups. Some other events which were also called "Red Terrors" include:

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography and further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Red Terror was a Bolshevik policy of systematic political repression, mass executions, and terroristic violence unleashed in Soviet Russia from September 1918 to 1922, enforced chiefly by the to eradicate class enemies, counter-revolutionaries, and perceived threats to the regime during the . Formally authorized by a decree of the on September 5, 1918, in direct response to assassination attempts against on August 30 and the killing of leader on August 17, the campaign mandated the shooting of individuals connected to White Guard organizations, conspiracies, or uprisings, alongside mass internment in concentration camps and hostage-taking from suspect social classes. Targeting the , , intellectuals, kulaks, striking workers, and anyone deemed unreliable, the under conducted summary executions often without trial or evidence, employing and public spectacles to instill fear and deter opposition. Historians estimate that the Red Terror resulted in 10,000 to 15,000 executions in its initial phase alone, with total Cheka-attributed killings reaching up to 200,000, though broader civil war violence and famines linked to Bolshevik policies inflated overall death tolls significantly higher. This deliberate strategy of class extermination not only secured Bolshevik dominance but also established terror as a foundational mechanism of Soviet rule, foreshadowing the scale of repressions under later leaders.

Ideological and Historical Background

Bolshevik Ideology of Violence

The Bolshevik ideology of violence stemmed from Vladimir Lenin's interpretation of Marxist theory, which posited the as essential for suppressing the during the transition to . In (1917), Lenin argued that the bourgeois state must be "smashed" rather than reformed, with the establishing a repressive apparatus to crush inevitable resistance from class enemies, framing this as a necessary phase of historical progress. This view echoed Karl Marx's assertion that violence acts as the "midwife" of history, facilitating the revolutionary overthrow of exploitative structures through class conflict. Lenin extended this by emphasizing that the dictatorship would involve "unlimited violence" against counter-revolutionary forces to prevent restoration of . Underlying this was the influence of , which portrayed societal evolution as driven by irreconcilable contradictions resolved through revolutionary upheaval, rendering terror a tool of to accelerate the proletarian victory. Marx and had outlined in (1848) that the proletariat's triumph requires dispossessing the bourgeoisie, implying forceful measures amid escalating antagonisms. Lenin, in pre-1917 works like What Is to Be Done? (1902), reinforced the need for a vanguard party to organize the masses for such confrontations, viewing non-violent reform as illusory under bourgeois dominance. This doctrine rejected , insisting that the "sharpest and most intense struggles" were indispensable for proletarian rule. Post-October Revolution actions exemplified this ideology's prioritization of proletarian power over formal democratic institutions. The Bolsheviks dissolved the on January 6, 1918 (), after it convened with a Socialist Revolutionary majority that refused to endorse Soviet authority, justifying the move as defending the dictatorship against bourgeois remnants. Lenin contended that the assembly embodied "outlived" parliamentary forms inferior to the Soviets, which directly represented worker and , thus necessitating extralegal dissolution to consolidate class-based rule. This act established a for bypassing electoral outcomes in favor of coercive measures aligned with Bolshevik .

Context of the Russian Civil War

The Russian Empire's participation in contributed to its rapid disintegration, with military defeats, economic strain, and widespread desertions eroding state authority by , setting the stage for the Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent Civil War that pitted the against fragmented anti-Bolshevik coalitions. The , signed on , , ended Russia's involvement in the war by ceding approximately 1 million square kilometers of territory and significant populations to and its allies, but it alienated former Entente partners, who began aiding forces in hopes of reopening the Eastern Front. This diplomatic rupture facilitated the formation of organized anti-Bolshevik armies, such as the in by January , comprising former imperial officers, , and conservatives seeking to restore order amid the power vacuum. Facing escalating opposition and logistical crises, introduced in June 1918, a policy framework enforcing state control over industry and agriculture, including compulsory grain requisitioning from rural producers to feed urban populations and sustain the Red Army's expansion to over 3 million troops by late 1918. These requisitions, targeting surplus from wealthier peasants, disrupted traditional agrarian economies already battered by wartime and , sparking localized resistance such as peasant uprisings in grain-rich regions like the and . This economic coercion deepened rural alienation, fueling peasant armies that operated independently against both Reds and , with insurgencies numbering in the tens of thousands by mid-1918. Although White offensives gained momentum in peripheral areas like and the Donbass, and Green forces mounted sporadic guerrilla actions, the Bolsheviks retained dominance over central Russia's urban-industrial core, including and Petrograd, which housed critical railways, factories, and administrative hubs essential for coordinating national defense and repression. This territorial advantage, bolstered by the Red Army's centralized command under , enabled the regime to prioritize internal security measures amid the Civil War's chaos, where —marked by and food shortages affecting over 50 million people—amplified the stakes of Bolshevik consolidation efforts.

Launch and Formalization

Triggering Events

In July 1918, the Bolshevik regime confronted acute internal threats, commencing with the uprising of their former allies, the (Left SRs). On July 6, Left SR agents German ambassador in to sabotage the Brest-Litovsk and provoke renewed hostilities, while seizing key buildings in an abortive bid to overthrow the government. The rapidly quelled the revolt, executing perpetrators such as and confining Left SR delegates at the Fifth , thereby dissolving their coalition and exposing factional fissures that fueled suspicions of broader disloyalty within Soviet institutions. Simultaneously, Socialist Revolutionary-affiliated insurgents initiated rebellions in regional centers including (seized July 13), Rybinsk, and Murom, capturing these towns briefly before Bolshevik forces recaptured them amid heavy fighting. The Bolshevik leadership depicted these actions as orchestrated foreign-backed conspiracies intended to fragment Red Army deployments, amplifying perceptions of existential vulnerability despite their localized scope and lack of coordination with major anti-Bolshevik armies. Escalation peaked in August with targeted strikes against Bolshevik command. On August 17, Petrograd Cheka chief was assassinated by Leonid Kanegisser, a disaffected officer protesting Bolshevik repressions. Thirteen days later, on August 30, Socialist Revolutionary shot and severely wounded outside a factory, later claiming the act punished his deviation from revolutionary ideals; she was executed without trial on September 3. These incidents, though isolated, engendered Bolshevik paranoia of pervasive cabals, prompting immediate Cheka-led reprisals: in Petrograd alone, approximately 500 hostages—encompassing , , and intellectuals—were summarily executed in the days following, far outstripping evidentiary links to the assailants and signaling a shift toward preemptive class-based terror. Similar purges ensued in , where hundreds more faced shooting or , rationalized as deterrence against imagined networks rather than calibrated retaliation.

Official Decree and Policy Establishment

The (Sovnarkom) issued the decree "On Red Terror" on September 5, 1918, which marked the official legalization of systematic mass repression by empowering the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission () to conduct mass shootings without trial against White Guardists, counterrevolutionaries, and their associates, while also mandating concentration camps for suspects' families and other categories of class enemies. The decree explicitly terminated the publication of execution lists to enhance secrecy and efficiency in operations, transforming prior sporadic reprisals into a coordinated state policy. This policy was expanded through directives from Cheka leaders, notably , who on November 1, 1918, published guidelines in Krasnaya Gazeta emphasizing class-based extermination over individual : "We are not carrying on a war against individuals... Our goal is the destruction of the as a class... Do not seek evidence that the accused acted against the Soviet power... The only question is: to which class does he belong?" Latsis, as head of the Cheka's Ukrainian operations, advocated for interrogations focused solely on social origin to expedite the of bourgeois elements, embedding guilt-by-association into administrative practice. The Red Terror's status as state doctrine was further entrenched at the VIII Congress of the Russian () from March 18–23, 1919, where delegates adopted the party's first program affirming the proletarian dictatorship's reliance on forcible suppression, including terror, as a core mechanism for class annihilation and socialist construction, rejecting any softening amid conditions. The congress resolutions integrated terror into the party's military and organizational framework, portraying it not as a temporary expedient but as an enduring instrument of power against internal enemies.

Machinery and Methods

The Cheka and Security Apparatus

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation—commonly known as the —was established on December 20, , by a of the signed by , with appointed as its chairman. The empowered the to investigate acts of counter-revolution and , initially framing its role as preparatory to handing cases to revolutionary tribunals, but it granted broad discretion to apply "such punishment as the circumstances require," bypassing standard legal processes. This formulation enabled the agency to evolve swiftly from a body into an extrajudicial executive force, conducting arrests, interrogations, and summary executions without oversight from courts or the judiciary. The Cheka's organizational framework emphasized and , operating as a parallel structure to conventional Bolshevik state organs like the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. It featured a central collegium in overseeing operations, supplemented by provincial guberniya Chekas (gubcheka) and local Chekas, creating a hierarchical "triple Cheka" system where lower levels reported upward while retaining latitude for immediate action. This setup streamlined repression by allowing local committees to initiate measures independently, with appeals or coordination routed to regional and central bodies only as needed, minimizing bureaucratic delays. The agency's was reinforced by direct subordination to the , insulating it from interference by soviets or party committees, which fostered its role as an unaccountable "sword of the revolution." By 1921, the had expanded rapidly amid escalating internal threats, employing approximately 40,000 full-time agents alongside auxiliary troops and informants, enabling it to embed deeply within Bolshevik-controlled territories as a self-sustaining apparatus. This growth reflected not only recruitment from revolutionary ranks but also the absorption of functions from military and civilian police, solidifying the 's dominance over internal order and its capacity to enforce policy through unchecked coercion.

Tactics of Execution and Repression

The conducted executions predominantly through mass shootings carried out in secluded sites such as prison cellars, remote forests, or fields, where victims were frequently compelled to dig their own graves prior to being killed by firing squads. These operations often proceeded without formal trials, records, or , reflecting a deliberate policy of summary justice as authorized by the September 5, 1918, decree on Red Terror, which mandated mass shootings inflicted "without hesitation" against perceived enemies. In places like in 1921 and Moscow's Lubyanka cellars in May 1921, executions involved hasty firing squads, with missed shots followed by point-blank finishes to ensure completion amid chaotic conditions. Hostage-taking targeted relatives of suspected opponents, including families of defectors or rebels, who were detained and executed as reprisals to deter resistance, as seen in St. Petersburg in 1919 where wives and children faced for deserters' actions. This tactic, rooted in orders like Tukhachevsky's June 11, 1921, directive to shoot hostages from bandit families, extended to broader repression by holding civilians accountable for others' deeds, amplifying familial leverage without evidentiary standards. Repression incorporated internment in early concentration camps, established under the 1918 Red Terror decree to isolate class enemies, where inmates endured forced labor such as trench-digging or site cleanup under execution threats, prefiguring systematic camp exploitation. In regions like in 1920 and province by July 1921, these facilities imposed grueling tasks on detainees, including bourgeois elements compelled to perform menial work amid harsh conditions that compounded physical coercion. Psychological terror was amplified through public announcements of executions in Bolshevik newspapers like Weekly, which listed names and fates to broadcast reprisals and fabricate inevitability, as in the October 20, 1918, edition detailing 500 Petrograd hostages shot post-Uritsky assassination. Staged conspiracies, such as those in in August 1921, generated coerced or invented confessions to justify sweeps, while public hangings in boulevards served as spectacles to instill pervasive dread, underscoring the system's reliance on fear over precision.

Targets and Victims

Class-Based Persecution

The ' class warfare doctrine, rooted in Marxist analysis, designated the —capitalists, merchants, and landowners—as irredeemable parasites whose elimination was essential to proletarian . Urban persecution manifested in mass expropriations and executions targeting these groups, with detachments conducting sweeps to confiscate property and liquidate "class enemies." In Petrograd and during late 1918, thousands of former factory owners, traders, and professionals were arrested, their assets seized under decrees like the nationalization of banks and industries, often culminating in summary shootings without trial. Rural class targeting focused on peasants resisting Bolshevik grain requisitions (prodrazvyorstka), who were increasingly labeled as kulaks—affluent exploiters hoarding surplus for profit—despite many being middling farmers. Requisition brigades, empowered by 1918-1919 decrees, forcibly seized harvests to feed cities and the , executing resisters en masse; by 1920, over 5 million poods of grain were extracted through such coercive measures, provoking widespread revolts met with village burnings and hostage-taking. The 1920-1921 , led by peasant partisans against these policies, saw forces under deploy chemical weapons, including gas shells, against forest hideouts; on June 12, 1921, Tukhachevsky ordered the use of poisonous gases to "scour" bandit areas, resulting in civilian casualties amid the campaign's estimated 240,000 rebel deaths from combat, famine, and repression. Industrial workers, proclaimed the vanguard yet subjected to labor conscription and ration cuts under , faced persecution when strikes challenged Bolshevik authority. In 1918-1919, protests in Petrograd, Tula, and —demanding better food distribution and against one-man management—were branded counter-revolutionary, prompting occupations of factories and executions of organizers; the March 1919 Astrakhan uprising alone saw 2,000-4,000 workers killed or drowned after suppression, with leaders like Bolshevik official Sergey Kiselev ordering machine-gun fire on crowds. This repression underscored the regime's prioritization of centralized control over proletarian autonomy, framing dissenting workers as influenced by bourgeois saboteurs.

Political and Ideological Enemies

The Bolsheviks targeted rival leftist factions deemed insufficiently aligned with Leninist centralism, revealing an intolerance for ideological deviation even among socialists. Following the Left Socialist-Revolutionary (Left SR) uprising on July 6–7, 1918, which protested the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and aimed to reignite war against Germany, the Bolsheviks swiftly suppressed the revolt, arresting over 400 Left SR members and executing key leaders such as Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Ivanov. This crackdown extended to Right SRs, with the Cheka conducting mass arrests and executions of suspected sympathizers, contributing to the elimination of the SRs as a viable political force by late 1918. Anarchists faced early and direct assaults for advocating decentralized communes and criticizing Bolshevik . On April 12, 1918, forces raided approximately 26 anarchist centers in , resulting in at least 40 anarchists killed—some shot during resistance—and around 500 arrested, with many subsequently imprisoned or executed. These operations dismantled anarchist strongholds, framing participants as bandits to justify the violence, and set a precedent for broader suppression of libertarian socialists. Mensheviks, advocates of gradual socialism through parliamentary means, were progressively marginalized and then repressed as the Red Terror intensified. Party leaders like went into hiding or exile, while others faced arrest; by 1921, systematic operations had imprisoned or banished remaining Menshevik organizers, effectively banning the party. This reflected Bolshevik rejection of Menshevik internationalism and opposition to one-party rule. Liberal Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) and monarchists from the Provisional Government era were branded as irredeemable reactionaries. Kadet figures were subject to arrest decrees labeling them instigators of , with many hunted down or forced underground as "former people"—a derogatory term for obsolete pre-revolutionary elites. Monarchists, including affiliates, were systematically executed as ideological threats, underscoring the Bolshevik aim to eradicate any non-communist governance models.

Religious and Ethnic Groups

' militant framed religious institutions as ideological threats to proletarian consciousness, leading to targeted repression under the Red Terror. The , intertwined with Tsarist legacy, was prioritized for dismantling; clergy were labeled counter-revolutionaries and subjected to arrests, show trials, and summary executions. Between 1917 and 1922, over 1,200 priests and 28 bishops were killed, with churches looted, bells melted for artillery, and sacred sites converted into warehouses or anti-religious museums. This aligned with Lenin's 1918 directives to eradicate religious influence as "spiritual booze," preempting organized resistance in rural areas. Muslim communities in and the encountered parallel assaults, as Bolshevik centralization clashed with Islamic structures supporting local . During 1918–1920 suppressions of revolts, units executed mullahs and seized mosques, conflating religious leaders with basmachi insurgents opposing Soviet rule. In , these actions disrupted traditional courts and madrasas, framing as a veil for counter-revolutionary feudalism. Jewish religious groups in and faced synagogue closures and rabbi arrests if tied to Zionist or Bundist networks deemed separatist, though ethnic rather than purely religious targeting was inconsistent due to Jewish overrepresentation in ranks. Ethnic dimensions intensified in borderlands, where groups viewed as inherently disloyal were repressed under class rhetoric. campaigns in the Don and regions (1919–1920) mandated the "physical extermination" of as a distinct ethno-social estate, involving mass shootings, village burnings, and forced expulsions. Directives from Bolshevik commissars, such as those in March 1919, urged "merciless mass terror" against entire stanitsas (Cossack settlements), resulting in widespread massacres that historians like Peter Holquist describe as genocidal in intent, targeting beyond economic status. This policy displaced hundreds of thousands, eroding Cossack military traditions seen as White-aligned.

Scale and Casualties

Estimates of Fatalities

Official Cheka reports documented 12,733 executions carried out between September 1918 and February 1920 across Soviet territories. These figures, derived from internal Bolshevik records, encompassed only formalized shootings and excluded unrecorded summary killings, mass drownings, or deaths in custody, which were widespread practices during the campaign. Contemporary witnesses, including sociologist , reported daily executions in major cities like Petrograd—three to five individuals per day and night in that city alone—suggesting regional tolls in the thousands even in urban centers under direct central oversight. Historians, drawing on declassified documents and eyewitness accounts, have revised these numbers upward, estimating direct fatalities from Cheka operations and related repressions at 100,000 to 200,000 during 1918–1922. For instance, early analyses indicated at least 10,000 executions in the initial months following the September 1918 decree, with provincial Chekas operating autonomously and often beyond Moscow's reporting requirements. Post-1991 access to Soviet archives has corroborated patterns of underreporting, as local organs frequently omitted "excesses" from tallies to avoid scrutiny, though comprehensive totals remain elusive due to destroyed records and decentralized violence. Indirect fatalities attributable to Red Terror policies, particularly grain requisitions under , contributed substantially to the 1921–1922 Volga famine, which claimed approximately 5 million lives amid drought-exacerbated shortages from forced extractions. These deaths stemmed from policies enforcing class-based confiscations that prioritized urban and military needs, depleting rural stocks and triggering widespread in requisition-heavy regions.
Source TypeEstimated Direct FatalitiesPeriod CoveredNotes
Official Reports12,7331918–1920Limited to documented executions; excludes unofficial killings.
Eyewitness/Historian Consensus100,000–200,0001918–1922Includes summary executions and camps; based on partial archives and testimonies.
Policy-Induced Famine~5 million1921–1922Tied to requisition policies; combines natural factors with enforced deprivation.

Non-Lethal Repressions and Long-Term Effects

The established a network of concentration camps starting in late , interning class enemies, suspected counterrevolutionaries, and hostages without trial, where prisoners faced compulsory labor in agriculture, logging, and construction under minimal rations. These facilities, often repurposed monasteries or factories, promoted rampant disease— epidemics alone killed thousands indirectly through weakened immunity—while survivors endured beatings, arbitrary transfers, and psychological coercion to extract confessions or labor compliance. By mid-1920, records indicated over 100 such camps operational across Soviet territories, confining tens of thousands in conditions designed for attrition rather than immediate execution, with forced marches and exposure exacerbating mortality from starvation and infection among non-lethally targeted groups like intellectuals and . Released inmates frequently bore chronic health issues, such as or joint damage from overwork, perpetuating cycles of and dependency in post-Terror society. Internal exile decrees, formalized in Cheka orders from 1919, deported survivors and families to or , stripping them of property through immediate under Bolshevik policies enacted December 1917 onward, which seized bourgeois assets without compensation and triggered widespread destitution. This generated refugee outflows exceeding 1 million by 1920, as targeted kulaks, merchants, and nobles fled across borders, disrupting local economies via abandoned farms and factories, and fostering black-market reliance among . The orphaning of children whose parents vanished into custody—estimated in the tens of thousands during peak Terror months of 1918–1919—intensified the besprizorniki phenomenon, with 4–7 million by 1922 scavenging in urban ruins, vulnerable to , recruitment into criminal bands, and state "reeducation" camps that imposed ideological amid . These repressions imprinted lasting societal scars, including intergenerational and suppressed family narratives among descendants, as evidenced by persistent oral histories of fear-induced silence persisting into the Soviet era, alongside demographic voids from disrupted family structures that hampered post-Civil War recovery.

Bolshevik Rationales

Theoretical Foundations in Marxism-Leninism

The concept of the , first articulated by and , served as a foundational doctrinal element for later Bolshevik justifications of repressive violence in the revolutionary process. Marx described it as the transitional phase following the proletarian seizure of power, during which the would wield state authority to dismantle capitalist structures and suppress bourgeois resistance, implying coercive measures against class enemies. In (1871), Marx praised the Paris Commune's armed suppression of Versailles forces as a model, underscoring that proletarian rule entailed "despotic inroads" on property rights and violent countermeasures to threats. Engels reinforced this by arguing that violence was inevitable to overcome the , stating in correspondence that force might be required to impose on unwilling elements, framing suppression as a historical necessity rather than mere contingency. Vladimir Lenin systematized and radicalized these ideas in (1917), portraying the as the "crushing of the resistance of the " through the destruction of the old state apparatus and the exercise of unrestrained proletarian power, which inherently involved organized violence to prevent restoration of . In (1918), Lenin critiqued Karl Kautsky's advocacy for parliamentary , insisting that proletarian must be "unlimited by any laws" and reject bourgeois notions of equality, thereby elevating coercive rule—including terror-like methods— as a moral and strategic imperative to safeguard the revolution against inevitable class antagonism. This adaptation positioned violence not as an aberration but as the dialectical of proletarian governance, demanding the subjugation of opponents to realize . Leon further entrenched terror within Marxist-Leninist ethics in (1920), a direct rebuttal to Kautsky's pacifist critique, where he argued that was indistinguishable from the itself, serving as the proletariat's "instrument" for exterminating elements and enforcing historical progress. contended that moral qualms about violence stemmed from bourgeois illusions, asserting instead that terror embodied the "iron logic" of class war, where leniency toward enemies equated to for the revolution, thus doctrinally sanctifying it as an ethical duty bound to Marxist . These theoretical constructs collectively framed terror as an organic outgrowth of the , intrinsic to the communist transition rather than a pragmatic deviation.

Claims of Defensive Necessity

Bolshevik leaders, including Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, framed the Red Terror as an essential defensive measure against existential threats posed by White Army offensives and foreign military interventions during the Russian Civil War. Following the attempted assassinations of Lenin on August 30, 1918, and Petrograd Cheka chief Moisei Uritsky on the same day, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on September 5, 1918, formally launching the Red Terror to "exterminate" counter-revolutionary elements and secure the Soviet regime from internal sabotage. This was presented as a direct response to escalating White Terror, with Lenin telegraphing local soviets to implement "mass terror" against Socialist Revolutionaries and other perceived plotters, arguing that hesitation allowed enemies to regroup. Foreign interventions, such as British and American landings in Murmansk in July 1918 and Archangel on August 2, 1918, were cited as evidence of a coordinated imperialist encirclement justifying preemptive repression to prevent the regime's collapse. Cheka head emphasized the preventive character of these operations in internal directives, ordering the arrest and liquidation of "hostile" individuals based on class affiliation or suspected sympathies rather than proven acts, to neutralize threats before they could materialize. For instance, Cheka units were instructed to execute "five to ten" hostages from bourgeois or officer families for each soldier killed by guerrillas, framing such measures as deterrents against desertion and sabotage amid White advances in regions like and the Urals in mid-1918. These claims portrayed terror not as aggression but as a calculated reciprocity to White atrocities, with asserting in 1919 that the Cheka's role was to "cleanse the rear" of potential fifth columnists amid ongoing invasions. However, these rationales have been critiqued for overstating immediate dangers, as Bolshevik forces maintained dominance over major urban centers, railway networks, and industrial heartlands by late , enabling centralized control that minimized genuine existential risks from scattered fronts. Post-facto propaganda often retrofitted terror campaigns to alleged peasant " uprisings," such as those in Province in 1919–1920, which Bolshevik grain requisitions had provoked through armed confiscations, yet officials like Trotsky depicted them as spontaneous plots necessitating escalation. This preemptive logic, while defended as vital for survival against encirclement, extended to mass executions exceeding verifiable threats, with internal reports acknowledging operations targeted "socially alien" groups prophylactically.

Comparisons and Contrasts

With White Terror Atrocities

The White Terror, reprisals by anti-Bolshevik forces during the , is estimated to have caused between 20,000 and 100,000 deaths, excluding victims of anti-Jewish pogroms, a fraction of the Red Terror's documented fatalities exceeding 100,000 executions alone by 1922. These figures derive from archival reviews and contemporary accounts, reflecting sporadic violence rather than coordinated extermination; for instance, historian Evan Mawdsley approximates White Terror victims at around 50,000, emphasizing decentralized acts over systematic policy. In contrast, the Bolshevik operated under explicit central directives with execution quotas, institutionalizing terror as state apparatus from its inception in December 1917. White atrocities lacked the unified command structure of the Red variant, manifesting as fragmented reprisals by autonomous White leaders and units. Admiral Kolchak's Siberian regime, for example, oversaw purges like the massacre of several hundred socialists in on December 25-26, , and 670 prisoners in in mid-April 1919, alongside a 2,200-victim in from July 10-14, 1919—episodes driven by local military tribunals without overarching quotas or ideological mandates. Similarly, General Anton Denikin's in executed suspected in ad hoc field courts, but without a dedicated equivalent to the Cheka's nationwide network of 40 provincial branches by , which enforced standardized "" and class purges. This fragmentation stemmed from the Whites' coalition of monarchists, liberals, and socialists, precluding consensus on terror as policy. Motivationally, White killings emphasized vengeance for prior Bolshevik offenses and immediate security threats, targeting captured commissars, agitators, and guerrillas in punitive raids, rather than the Reds' doctrinal aim of eradicating entire social strata for revolutionary purification. Accounts from participants, such as those under Kolchak, describe executions as retaliatory—e.g., responses to partisan ambushes—lacking the Marxist-Leninist framing of "" elimination via lists and categories. This reactive character, while brutal, did not evolve into ' perpetual internal policing mechanism, which persisted beyond the to underpin Soviet repression.

Distinctive Features of Red Terror

The Red Terror was characterized by its systematic targeting of individuals based on class affiliation rather than solely military or political opposition, extending to civilians, intellectuals, and economic groups deemed inherently antagonistic to proletarian rule. This approach, rooted in Bolshevik ideology, framed entire social strata—such as , kulaks, and —as existential threats requiring preemptive elimination, irrespective of active . Formalized by the ' decree on September 5, 1918, which mandated the to conduct mass arrests, shootings, and hostage-taking against "counter-revolutionaries" and their "families," the policy institutionalized class warfare as a core state function. This legal embedding distinguished it from sporadic violence, embedding terror mechanisms into the Soviet apparatus and persisting beyond battlefield exigencies. A hallmark was the deliberate use of to broadcast terror's reach, with organs publishing detailed execution lists in official newspapers such as Izvestia and regional presses, often under headings like "Red Terror" to enumerate victims' names, professions, and fabricated crimes. Between September 1918 and early 1919, such publications in Petrograd alone listed over 500 executions, serving to instill widespread fear, legitimize reprisals as collective , and condition public acquiescence to unchecked state power. This transparency in atrocity contrasted with covert operations, functioning as to erode resistance and normalize violence against class-designated foes. The Red Terror's proto-totalitarian nature lay in its ideological permanence and universality, positing terror not as a wartime expedient but as an ongoing imperative to eradicate class remnants and forge a homogeneous socialist order. Unlike episodic counter-terror, it prioritized comprehensive societal remaking through perpetual vigilance, influencing the evolution of Soviet organs into instruments of ideological . This model—combining impunity, class purge quotas, and exported tactics via Comintern directives—provided a template for terror campaigns in subsequent communist states, where similar class-based repression supplanted mere political stabilization.

Historiographical Perspectives

Early Soviet Narratives

In the 1920s, Bolshevik historiography framed the Red Terror as a necessary and exemplary proletarian response to counter-revolutionary threats, emphasizing its role in safeguarding the October Revolution against White forces and foreign intervention. Official accounts, including those in party publications and Dzerzhinsky's addresses, portrayed the Cheka not as an instrument of unchecked violence but as a disciplined organ of class justice, systematically eliminating "enemies of the people" to enable socialist construction. These narratives systematically omitted reports of arbitrary arrests, summary executions exceeding official quotas, and civilian casualties, attributing any deviations to isolated "excesses" rather than systemic policy. By , under Stalinist consolidation, this glorification intensified through state-controlled textbooks and memoirs, which integrated the Terror into a teleological of Bolshevik inevitability, depicting Chekists as heroic pioneers who preempted fascist-like conspiracies. Critics within the , such as those documenting overreach in regional operations, faced suppression or erasure during the purges, ensuring historiographical uniformity that downplayed victim tolls estimated internally at hundreds of thousands but never publicized. The Cheka's successor organs, like the OGPU, were retroactively mythologized in as flawless defenders, with archival records of executions and forced labor camps sealed to prevent scrutiny. Post-World War II Soviet cultural output reinforced these narratives, embedding the Terror within broader epics of revolutionary defense. Films and literature, influenced by Eisenstein's montage techniques in works like (1928), stylized revolutionary violence as aesthetically triumphant and morally unassailable, eliding the Terror's brutal mechanics in favor of symbolic clashes between and . This mythologization persisted until the late 1980s, when began challenging sealed archives, though official histories maintained the defensive justification without conceding scale or gratuitousness. The resulting fostered a legacy of denial, where victim data remained state secrets, accessible only after 1991 declassifications revealed discrepancies between proclaimed heroism and documented atrocities.

Western and Revisionist Analyses

Western scholars in the pre-1990s era, operating without access to Soviet archives, framed the Red Terror as a deliberate Bolshevik rooted in ideological imperatives rather than a mere to threats. Drawing on accounts, foreign press dispatches, and fragmentary official data, they emphasized its premeditated nature and alignment with totalitarian governance models, where state terror served to atomize society and enforce ideological conformity. This perspective contrasted with later revisionist tendencies but underscored the terror's role in preemptively eliminating potential opposition, as evidenced by directives predating major White advances. William Henry 's 1935 analysis in The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 portrayed the terror as a systematic campaign launched via the September 5, 1918, , with executions exceeding 50,000 in the first months alone, aimed at "extirpating" and counterrevolutionaries through mass hostage-taking and summary trials. Chamberlin relied on eyewitness reports from and refugees to argue that the scale—far beyond defensive needs—reflected Bolshevik fanaticism, not exigency, noting instances like the 500 executions in Petrograd within days of the . Similarly, Sergei Melgunov, in his 1925 émigré compilation The Red Terror in Russia, aggregated regional reports and survivor testimonies to estimate 1,766,188 executions by mid-1922, highlighting methodological reliance on indirect tallies due to Bolshevik concealment. Richard extended this interpretive framework in works like his 1990 The Russian Revolution, applying totalitarian theory to depict the terror as ideologically predestined, with Lenin's pre-1918 writings advocating class extermination as a proletarian tool. Pipes contended that archival inaccessibility forced quantification via émigré extrapolations, such as Melgunov's figures, and rejected "necessity" rationales by pointing to the terror's expansion into rear areas absent direct threats, arguing it facilitated Bolshevik consolidation not through military edge but by demoralizing society and purging internal dissent. Scholars debated its decisiveness in Bolshevik victory: while some acknowledged terror's role in suppressing peasant revolts (e.g., in 1921, with 100,000+ casualties), others like viewed it as counterproductive, alienating potential allies and prolonging chaos, yet ideologically non-negotiable. These analyses privileged émigré credibility over Soviet opacity, quantifying fanaticism through patterns like the Cheka's 1919 peak of 1,826 daily operations, to portray the terror as a foundational totalitarian mechanism.

Post-Soviet and Contemporary Evaluations

The opening of Soviet archives in the early following the USSR's dissolution enabled historians to cross-reference operational logs and regional reports, yielding more precise tallies of executions during the Red Terror. These documents confirmed direct executions numbering over 100,000 between 1918 and 1921, with official records alone documenting around 37,300 death sentences in that span, though underreporting and summary killings inflated the actual figure. , drawing on these sources in his examination of revolutionary violence, attributed roughly 100,000 deaths to systematic operations, underscoring the campaign's role in class-based extermination rather than isolated reprisals. Contemporary evaluations have dismantled the Bolshevik rationale of purely defensive terror, highlighting its escalation in 1920 amid Bolshevik military successes, when threats from White forces had waned. Archival evidence shows Cheka detachments intensifying repressions in rear areas under Red control, targeting peasants, clergy, and former officials to preempt resistance and enforce ideological conformity, with execution quotas rising as territorial gains solidified Bolshevik dominance. This pattern, analyzed in post-Soviet studies, reveals the Terror's proactive function in reshaping society along Marxist lines, independent of immediate counterrevolutionary perils. Debates persist on indirect casualties, with frameworks like R.J. Rummel's democide concept estimating additional hundreds of thousands of deaths from Cheka-induced policies such as forced grain requisitions and early labor camps during 1918–1921, linking these to totalitarian ideology's causal primacy over wartime chaos. Rummel's aggregation places civil war-era democide at over 2 million when including famine and disease exacerbated by terror tactics, critiquing narratives that minimize ideological intent in favor of circumstantial explanations. These assessments, grounded in declassified data, affirm the Red Terror's excessiveness as a deliberate instrument of Marxist-Leninist state-building, with minimal credible evidence supporting claims of restraint or proportionality.

Legacy and Impact

Role in Bolshevik Victory

The Red Terror, conducted primarily by the from late onward, decimated organized political opposition within Bolshevik-controlled territories, enabling the regime to monopolize recruitment into the and secure essential supplies. By targeting Socialist Revolutionaries, , anarchists, and other rivals, the dismantled alternative power centers that could have competed for manpower or undermined efforts; for instance, the execution of SR leaders following their party's resistance in eliminated a major threat to Bolshevik authority in soviets and rural areas. This suppression extended to internal military threats, with special departments monitoring and purging suspected disloyal elements among the ranks, including former Imperial officers who comprised up to 75% of command in , fostering a disciplined force that grew from approximately 154,000 troops in April to 5.3 million by late 1920. In 1919-1920, the terror played a critical role in quelling peasant revolts that jeopardized supply lines, particularly through brutal enforcement of grain requisitions vital for feeding the . The , erupting in August 1919 and intensifying in 1920 under Alexander Antonov, saw Bolshevik forces under deploy hostage-taking, village burnings, and concentration camps, redoubling the Red Terror to extract grain from resistant peasants and restore control over fertile regions by May 1921. Such measures broke widespread rural resistance, ensuring food supplies reached the fronts amid policies, though they coincided with massive desertions—over 2.6 million recorded between June 1919 and June 1920—highlighting the coercive nature of Bolshevik mobilization. While these tactics facilitated short-term political and military dominance, culminating in the defeat of major White armies by 1920-1921, they alienated the peasant majority, eroding potential alliances with rural populations who formed the bulk of recruits. The of March 1921, involving sailors previously loyal to , exemplified this backlash against repressive methods, requiring further bloody suppression to prevent contagion to other garrisons and consolidate power post-Civil War. This reliance on terror achieved victory but at the expense of broader legitimacy, sowing seeds of future unrest by prioritizing over consent.

Influence on Soviet Totalitarianism

The Red Terror institutionalized a system of extrajudicial state violence through the , established on December 20, 1917, which directly evolved into the GPU in 1922, the OGPU in 1923, and the in 1934, maintaining continuity in structure, leadership ethos, and operational methods such as mass arrests and summary executions. This repressive apparatus, initially deployed against perceived class enemies during the Civil War, provided the blueprint for Stalin's amplification of terror, culminating in the Great Terror of 1936–1938, during which the conducted operations leading to roughly 681,000 documented executions and millions more in arrests, deportations, and internment. The Red Terror normalized quotas for repression within Bolshevik administrative culture, as evidenced by Cheka directives for targeted executions—such as the September 1918 "day of Red Terror" in , where 300 individuals were killed—and Lenin's August 1918 telegrams ordering the shooting of hundreds of hostages without trial. This precedent echoed in Stalin-era of July 1937, which mandated quotas for arrests and executions of "anti-Soviet elements," with regional organs required to propose and meet numerical targets for repression, often exceeding them through fabricated cases. Such quota-driven violence entrenched a bureaucratic approach to elimination, where party loyalty demanded participation in purges, fostering and self-policing that defined totalitarian control. Early Soviet concentration camps, used during the Red Terror to detain and exploit "unreliable elements" through forced labor, directly prefigured the system's expansion under from 1929 onward, which imprisoned tens of millions and caused deaths estimated in the millions from , , and overwork. The ideological justification of terror as a defensive necessity for class struggle, articulated by figures like Trotsky—who argued the revolution "kills individuals, and intimidates thousands"—permeated Stalinist doctrine, enabling the regime's total domination over by eradicating internal dissent and enforcing ideological conformity. Beyond the USSR, the Red Terror's model of revolutionary violence as a tool for consolidating power influenced global communist movements, notably Mao Zedong's campaigns (1949–1953) and the (1966–1976), where similar tactics of mass mobilization, purges, and executions targeted "class enemies" and resulted in tens of millions of deaths. This Leninist template contributed to the broader pattern of repression across 20th-century communist regimes, with estimating approximately 94 million victims from executions, famines, and labor camps worldwide.

References

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