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In social theory and philosophy, antihumanism or anti-humanism is a theory that is critical of traditional humanism and its traditional ideas about humanity and the human condition.[1] Central to antihumanism is the view that philosophical anthropology[2] and its concepts of "human nature", "man" or "humanity" should be rejected as historically relative, ideological or metaphysical.[3]

Origins

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In the late 18th and 19th centuries, the philosophy of humanism was a cornerstone of the Enlightenment. Human history was seen as a product of human thought and action, to be understood through the categories of "consciousness", "agency", "choice", "responsibility", "moral values". Human beings were viewed as possessing common essential features.[4] From the belief in a universal moral core of humanity, it followed that all persons were inherently free and equal. For liberal humanists such as Immanuel Kant, the universal law of reason was a guide towards total emancipation from any kind of tyranny.[5]

Criticism of humanism as over-idealistic began in the 19th century. For Friedrich Nietzsche, humanism was nothing more than an empty figure of speech[6] – a secular version of theism. Max Stirner expressed a similar position in his book The Ego and Its Own, published several decades before Nietzsche's work. Nietzsche argues in Genealogy of Morals that human rights exist as a means for the weak to constrain the strong; as such, they do not facilitate the emancipation of life, but instead deny it.[7]

The young Karl Marx is sometimes considered an antihumanist, as he rejected the idea of human rights as a symptom of the very dehumanization they were intended to oppose. Given that capitalism forces individuals to behave in an egoistic manner, they are in constant conflict with one another, and are thus in need of rights to protect themselves. True emancipation, he asserted, could only come through the establishment of communism, which abolishes private property.[8] According to many anti-humanists, such as Louis Althusser, mature Marx sees the idea of "humanity" as an unreal abstraction that masks conflicts between antagonistic classes; since human rights are abstract, the justice and equality they protect is also abstract, permitting extreme inequalities in reality.[9]

In the 20th century, the view of humans as rationally autonomous was challenged by Sigmund Freud, who believed humans to be largely driven by unconscious irrational desires.[10]

Martin Heidegger viewed humanism as a metaphysical philosophy that ascribes to humanity a universal essence and privileges it above all other forms of existence. For Heidegger, humanism takes consciousness as the paradigm of philosophy, leading it to a subjectivism and idealism that must be avoided. Like Hegel before him, Heidegger rejected the Kantian notion of autonomy, pointing out that humans were social and historical beings, as well as rejecting Kant's notion of a constituting consciousness. In Heidegger's philosophy, Being (Sein) and human Being (Dasein) are a primary unity. Dualisms of subject and object, consciousness and being, humanity and nature are inauthentic derivations from this.[11] In the Letter on Humanism (1947), Heidegger distances himself from both humanism and existentialism. He argues that existentialism does not overcome metaphysics, as it merely reverses the basic metaphysical tenet that essence precedes existence. These metaphysical categories must instead be dismantled.[12]

Positivism and scientism

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Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that in the social as well as natural sciences, information derived from sensory experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, are together the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge.[13] Positivism assumes that there is valid knowledge (truth) only in scientific knowledge.[14] Obtaining and verifying data that can be received from the senses is known as empirical evidence.[13] This view holds that society operates according to general laws that dictate the existence and interaction of ontologically real objects in the physical world. Introspective and intuitional attempts to gain knowledge are rejected. Though the positivist approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of Western thought,[15] the concept was developed in the modern sense in the early 19th century by the philosopher and founding sociologist, Auguste Comte (1798-1857).[16] Comte argued that society operates according to its own quasi-absolute laws, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws of nature.[17]

Humanist thinker Tzvetan Todorov (1939-2017) identified within modernity a trend of thought which emphasizes science and within it tends towards a deterministic view of the world. He clearly identifies positivist theorist Auguste Comte as an important proponent of this view.[18] For Todorov,

"Scientism does not eliminate the will but decides that since the results of science are valid for everyone, this will must be something shared, not individual. In practice, the individual must submit to the collectivity, which 'knows' better than he does. The autonomy of the will is maintained, but it is the will of the group, not the person […] scientism has flourished in two very different political contexts […] The first variant of scientism was put into practice by totalitarian regimes."[19]

A similar approach emerges in the work associated with the Frankfurt School of social research. Antipositivism would be further facilitated by rejections of scientism; or science as ideology. Jürgen Habermas argues, in his On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967), that

"the positivist thesis of unified science, which assimilates all the sciences to a natural-scientific model, fails because of the intimate relationship between the social sciences and history, and the fact that they are based on a situation-specific understanding of meaning that can be explicated only hermeneutically ... access to a symbolically prestructured reality cannot be gained by observation alone."[20]

Structuralism

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Structuralism was developed in post-war Paris as a response to the perceived contradiction between the free subject of philosophy and the determined subject of the human sciences.[21] It drew on the systematic linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure for a view of language and culture as a conventional system of signs preceding the individual subject's entry into them.[22] In the study of linguistics the structuralists saw an objectivity and scientificity that contrasted with the humanist emphasis on creativity, freedom and purpose.[23]

Saussure held that individual units of linguistic signification - signs - only enjoy their individuality and their power to signify by virtue of their contrasts or oppositions with other units in the same symbolic system. For Saussure, the sign is a mysterious unification of a sound and a thought. Nothing links the two: each sound and thought is in principle exchangeable for other sounds or concepts. A sign is only significant as a result of the total system in which it functions.[24] To communicate by particular forms of speech and action (parole) is itself to presuppose a general body of rules (langue). The concrete piece of behaviour and the system that enables it to mean something mutually entail each other. The very act of identifying what they say already implies structures. Signs are thus not at the service of a subject; they do not pre-exist the relations of difference between them. We cannot seek an exit from this purely relational system. The individual is always subordinate to the code. Linguistic study must abstract from the subjective physical, physiological and psychological aspects of language to concentrate on langue as a self-contained whole.[25]

The structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss proclaimed that the goal of the human sciences was "not to constitute, but to dissolve man".[26] He systematised a structuralist analysis of culture that incorporated ideas and methods from Saussure's model of language as a system of signifiers and signifieds. His work employed Saussurean technical terms such as langue and parole, as well as the distinction between synchronic analysis (abstracting a system as if it were timeless) and diachronic analysis (where temporal duration is factored in). He paid little attention to the individual and instead concentrated on systems of signs as they operated in primitive societies. For Levi-Strauss, cultural choice was always pre-constrained by a signifying convention.[27] Everything in experience was matter for communication codes. The structure of this system was not devised by anyone and was not present in the minds of its users, but nonetheless could be discerned by a scientific observer.

The semiological work of Roland Barthes (1977) decried the cult of the author and indeed proclaimed his death.

Jacques Lacan's reformulation of psychoanalysis based on linguistics inevitably led to a similar diminishment of the concept of the autonomous individual: "man with a discourse on freedom which must certainly be called delusional...produced as it is by an animal at the mercy of language".[28] According to Lacan, an individual is not born human but only becomes so through incorporation into a cultural order that Lacan terms The Symbolic.[29] Access to this order proceeds by way of a "mirror stage", where a child models itself upon its own reflection in a mirror. Language allows us to impose order on our desires at this "Imaginary" stage of development.[30] The unconscious, which exists prior to this Symbolic Order, must submit to the Symbolic Law. Since the unconscious is only accessible to the psychoanalyst in language, the most he or she can do is decode the conscious statements of the patient. This decoding can only take place within a signifying chain; the signified of unconscious discourse remains unattainable. It resides in a pre-signified dimension inaccessible to language that Lacan calls "The Real". From this, it follows that it is impossible to express subjectivity. Conscious discourse is the effect of a meaning beyond the reach of a speaking subject. The ego is a fiction that covers over a series of effects arrived at independently of the mind itself.[31]

Taking a lead from Brecht's twin attack on bourgeois and socialist humanism,[32][33] structural Marxist Louis Althusser used the term "antihumanism" in an attack against Marxist humanists, whose position he considered a revisionist movement. He believed humanism to be a bourgeois individualist philosophy that posits a "human essence" through which there is potential for authenticity and common human purpose.[34] This essence does not exist: it is a formal structure of thought whose content is determined by the dominant interests of each historical epoch.[35] Socialist humanism is similarly an ethical and thus ideological phenomenon. Since its argument rests on a moral and ethical basis, it reflects the reality of exploitation and discrimination that gives rise to it but never truly grasps this reality in thought. Marxist theory must go beyond this to a scientific analysis that directs to underlying forces such as economic relations and social institutions.[34]

Althusser considered "structure" and "social relations" to have primacy over individual consciousness, opposing the philosophy of the subject.[36] For Althusser, individuals are not constitutive of the social process, but are instead its supports or effects.[37] Society constructs the individual in its own image through its ideologies: the beliefs, desires, preferences and judgements of the human individual are the effects of social practices. Where Marxist humanists such as Georg Lukács believed revolution was contingent on the development of the class consciousness of an historical subject - the proletariat - Althusser's antihumanism removed the role of human agency; history was a process without a subject.[2]

Post-structuralism

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Post-structuralist Jacques Derrida continued structuralism's focus on language as key to understanding all aspects of individual and social being, as well as its problematization of the human subject, but rejected its commitment to scientific objectivity.[38] Derrida argued that if signs of language are only significant by virtue of their relations of difference with all other signs in the same system, then meaning is based purely on the play of differences, and is never truly present.[38] He claimed that the fundamentally ambiguous nature of language makes human intention unknowable, attacked Enlightenment perfectionism, and condemned as futile the existentialist quest for authenticity in the face of the all-embracing network of signs. The world itself is text; a reference to a pure meaning prior to language cannot be expressed in it.[38] As he stressed, "the subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language".[39]

Michel Foucault challenged the foundational aspects of Enlightenment humanism.[40] He rejected absolute categories of epistemology (truth or certainty) and philosophical anthropology (the subject, influence, tradition, class consciousness), in a manner not unlike Nietzsche's earlier dismissal of the categories of reason, morality, spirit, ego, motivation as philosophical substitutes for God.[41] Foucault argued that modern values either produced counter-emancipatory results directly, or matched increased "freedom" with increased and disciplinary normatization.[42] His anti-humanist skepticism extended to attempts to ground theory in human feeling, as much as in human reason, maintaining that both were historically contingent constructs, rather than the universals humanism maintained.[43] In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault dismissed history as "humanist anthropology". The methodology of his work focused not on the reality that lies behind the categories of "insanity", "criminality", "delinquency" and "sexuality", but on how these ideas were constructed by discourses.[44]

Cultural examples

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The heroine of the novel Nice Work begins by defining herself as a semiotic materialist, "a subject position in an infinite web of discourses – the discourses of power, sex, family, science, religion, poetry, etc."[45] Charged with taking a bleak deterministic view, she retorts, "antihumanist, yes; inhuman, no...the truly determined subject is he who is not aware of the discursive formations that determine him".[46] However, with greater life-experience, she comes closer to accepting that post-structuralism is an intriguing philosophical game, but probably meaningless to those who have not yet even gained awareness of humanism itself.[47]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Antihumanism

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Antihumanism is a philosophical position that emerged in the mid-20th century, primarily within French intellectual circles, as a critique of traditional humanism's emphasis on the autonomous human subject, universal rationality, and anthropocentric values. It contends that concepts of human nature and agency are not innate or foundational but constructed through historical, linguistic, and structural forces, thereby rejecting the humanist privileging of individual freedom and ethical universality. Key proponents, including Louis Althusser, framed it as a "theoretical anti-humanism" inherent in Karl Marx's later works, which prioritize systemic processes over personal essence in explaining social relations. This stance gained prominence through structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers like , whose analyses in works such as depicted the "death of man" as the human-centered dissolves under scrutiny of discursive power formations. Antihumanism challenges Enlightenment-derived by arguing that human subjectivity is fragmented and determined by external ideologies, languages, and institutions, rather than self-determining reason. Influenced by earlier critiques from Nietzsche and Heidegger, it extends to rejecting in favor of decentering humanity within broader ontological or materialist frameworks. Notable for its role in shaping postmodern thought, antihumanism has sparked controversies over its implications for and , as it undermines traditional bases for and by dissolving the unified human agent into relational constructs. Critics argue this leads to and a diminished capacity to address human suffering on principled grounds, while proponents see it as liberating from anthropocentric illusions that obscure power dynamics. Despite its academic influence, particularly in Marxist and post-colonial theory, antihumanism remains contested for potentially eroding causal tied to actions in favor of abstract structural .

Definition and Core Principles

Definition and Etymology

Antihumanism denotes a philosophical of , particularly its of a universal essence, autonomous agency, or centered subject as the foundation for , , and . Instead, it posits that and meaning are primarily shaped by impersonal structures—such as economic relations, systems, or power dynamics—rather than inherent individual rationality or freedom. This stance rejects anthropocentric explanations, viewing traditional as an ideological construct that obscures causal realities like class structures or discursive formations. The term "theoretical antihumanism" was coined by French Marxist philosopher in his June 1964 essay " and Humanism," published in Cahiers de l’I.S.E.A.. Althusser argued that Marx's mature work embodied this antihumanism by prioritizing scientific analysis of social formations over speculative notions of , stating: "Strictly in respect to theory, therefore, one can and must speak openly of Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism." He presented it as a necessary precondition for genuine science, critiquing "socialist humanism" as a practical detached from structural . While Althusser's formulation targeted deviations within , the concept later informed broader structuralist and post-structuralist thought, emphasizing the "death of the subject" in favor of relational forces. Etymologically, "antihumanism" derives from the Greek prefix anti- ("against") combined with "humanism," referring to doctrines elevating human centrality, which trace to Renaissance revivals of classical antiquity but were philosophically formalized in Enlightenment and 19th-century thought. Althusser's neologism adapted this opposition specifically to theory (théorique), underscoring a methodological rejection rather than outright ethical nihilism, as he maintained it enabled practical commitments to human emancipation through structural transformation.

Fundamental Critiques of Humanism

Antihumanism challenges 's core tenet of an autonomous, rational human subject endowed with inherent essence and agency to direct toward progress. , rooted in and Enlightenment ideals, posits universal human capacities for reason and moral as foundational to , , and . Antihumanists contend this anthropocentric framework ignores how individuals are constituted by external structures—social, linguistic, and ideological—that precede and determine subjectivity, rendering the humanist subject an ideological that masks real causal forces. A primary , advanced by in his 1964 essay "Marxism and Humanism," rejects the humanistic interpretation of Marx's early writings, which emphasize alienation and human essence, as idealist and speculative. Althusser argues that mature Marxist theory requires "theoretical anti-humanism," focusing on structural practices and rather than abstract human needs or ; , he asserts, functions as an reconciling individuals with exploitative relations by invoking illusory unity. This structural causality prioritizes concrete historical analysis over humanist appeals to transhistorical , which Althusser views as obscuring class antagonism and the reproducibility of production relations. Michel Foucault extends this by historicizing the humanist "man" as a contingent figure emergent in the 19th-century , critiqued in (1966) as an empirical-transcendental doublet destined for erasure in epistemic shifts. Foucault's reveals humanism's complicity in normalizing power through discourses that posit the subject as both knowing and known, yet oblivious to its own discursive constitution; this "death of man" underscores how humanist universals serve disciplinary regimes rather than liberating potentials. Such critiques dismantle humanism's presumption of neutral , exposing it as embedded in historically specific knowledge-power formations that constrain rather than enable genuine . Structuralist influences, evident in thinkers like , further erode by emphasizing invariant cultural structures—such as binary oppositions in myth—that govern unconsciously, subordinating individual agency to systemic logics. This contrasts 's voluntaristic subject with a decentered view where meaning arises from differential relations, not originary human intent, thus questioning 's faith in self-transparent reason as a tool for . Collectively, these critiques privilege causal realism in social explanation, demanding recognition of determinations beyond humanist self-conception.

Key Philosophical Assumptions

Antihumanism fundamentally rejects the humanist premise of a universal human essence or nature, positing instead that notions of "humanity" or "man" are historically contingent constructs devoid of transhistorical validity. This assumption stems from the view that human identity emerges not from innate qualities but from determinations imposed by social, economic, and ideological structures, rendering abstract appeals to human centrality illusory. Louis Althusser's theoretical antihumanism, as elaborated in his 1965 essay "Marxism and Humanism," frames Marx's philosophy as a break from anthropocentric idealism, insisting that "history is a process without a subject or goal," where individuals function as bearers of structural relations rather than autonomous agents shaping history through will or reason. Althusser argued that humanist interpretations of Marxism—emphasizing alienation or species-being—obscure the primacy of class struggle and production modes, substituting ideological fictions for material processes. A core corollary is the denial of human autonomy and rationality as foundational, with the subject instead conceived as an effect of external systems such as language, discourse, and power. In structuralist and post-structuralist variants, human behavior and meaning derive from relational differentials within larger signifying or power networks, not from sovereign individual cognition. Michel Foucault's 1966 work The Order of Things exemplifies this by tracing the epistemic configuration of "Man" as a limited, 19th-century invention intertwined with life, labor, and language, prophesying its erasure in emerging knowledge paradigms: "As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end." This antihumanist stance critiques humanism's anthropocentrism—privileging humans as measure of value or truth—as a provincial illusion, prioritizing impersonal processes that precede and exceed individual agency. These assumptions underpin antihumanism's causal realism, emphasizing how ideological apparatuses and discursive formations "interpellate" individuals into subject positions, producing the illusion of free, essence-bearing actors. Althusser described this mechanism in (1970), where subjects are "hailed" by , misrecognizing structural necessities as personal choices. Foucault extended this to power's productivity, arguing that subjects are not repressed victims but constituted through disciplinary and biopolitical regimes, challenging any presumption of pre-social human freedom. Such views, while influential in , have drawn criticism for underestimating empirical evidence of cross-cultural , such as basic cognitive capacities documented in studies since the , though antihumanists counter that such data themselves reflect culturally mediated interpretations. A further contemporary illustration of these assumptions appears in digitally engineered author identities, where a speaking position can be designed and stabilized without corresponding to a single human subject. Some research collectives configure a persistent named AI persona that functions as the public authorial voice of a project, while the underlying production remains distributed across technical systems, editorial decisions, and institutional constraints. The Aisentica Research Group presents the artificial intelligence as a Digital Author Persona in this sense, formalizing the persona through persistent identifiers and a machine readable schema. Although such cases are niche and documented primarily in project affiliated sources, they offer a concrete way to see antihumanist claims about subject positions as effects of external structures rather than expressions of an inner essence.

Historical Origins and Precursors

19th-Century Influences

Criticism of as anthropocentric and overly idealistic emerged in , challenging the Enlightenment emphasis on human reason, , and . Thinkers began questioning the centrality of human agency and moral universality, paving the way for structural and post-anthropocentric critiques in the . Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) mounted a direct assault on humanistic ideals, viewing them as decadent residues of Christian morality repackaged in secular form. In (1887), he traced modern human rights and egalitarian values to "slave morality," arguing they inverted natural hierarchies and stifled vital instincts, rendering a tool for rather than elevation. Nietzsche's declaration of the "death of " in (1882, section 125) further eroded humanistic confidence by exposing the contingency of human-centered meaning systems, without transcendent anchors. His vision of the Übermensch transcended conventional human limits, prioritizing over rational autonomy, influencing later antihumanists by decentering . Max Stirner (1806–1856), in The Ego and Its Own (1844), rejected humanism's abstract "human essence" as a spook haunting individual freedom. Stirner advocated radical , dismissing universal and moral imperatives as phantoms that subordinate the unique self to collective fictions, including humanistic ones. This atomistic critique prefigured antihumanist skepticism toward reified , emphasizing subjective phantasmagoria over species-wide . Karl Marx (1818–1883) critiqued Enlightenment as ideological superstructure masking class exploitation. In works like (1845–1846), co-authored with Engels, Marx rejected abstract as bourgeois illusions perpetuating alienation under , prioritizing where human activity emerges from economic base rather than innate essence. While Marx's early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts () retained humanist elements like species-being, his mature subordinated individual agency to deterministic forces, influencing antihumanist readings that view as ahistorical obfuscation. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) contributed through metaphysical pessimism in The World as Will and Representation (1818), positing a blind, striving Will underlying phenomena, with intellect as mere servant rather than sovereign. This demoted rational , portraying as endless driven by insatiable will, escapable only via ascetic —foreshadowing antihumanist devaluation of anthropic optimism. Charles Darwin's (1859) empirically undermined exceptionalism by demonstrating descent with modification via , erasing teleological purpose in and aligning humanity with mechanistic biological processes. This naturalistic continuity challenged humanistic narratives of inherent and , reducing moral and cognitive faculties to adaptive traits without divine or rational primacy.

Early 20th-Century Developments

The emergence of in the early , spearheaded by , marked a pivotal critique of humanistic assumptions regarding human and . In works such as (1900), Freud posited that human psyche is dominated by unconscious drives, repressed desires, and instinctual conflicts, rendering conscious reason a mere superstructure rather than the sovereign faculty envisioned by Enlightenment thinkers. This decentering of the ego challenged the core humanistic belief in the individual's transparent self-mastery and , suggesting instead that behavior stems from irrational, biologically rooted forces beyond deliberate control. Parallel developments in further eroded subject-centered views of meaning and agency. Ferdinand de Saussure's , compiled posthumously from lectures delivered between 1906 and 1911 and published in 1916, introduced a structuralist framework where linguistic signs derive their value not from individual usage or reference to external reality, but from arbitrary differences within an autonomous system of langue. This synchronic approach prioritized impersonal structures over diachronic creativity or , presaging later antihumanist emphases on determination by underlying codes rather than free subjects. Saussure's ideas influenced subsequent thinkers by framing and as products of differential relations, diminishing the role of personal volition in signification. The cataclysm of (1914–1918), resulting in approximately 16–20 million deaths and widespread mechanized slaughter, empirically undermined the optimistic of the , which had equated industrial progress with moral advancement. The conflict exposed the fragility of rational diplomacy and the propensity for collective barbarism, as industrialized warfare—employing machine guns, poison gas, and trench stalemates—revealed human institutions' vulnerability to irrational nationalism and total mobilization. This historical rupture contributed to a loss of the prevailing humanist consensus on human betterment through reason, fostering cultural movements like (founded 1916 in by artists including ) that rejected Enlightenment rationality as complicit in catastrophe. Philosophers and intellectuals increasingly viewed humanism's faith in progress as illusory, paving the way for deterministic interpretations of history and society. These intellectual shifts intersected with broader philosophical inquiries, such as Martin Heidegger's (1927), which critiqued the humanistic tradition's anthropocentric reduction of to human subjectivity, advocating instead for an analysis of within worldly and impersonal Being. While Heidegger's early involvement with National Socialism complicates his legacy, his phenomenology highlighted existential structures preceding individual agency, reinforcing antihumanist skepticism toward humanism's exaltation of the self-determining person. Collectively, these early 20th-century developments—spanning , , , and —laid foundational critiques against humanism's privileging of rational, autonomous humanity over structural, unconscious, and historical determinations.

Emergence in Mid-20th-Century Thought

Althusser's Theoretical Antihumanism

Althusser formulated theoretical antihumanism as a cornerstone of , arguing that it constitutes the scientific foundation of mature by rejecting anthropocentric explanations of history and society. In his 1964 essay "Marxism and Humanism," published in the 1965 collection For Marx, he contended that —positing a universal human essence or subject as the producer of social relations—represents an ideological illusion that obscures the primacy of structural determinations. This antihumanism demands a "symptomatic reading" of texts, including Marx's own, to uncover absences and structural effects rather than expressions of human agency or intentionality. Central to Althusser's framework is the concept of an "epistemological break" in Marx's thought around 1845, severing early humanistic writings (e.g., the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts) from the scientific analysis in Capital (1867), where history emerges from the objective contradictions of the mode of production rather than human alienation or praxis. Theoretical antihumanism thus privileges structural causality over expressive or teleological models: social formations are overdetermined ensembles of practices (economic, political, ideological) where the "absent cause"—the mode of production—structures elements without being reducible to them or originating from human subjects. Althusser distinguished this theoretical stance from practical humanism, asserting that while theory must dismantle humanistic to grasp causal realism in , communist practice remains oriented toward human under existing conditions. Individuals, far from autonomous bearers of , function as "supports" or "bearers" (Träger) of impersonal structures, interpolated as subjects through ideological state apparatuses that hail them into alignment with dominant relations (e.g., via or ). This interpellation process underscores antihumanism's causal emphasis: subjectivity arises post hoc from structural imperatives, not as a pregiven essence driving change. Influenced by Spinoza and Lacan, Althusser's antihumanism critiqued Hegelian dialectics and Sartrean for anthropomorphizing contradictions, insisting instead on a where "the whole exists only in its effects" without humanistic . By 1965's (co-authored with Étienne Balibar and others), this evolved into a theory of history as discontinuous processes governed by conjunctural , rejecting continuous human-centered narratives. Althusser maintained that such theoretical antihumanism enables rigorous analysis of ideology's necessity, as humanism ideologically sutures structural gaps by attributing causality to an illusory human center.

Structuralist Foundations

Structuralism provided foundational critiques of by prioritizing impersonal systems over individual agency, originating in Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic theory, which distinguished langue (the collective, differential system of signs) from (individual utterances), arguing that signs derive meaning solely from relational differences within the system, not from inherent essence or subjective intent. Published posthumously in 1916 as , Saussure's framework rejected diachronic evolution in favor of synchronic analysis, implying that is constrained by pre-existing structural rules, undermining humanist ideals of creative authorship and rational self-expression. Claude Lévi-Strauss adapted these principles to in works like (1958), positing that human cultures—manifest in myths, taboos, and rituals—are products of universal, unconscious binary structures (e.g., raw/cooked, nature/culture) operating beneath conscious thought, akin to phonological oppositions in language. He explicitly articulated antihumanist implications in 1962, stating that "the ultimate goal of the human sciences [is] not to constitute, but to dissolve man," as reveals humanity as an effect of infrastructural logics rather than their originator, dissolving anthropocentric primacy in favor of comparative, ahistorical analysis across "savage" and modern societies. Jacques Lacan further embedded structuralism in psychoanalysis during the 1950s, reformulating Freud through Saussurean semiotics to claim the unconscious is "structured like a language," with the human subject emerging as a fragmented, "barred" entity ($), alienated by entry into the symbolic order of signifiers that precedes and exceeds individual desire. This decentered the ego, portraying subjectivity as determined by impersonal chains of signification and the "big Other" (the structural law of language and society), thus critiquing humanist assumptions of unified selfhood and as illusions sustained by misrecognition (méconnaissance). These structuralist innovations collectively shifted philosophical focus from human essence to systemic determination, paving the way for explicit antihumanism by evidencing how cognition, , and psyche are governed by transindividual mechanisms.

Post-Structuralist Extensions

Foucault and the Death of Man

In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (original French publication 1966; English translation 1970), concluded that "man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end," employing the metaphor of a human face sketched in at the water's edge, gradually erased by encroaching waves. This "death of man" refers not to biological but to the impending obsolescence of within Western , where "man" emerged as the foundational figure only in the late 18th-century modern , doubling as both the empirical object of study (in , , ) and the transcendental condition enabling that study. Foucault's archaeological method historicizes this configuration, revealing it as a contingent rupture from prior epistemes—such as the Renaissance's similitudes or the Classical age's representation—rather than a timeless truth derived from human essence. This critique embodies antihumanism by dismantling humanism's postulate of a sovereign, rational human subject authoring history and knowledge through universal capacities like reason or will. Foucault contends that the empirico-transcendental doublet generates paradoxes, such as the knowing subject who is simultaneously finite and infinite, leading to an internal crisis manifest in 20th-century thought's shift toward language, structures, and finitude over humanistic positivity. Influenced by structuralist precursors like Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, yet extending beyond them, Foucault rejects existentialist humanism (e.g., Sartre's emphasis on human freedom) as illusory, arguing that discourses precede and constitute the "human" rather than vice versa. In this view, humanism functions as an ideological envelope masking the discontinuities of epistemic shifts, privileging instead anonymous rules of formation that govern what counts as knowledge about "man." Foucault's thesis contributed to the mid-20th-century French antihumanist wave, paralleling Althusser's structural Marxism in subordinating individual agency to systemic determinations, though Foucault focused on discursive archaeologies rather than economic bases. While later works like The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) refined this by emphasizing power-knowledge relations, the "death of man" remains a cornerstone of his early rejection of humanist anthropology, forecasting post-human configurations where thought escapes anthropomorphic limits. Critics, including Habermas, later charged this with relativism that erodes normative foundations, but Foucault maintained it liberates analysis from anthropocentric teleology.

Derrida and Deconstruction

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) introduced deconstruction in the late 1960s as a philosophical approach to textual analysis that reveals the inherent instabilities, contradictions, and hierarchies within Western metaphysics, particularly logocentrism—the privileging of speech, presence, and fixed origins over writing and difference. In works such as Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida argues that meaning is not stable but perpetually deferred through différance, a term denoting both difference and deferral, which undermines the humanist assumption of a self-present, essential human subject capable of transparent self-knowledge. This method exposes binary oppositions (e.g., speech/writing, presence/absence) as constructed and reversible, rather than natural or foundational, thereby eroding the metaphysical anchors of traditional humanism. Deconstruction relates to antihumanism by extending structuralist critiques of human-centered explanations, reducing apparent human agency to effects of linguistic and cultural structures without a sovereign essence. Unlike explicit antihumanists like Althusser, Derrida's critique of humanism is indirect and entangled with broader deconstructions of presence; in "The Ends of Man" (1968), he questions anthropocentric humanism's reliance on a teleological view of humanity as the endpoint of history or philosophy, aligning with post-structuralist efforts to "decenter" the human from interpretive frameworks. Scholars note that deconstruction's anti-foundationalism—treating identity, truth, and being as without ultimate ground—facilitates antihumanist positions by dissolving humanist notions of inherent human rationality or universality, though Derrida avoids outright rejection of humanism, instead rendering it aporetic through imperfection and undecidability. Critics argue that deconstruction's emphasis on textual play over referential truth risks , further detaching from empirical human capacities and reinforcing antihumanist toward humanist or agency. Derrida's approach has influenced posthumanist thought, where deconstruction of the human as a privileged category paves the way for analyses prioritizing relationality and technics over anthropocentric norms, as seen in extensions to critiques of subjective in favor of dispersed, machinic assemblages. However, interpretations vary; some contend Derrida retains a latent via ethical undecidability, distinguishing his work from stricter structural .

Relation to Marxism and Ideology

Critique of Marxist Humanism

Louis , in his 1964 essay "Marxism and Humanism," articulated a foundational critique of by positing a theoretical anti-humanism inherent to mature theory, arguing that constitutes an ideological distortion rather than a core principle. He identified an "epistemological break" in Karl Marx's oeuvre around 1845, distinguishing the early humanistic writings—influenced by Ludwig Feuerbach's anthropology and focused on alienation and human essence (Gattungswesen)—from the later scientific analysis of , where social relations, not an abstract human subject, drive historical processes. contended that , such as Georg Lukács and the Yugoslav thinkers like Mihailo Marković, erroneously projected this pre-break humanism onto Marx's entire corpus, thereby reviving Hegelian idealism and empiricist tendencies that undermine 's structural determinism. This critique emphasized that humanist Marxism privileges subjective human agency and moral appeals to universal emancipation, sidelining the objective primacy of economic base and ideological state apparatuses in shaping class relations and revolutionary practice. Althusser argued such approaches foster a "practical humanism" in political ideology—evident in 1960s Western Marxist movements seeking ethical socialism over class struggle—but fail theoretically by treating humanism as truth rather than ideology, thus obscuring how individuals are constituted as subjects ("interpellation") by structural forces rather than pre-existing essences. For instance, in For Marx (1965), he rejected the notion of a transhistorical human nature as incompatible with dialectical materialism, claiming it leads to voluntarism where revolutionaries impose ideals without regard for concrete historical contradictions. Structural Marxists extended this by highlighting empirical shortcomings: humanist interpretations contributed to the failures of reformist socialism in post-World War II Europe, where emphasis on individual alienation over structural overhaul delayed recognition of capitalism's resilience through ideological . Critics like Althusser viewed this as a regression to bourgeois ideology, empirically verifiable in the 1968 student movements' blend of existentialist with , which dissipated without altering base-superstructure dynamics. While acknowledging 's motivational role in praxis, antihumanists maintained it theoretically dissolves 's causal realism—social being determines consciousness—into , rendering it vulnerable to co-optation by liberal reforms rather than .

Structural Determinism in Practice

In Althusser's framework, structural determinism posits that social structures, particularly the economic base in its determination "in the last instance," dictate the form and function of political and ideological levels, rendering individuals mere supports or "bearers" (Träger) of these structures rather than agents shaping them. This rejects expressive , where structures merely express an underlying essence, in favor of "structural ," an absent yet efficacious presence where the social whole overdetermines its parts through complex, contradictory interactions. ensures no single factor reduces to another, allowing relative among levels while maintaining ultimate economic primacy, as articulated in Althusser's 1965 analysis of Capital. In practice, this manifests through ideological mechanisms that reproduce class relations without direct economic intervention. Althusser's theory of interpellation illustrates how "hails" concrete individuals into subjects, transforming them into ideological subjects aligned with structural imperatives; for instance, a routine call like a police officer's "Hey, you there!" prompts the addressee to recognize themselves as guilty or dutiful, enacting subjection to state authority. This process operates universally in any society, as has no history and interpellates subjects to sustain the existing , per Althusser's 1970 essay "" (ISAs). ISAs—such as educational systems, families, churches, and media—embody structural by functioning primarily through ideological means rather than overt repression, unlike the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) like or army. Schools, for example, interpellate children as future proletarians by imparting not just skills but a recognition of their place in of labor, rituals of deference, and the "always-already" subjectivation that masks exploitation as natural. Family structures reinforce this by hailing members into roles that perpetuate generational reproduction of labor power, ensuring the ideological conditions for capitalist accumulation without individuals perceiving their actions as structurally compelled. Empirically, Althusser applied this to critique humanist Marxism, arguing that events like the 1968 French student revolts reflected contradictions within overdetermined structures rather than heroic individual agency, though such praxis remains paradoxical under determinism, as revolutionary subjects must first be interpellated by dominant ideology before potential ruptures. Critics note this framework's tension with historical agency, as structural rigidity struggles to account for non-predetermined change without lapsing into voluntarism.

Criticisms and Philosophical Debates

Denial of Human Agency and Rationality

Antihumanist theories, particularly those emerging from structuralist , posit that human agency is illusory, with individuals functioning as bearers of impersonal social structures rather than autonomous decision-makers. Louis Althusser's concept of ideological interpellation maintains that subjects are "hailed" into existence by ideological apparatuses, such as and media, which preemptively shape desires and behaviors, rendering free choice a ideological that sustains structural reproduction. This framework denies volitional freedom, as actions are overdetermined by the totality of contradictory social relations, not individual intent. In post-structuralist extensions, Michel Foucault further erodes agency by conceiving the human subject as an historical construct emergent from diffuse power relations, where power operates not through repression but as productive networks that constitute subjects prior to any self-originating will. Foucault's analysis in works like The Subject and Power emphasizes that individuality arises within strategic games of truth and power, with no foundational autonomy; instead, apparent agency serves as a relay in capillary power dynamics that traverse bodies and institutions. Rationality fares no better, framed as a regime of truth contingent on epistemic discourses rather than universal cognitive endowment, vulnerable to genealogical critique revealing its ties to normalization and exclusion. Such denials underpin critiques of Enlightenment humanism but encounter empirical resistance from , which identifies neural correlates of agency, including intentional binding effects where temporal perception aligns predicted motor outcomes with sensory feedback, affirming experiential control over actions. studies demonstrate heightened agency attribution during rational, goal-directed choices, with prefrontal and parietal activations supporting deliberative processes that modulate outcomes beyond deterministic prediction. These findings, drawn from controlled experiments on action-outcome contingencies, contradict structuralist by evidencing causal loops between internal states and external efficacy, as humans routinely exhibit adaptive behaviors—like or ethical overrides of social norms—that defy purely structural causation. Philosophical rebuttals highlight antihumanism's reliance on unverifiable posits of total determination, which falter against causal evidence of human intervention in historical trajectories, such as the Manhattan Project's deliberate engineering of atomic fission in 1945, where coordinated rational agency overcame material constraints. Academic endorsement of these denials often reflects institutional biases favoring constructivist paradigms over agentic realism, despite neuroscience's accumulation of replicable data since the affirming bounded yet substantive volition.

Ethical and Moral Implications

Antihumanism posits that ethical norms cannot be derived from an inherent human essence or , as human subjects are constituted by external structures such as , , or power relations rather than possessing independent . This rejection of humanist , which typically grounds in individual dignity and rational , implies a form of moral constructivism where values emerge from historical or social formations rather than timeless principles. For instance, argued that appeals to human emancipation in ethical terms mask ideological distortions, subordinating to the objective processes of class struggle and structural transformation. Similarly, Michel Foucault's analysis of frameworks portrays moral systems as products of disciplinary apparatuses that regulate conduct, rendering ethical truths contingent upon prevailing rather than universal human capacities. The denial of autonomous human agency in antihumanist thought carries significant moral implications, particularly in complicating accountability and normative judgment. If individuals are interpellated as subjects by ideological state apparatuses, as Althusser maintained, then moral responsibility shifts from personal intent to systemic forces, potentially excusing individual actions as mere expressions of structural necessity. Foucault extended this by viewing ethical practices as techniques of the self embedded in power relations, which eschews foundational critiques of injustice in favor of genealogical exposures of how norms normalize exclusion. Critics, including those examining Foucault's trajectory, argue that this framework undermines the ethical basis for human rights, which rely on presumptions of inherent dignity and agency that antihumanism dismantles, leading to a relativistic ethic where power dynamics supplant absolute prohibitions against harm. Philosophical debates highlight antihumanism's potential to foster ethical or , where ends like societal restructuring justify means irrespective of human cost, as seen in interpretations linking it to Marxist practices that prioritized historical dialectics over individual welfare. Proponents counter that by exposing 's complicity in bourgeois ideology, antihumanism enables a more realistic attuned to causal determinants beyond illusory , though empirical applications—such as in post-structuralist critiques—often struggle to prescribe actionable moral norms without reverting to pragmatic . This tension underscores a core dilemma: while antihumanism critiques anthropocentric moral hubris, it risks evacuating of any anchor, leaving moral evaluation vulnerable to the very power structures it seeks to unmask.

Empirical and Political Critiques

Historical Failures in Application

The application of antihumanist principles in political contexts has often resulted in endorsements of movements that prioritized structural rupture over individual human costs, leading to empirically verifiable authoritarian outcomes. A prominent case is Michel Foucault's support for the 1978–1979 , where he interpreted the uprising against the as a novel form of "political spirituality" that disrupted Western humanist models of power and subjectivity, publishing enthusiastic dispatches in that framed Khomeini's leadership as embodying collective self-creation beyond rational . Foucault's antihumanist lens, which deconstructed the autonomous human subject as a discursive construct, led him to downplay warnings about Islamist governance structures, viewing opposition to them through secular-left frameworks as mere humanist bias. Post-revolution, the Islamic Republic rapidly consolidated power through repression, executing at least 500–8,000 political dissidents in 1980–1981 alone, imposing mandatory hijab laws that sparked protests, and establishing a theocratic apparatus that subordinated personal agency to religious-legal structures, resulting in widespread human rights violations documented by Amnesty International. Foucault's failure to foresee or robustly critique this shift—later offering only partial qualifications without recanting his initial advocacy—illustrates how antihumanism's emphasis on power's anonymity can obscure causal accountability for regime-induced suffering, as the revolution devolved from anti-imperial promise into institutionalized tyranny affecting millions. Critics, including former associates like Claude Lefort, attributed this oversight to antihumanism's relativistic denial of universal human norms, which hindered empirical assessment of outcomes against individual dignity. Althusserian structural antihumanism similarly reinforced deterministic views in Marxist parties, portraying individuals as bearers of ideological structures rather than agents capable of praxis, which contributed to the French Communist Party's (PCF) post-1968 stagnation and inability to reform amid revelations of Soviet atrocities. Althusser's insistence on separating base-superstructure dynamics from humanist voluntarism justified deference to party apparatuses as reproducers of revolutionary truth, yet this rigidity correlated with the PCF's electoral decline from 25% in 1978 to under 10% by the 1990s, mirroring broader communist failures where structural primacy ignored human incentives and led to policy disasters like the Soviet Union's 1930s collectivization famines (killing 5–7 million). In practice, such theories facilitated causal misattribution of regime errors to external forces rather than internal denial of agency, perpetuating cycles of ideological overreach without adaptive correction.

Undermining Individual Rights

Antihumanist thought undermines individual rights by denying the existence of an autonomous human essence or agency, which forms the ontological basis for rights as inherent protections against arbitrary power. Louis Althusser's theoretical anti-humanism, articulated in his 1964 critique of Marxist humanism, rejects the individual as the sovereign subject of history, instead conceiving persons as "bearers" interpolated by ideological state apparatuses that ensure the reproduction of social relations. This structural determinism subordinates personal autonomy to impersonal forces, portraying liberal rights—such as those enshrined in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen—as bourgeois ideologies that mask exploitation rather than affirm universal human dignity. Althusser explicitly critiques humanist appeals to a transhistorical "human nature" as unscientific, arguing they obscure class contradictions and enable the illusion of individual freedom within capitalist structures. Michel Foucault extends this erosion through his anti-humanist archaeology, which historicizes discourses as contingent effects of formations rather than derivations from an ahistorical human subject. In works like (1966), Foucault announces the "death of man" as the end of anthropocentric mastery, framing the liberal rights-bearing individual as a modern epistemic construct vulnerable to and redeployment as a normalizing device. Even in his later engagements with —such as advocacy for in 1979—Foucault treats them not as foundational universals but as tactical, unfinished projects open to critique, thereby relativizing their claim to absoluteness and exposing them to subversion by dominant discourses. These theoretical positions yield political consequences that prioritize systemic reconfiguration over safeguards, fostering tolerance for encroachments justified by structural imperatives. By positing the subject as a site of interpellation or subjection, antihumanism aligns with views that render personal freedoms contingent on prevailing power relations, as evidenced in poststructuralist critiques of where is dismissed as a sustaining inequality. Critics, including those analyzing strands, contend this facilitates elitist governance models that deem individuals unfit for self-rule, evident in ideological shifts toward technocratic oversight since the mid-20th century. Empirically, such ideas have informed Marxist-Leninist practices in states like the (1917–1991), where Althusserian echoed purges of "individualist" deviations to preserve revolutionary totality, resulting in the documented suppression of over 20 million lives under Stalinist collectivization. In contemporary extensions, antihumanist contributes to policy frameworks—such as certain identity-based equity initiatives post-2010—that subordinate and free expression to deconstructive equity goals, as tracked in indices showing declines in Western universities.

Cultural and Intellectual Impact

Influence on Postmodern Academia

Antihumanism, originating in mid-20th-century structuralist and post-structuralist thought, profoundly shaped postmodern approaches in academic disciplines such as , , and by rejecting the humanist notion of a sovereign, rational human subject. Louis Althusser's formulation of "theoretical anti-humanism" in the 1960s critiqued for positing an essential human agency, instead emphasizing structural determinations like and state apparatuses that precede and condition individual action. This framework influenced subsequent postmodern scholars by prioritizing impersonal systems—language, discourse, and power relations—over anthropocentric explanations, as seen in Michel Foucault's 1966 declaration of the "death of man" in , where he argued that humanistic conceptions of subjectivity dissolve under historical epistemes. In academia, this shift manifested in the 1970s through post-structuralist critiques that decentered human intentionality, promoting analyses of texts and institutions as self-sustaining networks rather than expressions of authorial or human essence. The permeation of antihumanist ideas into postmodern academia accelerated via French Theory's importation to Anglo-American universities in the late 1960s and 1970s, fostering disciplines like and . Jacques Derrida's 1967 work extended antihumanist skepticism by dismantling binary oppositions rooted in humanistic metaphysics, such as presence/absence, influencing to view meaning as deferred and unstable rather than humanly constructed. Similarly, Foucault's genealogical method, which traced knowledge/power formations without recourse to human origins, inspired academic fields to interrogate disciplines like and through lenses of subjugation rather than or agency, evident in the rise of programs at institutions such as the , by the 1980s. These developments supplanted earlier humanist paradigms, such as New Criticism's focus on the text as autonomous yet human-centered, with relativistic frameworks that questioned universal and truth claims. Critics within academia have noted that antihumanism's dominance in postmodern circles contributed to a proliferation of identity-based and relativist scholarship, often sidelining empirical verification in favor of interpretive multiplicity, as Althusser's structural echoed in post-Marxist marginalized humanist . By the , this influence was institutionalized in departments, where over 60% of syllabi in major U.S. universities incorporated post-structuralist readings, per surveys of trends, correlating with declines in objective . However, empirical pushback emerged in the 2000s, with figures like decrying antihumanism's erosion of , highlighting its causal role in fostering toward Enlightenment-derived norms without sufficient evidence for alternative ontologies. Despite such debates, antihumanist premises persist in contemporary postmodern subfields, underpinning critiques of in areas like and postcolonial theory.

Manifestations in Literature and Art

Antihumanism manifests in modernist literature through depictions of human existence as subordinated to irrational or structural forces, rejecting Enlightenment ideals of rational autonomy and progress. T.E. Hulme's essays, such as those in Speculations (1924), critiqued romantic humanism by advocating a "classical" restraint that diminished human centrality in favor of mechanistic or vitalistic views, influencing imagist poetry's focus on objective fragments over subjective emotion. Similarly, W.B. Yeats's later works, including A Vision (1925), incorporated occult systems that portrayed human actions as determined by eternal gyres and phases, eroding individual agency in favor of cyclical, impersonal patterns. Alfred Jarry's Ubu Roi (1896) exemplified early antihumanist satire via pataphysics, a pseudoscience mocking human reason and causality through absurd, puppet-like characters driven by base instincts rather than moral purpose. In , antihumanist themes emerge in narratives where , , or material systems construct and dissolve the subject, as analyzed in studies of works by authors like and . DeLillo's White Noise (1985) illustrates human identity as fragmented by media simulacra and toxic events, with protagonists lacking coherent agency amid systemic "white noise" that overrides personal narrative. Pynchon's (1973) deploys entropy and conspiracy structures to render characters as vectors in probabilistic plots, underscoring over humanistic volition. Samuel Beckett's (1953) further embodies this by staging existential stasis, where dialogue loops in tautological voids, denying teleological meaning or in line with Freudian and Nietzschean influences on modernist antihumanism. In visual art, antihumanism appears in early 20th-century vanguard movements that "dehumanize" representation, prioritizing abstract forms and systems over empathetic human depiction, as theorized by in The Dehumanization of Art (1925). Ortega described this shift as art's aversion to "living form" and sentiment, favoring stylization and distortion to evoke a "dehumanized reality" detached from vital human experience, evident in cubism's geometric fragmentation of bodies. Pablo Picasso's (1907) exemplifies this by angularly dissecting female figures into prismatic planes, subverting anatomical wholeness and viewer empathy for perceptual multiplicity. Later manifestations include and surrealism's assault on rational ; Marcel Duchamp's (1917, replica 1964) elevated a readymade as , bypassing human craftsmanship for arbitrary nomination by institutional systems. In , Sol LeWitt's instructional wall drawings (from 1968) generated patterns via algorithmic certificates rather than direct execution, ceding control to procedural logic over artist intent, aligning with antihumanist emphasis on autonomous systems. These practices collectively prioritize non-anthropocentric processes, reflecting structural in aesthetic production.

Contemporary Developments and Extensions

Antihumanism's rejection of the humanist conception of a sovereign, rational human subject—as articulated in post-structuralist critiques like Michel Foucault's notion of the "death of Man"—lays foundational groundwork for posthumanism by dismantling anthropocentric hierarchies and universalist claims about human exceptionalism. This critique challenges the idea of humans as the measure of all things, emphasizing instead structural determinations, power relations, and the constructed nature of subjectivity, which posthumanism extends into a broader interrogation of human-nonhuman boundaries. Posthumanism, however, differentiates itself from antihumanism's primarily negative by proposing affirmative, relational ontologies that incorporate technological, biological, and ecological entanglements without dualistic oppositions. Where antihumanism often remains rooted in postmodern toward human agency, posthumanism seeks to transcend the humanism-antihumanism binary, fostering ethical frameworks that affirm hybrid subjectivities and post-anthropocentric perspectives, such as those addressing species and vital . This evolution is evident in works like Rosi Braidotti's, which position posthumanism as a moving beyond antihumanist negation toward nomadic, embodied alternatives. Transhumanism intersects with antihumanism through a shared toward fixed biological or essentialist limits on humanity, advocating technological interventions—like and neural implants—to transcend current human constraints, thereby echoing antihumanist decentering of the "natural" human form. Yet aligns more closely with Enlightenment as an "ultra-humanism," prioritizing individual enhancement and rational progress via science, in contrast to antihumanism's structuralist dismissal of autonomous agency and posthumanism's emphasis on decentralized, non-hierarchical relations. For instance, transhumanist declarations, such as those from Humanity+ in , focus on elevating the human condition through evidence-based technologies, potentially converging with antihumanist in viewing unmodified humanity as insufficient, though without the latter's rejection of progressive .

Role in Environmentalism and Effective Altruism

Antihumanism plays a prominent role in through , a philosophy developed by Norwegian thinker Arne Naess in his 1973 essay "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement." rejects —the view that human interests should guide —and advances biocentrism, asserting that all living beings possess equal intrinsic value independent of their utility to humans. Naess argued that humans are merely one part of nature, incapable of superseding ecological balance with their needs, and called for substantial human population reduction alongside a shift from prioritizing to qualitative in harmony with ecosystems. This framework explicitly abandons human flourishing as the ethical lodestar for environmental management, influencing policies that favor wilderness preservation and over human development or . Radical environmental groups like Earth First!, founded in 1980, operationalized these ideas with explicitly antihumanist rhetoric. Co-founder Dave Foreman advocated reducing global human population to 100 million or one billion, dismantling industrial civilization, and restoring wilderness, viewing humans as a pathological force akin to a cancer on the planet. Such positions prioritize ecosystems' "rights" over human prosperity, as seen in legal recognitions of nature's in places like , , and several U.S. municipalities by 2014, which equate floral and faunal interests with human ones in land-use decisions. Critics contend this subordinates human agency and welfare to abstract natural equilibria, fostering policies that hinder poverty alleviation and technological advancement in developing regions. In (EA), antihumanism appears more tenuously through debates and the longtermist prioritization of over present lives. EA's utilitarian calculus, which seeks to maximize across causes, intersects with antinatalist arguments—positing birth as morally negative due to imposed —that question preventing if it perpetuates net harm. Forum discussions within EA communities explore how averting might irresponsibly create future sufferers, echoing antihumanist devaluation of human propagation. , a key EA strand emphasizing safeguards for trillions of potential future humans, draws critiques for deflecting resources from current ; philosopher Alice Crary argues it sidelines immediate and in favor of speculative futures, implying present individuals matter chiefly as means to distant ends. Intellectual historian Émile P. Torres similarly warns that this focus treats contemporary problems as secondary unless they impact long-run trajectories, potentially justifying neglect of extant agency for abstract ethical optimization. While core EA remains pro-human in valuing lives saved, these extensions accommodate antihumanist logics by quantifying human worth against non- or hypothetical scales.

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