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Conformity
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Conformity or conformism is the act of matching attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to group norms, politics or being like-minded.[1] Norms are implicit, specific rules, guidance shared by a group of individuals, that guide their interactions with others. People often choose to conform to society rather than to pursue personal desires – because it is often easier to follow the path others have made already, rather than forging a new one. Thus, conformity is sometimes a product of group communication.[2] This tendency to conform occurs in small groups and/or in society as a whole and may result from subtle unconscious influences (predisposed state of mind), or from direct and overt social pressure. Conformity can occur in the presence of others, or when an individual is alone. For example, people tend to follow social norms when eating or when watching television, even if alone.[3]

Solomon Asch, a social psychologist whose obedience research remains among the most influential in psychology, demonstrated the power of conformity through his experiment on line judgment. The Asch conformity experiment demonstrates how much influence conformity has on people. In a laboratory experiment, Asch asked 50 male students from Swarthmore College in the US to participate in a 'vision test'. Asch put a naive participant in a room with seven stooges in a line judgment task. When confronted with the line task, each stooge had already decided what response they would give. The real members of the experimental group sat in the last position, while the others were pre-arranged experimenters who gave apparently incorrect answers in unison; Asch recorded the last person's answer to analyze the influence of conformity. Surprisingly, about one third (32%) of the participants who were placed in this situation sided with the clearly incorrect majority on the critical trials. Over the 12 critical trials, about 75% of participants conformed at least once. Ash demonstrated in this experiment that people could produce obviously erroneous responses just to conform to a group of similar erroneous responders, this was called normative influence. After being interviewed, subjects acknowledged that they did not actually agree with the answers given by others. The majority of them, however, believed that groups are wiser or did not want to appear as mavericks and chose to repeat the same obvious misconception. There is another influence that is sometimes more subtle, called informational influence. This is when people turn to others for information to help them make decisions in new or ambiguous situations. Most of the time, people were simply conforming to social group norms that they were unaware of, whether consciously or unconsciously, especially through a mechanism called the Chameleon effect. This effect is when people unintentionally and automatically mimic others' gestures, posture, and speech style in order to produce rapport and create social interactions that run smoothly (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999[4]). It is clear from this that conformity has a powerful effect on human perception and behavior, even to the extent that it can be faked against a person's basic belief system.[5]

Changing one's behaviors to match the responses of others, which is conformity, can be conscious or not.[6] People have an intrinsic tendency to unconsciously imitate other's behaviors such as gesture, language, talking speed, and other actions of the people they interact with.[7] There are two other main reasons for conformity: informational influence and normative influence.[7] People display conformity in response to informational influence when they believe the group is better informed, or in response to normative influence when they are afraid of rejection.[8] When the advocated norm could be correct, the informational influence is more important than the normative influence, while otherwise the normative influence dominates.[9]

People often conform from a desire for security within a group, also known as normative influence[10]—typically a group of a similar age, culture, religion or educational status. This is often referred to as groupthink: a pattern of thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture of consent, and conformity to group values and ethics, which ignores realistic appraisal of other courses of action. Unwillingness to conform carries the risk of social rejection. Conformity is often associated in media with adolescence and youth culture, but strongly affects humans of all ages.[11]

Although peer pressure may manifest negatively, conformity can be regarded as either good or bad. Driving on the conventionally-approved side of the road may be seen as beneficial conformity.[12] With the appropriate environmental influence, conforming, in early childhood years, allows one to learn and thus, adopt the appropriate behaviors necessary to interact and develop "correctly" within one's society.[13] Conformity influences the formation and maintenance of social norms, and helps societies function smoothly and predictably via the self-elimination of behaviors seen as contrary to unwritten rules.[14] Conformity was found to impair group performance in a variable environment, but was not found to have a significant effect on performance in a stable environment.[15]

According to Herbert Kelman, there are three types of conformity: 1) compliance (which is public conformity, and it is motivated by the need for approval or the fear of disapproval; 2) identification (which is a deeper type of conformism than compliance); 3) internalization (which is to conform both publicly and privately).[16]

Major factors that influence the degree of conformity include culture, gender, age, size of the group, situational factors, and different stimuli. In some cases, minority influence, a special case of informational influence, can resist the pressure to conform and influence the majority to accept the minority's belief or behaviors.[8]

Definition and context

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Definition

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Conformity is the tendency to change our perceptions, opinions, or behaviors in ways that are consistent with group norms.[17] Norms are implicit, specific rules shared by a group of individuals on how they should behave.[18] People may be susceptible to conform to group norms because they want to gain acceptance from their group.[18]

Peer

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Some adolescents gain acceptance and recognition from their peers by conformity. This peer moderated conformity increases from the transition of childhood to adolescence.[19] It follows a U-shaped age pattern wherein conformity increases through childhood, peaking at sixth and ninth grades and then declines.[20] Adolescents often follow the logic that "if everyone else is doing it, then it must be good and right".[21] However, it is found that they are more likely to conform if peer pressure involves neutral activities such as those in sports, entertainment, and prosocial behaviors rather than anti-social behaviors.[20] Researchers have found that peer conformity is strongest for individuals who reported strong identification with their friends or groups, making them more likely to adopt beliefs and behaviors accepted in such circles.[22][23]

There is also the factor that the mere presence of a person can influence whether one is conforming or not. Norman Triplett (1898) was the researcher that initially discovered the impact that mere presence has, especially among peers.[24] In other words, all people can affect society. We are influenced by people doing things beside us, whether this is in a competitive atmosphere or not. People tend to be influenced by those who are their own age especially. Co-actors that are similar to us tend to push us more than those who are not.

Social responses

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According to Donelson Forsyth, after submitting to group pressures, individuals may find themselves facing one of several responses to conformity. These types of responses to conformity vary in their degree of public agreement versus private agreement.

When an individual finds themselves in a position where they publicly agree with the group's decision yet privately disagrees with the group's consensus, they are experiencing compliance or acquiescence. This is also referenced as apparent conformity. This type of conformity recognizes that behavior is not always consistent with our beliefs and attitudes, which mimics Leon Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory. In turn, conversion, otherwise known as private acceptance or "true conformity", involves both publicly and privately agreeing with the group's decision. In the case of private acceptance, the person conforms to the group by changing their beliefs and attitudes. Thus, this represents a true change of opinion to match the majority.[25]

Another type of social response, which does not involve conformity with the majority of the group, is called convergence. In this type of social response, the group member agrees with the group's decision from the outset and thus does not need to shift their opinion on the matter at hand.[26]

In addition, Forsyth shows that nonconformity can also fall into one of two response categories. Firstly, an individual who does not conform to the majority can display independence. Independence, or dissent, can be defined as the unwillingness to bend to group pressures. Thus, this individual stays true to his or her personal standards instead of the swaying toward group standards. Secondly, a nonconformist could be displaying anticonformity or counterconformity which involves the taking of opinions that are opposite to what the group believes. This type of nonconformity can be motivated by a need to rebel against the status quo instead of the need to be accurate in one's opinion.

To conclude, social responses to conformity can be seen to vary along a continuum from conversion to anticonformity. For example, a popular experiment in conformity research, known as the Asch situation or Asch conformity experiments, primarily includes compliance and independence. Also, other responses to conformity can be identified in groups such as juries, sports teams and work teams.[26]

Main experiments

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Sherif's experiment (1935)

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Muzafer Sherif was interested in knowing how many people would change their opinions to bring them in line with the opinion of a group. In his experiment, participants were placed in a dark room and asked to stare at a small dot of light 15 feet away. They were then asked to estimate the amount it moved. The trick was, there was no movement, it was caused by a visual illusion known as the autokinetic effect.[27] The participants stated estimates ranging from 1–10 inches. On the first day, each person perceived different amounts of movement, but from the second to the fourth day, the same estimate was agreed on and others conformed to it.[28] Over time, the personal estimates converged with the other group members' estimates once discussing their judgments aloud. Sherif suggested this was a simulation for how social norms develop in a society, providing a common frame of reference for people. His findings emphasize that people rely on others to interpret ambiguous stimuli and new situations.

Subsequent experiments were based on more realistic situations. In an eyewitness identification task, participants were shown a suspect individually and then in a lineup of other suspects. They were given one second to identify him, making it a difficult task. One group was told that their input was very important and would be used by the legal community. To the other it was simply an experiment. Being more motivated to get the right answer increased the tendency to conform. Those who wanted to be more accurate conformed 51% of the time as opposed to 35% in the other group.[29] Sherif's study provided a framework for subsequent studies of influence such as Solomon Asch's 1955 study.

Asch's experiment (1951)

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Which line matches the first line, A, B, or C? In the Asch conformity experiments, people frequently followed the majority judgment, even when the majority was wrong.

Solomon E. Asch conducted a modification of Sherif's study, assuming that when the situation was very clear, conformity would be drastically reduced. He exposed people in a group to a series of lines, and the participants were asked to match one line with a standard line. All participants except one were accomplices and gave the wrong answer in 12 of the 18 trials.[30]

The results showed a surprisingly high degree of conformity: 74% of the participants conformed on at least one trial. On average people conformed one third of the time.[30] A question is how the group would affect individuals in a situation where the correct answer is less obvious.[31]

After his first test, Asch wanted to investigate whether the size or unanimity of the majority had greater influence on test subjects. "Which aspect of the influence of a majority is more important – the size of the majority or its unanimity? The experiment was modified to examine this question. In one series the size of the opposition was varied from one to 15 persons."[32] The results clearly showed that as more people opposed the subject, the subject became more likely to conform. However, the increasing majority was only influential up to a point: from three or more opponents, there is more than 30% of conformity.[30]

Besides that, this experiment proved that conformity is powerful, but also fragile. It is powerful because just by having actors giving the wrong answer made the participant to also give the wrong answer, even though they knew it was not correct. It is also fragile, however, because in one of the variants for the experiment, one of the actors was supposed to give the correct answer, being an "ally" to the participant. With an ally, the participant was more likely to give the correct answer than he was before the ally. In addition, if the participant was able to write down the answer, instead of saying out loud, he was also more likely to put the correct answer. The reason for that is because he was not afraid of being different from the rest of the group since the answers were hidden.[33]

Milgram's shock experiment (1961)

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This experiment was conducted by Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram in order to portray obedience to authority. They measured the willingness of participants (men aged 20 to 50 from a diverse range of occupations with different levels of education) to obey the instructions from an authority figure to supply fake electric shocks that would gradually increase to fatal levels. Regardless of these instructions going against their personal conscience, 65% of the participants shocked all the way to 450 volts, fully obeying the instruction, even if they did so reluctantly. Additionally, all participants shocked to at least 300 volts.[34]

In this experiment, the subjects did not have punishments or rewards if they chose to disobey or obey. All they might receive is disapproval or approval from the experimenter. Since this is the case they had no motives to sway them to perform the immoral orders or not. One of the most important factors of the experiment is the position of the authority figure relative to the subject (the shocker) along with the position of the learner (the one getting shocked). There is a reduction in conformity depending on if the authority figure or learner was in the same room as the subject. When the authority figure was in another room and only phoned to give their orders the obedience rate went down to 20.5%. When the learner was in the same room as the subject the obedience rate dropped to 40%.[35]

Stanford prison experiment (August 15–21, 1971)

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This experiment, led by psychology professor Philip G. Zimbardo, recruited Stanford students using a local newspaper ad, who he checked to be both physically and mentally healthy.[36] Subjects were either assigned the role of a "prisoner" or "guard" at random over an extended period of time, within a pretend prison setting on the Stanford University Campus. The study was set to be over the course of two weeks but it was abruptly cut short because of the behaviors the subjects were exuding. It was terminated due to the "guards" taking on tyrannical and discriminatory characteristics while "prisoners" showed blatant signs of depression and distress.[37]

In essence, this study showed us a lot about conformity and power imbalance. For one, it demonstrates how situations determines the way our behavior is shaped and predominates over our personality, attitudes, and individual morals. Those chosen to be "guards" were not mean-spirited. But, the situation they were put in made them act accordingly to their role. Furthermore, this study elucidates the idea that humans conform to expected roles. Good people (i.e. the guards before the experiment) were transformed into perpetrators of evil. Healthy people (i.e. the prisoners before the experiment) were subject to pathological reactions. These aspects are also traceable to situational forces. This experiment also demonstrated the notion of the banality of evil which explains that evil is not something special or rare, but it is something that exists in all ordinary people.[citation needed]

Varieties

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Harvard psychologist Herbert Kelman identified three major types of conformity.[16]

  • Compliance is public conformity, while possibly keeping one's own original beliefs for yourself. Compliance is motivated by the need for approval and the fear of being rejected.
  • Identification is conforming to someone who is liked and respected, such as a celebrity or a favorite uncle. This can be motivated by the attractiveness of the source,[16] and this is a deeper type of conformism than compliance.
  • Internalization is accepting the belief or behavior and conforming both publicly and privately, if the source is credible. It is the deepest influence on people, and it will affect them for a long time.

Although Kelman's distinction has been influential, research in social psychology has focused primarily on two varieties of conformity. These are informational conformity, or informational social influence, and normative conformity, also called normative social influence. In Kelman's terminology, these correspond to internalization and compliance, respectively. There are naturally more than two or three variables in society influential on human psychology and conformity; the notion of "varieties" of conformity based upon "social influence" is ambiguous and indefinable in this context.

According to Deutsch and Gérard (1955), conformity results from a motivational conflict (between the fear of being socially rejected and the wish to say what we think is correct) that leads to normative influence, and a cognitive conflict (others create doubts in what we think) which leads to informational influence.[38]

Informational influence

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Informational social influence occurs when one turns to the members of one's group to obtain and accept accurate information about reality.[39] A person is most likely to use informational social influence in certain situations: when a situation is ambiguous, people become uncertain about what to do and they are more likely to depend on others for the answer; and during a crisis when immediate action is necessary, in spite of panic. Looking to other people can help ease fears, but unfortunately, they are not always right. The more knowledgeable a person is, the more valuable they are as a resource. Thus, people often turn to experts for help. But once again people must be careful, as experts can make mistakes too. Informational social influence often results in internalization or private acceptance, where a person genuinely believes that the information is right.[28]

Normative influence

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Normative social influence occurs when one conforms to be liked or accepted by the members of the group. This need of social approval and acceptance is part of our state of humans.[28] In addition to this, we know that when people do not conform with their group and therefore are deviants, they are less liked and even punished by the group.[40] Normative influence usually results in public compliance, doing or saying something without believing in it. The experiment of Asch in 1951 is one example of normative influence. Even though John Turner et al. argued that the post experimental interviews showed that the respondents were uncertain about the correct answers in some cases. The answers might have been evident to the experimenters, but the participants did not have the same experience. Subsequent studies pointed out the fact that the participants were not known to each other and therefore did not pose a threat against social rejection. See: Normative influence vs. referent informational influence

In a reinterpretation of the original data from these experiments Hodges and Geyer (2006)[41] found that Asch's subjects were not so conformist after all: The experiments provide powerful evidence for people's tendency to tell the truth even when others do not. They also provide compelling evidence of people's concern for others and their views. By closely examining the situation in which Asch's subjects find themselves they find that the situation places multiple demands on participants: They include truth (i.e., expressing one's own view accurately), trust (i.e., taking seriously the value of others' claims), and social solidarity (i.e., a commitment to integrate the views of self and others without deprecating). In addition to these epistemic values, there are multiple moral claims as well: These include the need for participants to care for the integrity and well-being of other participants, the experimenter, themselves, and the worth of scientific research.

Deutsch & Gérard (1955) designed different situations that variated from Asch' experiment and found that when participants were writing their answer privately, they gave the correct one.[38]

Normative influence, a function of social impact theory, has three components.[42] The number of people in the group has a surprising effect. As the number increases, each person has less of an impact. A group's strength is how important the group is to a person. Groups we value generally have more social influence. Immediacy is how close the group is in time and space when the influence is taking place. Psychologists have constructed a mathematical model using these three factors and are able to predict the amount of conformity that occurs with some degree of accuracy.[43]

Baron and his colleagues conducted a second eyewitness study that focused on normative influence. In this version, the task was easier. Each participant had five seconds to look at a slide instead of just one second. Once again, there were both high and low motives to be accurate, but the results were the reverse of the first study. The low motivation group conformed 33% of the time (similar to Asch's findings). The high motivation group conformed less at 16%. These results show that when accuracy is not very important, it is better to get the wrong answer than to risk social disapproval.

An experiment using procedures similar to Asch's found that there was significantly less conformity in six-person groups of friends as compared to six-person groups of strangers.[44] Because friends already know and accept each other, there may be less normative pressure to conform in some situations. Field studies on cigarette and alcohol abuse, however, generally demonstrate evidence of friends exerting normative social influence on each other.[45]

Minority influence

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Although conformity generally leads individuals to think and act more like groups, individuals are occasionally able to reverse this tendency and change the people around them. This is known as minority influence, a special case of informational influence. Minority influence is most likely when people can make a clear and consistent case for their point of view. If the minority fluctuates and shows uncertainty, the chance of influence is small. However, a minority that makes a strong, convincing case increases the probability of changing the majority's beliefs and behaviors.[46] Minority members who are perceived as experts, are high in status, or have benefited the group in the past are also more likely to succeed.

Another form of minority influence can sometimes override conformity effects and lead to unhealthy group dynamics. A 2007 review of two dozen studies by the University of Washington found that a single "bad apple" (an inconsiderate or negligent group member) can substantially increase conflicts and reduce performance in work groups. Bad apples often create a negative emotional climate that interferes with healthy group functioning. They can be avoided by careful selection procedures and managed by reassigning them to positions that require less social interaction.[47]

Specific predictors

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Culture

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Individualism versus collectivism worldwide (5 August 2020) Description: countries colored with green have cultures that are more individualistic than the world average. Countries colored in red have relatively collectivistic cultures.

Stanley Milgram found that individuals in Norway (from a collectivistic culture) exhibited a higher degree of conformity than individuals in France (from an individualistic culture).[48][clarification needed] Similarly, Berry studied two different populations: the Temne (collectivists) and the Inuit (individualists) and found that the Temne conformed more than the Inuit when exposed to a conformity task.[49]

Bond and Smith compared 134 studies in a meta-analysis and found that there is a positive correlation between a country's level of collectivistic values and conformity rates in the Asch paradigm.[50] Bond and Smith also reported that conformity has declined in the United States over time.

Influenced by the writings of late-19th- and early-20th-century Western travelers, scholars or diplomats who visited Japan, such as Basil Hall Chamberlain, George Trumbull Ladd and Percival Lowell, as well as by Ruth Benedict's influential book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, many scholars of Japanese studies speculated that there would be a higher propensity to conform in Japanese culture than in American culture. However, this view was not formed on the basis of empirical evidence collected in a systematic way, but rather on the basis of anecdotes and casual observations, which are subject to a variety of cognitive biases. Modern scientific studies comparing conformity in Japan and the United States show that Americans conform in general as much as the Japanese and, in some situations, even more. Psychology professor Yohtaro Takano from the University of Tokyo, along with Eiko Osaka reviewed four behavioral studies and found that the rate of conformity errors that the Japanese subjects manifested in the Asch paradigm was similar with that manifested by Americans.[51] The study published in 1970 by Robert Frager from the University of California, Santa Cruz found that the percentage of conformity errors within the Asch paradigm was significantly lower in Japan than in the United States, especially in the prize condition. Another study published in 2008, which compared the level of conformity among Japanese in-groups (peers from the same college clubs) with that found among Americans found no substantial difference in the level of conformity manifested by the two nations, even in the case of in-groups.[52]

Gender

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Societal norms often establish gender differences and researchers have reported differences in the way men and women conform to social influence.[53][54][55][56][57][58][59] For example, Alice Eagly and Linda Carli performed a meta-analysis of 148 studies of influenceability. They found that women are more persuadable and more conforming than men in group pressure situations that involve surveillance.[60] Eagly has proposed that this sex difference may be due to different sex roles in society.[61] Women are generally taught to be more agreeable whereas men are taught to be more independent.

The composition of the group plays a role in conformity as well. In a study by Reitan and Shaw, it was found that men and women conformed more when there were participants of both sexes involved versus participants of the same sex. Subjects in the groups with both sexes were more apprehensive when there was a discrepancy amongst group members, and thus the subjects reported that they doubted their own judgments.[54] Sistrunk and McDavid made the argument that women conformed more because of a methodological bias.[62] They argued that because stereotypes used in studies are generally male ones (sports, cars..) more than female ones (cooking, fashion..), women felt uncertain and conformed more, which was confirmed by their results.

Age

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Research has noted age differences in conformity. For example, research with Australian children and adolescents ages 3 to 17 discovered that conformity decreases with age.[63] Another study examined individuals that were ranged from ages 18 to 91.[64] The results revealed a similar trend – older participants displayed less conformity when compared to younger participants.

In the same way that gender has been viewed as corresponding to status, age has also been argued to have status implications. Berger, Rosenholtz and Zelditch suggest that age as a status role can be observed among college students. Younger students, such as those in their first year in college, are treated as lower-status individuals and older college students are treated as higher-status individuals.[65] Therefore, given these status roles, it would be expected that younger individuals (low status) conform to the majority whereas older individuals (high status) would be expected not to conform.[66]

Researchers have also reported an interaction of gender and age on conformity.[67] Eagly and Chrvala examined the role of age (under 19 years vs. 19 years and older), gender and surveillance (anticipating responses to be shared with group members vs. not anticipating responses being shared) on conformity to group opinions. They discovered that among participants that were 19 years or older, females conformed to group opinions more so than males when under surveillance (i.e., anticipated that their responses would be shared with group members). However, there were no gender differences in conformity among participants who were under 19 years of age and in surveillance conditions. There were also no gender differences when participants were not under surveillance. In a subsequent research article, Eagly suggests that women are more likely to conform than men because of lower status roles of women in society. She suggests that more submissive roles (i.e., conforming) are expected of individuals that hold low status roles.[66] Still, Eagly and Chrvala's results do conflict with previous research which have found higher conformity levels among younger rather than older individuals.

Size of the group

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Although conformity pressures generally increase as the size of the majority increases, Asch's experiment in 1951 stated that increasing the size of the group will have no additional impact beyond a majority of size three.[68] Brown and Byrne's 1997 study described a possible explanation that people may suspect collusion when the majority exceeds three or four.[68] Gerard's 1968 study reported a linear relationship between the group size and conformity when the group size ranges from two to seven people.[69] According to Latane's 1981 study, the number of the majority is one factor that influences the degree of conformity, and there are other factors like strength and immediacy.[70]

Moreover, a study suggests that the effects of group size depend on the type of social influence operating.[71] This means that in situations where the group is clearly wrong, conformity will be motivated by normative influence; the participants will conform in order to be accepted by the group. A participant may not feel much pressure to conform when the first person gives an incorrect response. However, conformity pressure will increase as each additional group member also gives the same incorrect response.[71]

Situational factors

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Research has found different group and situation factors that affect conformity.  Accountability increases conformity, if an individual is trying to be accepted by a group which has certain preferences, then individuals are more likely to conform to match the group.[72] Similarly, the attractiveness of group members increases conformity. If an individual wishes to be liked by the group, they are increasingly likely to conform.[73]

Accuracy also effects conformity, as the more accurate and reasonable the majority is in their decision than the more likely the individual will be to conform.[74] As mentioned earlier, size also effects individuals' likelihood to conform.[33] The larger the majority the more likely an individual will conform to that majority. Similarly, the less ambiguous the task or decision is, the more likely someone will conform to the group.[75] When tasks are ambiguous people are less pressured to conform. Task difficulty also increases conformity, but research has found that conformity increases when the task is difficult but also important.[29]

Research has also found that as individuals become more aware that they disagree with the majority they feel more pressure, and hence are more likely to conform to the decisions of the group.[76] Likewise, when responses must be made face-face, individuals increasingly conform, and therefore conformity increases as the anonymity of the response in a group decreases. Conformity also increases when individuals have committed themselves to the group making decisions.[77]

Conformity has also been shown to be linked to cohesiveness. Cohesiveness is how strongly members of a group are linked together, and conformity has been found to increase as group cohesiveness increases.[78] Similarly, conformity is also higher when individuals are committed and wish to stay in the group. Conformity is also higher when individuals are in situations involving existential thoughts that cause anxiety, in these situations individuals are more likely to conform to the majority's decisions.[79]

Different stimuli

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In 1961 Stanley Milgram published a study in which he utilized Asch's conformity paradigm using audio tones instead of lines; he conducted his study in Norway and France.[48] He found substantially higher levels of conformity than Asch, with participants conforming 50% of the time in France and 62% of the time in Norway during critical trials. Milgram also conducted the same experiment once more, but told participants that the results of the study would be applied to the design of aircraft safety signals. His conformity estimates were 56% in Norway and 46% in France, suggesting that individuals conformed slightly less when the task was linked to an important issue. Stanley Milgram's study demonstrated that Asch's study could be replicated with other stimuli, and that in the case of tones, there was a high degree of conformity.[80]

Neural correlates

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Evidence has been found for the involvement of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) in conformity,[81] an area associated with memory and decision-making. For example, Klucharev et al.[82] revealed in their study that by using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation on the pMFC, participants reduced their tendency to conform to the group, suggesting a causal role for the brain region in social conformity.

Neuroscience has also shown how people quickly develop similar values for things. Opinions of others immediately change the brain's reward response in the ventral striatum to receiving or losing the object in question, in proportion to how susceptible the person is to social influence. Having similar opinions to others can also generate a reward response.[80]

The amygdala and hippocampus have also been found to be recruited when individuals participated in a social manipulation experiment involving long-term memory.[83] Several other areas have further been suggested to play a role in conformity, including the insula, the temporoparietal junction, the ventral striatum, and the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices.[84][85][86][87][88]

More recent work[89] stresses the role of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in conformity not only at the time of social influence,[90] but also later on, when participants are given an opportunity to conform by selecting an action. In particular, Charpentier et al. found that the OFC mirrors the exposure to social influence at a subsequent time point, when a decision is being made without the social influence being present. The tendency to conform has also been observed in the structure of the OFC, with a greater grey matter volume in high conformers.[91]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Conformity refers to the process by which individuals adjust their behaviors, beliefs, or perceptions to align with the norms, expectations, or judgments of a social group, often yielding to real or imagined pressure from others. This social influence phenomenon, extensively studied in psychology, can serve adaptive functions by enabling coordination and transmission of beneficial practices within groups, though it risks overriding accurate individual judgment. Distinctions exist between normative conformity, motivated by the desire to gain approval or evade disapproval, and informational conformity, arising from reliance on the group as a source of accurate information in ambiguous situations. Solomon Asch's 1950s line judgment experiments exemplified conformity's potency, revealing that one-third of responses from participants matched the incorrect consensus of confederates, demonstrating how group unanimity compels perceptual distortion even when the correct answer is evident. Conformity exhibits variation, with elevated rates in collectivist orientations emphasizing interdependence and , as opposed to lower tendencies in individualistic cultures prioritizing . While facilitating social stability and error reduction in uncertain environments, unchecked conformity contributes to phenomena like group polarization and suppression of dissent, potentially stifling innovation and enabling maladaptive behaviors.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Scope

Conformity refers to a change in an individual's behavior, beliefs, or attitudes to match those of a group, resulting from real or imagined social pressure. This process can manifest as public compliance without private agreement or as deeper internalization where the group's position is adopted as one's own. Pioneering work by Solomon Asch in the 1950s highlighted conformity as a response to majority influence, where participants adjusted judgments to align with group consensus despite evident inaccuracies. The scope of conformity in social psychology extends beyond overt behavioral mimicry to subtle influences on perception, decision-making, and norm adherence across diverse contexts. It encompasses everyday phenomena, such as adopting fashion trends or opinions to gain social approval, as well as responses to ambiguous situations where individuals rely on group cues for accuracy. Empirical evidence indicates conformity's prevalence varies by factors like group size, unanimity, and cultural norms, with studies showing it promotes social cohesion but can also propagate errors or suppress dissent. While adaptive for coordination in groups, excessive conformity risks undermining individual autonomy and critical thinking, as observed in historical analyses of mass behavior. Conformity operates through mechanisms rooted in social interdependence, where individuals weigh personal convictions against group expectations to navigate interpersonal relations. Its study reveals quantitative patterns, such as conformity rates increasing with group unanimity—up to 37% erroneous judgments in controlled perceptual tasks—underscoring its potency even against objective reality. This broad applicability spans disciplines, informing insights into organizational dynamics, consumer behavior, and political alignment, though interpretations must account for methodological limitations in early experiments, including potential demand characteristics.

Evolutionary and Biological Origins

Conformist bias, a social learning strategy where individuals adopt behaviors in proportion exceeding their frequency in the population, underpins the evolutionary origins of conformity by enabling the stable transmission of adaptive cultural traits across generations. Theoretical models demonstrate that this bias evolves under conditions of environmental variability, as it allows learners to efficiently copy successful group norms without the high costs of individual trial-and-error experimentation, thereby promoting cumulative culture unique to humans. In ancestral hunter-gatherer societies, such conformity likely enhanced group cohesion and survival by aligning behaviors with collectively vetted solutions to ecological challenges, such as foraging or predator avoidance, where deviating from the majority could incur fitness costs. Evidence from comparative biology supports conformity's deep evolutionary roots, observable in non-human species where it functions as a heuristic for decision-making in social contexts. For example, in mate choice, females across taxa like fish, birds, and primates preferentially select partners endorsed by the majority, amplifying the spread of preferred traits and suggesting a sex-driven pathway for the emergence of proto-cultural transmission. Similarly, conformist foraging in birds and fish under ambiguous conditions demonstrates that majority adherence stabilizes group-level adaptations, reducing individual risk in uncertain environments and paralleling human mechanisms. Biologically, conformity arises from neural mechanisms linking social alignment to reward and error processing, as revealed by neuroimaging studies. Functional MRI experiments show that yielding to group consensus activates the nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum, regions central to reinforcement learning and dopaminergic reward signaling, akin to responses elicited by primary reinforcers like food or money.01020-9) Divergence from group norms, conversely, engages the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex for conflict monitoring and behavioral inhibition, facilitating adjustment to majority views. These circuits, conserved across mammals, integrate informational cues from others with personal utility computations, underscoring conformity's role as an evolved predisposition for social navigation rather than mere situational response.

Distinctions from Compliance, Obedience, and Independence

Conformity involves a change in an individual's behavior or private attitudes to match those of a group, often driven by informational or normative social influence, whereas compliance refers to superficial public agreement without altering underlying beliefs, typically motivated by the desire to obtain rewards or avoid punishments under surveillance. Herbert C. Kelman, in his 1958 framework, distinguished compliance as the least enduring form of influence, where the adopted response persists only in the presence of the influencing agent and ceases once external pressures are removed, contrasting with deeper processes like identification (adopting influence to maintain a satisfying relationship) or internalization (integrating the influence into one's value system as inherently rewarding). Empirical studies, such as those examining attitude persistence post-influence, show compliance yields minimal long-term behavioral change compared to conformity's potential for genuine acceptance, as compliance lacks the motivational congruence that sustains conformity. Obedience, by contrast, entails behavioral changes in direct response to explicit commands from a perceived authority figure, emphasizing hierarchical legitimacy rather than the diffuse peer pressures characteristic of conformity. Stanley Milgram highlighted this distinction in his analysis, noting that obedience involves yielding to structured directives where the agent feels bound by the authority's right to command, whereas conformity arises from the implicit norms or majority opinions of equals without such overt orders; for instance, Milgram's experiments demonstrated obedience rates up to 65% under authority cues, differing from conformity paradigms where group unanimity drives influence absent formal power differentials. This separation underscores causal differences: obedience often activates agentic states deferring personal responsibility, while conformity engages social validation needs, with meta-analyses confirming obedience is more prevalent in vertical structures and conformity in horizontal group dynamics. Independence represents the counterpoint to conformity, defined as the steadfast adherence to one's own perceptions or judgments despite opposing group consensus, reflecting resistance to rather than mere non-participation. In experimental contexts like perceptual judgment tasks, independence manifests when individuals prioritize objective over majority views, occurring in approximately 25-30% of trials across studies where alternatives to conformity are viable, as opposed to conformity's alignment with group errors even in unambiguous conditions. Factors promoting independence include high and exposure to dissenting peers, which disrupt normative pressures, distinguishing it from conformity not as opposition but as the preservation of autonomous reasoning amid social incentives to yield.

Historical Experiments and Evidence

Autokinetic Effect and Ambiguity (Sherif, 1935)

In 1935, Muzafer Sherif conducted experiments utilizing the autokinetic effect, a perceptual illusion where a stationary pinpoint of light viewed in an otherwise completely dark room appears to move erratically due to involuntary eye movements and the absence of spatial reference points. This phenomenon creates high ambiguity, as observers lack an objective standard to judge the light's displacement, leading to wide individual variation in perceived movement estimates, typically ranging from 0 to over 20 inches. Sherif's methodology involved seating participants—primarily college students—in a dark chamber approximately 12 feet from the light source, instructing them to verbally estimate the distance of apparent movement after each 5-10 second exposure, with trials repeated multiple times. In solitary conditions, estimates showed no convergence, with individuals maintaining idiosyncratic judgments across sessions. Group sessions, however, involved 2-3 participants (in some cases including a single confederate who provided fixed estimates) taking turns to call out judgments aloud after each light presentation, without prior discussion of criteria. Results indicated rapid norm formation in groups: estimates shifted toward a common value within the first few trials, stabilizing around a group average (e.g., 2-6 inches in various triads), even when this deviated from participants' initial solitary judgments. Subsequent individual testing post-group exposure revealed persistence of the acquired group norm, with little reversion to original estimates, demonstrating internalization rather than mere acquiescence. Even in all-naive groups without confederates, judgments clustered around emergent norms, underscoring that conformity arises from mutual reliance on others' perceptions amid uncertainty, rather than solely from authority or majority pressure. Sherif interpreted these findings as evidence of informational social influence, wherein ambiguous stimuli prompt individuals to adopt group consensus as a reality-testing mechanism, fostering the emergence of social norms to resolve perceptual uncertainty. Unlike normative influence driven by affiliation desires, this process reflects epistemic deference to perceived expertise in others, with norms proving stable yet malleable to group composition. The study's controlled lab setting isolated ambiguity's role, though critics note potential demand characteristics and limited ecological validity for real-world norm formation.

Line Judgment and Peer Pressure (Asch, 1951)

Solomon Asch conducted experiments in 1951 to examine how group pressure influences individual judgment on a simple perceptual task. Participants were presented with a standard line and three comparison lines, tasked with identifying the matching one; the correct answer was unambiguous. Groups consisted of one naive subject and seven confederates who, on 12 of 18 trials (critical trials), unanimously selected an incorrect comparison line before the real participant responded, typically second-to-last. Results showed that participants conformed to the erroneous majority answer on approximately 32% of critical trials overall. About 75% of the 50 male college student participants yielded to the group at least once, while 25% maintained independence across all critical trials. In control conditions without confederates, error rates were under 1%, confirming the task's clarity and isolating the effect of social pressure. Post-trial interviews indicated that conformers often experienced distress, doubting their own perceptions due to the unanimity of the group, highlighting normative influence driven by the desire to fit in and avoid ridicule. Asch's variations revealed that conformity peaked with three to four confederates and decreased sharply if even one dissenter provided the correct answer, underscoring the role of unanimity in amplifying peer pressure. These findings demonstrated that peer pressure can compel individuals to publicly endorse incorrect judgments, prioritizing social acceptance over evident reality. Recent replications, such as a 2021 study with university students, reported a 33% conformity rate—closely matching Asch's 37%—confirming the robustness of this effect despite methodological controls like monetary incentives, which slightly reduced but did not eliminate it. Critics note limitations including the sample's restriction to male undergraduates, potentially limiting generalizability, and the artificial lab setting, which may inflate demand characteristics. Ethical concerns arose from deception and induced stress, though the study's high internal validity and replicability across contexts affirm its value in illustrating how peer pressure enforces conformity independently of informational ambiguity. In Stanley Milgram's 1961 obedience experiment, conducted at Yale University, 40 male participants aged 20 to 50 were recruited under the guise of a study on learning and memory, receiving $4.50 for their time. Participants were assigned the role of "teacher" and instructed by an experimenter in a lab coat to administer increasingly severe electric shocks—ranging from 15 to 450 volts—to a "learner" (an actor strapped to a chair in another room) for incorrect responses in a word-pair association task. The shocks were fake, but the learner's prerecorded responses escalated from grunts at 75 volts to screams of agony at 285 volts, protests at higher levels, and silence after 300 volts, implying possible death at maximum voltage labeled "XXX" (danger: severe shock). The experimenter prompted continuation with phrases like "The experiment requires that you continue" when participants hesitated. Results showed 100% of participants administered shocks up to 300 volts, with 65% fully obeying to the 450-volt level despite apparent harm, averaging a maximum of 405 volts. Only 35% defied authority before the end, often after the learner's silence, citing moral concerns. Milgram interpreted this as evidence of an agentic state, where individuals surrender responsibility to authority, facilitating destructive obedience under situational pressures rather than inherent sadism. However, methodological critiques question internal validity, suggesting demand characteristics—cues signaling expected behavior—may have inflated rates, though replications partially counter this by showing similar outcomes without full deception. Milgram conducted over 20 variations to isolate factors influencing obedience. In the baseline remote condition, obedience reached 65%, but proximity reduced it: when the learner was in the same room, obedience dropped to 40%; forcing physical contact (e.g., pressing the learner's hand on a shock plate) yielded only 30%. Authority legitimacy mattered: obedience fell to 20% in a rundown office versus Yale's prestige, and to 20% when two peers rebelled against the experimenter. Uniforms enhanced compliance, with lab coats signaling expertise. A 2009 partial replication by Jerry Burger, stopping at 150 volts for ethical reasons, found 70% obedience to that point, comparable to Milgram's 82.5%, indicating persistence of the effect. Related field studies extended these paradigms to real-world authority dynamics. In Charles Hofling's 1966 hospital experiment, 22 nurses received phone calls from an unfamiliar doctor ordering 20 mg of a fictional drug (Astroten), five times the maximum dosage, violating hospital rules against unverified phone orders and unlisted drugs. Despite awareness of risks—95% later deemed the order improper in a survey—21 nurses (95%) prepared to administer it before interception, highlighting obedience in hierarchical medical settings where authority overrides protocols. Ethical concerns pervade these paradigms: Milgram's deception induced severe stress, with participants showing nervous laughter, tremors, and seizures in three cases, prompting debates on psychological harm despite debriefing. Such studies underscore situational determinants of obedience but faced institutional bans post-1970s due to informed consent violations.

Role Assignment and Situational Dynamics (Zimbardo, 1971)

The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), conducted by Philip G. Zimbardo and colleagues at Stanford University from August 14 to 20, 1971, examined how role assignment in a simulated prison environment influenced behavior among 24 male undergraduate students screened for psychological stability. Participants responded to a newspaper advertisement offering $15 per day for two weeks to participate in a study on prison life; they were randomly assigned via coin flip to either "prisoner" or "guard" roles, with 12 in each group initially, though one prisoner was released early due to distress. Prisoners were "arrested" by real police, stripped, deloused, issued numbered smocks instead of clothing, and confined to cells in the psychology department basement, stripped of personal belongings to emphasize dehumanization. Guards received khaki uniforms, mirrored sunglasses, wooden batons, and whistles, fostering an atmosphere of authority without specific instructions on abusive behavior beyond maintaining simulated prison order. Situational dynamics rapidly shaped conformity to roles, as guards improvised rules like count-offs and punishments (e.g., push-ups, solitary confinement in a closet), escalating to psychological abuse including sleep deprivation and privilege denial, while prisoners exhibited submission, rebellion, or emotional breakdown. Zimbardo, acting as prison superintendent, and graduate student assistants as wardens, observed via video and audio, noting that by day two, a prisoner-led rebellion was quashed with fire extinguishers, after which guards intensified control, leading to pathological behaviors not predicted by pre-experiment personality assessments. The experiment, planned for 14 days, was terminated after six days at the urging of an outsider (Christina Maslach), as five prisoners showed severe distress and guards displayed escalating sadism, interpreted by Zimbardo as evidence that situational forces—deindividuation, anonymity, and power differentials—overrode dispositional traits to drive conformity to abusive roles. However, subsequent analyses have challenged the experiment's validity as a demonstration of pure situational conformity, highlighting researcher influence on dynamics: guards received pre-experiment coaching to induce helplessness in prisoners, and Zimbardo's active role blurred objectivity, potentially creating demand characteristics where participants enacted expected "prison-like" behaviors rather than spontaneously conforming to roles. Archival reviews reveal incomplete data collection favoring dramatic incidents while omitting mundane ones, and guards' abusiveness was not uniform—some resisted escalation—suggesting individual agency and scripted elements over unadulterated situational power. These critiques, including from French researcher Thibault Le Texier, argue the SPE resembled a theatrical demonstration influenced by prior theatrical prison simulations rather than a controlled experiment isolating role assignment effects, undermining claims of broad causal realism in situational determinism. Despite Zimbardo's defenses citing video evidence of unprompted guard aggression, the study's ethical lapses (e.g., inadequate consent, harm without full debriefing) and methodological flaws have led many psychologists to view it as illustrative but not rigorously evidentiary for conformity mechanisms.

Mechanisms and Types

Informational Social Influence

Informational social influence refers to the process by which individuals adopt the attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors of others because they view those others as possessing valid or superior knowledge, particularly when faced with ambiguous or uncertain situations. This form of influence, distinct from normative pressures to gain social approval, involves genuine private acceptance of the group's judgment as evidence of reality, rather than mere public compliance. Deutsch and Gerard formalized this distinction in their 1955 study, hypothesizing that informational influence arises from epistemic needs— the drive to form accurate perceptions— and is amplified when objective cues are lacking. A foundational demonstration occurred in Muzafer Sherif's 1935 autokinetic effect experiments, where participants in a darkened room estimated the apparent movement of a stationary pinpoint of light, an illusion inducing high perceptual ambiguity. Alone, individuals provided varying estimates averaging around 2-6 inches of movement; however, when placed in groups of three, estimates rapidly converged toward a shared norm within minutes, typically stabilizing at a group-specific distance such as 2 inches or 5 inches. Even after group sessions, participants tested individually retained the group's norm, indicating internalization rather than superficial yielding, as they had incorporated others' perceptions to resolve uncertainty about the light's motion. Sherif's findings underscored how informational influence fosters norm formation in novel or ambiguous contexts, with convergence rates reaching near-unanimity across trials. This mechanism operates through social validation, where individuals treat group consensus as a proxy for truth, especially under conditions of perceptual or informational scarcity. Research distinguishes it from normative influence by showing that informational effects persist in private settings and are reduced when unambiguous information is available; for instance, in manipulations providing clear objective standards, conformity drops significantly. Real-world applications include emergency evacuations, where ambiguous threat cues lead people to mimic observed behaviors for cues on appropriate responses, or eyewitness testimony, where uncertain observers align recollections with co-witnesses presumed to have better vantage points. Factors enhancing informational influence include the perceived expertise of influencers and situational novelty, with neuroscientific correlates involving heightened activity in brain regions like the anterior cingulate cortex during uncertainty resolution via social input. While adaptive for learning in complex environments, it risks erroneous convergence on flawed group judgments if the initial informants are inaccurate.

Normative Social Influence

Normative social influence occurs when individuals alter their behavior or expressed opinions to align with group norms primarily to obtain social approval or evade disapproval, rather than because they accept the group's judgment as correct. This form of influence, distinguished from informational social influence by its focus on interpersonal acceptance over epistemic accuracy, typically yields public compliance without corresponding private acceptance of the norm. Deutsch and Gerard introduced the concept in their 1955 study, demonstrating through experimental manipulations—such as varying anonymity—that conformity decreases when individuals' responses are not publicly observable, isolating the normative motive from informational uncertainty. Empirical evidence for normative social influence prominently features in Solomon Asch's 1951 line judgment experiments, where participants faced unambiguous perceptual tasks but conformed to incorrect group consensus on 37% of critical trials on average, with 75% of participants yielding at least once across trials. Post-experiment interviews revealed that conformists often reported discomfort with deviating, driven by desires to avoid appearing foolish or facing group ridicule, underscoring the approval-seeking mechanism rather than doubt in their own perceptions. A 2023 replication of Asch's paradigm with modern participants confirmed similar conformity rates, approximately 32-40% depending on group size, affirming the persistence of normative pressures in controlled settings. Field studies further validate normative influence's potency in everyday behaviors. In a 2008 experiment on hotel towel reuse, messages highlighting that "the majority of guests reuse their towels" increased compliance by 26% compared to standard requests, outperforming informational appeals about environmental benefits, as participants sought to match perceived peer norms. Similarly, research on ant littering behaviors showed that descriptive norm cues (e.g., "many people pick up after themselves") reduced violations more effectively than educational messaging, with effects mediated by perceived social expectations rather than factual persuasion. These findings indicate normative influence operates through anticipated social sanctions or rewards, often overriding individual preferences when group visibility is high. Normative pressures intensify under conditions of group cohesion and identifiability, as individuals weigh potential relational costs against deviance. However, its effects can be moderated by personal factors like self-esteem or cultural emphasis on independence, with individualistic societies exhibiting lower susceptibility compared to collectivist ones. While adaptive for maintaining social harmony, unchecked normative influence risks suppressing dissent and fostering erroneous consensus, as observed in historical mass delusions where fear of ostracism perpetuated flawed group beliefs.

Minority and Anti-Conformity Effects

In social psychology, minority influence describes the capacity of a numerically small group to induce change in the perceptions, attitudes, or behaviors of a larger majority, contrasting with the majority-driven dynamics of conformity. This process typically requires the minority to exhibit high consistency in their position, behavioral style marked by confidence and commitment, and moderate flexibility to avoid perceptions of dogmatism. Unlike conformity, which often yields superficial compliance, minority influence tends to produce latent, deeper shifts in private opinions that can propagate over time and foster innovation or social progress. A foundational demonstration came from Serge Moscovici and colleagues' 1969 experiment, involving 192 female participants divided into groups of four, with two confederates posing as minority members. Participants judged the color of 36 slides varying in blueness; the confederates consistently labeled unambiguously green slides as blue in the key condition (versus inconsistent responses in a control). This consistency led to 8.42% of majority responses aligning with the minority's erroneous judgment across trials, compared to 1.25% in the inconsistent condition; moreover, 32% of majority participants endorsed the minority view on at least one trial, versus 7.7% in the control. Post-experiment surveys revealed indirect influence, with 12.6% of consistent-condition majorities later calling a green slide blue privately, indicating validation rather than mere comparison processes. Subsequent research has identified key moderators: immediate consistency strengthens initial impact, while delayed consistency sustains deeper conversion; rigid minorities fail due to perceived inflexibility, but those showing controlled flexibility validate their position more effectively. Empirical meta-analyses confirm minority influence is weaker than majority pressure overall (effect sizes around d=0.2-0.5 for attitude change) but uniquely drives indirect influence on unmonitored behaviors, as seen in studies where minority exposure altered majorities' responses to novel tasks without direct confrontation. This mechanism underpins historical shifts, such as civil rights advocacy by small dissident groups, though success hinges on avoiding isolation through strategic alliance-building. Anti-conformity, by contrast, represents a distinct mode of nonconformity wherein individuals or subgroups systematically oppose prevailing group norms, irrespective of the objective accuracy of their stance, often to assert autonomy or uniqueness. Distinguished from independence—which entails adherence to personal evidence-based judgments while ignoring group pressure—anti-conformity involves active rejection of the majority position, potentially aligning with error if the norm reflects reality. Early conceptualizations frame it as one pole in a multidimensional response space, alongside conformity and independence, with anti-conformists exhibiting high public disagreement even when privately aware of the majority's correctness. Experimental evidence highlights anti-conformity's dual-edged effects: in perceptual tasks akin to Asch's, some participants (5-10% in replications) select demonstrably incorrect options to defy unanimity, sustaining response variability but risking maladaptive outcomes like amplified errors in ambiguous settings. Agent-based models reveal that anti-conformists can catalyze societal transitions by breaking spirals of silence, facilitating norm divergence and diversity when preferences vary; however, they also polarize populations by reinforcing extremes, particularly under reward incentives that reduce conformity. For instance, in networked simulations, inter-group anti-conformity alongside intra-group conformity yields bipolar states, where anti-conformists prevent assimilation but entrench factions, with polarization rates increasing 20-50% relative to pure conformity scenarios. While adaptive for innovation in stagnant systems, unchecked anti-conformity correlates with reduced collective accuracy in truth-tracking tasks, as opposition overrides informational cues.

Influencing Factors

Cultural and Cross-Societal Variations

Conformity tendencies vary significantly across cultures, with empirical evidence indicating higher levels in collectivist societies that prioritize group harmony over individual autonomy compared to individualistic societies that emphasize personal independence. A meta-analysis by Bond and Smith examined 133 studies employing Asch's (1951) line judgment paradigm across 17 countries, revealing a positive correlation between national conformity rates and Hofstede's individualism-collectivism index, where collectivist cultures exhibited mean conformity rates approximately 10-15% higher than individualistic ones, such as the United States (25-30% conformity) versus Japan or Brazil (up to 40%). Early cross-cultural research by Berry (1967) compared conformity using modified Asch tasks among the Temne people of Sierra Leone, a collectivist agricultural society, and the Inuit of Canada, a more individualistic foraging group; Temne participants conformed at rates of 51.2% to incorrect group judgments, while Inuit conformed at only 24.7%, attributing differences to ecological pressures favoring interdependence in settled farming communities versus autonomy in hunter-gatherer lifestyles. These patterns align with broader findings that conformity serves adaptive functions in high-threat environments, where social coordination enhances survival, as seen in studies linking historical pathogen prevalence and famine risks to elevated conformity norms. Beyond the individualism-collectivism dimension, Gelfand's tightness-looseness framework captures variations in norm enforcement, with "tight" cultures—characterized by strong situational constraints and low tolerance for deviance, such as Germany or South Korea—demonstrating greater conformity to social rules than "loose" cultures like the Netherlands or New Zealand, which permit more behavioral flexibility. A 33-nation study by Gelfand et al. (2011) quantified tightness via self-reported norm strength and deviance punishment, finding tight societies impose harsher sanctions for norm violations, correlating with reduced innovation but heightened group cohesion during crises, as evidenced by lower COVID-19 case rates in tighter nations during the 2020 pandemic. Such variations underscore how conformity is shaped by ecological, historical, and institutional factors rather than universal psychological constants, with peer-reviewed replications confirming robustness across paradigms despite methodological critiques of WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) sample biases in early research.

Demographic Predictors (Age, Gender, Personality)

Susceptibility to conformity pressures varies systematically with age, with empirical evidence indicating a peak during adolescence followed by a decline into adulthood. Developmental studies demonstrate that adolescents exhibit heightened conformity due to increased sensitivity to peer influence and identity formation needs, as measured in tasks involving social judgments where teens align more with group norms than adults. This pattern aligns with neurodevelopmental changes, such as prolonged maturation of prefrontal cortex regions involved in independent decision-making, leading to reduced conformity in early adulthood. In older adults, conformity rates are notably lower, particularly for emotionally valenced stimuli like facial expressions, where seniors resist peer pressure more than younger cohorts, potentially reflecting accumulated life experience and diminished concern for social approval. Gender differences in conformity remain debated, with meta-analytic evidence from earlier decades suggesting women display slightly higher rates than men, especially in public settings or tasks emphasizing social harmony, attributed to socialization toward relational interdependence. For instance, a 1981 meta-analysis found women more persuadable overall, a pattern replicated in surveillance-monitored visual judgment tasks where older females conformed more than males. However, more recent systematic reviews of post-2000 studies report no consistent sex differences across diverse paradigms, including Asch-style line judgments and online conformity experiments, challenging prior generalizations and highlighting contextual moderators like task type or cultural norms. In digital environments, some evidence points to marginally higher female conformity under high task difficulty, though effect sizes are small and not universally replicated. Personality traits, particularly within the Big Five framework, robustly predict conformity tendencies, with higher agreeableness and conscientiousness associated with greater susceptibility due to their links to norm adherence and social harmony-seeking. Individuals high in agreeableness prioritize group cohesion, yielding higher conformity in peer pressure scenarios, while conscientiousness fosters rule-following behaviors that amplify alignment with majority views. Extraversion inversely correlates, as outgoing traits promote assertiveness and resistance to influence, evidenced in studies where extroverted children and adults conform less to parental or group cues. Higher-order meta-traits further illuminate this: the Alpha factor (encompassing emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) emerges as a strong socialization predictor of conformity, contrasting with Beta (openness and extraversion), which buffers against it through novelty-seeking and independence. Neuroticism shows mixed effects, sometimes heightening conformity via anxiety-driven avoidance of rejection, though not as consistently as prosocial traits.

Group and Situational Dynamics

Group size influences conformity rates, with empirical evidence indicating that conformity peaks when the majority consists of three to four members before plateauing at higher sizes. In Solomon Asch's 1951 line judgment experiments, participants conformed on approximately 32% of trials with three confederates giving incorrect unanimous answers, but rates did not rise significantly beyond that threshold despite larger groups. This pattern suggests diminishing returns from additional group members, potentially due to saturation of social pressure or increased detectability of dissent. Unanimity within the group amplifies conformity, as a single dissenting voice substantially mitigates pressure to align. Asch's follow-up studies in 1956 demonstrated that introducing one confederate who provided the correct response reduced overall conformity by up to 80%, from baseline levels observed in fully unanimous conditions. This effect underscores the causal role of perceived consensus in sustaining normative influence, where breaking uniformity signals legitimacy for independent judgment. Group cohesiveness, defined as the interpersonal attraction and unity among members, positively correlates with conformity levels. Research from the early 1960s found that higher cohesion fosters greater communication and acceptance of group norms, leading to elevated conformity behaviors in decision-making tasks. More recent analyses confirm this dynamic, with cohesive groups exhibiting stronger adherence to collective positions, particularly in ambiguous scenarios where individual uncertainty heightens reliance on group bonds. Situational variables, such as response publicity and task ambiguity, further modulate conformity. Public responses elicit higher compliance rates than private ones, as individuals prioritize avoiding social rejection over internal belief alignment; private settings allow greater independence without observable deviation. Ambiguous or difficult tasks increase conformity by enhancing informational influence, where participants defer to the group for perceived expertise, contrasting with clear tasks that bolster personal confidence. These factors interact dynamically; for instance, high-stakes public ambiguity in cohesive groups can intensify normative pressures, as evidenced in meta-analyses of Asch-type paradigms.

Neurological and Cognitive Correlates

Neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have identified distinct neural activations associated with conformity, particularly distinguishing between informational influence, where individuals adjust perceptions based on perceived expertise, and normative influence, driven by desire for social approval. In perceptual conformity tasks akin to Asch's line judgment experiments, peer disagreement activates visual and parietal cortices, reflecting genuine perceptual uncertainty resolution rather than mere compliance. For opinion-based conformity, such as mental rotation judgments, activity shifts to the amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus, indicating emotional conflict and cognitive reappraisal when overriding personal judgments to align with group views. Normative conformity engages reinforcement learning mechanisms, where deviation from group norms triggers prediction error signals in the ventral striatum and rostral cingulate zone/rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), akin to error detection in reward-based learning. These regions process social feedback as a teaching signal, predicting behavioral adjustments toward conformity to minimize future discrepancies, as observed in studies on aesthetic judgments where participants conformed to group ratings after viewing them. Posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), including the rACC, consistently shows heightened activity during norm violations, facilitating conflict monitoring and behavioral adaptation, with transcranial magnetic stimulation disrupting pMFC reducing susceptibility to conformity. Cognitively, conformity correlates with reduced neural efficiency in decision-making networks under social pressure, involving prefrontal cortex modulation of default personal biases toward group alignment, often without explicit awareness. Meta-analyses of fMRI data confirm convergent activation in the pMFC across paradigms, underscoring its role in integrating social signals with self-referential processing, while ventral striatal responses link conformity to hedonic reinforcement from affiliation. Developmental differences emerge, with adolescents showing amplified striatal sensitivity to peer norms compared to adults, potentially heightening vulnerability to maladaptive conformity. These findings suggest conformity arises from evolutionarily conserved mechanisms prioritizing social harmony over individual accuracy when cues indicate group consensus reliability.

Functional Outcomes

Adaptive Benefits for Cooperation and Survival

Conformity facilitates the evolution of cooperation by enabling the transmission and enforcement of prosocial norms in social dilemmas, where individual self-interest might otherwise undermine collective benefits. Evolutionary game-theoretic models demonstrate that conformist strategies, where individuals adopt the majority behavior within their group, stabilize cooperation in iterated prisoner's dilemma scenarios by countering defection and promoting network reciprocity. This mechanism provides a selective advantage in structured populations, as conformists cluster with cooperators, amplifying mutualistic outcomes and reducing exploitation risks. In ancestral environments, particularly small-scale hunter-gatherer bands, conformity to shared norms for resource allocation and risk-sharing enhanced group survival amid unpredictable foraging and intergroup threats. Adherence to egalitarian principles, enforced through social pressures like gossip and ostracism, minimized free-riding and intra-group conflict, fostering equitable food distribution that buffered against individual starvation during scarcity—evidenced by ethnographic data from groups like the Hadza, where norm violators face reduced mating opportunities and alliance access. Such conformity-driven cooperation supported division of labor in hunting and gathering, with collective yields exceeding solitary efforts by factors of 2-3 times in modeled scenarios, thereby elevating reproductive success through sustained caloric intake and defense capabilities. Beyond direct reciprocity, conformity yields indirect fitness benefits by maintaining group cohesion during mobility and environmental stressors, as seen in comparative studies of social mammals where behavioral synchronization via majority-rule decision-making optimizes migration routes and predator evasion. In human evolution, this extended to cultural norms for vigilance and alliance formation, where nonconformity increased vulnerability to expulsion, a lethal risk in Pleistocene coalitions reliant on mutual aid for 70-80% of caloric needs from cooperative hunts. These dynamics underscore conformity's role in scaling cooperation from dyads to bands of 20-150 individuals, underpinning the ultrasocial trajectory that distinguished hominins.

Pathological Risks Including Groupthink and Stifled Innovation

Groupthink represents a pathological escalation of conformity pressures within highly cohesive groups, leading to irrational decision-making and flawed outcomes. Coined by psychologist Irving L. Janis in 1972, it describes how the drive for consensus suppresses critical evaluation, manifesting in symptoms like collective illusions of invulnerability, self-censorship of doubts, and stereotyping of outsiders as threats. Empirical analyses of historical cases, such as the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion—where U.S. President Kennedy's advisors overlooked evident risks due to unanimous support for the CIA-backed plan, resulting in the capture or death of over 1,100 invaders—illustrate groupthink's role in policy failures. Similarly, the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster, in which engineers' warnings about O-ring failures were dismissed amid managerial pressure for launch approval, contributed to the deaths of seven astronauts, highlighting conformity's override of technical evidence. While influential, groupthink's empirical foundation remains debated, with some reviews noting limited experimental replication and overreliance on retrospective case studies, potentially inflating its prevalence in real-world settings. Nonetheless, organizational research consistently links high conformity to defective processes, including mindguarding—where group members shield the leader from dissent—and direct pressure on deviants, fostering escalation of commitment to erroneous courses. In corporate contexts, such dynamics contributed to Enron's 2001 collapse, where executives and auditors conformed to aggressive accounting practices despite internal red flags, leading to $74 billion in investor losses and bankruptcy. Conformity's pathological risks extend to stifled innovation, as normative pressures to align with group norms deter risk-taking and novel idea generation essential for breakthroughs. A 2023 study of professional employees found that work conformity negatively impacts innovative performance by curtailing individual initiative and idea diversity, though it may aid routine implementation. Experimental evidence supports this: conformity manipulations in group tasks reduce creative output, with participants generating fewer original solutions under social pressure compared to independent conditions, as conformity prioritizes acceptance over exploration. In culturally tight environments—characterized by strong norms and low tolerance for deviation—perceived informal pressures more potently suppress employee creativity than formal rules, per a 2024 analysis across multiple firms, linking such rigidity to diminished patent filings and product novelty. These risks compound in isolated echo chambers, where unchallenged assumptions prevent adaptation; for instance, Nokia's adherence to Symbian OS norms circa 2007-2010 blinded leadership to smartphone disruptions, culminating in market share plunge from 50% to under 3% by 2012. Pathological conformity thus not only amplifies errors through collective delusion but erodes long-term competitiveness by marginalizing outliers whose dissent drives progress, underscoring the causal trade-off between short-term harmony and sustained advancement.

Contemporary Manifestations and Debates

Digital and Media-Driven Conformity

Digital platforms amplify conformity through mechanisms like algorithmic curation and social feedback loops, where users adjust behaviors to align with perceived majorities. Replications of Solomon Asch's line judgment paradigm in online settings have demonstrated conformity rates comparable to offline experiments, typically around 30-33%, influenced by the perceived unanimity of virtual group responses. For instance, in digital adaptations involving anonymous participants viewing shared stimuli, individuals shifted judgments to match fabricated majorities, underscoring the persistence of normative pressure absent physical cues. Echo chambers, formed by platform algorithms prioritizing engagement with ideologically congruent content, exacerbate this dynamic by reducing exposure to countervailing views and reinforcing group norms. A 2023 analysis of short video platforms such as TikTok and equivalents revealed that users within homogeneous networks exhibited heightened polarization, with conformity driven by repeated affirmation of shared attitudes rather than informational diversity. These structures operate via recommendation systems that favor content eliciting strong emotional responses, fostering normative expectations that penalize deviation through diminished visibility or negative interactions. Empirical models indicate that such algorithmic feedback loops elevate conformity by amplifying false consensus effects, where users overestimate agreement within their feeds. Online moral and informational conformity manifests in domains like ethical judgments during video interactions, where participants align decisions with anonymous peers at rates exceeding solitary reasoning. A 2023 study found that in simulated online meetings, exposure to group verdicts on right-wrong dilemmas prompted shifts in individual stances, attributable to social presence and majority size rather than evidential updates. Personality factors, including low self-confidence, further modulate this, with algorithms personalizing feeds to exploit vulnerabilities and sustain adherence to prevailing narratives. In political contexts, this has led to observable spikes in coordinated messaging, as seen in hashtag campaigns where dissenters face algorithmic deprioritization, entrenching collective behaviors over independent assessment.

Ideological Enforcement in Politics and Society

In political and social contexts, ideological enforcement manifests as pressures to align public expressions with dominant group norms, often through social ostracism, reputational damage, or institutional sanctions, fostering conformity to prevailing ideologies. Surveys indicate widespread self-censorship driven by these pressures; for instance, a 2020 Cato Institute poll found that 62% of Americans hold political views they fear sharing publicly, with conservatives (77%) and moderates (64%) reporting higher rates than liberals (51%). Similarly, a 2023 American Public Media survey revealed that 75% of adults self-censor political opinions with at least some social contacts, attributing this to anticipated backlash. These patterns align with the spiral of silence theory, where perceived minority views lead individuals to withhold dissent, skewing visible discourse toward hegemonic positions. Empirical studies demonstrate conformity in political discussions resembling Asch-line experiments, where participants adjust stated opinions to match perceived group consensus. A 2017 William & Mary study on "political chameleons" showed individuals temporarily suppressing true views to align with interlocutors, with conformity rates increasing under perceived peer scrutiny. In academic settings, a 2015 classroom experiment indicated Republicans (45%) and social conservatives (38%) self-censor more frequently than others, citing fear of ideological misalignment with faculty or peers. Political identity amplifies this; research from 2016 found implicit cues like eyespots—signaling observation—boosted conformity among Republicans in voter mobilization tasks, suggesting surveillance-like enforcement heightens norm adherence. Such dynamics are exacerbated in polarized environments, where cross-partisan interactions decline, reinforcing echo chambers. Enforcement mechanisms extend to institutional levels, including workplace DEI policies and media narratives that penalize deviation, though empirical quantification remains challenging due to underreporting. A 2022 study on self-censorship orientation linked it to relational motives, predicting reduced civic participation among those fearing social discord. In autocratic contexts, fear induces systematic bias in reported regime support, with surveys underestimating approval by up to 20% due to conformity pressures. While Western societies lack overt state coercion, analogous effects arise via "cancel culture," where public shaming enforces orthodoxy; however, sources documenting its prevalence often stem from libertarian outlets, warranting caution against selection bias, yet corroborated by rising self-censorship trends post-2016. These pressures risk stifling dissent, as evidenced by a tripling in Americans feeling unable to express views freely from pre-2020 levels to over 40% by 2023.

Empirical Challenges and Recent Research (Post-2000 Developments)

Replications of classic conformity experiments, such as Solomon Asch's line judgment task from the 1950s, have revealed declining rates of conformity in Western samples over time. A meta-analysis of U.S. studies indicated that conformity levels have decreased since the mid-20th century, potentially due to shifts in cultural individualism or greater exposure to diverse viewpoints. Similarly, partial replications of Stanley Milgram's obedience studies, constrained by modern ethical standards, have shown obedience rates around 28% for delivering shocks up to 150 volts, lower than Milgram's original 65% for maximum levels, highlighting challenges in directly extrapolating historical findings to contemporary contexts amid heightened awareness of ethical issues. Post-2000 research has increasingly incorporated neuroimaging to uncover neural mechanisms underlying conformity, moving beyond behavioral measures. Functional MRI studies using modified Asch-like paradigms with mental rotation tasks demonstrated that conformity to incorrect group opinions activates regions like the posterior medial frontal cortex, associated with error detection and conflict monitoring, while independent judgments engage visual and parietal areas more strongly, suggesting conformity involves suppressing perceptual evidence rather than mere social compliance. A coordinate-based meta-analysis of fMRI conformity paradigms identified consistent activation in the medial prefrontal cortex and insula, regions linked to self-referential processing and emotional salience, indicating conformity modulates self-other distinction and normative evaluation. Systematic reviews of conformity literature since 2004, encompassing 48 empirical studies, reveal persistent effects across paradigms but emphasize moderators like task difficulty and group size, with conformity rising under ambiguity or high cognitive load. In digital contexts, online experiments adapting Asch tasks found conformity rates of about 13% per trial, amplified by task difficulty and mediated communication, though anonymity in social media networks can yield U-shaped patterns where moderate network centrality predicts higher alignment with majority views. Cross-cultural meta-analyses post-2000 confirm higher conformity in collectivist societies via line judgment tasks, yet challenge universality by showing variability tied to economic development and exposure to global norms. Emerging work on conformity in decision-making under risk posits it as a heuristic for navigating uncertain social environments, with fMRI evidence showing reduced activity in value-based regions like the ventral striatum when aligning with group choices, potentially conserving cognitive resources but risking suboptimal outcomes. These findings collectively challenge overly deterministic views of conformity from mid-20th-century experiments by integrating causal factors like neural conflict resolution and situational heuristics, while underscoring adaptive yet context-dependent pressures in modern settings.

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