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The Moderate Party (Swedish: Moderata samlingspartiet [mʊdɛˈrɑ̌ːta ˈsâmːlɪŋspaˌʈiːɛt] ⓘ,[4] lit. 'Moderate Coalition Party', M), commonly referred to as the Moderates (Swedish: Moderaterna [mʊdɛˈrɑ̌ːtɛɳa] ⓘ), is a liberal-conservative[5] political party in Sweden. The party generally supports tax cuts, the free market, civil liberties and economic liberalism.[6] Globally, it is a full member of the International Democracy Union[7] and the European People's Party.[8]

Key Information

The party was founded in 1904 as the General Electoral League (Allmänna valmansförbundet [ˈâlːmɛnːa ˈvɑ̂ːlmansfœrˌbɵndɛt] ⓘ) by a group of conservatives in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. The party was later known as The Right (Högern [ˈhø̌ːɡɛɳ] ⓘ; 1938–1952) and Right Party (Högerpartiet [ˈhø̂ːɡɛrpaˌʈiːɛt] ⓘ; 1952–1969).[9] During this time, the party was usually called the Conservative Party outside of Sweden.[citation needed]

After holding minor posts in centre-right governments, the Moderates eventually became the leading opposition party to the Swedish Social Democratic Party and since then those two parties have dominated Swedish politics. After the 1991 Swedish general election, party leader Carl Bildt formed a minority government, the first administration since 1930 to be headed by a member of the party, which lasted three years. The party returned to government under leader and Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, after the 2006 and 2010 general elections. In 2010, the party was the leading member of the Alliance, a centre-right coalition, along with the Centre Party (C), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Liberal People's Party (L), and obtained its best result ever (30.1%), despite the coalition not being able to obtain majority.[10]

The current chairman of the party, Ulf Kristersson, was elected at a special party congress on 1 October 2017, following Anna Kinberg Batra's sudden resignation. Kinberg Batra had replaced Reinfeldt, Prime Minister from 2006 to 2014. Under Reinfeldt's leadership, the party moved more towards the centre.[11] Under Kristersson's leadership, the party moved back to the right and opened up to the Sweden Democrats (SD) following the 2018 Swedish general election.[12] Having formed in late 2021 an informal right-wing alliance with SD and former Alliance members, KD and L, with Kristersson as the prime ministerial candidate, the right-wing bloc obtained a narrow win in the 2022 Swedish general election.[13][14]

History

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General Electoral League (1904–1938)

[edit]

The party was founded on 17 October 1904 in a restaurant called Runan in Stockholm. The intention was to start a campaign organization in support of the group of Conservatives which had emerged in the Riksdag. During the 19th century conservatives had organised themselves in the Riksdag but there was no party to support them. The Swedish right was also threatened by the rise of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (founded in 1889) and the Liberals (1902). The party was called the General Electoral League (Swedish: Allmänna valmansförbundet).

Gustaf Fredrik Östberg, was the first chairman of the party.

At first, the party was clearly nationalist and staunchly conservative. The importance of a strong defence was underlined and other societal institutions embraced by the party were the monarchy and the state of law. The party initially held ia protectionist view towards the economy; tariffs were widely supported as well as interventionist economical measures such as agricultural subsidies. In the defence policy crisis in 1914 (which overturned the parliamentary Liberal government), the party sided with King Gustaf V but stopped short of accepting a right-wing government by royal appointment, instead opting for an independent-conservative "war cabinet" under Hjalmar Hammarskjöld which was eventually overturned in favour of a Liberal-Social Democratic majority coalition government and thus the breakthrough of parliamentary rule, albeit reluctantly embraced by the right.

An election poster from the party in 1914 stating that military defense comes first.

Arvid Lindman (often called "The Admiral") became influential in the party and served two terms as Prime Minister of Sweden, before and after the enactment of universal suffrage. In 1907, he proposed universal male suffrage to the parliament and in 1912 he was formally elected leader. But the party voted against universal suffrage and the party again voted against women's right to vote. It was only because the party was in the minority that Sweden was able to grant the right to vote for all, pushed through by the Liberals and the Social Democrats (the left), against the objections of the right. Although not one of the founders of the party and not a prominent ideologist, Lindman and his achievements as a leader are often appreciated as being of great importance to the new party. His leadership was marked by a consolidation of the Swedish right, and by transforming the party into a modern, effective, political movement. Lindman was a very pragmatic politician, but without losing his principles. He was a formidable negotiator and peace broker. For this, he was widely respected, even by his fiercest political opponents and when he resigned and left the parliament in 1935, the leader of the Social Democrats, Per Albin Hansson, expressed his "honest thanks over the battle lines".

From the beginning of the 20th century, social democracy and the labour movement rose to replace liberalism as the major political force for radical reforms. The Moderate Party intensified its opposition to socialism during the leadership of Lindman—the importance of continuance and strengthening national business were cornerstones. But at the same time, recent social issues gained significant political attention; by appeasing the working class, the party also hoped to reduce the threat of revolutionary tendencies. During the governments led by Lindman, several reforms for social progress were made, and it was his first government that initiated the public state pension.

The second cabinet of Arvid Lindman in 1928.

In the 1920s, the Swedish right slowly started to move towards a classical liberal view on economic issues, mainly under the influence of the liberal economist Gustav Cassel, but the economic downturn following the Great Depression frustrated the possible liberal transition of their economic policy. Before that occurred the party gained its greatest success yet with 29.4% in the general election of 1928, often called the Cossack Election, on a clearly anti-socialist programme. The government later formed by the party did not accept the concept of the market economy but continued the protectionist policy by generous financial aid. The government also began complete regulation of agriculture. Production associations, with the objective to administer the regulations and running monopolies on imports, were also established during the period. All this made for a corporate control of the Swedish economy unsurpassed since the popularisation of liberalism at the end of the 19th century.[15] The government of Lindman fell in 1930 after the Social Democrats and the Freeminded People's Party had blocked a proposition for a raised customs duty on grain.

The 1930s saw the party in conflict over how to relate to the rising threat of National Socialism and Fascism. Its loosely affiliated youth organisation, the National Youth League of Sweden (Swedish: Sveriges Nationella Ungdomsförbund) was openly pro-Nazi and set up uniformed "fighting groups" to combat political enemies on the streets.[citation needed] The mother party did not like this development, with Lindman clearly stating that pro-Nazi views were not to be accepted in the party, and in 1933 the National Youth League was separated from the party. While the party set up a new youth league in 1934, called The Young Swedes (known since 1969 as the Moderate Youth League), the core of the old one (in spite of some districts, such as Young Swedes-Gothenburg joining the new one) set up its own party—the National League of Sweden—taking with them three of the mother party's MPs and unsuccessfully fighting elections as a radical conservative and openly pro-Nazi party.[citation needed]

National Organization of the Right (1938–1952)

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The party participated in the third cabinet of Per Albin Hansson during the Second World War. It was a grand coalition including all major parties, only excluding the Communist Party and the pro-Nazi Socialist Party, both parties being members of the parliament at this time.

In 1934, the Social Democrats formed a new government, and except for the World War II era, would stay in power until 1976. From having been a ruling party, the General Electoral League turned into a bastion of right-wing opposition, and in 1938 it was renamed the National Organization of the Right (Swedish: Högerns riksorganisation [ˈhøːɡɛɳʂ ˈrɪ̂ksɔrɡanɪsaˌɧuːn] ⓘ), a name that would stay until 1952. Outside Sweden, the party was typically called the Conservative Party.

After the Second World War, the party gradually lost support and the Liberals rose to become the second most popular party after the Social Democrats.

Conservative Party (1952–1969)

[edit]
Jarl Hjalmarsson, leader of the party between 1950 and 1961.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the party re-emerged after being renamed the Rightist Party (Swedish: Högerpartiet); its name outside Sweden remained Conservative Party. Under the leadership of Jarl Hjalmarson (1950–1961) the party became a prominent voice against the rising levels of taxation and a defender of private ownership from, what the party saw as, the growing tendencies of state centralization.

The party had significant success in the elections during the 1950s and became the largest party of the opposition in 1958. However, the next decade brought changes to the political climate of Sweden. The election of 1968 gave the Social Democrats an absolute majority in the parliament and made the Rightist Party into the smallest party of the opposition.

Moderate Party (1969–present)

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Carl Bildt, leader of the party between 1986 and 1999, was Prime Minister between 1991 and 1994. In addition he was Foreign Minister between 2006 and 2014.

By 1968, the dominance of the Social Democratic Party and 24 years of trailing the liberal People's Party among the opposition bloc had pushed the party to the edge of political relevance. Seeking to shed its conservative image, in 1969, the party changed its name to the Moderate Coalition Party (Swedish: Moderata samlingspartiet, generally just referred to as Moderaterna) or just the Moderate Party.

In 1970, Gösta Bohman was elected leader of the Moderate Party. During his leadership the party continued its gradual movement from nationalist traditionalist conservatism towards internationalist liberal conservatism, calling for Swedish membership in the EEC since the 1960s and in practice adopting most policies affiliated with classical liberalism. It also adopted a much more liberal social outlook, which was seen as a key factor in the foundation of the Christian Democratic Gathering in 1964, a socially conservative party. Bohman proved a successful leader, and helped lead the non-socialist opposition to victory in the 1976 election.

The Moderate Party joined the government under Thorbjörn Fälldin, with Gösta Bohman as Minister of Economy. The non-socialist parties managed to remain in power until 1982 in different constellations, but the election of 1979 again made the Moderate Party become the second most popular after the Social Democrats, a position it has held since then. Gösta Bohman was in 1981 replaced by Ulf Adelsohn.

In 1986, Carl Bildt was elected leader of the party. A son-in-law of Bohman, he managed to lead the party to an election victory in 1991. The Moderate Party led a center-right coalition between 1991 and 1994, with Bildt serving as the first conservative Prime Minister since Arvid Lindman. The cabinet of Carl Bildt did much to reform the Swedish government: they cut taxes, cut public spending, introduced voucher schools, made it possible for counties to privatize health care, liberalised markets for telecommunications and energy, and privatised former publicly owned companies (further deregulations and privatisations were carried out by the following Social Democratic Cabinet of Göran Persson). The negotiations for membership with the European Union were also finalized.

Fredrik Reinfeldt, leader of the party between 2003 and 2015.

The party gained votes in 1994, but the governing coalition lost its majority. While Bildt stayed on as the Moderate Party leader, failing to unite with the Greens, the non-socialist parties failed to return to government after the election in 1998 as well. Bo Lundgren replaced him and led the party in the disastrous general election of 2002, much owed to his alleged neoliberal stances, for which Lundgren continued to receive praise from younger members. Former head of the Moderate Youth Fredrik Reinfeldt was elected as the new party leader in 2003.

Prior to the 2006 general election, the Moderate Party adjusted its position in the political spectrum, moving towards the centre-right. To reflect these changes, the party's unofficial name was altered to The New Moderates (Swedish: De Nya Moderaterna [dɔm ˈnŷːa mʊdɛˈrɑ̌ːtɛɳa] ⓘ).[16] This has included focus on proactive measures against unemployment, lower taxes combined with reforms to strengthen the Swedish welfare state. The Moderate Party has since 2006 used the slogan "the Swedish Workers' Party", a slogan formerly synonymous with the Social Democrats.

In the 2006 general election, the Moderate Party enjoyed its best result since 1928 with 26.2% of the votes. The Moderate Party had formed the Alliance for Sweden, a political and electoral alliance, along with the Centre Party, the Liberal People's Party and the Christian Democrats prior to this election. After the election, the Alliance for Sweden was able to form a coalition government. Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt took office as Prime Minister of Sweden on 6 October 2006 along with his cabinet. In the 2010 general election, the Moderate Party performed their best results, since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1919, with 30.1% of the votes. However, the minor parties in the Alliance performed relatively poorly, and the Reinfeldt cabinet continued in office as a minority government.

Ulf Kristersson, the current leader of the party since 2017.

He is the longest-serving non–Social Democrat Prime Minister since Erik Gustaf Boström who left office in 1900.

In the 2014 European elections, the Moderate Party came in third place nationally with 13.6% of the vote, returning three MEPs.

In the 2014 general election, the Red-Green coalition outpolled Reinfeldt's incumbent Alliance coalition, prompting its resignation. The Social Democrat Stefan Löfven became Prime Minister on 3 October 2014. The Moderate Party performed reasonably well also in the 2014 election, making Reinfeldt its most successful leader with three of their four best election results since 1932.[citation needed] Anna Kinberg Batra was elected to succeed Reinfeldt as party leader on 10 January 2015. Ulf Kristersson succeeded Kinberg-Batra on 1 October 2017.

The Moderate Party made its worst election result since 2002 in the 2018 general election.[17] Ulf Kristersson announced that the party would "create a new Swedish Model" at the Moderate Party Congress on 5 April 2019 and also that the party would be phasing out the New Moderates name. The party also presented its new logo, the old M logo which was used between 1972 and 2006 was adopted again.[18] The change in logo was seen by analysts as a way to show that the party breaks with Reinfeldt's policies.[19] Ulf Kristersson has also been critical of multiculturalism.[20]

Kristersson held a meeting in December 2019 with Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, and said that he would cooperate with them in parliament. The anti-immigration party had previously been subject to a cordon sanitaire by all other parties, with Kristersson himself ruling out dialogue with them ahead of the 2018 elections. According to Ann-Cathrine Jungar of Södertörn University, this put Sweden in line with several other European countries in which the centre-right and nationalist-right parties cooperate.[12]

In October 2022, the Tidö Agreement was formed, which led to the formation of the Kristersson Cabinet as Sweden's government.[21] On 18 October 2022, Ulf Kristersson became the new Prime Minister of Sweden.[22] The Moderates formed a centre-right coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, backed by the Sweden Democrats.[23] Soon after his appointment as foreign minister, Tobias Billström of the Moderate Party, announced that Sweden will renounce "feminist foreign policy", implemented by the previous left-wing government.[24]

In 2024, new laws proposed by the Kristersson Cabinet to combat Sweden's criminality crisis took in effect including harder penalties against weapons offences, breach of the permit obligation for explosive goods, arms smuggling and smuggling of explosive goods.[25] Other laws gave increased opportunities to the police to use covert means of coercion to prevent and investigate serious crime, tougher border controls and extended power to security guards.[25] On 20 February 2024, the Kristersson cabinet sent the largest military support package to Ukraine.[26] During Kristerssons Premiership, Sweden ended longstanding neutrality to become a NATO member on 7 March.[27]

Ideology and political positions

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The Moderate Party states that its ideology is a mix of liberalism and conservatism, and corresponds to what is called liberal conservatism. As is common in European centre-right[28][12] and conservative parties, the term liberalism in Sweden refers to the traditional meaning of classical liberalism rather than progressivism or social liberalism in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

The party supports free markets and personal freedom and has historically been the essential force for privatisation, deregulation, lowering tax rates, and a reduction of the public-sector growth rate.[29] Other issues emphasized by the party are such as actions against violent crime and sex crime, increasing and promoting the value of working, and quality in the educational system. The party supports same-sex marriage in Sweden and Sweden's membership in the European Union. The Moderate Party considers itself as a "green-right" party.[30]

The party campaigned for changing currency to the euro in the 2003 referendum. As of 2013, the party was still in favor of the euro, but it expressed that the issue of a membership of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union and the eurozone would not be relevant until the member states have met certain strict requirements set up by the party in regard to budget deficits.[31] In the 2024 EU elections, the Moderate Party proposed making abortion constitutionally protected in Europe.[32]

After Fredrik Reinfeldt became leader, the party slowly moved further towards the political centre and also adopted pragmatic views. The party abandoned several of its old key features such as a proportional income tax and increased military spending. Criticism of the labour laws, its former characteristic which was neoliberal, was changed towards conserving the Swedish model and a careful embracing of balance on the labour market.[33]

With the ascension of Anna Kinberg Batra as party leader, the party adjusted its position in the political spectrum and moved back towards the political right.[34] The party abandoned its previously liberal stance on immigration, notably manifested by Fredrik Reinfeldt's summer speech in 2014 in which he appealed for "open hearts" to meet the expected migrant waves. The party supports border controls and tougher rules for immigrants, including temporary residence permits, stricter requirements for family reunification and cuts in welfare benefits.[35][36] Swedish values was a recurring subject in Anna Kindberg Batra's speech at the Almedalen Week in 2016, and she said that immigrants should make efforts to learn the Swedish language and take part of Swedish societal orientation, or risk getting reduced benefits and harder to get permanent residence permits.[37] Since 2015, the party has taken up its demand for increased military spending, and has supported the re-introduction of mandatory military service, inactivated in Sweden under Fredrik Reinfeldt in 2010.[38][39]

The party is in favour of Swedish membership of NATO and supported Sweden's application for membership.[40] The party expressed a wish that a membership is applied for together with Finland which is what happened in May 2022.[41]

Voter base

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Statistical changes in voter base

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Socio-economic group and gender of voters
 Percentage of which voting for the Moderates
Groups/Gender 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022
Blue-collar workers 7 16 19 13 14 14
White-collar workers 21 32 34 26 22 21
Businessmen and farmers 25 44 38 35 29 25
Male 16 31 32 25 21 21
Female 11 23 26 22 19 17
Source: [42]

Election results

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Riksdag

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Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Status
1911 Gustaf Fredrik Östberg 188,691 31.1 (#2)
65 / 230
 Opposition
Mar 1914 Arvid Lindman 286,250 37.7 (#1)
86 / 230
 Increase 21 Opposition
Sep 1914 268,631 36.7 (#1)
86 / 230
 Steady Opposition (1914–1917)
Minority (1917)
1917 182,070 24.7 (#3)
59 / 230
 Decrease 27 Opposition
1920 183,019 27.9 (#2)
70 / 230
 Increase 11 Opposition
1921 449,257 25.8 (#2)
62 / 230
 Decrease 8 Opposition (1921–1923)
Minority (1923–1924)
1924 461,257 26.1 (#2)
65 / 230
 Increase 3 Opposition
1928 692,434 29.4 (#2)
73 / 230
 Increase 8 Minority (1928–1930)
Opposition (1930–1932)
1932 576,053 23.1 (#2)
58 / 230
 Decrease 15 Opposition
1936 Gösta Bagge 512,781 17.6 (#2)
44 / 230
 Decrease 9 Opposition (1936–1939)
Coalition (1939–1940)
1940 518,346 18.0 (#2)
42 / 230
 Decrease 2 Coalition
1944 488,921 15.8 (#2)
39 / 230
 Decrease 3 Coalition (1944–1945)
Opposition (1945–1948)
1948 Fritiof Domö 478,779 12.3 (#2)
23 / 230
 Decrease 16 Opposition
1952 Jarl Hjalmarson 543,825 14.4 (#3)
31 / 230
 Increase 8 Opposition
1956 663,693 17.1 (#3)
42 / 231
 Increase 11 Opposition
1958 750,332 19.5 (#2)
45 / 233
 Increase 3 Opposition
1960 704,365 16.6 (#3)
39 / 233
 Decrease 6 Opposition
1964 Gunnar Heckscher 582,609 13.7 (#4)
33 / 233
 Decrease 6 Opposition
1968 Yngve Holmberg 621,031 12.9 (#4)
32 / 233
 Decrease 1 Opposition
1970 573,812 11.5 (#4)
41 / 350
 Increase 9 Opposition
1973 Gösta Bohman 737,584 14.3 (#3)
51 / 350
 Increase 10 Opposition
1976 847,672 15.6 (#3)
55 / 349
 Increase 4 Coalition (1976–1978)
Opposition (1978–1979)
1979 1,108,406 20.3 (#2)
73 / 349
 Increase 18 Coalition (1979–1981)
External support (1981–1982)
1982 Ulf Adelsohn 1,313,337 23.6 (#2)
86 / 349
 Increase 13 Opposition
1985 1,187,335 21.3 (#2)
76 / 349
 Decrease 10 Opposition
1988 Carl Bildt 983,226 18.3 (#2)
66 / 349
 Decrease 10 Opposition
1991 1,199,394 21.9 (#2)
80 / 349
 Increase 14 Coalition
1994 1,243,253 22.4 (#2)
80 / 349
 Steady Opposition
1998 1,204,926 22.9 (#2)
82 / 349
 Increase 2 Opposition
2002 Bo Lundgren 791,660 15.1 (#2)
55 / 349
 Decrease 27 Opposition
2006 Fredrik Reinfeldt 1,456,014 26.2 (#2)
97 / 349
 Increase 42 Coalition
2010 1,791,766 30.1 (#2)
107 / 349
 Increase 10 Coalition
2014 1,403,630 23.3 (#2)
84 / 349
 Decrease 23 Opposition
2018 Ulf Kristersson 1,284,698 19.8 (#2)
70 / 349
 Decrease 14 Opposition
2022 1,237,428 19.1 (#3)
68 / 349
 Decrease 2 Coalition

European Parliament

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Election List leader Votes % Seats +/– EP Group
1995 Staffan Burenstam Linder 621,568 23.17 (#2)
5 / 22
 New EPP
1999 524,755 20.75 (#2)
5 / 22
 Steady EPP-ED
2004 Gunnar Hökmark 458,398 18.25 (#2)
4 / 19
 Decrease 1
2009 596,710 18.83 (#2)
4 / 18
4 / 20
 Steady
Steady 		EPP
2014 507,488 13.65 (#3)
3 / 20
 Decrease 1
2019 Tomas Tobé 698,770 16.83 (#2)
4 / 20
 Increase 1
2024 736,079 17.53 (#2)
4 / 21
 Steady

Organization

[edit]

The party is organised on national, county and municipal level. Currently the party has around 600 local party associations and 26 county or city associations[43] Each county or city association sends delegates to the party congress, which is held every third year.[44] The 200 congress delegates elect a party chairman, two deputy party chairmen, and members of the party board.[44] The party board appoints a party secretary.[44]

In February 2022, the party's reported membership is 49,768 people, the second largest membership count after the Social Democrats.[45]

Affiliated organizations

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The Moderate Party has the following affiliated groups and organizations:

  • Moderate Youth League (Moderata ungdomsförbundet, abbr. MUF), organizes students and young members.
  • Moderate Seniors (Moderata seniorer [mʊdɛˈrɑ̌ːta sɛnɪˈǒːrɛr] ⓘ), organizes senior members.
  • Moderate Women (Moderatkvinnorna), organizes female members.
  • Open Moderates (Öppna moderater Swedish pronunciation: [ˈœ̂pːna mʊdɛˈrɑ̌ːtɛr]), organizes queer members.

Leaders

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Chairpersons

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Timeline

[edit]
Ulf KristerssonAnna Kinberg BatraFredrik ReinfeldtBo LundgrenCarl BildtUlf AdelsohnGösta BohmanYngve HolmbergGunnar HeckscherJarl HjalmarsonFritiof DomöGösta BaggeArvid LindmanHugo TammAxel SvedeliusGustaf Fredrik Östberg

First deputy party chairpersons (since 1935)

[edit]

Timeline

[edit]
Elisabeth SvantessonPeter DanielssonGunilla CarlssonChris HeisterLars TobissonStaffan Burenstam LinderGösta BohmanLeif CasselMartin SkoglundBernhard Johansson

Second deputy party chairpersons (since 1935)

[edit]

Timeline

[edit]
Anna TenjeElisabeth SvantessonBeatrice AskKristina Axén OlinGunilla CarlssonGun HellsvikIngegerd TroedssonElla Tengbom-VelanderEric KrönmarkYngve NilssonRolf EliassonGunnar HeckscherKnut EwerlöfJarl HjalmarsonFritiof DomöKarl Magnusson

Party secretaries (since 1949)

[edit]

Timeline

[edit]
Karin EnströmGunnar StrömmerAnders EdholmTomas TobéKent Persson (politician)Sofia ArkelstenPer SchlingmannSven Otto LittorinJohnny MagnussonGunnar HökmarkPer UnckelGeorg DanellLars TobissonBertil af UgglasSam NilssonYngve HolmbergGunnar Svärd

National ombudsmen (1909–1965)

[edit]

Prime Ministers

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Moderate Party

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Moderate Party (Swedish: Moderata samlingspartiet, commonly known as Moderaterna or the Moderates) is a liberal-conservative in advocating free-market economics, tax reductions, personal freedoms, and robust national defense. Founded on October 17, 1904, as the General Electoral League by conservative parliamentarians seeking to counter socialist influences, the party initially emphasized protection of property rights, , and military strength before evolving toward modern center-right . It has alternated between opposition to dominant Social Democratic rule and participation in non-socialist coalitions, notably forming s under leaders like (1991–1994), (2006–2014), and currently (since 2022), during which it has pursued welfare reforms, deregulation, and fiscal discipline amid Sweden's high-tax . In recent decades, the party has hardened its stance on and , reflecting voter concerns over integration failures and rising , while cooperating with broader right-wing alliances to challenge left-leaning dominance.

History

Origins as General Electoral League (1904–1938)

The General Electoral League (Allmänna Valmansförbundet, AVF) was founded on 17–18 October 1904 at a meeting in , initiated by Gustaf Fredrik Östberg with Gustaf Gustafsson tasked with building the organization. It emerged as a national coordinating body for conservative and protectionist factions within the , primarily to counter the rising influence of liberal and socialist parties by mobilizing voter support and unifying disparate right-wing elements. The AVF positioned itself as an alliance of industrial ("") and agricultural ("") interests, advocating for tariffs, robust national defense, and economic policies favoring business and farming. In its early years, the AVF benefited from the political crisis of 1905–1906, during which King appointed Arvid Lindman as , leading to the formation of the first Lindman cabinet (1906–1911). This government enacted universal male in 1907 through a system of with "double proportionality," alongside reforms strengthening military preparedness and introducing protective tariffs to shield domestic industries. The AVF supported these measures while opposing radical socialist agendas, and it also backed women's eligibility for local political offices and initiated investigations into folk pensions as moderate social reforms. Arvid Lindman assumed leadership of the AVF in 1912, guiding it through World War I neutrality and subsequent electoral contests. The party achieved notable success in the first general elections under the new system, garnering 25.8% of the vote in 1921 and peaking at 29.4% in 1928, which enabled Lindman's second cabinet (1928–1930). This period saw continued emphasis on defense enhancements and economic stability amid global shifts, though the onset of the eroded support as social democrats capitalized on welfare demands. By the mid-1930s, internal women's organizations within the AVF merged in 1937 under Alexandra Skoglund, reflecting efforts to broaden grassroots engagement. The league maintained its conservative core, prioritizing anti-socialist stances and causal links between strong institutions, defense, and prosperity, but faced mounting challenges from the expanding social democratic model, culminating in the decision to rebrand as Högerns riksorganisation in to modernize its image.

Transition to National Organization of the Right and Conservative Party (1938–1969)

![Jarl Hjalmarson, leader of the party from 1950 to 1961](./assets/Hjalmarson_22 In 1938, the General Electoral League underwent a structural reorganization and name change to the National Organization of the Right (Riksföreningen Nationella Partiet Högern), commonly referred to as Högern or the Right Party, to establish itself as a modern political party rather than a mere electoral alliance and to explicitly embrace its conservative positioning amid rising social democratic influence. This transition reflected efforts to consolidate conservative forces, strengthen party infrastructure, and appeal to voters concerned with national defense and economic liberalism in the lead-up to World War II. Under leader Gösta Bagge, the party advocated for robust military preparedness while supporting Sweden's neutrality policy, which involved limited economic concessions to Germany, such as iron ore exports and troop transit rights, to avoid invasion. During the war years, Högern's support surged in the 1940 , securing 23.8% of the vote and 42 seats in the Second Chamber, driven by public anxiety over security threats and the perceived need for conservative stability. Post-war, as Social Democrats entrenched expansions, the party positioned itself in opposition, criticizing excessive state intervention, high taxation, and centralized planning, while promoting private enterprise and fiscal restraint; election results varied, with 22.1% in 1948 but declining to 13.9% in 1952 amid economic recovery under socialist governance. In 1952, the party renamed itself the Conservative Party (Konservativa partiet) to underscore its commitment to traditional values, , and market-oriented policies, distancing from the potentially divisive "right" label associated with pre-war extremism and aiming to broaden appeal in a democratized electorate. Leadership passed to Jarl Hjalmarson in 1950, who emphasized and alliance-building with liberal and agrarian parties against social democratic dominance. By the 1960s, under Gunnar Heckscher from 1961, the party began internal reforms, including youth wing modernization and policy shifts toward on issues like education, while maintaining core economic ; it achieved 17.7% in the 1968 election, signaling potential for future gains but highlighting persistent challenges from welfare consensus.

Rebranding as Moderate Party and Liberal-Conservative Consolidation (1969–2006)

In 1969, the party rebranded from the Right Party to the Moderate Coalition Party (Moderata samlingspartiet) in response to declining electoral support and to project a more modern, less rigidly conservative image aimed at broadening its voter base beyond traditional elites. This shift emphasized liberal-conservative principles, including support for private enterprise and individual freedoms, while accepting the postwar framework established by Social Democrats, thereby consolidating internal factions around pragmatic economic reforms rather than outright opposition to social programs. Under Gösta Bohman's leadership from 1970 to 1981, the party advanced this consolidation by adopting more market-oriented policies, such as advocating reduced regulations and incentives for , which marked a departure from earlier protectionist toward neoliberal influences gaining traction internationally. Bohman positioned the Moderates as a viable alternative to Social Democratic dominance, participating in non-socialist coalition governments from 1976 to 1982, where he served as Minister of , focusing on fiscal discipline amid Sweden's economic challenges like and slowdowns. Electoral performance reflected gradual stabilization: the party secured 19.0% of the vote in 1970, dipped to 14.3% in 1973 amid economic discontent, but rebounded to 20.3% in 1979, according to official statistics. Ulf Adelsohn's tenure as leader from 1981 to 1986 intensified debates on tax reductions and , though internal divisions and strains limited gains, with vote shares at 23.6% in 1982 and 21.7% in 1985. Carl Bildt's as leader in 1986 further unified the party's liberal-conservative core, blending free-market advocacy with pro-European integration and defense strengthening, culminating in leading a non-socialist to power in 1991 after securing 21.0% of the vote. The Bildt (1991–1994) implemented verifiable reforms, including of state assets and spending cuts to address a banking crisis and deficit exceeding 11% of GDP in 1993, though it lost power in 1994 with 22.2% support amid recovery efforts. Bildt's era solidified the party's commitment to causal economic realism, prioritizing incentives over expansive redistribution. Post-1994 opposition under Bildt until 1999, followed by Bo Lundgren (1999–2003), exposed vulnerabilities, with vote shares falling to 15.2% in 1998 and 15.3% in 2002 amid scandals and perceived rigidity on welfare issues. Fredrik Reinfeldt's ascension in 2003 initiated renewed consolidation, moderating rhetoric on taxes and labor markets to appeal to centrist voters while maintaining core liberal-conservative tenets like and security priorities, setting the stage for improved cohesion by 2006. This period overall transformed the party from a marginal conservative into a structured liberal-conservative entity capable of challenging Social Democratic through adaptation.

Alliance Era and Economic Reforms (2006–2014)

The Moderate Party, under the leadership of Fredrik Reinfeldt who assumed the party chairmanship in 2003, spearheaded the formation of the Alliance for Sweden in 2004, a center-right coalition comprising the Moderates, Liberals, Center Party, and Christian Democrats. This alliance campaigned on a platform of economic liberalization and welfare recalibration, emphasizing increased labor participation through tax incentives and reduced benefit disincentives. In the September 17, 2006, general election, the Alliance secured 48.2% of the vote, defeating the incumbent Social Democrats' 35%, enabling Reinfeldt to become Prime Minister on October 6, 2006, marking the first center-right government in Sweden since 1991. Central to the government's economic agenda was a series of reductions aimed at boosting and consumption, with five major rounds implemented between 2006 and 2014, including targeted relief for low- and middle-income earners and pensioners. These cuts, which exceeded those of any other country in scale during the period, were financed partly by trimming and sickness benefits to encourage workforce entry, aligning with the slogan "more people in work instead of welfare." rates were also lowered from 26.3% to 22% by 2013 through phased reductions, enhancing competitiveness. The reforms contributed to robust economic outcomes amid the global ; Sweden's GDP grew at an average annual rate of approximately 1.5% from to 2014, with a notable rebound post-2009, while maintaining fiscal surpluses and low public debt. Net job creation exceeded 300,000 positions, and , which peaked at around 8.5% in 2010, declined to about 7.9% by 2014, reflecting effective labor activation policies. Pension system adjustments, including linking benefits more closely to contributions and raising retirement ages, sustained the earlier notional defined contribution framework without major overhauls. The secured re-election in 2010 with 49.3% of the vote, forming a supported by tacit agreements, allowing continuation of pro-market policies like further tax relief totaling around 15 billion SEK annually in later years. However, by 2014, voter fatigue with benefit reductions and rising concerns led to electoral defeat, with the Moderates dropping to 23.3% amid gains for the Social Democrats and . Despite criticisms of increased inequality from tax policies, empirical data showed sustained public finances and outperforming peers in recovery.

Post-Power Realignment and Response to Immigration and Crime Crises (2014–2022)

Following the Moderate Party's defeat in the 2014 general election, where it secured 23.3% of the vote amid criticism of its liberal immigration policies under , the party underwent internal reflection and leadership transition. Reinfeldt resigned shortly after the loss, and assumed leadership in January 2015. The , during which received 162,877 asylum applications— the highest per capita in the EU—exposed integration challenges, including strained welfare systems and rising social tensions. In response, the Moderates advocated for stricter asylum rules, supporting the government's November 2015 temporary border controls and advocating alignment with more restrictive EU norms, marking a departure from prior openness. Under Kinberg Batra, the party proposed incentives and reduced family reunifications, but internal divisions and failure to regain voter trust led to her resignation in 2017. Kristersson's election as leader signaled a sharper pivot, emphasizing causal links between unchecked , failed integration, and escalating . Swedish government data indicate foreign-born individuals are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as suspects than native-born , with gang-related shootings and bombings surging from 17 in 2011 to over 100 annually by 2018, disproportionately involving immigrant-background perpetrators. The Moderates highlighted these empirical realities, calling for deportations of rejected asylum seekers, tougher sentencing for gang , and prioritized resources in high-risk migrant-heavy areas. In the 2018 election, the Moderates polled 19.8%, a decline reflecting voter migration to the (17.5%), who capitalized on immigration discontent. Post-election, Kristersson abandoned the Alliance's exclusion of the , proposing cooperation on restrictive and anti-crime measures, including value-based and enhanced police powers. This realignment acknowledged the limitations of prior multicultural policies, prioritizing and integration realism over ideological commitments. By 2022, the party's platform demanded paradigm shifts, such as suspending asylum until integration capacity was assured and linking benefits to , driven by of parallel societies and rates exceeding 50% among non-Western immigrants.

Tidö Agreement and Current Governance (2022–present)

Following the September 11, 2022, Riksdag election, where the right-wing bloc secured a narrow majority with 176 of 349 seats, the Moderate Party led negotiations resulting in the Tidö Agreement, a 60-page political platform signed on October 14, 2022, with the Christian Democrats and Liberals, and parliamentary confidence-and-supply support from the Sweden Democrats. This enabled Moderate Party leader Ulf Kristersson to be elected Prime Minister on October 17, 2022, forming a minority coalition government comprising the three parties, which together held 73 seats but relied on Sweden Democrats' 73 seats for legislative passage. The agreement, named after Tidö Castle where talks occurred, emphasized restoring law and order amid rising gang violence, controlling migration to address integration failures evidenced by disproportionate crime involvement among certain immigrant groups, bolstering energy security post-Ukraine invasion, and pursuing tax reductions alongside welfare reforms tied to work incentives. The government's initial actions included enacting temporary legislation in June 2023 to tighten asylum rules, cap family reunifications, and facilitate deportations of rejected applicants, reducing net migration from 2015 peaks linked to welfare strain and public safety declines, with preliminary data showing a 20% drop in asylum applications by 2024. On crime, reforms raised minimum sentences for gang-related offenses, expanded police resources by 4,800 officers, and introduced for youth offenders, contributing to a reported stabilization in fatal shootings after years of escalation driven by no-go zones and parallel societies. Economic measures featured cuts for young workers and tax repeal in the 2025 budget to spur competitiveness, while defense spending surged to 2.6% of GDP by 2025, facilitating 's NATO accession on March 7, 2024, amid heightened Baltic security threats. As of October 2025, the persists despite internal Liberal Party frictions over ' influence, with the Tidö framework extended informally as "Tidö 2.0" to advance further restrictions, including Moderate proposals for an integration "Sweden Contract" mandating adherence to core values like equality and for residency benefits. Empirical outcomes include improved metrics, such as fewer bombings, but challenges remain from opposition-led municipal resistance and judicial backlogs, underscoring causal links between prior lax policies and societal costs the agreement seeks to reverse. The government's September 9, 2025, policy statement reaffirmed priorities on fiscal discipline, with a projected surplus by 2026, prioritizing empirical adjustments over ideological .

Ideology and Principles

Foundational Liberal-Conservative Tenets

The Moderate Party's liberal-conservative ideology rests on the core tenets of individual , personal responsibility, , and a robust , which together form the bedrock of its approach to and society. These principles emphasize empowering individuals to shape their lives through voluntary choices and market-driven incentives, while conserving institutional frameworks that promote stability and . is understood not as unfettered license but as the to act without undue state interference, enabling personal agency in economic and social spheres; this aligns with the party's historical advocacy for market liberalization, such as dismantling public monopolies in and during the 1990s. Personal responsibility counters dependency on expansive welfare systems, positing that self-reliance fosters both individual dignity and collective prosperity, as evidenced by the party's consistent push for tax reductions and reduced public spending to reward effort over entitlement. Complementing these liberal elements are conservative commitments to security and , where the state ensures protection of citizens' and national cohesion against threats to . Security—encompassing physical safety, legal predictability, and economic stability—is framed as a prerequisite for exercising , drawing from the causal insight that unchecked disorder erodes incentives for productive behavior and . is elevated as a societal , with policies aimed at low barriers to business formation and to harness for growth; data from periods of Moderate-led governance, such as the 2006–2014 era, show correlations between and rising employment rates among working-age populations. The serves as the impartial arbiter, enforcing contracts, property , and equal application of justice to prevent arbitrary power, reflecting a first-principles recognition that predictable institutions enable long-term planning and trust essential for liberal societies. This synthesis avoids ideological purism, acknowledging trade-offs: liberal economic openness must be tempered by conservative safeguards against and cultural erosion. , rather than enforced equality of outcomes, underscores the framework, with empirical emphasis on merit-based advancement over redistributive leveling; party documents assert that every individual merits basic respect and the to pursue life goals, provided choices do not infringe on others' . Historically rooted in opposition to pre-WWII collectivism, these tenets have endured rebrandings, adapting to Sweden's without abandoning the view that sustainable progress stems from decentralized decision-making and voluntary cooperation over centralized fiat.

Empirical Shifts Toward Causal Realism on Welfare, Economy, and Security

![Ulf Kristersson, Moderate Party leader and Swedish Prime Minister][float-right] The Moderate Party has progressively incorporated empirical evidence into its policy framework, emphasizing causal mechanisms that link welfare generosity to labor market disincentives, economic overregulation to stagnation, and unchecked immigration to heightened insecurity. This evolution, particularly evident since the mid-2010s amid rising crime rates and integration challenges, reflects a departure from earlier consensus-driven approaches toward targeted interventions informed by data on dependency cycles and socioeconomic outcomes. On welfare, the party has championed the "work line" principle, prioritizing activation policies over indefinite benefits to counteract empirical patterns of long-term and welfare traps, especially among migrant populations. During the 2006–2014 government, reforms reduced unemployment benefit durations from indefinite to 300 days for those under 57 and introduced partial earning allowances, correlating with an employment rate increase from 73.2% in 2006 to 77.5% in 2014. Under the 2022 , further overhauls mandate work requirements for benefit eligibility, aiming to replace passive support with incentives that address the 14 percentage point gap between native-born (86%) and foreign-born (72%) individuals in 2022, thereby mitigating fiscal strains from non-integration. In , Moderaterna has advocated and reductions grounded in evidence of how high marginal rates and bureaucratic hurdles impede and , drawing lessons from Sweden's recovery through market-oriented adjustments. Post-2014, the party has pushed for evidence-based retrenchment, recognizing that unchecked public spending erodes competitiveness, as seen in sustained GDP per capita growth averaging 1.8% annually from 2006–2014 under prior reforms, while critiquing excessive redistribution for distorting labor supply. The Tidö framework extends this by prioritizing fiscal discipline and private sector incentives to counter expansions that empirical analyses link to rising inequality and reduced work effort. Regarding security, the party has shifted toward stringent measures acknowledging the causal role of selective failures in fueling and overrepresentation in , with foreign-born individuals 2.5 times more likely to be suspects and those with two foreign-born parents 3.2 times more likely, even after adjustments for demographics yielding factors of 1.8 and 1.7. This realism underpins Tidö commitments to expand police resources, impose tougher sentences, and dismantle criminal networks, responding to 391 shootings in 2022—many tied to —and a surge in lethal from 17 cases in 2011 to 116 in 2022, attributing these to integration deficits rather than abstract socioeconomic factors alone.

Political Positions

Economic Policies: Tax Cuts, Deregulation, and Market Incentives

The Moderate Party emphasizes tax reductions as a core mechanism to stimulate economic activity, increase labor supply, and reward productivity, arguing that high marginal tax rates distort incentives and hinder growth. During the 1991–1994 Bildt government, led by Moderate prime minister Carl Bildt, income tax rates were lowered for high earners while public spending was curtailed to balance fiscal pressures from the early 1990s banking crisis. In the 2006–2014 Alliance administration under Fredrik Reinfeldt, further tax cuts targeted payroll taxes and capital gains, reducing the effective tax wedge on labor by approximately 5 percentage points for average earners, which correlated with rising employment rates from 74% to 77% of the working-age population. More recently, the 2022 Tidö Agreement, forming the basis of the Kristersson cabinet, prioritized lowering taxes on earned income and pensions to boost workforce participation, with the 2024 budget proposing reductions in labor taxes equivalent to 20 billion SEK annually. The 2025 budget expanded this approach, including tax relief for workers, pensioners, and companies totaling around 80 billion SEK in reforms aimed at countering economic stagnation. On deregulation, the party supports easing bureaucratic burdens to enhance business flexibility and , viewing excessive regulation as a barrier to and . Historical reforms under Moderate influence in the included liberalizing , , and financial markets, which empirical studies attribute to a productivity dividend through reduced entry barriers and increased competition. The commits to cutting administrative costs for enterprises, such as simplifying permitting processes for construction and projects, to accelerate development and private sector expansion. Party manifestos have long advocated privatization of state monopolies and reduced in labor markets to foster dynamic allocation of resources, with recent proposals targeting in and to address supply shortages. Market incentives form a foundational element of Moderate economic strategy, promoting competition and private initiative over state intervention to drive efficiency and welfare gains. Key implementations include the introduction of voucher-based in the early , enabling parental selection of providers and spurring a proliferation of independent schools that improved educational outcomes via . The Reinfeldt era extended this to healthcare and elder care, allowing patient-driven provider competition funded by tax-financed vouchers, which expanded capacity without proportional spending increases. Under current governance, incentives target through R&D tax credits broadened to encompass more business activities and reduced corporate taxes to attract , with the 2025 proposals including lower VAT on essentials like food to stimulate consumption. These policies rest on the causal premise that aligning individual rewards with productive effort—via lower taxes, fewer rules, and competitive markets—yields superior growth compared to redistributive models, as evidenced by Sweden's post-reform GDP per capita gains outpacing averages in the 2000s.

Social and Cultural Policies: Family Values and Integration Realities

The Moderate Party advocates for family policies that prioritize parental choice and economic incentives to encourage workforce participation, including reforms to systems to enhance flexibility while maintaining support for child-rearing. In government under the 2022 , the party has endorsed measures to strengthen family support through targeted child allowances and tax relief for families, aiming to reduce by linking benefits to activation. These positions reflect a causal emphasis on , where empirical data on long-term leave's impact on gender wage gaps and labor market outcomes informs proposals for shorter, more adaptable leave periods to align with market realities. On integration, the party has shifted toward stringent requirements grounded in evidence of prior policy failures, mandating Swedish language proficiency, civic orientation courses, and employment participation as prerequisites for permanent residency and full welfare access. Party leader Ulf Kristersson, as Prime Minister, has publicly stated that Sweden's integration efforts over the past two decades have faltered, resulting in parallel societies and elevated gang violence, with official crime statistics showing disproportionate involvement of foreign-born individuals in organized crime networks. This stance includes proposals for temporary residence permits, restricted family reunification, and benefit reductions for non-compliant immigrants, justified by data linking lax integration to welfare strain and social segregation. These policies underscore a commitment to Swedish values—such as individual responsibility and —as bulwarks against empirical risks of non-integration, including heightened rates and eroded social cohesion, with the party planning to center "Swedish values" in its 2026 election platform. While supporting progressive elements like , the approach prioritizes causal interventions over expansive state intervention, critiquing prior multicultural models for fostering dependency rather than genuine societal incorporation.

Foreign and Security Policies: NATO Alignment and Defense Prioritization

The Moderate Party has consistently prioritized Sweden's alignment with , viewing full membership as essential for collective defense against authoritarian threats, particularly following Russia's 2014 annexation of and full-scale invasion of in 2022. Party leader , as opposition head in May 2022, declared Sweden "no longer neutral" and urged immediate NATO application to restore security guarantees eroded by non-alignment policies. This stance contrasted with the ruling Social Democrats' initial hesitation, reflecting Moderaterna's empirical assessment that bilateral pacts and EU solidarity alone insufficiently deter aggression without Article 5 mutual defense commitments. Under Kristersson's premiership from October 2022, Moderaterna drove Sweden's accession process, culminating in formal membership on March 7, 2024, after parliamentary approval in 2022 and ratification by all allies. In his accession speech, Kristersson emphasized Sweden's role as a "security provider" contributing submarines, combat aircraft, and capabilities to 's northern flank, while committing to interoperability with alliance standards. The party critiques pre-2022 defense underinvestment—Sweden's spending hovered at 1.2% of GDP in 2020—as causally linked to vulnerability, advocating realignment toward deterrence through credible force posture rather than declaratory diplomacy. On defense prioritization, Moderaterna proposes annual budget increases for the (Försvarsmakten), targeting NATO's 2% GDP benchmark by 2026, with allocations for personnel expansion to 90,000 active troops and enhanced integration. This includes investments in high-readiness units, cyber defenses, and total defense concepts syncing and resilience, justified by data on Russia's hybrid threats and Sweden's exposed geography. Unlike prior governments' reliance on and sanctions, the party grounds its policy in first-principles realism: sustained capability deters invasion more effectively than moral suasion, as evidenced by Ukraine's pre-2022 underpreparedness despite diplomatic assurances. Post-accession, Moderaterna supports hosting NATO exercises and potential Centers of Excellence for Russia studies to bolster alliance-wide intelligence.

Immigration and Crime: Restrictive Measures Backed by Crime Data

The has shifted toward advocating restrictive immigration measures, emphasizing the causal links between high levels of non-Western immigration and elevated crime rates, as evidenced by official Swedish statistics. Data from the Swedish indicate that individuals born abroad are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as crime suspects compared to those born in with two Swedish-born parents, a disparity attributed to challenges in integration and socioeconomic factors. This overrepresentation is particularly pronounced in violent crimes, with foreign-born individuals comprising a disproportionate share of suspects in gang-related shootings and other serious offenses, prompting the party to prioritize security in policy formulation. Under Prime Minister , the party has explicitly linked unsustainable volumes to and heightened insecurity, stating in the 2022 Statement of Government Policy that prior policies resulted in "dangerous among many people born in other countries." In the of 2022, which formed the basis for the Moderate-led coalition government, the party committed to tightening asylum rules, expanding deportations for criminal migrants, and limiting family reunifications to reduce inflows and enhance public safety. These measures include raising the evidentiary threshold for asylum claims, prioritizing returns to countries of origin, and allocating resources for increased controls, all justified by the empirical between patterns and trends observed in Brå reports and police data. The party's rationale draws on longitudinal studies showing persistent overrepresentation, such as a 2.1 for among foreign-born individuals compared to natives, even after controlling for age and gender. Kristersson's administration has implemented policies granting police expanded powers for and deportations, targeting concentrated in areas with high immigrant densities, where native face elevated risks of victimization. By 2023, the government outlined further reforms to overhaul migration policy, aiming to lower net to sustainable levels that permit effective integration and mitigate pressures, as articulated in subsequent policy statements. This approach reflects a departure from earlier liberal stances, driven by accumulating evidence of failed multicultural policies contributing to parallel societies and criminal networks.

Electoral Performance

National Elections in Riksdag

The Moderate Party, known as Moderata samlingspartiet, has contested every election since its founding, achieving representation continuously since , with notable fluctuations in support reflecting shifts in Swedish political dynamics. In the post-1970 era, following the unicameral 's establishment, the party experienced growth from modest bases in the early 1970s to peaks in the 1980s and 2000s, often aligning with center-right coalitions. Support dipped in the early 2000s amid economic debates but rebounded under leaders emphasizing tax reductions and , culminating in government participation after the 2006, 2010, and 2022 elections. Election outcomes are determined by proportional representation across 29 constituencies, allocating 310 fixed seats plus 39 leveling seats to approximate national vote shares, with a 4% national threshold for entry. The party's vote shares and seats from 1970 to 2022 are summarized below, drawn from official statistics.
YearDateVote Share (%)Seats
197020 Sep11.839
197316 Sep14.355
197619 Sep15.155
197915 Sep20.373
198219 Sep23.676
198515 Sep21.376
198818 Sep18.355
199115 Sep21.080
199418 Sep22.280
199820 Sep23.282
200215 Sep15.255
200617 Sep26.297
201019 Sep30.1107
201414 Sep23.384
20189 Sep19.870
202211 Sep19.168
Post-2022, the party holds 68 seats as part of the coalition supporting Ulf Kristersson's , marking its fourth period in executive influence since 1976. across these elections averaged above 80%, with the party's strongest performances correlating with opposition to prolonged Social Democratic dominance and emphasis on .

European Parliament Results

In the European Parliament elections since Sweden's entry into the EU in 1995, the Moderate Party has consistently secured seats, affiliating its members with the Group of the (EPP), which emphasizes Christian-democratic and conservative-liberal policies. The party's performance has fluctuated, peaking in 2004 amid favorable national economic conditions under its governance, and declining in periods of opposition, such as post-2006, before stabilizing around 13-17% in recent cycles. This reflects voter priorities on , , and EU integration, with turnout varying from 37.9% in 1995 to 52.1% in 2019. The following table summarizes the party's vote shares and seats won, based on official data from :
YearVote Share (%)SeatsChange in Seats
199513.74—
199912.85+1
200418.45Steady
200913.94-1
201413.63-1
201916.14+1
202417.54Steady
Notable shifts include gains in 2004 correlating with the party's national incumbency and pro-market reforms, while losses in 2014 aligned with broader center-right setbacks amid rising concerns favoring other parties. In 2024, the party retained its four seats despite a fragmented right-wing vote, with MEP candidates focusing on accession support and defense spending increases.

Voter Base Demographics and Shifts

The Moderate Party's voter base has historically been characterized by higher , with disproportionate support among individuals with postsecondary education, higher incomes, and urban residences. (SCB) data from party preference surveys indicate that in recent years, the party garners stronger support among men (approximately 25-28% sympathy) compared to women (18-22%), and among those aged 31-64, particularly in professional and managerial occupations. Support is also elevated among voters in large cities like and , where and market-oriented policies resonate with business owners and white-collar workers, contrasting with more rural or industrial bases of left-leaning parties. In terms of ethnic composition, the party's supporters are predominantly native-born , with limited appeal among foreign-born voters, aligning with its emphasis on integration requirements and . SCB breakdowns show party sympathy below 10% among non-Western immigrants, while native-born voters with concerns over welfare sustainability and provide core backing. Higher education correlates positively with support, as voters with university degrees (over 25% sympathy) favor the party's tax reduction and agenda over redistributive alternatives. Shifts in the voter base since the mid-2010s reflect responses to rising , , and integration challenges. Following the migrant influx, the party lost ground to the (SD), with former Moderate voters—particularly working-class men in suburban and smaller urban areas—migrating to SD due to perceived leniency on border controls. By the 2022 election, however, Moderaterna stabilized at 19.1% nationally, achieving net gains of about 0.8 percentage points from SD sympathizers in subsequent SCB surveys through adoption of stricter and law-and-order policies in the . This recalibration attracted security-focused voters from across the right-wing spectrum, modestly broadening appeal to lower-middle-income groups without eroding the affluent urban core, as evidenced by persistent overrepresentation among high earners and entrepreneurs. Overall, while the base remains skewed toward educated urban males, recent hardening on causal drivers of social strain—like unchecked migration and gang violence—has facilitated retention amid bloc-wide rightward realignment.

Factors Driving Support Changes: Empirical Analysis of Crime and Integration Data

Empirical data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) indicate that individuals with foreign-born backgrounds are significantly overrepresented in crime statistics, with conviction risks approximately twice that of native Swedes across various offense categories from 1973 to 2017. A 2019 Brå literature review of Nordic studies confirmed this pattern, attributing it to factors including socioeconomic conditions and cultural differences rather than solely discrimination in reporting or policing. In 2017, migrants—comprising 33% of the population—accounted for 58% of total crime suspects and 73% of murder and manslaughter suspects, with non-registered migrants linked to 13% of the latter. This overrepresentation extends to violent crimes, where foreign-born individuals and their Swedish-born children show elevated risks, including fivefold higher suspicion rates for murder among those with two foreign-born parents compared to natives. Gang-related violence has surged since 2013, with police data showing increased lethal shootings tied to networks disproportionately involving individuals of migrant backgrounds. By 2024, an estimated 62,000 people were connected to such networks, many recruited from immigrant-heavy suburbs with high . Suspects aged 15-20 in crimes numbered nearly a third of total cases by 2023, reflecting recruitment of second-generation immigrants into narcotics and rackets. These trends correlate with Sweden's foreign-born rising from 11% in 2000 to 20% by 2020, peaking amid asylum inflows from conflict zones with cultural mismatches to Swedish norms. Integration metrics reveal persistent challenges exacerbating drivers, including rates for non-Western immigrants lagging 20-30 percentage points behind natives a decade post-arrival, particularly for low-skilled refugees. remains high, with refugees imposing net fiscal costs estimated at SEK 75,000-150,000 annually per person due to low self-sufficiency and high public service usage. A 10-year follow-up found only partial for labor migrants and refugees, with issues and skill gaps hindering labor market entry. These data patterns have driven Moderate Party support fluctuations by fueling voter prioritization of law-and-order and integration realism. Post-2015 migration peak, public concern over immigrant-linked eroded centrist backing, contributing to Moderates' vote share drop from 23.3% in 2014 to 19.8% in 2018 amid perceptions of insufficiently restrictive policies. The party's subsequent pivot—adopting stricter controls, zero-tolerance for foreign-born criminals, and emphasis on —aligned with of integration failures, enabling a 2022 electoral recovery to 19.1% and government formation via Tideman collaboration with the . Polling linked this rebound to fears, with 2022 campaigns highlighting gang violence statistics to recapture voters disillusioned by prior liberal stances. Critics from left-leaning sources attribute shifts to , but causal analysis ties gains to addressing verifiable overrepresentation and welfare strains rather than rhetoric alone.
MetricNative SwedesForeign-Born/Immigrant BackgroundSource
Crime Suspect Share (2017 Total)42%58% (33% share)
Murder/Manslaughter Suspects (2017)27%73%
Conviction Risk Ratio (1973-2017)1x~2x
Murder Suspicion Risk (Parental Background)1x5x (two foreign-born parents)

Organizational Structure

Party Leadership and Internal Governance

The Moderate Party's leadership is centered on the party chairman, who serves as the primary spokesperson and directs overall strategy. has held this position since his election on 1 October 2017 at an extraordinary party following the resignation of . The chairman is elected by delegates at the national party congress (partikongress), the party's supreme decision-making body, which convenes every three years and comprises around 200 representatives from district and local associations. This congress also selects two deputy chairmen and members of the party board (partistyrelsen), responsible for executing policies between congresses. The party board, led by the chairman, oversees daily operations and appoints the party secretary, who manages administrative functions and organizational development. Karin Enström has served as party secretary since October 2022. Internal emphasizes a balance between centralized and decentralized implementation, with 26 district organizations and approximately 600 local associations handling regional and municipal activities. Membership stood at 49,768 as of early 2022, supporting involvement in candidate selection and policy input. Governance reflects tensions between the party's liberal economic wing and more conservative social elements, influencing board composition and congress debates. For instance, shifts in leadership have alternately emphasized market liberalization under figures like (2003–2015) and security-focused conservatism under Kristersson. Ethical guidelines and conduct standards are maintained through internal strategies, though Swedish parties generally rely on elite-driven processes rather than broad member votes for leadership selection.

Affiliated Organizations and Youth Wings

The Moderate Youth League (Moderata Ungdomsförbundet, MUF), established in 1934 as the Young Swedes and adopting its current name in 1969, serves as the official of the Moderate Party, targeting individuals aged 12 to 30. With over 20,000 members, it operates as the largest political youth organization in and the Nordic region, emphasizing a blend of classical liberal and conservative principles through independent district activities and an executive board chaired by Douglas Thor. The league maintains specialized sections, including Moderata Studenter for students and Moderat Skolungdom for school-aged members, while holding international affiliations with the Youth of the (YEPP), the International Young Democrat Union (IYDU), and the Nordic Young Conservative Union (NUU). Moderatkvinnorna functions as the Moderate Party's women's federation, focusing on policy development, women's political education, and efforts to dismantle barriers to female advancement within the party and society. Operating as a network across regions, it engages in advocacy on issues such as and economic opportunities, with local chapters like those in and Jämtland counties promoting moderate values tailored to female perspectives. The Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, designated as the Moderate Party's foundation for international democracy assistance, supports global cooperation and integration based on principles of freedom, democracy, and market economics, primarily funded through Swedish government allocations. It conducts training for politicians aligned with moderate ideologies and hosts events on party building and campaigning, often featuring Swedish experts.

Key Leaders and Figures

Chairpersons and Their Tenures

The chairperson of the Moderate Party serves as the party's leader, directing its political strategy and representing it in public discourse. The position has been held by individuals who have shaped the party's from its conservative roots to its current center-right liberal-conservative orientation. Notable early leaders include Arvid Lindman, who led from 1912 to 1935 and served as during two terms, implementing key reforms such as universal male suffrage. Post-World War II chairpersons focused on modernizing the party amid Sweden's social democratic dominance.
ChairpersonTenure
Jarl Hjalmarson1950–1961
Yngve Holmberg1961–1970
Gösta Bohman1970–1981
Ulf Adelsohn1981–1986
1986–1999
Bo Lundgren1999–2003
2003–2015
2015–2017
2017–present
Gösta Bohman expanded the party's appeal, making it the largest non-socialist party by 1976. led the party to government in 1991, serving as Prime Minister until 1994. Fredrik Reinfeldt's tenure saw and two terms in coalition government from 2006 to 2014. , the incumbent, formed a government in 2022 supported by the .

Prime Ministers and Policy Architects

The Moderate Party, historically rooted in conservative traditions, has produced multiple Prime Ministers who advanced liberal economic reforms and structural changes in . Arvid Lindman, serving from 1906 to 1911 and again from 1928 to 1930, spearheaded early policy innovations including expanded enfranchisement for male citizens, reforms in industry, education, and social welfare, alongside defense enhancements through committee appointments. These efforts reflected the party's initial focus on modernization and , contributing to 's transition toward broader democratic participation. In the modern era, led as from 1991 to 1994, implementing , spending reductions, of public services, and negotiating Sweden's accession agreement. His administration's emphasis on addressed fiscal challenges post-financial crisis, fostering market-oriented policies that influenced subsequent conservative governance. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Prime Minister from 2006 to 2014, architected the "New Moderates" strategy, prioritizing tax reductions, welfare adjustments to promote self-reliance, and labor market reforms that generated over 300,000 jobs amid global recession. His policies enhanced Sweden's competitiveness, reduced welfare dependency, and maintained fiscal discipline, evidenced by sustained economic growth and low unemployment relative to European peers. Ulf Kristersson, serving since October 2022, has prioritized inflation control, economic growth reforms, accession, and the largest military rearmament since the , alongside stricter immigration measures and anti- initiatives to address rising insecurity. These policies respond to empirical trends in migration-related and integration failures, aiming to restore and prosperity through targeted investments in defense and . Beyond Prime Ministers, party figures like Reinfeldt have served as pivotal policy architects by reorienting the Moderates toward pragmatic , balancing free-market principles with social adaptability, though internal tensions persist over ideological shifts.

Policy Impacts and Outcomes

Achievements: Economic Growth and Crime Reduction Initiatives

The Moderate Party-led government under Fredrik from 2006 to 2014 enacted comprehensive tax reductions totaling approximately 140 billion Swedish kronor, alongside reforms to and labor market policies aimed at incentivizing . These measures contributed to the creation of around 300,000 private-sector jobs during the period, despite the , with achieving one of Europe's stronger economic recoveries. Annual GDP growth averaged approximately 1.9% from 2006 to 2014, supported by fiscal discipline that maintained budget surpluses and reduced public spending as a share of GDP. Key initiatives included lowering income taxes and easing hiring regulations, which boosted labor force participation and helped fall from 8.4% in 2006 to around 8% by 2014, though remained a challenge. The government's focus on , including of state assets worth up to 200 billion kronor, enhanced competitiveness and positioned as a high-growth within the during the post-crisis rebound. These policies demonstrated causal links between reduced marginal tax rates and increased work incentives, as evidenced by rising among low-income groups. Under the Moderate-led government of since October , supported by the , crime reduction efforts have emphasized tougher penalties for -related offenses, expanded police powers, and earlier interventions for youth crime. Initiatives include doubling punishments for crimes, lowering the age of criminal responsibility, and increasing resources for anti- operations, resulting in higher solve rates for cases. By late , shooting deaths dropped 35% in December compared to levels, with 40 fatalities reported amid an intensified national anti-crime offensive. Additional measures, such as enhanced parental responsibility laws and stricter controls linked to integration failures, aim to address root causes of rising , which had surged prior to 2022 due to networks exploiting lax . Processed offenses remained stable at around 1.5 million in 2024, per official statistics, while targeted reforms have prioritized lethal violence prevention, with government data showing improved security outcomes from policy shifts. These efforts reflect empirical responses to data indicating disproportionate involvement of non-integrated migrant in serious crimes, prioritizing causal deterrence over prior lenient approaches.

Criticisms: Internal Liberal-Conservative Tensions and Alliance Controversies

The Moderate Party has long experienced ideological friction between its liberal wing, emphasizing economic deregulation, individual freedoms, and international openness, and its conservative faction, prioritizing national sovereignty, traditional values, and stricter social policies. This divide became pronounced during Reinfeldt's leadership (2006–2014), when pro-immigration stances drew sharp internal rebukes from conservatives who viewed them as eroding cultural cohesion amid rising migration pressures. Party analyses have described Moderaterna as "deeply split" along these lines, with the liberal "light-blue" elements clashing against the more nationalist "dark-blue" conservatives, contributing to electoral dips under leaders like . Alliance controversies intensified with Ulf Kristersson's overtures toward the starting in 2018, as regional heavyweights in southern debated local pacts despite national reservations, fracturing party cohesion. Critics within Moderaterna, including vocal members in 2021, argued that ' unchanged ideological roots—tied to historical —undermined the party's liberal credentials, with one internal voice stating, "They have not changed." The 2022 , signed on October 14 by Moderaterna, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and backed by , formalized this shift to secure government formation after the September election, but it amplified rifts by mandating concessions on immigration curbs and , alienating liberals who saw it as pragmatic betrayal of core principles for power. These tensions have manifested in strategic disputes, such as debates over voter retention amid ' rise—polling second nationally by 2022—prompting Moderaterna's rightward pivot that conservatives hailed as necessary realism but liberals decried as ideological dilution. Internal surveys and post-election reviews highlight how such divisions impair unified campaigning, with unresolved conflicts over ' influence risking further erosion of the party's moderate identity. Despite leadership efforts to frame cooperation as matured , the has sustained critiques that it prioritizes electoral math over principled consistency, exacerbating the liberal-conservative .

Controversies and Debates

Relationship with Sweden Democrats: Pragmatism vs. Ideological Purity

The Moderate Party historically maintained a cordon sanitaire against the , refusing formal cooperation due to the latter's origins in fringe nationalist groups and associations with extremism in the and early . Under Fredrik Reinfeldt's leadership from 2006 to 2014, the party emphasized liberal economic policies and openness to , viewing alliances with the Sweden Democrats as incompatible with Moderate values of moderation and internationalism. This stance persisted post-2014, with party leaders arguing that ideological purity preserved the party's appeal to centrist voters and avoided legitimizing what mainstream outlets often described as far-right rhetoric. A pragmatic shift occurred after the 2018 election, when the secured 17.5% of the vote, becoming the third-largest party and blocking the right-wing bloc from power without their support. , elected party leader in 2017 and in 2022, pivoted toward conditional collaboration, stating in October 2022 that the Moderates would work with the Sweden Democrats on key issues like crime and migration without granting them cabinet positions. This culminated in the on October 14, 2022, a policy platform signed by the Moderates, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Sweden Democrats, enabling Kristersson's to pass legislation on stricter asylum rules, increased deportations, and tougher gang crime measures—policies aligned with Moderate priorities but historically unattainable without Sweden Democrat backing. Proponents of pragmatism within the Moderate Party, including Kristersson, argue that excluding the perpetuated Social Democrat dominance and ignored voter demands for controlled and , as evidenced by the right-wing bloc's 176 seats in the 2022 versus the left's 173. By 2024, this approach yielded outcomes like a 20% rise in orders and enhanced police resources, credited with addressing rising statistics from 2015–2022. Kristersson reaffirmed this in May 2024, ruling out ending cooperation despite policy frictions, prioritizing governance stability over purity. Critics of , including some Moderate MPs and former figures, decry the alliance as a betrayal of ideological principles, warning it normalizes Sweden Democrat nativism and erodes the party's liberal-conservative identity. Internal tensions surfaced in debates over adopting Sweden Democrat language on "failed ," with analyses noting Moderate accommodation of such framing to secure votes, though party leadership dismisses purity arguments as electoral suicide amid Sweden Democrat polling at over 20% by 2025. This divide reflects broader causal pressures: demographic shifts and data from sources like the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, which reported a 40% increase tied to networks, compelling Moderates to weigh power's policy leverage against reputational risks from media narratives amplifying Sweden Democrat claims despite their post-2010 moderation efforts.

Accusations of Rightward Shift: Data-Driven Responses to Failed Multiculturalism

Critics, including outlets aligned with progressive viewpoints, have accused the Moderate Party of a pronounced rightward ideological shift, particularly evident in its participation in the 2022 , which formalized cooperation with the to enact stricter immigration controls and prioritize integration requirements. This perception stems from the party's evolution from the more permissive asylum policies under (2006–2014), which emphasized humanitarian intake, to the current administration's focus on border security and deportation of failed integrators under . Party leadership counters that these adjustments represent evidence-based adaptations to verifiable policy shortcomings rather than ideological drift, citing Sweden's documented struggles with mass and inadequate assimilation. Kristersson explicitly stated in April 2022 that the country's integration efforts over the prior two decades had collapsed, fostering parallel societies and escalating gang-related violence disproportionately linked to unintegrated migrant communities. This acknowledgment aligns with official assessments from the Moderate-led government, which highlight overrepresentation of foreign-born individuals in as a core driver necessitating reform. Empirical data underscores these claims: Sweden's foreign-born population rose from 11.3% in 2000 to 20.1% by 2022, coinciding with a surge in lethal incidents from 17 annually in to 62 in 2022, many tied to networks originating from migrant-heavy suburbs. Studies by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) consistently show foreign-born suspects committing violent crimes at rates 2–3 times higher than native Swedes, with non-Western immigrants exhibiting even greater disparities in offenses like and . Government analyses further link this to integration deficits, including high (58% of non-EU migrants reliant on benefits versus 16% of natives) and educational underperformance, perpetuating socioeconomic isolation and criminal recruitment. In response, the Tidö framework introduced measures like tightened family reunification rules, mandatory integration contracts, and expedited returns for criminal non-citizens, yielding initial declines in asylum applications (from 84,000 in 2015 to under 10,000 in 2023) and emigration outpacing immigration in 2024 for the first time in decades. These outcomes, Moderates argue, validate a causal pivot from unchecked multiculturalism—evidenced by Sweden's divergence from Nordic peers in per capita gun deaths (five times Denmark's rate)—toward policies grounded in verifiable integration metrics over ideological openness. Such data-driven recalibration, rather than marking extremism, reflects accountability to rising empirical costs, including a 2023 Brå report noting youth homicide suspects under 20 tripling since 2015 amid gang proliferation.

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  143. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/449251
  144. https://www.dw.com/en/sweden-sees-drop-in-immigration-as-more-people-leave/a-69954145
  145. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1ticq22a
  146. https://ijab.de/en/topics/internationalisation-of-youth-services/current-articles-on-internationalisation-of-youth-services/alarming-rise-in-youth-crime-in-sweden
  147. https://bra.se/english/publications/archive/2024-10-16-swedish-crime-survey-2024
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