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Nanking residents with armbands of the Japanese flag
Chinese civilians assisting Japanese soldiers

In China, the word hanjian (traditional Chinese: 漢奸; simplified Chinese: 汉奸; pinyin: Hànjiān; Wade–Giles: han-chien) is a pejorative term for those seen as traitors to the Chinese state and, to a lesser extent, Han Chinese ethnicity. The word hanjian is distinct from the general word for traitor, which could be used for any country or ethnicity. As a Chinese term, it is a digraph of the Chinese characters for "Han" and "traitor". Han is the majority ethnic group in China; and Jian, in Chinese legal language, primarily referred to illicit sex. Implied by this term was a Han Chinese carrying on an illicit relationship with the enemy.[1] Hanjian is often worded as "collaborator" in the West.

Hanjian
Traditional Chinese漢奸
Simplified Chinese汉奸
Literal meaningHan traitor
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinHànjiān
Wade–GilesHan4-chien1
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingHon3 Gaan1
Southern Min
Hokkien POJHàn-kan

History

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A Chinese propaganda poster titled "Fate of Hanjians", published by the Capital City Resistance War Supporters Association of All Citizens, was posted throughout Nanjing soon after the Battle of Nanking. Clockwise from top right: a hanjian being beaten by a mob; a hanjian who sends a signal to enemy aircraft will die in an air raid; the severed head of a hanjian put on display as a warning to others; a hanjian will be arrested and shot.

The term hanjian emerged from a "conflation of political and ethnic identities, which was often blurred in the expression of Chinese nationalism."[1] It is a label applied to individuals who are designated collaborators and by which were not all ethnically Han. The modern usage of the term stems from the Second Sino-Japanese War in which circumstances forced political figures in China to choose between resistance and collaboration.[1] The nuance in understanding why Chinese individuals would decide to cooperate with the Japanese obscures the seemingly clear-cut definition of hanjian, evolving it into an ambiguous term in modern history.[2]

When observing the era of the Sino-Japanese War, there tends to be two types of hanjian: the educated and intellectuals, who "simply wanted to get power and wealth for themselves"; and the poor and uneducated, whose poverty drove them to collaborate and whose "ignorance saved them from even thinking they had to justify what they were doing".[3] Due to this notion and the modern ambiguity of the term, each of these two categories had various motives with the majority being different but some overlapping.

Officials, journalists, artists and intellectuals

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A portrait of Wang Jingwei

Educated hanjian is often reserved for those who were either scholars or within government. The most infamous hanjian government in mainland China is the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China, often referred to as the Wang Jingwei regime after Wang Jingwei, its president. The Wang Jingwei regime sought to be the dominant governmental force in China and believed it could do so by collaborating and being submissive to Japan in what they deemed as their "Peace Movement". Wang experienced resistance to his government when he visited Shanghai, among other cities. It was recorded that "intellectuals who showed sympathy for Wang risked ostracism, if not death."[4]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the National Revolutionary Army was defeated in various battles by the Imperial Japanese Army. Chiang Kai-shek explained that hanjian espionage helped the Japanese. He ordered CC Clique commander Chen Lifu to arrest the hanjians.[5] 4,000 were arrested in Shanghai[6] and 2,000 in Nanjing.[7] Because martial law was enforced, formal trials were not necessary, and the condemned were executed swiftly, while thousands of men, women and children watched with evident approval.[8]

Uneducated peasants, vagabonds, rebels, and others

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Lee Teng-hui (right) and his brother Lee Teng-chin, who both served in the Japanese army.

Taiwanese soldiers who fought in the Japanese military against Chinese forces and the Allies are also considered to be hanjian.[9] The Republic of China issued an important law in 1937:

The centerpiece of anti-hanjian laws, "Regulations on Handling Hanjian Cases (處理漢奸案件條例; 处理汉奸案件条例; Chŭlǐ Hànjiān Ànjiàn Tiáolì)", promulgated in August 1937, identified collaborators based on their wartime conduct and stipulated punishments regardless of their age, gender, or ethnicity. Popular anti-hanjian discourse, however, paid particular attention to "female collaborators" and deployed a highly gendered vocabulary to attack hanjian suspects of both sexes. Complementing the legal purge of collaborators, such literature brought extreme pressure on individuals targeted as hanjian and influenced how political crimes should be exposed and transposed onto other aspects of social life.[10]

Several Taiwanese were prosecuted by the Nationalist government as hanjian, despite a Judicial Yuan interpretation issued in January 1946 that advised against such action.[11]

After the Sook Ching (肅清; 肃清; Sùqīng) or ethnic cleansing by mass murder of ethnic Chinese opposed to the Japanese occupation of Singapore and Malaya in February–March 1942, Tan Kah Kee, a prominent Chinese industrialist and philanthropist in Southeast Asia, proposed to the provisional Republic of China government to treat all Chinese who attempted to negotiate with the Japanese as hanjians.[citation needed] His proposal was adopted by the Second Legislative Yuan,[citation needed] and was praised by Chinese resistance fighters.

Political usage

[edit]

The term hanjian is also used politically, in both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, to label certain individuals or movements as treasonous to China, Chinese people, or Chinese interests. In the ROC political song, The Anti-Communist and Anti-Russian Aggression Song, the phrase 殺漢奸 – meaning "kill the hanjians" is sung two times. The term is also used to label the so-called "spiritually Japanese", or Chinese people who express opinions sympathetic of Japanese militarism.[12] It has also been used rhetorically by Chinese nationalists and supporters of Chinese unification, to label supporters of Taiwanese independence and Hong Kong independence.[13][14][15]

Notable people who are considered hanjians

[edit]
  • Qin Hui (1091–1155), a Song chancellor who executed a rival politician, Yue Fei, a Song general and war hero who fought against the Jin (a non-Han state) in the Jin-Song Wars.[16] After his death, he was branded a traitor.[17] His political victims, including Yue Fei posthumously, were pardoned by Emperor Xiaozong of Song.
  • Wu Sangui (1612–1678), a Ming general who defected to the Qing (a non-Han state) and executed the Yongli Emperor of Ming.[18] He later betrayed the Qing as well, after being demoted of power.[19]
  • Wang Kemin (1879–1945), who collaborated with the Japanese during World War II and helped to establish the pro-Japan Provisional Government of the Republic of China (or North China Autonomous Government). After the war, he was arrested by the ROC government and tried for treason but committed suicide before his trial ended.
  • Demchugdongrub (1902–1966), commonly known as Prince De, a Mongol leader who collaborated with the Japanese. He was installed by the Japanese as the head of state of Mengjiang, a Japanese puppet state in Inner Mongolia. He was arrested by the PRC government in 1949 and charged with treason but was pardoned later. As he was an ethnic Mongol and not a Han Chinese, some[who?] do not consider him to be a hanjian.
  • Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), a left-wing Kuomintang politician and former close aide of Sun Yat-sen, who turned far-right as he collaborated with the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War. He led the pro-Japan Reorganized National Government of China in Nanjing under the control of the Japanese.
  • Zhou Fohai (1897–1948), the second-in-command of the Wang Jingwei government's Executive Yuan. He was convicted of treason after the war and sentenced to death, but Chiang Kai-shek commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. He died of heart and stomach problems in jail.
  • Chen Gongbo (1892–1946), who served as the head of the Legislative Yuan of the Wang Jingwei government, is seen as one of China's most prominent hanjians.[20] Chen held important positions within the Reorganized Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and succeeded Wang Jingwei as acting chairman after Wang's death in November 1944. Chen was accused of "plotting with the enemy" and "opposing the central government". Chen defended his work with the Reorganized Nationalist Government of the Republic of China by describing it as "negotiating with the Japanese in an attempt to preserve China’s resources, protect its people, and slowly erode Japan’s control over China."[21] He fled to Japan after the war but was extradited back to China, where he was convicted of treason and executed.
  • Yoshiko Kawashima (1907–1948), also known as the "Eastern Jewel", was a Manchu princess raised in Japan who spied for the Japanese in Manchuria. After the war, she was arrested, convicted of treason, and executed. She has been featured in numerous Chinese and Japanese novels, films, television programs, and video games, with the Chinese frequently depicting her as a wanton villain and seductress while the Japanese portrayed her as a tragic heroine. Due to her Manchu ethnicity and Japanese background, some[who?] do not consider her to be a hanjian.
  • Yoshiko Yamaguchi (1920–2014), also known as Li Xianglan, was one of the Seven Great Singing Stars. After the war, she was arrested and sentenced to death for starring in Japanese propaganda films, but after Chinese authorities discovered her Japanese ancestry, she was acquitted, but warned to leave China by the judges due to risk of lynching. As she was the daughter of Japanese immigrants, some[who?] do not consider her to be a hanjian.
  • Date Junnosuke (1892–1948), also known as Zhang Zongyuan, was a sworn brother of Fengtian Clique warlord Zhang Zongchang, who changed his nationality to Chinese in 1931, though he was of Japanese ethnicity. He took over Jinan and led a massacre of around 400 people in 1939. In 1945, he created the ultimately unsuccessful Zhang Zongchang Unit. After the war, he was arrested for war crimes and executed by firing squad. As he was ethnically Japanese, some[who?] do not consider him to be a hanjian.
  • Zhang Haipeng (1867–1949) was a General of Manchukuo Imperial Army. Following the collapse of Manchukuo in 1945, he hid in Tianjin to escape his arrest. He was later discovered, tried and sentenced to death in 1949 in Beijing for treason.
  • Lee Teng-hui (1923–2020) was a former President of the Republic of China who was heavily associated with the Taiwan independence movement. He served in the Imperial Japanese Army from 1944 to 1945, which would meet the wartime Kuomintang classification of hanjian, which included Taiwanese who served in the Japanese military.[9] Despite being of Chinese (Hakka) origin, he has referred to Japan as his "motherland"[22], sparking controversy in both Taiwan and mainland China.[23][24] In 2015, Kuomintang legislators and then-incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou accused Lee of treason and being a hanjian.[25]
[edit]

Popularly, most hanjian in Chinese films and drama series, skits, Hanjian are mostly the translators. Sometimes they are also called the er guizi (Chinese: 二鬼子, lit. second devils) or jia yang guizi (Chinese: 假洋鬼子, lit. fake foreign devils). For example, Chinese actor Chen Peisi's famous skit Zhujue yu Peijue (主角与配角, lit. the main actor and the supportive actor), Chen is acting as the supportive actor who is in a film that the character is the translator leading the way for Japanese Imperial Army. The translator represents the Army officer to send a message to the Eighth Route Army officer whose actor would be Zhu Shimao that if he surrenders, the Japanese officer will have a great beautiful offer for him.[26]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Hanjian

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Hanjian (漢奸; : hànjiān) is a Chinese term for ethnic Han individuals accused of treasonous with foreign enemies, literally denoting a "traitor to the Han," the dominant ethnic group in whose identity is conflated with national loyalty. The label gained widespread usage during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), when the systematically identified and condemned providing political, military, or economic aid to Japanese invaders, including establishment of puppet administrations. Prominent examples include , a former leader who defected to head the Japanese-backed Reorganized National Government in from 1940 until his death in 1944, symbolizing elite betrayal amid occupation. Postwar retribution campaigns prosecuted accused hanjian through tribunals like those in and , enforcing legal accountability for that facilitated Japanese control and atrocities, thereby reinforcing Chinese sovereignty and deterring future disloyalty.

Etymology and Definition

Linguistic Origins

The term hanjian (漢奸 or 汉奸) is a disyllabic compound in Chinese, formed by combining Hàn (漢), which denotes the Han ethnic group—the predominant demographic in China comprising over 90% of the population—or the historical Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) that solidified this ethnonym—and jiān (奸), an ancient morpheme signifying treachery, villainy, or illicit betrayal. The character jiān traces its semantic roots to classical Chinese texts, such as the Zuo Zhuan (ca. 4th century BCE), where it describes morally corrupt or evil actions, often implying deception or subversion against rightful authority, evolving from connotations of adultery or covert wrongdoing in oracle bone inscriptions dating to the Shang dynasty (ca. 1600–1046 BCE). This component's phonetic structure, featuring the radical 女 (nǚ, "woman") compounded with 干 (gān, "interfere" or "dry"), underscores archaic associations with relational duplicity, though its extended usage broadened to political disloyalty by the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). Linguistically, hanjian functions as a emphasizing ethnic-specific , distinguishing it from generic terms like pàndòu (叛徒, "rebel" or "defector") by fusing Han identity with , a construction reflective of Chinese patterns where the first specifies the betrayed entity and the second the act of betrayal. While jiān appears in pre-modern literature to denote individual malefactors—such as in (206 BCE–220 CE) histories critiquing court intriguers—the fixed compound Hànjiān remained rare until the late (1644–1912), when nascent nationalist discourses began invoking it sporadically amid foreign encroachments, such as the (1839–1842, 1856–1860). Scholarly analysis indicates the term's absence as a standardized label in most dynastic records, where broader invectives like guójì (国贼, "national thief") sufficed for collaborators with non-Han conquerors, such as or Manchus; its crystallization as hanjian thus marks a modern lexical innovation tied to Republican-era (1912–1949) Han-centric patriotism. This evolution aligns with shifts in Chinese linguistic , where ethnic self-reference (Hàn) gained potency against perceived internal saboteurs, amplifying jiān's classical venom into a targeted slur by amid Japanese aggression. The term's phonetic tone—high level on Hàn (51) and falling-rising on jiān (35) in Mandarin—further entrenches its memorability and rhetorical force in , distinguishing it from dialectal variants that retained similar orthographic fidelity across .

Core Meaning and Evolution

The term hanjian (汉奸) denotes a betrayer of the Han Chinese people, typically involving collaboration with foreign invaders, non-Han rulers, or enemies perceived to threaten Han ethnic or national interests. Linguistically, it combines Hàn (汉), referencing the Han ethnic majority or the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) as a symbol of Chinese cultural core, with jiān (奸), an ancient character connoting treachery, adultery, or villainous deceit dating back to classical texts like the Analects. This core semantic pairing emphasizes ethnic betrayal over mere political disloyalty, distinguishing hanjian from broader terms like guìjiān (傀儡, puppet) or pàn guó (叛国, treason). Historical records indicate hanjian was largely absent from mainstream discourse during most imperial eras, with rare or unverified allusions possibly in the (960–1279 CE), where it described Han officials spying for the Jurchen Jin regime. Its documented emergence occurred in the early (late 17th century), initially applied to Han resistors challenging Manchu policies toward non-Han groups like the Miao in southern , framing betrayal in ethnic terms amid conquest dynamics. By the mid-19th century, amid the (1839–1842, 1856–1860) and (1850–1864), hanjian evolved to carry nationalist undertones, targeting those accused of aiding Western imperialists or Qing loyalists seen as subjugating Han interests. This shift reflected growing conflation of Han ethnicity with anti-foreign resistance, culminating in widespread revival during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), where it became a politicized slur against Japanese collaborators, embedding it in modern narratives of national humiliation and unity. Post-1945, the term persisted in legal and cultural retribution, though its application broadened to ideological foes, underscoring a transition from sporadic ethnic invective to institutionalized marker of disloyalty.

Historical Usage

Pre-Modern and Early 20th-Century Contexts

The term hanjian (汉奸), denoting a traitor to the Han Chinese, appeared sporadically in pre-modern Chinese historical records but lacked widespread usage or the ethnic-nationalist connotation it later acquired. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), the compound emerged to describe Han officials who spied for or collaborated with the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234), marking one of its earliest documented applications in contexts of inter-dynastic conflict. Similarly, amid the Ming-Qing transition (mid-17th century), Ming loyalists applied hanjian to Han Chinese who defected to the invading Manchu forces, portraying such acts as betrayals of Han interests against "barbarian" rule. These instances, however, were exceptional; the term is largely absent from major dynastic histories like the Twenty-Four Histories, where loyalty emphasized dynastic allegiance over Han ethnicity, rendering ethnic-framed treason less salient in imperial discourse. In imperial , accusations of treachery more commonly invoked terms like (奸, treacherous) without the explicit Han prefix, reflecting a worldview prioritizing Confucian hierarchies and imperial rather than racial or ethnic purity. Even during conquest dynasties such as the Mongol Yuan (1271–1368) or Manchu Qing (1644–1912), Han collaborators faced condemnation but not routinely as hanjian; instead, they were critiqued for disloyalty to the or personal moral failings, with ethnic collaboration normalized in bureaucratic integration. The term gained traction in the late (late 19th–early ) as Han-centric intensified amid foreign encroachments and domestic unrest, with revolutionaries like those in the applying hanjian to Han officials or elites perceived as propping up the "alien" Manchu regime. This shift marked hanjian's evolution from rare dynastic to a tool for mobilizing , conflating political loyalty with Han ethnic identity in proto-nationalist rhetoric. In the early Republican period (1912–1931), usage remained limited, surfacing in polemics against warlords or compradors aiding foreign powers, but without the mass mobilization seen later; for instance, it critiqued those facilitating unequal treaties or internal divisions, foreshadowing its wartime expansion. This era's sparse applications reflected ongoing fragmentation, where ethnic framing competed with broader republican ideals.

Sino-Japanese Wars (1931–1945)


The term hanjian proliferated in usage amid Japan's expansion into China, beginning with the occupation of Manchuria after the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, and the subsequent creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932. Chinese figures involved in Manchukuo's administration, such as officials aiding Japanese economic exploitation and governance, faced denunciations as hanjian from Nationalist and other resistance elements, who viewed such cooperation as betrayal enabling foreign domination. Following the outbreak of full-scale hostilities at the on , 1937, the under formalized anti-traitor measures, incorporating hanjian into official rhetoric to rally national unity against perceived internal enemies undermining resistance efforts. The Military Investigation and Statistics Bureau (Juntong), led by , spearheaded covert operations targeting accused collaborators, including assassinations of individuals suspected of providing intelligence or logistical support to Japanese forces in occupied cities like . These campaigns aimed to deter collaboration while bolstering the regime's legitimacy amid territorial losses, though they sometimes blurred lines between genuine treason and political rivals. A pivotal escalation occurred with Wang Jingwei's defection in December 1938, culminating in the establishment of the Reorganized National Government in on March 30, 1940, a Japanese-backed entity that administered swathes of occupied territory and employed thousands in puppet roles. Wang and his adherents justified alignment with as a path to and Asian , drawing on pre-war pan-Asianist ideas, but Nationalists branded the regime's participants hanjian for legitimizing and diverting resources from anti-Japanese warfare. extended beyond elites to local administrators, merchants, and informants who managed daily operations under occupation, often coerced or incentivized by survival needs yet vilified in as ethnic betrayers. Communist forces similarly deployed hanjian accusations against collaborators and even select Nationalist officials to frame their guerrilla resistance as purer patriotism, fostering a shared yet factional of national . Public sentiment, amplified by posters and media in free , equated hanjian acts—ranging from to economic dealings—with aiding atrocities like the of December 1937, intensifying vigilante reprisals in contested areas. By war's end in 1945, the label encapsulated a broad spectrum of perceived disloyalty, setting precedents for postwar reckonings while reflecting causal pressures of occupation where survival intersected with ideology.

Postwar Trials and Retribution (1945–1949)

Following Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek rapidly established special military tribunals and investigative committees across reclaimed territories to prosecute Chinese collaborators labeled as hanjian. These bodies, often operating under the Ministry of Justice or local military commands, focused on officials, intellectuals, and businessmen who had served in puppet regimes like Wang Jingwei's Reorganized National Government. The trials served dual purposes: delivering retribution for wartime treason and bolstering the Kuomintang's (KMT) legitimacy amid ongoing civil war with the Chinese Communists, though proceedings were frequently politicized to target political rivals rather than solely based on evidence of collaboration. Prominent cases exemplified the tribunals' scope and severity. , acting head of the puppet regime after Wang Jingwei's death in 1944, was arrested in October 1945 and tried in starting October 25, 1946; convicted of for establishing the collaborationist government and aiding Japanese occupation, he was executed by shooting on December 26, 1946. Similar proceedings occurred in , where trials from late 1945 onward publicized hanjian accusations internationally, framing as a universal moral failing while emphasizing Chinese agency in postwar justice. In and other cities, tribunals handled lower-level collaborators, with convictions often resulting in public executions to deter future disloyalty and rally public support; however, the KMT's Military Investigation and Statistics Bureau (Juntong) exerted influence, using trials for corruption, selective prosecutions, and even protecting former collaborators for intelligence purposes. Retribution extended beyond formal courts to extrajudicial measures, including lynchings, social ostracism, and assassinations. Juntong orchestrated targeted killings of high-profile hanjian in the immediate postwar chaos, while mass campaigns in urban areas like involved public shaming, property seizures, and mob violence against accused elites and merchants who had profited from Japanese partnerships. In , incorporated into the in 1945, a July 1947 government report documented 26,970 hanjian charges, with 342 executions and 847 life sentences, reflecting intensified scrutiny of local elites amid and KMT consolidation. Overall, while exact mainland figures remain disputed due to incomplete records and disruptions, academic estimates suggest thousands prosecuted and hundreds executed officially by 1949, though many cases dissolved into leniency or evasion as KMT forces retreated. These efforts, blending with vengeful , underscored hanjian as a tool for national but also exposed inconsistencies, as some collaborators were rehabilitated for anti-Communist utility.

Social and Class Dimensions of Accusations

Elites: Officials, Intellectuals, and Professionals

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, numerous Chinese elites, including high-ranking officials, intellectuals, and professionals, were accused of hanjian for participating in Japanese puppet administrations, particularly the Reorganized National Government established by in on March 30, 1940. These individuals often rationalized their involvement as a means to negotiate peace and reduce civilian suffering amid prolonged conflict, but Nationalist authorities postwar framed such actions as betrayal that aided Japanese aggression. Prominent officials in the puppet regime, such as , who held positions including mayor of from 1940 and finance minister, managed fiscal policies and local governance under Japanese oversight, facilitating economic operations in occupied areas. In postwar trials, Fohai was convicted of hanjian in 1946 and initially sentenced to death for treasonous collaboration, but commuted the penalty to in 1947, citing Fohai's secret provision of intelligence to Nationalist forces. Similarly, , who succeeded Wang as acting president in 1944, was executed by the Nationalists on December 7, 1946, following his hanjian conviction for leading the regime's political apparatus. Intellectuals accused of hanjian included those who endorsed collaboration through public writings or cultural roles in occupied zones, such as contributing to Japanese-controlled publications that promoted "peace" narratives. Professionals, particularly in economic sectors like banking and administration, were targeted for enabling Japanese resource extraction and governance; these "economic hanjian" faced asset seizures and imprisonment as part of broader retribution campaigns designed to purge perceived internal threats and bolster Nationalist legitimacy amid tensions. Such prosecutions, conducted through tribunals like the trials starting in 1946, often prioritized high-profile elites to symbolize national purification, though outcomes varied based on utility to the ruling regime.

Masses: Peasants, Rebels, and Marginal Groups

Accusations of hanjian against peasants in occupied rural typically arose from their involvement in local administrative structures established by Japanese forces to extract resources and maintain order. Japanese occupation policies, particularly after , relied on reviving the traditional baojia system, compelling village heads and peasant households to form self-policing units responsible for levies, labor , and gathering. Peasants who complied or served in these roles, often under threat of reprisal, were denounced by Nationalist and Communist resistance groups as traitors for facilitating Japanese control over agricultural production, which sustained occupation armies. For instance, in , rural pacification campaigns encouraged peasants to return to fields and participate in "production increase" drives, but those who accepted incentives like reduced taxes or protection from guerrillas faced hanjian labels from underground networks. Rebels and bandit groups, prevalent in pre-war rural , provided a ready pool for Japanese recruitment into auxiliary forces, leading to widespread postwar hanjian designations. Many disorganized bandit outfits, facing suppression by both Chinese governments and Japanese troops, surrendered en masse between 1937 and 1941, particularly in and , where they were reorganized into peace preservation corps (baoan dui) or local security units numbering tens of thousands. These groups, including former bandits, conducted anti-guerrilla operations and guarded railways, earning them the hanjian stigma for betraying anti-Japanese resistance in exchange for , arms, and pay. Postwar tribunals, such as those under the Nationalist regime in 1945–1946, prosecuted leaders and rank-and-file members alike, with executions and public shaming reinforcing nationalist narratives; estimates suggest thousands from these forces were tried, though exact figures for non-elite participants remain imprecise due to decentralized purges. Marginal groups, encompassing urban vagrants, displaced refugees, and ethnic minorities on society's fringes, encountered hanjian accusations for opportunistic or coerced , often blurring lines between survival and . In occupied cities and border regions, Japanese forces enlisted outcasts into labor battalions or informant networks, promising food amid conditions exacerbated by war; Hui Muslim communities in , for example, saw some local figures negotiate under puppet administrations, drawing ire from Han-centric resistance for perceived ethnic betrayal. Post-liberation retribution campaigns targeted these lower strata harshly, with local committees in 1945–1949 identifying and punishing "running dogs" through mass trials that prioritized ideological purity over individual agency, resulting in land confiscations and mob violence against families of accused collaborators. Such applications highlighted class tensions, as elites often evaded scrutiny through connections, while marginal actors bore disproportionate blame for systemic occupation demands.

Political and Ideological Applications

Nationalist and Anti-Imperialist Framing

The term hanjian was prominently invoked by Chinese nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) to denounce individuals perceived as aiding Japanese imperial expansion, framing such collaboration as a profound betrayal of ethnic Han solidarity and national sovereignty against foreign aggression. Nationalist authorities, led by Chiang Kai-shek's (KMT), formalized the hanjian crime in legislation enacted on August 29, 1938, shortly after the of July 7, 1937, which escalated full-scale Japanese invasion. This legal measure criminalized acts like espionage, propaganda dissemination, or resource provision to Japanese forces, with penalties including death, aiming to galvanize public resistance by equating collaboration with existential threats to China's independence. Anti-hanjian campaigns became a cornerstone of KMT , portraying traitors as enablers of Japanese imperialism who undermined the unified war effort against occupation. Organizations such as the KMT's Military Statistics Bureau (Juntong) orchestrated assassinations, public denunciations, and media exposés targeting suspected collaborators, thereby constructing a narrative of that bolstered wartime . Posters and leaflets, like those circulated in in 1938, depicted hanjian facing execution or humiliation, reinforcing the idea that true demanded uncompromising opposition to imperial domination. This framing extended to intellectual and cultural spheres, where figures expressing pro-Japanese sentiments were labeled hanjian to purify national discourse and rally diverse factions—urban elites, rural masses, and —under an anti-imperialist banner. By embedding hanjian accusations within broader anti-imperialist rhetoric, nationalists sought to legitimize their governance amid territorial losses, such as the fall of on December 13, 1937, where collaboration rumors fueled mass executions of suspected traitors. The discourse emphasized causal links between individual betrayal and collective subjugation, arguing that hanjian actions prolonged Japanese atrocities like the , which claimed an estimated 200,000–300,000 Chinese lives. This approach not only deterred defection but also fostered a proto-ethnic , distinguishing loyal Han defenders from those deemed culturally or politically compromised by imperial influence.

Communist and Post-1949 Deployments

Following the establishment of the on October 1, 1949, the (CCP) explicitly incorporated the punishment of hanjian into its foundational legal framework, as outlined in Article 7 of the Common Programme of the , which mandated the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities and severe punishment of Kuomintang war criminals alongside hanjian who had betrayed the nation and people. This directive framed wartime collaborators as inherent threats to the socialist revolution, integrating their prosecution into the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1953), a nationwide purge that targeted remaining Japanese puppet regime affiliates, unprosecuted collaborators, former Kuomintang agents, and members. An estimated 700,000 executions occurred during the campaign, with hanjian labels applied to many former officials and intellectuals whose wartime actions—such as administrative roles in occupied zones—were retroactively deemed treasonous, serving to eliminate potential opposition and redistribute assets during and industrial . The CCP's deployments emphasized ideological purity, distinguishing genuine resistance from pragmatic survival under occupation, though accusations often extended beyond clear-cut collaboration to encompass class enemies or those with ambiguous ties to Japanese authorities. Unlike the Kuomintang's trials, marred by and , CCP proceedings were portrayed as more equitable, fostering public trust by prioritizing and public denunciations over elite intrigue. In practice, this involved local tribunals where communities identified hanjian based on wartime records, leading to convictions of figures like minor officials who had evaded earlier Nationalist retribution; however, the campaign's quotas for "suppression" resulted in inflated numbers, with some innocents mislabeled amid fervor to meet targets. The hanjian rhetoric persisted into later movements, repurposed to reinforce loyalty amid internal purges. During the (1957), accusations of pro-Japanese collaboration were revived in regional histories, particularly in the northeast, to discredit intellectuals and officials whose past associations undermined their revolutionary credentials, blending historical retribution with contemporary class struggle. Similarly, in the (1966–1976), the term surfaced in Red Guard attacks on "bourgeois" elites, equating cultural or intellectual compromises during the war with betrayal of Maoist principles, though primary focus shifted to "capitalist roaders" rather than strictly wartime acts. These applications underscored the label's evolution from anti-imperialist tool to instrument of ideological conformity, prioritizing causal links between past "" and present threats to party rule over nuanced assessments of coercion under occupation.

Contemporary Invocations and Nationalism

In the , invocations of hanjian in contemporary nationalist discourse often target perceived betrayals of national and unity, extending the term beyond wartime contexts to ideological and political opponents. A online poll organized by , a platform aligned with leftist-nationalist viewpoints, solicited votes for the "10 most notorious hanjian in modern times," nominating 18 figures and highlighting the term's application to post-1949 individuals accused of undermining state interests. The initiative, which received limited engagement with the top nominee garnering only votes, exemplified how nationalists repurpose historical stigma to critique domestic rivals, framing them as despite the absence of foreign invasion. Critics within the , including commentators in state-affiliated media, contended that true hanjian requires active with a hostile foreign power, rendering modern usages more rhetorical than legal, yet the poll's resonance underscored the term's role in sustaining anti-elite amid ideological left-right tensions. This reflects broader patterns where hanjian accusations amplify public vigilance against perceived internal threats, bolstering without formal trials. In cross-strait relations, mainland nationalists routinely label independence advocates as hanjian, equating with ethnic and national disloyalty akin to . This framing positions unification as a defense against "traitorous" fragmentation, invoking historical memory to delegitimize pro-independence figures and movements as existential betrayals of the Chinese nation. Such intensifies during electoral cycles or diplomatic tensions, reinforcing PRC narratives of indivisible .

Notable Individuals Labeled as Hanjian

Prominent Political Collaborators

Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), once a leading figure in the Kuomintang and associate of Sun Yat-sen, defected from the Nationalist government in December 1938 to pursue peace negotiations with Japan, establishing the Reorganized National Government in Nanjing on March 30, 1940, as the primary collaborationist regime during the Second Sino-Japanese War. This puppet administration claimed legitimacy as the continuation of the Republic of China, signing a treaty with Japan on November 30, 1940, that granted Japanese military access and economic privileges in exchange for nominal independence. Wang's faction argued collaboration minimized Chinese suffering amid perceived inevitable defeat, but postwar Nationalist authorities branded him the archetypal hanjian, with his regime viewed as facilitating Japanese occupation and atrocities. Zhou Fohai (1897–1948), a former Communist turned leftist and finance expert, joined Wang's government as vice president of the and mayor of occupied from 1940, overseeing administrative and financial operations that supported Japanese control. He secretly maintained ties with Chiang Kai-shek's intelligence networks, providing intelligence on Japanese activities, which some historians interpret as pragmatic subversion rather than pure , though this did not prevent his 1946 conviction for hanjian activities, resulting in a death sentence commuted to by Chiang in 1947 due to his wartime intelligence contributions. Zhou died in prison in 1948. Chen Gongbo (1892–1946), an early member who later aligned with the left, served as minister of education and president of the in Wang's regime before succeeding as acting chairman of the Reorganized National Government following Wang's death on November 10, 1944. Chen defended his involvement at the 1946 trial by claiming it stemmed from a belief in the war's futility and a desire to preserve Chinese autonomy under duress, but he was convicted of as a hanjian and executed by the Nationalists on June 3, 1946. His trial highlighted tensions between legal retribution and accusations of , as some collaborators escaped severe through connections or testimony.

Cultural and Intellectual Figures

Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967), a prominent essayist, translator, and key figure in China's , was accused of hanjian for remaining in Japanese-occupied and accepting administrative roles in the puppet regime. After the 1937 Japanese invasion, he served as dean of and director of the College under the occupation authorities, while continuing to publish essays that critics interpreted as conciliatory toward , emphasizing cultural continuity over resistance. Postwar trials in 1947 convicted him of , sentencing him to 14 years imprisonment, though he was released in 1949 amid shifting political dynamics; he maintained that his actions prioritized individual and cultural preservation over national loyalty, rejecting the label of betrayal. Qian Daosun (1887–1966), a classical scholar and bibliophile, faced hanjian charges for collaborating with Japanese cultural initiatives during the occupation, including cataloging rare Chinese texts for preservation under puppet auspices, which prosecutors viewed as aiding the enemy despite his stated motive of safeguarding heritage amid wartime destruction. Imprisoned postwar for these activities, his case highlighted tensions between intellectual pragmatism—such as admiring Japanese scholarly methods—and accusations of disloyalty, with some analyses portraying him as a "positive hanjian" for cultural contributions that benefited postwar recovery, though official verdicts emphasized treasonous intent. His 1966 death in custody underscored the enduring stigma, as Chinese historiography often framed such scholars' Japanophilia as inherently subversive, drawing from prewar Sinophile networks that blurred into collaboration. Other intellectuals, such as certain faculty who lectured under occupation, were sporadically labeled hanjian in Nationalist retribution campaigns, but cases like Zhou's and Qian's exemplify how accusations targeted those advocating cultural accommodation over armed resistance, reflecting broader debates on intellectual autonomy versus national solidarity. These figures' defenses, rooted in and anti-militarism, were often dismissed in trials prioritizing collective survival, with evidence including wartime publications and administrative records used to substantiate charges.

Controversies and Alternative Perspectives

Criteria for Treason vs. Pragmatic Survival

The legal criteria for designating individuals as hanjian were formalized during the Sino-Japanese War through regulations, which emphasized active betrayal of national sovereignty rather than mere acquiescence to occupation. The 1938 Regulations on the Punishment of Hanjian outlined punishable acts including organizing pro-Japanese groups, serving in puppet governments, spying, or conducting that undermined resistance efforts; penalties ranged from imprisonment to death based on the severity and intent of the collaboration. Post-war trials, such as those in and from 1946 onward, applied these standards, convicting based on evidence like documented service in occupied administrations or economic dealings that facilitated Japanese control, with over 14,000 convictions recorded by 1949 for aiding the enemy in various capacities. These criteria prioritized demonstrable harm to Chinese war efforts, such as provision or administrative roles that legitimized Japanese rule, distinguishing them from passive endurance of occupation. Pragmatic survival strategies, however, blurred these boundaries, as many in Japanese-held territories cooperated under duress to avert immediate destruction or , without ideological commitment to the invaders. In cities like following its 1937 fall, local elites maintained civil administration and safety zones to shield civilians from reprisals, actions that preserved lives amid atrocities but were later prosecuted as enabling enemy governance; historians argue such continuity often reflected calculated rather than disloyalty, given that refusal could trigger punishments killing thousands. Economic participation, like operating businesses under Japanese oversight, sustained populations in occupied zones where resistance networks were absent, yet trials rarely accounted for contextual , with convictions extending to minor functionaries who prioritized communal stability over abstract . This approach overlooked causal realities: prolonged occupation in areas like since 1931 fostered adaptive behaviors for endurance, where outright defiance escalated casualties without altering strategic outcomes. Debates over these distinctions highlight tensions between punitive nationalism and empirical nuance, as post-war proceedings under the frequently conflated imperatives with to bolster regime legitimacy amid . While ideologically driven figures, such as those in Wang Jingwei's Reorganized National Government, clearly met thresholds through voluntary alliance for power, lower-level cases often lacked evidence of personal gain or active , leading scholars to the trials' overreach—thousands faced execution or for roles arguably coerced by necessities. Such applications prioritized collective retribution over individualized intent, reflecting wartime propaganda's binary framing of collaborators as existential threats, yet ignoring how occupation's total control rendered pure resistance infeasible for most, thereby complicating judgments of betrayal versus resilience.

Revisionism and Defense of Accused Figures

In the decades following , some historians have challenged the blanket application of the hanjian label to all who cooperated with Japanese authorities, arguing that motivations ranged from ideological alignment and opportunism to coercion, economic necessity, and pragmatic efforts to mitigate civilian suffering in occupied territories. This revisionist perspective emphasizes the complexity of wartime decisions amid Japan's brutal occupation, where resistance often invited reprisals, as evidenced by the 1937-1938 and subsequent scorched-earth tactics that displaced millions and destroyed infrastructure. Scholars note that while high-level puppet officials actively aided the Japanese war effort, lower-level collaborators frequently prioritized local stability, family protection, or administrative continuity over abstract loyalty to the , which itself struggled with corruption and internal divisions. Wang Jingwei, the most prominent accused figure, has been defended by select analysts as a misguided patriot rather than a venal traitor, citing his pre-war revolutionary credentials—including a 1910 assassination attempt on Qing regent —and his belief that negotiating "peace" with would avert China's total annihilation, given the Nationalists' military setbacks by 1938. Proponents argue his Reorganized National Government (established March 1940) sought nominal sovereignty and restrained Japanese excesses where possible, such as limiting and maintaining anti-communist policies aligned with his KMT faction's , though these claims are contested given the regime's declaration of war on the Allies in December 1941. Wang himself framed his defection as a sacrificial act to end the conflict, drawing parallels to European leaders like , but critics counter that his actions legitimized Japanese imperialism and diverted resources from resistance. Zhou Fohai, finance minister in Wang's regime and former Communist turned KMT operative, mounted a defense claiming his was a covert ploy to undermine the Japanese from within, providing the Nationalists with economic data and opportunities during his tenure from 1940 to 1945. Sentenced to death in 1947 as a hanjian by a tribunal, his penalty was commuted to life imprisonment by after Zhou testified against other collaborators and revealed Japanese financial manipulations, highlighting how some accused figures leveraged utility to argue their actions served broader anti-Japanese ends rather than personal gain. Similar arguments appeared in trials of mid-level bureaucrats, where defendants cited duress from Japanese threats—such as family executions or property seizures—and the absence of viable resistance alternatives in occupied zones controlling 40% of China's population by 1940. These defenses remain marginal in mainland Chinese historiography, which prioritizes nationalist narratives of unified resistance, but have gained traction in Western scholarship examining accommodation as a survival strategy rather than moral failing, cautioning against retrospective judgments ignorant of the era's desperation. Empirical data from occupation records show that while puppet regimes facilitated Japanese resource extraction—totaling over 50 billion yen in "contributions" from 1937-1945—many local collaborators negotiated concessions that preserved Chinese administrative roles and reduced direct impositions compared to fully annexed areas. Nonetheless, such revisionism does not absolve active but underscores causal factors like Japan's superior firepower and the Nationalists' relocation to , which left urban elites facing impossible choices.

Overreach in Labeling and Its Consequences

Following the end of , the in applied the hanjian label extensively to local Taiwanese who had participated in the Japanese colonial administration spanning 1895 to 1945, often overlooking the coercive context of prolonged colonization where many held administrative or roles to maintain basic governance and survival. A July 1947 government report documented 26,970 individuals charged with hanjian offenses, culminating in 342 executions, 847 life sentences, and widespread property confiscations, reflecting a prosecutorial scale that prioritized punitive over individualized assessments of intent or duress. This approach extended to Taiwanese who had served in Japanese or police units, even as had ruled the island as a , integrating locals into its and system, which blurred lines between collaboration and pragmatic adaptation. Such overreach fueled acute social divisions, as the incoming authorities, lacking deep understanding of Taiwan's colonial history, imposed retroactive standards that stigmatized an entire generation, including educators, officials, and merchants who had operated under the only government they had known. The resultant backlash manifested in the 228 Incident of , 1947, triggered partly by outrage over arbitrary arrests and perceived injustices in hanjian prosecutions alongside corruption, leading to protests that were suppressed with military force, resulting in an estimated 10,000 to 28,000 deaths and long-term under the Nationalists. In , parallel post-war tribunals under both Nationalist and subsequent auspices similarly broadened hanjian definitions to encompass not only overt puppets like those in the but also peripheral figures such as local mediators or economic operators in occupied zones, with campaigns encouraging denunciations that devolved into vendettas and unsubstantiated claims. The consequences extended beyond immediate violence to enduring societal fractures, including familial ruin through guilt-by-association policies that barred descendants from and employment, economic dislocations from mass asset seizures, and a legacy of distrust in legal processes that prioritized ideological purity over evidentiary rigor. This instrumentalization eroded incentives for nuanced wartime , such as localized ceasefires or administrative continuity to avert , fostering a historical that conflated strategies with moral and complicating post-conflict efforts. In the Communist after , repurposing hanjian rhetoric in purges amplified these effects, as retrospective applications targeted pre-1949 rivals, yielding thousands of convictions in show trials that served consolidation of power rather than , with records indicating over 100,000 processed in early tribunals amid coerced confessions and minimal appeals. Ultimately, the overreach perpetuated cycles of retribution, distorting by suppressing defenses of accused figures who argued pragmatic necessity, and conditioning public discourse to favor absolutist loyalty over contextual realism.

Representations in Culture and Media

Literature and Film Depictions

In Chinese cinema addressing the Second Sino-Japanese War, hanjian—traitors collaborating with Japanese occupiers—are typically depicted as morally corrupt auxiliaries, such as interpreters, soldiers, or local enforcers, who prioritize self-interest over national loyalty and suffer condemnation or retribution. These portrayals reinforce narratives of unified resistance, often simplifying collaborators as unambiguous villains to heighten patriotic sentiment. Prewar and wartime films like Big Road (1934) illustrate early such characterizations, with a local strongman bribing resisters and imprisoning them on behalf of Japanese interests, leading to his capture and denunciation as a traitor. Postwar propaganda cinema, including Tunnel Warfare (1965), explicitly labels puppet troops and spies as hanjian, portraying them with exaggerated villainy—such as sinister laughter—to underscore their betrayal and justify their elimination by partisans. Later films introduce nuance amid broader moral binaries. In (2000), the interpreter Dong Hanchen aids Japanese captors under duress, pleading ethnic solidarity ("we are both Chinese") before postwar execution, highlighting survival dilemmas without absolving guilt. Similarly, (2007) presents Mr. Yee, a collaborationist chief, in a complex romantic entanglement with an assassin, blurring resistance heroism while still framing his allegiance as complicity in occupation atrocities. Such er guizi ("second devils") archetypes—derogatory for Chinese puppets—persist in dramas and skits, often as translators facilitating Japanese brutality. Chinese literature from the war era featured anti-hanjian campaigns in popular press and , condemning collaborators through exposés and fabricated scandals to mobilize public outrage. These works particularly targeted "female collaborators," deploying gendered to depict them as morally degraded seductresses allied with male traitors, amplifying contempt via invented romantic intrigues. Postwar memoirs, such as those detailing figures like , further entrenched hanjian as symbols of national dishonor, blending factual trials with narrative vilification to legitimize Nationalist retribution. Overall, these depictions prioritized causal narratives of enabling invasion, sidelining pragmatic motivations like coercion or ideological divergence.

Modern Media and Propaganda Usage

In contemporary Chinese nationalist discourse, amplified through state-controlled media and online platforms, the term hanjian is deployed to vilify individuals accused of betraying Chinese sovereignty, particularly those advocating independence or criticizing the (CCP). This usage serves propagandistic purposes by framing as treasonous collaboration with foreign entities, thereby rallying public support for unified national narratives. Official PRC bodies, such as the , have applied hanjian to Taiwanese leaders like former President , portraying their policies as splitting the Chinese nation akin to . Such rhetoric appears in commentaries on cross-strait tensions, where independence proponents are depicted as modern equivalents of Japanese puppets, eroding their legitimacy among mainland audiences. This tactic draws on historical anti-hanjian campaigns to equate political separation with existential betrayal. Domestically, hanjian accusations surge in state-orchestrated online campaigns during perceived national affronts, such as foreign brand boycotts or historical commemorations. In 2023, amid discussions of national memory laws, platforms hosted grassroots "witch-hunts" targeting alleged hanjian for supposedly insulting or aiding adversaries, with often echoing or tolerating the fervor to reinforce loyalty. These episodes illustrate how the term functions as a tool for , deterring criticism by invoking collective outrage rooted in wartime trauma, though critics argue it overextends historical precedents to stifle legitimate debate. The propagation of hanjian labels via platforms like integrates with CCP strategies to shape , where algorithmic amplification and official endorsements blur lines between spontaneous and directed . This modern adaptation sustains the term's potency beyond its WWII origins, adapting it to contemporary geopolitical rivalries, such as U.S.- frictions, where domestic figures aligning with Western views risk similar denunciations. Empirical analysis of such reveals patterns of escalation during crises, underscoring its role in maintaining regime cohesion through enemy construction.

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