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New antisemitism
New antisemitism
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New antisemitism is a form of antisemitism said to have developed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, typically manifesting itself as anti-Zionism.[1]: 296–297  The concept dates to the early 1970s.[2]

Proponents of the concept generally argue that anti-Zionism and demonization of Israel, or double standards applied to its conduct (some also include anti-Americanism, anti-globalization, and Third-Worldism) represents an evolution in the appearance of antisemitic beliefs,[3] are linked to antisemitism, or constitute disguised antisemitism, particularly when emanating simultaneously from the far-left, Islamism, and the far-right.[1]: 296–297 [4][page needed][5] Some describe it as a third political wave of antisemitism, after the religious and racial forms dominant in previous periods.

Critics of the concept argue that it is used in practice to weaponize antisemitism in order to silence political debate and freedom of speech regarding the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict, by conflating political anti-Zionism and criticism of the Israeli government with racism, condoning violence against Jews or likening the Israeli government's actions to the Holocaust. Such arguments have in turn been criticized as antisemitic and rhetorically irrelevant to the contested reality of new antisemitism.[6][7] Further critical arguments include that the concept defines legitimate criticism of Israel too narrowly and demonization too broadly, and that it trivializes the meaning of antisemitism.[8][9][10]

History of the concept

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1960s: origins

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French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff argues that the first wave of "la nouvelle judéophobie" emerged in the Arab-Muslim world and the Soviet sphere following the 1967 Six-Day War. He cites papers by Jacques Givet (1968) and historian Léon Poliakov (1969) discussing the idea of a new antisemitism rooted in anti-Zionism.[11] He argues that anti-Jewish themes centered on the demonical figures of Israel and what he calls "fantasy-world Zionism": that Jews plot together, seek to conquer the world, and are imperialistic and bloodthirsty, which gave rise to the reactivation of stories about ritual murder and the poisoning of food and water supplies.[12]

1970s: early debates

[edit]

Writing in the American Jewish Congress' Congress Bi-Weekly in 1973, the Foreign Minister of Israel Abba Eban identified anti-Zionism as "the new anti-Semitism", saying:[13]

[R]ecently we have witnessed the rise of the new left which identifies Israel with the establishment, with acquisition, with smug satisfaction, with, in fact, all the basic enemies ... Let there be no mistake: the new left is the author and the progenitor of the new anti-Semitism. One of the chief tasks of any dialogue with the Gentile world is to prove that the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism is not a distinction at all. Anti-Zionism is merely the new anti-Semitism. The old classic anti-Semitism declared that equal rights belong to all individuals within the society, except the Jews. The new anti-Semitism says that the right to establish and maintain an independent national sovereign state is the prerogative of all nations, so long as they happen not to be Jewish. And when this right is exercised not by the Maldive Islands, not by the state of Gabon, not by Barbados ... but by the oldest and most authentic of all nationhoods, then this is said to be exclusivism, particularism, and a flight of the Jewish people from its universal mission.

In 1974, Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League published the book The New anti-Semitism. They expressed concern about what they described as new manifestations of antisemitism coming from radical left, radical right, and pro-Arab figures in the U.S.[14] Forster and Epstein argued that it took the form of indifference to the fears of the Jewish people, apathy in dealing with anti-Jewish bias, and an inability to understand the importance of Israel to Jewish survival.[15]

A sign held at a protest in Edinburgh, Scotland, on January 10, 2009

Reviewing Forster and Epstein's work in Commentary, Earl Raab, founding director of the Nathan Perlmutter Institute for Jewish Advocacy at Brandeis University, argued that a "new anti-Semitism" was indeed emerging in America, in the form of opposition to the collective rights of the Jewish people, but he criticized Forster and Epstein for conflating it with anti-Israel bias.[16] Edward S. Shapiro, in A Time for Healing: American Jewry Since World War II (1992), wrote that "Forster and Epstein implied that the new anti-Semitism was the inability of Gentiles to love Jews and Israel enough."[17]

1980s–present day: continued debate

[edit]
Graffiti in Madrid, 2003

Historian Robert Wistrich addressed the issue in a 1984 lecture delivered in the home of Israeli President Chaim Herzog, in which he argued that a "new anti-Semitic anti-Zionism" was emerging, distinguishing features of which were the equation of Zionism with Nazism and the belief that Zionists had actively collaborated with Nazis during World War II. He argued that such claims were prevalent in the Soviet Union, but added that similar rhetoric had been taken up by a part of the radical Left, particularly Trotskyist groups in Western Europe and America.[18]

When asked in 2014 if "anti-Zionism is the new anti-Semitism", Noam Chomsky stated:[19]

Actually, the locus classicus, the best formulation of this, was by an ambassador to the United Nations, Abba Eban, ... He advised the American Jewish community that they had two tasks to perform. One task was to show that criticism of the policy, what he called anti-Zionism – that means actually criticisms of the policy of the state of Israel – were anti-Semitism. That's the first task. Second task, if the criticism was made by Jews, their task was to show that it's neurotic self-hatred, needs psychiatric treatment. Then he gave two examples of the latter category. One was I.F. Stone. The other was me. So, we have to be treated for our psychiatric disorders, and non-Jews have to be condemned for anti-Semitism, if they're critical of the state of Israel. That's understandable why Israeli propaganda would take this position. I don't particularly blame Abba Eban for doing what ambassadors are sometimes supposed to do. But we ought to understand that there is no sensible charge. No sensible charge. There's nothing to respond to. It's not a form of anti-Semitism. It's simply criticism of the criminal actions of a state, period.

Definitions and arguments for and against the concept

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A new phenomenon

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In 2003, Irwin Cotler, Professor of Law at McGill University and a scholar of human rights, has identified nine aspects of what he considers to constitute the "new anti-Semitism":[20]

Cotler defines "classical or traditional anti-Semitism" as "the discrimination against, denial of or assault upon the rights of Jews to live as equal members of whatever host society they inhabit" and "new anti-Semitism" as "discrimination against the right of the Jewish people to live as an equal member of the family of nations – the denial of and assault upon the Jewish people's right even to live – with Israel as the 'collective Jew among the nations'".[21]

Cotler elaborated on this position in a June 2011 interview for Israeli television. He re-iterated his view that the world is "witnessing a new and escalating ... and even lethal anti-Semitism" focused on hatred of Israel, but cautioned that this type of antisemitism should not be defined in a way that precludes "free speech" and "rigorous debate" about Israel's activities. Cotler said that it is "too simplistic to say that anti-Zionism, per se, is anti-Semitic" and argued that labelling Israel as an apartheid state, while in his view "distasteful", is "still within the boundaries of argument" and not inherently antisemitic. He continued: "It's [when] you say, because it's an apartheid state, [that] it has to be dismantled – then [you've] crossed the line into a racist argument, or an anti-Jewish argument."[22]

Jack Fischel, former chair of history at Millersville University of Pennsylvania, writes that new antisemitism is a new phenomenon stemming from a coalition of "leftists, vociferously opposed to the policies of Israel, and right-wing antisemites, committed to the destruction of Israel, [who] were joined by millions of Muslims, including Arabs, who immigrated to Europe... and who brought with them their hatred of Israel in particular and of Jews in general." It is this new political alignment, he argues, that makes new antisemitism unique.[23] Mark Strauss of Foreign Policy links new antisemitism to anti-globalism, describing it as "the medieval image of the 'Christ-killing' Jew resurrected on the editorial pages of cosmopolitan European newspapers."[24]

Rajesh Krishnamachari, researcher with the South Asia Analysis Group, analyzed antisemitism in Iran, Turkey, Palestine, Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia and posited that the recent surge in antisemitism across the Muslim world should be attributed to political expediency of the local elite in these countries rather than to any theological imperative.[25]

It is the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement refusing to put the Star of David on their ambulances. ... It is neo-Nazis donning checkered Palestinian kaffiyehs and Palestinians lining up to buy copies of Mein Kampf. —Mark Strauss[24]

The French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff argues that antisemitism based on racism and nationalism has been replaced by a new form based on anti-racism and anti-nationalism. He identifies some of its main features as the identification of Zionism with racism; the use of material related to Holocaust denial (such as doubts about the number of victims and allegations that there is a "Holocaust industry"); a discourse borrowed from third worldism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-Americanism and anti-globalization; and the dissemination of what he calls the "myth" of the "intrinsically good Palestinian – the innocent victim par excellence."[26]

In early 2009, 125 parliamentarians from various countries gathered in London for the founding conference of a group called the "Interparliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism" (ICCA). They suggest that while classical antisemitism "overlaps" modern antisemitism, it is a different phenomenon and a more dangerous one for Jews.[21]

A new phenomenon, but not antisemitism

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Brian Klug argues that the new prejudice is not antisemitism, new or old, nor a mutation of an existing virus, but "a brand new 'bug'".[27]

Brian Klug, senior research fellow in philosophy at St Benet's Hall, Oxford – who gave expert testimony in February 2006 to a British parliamentary inquiry into antisemitism in the UK, and in November 2004 to the Hearing on Anti-Semitism at the German Bundestag – argues against the idea that there is a "single, unified phenomenon" that could be called "new" antisemitism. He accepts that there is reason for the Jewish community to be concerned, but argues that any increase in antisemitic incidents is attributable to classical antisemitism. Proponents of the new antisemitism concept, he writes, see an organizing principle that allows them to formulate a new concept, but it is only in terms of this concept that many of the examples cited in evidence of it count as examples in the first place.[28] That is, the creation of the concept may be based on a circular argument or tautology. He argues that it is an unhelpful concept, because it devalues the term "antisemitism," leading to widespread cynicism about the use of it. People of goodwill who support the Palestinians resent being falsely accused of antisemitism.[27]

Klug defines classical antisemitism as "an ingrained European fantasy about Jews as Jews," arguing that whether Jews are seen as a race, religion, or ethnicity, and whether antisemitism comes from the right or the left, the antisemite's image of the Jew is always as "a people set apart, not merely by their customs but by their collective character. They are arrogant, secretive, cunning, always looking to turn a profit. Loyal only to their own, wherever they go they form a state within a state, preying upon the societies in whose midst they dwell. Mysteriously powerful, their hidden hand controls the banks and the media. They will even drag governments into war if this suits their purposes. Such is the figure of 'the Jew,' transmitted from generation to generation."[29]

[W]hen anti-Semitism is everywhere, it is nowhere. And when every anti-Zionist is an anti-Semite, we no longer know how to recognize the real thing—the concept of anti-Semitism loses its significance. —Brian Klug[28]

He argues that although it is true that the new antisemitism incorporates the idea that antisemitism is hostility to Jews as Jews, the source of the hostility has changed; therefore, to continue using the same expression for it – antisemitism – causes confusion. Today's hostility to Jews as Jews is based on the Arab–Israeli conflict, not on ancient European fantasies. Israel proclaims itself as the state of the Jewish people, and many Jews align themselves with Israel for that very reason. It is out of this alignment that the hostility to Jews as Jews arises, rather than hostility to Israelis or to Zionists. Klug agrees that it is a prejudice, because it is a generalization about individuals; nevertheless, he argues, it is "not rooted in the ideology of 'the Jew'," and is therefore a different phenomenon from antisemitism.[27]

Criticism of Israel is not always antisemitism

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The 3D Test of Antisemitism is a set of criteria put forth by Natan Sharansky to distinguish legitimate criticism of Israel from antisemitism. The three Ds stand for Delegitimization of Israel, Demonization of Israel, and subjecting Israel to Double standards, each of which, according to the test, indicates antisemitism.[30][31] The test is intended to draw the line between legitimate criticism towards the State of Israel, its actions and policies, and non-legitimate criticism that becomes antisemitic.[32]

Earl Raab writes that "[t]here is a new surge of antisemitism in the world, and much prejudice against Israel is driven by such antisemitism," but argues that charges of antisemitism based on anti-Israel opinions generally lack credibility. He writes that "a grave educational misdirection is imbedded in formulations suggesting that if we somehow get rid of antisemitism, we will get rid of anti-Israelism. This reduces the problems of prejudice against Israel to cartoon proportions." Raab describes prejudice against Israel as a "serious breach of morality and good sense," and argues that it is often a bridge to antisemitism, but distinguishes it from antisemitism as such.[33]

Steven J. Zipperstein, professor of Jewish Culture and History at Stanford University, argues that a belief in the State of Israel's responsibility for the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered "part of what a reasonably informed, progressive, decent person thinks." He argues that Jews have a tendency to see the State of Israel as a victim because they were very recently themselves "the quintessential victims".[34]

Accusations of misuse of the term to stifle criticism of Israel

[edit]

Norman Finkelstein argues that organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League have brought forward charges of new antisemitism at various intervals since the 1970s, "not to fight antisemitism but rather to exploit the historical suffering of Jews in order to immunize Israel against criticism".[35] He writes that most evidence purporting to show a new antisemitism has been taken from organizations that are linked in some way to Israel, or that have "a material stake in inflating the findings of anti-Semitism," and that some antisemitic incidents reported in recent years either did not occur or were misidentified.[36] As an example of the misuse of the term "antisemitism," he cites the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia's 2003 report, which he says included displays of the Palestinian flag, support for the PLO, and the comparisons between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa in its list of antisemitic activities and beliefs.[37]

Norman Finkelstein writes that anger at what he calls "Israel's brutal occupation has undoubtedly slipped over to an animus against Jews generally", which he describes as "lamentable" but "hardly cause for wonder".[38]

He writes that what is called the new antisemitism consists of three components: (i) "exaggeration and fabrication"; (ii) "mislabeling legitimate criticism of Israeli policy"; and (iii) "the unjustified yet predictable spillover from criticism of Israel to Jews generally."[39] He argues that Israel's apologists have denied a causal relationship between Israeli policies and hostility toward Jews, since "if Israeli policies, and widespread Jewish support for them, evoke hostility toward Jews, it means that Israel and its Jewish supporters might themselves be causing anti-Semitism; and it might be doing so because Israel and its Jewish supporters are in the wrong".[40]

Tariq Ali, a British-Pakistani historian and political activist, argues that the concept of new antisemitism amounts to an attempt to subvert the language in the interests of the State of Israel. He writes that the campaign against "the supposed new 'anti-semitism'" in modern Europe is a "cynical ploy on the part of the Israeli Government to seal off the Zionist state from any criticism of its regular and consistent brutality against the Palestinians.... Criticism of Israel can not and should not be equated with anti-semitism." He argues that most pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist groups that emerged after the Six-Day War were careful to observe the distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism.[41][42][undue weight?discuss]

A third wave

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Bernard Lewis argues that the new antisemitism – what he calls "ideological antisemitism" – has mutated out of religious and racial antisemitism.

Historian Bernard Lewis argues that the new antisemitism represents the third, or ideological, wave of antisemitism, the first two waves being religious and racial antisemitism.[43]

Lewis defines antisemitism as a special case of prejudice, hatred, or persecution directed against people who are in some way different from the rest. According to Lewis, antisemitism is marked by two distinct features: Jews are judged according to a standard different from that applied to others, and they are accused of cosmic evil. He writes that what he calls the first wave of antisemitism arose with the advent of Christianity because of the Jews' rejection of Jesus as Messiah. The second wave, racial antisemitism, emerged in Spain when large numbers of Jews were forcibly converted, and doubts about the sincerity of the converts led to ideas about the importance of "la limpieza de sangre", purity of blood.[43]

He associates the third wave with the Arabs and writes that it arose only in part because of the establishment of the State of Israel. Until the 19th century, Muslims had regarded Jews with what Lewis calls "amused, tolerant superiority – they were seen as physically weak, cowardly and unmilitary – and although Jews living in Muslim countries were not treated as equals, they were shown a certain amount of respect. The Western form of antisemitism – what Lewis calls "the cosmic, satanic version of Jew hatred – arrived in the Middle East in several stages, beginning with Christian missionaries in the 19th century and continued to grow slowly into the 20th century up to the establishment of the Third Reich. He writes that it increased because of the humiliation of the Israeli military victories of 1948 and 1967.[43]

Into this mix entered the United Nations. Lewis argues that the international public response and the United Nations' handling of the 1948 refugee situation convinced the Arab world that discrimination against Jews was acceptable. When the ancient Jewish community in East Jerusalem was evicted and its monuments desecrated or destroyed, they were offered no help. Similarly, when Jewish refugees fled or were driven out of Arab countries, no help was offered, but elaborate arrangements were made for Arabs who fled or were driven out of the area that became Israel. All the Arab governments involved in the conflict announced that they would not admit Israelis of any religion into their territories, and that they would not give visas to Jews, no matter which country they were citizens of. Lewis argues that the failure of the United Nations to protest sent a clear message to the Arab world.[43]

He writes that this third wave of antisemitism has in common with the first wave that Jews are able to be part of it. With religious antisemitism, Jews were able to distance themselves from Judaism, and Lewis writes that some even reached high rank within the church and the Inquisition. With racial antisemitism, this was not possible, but with the new, ideological, antisemitism, Jews are once again able to join the critics. The new antisemitism also allows non-Jews, he argues, to criticize or attack Jews without feeling overshadowed by the crimes of the Nazis.[43]

Antisemitism, but not a new phenomenon

[edit]
Yehuda Bauer argues that "new" antisemitism is not actually new.

Yehuda Bauer, professor of Holocaust studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, considers the concept "new antisemitism" false, describing the phenomenon as old, latent antisemitism that recurs when triggered. In his view, the current trigger is the Israeli situation, and if a compromise were achieved there antisemitism would decline but not disappear.[44]

Dina Porat, professor at Tel Aviv University says that, while in principle there is no new antisemitism, we can speak of antisemitism in a new envelope. Otherwise Porat speaks of a new and violent form of antisemitism in Western Europe starting after the Second Intifada.[44]

Howard Jacobson, a British novelist and journalist, calls this phenomenon "Jew-hating pure and simple, the Jew-hating which many of us have always suspected was the only explanation for the disgust that contorts and disfigures faces when the mere word Israel crops up in conversation."[45]

An inappropriate redefinition

[edit]

Antony Lerman, writing in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz in September 2008, argues that the concept of a "new antisemitism" has brought about "a revolutionary change in the discourse about anti-Semitism". He writes that most contemporary discussions concerning antisemitism have become focused on issues concerning Israel and Zionism, and that the equation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism has become for many a "new orthodoxy". He adds that this redefinition has often resulted in "Jews attacking other Jews for their alleged anti-Semitic anti-Zionism". While Lerman accepts that exposing alleged Jewish antisemitism is "legitimate in principle", he adds that the growing literature in this field "exceeds all reason"; the attacks are often vitriolic, and encompass views that are not inherently anti-Zionist.

Lerman argues that this redefinition has had unfortunate repercussions. He writes that serious scholarly research into contemporary antisemitism has become "virtually non-existent", and that the subject is now most frequently studied and analyzed by "people lacking any serious expertise in the subject, whose principal aim is to excoriate Jewish critics of Israel and to promote the "anti-Zionism = anti-Semitism" equation. Lerman concludes that this redefinition has ultimately served to stifle legitimate discussion, and that it cannot create a basis on which to fight antisemitism.[46]

Peter Beaumont, writing in The Observer, agrees that proponents of the concept of "new antisemitism" have attempted to co-opt anti-Jewish sentiment and attacks by some European Muslims as a way to silence opposition to the policies of the Israeli government. "[C]riticise Israel," he writes, "and you are an anti-Semite just as surely as if you were throwing paint at a synagogue in Paris."[47]

Antisemitic anti-Zionism

[edit]

Scholars including Werner Bergmann, Simon Schama, Alan Johnson, David Hirsh and Anthony Julius have described a distinctively 21st century form of antisemitic anti-Zionism characterized by left-wing hostility to Jews.[48][49][50][51][52] According to historian Geoffrey Alderman, opposition to Zionism (being against a Jewish state) can be legitimately described as racist in essence.[53][54]

Some proponents of the new antisemitism thesis see the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement as an exemplar of the phenomenon.[55] [56] [57] For example, Norman H. Finkelstein describes the BDS movement as failing all of Natan Sharansky's 3D's, since the movement delegitimizes Israel, demonizes Israel, and applies double standards for criticizing Israel out of proportion to other nations, ignoring other countries' misdeeds.[58]

International perspectives

[edit]

Europe

[edit]

The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (superseded in 2007 by the Fundamental Rights Agency) noted an upswing in antisemitic incidents in France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and The Netherlands between July 2003 and December 2004.[59] In September 2004, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, a part of the Council of Europe, called on its member nations to ensure that anti-racist criminal law covers antisemitism, and in 2005, the EUMC offered a discussion paper on a working definition of antisemitism in an attempt to enable a standard definition to be used for data collection:[60] It defined antisemitism as "a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jews and non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, towards Jewish community institutions and religious facilities." The paper's “Examples of the ways in which anti-Semitism manifests itself with regard to the state of Israel taking into account the overall context could include":

  • Denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavor;
  • Applying double standards by requiring of Israel a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation;
  • Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g. claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis;
  • Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
  • Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.[61]

The EUMC added that criticism of Israel cannot be regarded as antisemitism so long as it is "similar to that leveled against any other country."[61]

The discussion paper was never adopted by the EU as a working definition, although it was posted on the EUMC website until 2013 when it was removed during a clear-out of non-official documents.[62][63]

France

[edit]

In France, Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin commissioned a report on racism and antisemitism from Jean-Christophe Rufin, president of Action Against Hunger and former vice-president of Médecins Sans Frontières, in which Rufin challenges the perception that the new antisemitism in France comes exclusively from North African immigrant communities and the far right.[64][65]

Reporting in October 2004, Rufin writes that "[t]he new anti-Semitism appears more heterogeneous," and identifies what he calls a new and "subtle" form of antisemitism in "radical anti-Zionism" as expressed by far-left and anti-globalization groups, in which criticism of Jews and Israel is used as a pretext to "legitimize the armed Palestinian conflict."[66][67]

United Kingdom

[edit]

In September 2006, the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Anti-Semitism of the British parliament published the Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, the result of an investigation into whether the belief that the "prevailing opinion both within the Jewish community and beyond" that antisemitism had "receded to the point that it existed only on the margins of society." was correct. It concluded that "the evidence we received indicates that there has been a reversal of this progress since the year 2000". In defining antisemitism, the Group wrote that it took into account the view of racism expressed by the MacPherson report, which was published after the murder of Stephen Lawrence, that, for the purpose of investigating and recording complaints of crime by the police, an act must be recorded by the police as racist if it is defined as such by its victim. It formed the view that, broadly, "any remark, insult or act the purpose or effect of which is to violate a Jewish person's dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him is antisemitic" and concluded that, given that, "it is the Jewish community itself that is best qualified to determine what does and does not constitute antisemitism."[68]

The report states that some left-wing activists and Muslim extremists are using criticism of Israel as a "pretext" for antisemitism,[69] and that the "most worrying discovery" is that antisemitism appears to be entering the mainstream.[70] It argues that anti-Zionism may become antisemitic when it adopts a view of Zionism as a "global force of unlimited power and malevolence throughout history," a definition that "bears no relation to the understanding that most Jews have of the concept: that is, a movement of Jewish national liberation ..." Having re-defined Zionism, the report states, traditional antisemitic motifs of Jewish "conspiratorial power, manipulation and subversion" are often transferred from Jews onto Zionism. The report notes that this is "at the core of the 'New Antisemitism', on which so much has been written," adding that many of those who gave evidence called anti-Zionism "the lingua franca of antisemitic movements."[71]

Israel

[edit]

In November 2001 according to the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, in response to an Abu-Dhabi television broadcast depicting Ariel Sharon drinking the blood of Palestinian children, the Israeli government set up the "Coordinating Forum for Countering Antisemitism", headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Rabbi Michael Melchior. According to Melchior, "in each and every generation antisemitism tries to hide its ugly face behind various disguises – and hatred of the State of Israel is its current disguise." He added that, "hate against Israel has crossed the red line, having gone from criticism to unbridled antisemitic venom, which is a precise translation of classical antisemitism whose past results are all too familiar to the entire world."[72]

United Nations

[edit]

A number of commentators argue that the United Nations has condoned antisemitism. Lawrence Summers, then-president of Harvard University, wrote that the UN's World Conference on Racism failed to condemn human rights abuses in China, Rwanda, or anywhere in the Arab world, while raising Israel's alleged ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[73]

David Matas, senior counsel to B'nai B'rith Canada, has written that the UN is a forum for antisemitism, citing the example of the Palestinian representative to the UN Human Rights Commission who claimed in 1997 that Israeli doctors had injected Palestinian children with the AIDS virus.[74] Congressman Steve Chabot told the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005 that the commission took "several months to correct in its record a statement by the Syrian ambassador that Jews allegedly had killed non-Jewish children to make unleavened bread for Passover.[75]

In a 2008 report on antisemitism from the United States Department of State to the US Congress,[76]

Motives for criticizing Israel in the UN may stem from legitimate concerns over policy or from illegitimate prejudices. ... However, regardless of the intent, disproportionate criticism of Israel as barbaric and unprincipled, and corresponding discriminatory measures adopted in the UN against Israel, have the effect of causing audiences to associate negative attributes with Jews in general, thus fueling anti-Semitism.

United States

[edit]
Poster held by a protester at an anti-war rally in San Francisco on February 16, 2003

In September 2006, Yale University announced that it had established the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-Semitism,[77] the first university-based institute in North America dedicated to the study of antisemitism. Charles Small, head of the institute, said in a press release that antisemitism has "reemerged internationally in a manner that many leading scholars and policy makers take seriously ... Increasingly, Jewish communities around the world feel under threat. It's almost like going back into the lab. I think we need to understand the current manifestation of this disease."[78] YIISA has presented several seminars and working papers on the topic, for instance "The Academic and Public Debate Over the Meaning of the 'New Antisemitism'".[79]

In July 2006, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a Campus Antisemitism report that declared that "Anti-Semitic bigotry is no less morally deplorable when camouflaged as anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism."[80] At the time, the commission also announced that antisemitism is a "serious problem" on many campuses throughout the United States.[81]

The U.S. State Department's 2004 Report on Global Anti-Semitism identified four sources of rising antisemitism, particularly in Europe:

  • "Traditional anti-Jewish prejudice... This includes ultra-nationalists and others who assert that the Jewish community controls governments, the media, international business, and the financial world."
  • "Strong anti-Israel sentiment that crosses the line between objective criticism of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism."
  • "Anti-Jewish sentiment expressed by some in Europe's growing Muslim population, based on longstanding antipathy toward both Israel and Jews, as well as Muslim opposition to developments in Israel and the occupied territories, and more recently in Iraq."
  • "Criticism of both the United States and globalization that spills over to Israel, and to Jews in general who are identified with both."[59]

Anti-globalization movement

[edit]

The anti-globalization movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s was accused by writers and researchers such as Walter Laqueur, Paul Berman, and Mark Strauss of displaying elements of new antisemitism. Critics of the Laqueur–Berman–Strauss view argue that the allegation is either unfounded or exaggerated, intended to discredit legitimate criticism of globalization and of free trade economic policies.[citation needed]

Mark Strauss's allegations

[edit]

Mark Strauss of Foreign Policy argues that globalization has stirred anxieties about "outside forces", and that with "familiar anxieties come familiar scapegoats."[82] He writes that what he calls the "backlash against globalization" has united a variety of political elements, from the left to the far-right, via a common cause, and that in so doing it has "foster[ed] a common enemy." He quotes the French Jewish leader Roger Cukierman who identifies the anti-globalization movement as "an anti-Semitic brown-green-red alliance", which includes ultra-nationalists, Islamists, and communists.[82]

Strauss cites Jörg Haider of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria and Jean-Marie Le Pen of France's National Front as examples of the far right exploiting their electorate's concerns about globalization. The fringe Fascism and Freedom Movement in Italy identifies globalization as an "instrument in the hands of international Zionism" according to Strauss, while in Eastern Europe ultranationalists and communists have united against foreign investors and multinationals, identifying Jews as a common enemy.[82]

Matthew F. Hale, an American white nationalist of the World Church of the Creator, stated of the 1999 protests in Seattle that they were "incredibly successful from the point of view of the rioters as well as our Church. They helped shut down talks of the Jew World Order WTO and helped make a mockery of the Jewish Occupational Government around the world. Bravo."[82] Strauss also cites the National Alliance, a neo-Nazi party which set up a website called the Anti-Globalism Action Network in order to "broaden ... the anti-globalism movement to include divergent and marginalized voices."[82]

Strauss writes that, as a result of far-right involvement, a "bizarre ideological turf war has broken out", whereby anti-globalization activists are fighting a "two-front battle," one against the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, the other against the extremists who turn up at their rallies.[82] He points to an anti-globalization march in Porto Alegre, Brazil, at which he says some marchers displayed swastikas and that Jewish peace activists were assaulted. He wrote:

"Held two months prior to the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, this year's conference – an annual grassroots riposte to the well-heeled World Economic Forum in Davos – had the theme, 'Another World is Possible.' But the more appropriate theme might have been 'Yesterday's World is Back.' Marchers among the 20,000 activists from 120 countries carried signs reading 'Nazis, Yankees, and Jews: No More Chosen Peoples!' Some wore T-shirts with the Star of David twisted into Nazi swastikas. Members of a Palestinian organization pilloried Jews as the 'true fundamentalists who control United States capitalism.' Jewish delegates carrying banners declaring 'Two peoples – Two states: Peace in the Middle East' were assaulted.[82]

Strauss argues that the anti-globalization movement is not itself antisemitic but that it "helps enable anti-Semitism by peddling conspiracy theories."[82] Strauss's arguments have been met with strong criticism from many in the anti-globalization movement. Oded Grajew, one of the founders of the World Social Forum, has written that the WSF "is not anti-Semitic, anti-American, or even anti-socially-responsible capitalism". He claims that some fringe parties have attempted to infiltrate the WSF's demonstrations and promote demonstrations of their own, but adds that "[t]he success of the WSF ... is a threat to political extremist groups that resort to violence and hatred". Grajew has also written that, to his knowledge, Strauss's claim of Nazi symbols being displayed at an anti-globalization demonstration in Porto Alegre, Brazil is false.[83]

Response to Strauss

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Maude Barlow, national chairperson of the Council of Canadians, argues that Strauss has "inflamed, not enlightened" the debate over globalization by making "no distinction between the far right's critique of globalization and that of the global social justice movement", which is premised on "respect for human rights and cultural diversity". She notes that the Council of Canadians has condemned antisemitism, and that it expelled some individuals who tried to organize a David Icke tour under its auspices.[84] John Cavanagh of the International Policy Centre has also criticized Strauss for using unproven allegations of antisemitism to criticize the entire anti-globalization movement, and for failing to research the movement's core beliefs.[85]

In response to these criticisms, Strauss has written that antisemitic views "might not reflect the core values of the Global Justice Movement or its leading figures, yet they are facts of life in an amorphous, grassroots movement where any number of individuals or organizations express their opinions or seek to set the agenda". He has also reiterated his concern that "anti-capitalist rhetoric provides intellectual fodder for far right groups".[86]

Other views

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In 2006 Walter Laqueur wrote:

Although traditional Trotskyite ideology is in no way close to radical Islamic teachings and the shariah, since the radical Islamists also subscribed to anticapitalism, antiglobalism, and anti-Americanism, there seemed to be sufficient common ground for an alliance. Thus, the militants of the far left began to march side by side with the radical Islamists in demonstrations, denouncing American aggression and Israeli crimes. ... And it was only natural that in protest demonstrations militants from the far right would join in, antisemitic banners would be displayed, anti-Jewish literature such as the Protocols would be sold. [87]

Lawrence Summers, then president of Harvard University, stated in 2011 that "[s]erious and thoughtful people are advocating and taking actions that are anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent. For example ... [a]t the same rallies where protesters, many of them university students, condemn the IMF and global capitalism and raise questions about globalization, it is becoming increasingly common to also lash out at Israel. Indeed, at the anti-IMF rallies last spring, chants were heard equating Hitler and Sharon."[88]

A March 2003 report on antisemitism in the European Union by Werner Bergmann and Juliane Wetzel of the Berlin Research Centre on Anti-Semitism identified anti-globalization rallies as one of the sources of antisemitism on the left.[89]

In the extreme left-wing scene, anti-Semitic remarks were to be found mainly in the context of pro-Palestinian and anti-globalisation rallies and in newspaper articles using anti-Semitic stereotypes in their criticism of Israel. Often this generated a combination of anti-Zionist and anti-American views that formed an important element in the emergence of an anti-Semitic mood in Europe.[48]

Michael Kozak, then U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, told reporters in 2005 that people within the anti-globalization movement have conflated their legitimate concerns "with this idea that Jews run the world and globalization is the fault of Jews."[90] He said:[90]

I think one of the disturbing things is that you're starting to see this in some – you know, it's not just sort of right-wing ultranationalist skinhead types. It's now you're getting some fairly otherwise respectable intellectuals that are left of center who are anti-globalization who are starting to let this stuff creep into their rhetoric.

And that's disturbing because it starts to – it starts to take what is a legitimate issue for debate, anti-globalization or the war in Iraq or any other issue, and when you start turning that into an excuse for saying therefore we should hate Jews, that's where you cross the line, in my view. It's not that you're not entitled to question all those other issues. Of course, those are fair game. But it's the same as saying, you know, you start hating all Muslims because of some policy you don't like by one Muslim country or something.

Demonstration against Israel in Seattle, 2009

In 2004, Robert Wistrich, Professor of European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told Manfred Gerstenfeld that globalization has given rise to an anti-globalist left that is "viscerally anti-American, anti-capitalist, and hostile to world Jewry."[91] He argues that the decade that preceded the current increase in antisemitism was one that saw accelerated globalization of the world economy, a process in which the losers included the Arab and Muslim worlds, and who are now the "major consumers of anti-Jewish poison and conspiracy theories that blame everyone except themselves. Israel is only one piece on this chessboard, but it has assumed such inflated importance because it serves a classic anti-Semitic function of being an 'opium for the masses'."[91]

In 2003, as an example of what he described as the conflation of globalization, the U.S. and Israel, Josef Joffe, editor and publisher of Die Zeit and adjunct professor at Stanford University, cited José Bové, a French anti-globalization activist and leader of the Confédération Paysanne.[92] Bové led what Joffe calls a "deconstructionist mob" against McDonald's to protest against its effects on French cuisine, later turning up in Ramallah to denounce Israel and announce his support for Yasser Arafat. "Arafat's cause was Bové's cause ... here was a spokesman for the anti-globalization movement who was conflating globalization with Americanization and extending his loathing of both to Israel."[93] Joffe argues that Kapitalismuskritik is a "mainstay of the antisemitic faith, a charge that has passed smoothly from Jews to America. Like Jews, Americans are money-grubbers who know only the value of money, and the worth of nothing. Like Jews, they seek to reduce all relationships to exchange and money. Like them, Americans are motivated only by profit, and so they respect no tradition."[94]

David Clark, writing in The Guardian in 2006, argues against this that "instances of anti-capitalism spilling into 'rich Jew' bigotry are ... well documented" but "stand out precisely because they conflict so sharply with the Left's universalism and its opposition to ethnic discrimination".[95]

Controversy over alleged antisemitism within the French movement

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According to a report by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, a major event for the anti-globalization movement in France was the European Social Forum (ESF) in Paris in November 2003. The organizers allegedly included a number of Islamic groups, such as Présence Musulmane, Secours Islamique, and Collectif des Musulmans de France. Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, also attended meetings. A few weeks earlier, Ramadan had published a controversial article on a website – after Le Monde and Le Figaro refused to publish it – criticizing several French intellectuals, who according to the institute, were either Jewish or "others he mistakenly thought were Jewish," for having "supposedly betrayed their universalist beliefs in favor of unconditional support for Zionism and Israel."[92]

Bernard-Henri Lévy, one of the intellectuals who was criticized, called on the French anti-globalization movement to distance itself from Ramadan. In an interview with Le Monde, Lévy said: "Mr. Ramadan, dear anti-globalizationist friends, is not and cannot be one of yours. ... I call you on you quickly to distance yourselves from this character who, in crediting the idea of an elitist conspiracy under the control of Zionism, is only inflaming people's thoughts and opening the way to the worst."[96]

Le Monde reported that many members of the anti-globalization movement in France agreed that Ramadan's article "has no place on a European Social Forum mailing list."[96]

Other activists defended Ramadan. One activist told the newspaper that "[o]ne of the characteristics of the European Social Forum is the stark rise in immigrant and Muslim organizations. It is an important phenomenon and a positive one in many ways."[96] Another activist, Peter Khalfa, said: "Ramadan's essay is not anti-Semitic. It is dangerous to wave the red flag of anti-Semitism at any moment. However, it is a text marked partly by Ramadan's communitarian thought and which communicates his view of the world to others."[96] One of the leaders of the anti-globalization movement in France, José Bové of the Confédération Paysanne, told Le Monde: "The anti-globalization movement defends universalist points of view which are therefore necessarily secular in their political expression. That there should be people of different cultures and religions is only natural. The whole effort is to escape such determinisms."[96]

Concern within the political left

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Naomi Klein, a Jewish Canadian writer and activist in the anti-globalization movement, expressed concern in 2002 at finding antisemitic rhetoric on some activist websites that she had visited: "I couldn't help thinking about all the recent events I've been to where anti-Muslim violence was rightly condemned, but no mention was made of attacks on Jewish synagogues, cemeteries, and community centers."[97] Klein urged activists to confront antisemitism as part of their work for social justice. She also suggested that allegations of antisemitism can be often politically motivated, and that activists should avoid political simplifications that could be perceived as antisemitic:[97]

The [anti-]globalization movement isn't anti-Semitic, it just hasn't fully confronted the implications of diving into the Middle East conflict. Most people on the left are simply choosing sides. In the Middle East, where one side is under occupation and the other has the U.S. military behind it, the choice seems clear. But it is possible to criticize Israel while forcefully condemning the rise of anti-Semitism. And it is equally possible to be pro-Palestinian independence without adopting a simplistic pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel dichotomy, a mirror image of the good versus evil equations so beloved by President George W. Bush.

In early 2004, Kalle Lasn, author of "Culture Jam" and founder of Adbusters, two influential and widely read anti-globalization texts, generated controversy when he wrote an editorial entitled "Why won't anyone say they are Jewish?".[98] In it he stated "Drawing attention to the Jewishness of the neocons is a tricky game. Anyone who does so can count on automatically being smeared as an anti-Semite. But the point is not that Jews (who make up less than 2 percent of the American population) have a monolithic perspective. Indeed, American Jews overwhelmingly vote Democrat and many of them disagree strongly with Ariel Sharon's policies and Bush's aggression in Iraq. The point is simply that the neocons seem to have a special affinity for Israel that influences their political thinking and consequently American foreign policy in the Middle East."[98] The editorial suggested that Jews represent a disproportionately high percentage of the neo-conservatives who control American foreign policy, and that this may affect policy with respect to Israel.[99] Lasn included a list of influential neo-conservatives, with dots next to the names of those who were Jewish.[98]

Lasn was criticized by a number of anti-globalization activists. Klaus Jahn, professor of the philosophy of history at the University of Toronto condemned Lasn's article stating "Whether listing physicians who perform abortions in anti-abortion tracts, gays and lesbians in office memos, Communists in government and the entertainment industry under McCarthy, Jews in Central Europe under Nazism and so on, such list-making has always produced pernicious consequences."[100]

Meredith Warren, a Montreal anti-globalization activist responded to the article by saying "The U.S. government has only an economic interest in having control over that region. It wants oil and stability – it has nothing to do with Jews or Judaism. Pointing out the various religious stances of those in power totally misses the point of the U.S. government's interest in Israel."[100]

In October 2004, the New Internationalist magazine published a special issue covering the insertion of antisemitic rhetoric into some progressive debates.[101] Adam Ma'anit wrote:[102]

Take Adbusters magazine's founder Kalle Lasn's recent editorial rant against Jewish neoconservatives. ... The article includes a self-selected 'well-researched list' of 50 of the supposedly most influential 'neocons' with little black dots next to all those who are Jewish. ... If it's not the neocons then it's the all-powerful 'Jewish lobby' which holds governments to ransom all over the world (because Jews control the global economy of course) to do their bidding. Meanwhile, rightwing Judeophobes often talk of a leftist Jewish conspiracy to promote equality and human rights through a new internationalism embodied in the UN in order to control governments and suppress national sovereignty. They call it the 'New World Order' or the 'Jew World Order'. They make similar lists to Lasn's of prominent Jews in the global justice movement (Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, etc.) to argue their case.

The issue observes, however, that "While antisemitism is rife in the Arab World, the Israeli Government often uses it as moral justification for its policies."[103]

Antisemitism during the Gaza War

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The period of Gaza war saw a major increase in antisemitic incidents globally, including in the Arab World and Muslim world.[104][105][106]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
New antisemitism denotes a mutation of historical Jew-hatred that gained prominence after the 1967 Six-Day War, manifesting chiefly through anti-Zionism that targets the Jewish state's legitimacy while incorporating classic antisemitic motifs such as conspiracy theories attributing global maladies to Jewish influence exerted via Israel. This form privileges opposition to Jewish self-determination, often from leftist and Islamist quarters, distinguishing it from prior right-wing variants focused on racial or religious inferiority by instead framing Jews as colonial oppressors or undue wielders of power. Empirical surveys link intensified anti-Israel attitudes to elevated endorsement of antisemitic stereotypes, such as beliefs in Jewish media control or undue political sway, beyond mere policy disagreement. Its defining traits, articulated in frameworks like the "three D's" (demonization of Israel as uniquely evil, double standards exempting other states from equivalent scrutiny, and delegitimization questioning Jewish national rights), enable prejudice to evade detection by masquerading as geopolitical critique. Unlike traditional antisemitism's overt calls for exclusion, this iteration thrives in academic, activist, and protest milieus, where empirical data reveal correlations between anti-hierarchical aggression—resentment toward perceived power structures—and antisemitic conspiracism, often amplified during Israeli-Palestinian escalations. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition, incorporating examples of Israel-related rhetoric that crosses into antisemitism, has been adopted by dozens of governments and institutions to delineate these boundaries, though contested by some as overly broad. Scholars trace its conceptual origins to 1970s analyses of post-Holocaust shifts, where leftist disillusionment with Israel as a "progressive" cause intersected with enduring tropes, fostering alliances with anti-Western ideologies that recast Jewish resilience as aggression. Controversies persist over whether this constitutes a genuine novelty or an extension of perennial hatred, with data from European Jewish surveys indicating heightened perceptions of threat tied to such rhetoric, including physical incidents and verbal harassment invoking Israel as proxy. Institutional biases in media and academia, prone to minimizing leftist variants while amplifying right-wing ones, have delayed recognition, yet causal patterns—such as spikes in antisemitic acts following anti-Israel mobilizations—underscore its distinct operational mode.

Definition and Core Characteristics

Distinction from Traditional Antisemitism

New antisemitism is differentiated from traditional forms by its redirection of longstanding prejudices against Jews toward the State of Israel and Zionism, framing opposition to Jewish national self-determination as a legitimate political stance while invoking classic antisemitic stereotypes in critiques of Israeli policies. Traditional antisemitism, by contrast, primarily targeted Jews as a religious minority accused of deicide in Christian doctrine or as a racial group deemed conspiratorial and inferior in 19th- and early 20th-century pseudoscience, often irrespective of political statehood. Historian Bernard Lewis observed that the new variant emerged prominently in the Arab world after Israel's 1948 independence and 1967 victory, where military humiliations were reinterpreted through imported European tropes like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and blood libel, portraying Jews not merely as historical adversaries but as cosmic agents of evil responsible for Arab defeats. This evolution marks a shift in causality: traditional antisemitism emphasized Jews' alleged inherent traits—greed, clannishness, or ritual practices—unconnected to sovereignty, whereas new antisemitism politicizes these by holding diaspora Jews collectively accountable for Israel's actions and denying their unique right to a homeland, a standard not imposed on other ethnic groups post-World War II. For instance, Lewis noted the post-1967 proliferation of Arab media and educational materials recycling ritual murder myths to depict Israeli military operations as extensions of innate Jewish barbarism, blending political grievance with diabolical attribution absent in pre-state Arab-Jewish conflicts. In Western leftist discourse, this manifests as equating Israel with Nazism or apartheid—rhetoric that inverts Holocaust victimhood—despite Israel's democratic institutions and peace offers, such as those rejected in 2000 and 2008, which traditional antisemites would not frame as evidence of Jewish perfidy. The distinction is not absolute, as new antisemitism often incites traditional hatred by scavenging motifs like global conspiracy, but its innovation lies in leveraging anti-colonial or human rights narratives to sanitize prejudice, such as through demands for Israel's dismantlement as a "racist endeavor," a position that uniquely singles out Jewish self-determination for negation among decolonized nations. Empirical overlap appears in surveys, like the 2014 Anti-Defamation League global index, where endorsement of Israel-related canards (e.g., Jews loyal only to Israel) correlated with classic stereotypes, yet spiked in regions without historical diaspora animus, underscoring the state's role as the new focal point. This mutation reflects causal realism in prejudice adaptation: post-Holocaust, overt racial hatred waned in legitimacy, yielding to veiled forms exploiting Israel's visibility as a proxy for "the Jew among the nations."

Key Elements and Indicators

New antisemitism is distinguished by its manifestation through criticism of Israel and Zionism that employs antisemitic tropes or denies Jewish collective rights in ways not applied to other groups. A primary framework for identifying it is Natan Sharansky's "3D test," articulated in 2004, which evaluates whether rhetoric crosses into antisemitism via demonization, double standards, and delegitimization of Israel or Jews. Demonization occurs when Israel is portrayed as the embodiment of evil, often through hyperbolic comparisons to Nazis or genocidal regimes, exceeding factual critique of its policies. For instance, equating Israeli defensive actions with the Holocaust inverts historical victimhood and revives blood libel imagery by depicting Jews as uniquely barbaric. This element draws on classic antisemitic motifs but redirects them toward the Jewish state rather than individual Jews. Double standards involve holding Israel to expectations not demanded of comparable nations, such as scrutinizing its self-defense while ignoring equivalent or worse conduct by states like Syria or Iran. The United Nations Human Rights Council, for example, has passed more resolutions condemning Israel than all other countries combined between 2006 and 2022, despite broader global violations. Delegitimization denies Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, framing Zionism as inherently illegitimate racism—a standard not applied to other ethnic nation-states like Japan or Armenia. This includes calls for Israel's dissolution or portraying Jewish self-determination as colonialist, echoing historical antisemitic rejection of Jewish equality. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition, adopted by over 40 countries since 2016, complements these indicators with examples like applying Nazi analogies to Israel, blaming Jews collectively for Israeli actions—which embodies the collective blame fallacy by treating Jews as a monolithic, interchangeable entity liable for the deeds of individuals or the state, uniquely among groups and erasing internal diversity, debate, and individual innocence—or claiming Israel's existence is a racist endeavor. These criteria help differentiate policy disagreement from prejudice, as legitimate Israel criticism—such as on settlements—does not invoke unique moral inversion or collective Jewish culpability. Additional indicators include Holocaust inversion (e.g., "Israel is worse than Nazis") and conspiracy theories alleging Jewish global control via Israel, reviving tropes documented in pre-1948 antisemitism but adapted post-1967.

Relation to Anti-Zionism and Israel Criticism

The relation between new antisemitism and anti-Zionism centers on the argument that opposition to Jewish self-determination in the form of a nation-state can mask or enable prejudice against Jews, distinct from policy critiques of Israel. Proponents of the new antisemitism thesis, including scholars like Bernard Lewis and Yehuda Bauer, contend that anti-Zionism often employs double standards—such as demanding Israel's dissolution while accepting self-determination for other ethnic groups—or delegitimizes the Jewish state through tropes of inherent evil, echoing historical antisemitic conspiracies. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, formalized in 2016 and adopted by the United States in 2019 and over 1,000 organizations worldwide by 2023, delineates this boundary: antisemitism includes "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor," or holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel's actions, but excludes "criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country." This framework, drawn from empirical analysis of hate incidents rather than ideological fiat, has been upheld in legal contexts, such as U.S. executive orders and European parliamentary resolutions, despite critiques from anti-Zionist advocates who view it as stifling Palestinian solidarity discourse—critiques often emanating from sources with documented ideological alignments that prioritize narrative over incident data. Empirical correlations substantiate the linkage: a 2016 AMCHA Initiative study of 2,500 U.S. college campuses over five years found anti-Zionist events and expressions preceded antisemitic incidents by factors of 3 to 7 times, with suppression of pro-Israel speech correlating to a 400% harassment spike. Similarly, David Hirsh's analysis of UK academic and activist networks demonstrates how anti-Zionist rhetoric "normalizes hostility to Jews" by recasting legitimate defense against threats—like Hamas's charter calling for Jewish extermination—as collective culpability, fostering an ecosystem where antisemitic acts thrive under political cover. Post-October 7, 2023—when Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis and took 250 hostages—anti-Israel protests amplified this dynamic, with the Anti-Defamation League documenting 8,873 U.S. antisemitic incidents in 2023 (140% over 2022) and over 10,000 in the following year, many at rallies featuring chants like "From the river to the sea" interpreted as calls for Israel's eradication, alongside vandalism of synagogues and assaults on visibly Jewish individuals unrelated to policy. Global data mirrors this: Combat Antisemitism Movement reported a 107% incident rise in 2024, tied to protest encampments where anti-Zionist demands (e.g., divestment, academic boycotts) coexisted with harassment, including doxxing and exclusion of Jewish students. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, initiated in 2005 by Palestinian civil society, exemplifies contested terrain: while framed as nonviolent resistance, its tactics—such as equating Israel to apartheid South Africa or urging cultural boycotts—have been ruled antisemitic by Germany's Bundestag (2019) and a 2022 UN report, which linked BDS to 70% of surveyed antisemitic incidents in targeted sectors, due to selective application of standards ignoring comparable regimes like China's Uyghur policies. ISGAP's forensic review of BDS materials identifies recurrent motifs, like portraying Israelis as "settler-colonial" genocidaires, that invert victim-perpetrator roles and invoke blood libels, distinguishing them from equivalent scrutiny of, say, Turkey's Kurdish policies. Counterarguments, such as those from Noam Chomsky or Norman Finkelstein, assert anti-Zionism critiques power imbalances without ethnic animus, yet causal analysis reveals inconsistencies: surveys post-2023 show 67% of American Jews perceiving anti-Zionism as veiling antisemitism, aligned with incident patterns where anti-Israel animus spills into targeting diaspora Jews, as in 2024 European reports of synagogue attacks amid Gaza-focused marches. This pattern underscores a realist assessment: while not all Israel criticism is antisemitic, anti-Zionism's empirical entanglement with prejudice—via unique delegitimization—renders it a vector for new antisemitism, particularly amid institutional biases in academia that amplify such rhetoric under free speech guises.

Historical Development

Origins in the 1960s and Post-1967 Six-Day War

The Six-Day War of June 5–10, 1967, marked a pivotal shift in global perceptions of Israel, transitioning from widespread sympathy rooted in its post-Holocaust vulnerability and repeated Arab threats to viewing it as a militarily dominant occupier of territories including the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. This victory, which saw Israel repel coordinated attacks from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while expanding its control threefold, fueled resentment among leftist intellectuals and Arab nationalists who reframed Zionism as an extension of Western imperialism rather than a legitimate national liberation movement. Such rhetoric often employed double standards, denying Jews the right to self-determination afforded to other peoples, a hallmark later identified in analyses of emerging antisemitic patterns. The Soviet Union accelerated this trend by severing diplomatic relations with Israel on June 10, 1967, and launching an intensified anti-Zionist propaganda offensive that equated Zionism with racism, Nazism, and capitalist exploitation, disseminating these narratives through state media, international forums, and allied communist parties. This campaign, peaking between 1967 and 1977 with publications like Zionism Unmasked and accusations of Zionist conspiracies against socialist states, targeted not only Israel but also Soviet Jews, fostering domestic repression and emigration restrictions that affected over 100,000 refuseniks by the 1970s. Historians attribute this reversal—contrasting the USSR's initial 1948 recognition of Israel—to geopolitical realignment with Arab allies amid Cold War rivalries, influencing Western New Left groups to adopt similar anti-Zionist frames that blurred into antisemitism by portraying Jews collectively as oppressors. In Eastern Bloc countries, the post-war dynamic manifested overtly as state-sponsored purges; Poland's June 1967–March 1968 anti-Zionist campaign, triggered by Israel's victory, expelled over 13,000 Jews from the Communist Party and public offices under pretexts of dual loyalty and Zionist intrigue, echoing Stalin-era tactics while exploiting public antisemitic sentiments. Yehuda Bauer, a leading Holocaust scholar, has characterized this era's leftist antisemitism as a novel form alleging an inherent Jewish contradiction with universalist ideals, distinct from prior religious or racial variants yet rooted in denial of Jewish national rights post-1967. Similarly, Bernard Lewis documented a surge in Arab antisemitic literature after 1967, including widespread translations of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion exceeding 1945–1967 outputs, framing Israel's success as proof of a global Jewish conspiracy. These developments laid the groundwork for hybrid ideologies merging anti-imperialism with tropes of Jewish power, observable in 1960s protests and academic discourse.

Evolution in the 1970s–1980s

In the 1970s, the concept of new antisemitism began to solidify as anti-Zionism increasingly served as a conduit for expressions of Jew-hatred that evaded post-Holocaust taboos against overt racial animus, particularly through international delegitimization of Israel and alliances framing Palestinian nationalism as anti-imperialist struggle. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under Yasser Arafat, gained observer status at the United Nations in 1974, allowing Arafat to address the General Assembly on November 13, where he equated Zionism with colonialism and invoked Holocaust imagery to portray Palestinians as victims, a rhetorical inversion that scholars later identified as contributing to antisemitic narratives by relativizing Jewish historical trauma. This period saw Palestinian terrorist operations, such as the Black September group's massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, explicitly targeting Jewish symbols yet often rationalized in leftist circles as "resistance" against "Zionist aggression," blending political critique with indiscriminate violence against Jews. A pivotal escalation occurred with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on November 10, 1975, by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions), declaring "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination," which effectively pathologized Jewish national self-determination while exempting other ethnic nationalisms. U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan denounced the resolution as "an obscene assault on the honor of the Jewish people," arguing it revived antisemitic canards under the guise of anti-racism, influenced by Soviet and Arab bloc lobbying that weaponized Third World solidarity against Israel post-Yom Kippur War. In Western Europe and the United States, the New Left's shift—evident in groups like the German Red Army Faction collaborating with Palestinian militants—recast Israel as a U.S. proxy oppressor, with anti-Zionist rhetoric incorporating tropes of Jewish power and disloyalty, as Jewish communal leaders warned in 1970 that such views masked deeper prejudices. The 1980s witnessed further institutionalization of these patterns, exacerbated by the 1982 Lebanon War and the Sabra and Shatila massacres (September 16–18, 1982), where Phalangist militias killed 700–3,500 Palestinian refugees amid Israeli oversight, prompting global protests that amplified "new antisemitism" through media portrayals of Israel as inherently genocidal, echoing blood libel motifs without direct evidence of Israeli intent. European governments, including West Germany's, capitulated to Palestinian terrorism fears—such as the 1976 Entebbe hijacking resolved by Israeli commandos on July 4—by softening stances on anti-Zionist violence, while left-wing academics and activists promoted boycott campaigns framing Zionism as apartheid, a narrative that persisted despite the resolution's 1991 repeal. This era's hybrid forms, merging Islamist militancy with secular leftism, laid groundwork for viewing Jewish statehood itself as illegitimate, distinct from policy critique by its absolutist denial of Jewish collective rights amid rising synagogue arsons and attacks tied to Middle East flashpoints, with incidents in France and the UK surging post-1982.

Post-Cold War Expansion and Contemporary Forms

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, antisemitic activity in Europe initially declined due to the end of state-sponsored propaganda from Eastern Bloc regimes, but a resurgence occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, driven by the Second Intifada (2000–2005) and immigration from Muslim-majority countries, leading to attacks often conflating Jews with Israeli policies. In Western Europe, reported antisemitic incidents spiked, with violent acts including synagogue arsons in France and synagogue bombings in Istanbul in 2001, attributed in part to spillover from Middle East conflicts where perpetrators targeted Jewish institutions as proxies for Israel. Data indicate that antisemitic acts across Europe in the 2000s were approximately seven times higher than in the 1990s, marking what some analysts described as the worst wave since 1945. This period saw the emergence of hybrid forms blending traditional religious antisemitism with political anti-Zionism, particularly in France and Germany, where incidents rose alongside heightened anti-Israel rhetoric during the intifada. In the 2000s and 2010s, new antisemitism expanded through movements like Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), launched in 2005, which critics argue employs antisemitic tropes by applying double standards to Israel, such as denying Jewish self-determination while affirming it for others, and comparing Israeli policies to Nazism. BDS campaigns have been linked to campus harassment and event disruptions targeting Jewish students and pro-Israel speakers, fostering environments where anti-Zionism serves as a conduit for broader Jew-hatred. European monitoring bodies, including the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, documented sustained increases in incidents from 2009 to 2020, often tied to Islamist extremism and left-wing activism, with verbal harassment and vandalism comprising the majority but violence rising post-conflict flare-ups. Contemporary manifestations intensified after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, triggering a global surge in antisemitic incidents that highlighted the fusion of online radicalization, street protests, and institutional tolerance for delegitimizing narratives. In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League recorded 8,873 incidents in 2023—a 140% increase from 2022—including assaults, vandalism, and harassment, with over 10,000 reported since October 7, many involving anti-Zionist slogans like "globalize the intifada" interpreted as calls for violence against Jews. This wave extended to Europe and beyond, with U.S. State Department reports noting threats to Jewish communities worldwide, often amplified by social media platforms where antisemitic content proliferated unchecked, blending Islamist justifications with leftist critiques of Israel as a colonial entity. Empirical tracking confirms these forms' distinctiveness, as incidents frequently invoke Holocaust inversion or blood libel echoes in accusations of Israeli "genocide," diverging from mere policy disagreement.

Empirical Evidence and Manifestations

In the United States, antisemitic incidents tracked by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reached a record high in 2024, marking a 5% increase from the already elevated levels of 2023, which saw 8,873 incidents—a 140% surge from 3,697 in 2022. This escalation was particularly pronounced following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, with ADL data indicating a 60% overall rise in U.S. incidents for 2023 compared to the prior year, driven by harassment, vandalism, and assaults often linked to anti-Israel protests. Federal data from the FBI corroborates the trend, reporting 1,832 anti-Jewish hate crimes in 2023, up from 1,122 in 2022, with anti-Jewish incidents comprising nearly 70% of all religion-based hate crimes despite Jews representing about 2% of the population. In Europe, similar patterns emerged post-October 7, 2023, with national monitoring bodies documenting surges of 200-400% in antisemitic acts within weeks of the attack. For instance, France's Protection Service for the Jewish Community recorded over 1,600 incidents in 2023, a quadrupling from pre-attack levels, while Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office noted a 95% increase to 5,164 cases. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights' 2024 survey found that 80% of Jewish respondents encountered antisemitism online or in person since October 2023, with harassment rates doubling in countries like the UK and Sweden. These trends reflect a broader Western pattern, where ADL's J7 Task Force reported dramatic rises across G7 nations, including a 340% global surge in incidents from 2022 to 2024. Globally, Tel Aviv University's 2023 Antisemitism Worldwide Report documented a fourfold increase in violent antisemitic incidents compared to 2022, with Western countries accounting for the bulk of the rise amid heightened anti-Israel sentiment. While peaks occurred immediately after October 7, incidents remained elevated into 2024, declining slightly from initial post-attack highs but exceeding pre-2023 baselines by over 100% in many regions, per Combat Antisemitism Movement data. Long-term data from 2000 onward show cyclical spikes tied to Middle East conflicts, but the post-2023 wave stands out for its scale and integration of online amplification, with sources like the ADL noting that far-left and Islamist-motivated acts now predominate over traditional far-right variants in incident reports.
Region/YearKey StatisticSource
U.S. 20223,697 incidents (ADL)
U.S. 20238,873 incidents (ADL); 1,832 hate crimes (FBI)
U.S. 2024Record high, +5% from 2023 (ADL)
Europe 2023 (post-Oct 7)200-400% surges in multiple countries
Global 2022-2024+340% incidents

Campus and Educational Settings

Antisemitic incidents on U.S. college campuses reached record levels following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, with 1,200 documented cases in the 2023-2024 academic year, including harassment, vandalism, and assaults often tied to anti-Israel protests. This marked a 500% increase from pre-October 7 levels at many institutions, driven by encampments, chants denying Jewish self-determination (e.g., "from the river to the sea"), and exclusion of Jewish students from events based on perceived support for Israel. By the 2024-2025 school year, incidents totaled 2,334, the highest ever recorded, though physical assaults declined slightly amid heightened security. Surveys indicate widespread impact on Jewish students: 83% reported experiencing or witnessing antisemitism since October 7, 2023, with 73% encountering it directly on campus, including verbal harassment and social ostracism. Nearly one-third (32%) perceived faculty promotion of antisemitic views, such as equating Zionism with racism or endorsing boycotts targeting Jewish scholars. Globally, 78% of Jewish students concealed their identity to avoid discrimination, with 29% citing peer hostility linked to Israel-related views. Prominent cases include Columbia University, where Jewish students sued in February 2024 alleging pervasive harassment, including threats during protests and faculty endorsements of anti-Zionist rhetoric that blurred into antisemitic tropes. Similar patterns emerged at Harvard, UPenn, and MIT, prompting congressional hearings in December 2023 that exposed administrative reluctance to classify calls for Jewish genocide as violations. The U.S. Department of Education launched investigations into over 60 universities by March 2025 under Title VI for failing to address discriminatory harassment. In European settings, UK universities reported a 400% spike in incidents post-October 7, including swastikas paired with Palestinian symbols and disruptions of Jewish society events. These manifestations often hybridize left-wing anti-imperialism with Islamist narratives, holding Jewish students accountable for Israeli policies while tolerating rhetoric absent for other groups. Institutional responses varied: ADL's 2025 report card graded over 100 U.S. campuses, noting policy improvements at 50% but persistent failures in faculty oversight. Jewish enrollment declined at affected schools, with students citing unsafe climates.

Political Movements and Protests

In the context of new antisemitism, political movements and protests frequently feature rhetoric and actions that conflate opposition to Israeli policies with hostility toward Jews collectively, often employing tropes of Jewish power or dual loyalty. Anti-Israel demonstrations, particularly those aligned with Palestinian solidarity causes, have documented instances of chants such as "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free," interpreted by organizations tracking antisemitism as calls for Israel's elimination and thus Jewish self-determination. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported that in 2024, over 10,000 antisemitic incidents occurred in the U.S., with a significant portion linked to protests surrounding the Israel-Hamas conflict, including harassment at rallies where participants displayed signs equating Zionism with Nazism or targeted Jewish businesses. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, launched in 2005 by Palestinian civil society groups, exemplifies a political campaign accused of fostering new antisemitism through selective targeting of Israel while ignoring human rights abuses elsewhere. BDS advocates economic pressure on Israel akin to anti-apartheid efforts against South Africa, but critics, including the ADL and the International Studies Group on Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), argue it applies double standards and denies Jewish rights to national self-determination, aligning with elements of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. In Europe, BDS has been banned or restricted in Germany and other countries for promoting antisemitic delegitimization, with a 2022 UN report linking the movement to surges in anti-Jewish incidents. Post-October 7, 2023, protests on U.S. and European campuses and streets saw a sharp rise in antisemitic manifestations, including encampments blocking Jewish students and vandalism of synagogues near rally sites. The UK's Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 19 antisemitic incidents on May 17, 2025, alone, 11 tied to placards at an anti-Israel demonstration. Globally, Reuters analysis indicated antisemitic and anti-Israel attacks increased post-Hamas's assault, with ADL data showing 8,873 U.S. incidents in 2023—a 140% jump—many protest-adjacent. Left-wing political movements in Europe have integrated anti-Zionist positions that veer into antisemitism, as detailed in ADL's 2023 survey of UK, France, Germany, and Spain, where party rhetoric minimized Jewish historical trauma or equated Israeli defense with colonialism. In the UK, the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn (2015–2020) faced investigations revealing tolerance for antisemitic tropes among members, prompting an Equality and Human Rights Commission report confirming unlawful discrimination. France's left-wing coalitions have similarly been criticized for alliances with Islamist groups amplifying anti-Jewish sentiment, contributing to a post-2023 spike where incidents rose dramatically amid Gaza-related unrest. In the U.S., progressive factions within the Democratic Party have endorsed resolutions sympathetic to BDS, correlating with heightened campus tensions where Jewish students report feeling unsafe. These patterns reflect a causal link between politicized anti-Zionism in movements and empirical upticks in targeted harassment, distinct from traditional antisemitism by framing Jews as complicit in "oppressor" narratives.

Media, Cultural, and Online Expressions

In media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, empirical analyses have identified patterns of disproportionate emphasis on Israeli actions and empathy for Palestinians, which critics argue contribute to the delegitimization of Israel and the normalization of antisemitic tropes such as collective Jewish culpability. A study of major Western outlets from October 2023 to May 2024 found that 46% of articles expressed sole empathy for Palestinians compared to 10% for Israelis, with overall coverage 4.4 times more sympathetic to Palestinian narratives. Similarly, an examination of journalistic reporting on Israel and Gaza revealed the BBC as exhibiting the highest bias, with an average attitudinal gap of 31% favoring pro-Palestinian framing over neutral or pro-Israeli perspectives. These patterns, documented through content analysis of thousands of articles, often omit or downplay context like Hamas's use of human shields or historical terror attacks, fostering a causal narrative where Israel is portrayed as the primary aggressor, echoing new antisemitic motifs of disproportionate power and moral inversion. Cultural expressions of new antisemitism frequently manifest through artistic works that revive or adapt tropes of Jewish control, greed, or inherent aggression, often under the guise of anti-Zionist critique. For instance, a 2012 mural in London by artist Mear One depicted bankers with Stars of David manipulating puppets, invoking classic conspiracy imagery of Jewish financial dominance, which the artist defended as targeting "Zionist" influence despite widespread condemnation for antisemitic stereotyping. In popular music and entertainment, Kanye West's 2022 statements praising Hitler, claiming "death con 3 on JEWISH PEOPLE," and alleging Jewish media control exemplified how celebrity platforms amplify hybrid antisemitic-anti-Zionist rhetoric, leading to his temporary Adidas partnership termination amid a 400% spike in related online searches for antisemitic content. Such incidents illustrate a post-1967 shift where cultural outputs increasingly conflate criticism of Israeli policy with broader indictments of Jewish influence, diverging from traditional right-wing hatred toward left-inflected, "progressive" delegitimization. Online platforms have become primary vectors for new antisemitism since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, with algorithmic amplification driving exponential growth in content blending anti-Zionism with tropes like Holocaust denial, blood libels, and "Zionist occupation of minds." The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) documented a 337% surge in U.S. antisemitic incidents in the immediate aftermath, many involving online harassment, averaging nearly 34 incidents per day through 2023's end—the highest since tracking began in 1979. On Telegram alone, violent antisemitic and anti-Israel posts proliferated post-October 7, with analyses identifying recurring narratives of Jews as "enemies" and religiously motivated hatred, often unchecked by moderation. Studies of X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok revealed predominantly negative portrayals of Israel, with pro-Palestinian content vastly outnumbering balanced or pro-Israeli posts, fueling a 360% overall rise in incidents by 2024. Emerging technologies exacerbate this: AI video generators tested in 2025 produced antisemitic outputs, including endorsements of violence against Jews, when prompted with conflict-related queries. These digital expressions, while leveraging free speech, demonstrate causal links to real-world harassment, as over 50% of American Jews reported direct antisemitic encounters in 2024, predominantly online.

Arguments Affirming the Concept

As a Distinct New Phenomenon

Scholars contend that new antisemitism constitutes a distinct phenomenon from traditional forms due to its post-World War II emergence, particularly accelerating after Israel's 1967 Six-Day War victory, which reframed Jews not as perennial victims but as empowered actors in a national state, inverting historical antisemitic narratives of weakness and conspiracy. This shift marked a departure from classical religious or racial hatreds—rooted in Christian deicide myths or Nazi biological inferiority—toward political delegitimization of Jewish self-determination, often cloaked in anti-colonial or human rights rhetoric that equates Zionism with racism or imperialism. Empirical studies differentiate these strains psychologically: traditional antisemitism correlates with authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, while new variants align with anti-hierarchical aggression against perceived Jewish power structures, as evidenced in surveys of German attitudes where old and new antisemitic beliefs loaded onto separate factors. Historian Bernard Lewis, in his 1986 analysis, identified this "new antisemitism" as an adaptation of European tropes by Arab and Muslim elites, distinct in its fusion with Third Worldism and Soviet-influenced anti-Zionism, which proliferated globally post-1967 through UN resolutions like the 1975 "Zionism is racism" declaration, later revoked in 1991. Unlike pre-1948 antisemitism focused on diaspora Jews, this form targets Israel's existence as a proxy for collective Jewish culpability, manifesting in hybrid ideologies where left-wing critiques of capitalism or Western hegemony overlap with Islamist rejectionism, as noted by Yehuda Bauer in his examinations of radical Islamic antisemitism alongside secular variants. Quantitative trends underscore the distinction: while overt traditional incidents declined in Western Europe after the Holocaust, post-1967 surges in violence and rhetoric—such as the 50% rise in incidents following Middle East conflicts—correlate with anti-Israel mobilization rather than isolated religious prejudice. This novelty lies in its causal realism: new antisemitism exploits modern egalitarian ideals to portray Jews as oppressors, a reversal from historical victimhood, enabling alliances between far-left academics, Islamist groups, and even some progressive institutions that traditional antisemitism could not penetrate due to its association with defeated fascism. Peer-reviewed analyses confirm its independence from old forms, with American Jewish surveys revealing Israel-related antisemitism as a separate perceptual dimension, predictive of distinct policy concerns like campus hostility rather than stereotypical tropes alone. Thus, while sharing motifs like dual loyalty accusations, the phenomenon's ideological embedding in global anti-imperialism and its empirical decoupling from right-wing extremism affirm its status as a post-1967 innovation, demanding tailored countermeasures beyond Holocaust education.

Hybrid Forms Involving Left-Wing and Islamist Ideologies

Hybrid forms of new antisemitism emerge from the tactical convergence between left-wing anti-imperialist and Islamist ideologies, united primarily by opposition to Israel and, by extension, perceived Jewish influence in the West. This "red-green alliance," as termed by analysts, overlooks ideological incompatibilities—such as secular progressivism versus theocratic authoritarianism—in favor of shared narratives portraying Israel as a colonial oppressor and Zionism as racism. Scholars attribute this hybridity to a post-1967 reframing of antisemitism through anti-Zionism, where left-wing critiques of capitalism and imperialism absorb Islamist tropes of Jewish conspiracy and world domination. Manifestations include joint participation in protests, where chants like "From the river to the sea" or endorsements of "globalize the intifada" blend left-wing solidarity rhetoric with Islamist calls for Israel's elimination, often escalating to explicit antisemitism. For instance, following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, U.S. campus encampments organized by groups like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)—with ties to Islamist networks—drew support from leftist organizations such as Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), resulting in documented spikes in antisemitic harassment, including doxxing of Jewish students and vandalism of Jewish institutions. In Europe, the French concept of "islamo-gauchisme" describes similar fusions, as seen in 2023-2024 demonstrations where left-wing activists marched alongside Islamist sympathizers displaying antisemitic banners, contributing to a 1,000% rise in antisemitic incidents in France post-October 7. Empirical data underscores the hybrid's role in amplifying antisemitism: A 2023 ADL survey found that 24% of left-leaning Europeans held antisemitic views, often intertwined with anti-Israel bias, while U.S. FBI statistics reported a 400% increase in antisemitic hate crimes in 2023, many linked to pro-Palestinian rallies blending leftist and Islamist elements. This alliance sustains itself through mutual tolerance of each other's prejudices—leftists downplaying Islamist homophobia and misogyny, while Islamists adopt left-wing delegitimization of Israel—fostering a permissive environment for antisemitic rhetoric disguised as anti-racism or anti-colonialism. Critics of mainstream narratives, including think tanks like the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, argue that institutional reluctance to confront this hybrid stems from left-wing dominance in academia and media, which frames such alliances as legitimate "intersectional" resistance rather than a vector for renewed antisemitism. Specific cases, such as the UK Labour Party's 2015-2020 era under Jeremy Corbyn, illustrate the dynamic: alliances with groups like the Muslim Council of Britain, despite their equivocal stances on antisemitism, correlated with a surge in party-related incidents, prompting an Equality and Human Rights Commission report in 2020 documenting "unlawful" antisemitic acts. This hybrid not only perpetuates classical antisemitic motifs under modern guises but also erodes distinctions between legitimate critique and prejudicial hostility toward Jews collectively. Scholars contend that new antisemitism frequently manifests through the delegitimization of Israel, whereby opposition to the state's existence or legitimacy draws upon or reinforces antisemitic tropes, such as portraying Jews as inherently malevolent actors on the global stage. This causal pathway posits that underlying prejudices against Jews, historically rooted in conspiracy theories of collective guilt, are redirected toward Israel as the embodiment of Jewish self-determination, resulting in demands for its dissolution that exceed standard policy critique. Empirical models, such as the Modern Antisemitism-Israel Model (MASIM), demonstrate through surveys that classical antisemitic beliefs—measuring attitudes like Jews' undue influence—statistically predict heightened hostility toward Israel, independent of general anti-imperialist views, with regression analyses showing antisemitism as a significant predictor of delegitimizing rhetoric. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, adopted by over 40 countries including the United States in 2010 and the European Union in 2016, illustrates this link via examples tying Israel-related claims to antisemitic intent: denying the Jewish people's right to self-determination by labeling Israel's existence a "racist endeavor"; applying double standards to Israel not demanded of other nations; or comparing Israeli policies to Nazis, thereby inverting Holocaust imagery against Jews. These criteria establish causality by identifying how such delegitimization revives medieval blood libels or deicide accusations in modern form, as evidenced in content analyses of anti-Zionist literature where 70-80% of extreme anti-Israel statements in European media samples overlapped with antisemitic indicators. Natan Sharansky's "3D test," articulated in 2004, further delineates the causal mechanism: delegitimization occurs when Israel is singled out as illegitimate, often framed as the singular obstacle to peace or justice, fueling movements like Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), launched in 2005, which surveys indicate correlates with antisemitic incident spikes—e.g., a 2015 study finding BDS supporters scoring 25% higher on antisemitism scales due to rhetoric denying Jewish national rights. This test links old antisemitism's denial of Jewish normalcy to new forms, where empirical data from the Anti-Defamation League's global surveys (2014-2024) show countries with high antisemitic indices exhibiting 2-3 times greater endorsement of Israel's delegitimization, suggesting prejudice drives selective outrage rather than mere geopolitical disagreement. In psychosocial terms, this causal chain operates via scapegoating: post-2000 data from the Kantor Center at Tel Aviv University reveal antisemitic violence surges 300-500% during Israeli military operations, coinciding with delegitimizing narratives in protests that conflate state actions with "Jewish supremacy," as quantified in event studies linking 60% of such incidents to imported Islamist or far-left ideologies portraying Israel as a colonial anomaly warranting eradication. Harvard's 2025 Task Force report on campus antisemitism corroborates this, documenting how anti-Israel encampments post-October 7, 2023, employed delegitimizing chants (e.g., "from the river to the sea") that empirically aligned with 40% rises in Jewish student harassment, attributing the escalation to ideological frameworks where antisemitism supplies the emotional fuel for Israel's existential negation.

Criticisms and Alternative Perspectives

Assertions That It Is Not Uniquely New

Critics of the "new antisemitism" framework contend that the phenomenon lacks distinct novelty, representing instead an adaptation of longstanding antisemitic motifs to modern political and ideological contexts. Philosopher and rabbi Brian Klug, in his 2003 essay "The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism," posits that antisemitism fundamentally entails treating Jews as a sinister, alien collective, a pattern evident in historical religious, economic, and racial prejudices rather than emerging solely from post-1967 anti-Zionism. Klug argues that labeling anti-Israel rhetoric as inherently antisemitic conflates policy disagreement with prejudice, diluting the term without evidence of a qualitative shift beyond continuity with pre-state tropes like dual loyalty accusations. Political scientist Norman Finkelstein, in his 2005 book Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, asserts that invocations of "new antisemitism" often rely on fabricated or exaggerated claims to shield Israeli policies from scrutiny, mirroring historical uses of antisemitism allegations to consolidate communal solidarity amid external pressures. Finkelstein examines surveys and incidents cited by proponents, such as those from the 1980s onward, and maintains they reflect recycled stereotypes—e.g., Jewish control of media or finance—rather than innovative forms, with no empirical surge attributable to uniquely contemporary ideologies like left-wing anti-Zionism. He cites data from organizations like the Anti-Defamation League, noting inconsistencies in their methodologies that inflate perceptions of novelty while ignoring baseline historical persistence, such as European pogroms or U.S. quotas in the early 20th century. Historians emphasizing continuity, such as those analyzing transitions from religious to secular antisemitism, argue that the "new" variant's supposed hybridity with Islamist or progressive critiques echoes 19th-century patterns where Jews were vilified as capitalist exploiters or revolutionary agitators. For example, a 2019 study in the Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism traces antizionism's roots to early 20th-century discourses, including Bolshevik and fascist critiques, positing no rupture but rather discursive evolution akin to how medieval blood libels morphed into modern conspiracy theories. These perspectives highlight that while manifestations adapt—e.g., from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1903) to online delegitimization campaigns—the causal core of scapegoating Jews for societal ills remains unchanged, challenging claims of uniqueness as politically motivated rebranding.

Claims of Misapplication to Suppress Israel Critique

Critics contend that accusations of "new antisemitism" are frequently deployed to conflate anti-Zionism or policy critiques of Israel with Jew-hatred, thereby stifling dissent on campuses, in politics, and in civil society. Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism—which underpins much of the discourse on new antisemitism—has warned that its adoption in legal and institutional contexts has transformed it from an educational tool into a mechanism for censoring anti-Israel activism, as seen in efforts to pressure universities to restrict events or speakers. In April 2023, 104 civil society organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and B'Tselem, petitioned the United Nations against adopting the IHRA definition, arguing that seven of its eleven illustrative examples target Israel-related speech—such as denying Jewish self-determination or applying double standards to Israel—and have been invoked to label routine critiques of occupation or apartheid as antisemitic, chilling protests and academic discourse. Specific instances include UK universities canceling "Israel Apartheid Week" events in 2017 under IHRA guidance and U.S. colleges facing federal scrutiny over Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) activities in 2020. The American Civil Liberties Union opposed the Antisemitism Awareness Act (H.R. 6090), passed by the House on May 1, 2024, claiming it codifies an overbroad IHRA-based definition that risks federal defunding of universities for hosting protected speech critical of Israeli military actions, such as comparisons to other nations' human rights violations. Between 2014 and 2020, Palestine Legal documented approximately 895 suppression incidents against Palestinian rights advocates, with roughly half involving erroneous antisemitism allegations tied to new antisemitism frameworks, including reopened complaints at Rutgers University in 2018 and targeting of Students for Justice in Palestine chapters at Columbia University. Proponents of these claims, often from human rights and free speech advocacy circles, assert that such misapplications prioritize shielding Israel from accountability over combating genuine prejudice, as evidenced by the Trump administration's 2019 executive order incorporating IHRA, which correlated with a surge in Department of Education probes into pro-Palestinian campus expression without proportional action on traditional antisemitic incidents.

Debates Over Definitional Boundaries

The concept of new antisemitism has sparked contention over whether its definitional scope appropriately distinguishes between prejudice against Jews and political opposition to Zionism or Israeli policies, with critics arguing that expansive definitions risk conflating legitimate critique with hatred. Proponents, drawing on frameworks like the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition adopted in 2016, contend that antisemitism includes manifestations such as denying the Jewish people's right to self-determination or applying double standards to Israel that are not demanded of other nations, viewing these as modern evolutions of historical tropes where anti-Zionism serves as a proxy for Jew-hatred. This perspective posits that such boundaries capture hybrid forms blending left-wing ideology and Islamist rhetoric, supported by data from organizations tracking incidents where anti-Israel protests devolve into calls for Jewish expulsion or violence. Opponents, including human rights groups and some scholars, assert that the IHRA's examples—such as comparing Israeli policy to Nazism or holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel's actions—impose overly vague or subjective thresholds that chill free speech and shield Israel from accountability for alleged violations of international law. In 2023, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch faced accusations of antisemitism under this rubric for reports documenting Israeli actions in occupied territories, prompting claims that the definition prioritizes state protection over empirical assessment of bias. Alternative formulations, like the 2021 Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA), emphasize intent and context, defining antisemitism as hostility toward Jews as Jews while explicitly permitting opposition to Zionism as a political ideology without equating it to prejudice, arguing this avoids the IHRA's perceived overreach in equating anti-Zionism with inherent antisemitism. These disputes intensified post-October 7, 2023, amid U.S. legislative efforts like the Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023, which sought to codify the IHRA definition for campus enforcement but drew opposition from over 100 civil rights organizations warning of its potential to mislabel pro-Palestinian advocacy as discriminatory. Defenders counter that empirical patterns, including a 400% surge in U.S. antisemitic incidents following the Hamas attacks—many linked to rhetoric framing Israel as a colonial oppressor—demonstrate the necessity of firm boundaries to address causal links between delegitimization and violence, rather than diluting definitions to accommodate ideological critiques. Scholars like those contributing to the Nexus Document further propose nuanced tests focusing on whether anti-Israel expressions invoke classic antisemitic motifs, such as blood libels or conspiracy theories, to delineate boundaries without blanket inclusion of policy disagreements. This ongoing tension underscores a broader methodological divide: whether definitions should prioritize historical precedents and incident data or safeguard discursive space for geopolitical debate, with source credibility often contested given institutional biases favoring narrower construals in academic and media outlets.

International Dimensions

Europe and Left-Wing Political Contexts

In Europe, new antisemitism within left-wing political contexts manifests through anti-Zionist ideologies that deny Jewish self-determination or repurpose classic antisemitic tropes—such as dual loyalty or undue influence—under the guise of anti-colonial or anti-imperialist critique. These expressions often emerge in parties and movements prioritizing solidarity with Palestinian causes, where opposition to Israel's existence correlates with harassment of Jewish individuals perceived as supportive of the state. Causal mechanisms include the fusion of Marxist frameworks viewing Zionism as racism with Islamist-influenced narratives, leading to a hybrid prejudice that erodes distinctions between legitimate policy criticism and ethnic targeting. In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership from 2015 to 2020 encountered widespread antisemitism allegations, including the sharing of conspiratorial content about Jewish media control and resistance to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigation concluded in October 2020 that the party committed unlawful acts of harassment, discrimination, and political interference in complaints processes, affecting Jewish members disproportionately. Over 500 complaints were lodged during this period, many involving anti-Zionist rhetoric that invoked tropes of Jewish power. France's La France Insoumise (LFI), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has faced repeated accusations of fostering antisemitism through ambiguous stances on Jewish-related issues, such as a 2013 statement implying Jews prioritize foreign allegiances over French identity and minimization of antisemitic violence post-October 7, 2023. LFI members have participated in marches equating anti-Muslim discrimination with the Holocaust, including wearing modified yellow stars in 2019, and defended narratives portraying Israel's actions as genocidal while downplaying Hamas's role. These patterns link to broader left-wing anti-Zionism that inverts victimhood, attributing rising antisemitism to Israeli policies rather than domestic prejudice. In Germany, the Die Linke party exhibits antisemitic anti-Zionism through endorsements of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns and tolerance for protest slogans like "Globalize the Intifada," which emerged at 2022 May Day events and escalated after October 7, 2023. Federal crime statistics recorded 5,164 antisemitic offenses in 2023, a 96% increase from 2022, with over 68% occurring post-October 7 and many tied to pro-Palestinian demonstrations featuring left-wing participants. This surge reflects a normalization of Israel-focused hatred in anti-racist spaces, pressuring Jews to disavow Zionism. Spain's left-wing coalitions, including Podemos, have advanced over 100 municipal BDS resolutions since 2014, with the Catalan Parliament declaring Israel an "apartheid state" in June 2022, implicitly contesting its legitimacy. Such policies intertwine neo-Marxist ideology with regional separatism, funding anti-Israel activism that spills into antisemitic vandalism and rhetoric. Post-October 7, 2023, left-led protests across Europe amplified these dynamics, with the Anti-Defamation League documenting a surge in violent incidents in countries like the UK, France, and Germany, often involving chants referencing historical pogroms or calls for Jewish expulsion. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights' 2024 survey found 80% of Jewish respondents perceiving antisemitism as worsening, with political motivations—including left-wing extremism—cited as primary drivers.

United States and Institutional Responses

In the United States, antisemitic incidents surged following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) documenting over 10,000 cases from October 7, 2023, to September 24, 2024, including harassment, vandalism, and assaults, marking a 200% increase over the prior year. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data for 2024 confirmed a record high in anti-Jewish hate crimes, comprising nearly 70% of all religion-based incidents despite Jews representing about 2% of the population. College campuses emerged as a primary locus, accounting for a significant portion of incidents, with ADL reporting over 1,200 campus-related cases in 2024 alone, often linked to anti-Israel protests involving chants, encampments, and disruptions that crossed into antisemitic rhetoric such as calls for violence against Jews or denial of Jewish self-determination. University administrations faced intense scrutiny for inadequate responses, exemplified by congressional hearings on December 5, 2023, where presidents of Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and MIT equivocated on whether calls for Jewish genocide violated campus policies, prompting resignations including Harvard's Claudine Gay on January 2, 2024, and Penn's Liz Magill shortly after. A U.S. House Committee on Education and the Workforce report in October 2024 detailed systemic failures at elite institutions, including tolerance of harassment and biased DEI frameworks that prioritized other identities over Jewish safety, attributing this to entrenched ideological conformity in academia. In response, institutions like Harvard adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in January 2025, which includes examples tying certain anti-Israel actions to antisemitic intent, as a tool for policy enforcement. Federal and state governments pursued countermeasures, with the Biden-Harris administration announcing actions on May 7, 2024, including enhanced Department of Education investigations into campus compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Justice Department task forces targeting antisemitic violence. By early 2024, 36 U.S. states had adopted or endorsed the IHRA definition for use in education and law enforcement, facilitating prosecutions and school policies against veiled antisemitism. Congressional efforts included bipartisan bills like the Antisemitism Awareness Act, passed by the House in May 2024, mandating IHRA adoption for federal anti-discrimination enforcement in education, amid debates over balancing free speech with protections against harassment. Critics from academic and advocacy groups argued such measures risked chilling legitimate Israel criticism, though empirical data showed persistent underreporting and enforcement gaps prior to these reforms.

Middle East, Islamist Influences, and Global South

In the Middle East, Islamist ideologies have propagated antisemitism by merging traditional Islamic texts with modern conspiracy theories imported from Europe, portraying Jews as a collective threat to Muslim sovereignty and religious purity. This "new Islamic antisemitism," emerging prominently from the mid-19th century, intensified through Nazi influences during World War II and post-war Arab nationalist movements, framing Zionism not merely as political opposition but as a Jewish plot for global domination akin to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a fabricated text widely disseminated in Arabic editions. Influential figures like Sayyid Qutb, a key ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, embedded genocidal rhetoric against Jews in works such as Our Struggle Against the Jews (1950), depicting them as eternally scheming enemies of Islam and justifying violence as a religious imperative, ideas that permeated jihadist groups including Hamas and Hezbollah. State-sponsored media in Iran and non-state actors in Gaza and Lebanon routinely invoke blood libels, Holocaust denial, and tropes of Jewish control over Western governments, with Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Khamenei explicitly calling for Israel's annihilation as a prelude to eradicating Jewish influence. Post-October 7, 2023, online antisemitism in Arabic-language spheres surged, with a George Washington University analysis documenting a 30-50% increase in hate speech on platforms like X and Telegram, including calls for Jewish extermination tied to the Israel-Hamas war; this rhetoric often conflates Israeli military actions with all Jews, reviving medieval accusations of ritual murder and poisoning wells. Islamist groups in the region, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, explicitly link anti-Zionism to broader anti-Jewish hatred in their charters and sermons, rejecting Israel's existence on theological grounds while endorsing violence against Jewish civilians as halal (permissible under Islamic law). Empirical data from monitoring bodies indicate that over 80% of surveyed Arabic media outlets post-2023 propagated such narratives, often without distinction between Israeli policies and Jewish people globally. In the Global South, antisemitism manifests through solidarity with Palestinian causes that frequently cross into delegitimization of Jews as a people, exacerbated by Islamist influences via diaspora networks and state alliances. The ADL Global 100 survey (2014, updated 2023) found that 74% of respondents in the Middle East-North Africa region and over 50% in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America endorsed multiple antisemitic stereotypes, such as Jews having too much power in business or being responsible for most wars; these rates correlate strongly with anti-Israel voting patterns at the UN, where Global South nations like South Africa and Malaysia consistently back resolutions equating Zionism with racism. In Latin America, Israeli government reports noted a 200% spike in antisemitic incidents from October 2023 to 2024, often in protests framing Israel as a colonial oppressor using classic tropes of Jewish greed and disloyalty. Countries like South Africa, with historical anti-apartheid rhetoric repurposed against Israel, saw antisemitic incidents rise to record levels in 2023, including synagogue vandalism and calls for boycotts invoking blood libels. This pattern reflects causal links where Islamist-funded NGOs and Quranic schools import Middle Eastern rhetoric, fostering views that anti-Israel activism inherently targets Jewish "supremacy," despite IHRA definitions distinguishing legitimate critique from such hatred. Overall, 46% of global adults hold significant antisemitic beliefs, with Global South majorities often viewing Jews through lenses of resentment toward perceived Western imperialism embodied by Israel.

United Nations and Supranational Bodies

The United Nations has adopted several resolutions addressing antisemitism, including General Assembly Resolution A/RES/76/250 in January 2022, which condemns Holocaust denial and distortion, emphasizing the need to counter antisemitic narratives propagated through information technologies. Similarly, Security Council Resolution 2686 in June 2023 highlighted the rise in antisemitism alongside other intolerances, urging member states to protect vulnerable communities. These measures build on earlier efforts, such as the 2005 General Assembly Resolution 60/7 establishing International Holocaust Remembrance Day, aimed at educating against hatred targeting Jews. However, the UN's institutional approach has drawn criticism for inconsistency, as the Human Rights Council has issued over 100 resolutions condemning Israel since 2006—more than against all other countries combined—while dedicating only sporadic attention to antisemitism globally. This disparity, documented in analyses of UN voting patterns, is argued by observers to reflect a systemic bias that conflates legitimate policy critique with the delegitimization of Israel's existence, a hallmark of new antisemitism. The role of UN special rapporteurs illustrates further tensions. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has issued reports exploring antisemitism as a global prejudice, including a 2019 warning that it poses a "toxic" threat to democracy and calling for enhanced data collection on incidents. Yet, appointees like Francesca Albanese, serving in related mandates on Palestinian territories since 2022, have faced accusations of employing antisemitic tropes, such as portraying Jewish influence in global finance or equating Israeli actions with historical atrocities, leading to condemnations from multiple governments including the United States in July 2025 for undermining the UN's credibility on the issue. Such cases highlight how UN mechanisms intended to monitor human rights can inadvertently amplify narratives that blur into new antisemitism, particularly when focused disproportionately on Israel without equivalent scrutiny of other states. Among supranational bodies, the European Union adopted its first Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life in October 2021, spanning 2021–2030 and structured around prevention, protection, and promotion of remembrance. The strategy addresses contemporary manifestations, including online hate and antisemitic conspiracy theories, while endorsing tools like the IHRA working definition—adopted by 26 of 27 EU member states—to distinguish protected criticism of Israel from antisemitic delegitimization. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), has tracked antisemitic hate crimes since 2009, reporting persistent verbal harassment, vandalism, and violence against Jews across its 57 participating states, with data showing spikes linked to Middle East conflicts. OSCE commitments, dating to 1990, condemn antisemitism explicitly and promote Holocaust education, though implementation varies, with annual reports revealing underreporting in regions where anti-Israel rhetoric intersects with traditional prejudices. These bodies' efforts contrast with the UN's, offering more operational focus on empirical incident tracking amid rising incidents post-2014 Gaza conflicts and the October 2023 Hamas attacks.

Recent Developments Since October 7, 2023

Surge in Incidents and Global Statistics

In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed over 1,200 people and took more than 250 hostages, antisemitic incidents surged globally, marking the most severe wave since the end of World War II. This escalation was documented across multiple countries, with data from Jewish advocacy organizations and government reports showing increases driven by harassment, vandalism, assaults, and online hate tied to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Incidents often involved rhetoric conflating Jews with Israeli policies, glorification of the attack, or calls for violence against Jewish communities. Vandalism manifestations included arson attacks on synagogues, such as the El Hamma synagogue in Tunisia burned on October 17 amid anti-Israel riots; the Berlin synagogue targeted with Molotov cocktails on October 18; the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne, Australia, attacked on December 6; and the Beth Israel synagogue in Jackson, Mississippi, USA, set ablaze on January 10, 2024, with a suspect arrested for hate-motivated arson. In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) recorded 8,873 antisemitic incidents in 2023, a 140% rise from 2022 and the highest annual total since tracking began in 1979; post-October 7 alone saw a 360% increase over the same period in 2022, averaging nearly 34 incidents per day. By mid-2025, the ADL had tallied over 10,000 incidents since October 7, including harassment (74%), vandalism (20%), and assaults (5%), with campuses accounting for a disproportionate share amid protests. In Europe, the UK's Community Security Trust reported 4,103 incidents in 2023, a 147% increase from 2022, with 2,000 occurring in the first two months after October 7; France saw over 1,676 incidents in the same period, up from 436 in 2022. Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office noted a 95% rise to 5,164 incidents in 2024, many linked to pro-Palestinian demonstrations.
Country/RegionPre-October 7 Baseline (e.g., 2022 or prior)Post-October 7 Surge (2023-2024)Source
United States3,697 incidents (2022)8,873 (2023); >10,000 since Oct 7ADL Audit
United Kingdom1,662 incidents (2022)4,103 (2023)CST via EU reports
France436 incidents (2022)>1,676 in late 2023French govt/ADL
Germany~2,500 (2022 est.)5,164 (2024)Federal Police/ADL
AustraliaBaseline pre-2023317% increase (2024)ADL J7 Report
Globally, the seven largest Jewish communities outside Israel (including the US, France, UK, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Argentina) documented 26,748 incidents in 2024 alone, reflecting sustained elevation from the post-October 7 peak despite some decline from initial highs reported by Tel Aviv University researchers. This data, aggregated from victim reports and law enforcement, underscores a pattern where incidents correlated temporally with conflict escalations, though underreporting remains a challenge in regions with smaller Jewish populations or repressive environments.

Campus Protests and Encampments

Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, pro-Palestinian encampments proliferated on U.S. college campuses in spring 2024, often demanding divestment from Israel and an end to U.S. support for the country. These occupations, inspired by tactics from earlier movements like Occupy Wall Street, frequently featured rhetoric and actions that Jewish students and advocacy groups identified as crossing into antisemitism, including chants of "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" interpreted as calls for Israel's elimination, glorification of intifada violence, and explicit exclusion of Jews who support Israel's right to exist. At Columbia University, the April 2024 encampment became a focal point, with protesters reportedly harassing Jewish students through ethnic slurs, blocking access to buildings, and enforcing "Zionist-free zones" that barred Jewish participants unless they denounced Israel. Antisemitic incidents during these encampments included vandalism of Jewish spaces, distribution of materials invoking blood libel tropes, and physical confrontations targeting visible Jewish identifiers like Stars of David. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) documented over 1,200 antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in the year following October 7, with encampments correlating to spikes in harassment, such as at Columbia where Jewish students reported feeling unsafe to walk freely. A Hillel International survey found that 83% of Jewish college students experienced or witnessed antisemitism firsthand since the attacks, often linked to protest environments where anti-Zionism merged with anti-Jewish hostility. Congressional investigations, including hearings by the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, revealed university failures to enforce policies against such conduct, with administrators equivocating on whether calls for Jewish genocide violated codes of conduct. Similar patterns emerged at Harvard, UCLA, and other institutions, where encampments led to over 3,000 arrests nationwide amid clashes involving antisemitic signage and assaults on Jewish counter-protesters. At Harvard, disciplinary records showed minimal suspensions for antisemitic harassment during protests, prompting federal probes under Title VI for failing to protect Jewish students from a hostile environment. The U.S. Department of Education launched investigations into over 60 universities by mid-2024 for antisemitic discrimination tied to these events, citing evidence like doxxing of Jewish students and faculty complicity in protest facilitation. While organizers maintained the actions targeted Israeli policy, empirical data from incident logs indicated disproportionate impacts on Jewish safety, with ADL noting an 84% rise in campus antisemitic cases from 2023 to 2024, many protest-adjacent.

Policy Shifts and Definitional Adoptions

In the United States, the surge in antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks prompted legislative efforts to codify definitions of antisemitism for federal enforcement. The Antisemitism Awareness Act (H.R. 6090), introduced in the 118th Congress on October 26, 2023, passed the House of Representatives on May 1, 2024, by a 320-91 vote, directing the Department of Education to use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism—described as "a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews"—and its examples when enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against discrimination in federally funded education programs. The bill stalled in the Senate amid concerns from groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, which argued it risked conflating antisemitism with protected political speech critical of Israel, though proponents emphasized its role in clarifying discrimination without prohibiting legitimate debate. Reintroduced as S. 558 in the 119th Congress on February 13, 2025, by Senators Jacky Rosen and Tim Scott, it continued to advance the IHRA framework to address campus environments where over 1,400 antisemitic incidents were documented since October 7, 2023. At the state level, multiple legislatures integrated the IHRA definition into law to combat rising incidents, with Florida's bipartisan bill unanimously passing both chambers and being signed in February 2024, mandating its use in state anti-discrimination policies. Georgia, Indiana, and South Dakota similarly advanced or enacted measures post-October 7, 2023, formalizing IHRA examples such as applying double standards to Israel or denying Jewish self-determination as potential antisemitism, amid a reported 433% increase in incidents targeting Jewish institutions in some regions from 2022-2023, with 64% occurring after the attacks. Wisconsin considered similar adoption in 2025, with supporters citing empirical data on post-attack spikes while critics warned of overreach into anti-Israel advocacy. Universities, facing lawsuits and task force reports on campus harassment, shifted policies toward explicit definitional adoptions. Harvard University, in settling six lawsuits in January 2025 alleging failures to protect Jewish students amid post-October 7 protests, committed to incorporating the IHRA definition into its anti-discrimination framework, including training and complaint processes, while affirming it does not target criticism of Israeli policy. Columbia University adopted IHRA per its Task Force on Antisemitism recommendations, applying it to investigations of bias incidents that tripled after October 7. Other institutions, including Stanford and Northwestern, issued reports and enhanced policies referencing IHRA-like standards to distinguish antisemitism from protected speech, responding to documented patterns like chants equating Zionism with racism. Internationally, at least 21 entities endorsed or adopted the IHRA definition in the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, contributing to a global total exceeding 1,216 by December 2023, with governments and supranational bodies leveraging it to address surges in incidents tied to anti-Israel rhetoric. These shifts prioritized operational clarity in policy enforcement, drawing on IHRA's non-binding examples to counter empirically observed escalations, such as 12 U.S. terrorist plots motivated by antisemitism or anti-Zionism since October 7, while navigating criticisms that the definition's Israel-related illustrations could inadvertently suppress discourse.

Impacts and Responses

Effects on Jewish Communities and Safety

The surge in antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has directly threatened the physical safety of Jewish individuals and communities worldwide, with documented increases in assaults, harassment, and vandalism. In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League recorded 9,354 antisemitic incidents in 2024, including assaults, encompassing a 140% rise from 2022 levels, predominantly after October 7. FBI data for 2024 confirmed Jews as targets in 69% of religion-motivated hate crimes, marking the highest recorded volume since tracking began in 1991. These events have included physical attacks, such as stabbings and beatings, often linked to anti-Israel protests spilling into anti-Jewish violence. In Europe, Jewish communities have reported similar escalations, with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights noting over 400% increases in incidents in some countries since October 2023, including arson, assaults, and desecrated sites. In the United Kingdom, 32% of Jews experienced at least one antisemitic incident in 2024, while 35% reported feeling unsafe in public spaces, prompting behavioral adaptations like concealing religious symbols or avoiding Jewish events. German Jewish life has been altered by pervasive graffiti and harassment, with residents in cities like Berlin describing constant exposure to hostility that restricts free movement. These threats have imposed tangible burdens on Jewish safety protocols, including heightened security at synagogues, schools, and community centers, with U.S. Jewish institutions expending millions on guards and surveillance amid over 1,800 vandalism acts in 2023 alone. Surveys indicate over 50% of American Jews encountered antisemitism in 2024, fostering widespread distrust, as half believe non-Jewish communities would not support them against threats. While mass emigration from diaspora communities remains unsubstantiated— with no evidence of a "Jewish exodus" from places like the UK—individual relocations and reduced visibility of Jewish practice reflect a causal link between incident spikes and diminished sense of security.

Broader Societal and Policy Implications

The resurgence of antisemitism, particularly since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, has exacerbated societal divisions by fostering environments of intimidation and polarization that extend beyond Jewish populations, undermining public trust in shared civic norms and multicultural frameworks. In the United States, surveys indicate that over half of Jewish Americans encountered antisemitism in the year following the attacks, contributing to broader perceptions of institutional failure and a climate of lawlessness where hate incidents normalize aggression against dissenters. This dynamic has strained social cohesion, as antisemitic rhetoric—often intertwined with anti-Zionist activism—spills into attacks on democratic discourse, eroding confidence in free expression and pluralism across ideological lines. In Europe and North America, the phenomenon signals a "canary in the coal mine" for intolerance, where unchecked bigotry against Jews correlates with rising extremism that threatens inclusive societies reliant on mutual respect. Policy responses have increasingly emphasized enforcement and definitional clarity to safeguard democratic resilience, with governments adopting frameworks like the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism to distinguish protected criticism from discriminatory incitement. In the U.S., executive actions since 2019, reinforced post-October 7, have prioritized campus safety and federal coordination against antisemitic violence, including enhanced reporting and prosecution mechanisms. Transatlantic efforts, such as EU-U.S. strategies, focus on education, online moderation, and legal harmonization to counter transnational threats, recognizing antisemitism's role in destabilizing civil liberties for all minorities. However, these measures have sparked debates over balancing hate speech prohibitions with free speech protections, as expansive definitions risk overreach while lax enforcement permits societal fragmentation. Long-term implications include a potential reconfiguration of immigration and integration policies, as Islamist-influenced antisemitism highlights failures in assimilating ideologies incompatible with liberal democracies, prompting calls for stricter vetting and cultural cohesion mandates in nations like those in the EU. Failure to address these root causes could accelerate democratic backsliding, where antisemitism serves as a vector for authoritarian populism or radical ideologies that prioritize group grievances over individual rights. Empirical data from post-2023 incident tracking underscores the urgency: unchecked surges correlate with heightened intercommunal tensions, necessitating proactive policies that prioritize empirical threat assessment over ideological equivocation.

Efforts at Countering Through Education and Law

In response to the surge in antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, governments have pursued legislative measures to define and prosecute antisemitism more effectively, often incorporating the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition, which characterizes antisemitism as "a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews" and includes examples such as denying Jewish self-determination. As of 2025, 46 countries, including most Western democracies, have adopted this non-legally binding definition for use in policy and enforcement, facilitating identification of antisemitic acts disguised as anti-Zionism. In the United States, the Antisemitism Awareness Act (H.R. 6090), passed by the House on May 1, 2024, directs the Department of Education to adopt the IHRA definition when enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act against discrimination in federally funded institutions, aiming to address campus harassment but drawing criticism from groups like the ACLU for potentially restricting political speech. The bipartisan Countering Antisemitism Act (H.R. 7921), introduced in April 2024, seeks to coordinate federal agencies in monitoring and responding to domestic antisemitism through enhanced data collection and interagency coordination. European nations have similarly strengthened legal frameworks, with Germany's Bundestag approving a resolution on November 6, 2024, to combat antisemitism by restricting funding to groups promoting anti-Israel boycotts and enhancing police training, amid concerns over imported Islamist ideologies contributing to incidents. The European Commission supports member states via its Working Group on Combating Antisemitism, implementing the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030), which includes directives under the Digital Services Act to remove online antisemitic content. In California, Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 973 on October 14, 2025, mandating schools to report antisemitic incidents and adopt curricula addressing Holocaust distortion, prompted by post-October 7 data showing elevated harassment in K-12 settings. Educational initiatives emphasize mandatory training and curriculum integration to foster awareness of antisemitism's contemporary forms, including its intersection with anti-Zionist rhetoric. The U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights initiated investigations into over 60 universities by March 2025 for failing to address antisemitic harassment under Title VI, while promoting best practices like bias incident reporting and staff training. Universities such as Columbia and Harvard have implemented IHRA-informed policies, including required antisemitism education for students and faculty, with Columbia's task force recommending modules on distinguishing legitimate Israel criticism from discriminatory tropes. The University of California system expanded its Antisemitism Education Initiative in 2024, funding programs and mandatory training to counter bias, reporting over 860 K-12 incidents in 2023 alone. In New Jersey, bipartisan legislation introduced on October 7, 2025, pushes for statewide K-12 curriculum on the October 7 attacks to educate against denialism and hatred. UNESCO advocates global programs framing antisemitism within human rights education, training educators to recognize and prevent its manifestations in schools. These efforts, while increasing institutional accountability, face challenges in balancing enforcement with free speech, as evidenced by ongoing debates over definitional applications.

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