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A term limit is a legal restriction on the number of terms a person may serve in a particular elected office. When term limits are found in presidential and semi-presidential systems they act as a method to eliminate the potential for "president for life", check the concentration of power in the executive, and curb authoritarianism.[1] Term limits may be a lifetime limit on the number of terms an officeholder may serve, or a limit on the number of consecutive terms.

According to a 2020 analysis, nearly one in four incumbents who face term limits seek to circumvent the term limits through various strategies, including constitutional amendments, working with the judiciary to reinterpret the term limits, let a placeholder govern for the incumbent, and cancelling or delaying elections.[2][3] Incumbents that seek to circumvent term limits frequently use repression of the opposition, electoral manipulation and foreign support to enable their circumvention.[3] According to a 2025 research project, attempts to circumvent term limits had become increasingly prevalent in African states over time, with few such attempts prior to 2000 and many such attempts post-2000.[3]

History

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Europe

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See also: Term limits in France and Term limits in Russia

Term limits date back to Ancient Greece and the Roman Republic, as well as the Republic of Venice.[4] In ancient Athenian democracy, many officeholders were limited to a single term. Council members were allowed a maximum of two terms. The position of Strategos could be held for an indefinite number of terms.[5] In the Roman Republic, a law was passed imposing a limit of a single term on the office of censor. The annual magistrates, including the tribune of the plebs, the aedile, the quaestor, the praetor, and the consul, were forbidden reelection until a number of years had passed.[6] The office of dictator was nearly unrestricted with the exception that it was limited to a single six-month term. Successive Roman leaders weakened this restriction until Julius Caesar became a perpetual dictator and ended the republic.[7]

Term limits returned in medieval Europe through the Novgorod Republic, the Pskov Republic, the Republic of Genoa, and the Republic of Florence.[8]

The first modern constitutional term limit was established in the French First Republic by the Constitution of 1795, which established five-year terms to the French Directory and banned consecutive terms. Napoleon ended the practice of term limits in 1799 in much the same way as Julius Caesar had.[9] The French Constitution of 1848 reestablished term limits, but this was abolished by Napoleon's nephew, Napoleon III.[10]

Many post-Soviet republics established presidential systems with five-year term limits after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.[11] The President of Russia is allowed a maximum of two consecutive terms, but the 2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia reset incumbent president Vladimir Putin's term count, allowing him to stand for two additional terms.[12] The President of Belarus was limited to two terms, but the limit was abolished in 2004.[13]

United States

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Main article: Term limits in the United States

A predecessor of modern term limits in the Americas dates back to the 1682 Pennsylvania Charter of Liberties and the colonial frame of government of the same year, authored by William Penn and providing for triennial rotation of the Provincial Council, the upper house of the colonial legislature.[14] Presidents of the United States typically honored an informal tradition of only serving two terms in office, but this limit was not enshrined into law until the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1951 after Franklin D. Roosevelt had been elected to an unprecedented third and fourth terms.[15]

Latin America

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As the countries of Latin America modeled presidential republics after the government of the United States in the 19th century, they established term limits for their presidents based on the two-term precedent of the United States. However, the implementation of legislative term limits in Latin America, while intended to foster elite renewal, occurs in a region already characterized by exceptionally high rates of legislative turnover (around 70% on average between 1985 and 2023), significantly higher than in Europe and other democratic regions.[16] In response to presidents overstaying their term, some of these term limits were eventually replaced by a limit of one term without reelection.[17]

In Mexico, Porfirio Díaz evaded term limits, running for eight terms before being forced into exile in 1911. A new constitution in 1917 established a one term limit. After Álvaro Obregón violated this law and ran for a second term, he was assassinated.[18] Currently, members of the Congress of Mexico cannot be reelected consecutively under article 50 and 59 of the Constitution of Mexico, and the President of Mexico is limited to a single six-year term, called the sexenio.[citation needed]

The President of Argentina was limited to one six-year term, until 1994 when the Constitution of Argentina was amended, changing the term limit to a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms.[citation needed]

In 1997, the Constitution of Brazil was amended, loosening the term limit for the President of Brazil from one five-year term to two four-year terms.[citation needed]

In 2004, the term limit for the President of Colombia was increased from one term to two terms before reverting to one term in 2015.[19]

The 2009 Venezuelan constitutional referendum abolished term limits in Venezuela.[20]

A 2024 study found that Costa Rica's new mayoral term limits modestly increased competition but had little impact on turnout.[21]

In 2025, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved a constitutional reform that extended terms of the President of El Salvador to six years, as well as abolishing term limits; the change will go into effect following the 2027 presidential election.[22]

Asia

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Following the 1911 Revolution, Prime Minister of the Imperial Cabinet Yuan Shikai became the second President of the Republic of China. He was initially subject to a maximum of two five-year terms, but the term was then lengthened to ten years and the term limit was removed.[citation needed]

In 1948, the Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion abolished the term limit for the President of the Republic of China and established Chiang Kai-shek as the country's military leader. The term limit was restored after the provisions were repealed in 1991.[citation needed]

The President of South Korea was initially permitted to serve a maximum of two four-year terms when the office was created in 1948, but the term limit was removed in 1954 so that Syngman Rhee could run for a third term. After Rhee was elected to a fourth term, the First Republic of Korea was overthrown. The two term limit was restored, but it was expanded to three terms in 1969 and abolished again in 1972. A one seven-year term limit was established in 1981, which was reduced to five years in 1988.[citation needed]

Under the original Constitution of Indonesia, there were no presidential or vice-presidential term limits, but since the first amendment in 1999 holders of both offices are limited to two terms each.

The Philippines established term limits following independence from the United States, but they were abolished by Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s.[23] Term limits were restored in the 1987 constitution, after Marcos was deposed in the People Power Revolution. The President is limited to one six-year term.[24][25]

Between 1982 and 2018, the Constitution of China stipulated that the president, vice president, premier and vice premiers could not serve more than two consecutive terms, though there was no term limit for the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who usually represented the paramount leader of China. In March 2018, the National People's Congress passed a set of constitutional amendments, including abolishing the term limits for the president and vice president, as well as enhancing the central role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), allowing CCP leader Xi Jinping to continue as paramount leader indefinitely.[26][27]

The President of Tajikistan was initially limited to one five-year term under the 1994 Constitution of Tajikistan. This was increased to one seven-year term in 1999 and to two seven-year terms in 2003. The term limit was reset for President Emomali Rahmon in 2006, and the term limit was abolished in 2016.[28][29]

The Prime Minister of Pakistan was limited to one five-year term until the limit was abolished in 2011.[citation needed]

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia is subjected to a term limit. Once elected, he is only allowed to serve for a single five-year term and cannot renew for a second term consecutively. This rule makes Malaysia among two constitutional monarchies in the world that is subjected to a term limit, the other being Andorra (with the President of France serving as one of its co-princes).[citation needed]

Sub-Saharan Africa

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Liberia briefly limited its presidents to an eight-year term between 1944 and 1951.[30] As the countries of sub-Saharan Africa were decolonised in the mid-20th century, most of the new governments established presidential systems, but term limits were rarely established. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, and Togo were the only countries to establish them, but they were abolished soon afterward.[30] After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989-90 and ensuing wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, many African engaged in similar political democratizations and established term limits.[31]

The President of Uganda was limited to two five-year terms in 1995. President Yoweri Museveni had previously served two terms, but these were not counted toward the new two term limit. The term limit was abolished in 2005, allowing Museveni to continue as president.[citation needed]

In Kenya, the 2010 constitution limits the president to a maximum of two five-year terms just like county governors. Before the promulgation of the 2010 constitution, term limits did not exist. The first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta ruled for 15 years and died in office. His vice president, Daniel Moi took over in 1978 and ruled for 24 years before Mwai Kibaki took over. Kibaki ruled for ten years, in a tenure that was characterized by major political reforms leading to the 2010 constitution. Immediate former President Uhuru Kenyatta was the first president under the new law, a position he served for two terms of 5 years each and was succeeded by his deputy William Ruto in September 2022. A member of President Ruto's United Democratic Alliance party revealed plans to scrap the term limits on 7 November 2022 but the leadership dismissed him saying that was his personal opinion which he was entitled to.

The 1999 constitution of Nigeria limits the President at the Federal level, and Governors at the state level to serving two four-year terms. This has been strictly followed since 1999.

The 2010 constitution of Niger limited the President to two five-year terms. Mahamadou Issoufou was the only president to step down after being term limited.[32]

In Sub-Saharan Africa, only South Africa (since 1994) Ghana (since 1993), Kenya (since 1964), and Nigeria (since 1999) have experienced a peaceful transition of power from one president to another after the expiry of term limits. Some countries have either scrapped the requirement or do not have it in their laws.[citation needed]

Middle East and North Africa

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The 2019 Egyptian constitutional referendum included amendments to expand the presidential term from four to six years and allow President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to stand for a third term over the constitutional limit of two terms.[33]

Term limits were one of the major demands of protesters during the Arab Spring.[34]

Mechanism

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See also: List of political term limits

Term limits are an element of constitutionalism that serves to limit the negative effects of democracy.[35]

Term limits may take the form of consecutive term limits or lifetime term limits. With consecutive term limits, an officeholder can only serve a certain number of terms before they have to stop running for that office. After a set period of time, the clock resets on the limit, and the officeholder may run for election to their original office and serve up to the limit again. With lifetime limits, once an officeholder has served up to the limit, they may never again run for election to that office. Lifetime limits are much more restrictive than consecutive limits.[36]

Countries that operate a parliamentary system of government are less likely to employ term limits on their leaders. This is because such leaders rarely have a set "term" at all: rather, they serve as long as they have the confidence of the parliament, a period which could potentially last for life. Many parliaments can be dissolved for snap elections which means some parliaments can last for mere months while others can continue until their expiration dates. Nevertheless, such countries may impose term limits on the holders of other offices—in republics, for example, a ceremonial presidency may have a term limit, especially if the office holds reserve powers.[citation needed]

Due in part to a lack of legal term limits in African countries, Mo Ibrahim created the Ibrahim Prize with an associated cash prize to incentivize African leaders to promote human rights and democratic transfer of power.[37]

Violation of term limits

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See also: Continuismo

Many presidents have tried to overstay their respective term limits by various methods.[2][38] According to one analysis, nearly one in four incumbents who faced term limits sought to circumvent the term limits.[2] The most common way in which they attempt this is through constitutional amendments (in particular, when the incumbent's party controls the legislature). Other strategies include getting the judiciary to re-interpret term limit provisions; letting a placeholder succeed the incumbent while the incumbent still governs in practice; write a new constitution; or delay/cancel elections.[2]

Between 1960 and 2010, more than one quarter of term-limited presidents successfully extended or violated their term limits to stay in power, and the enforcement of term limits is recognized as one of the great challenges in democratic development. Term limits typically receive greater domestic and international recognition than other mechanisms of democracy, and attempts to violate term limits are typically met with strong resistance by a country's population and on the world stage.[39] The violation of term limits is strongly correlated with democratic backsliding and the erosion of human rights.[40]

Whether a president seeks to subvert term limits may be affected by how much wealth can be gained from the office, opportunities for acquiring wealth after leaving office, what constraints are in place to enforce term limits, how much control leader has over other branches of government or a political party, precedent in the region, and the likelihood of facing criminal prosecution upon leaving office.[41] Presidents are more likely to be successful in violating term limits if they control the other branches of government, whether through their political parties or through insufficient checks and balances.[42] Though violation of term limits is more common in less democratic countries, political opposition, foreign governments, and the citizenry can still enforce term limits in nondemocratic countries.[43]

A president may attempt to circumvent term limits indirectly by extending their rule without an additional term. This may be done by extending the length of the term or postponing elections. In some cases, a president may circumvent term limits by officially stepping down from office but maintaining de facto control of the government.[44]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Term limit

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A term limit is a statutory or constitutional provision that restricts the number of terms or consecutive terms an individual may serve in a specified elected or appointed public office, aiming to curtail the accumulation of power and encourage turnover among officeholders. Such limits have roots in early democratic practices, including informal precedents set by figures like , who voluntarily stepped down after two presidential terms, influencing later formal adoptions. In the United States, the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1951, explicitly caps presidential service at two elected terms or a maximum of ten years if ascending mid-term, a response to Franklin D. Roosevelt's four-term tenure amid concerns over executive overreach. Term limits gained broader traction in the late , particularly at the state level, with pioneering enactments in and in the to address perceived legislative entrenchment and incumbency advantages that deter challengers. Proponents argue they foster fresh perspectives, reduce risks from long tenures, and compel politicians to prioritize short-term over careerist incentives, aligning with first principles of preventing in representative systems. However, empirical analyses of state legislative term limits reveal mixed outcomes: while they increase turnover, they often elevate reliance on lobbyists and unelected staff for policy expertise, diminish institutional knowledge, and correlate with heightened ideological polarization and slower in affected jurisdictions. Studies further indicate no consistent reduction in or fiscal discipline, as longer tenures can enhance performance through experience while posing risks only when unchecked by other mechanisms like elections. Controversies surrounding term limits center on their causal impacts versus voter , with evidence suggesting they may inadvertently shift influence toward party machines or executive branches, as seen in partisan reallocations favoring Republicans in some term-limited states during the 1990s-2000s. Internationally, while many democracies impose executive term limits to avert authoritarian drift—evident in post-colonial constitutions—they face evasion through constitutional manipulations, underscoring enforcement challenges absent robust . Debates persist on federal congressional application, where proposals encounter constitutional hurdles under Article I, yet empirical state data tempers enthusiasm by highlighting trade-offs: term limits disrupt expertise without proportionally enhancing representation or curbing special interests.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Scope

Term limits constitute legal restrictions imposed on the tenure of public officials, specifying the maximum number of terms—typically consecutive or cumulative—that an individual may serve in a given elected or appointed position. These provisions apply primarily to political offices within governmental structures, setting fixed durations such as one, two, or a limited aggregate of terms, after which the officeholder must vacate the role and is ineligible for immediate reelection to that same position. The concept extends beyond mere electoral cycles by enforcing mandatory rotation, distinguishing it from voluntary retirement or defeat at the polls. In scope, term limits most frequently target executive roles, such as presidents or governors, where they limit service to two terms of four or five years each, as exemplified by the U.S. Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified on February 27, 1951, which caps presidential elections at two despite prior service exceeding two years in an unexpired term. Legislative applications vary, appearing in subnational bodies like legislatures—where 15 states enacted limits in the , often restricting service to six or eight years total—and municipal councils, but remain absent at the federal congressional level in the United States following a 1995 ruling deeming state-imposed limits unconstitutional for national offices. Judicial term limits are rarer, proposed in reforms like 18-year nonrenewable terms for U.S. justices to align appointments with presidential cycles, though not currently implemented. Globally, term limits characterize many presidential democracies, particularly in and , where over 70 countries adopted them post-1980s to avert prolonged incumbency akin to authoritarian rule, though enforcement has faltered in cases like Venezuela's 2009 abolition under . Parliamentary systems, such as the or , generally eschew formal limits for prime ministers or legislators, relying instead on electoral competition and party dynamics, underscoring term limits' prevalence in separation-of-powers frameworks over fusion-of-powers ones. Non-political applications, like corporate board tenures or nonprofit directorships, occasionally mirror these restrictions but fall outside core governmental scope.

Theoretical Rationales

Proponents of term limits argue that they prevent the concentration of power in individuals or elites, drawing from republican principles that emphasize rotation in office to avert tyranny or oligarchic tendencies. This rationale traces to ancient philosophers like Aristotle, who advocated short terms and the rule of "all over each and each in turn over all" to ensure broad participation and guard against factional dominance. Similarly, American Founders such as Thomas Jefferson viewed mandatory rotation as essential to liberty, warning that abandoning it for presidents or senators would lead to abuse and the consolidation of authority beyond democratic accountability. Term limits thus enforce a causal mechanism where fixed tenure disrupts perpetual incumbency, theoretically restoring the temporary nature of public service intended in republican governance. A second theoretical justification centers on countering structural incumbency advantages that distort electoral competition and voter . Incumbents benefit from institutionalized perks—such as privileges, staff allocations, and media visibility—which create barriers for challengers, resulting in reelection rates exceeding 95% despite widespread public dissatisfaction with . Term limits address this by mandating turnover, theoretically leveling the field and compelling elections based on policy merit rather than entrenched or networks. This rationale posits that without such limits, elections fail to reflect collective voter preferences due to problems: individual voters rationally reelect flawed incumbents to avoid relative losses in district influence (e.g., seniority-based committee assignments), even as aggregate sentiment favors change. By removing the option of indefinite reelection, term limits theoretically resolve this coordination failure, enhancing representational accuracy across districts. Term limits are also theorized to mitigate risks arising from long-term office-holding, where sustained relationships with special interests erode public-oriented incentives. Prolonged tenure fosters dependencies on lobbyists and donors, as evidenced by patterns where former members transition into influence peddling, perpetuating insider networks that prioritize private gains over constituent needs. Theoretically, limits disrupt these cycles by shortening horizons for arrangements, redirecting legislative focus toward immediate accountability and reducing the "reelection incentive" distortion that favors pork-barrel spending or . In executive contexts, this extends to preventing authoritarian drift, where unlimited terms enable leaders to manipulate institutions for self-perpetuation, undermining democratic alternation; term limits enforce leadership renewal, theoretically bolstering institutional resilience against power abuses. Finally, advocates contend that term limits promote a of citizen-representatives rather than politicians, fostering and detachment from bureaucratic . Long-serving officials risk becoming insulated from real-world conditions, prioritizing federal preservation over dynamic . By design, term limits theoretically inject diverse, short-term perspectives, aligning incentives with temporary stewardship and theoretically curbing the evolution of a detached that views office as a rather than civic duty. This draws from foundational republican ideals, where ensures reflects societal pluralism rather than elite continuity.

Principal Criticisms

Critics contend that term limits erode legislative expertise by mandating the exit of experienced officials, replacing them with novices deficient in institutional knowledge and policymaking acumen. Empirical studies of legislatures demonstrate that term-limited lawmakers sponsor fewer bills, achieve lower productivity, and exert diminished influence, as they defer policy decisions to unelected staff and bureaucrats who retain continuity. This loss of accumulated wisdom hampers oversight of complex issues, such as budgeting and regulation, where seasoned legislators historically excel in negotiating effective outcomes. A related objection centers on the redistribution of power toward unelected influencers, including lobbyists and administrative personnel, who exploit the informational vacuum left by transient politicians. Surveys across 50 states reveal that term limits heighten legislative dependence on lobbyists for policy guidance, accelerating the between public office and private advocacy roles. In Missouri, post-1992 term limits implementation shifted authority from lawmakers to governors and interest groups, diminishing legislative capacity to check executive overreach. Term limits further incentivize shirking by reducing officials' stakes in sustained performance, as barred reelection prospects encourage short-termism over enduring reforms. on U.S. governors indicate that those under term constraints impose higher taxes and expenditures than reelection-eligible counterparts, prioritizing immediate gains amid waning . At the legislative level, this manifests in curtailed incentives for expertise-building, fostering polarization and impeding , per analyses of state-level adoption effects. Opponents also highlight term limits' infringement on voter , forcibly ousting effective incumbents despite constituent support and thereby subverting electoral as a mechanism for removing underperformers. Far from curbing entrenched interests, such measures fail to eradicate —evidenced by persistent scandals in term-limited environments—and instead amplify reliance on external actors unburdened by electoral scrutiny.

Historical Development

Ancient and Early Modern Precedents

In ancient , following reforms in the BCE, many public offices under the democratic system incorporated term limits to promote rotation and curb entrenchment. For instance, members of the Boule, a council of 500 citizens selected by lot, were restricted to a single one-year term, ineligible for immediate reelection. The archonship, a key executive role, evolved to a one-year term by the 5th century BCE, after which incumbents could not be reelected, a practice endorsed to prevent corruption and the formation of a perpetual ruling . The similarly employed short-term mandates to balance power among magistrates. Consuls, the chief executives and military commanders, served one-year terms elected annually by the , with initial customs prohibiting consecutive reelection to avoid dominance by individuals. Censors, responsible for population registers and moral oversight, were appointed every five years for an 18-month tenure, while —emergency rulers—faced a six-month maximum to limit authoritarian risks. These mechanisms reflected a broader of , as evidenced in adjustments to praetorian terms from five years to 18 months by the BCE. During the in early modern , city-state republics like and adapted term limits to sustain oligarchic stability amid factional pressures. In , while the doge held lifelong tenure, most other magistracies and council positions were confined to one-year terms to inhibit power concentration and encourage broad participation among nobles. 's republican institutions imposed similar restrictions on gonfaloniers and priors, drawing from communal traditions where consuls and ruling councils faced mandatory rotation to forestall oligarchic capture. These practices, rooted in medieval precedents, prioritized institutional continuity over individual longevity, though enforcement varied with political exigencies.

European and Colonial Origins

In early modern European colonies in , formal mechanisms resembling term limits emerged through rotation-in-office provisions designed to curb potential abuses of power in nascent legislative bodies. The 1682 promulgated by for the explicitly mandated that, after an initial seven-year period, one-third of the 72-member provincial council would vacate office annually, with departing members rendered ineligible for re-election for one full year thereafter. This structure divided the council into three classes, ensuring regular turnover and distributing governance experience more widely among freemen, while the accompanying Frame of Government outlined a bicameral assembly with the council serving as an advising the proprietor or . Penn's framework, influenced by Quaker principles of equality and classical republican ideas of preventing factional dominance, marked one of the earliest codified restrictions on consecutive service in a colonial context. Such rotations contrasted with the more fluid practices in other English colonies, where assemblies like Virginia's or Massachusetts's General Court typically held annual elections without formal bars to re-election, relying instead on voter . In and corporate colonies, however, charters occasionally incorporated similar limits to balance authority with settler representation; for instance, Dutch governance in emphasized periodic rotation among burgomasters and schepens to maintain under the West India Company's oversight, though enforcement varied amid director-general appointments. These colonial innovations reflected pragmatic adaptations of European administrative traditions—such as short-term magistracies in mercantile republics—to frontier conditions, prioritizing stability against monarchical overreach while fostering . By the mid-18th century, these precedents informed debates in colonial legislatures, where gained traction as a safeguard against entrenched elites, though implementation remained inconsistent until revolutionary constitutions formalized stricter limits. European metropoles, dominated by absolute or constitutional monarchies with indefinite parliamentary sessions, provided limited direct models, but the colonial experiments laid groundwork for post-independence reforms by demonstrating rotation's utility in diffuse, non-hereditary polities.

Adoption in the United States

The Twenty-second Amendment to the , ratified on February 27, 1951, established term limits for the , prohibiting any person from being elected to more than twice, with an additional restriction for those who succeed to the and serve more than two years of a predecessor's term. This measure followed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's unprecedented four terms (1933–1945), which prompted bipartisan concern over concentrated executive power, leading to the amendment's proposal by in and swift ratification by 41 states. Prior to this, a two-term tradition had been observed since voluntarily stepped down after eight years in 1797, though it was not legally binding. Efforts to impose term limits on members of Congress gained momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s amid public frustration with incumbency advantages and legislative gridlock, but no constitutional amendment has succeeded at the federal level. Between 1990 and 1995, 23 states adopted measures via ballot initiatives or legislation to limit their federal congressional delegations, typically to three House terms (six years) and two Senate terms (12 years), reflecting voter approval averaging over 66% in referenda where held. However, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995), the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that such state-imposed qualifications violate the Constitution's structure, as Article I specifies uniform qualifications for congressional service that states cannot supplement, thereby invalidating all state efforts without a federal amendment. Subsequent proposals for a constitutional amendment, including via Article V convention calls, have advanced in some state legislatures—reaching resolutions from 19 states by 2024—but fall short of the 34 needed for a convention. At the state level, term limits for governors were adopted in 36 states by 2024, often through constitutional amendments or statutes limiting service to two consecutive four-year terms, with variations allowing non-consecutive reelection in some cases; these proliferated post-1960s amid anti-incumbency reforms, though a few states like Virginia permit three consecutive terms. For state legislatures, 16 states imposed term limits by 2024—Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and one additional unspecified in summaries—primarily via voter initiatives in the 1990s, with the first adoptions in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma in 1990 and the last in Nebraska via 2000 referendum. Limits typically cap House service at six to eight years and Senate at eight to 12 years, though two states legislatively nullified voter-approved limits and four saw them overturned by courts on procedural grounds. Municipal adoption of term limits for mayors and city councils accelerated in the , driven by similar anti-careerism sentiments, with nine of the ten largest U.S. cities enforcing them by 2024 (excluding ), often restricting mayors to two four-year terms. A 2006 survey indicated that about half of surveyed municipalities use four-year terms with limits of two to three terms for both mayors and councilors, implemented via city charters or ordinances; examples include New York City's two-term limit for mayor (eight years total) adopted in 1993 and Los Angeles's two-term limit since 1999. These local measures, affecting thousands of offices, have faced fewer legal challenges than state or federal attempts, reflecting greater flexibility in municipal governance structures.

Spread to Latin America and Other Regions

Presidential term limits originated in during the early independence era, with the first constitutions incorporating such provisions in the and to prevent the entrenchment of executive power amid fears of monarchical revival or caudillo dominance. For instance, Venezuela's 1811 constitution limited the president to a one-year term, while subsequent frameworks in countries like (1853 constitution: six-year term without immediate reelection) and (1824 constitution: four-year term) embedded similar restrictions, drawing from republican ideals but adapting to local instability. By 1985, approximately 81 percent of Latin American constitutions since included formal term limits, contrasting with the absence of such rules in the U.S. until the 22nd Amendment in 1951. The institution persisted through cycles of and redemocratization, with significant reinforcement during the 1980s and 1990s transitions from military rule. New or amended constitutions in nations such as (1988: five-year terms with one consecutive reelection permitted), Peru (1993: five years, no immediate reelection), and (1980, reformed post-1988 plebiscite: alternating four- and six-year terms initially) prioritized term limits to signal commitments against perpetual incumbency and foster electoral rotation. This wave reflected international norms from the third wave of democratization, yet faced early challenges, including 31 attempts to alter limits since 1988, succeeding in 19 cases, often via referenda or legislative maneuvers in countries like (2009 abolition) and (2015 reversal). Beyond , term limits spread unevenly during post-colonial and periods in other regions, remaining rare until the late . In , independence constitutions from the 1960s rarely included them, enabling extended tenures by leaders like in (1966–1994); however, the 1990s reform wave introduced two-term limits (typically five or seven years) in most countries' new charters, such as South Africa's 1996 (two five-year terms) and Nigeria's 1999 framework (two four-year terms), as safeguards against one-party dominance. By 2005, over 80 percent of sub-Saharan states had adopted presidential term limits, though compliance varied amid third-term bids in at least 19 countries. In , adoption aligned with democratic consolidations in select presidential systems, such as South Korea's 1987 constitution (single five-year term to avert military resurgence) and the Philippines' 1987 charter (one six-year term post-Marcos), while Indonesia's 2002 amendments post-Suharto limited presidents to two five-year terms. Parliamentary-dominant systems like and historically avoided executive term limits, emphasizing electoral over fixed tenures, though hybrid cases like (1997 amendments: two four-year terms) illustrate diffusion via U.S.-influenced models. Overall, global proliferation emphasized preventing personalist rule, but enforcement hinged on institutional strength and elite pacts.

Mechanisms of Implementation

Structural Variations

Term limits are structured in diverse ways across political systems, differing primarily in whether they enforce restrictions on consecutive service or impose lifetime caps, the precise number of terms allowed, and their application to executive versus legislative roles. Consecutive limits bar serving beyond a set number of terms in immediate succession, permitting a return after a mandatory break, while lifetime limits restrict the aggregate terms an individual may hold, precluding further service irrespective of gaps. These designs aim to balance renewal with experience retention, though lifetime variants predominate in jurisdictions seeking stricter rotation. In the executive branch, presidential or gubernatorial term limits often specify two terms, typically four or five years each, as a lifetime maximum to curb entrenchment while allowing reelection tests. The U.S. Constitution's Twenty-second Amendment, ratified in 1951, limits presidents to two elected terms, aggregating partial terms exceeding two years toward the cap. Among U.S. states, 37 impose gubernatorial limits as of 2025, with structures varying: enforces a lifetime maximum of two four-year terms, while prohibits consecutive terms but permits non-consecutive service after one term out, effectively allowing indefinite tenure with intervals. Internationally, Mexico's constitution mandates a single six-year term with no reelection to prevent incumbency advantages, whereas permits two consecutive four-year terms as a lifetime limit. Legislative term limits, less common globally but prevalent in 15 U.S. states, frequently adopt lifetime caps tailored to chamber-specific term lengths for proportionality. For instance, Arizona's constitution limits representatives to three two-year terms (six years total) and senators to two four-year terms (eight years), both lifetime. In contrast, states like apply consecutive restrictions, such as three four-year senate terms before a mandatory absence. Such variations reflect trade-offs: shorter consecutive limits accelerate turnover but risk discontinuity, while lifetime caps ensure permanent exclusion but may deter qualified candidates. Empirical comparisons across U.S. states indicate lifetime structures correlate with higher legislative polarization due to compressed expertise accumulation.

Enforcement Procedures

Enforcement of term limits generally relies on constitutional provisions, statutory requirements, and administrative processes integrated into electoral systems, with judicial intervention available for disputes. In presidential systems, electoral commissions or equivalent bodies verify candidate eligibility against term limits before certifying ballots, preventing ineligible incumbents from running. For instance, under the U.S. Constitution's Twenty-Second Amendment, which restricts presidents to two elected terms (or one if succeeding to more than two years of a predecessor's term), enforcement occurs primarily through self-executing political mechanisms: major parties refrain from nominating ineligible candidates, and the transmits votes only for qualified electors, with ultimately certifying results under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment. At the state level in the U.S., where 36 states impose gubernatorial term limits typically capping service at two consecutive four-year terms, enforcement is handled by secretaries of state or election boards, who disqualify candidates exceeding limits from upon filing for office. These officials cross-reference candidacy petitions against state constitutional records of prior service, issuing binding determinations that can be appealed in state courts. Legislative term limits in 15 states, affecting over 80% of state lawmakers, follow similar procedures: election administrators enforce lifetime or consecutive-term caps by denying re-election filings, as seen in California's Proposition 140 (1990), which limits assembly members to six years and senators to 12 years total, upheld through routine administrative review rather than litigation. Judicial enforcement activates when challenges arise, such as disputes over partial terms or succession counting toward limits. Courts interpret term limit clauses strictly, as in the U.S. 's ruling in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995), which invalidated state-imposed congressional term limits as violating federal qualifications under Article I, emphasizing that only constitutional amendments can add such restrictions nationally. Internationally, in systems like Mexico's presidency (limited to one six-year term since 1933), the National Electoral Institute enforces compliance by rejecting registrations, with the Supreme Court of Justice resolving appeals, as demonstrated in 2018 when it blocked incumbent re-election bids. Violations trigger automatic disqualification, fines, or , underscoring reliance on independent electoral bodies to maintain procedural integrity. In legislative contexts, enforcement often involves internal chamber rules alongside electoral checks; for example, in term-limited state assemblies, presiding officers and clerks track service history to bar voting or leadership eligibility post-limit, while courts provide oversight for constitutional challenges. Empirical data from the National Conference of State Legislatures indicates near-universal compliance in U.S. states since adoption, with fewer than 1% of cases requiring judicial resolution, attributing this to clear statutory language and preemptive administrative screening that minimizes post-election disputes. Where term limits are statutory rather than constitutional, legislatures can amend them, but enforcement remains procedural until altered, highlighting the causal link between entrenched constitutional status and robust adherence.

Empirical Effects on Governance

Evidence of Positive Outcomes

In U.S. states with restrictive legislative term limits, empirical analysis indicates lower net levels of compared to states without such limits, as measured by the negative impact of on . A 2025 study utilizing from U.S. states found that tighter term limits correlate with reduced aggregate corruption costs, proxied through higher rates, suggesting that limits curb the entrenchment that enables large-scale corrupt practices. Term limits have been associated with decreased magnitude of individual incidents, even if the frequency of detected cases may rise due to higher turnover exposing more opportunities for . examining political tenure and corruption across democratic systems shows that term-limited officials engage in lower-cost corrupt acts toward the end of their tenure, as the reduced value of future office-holding diminishes incentives for high-stakes graft. Adoption of term limits in state legislatures has reinvigorated electoral competition by forcing exits, leading to more open seats and increased candidate recruitment. A analysis of U.S. state elections demonstrated that term limits modestly boosted among low-propensity demographics while enhancing overall contest competitiveness, as measured by narrower victory margins and higher challenger quality in affected races. From a voter welfare perspective, term limits can enhance electoral by lowering the rents associated with prolonged office-holding, thereby amplifying the disciplining effect of elections on outcomes. Theoretical and empirical modeling in multi-period electoral settings reveals that binding limits improve expected for voters by mitigating shirking and aligning incentives more closely with constituent preferences over time. In gubernatorial contests, term limits reduce incentives for sabotage, such as excessive , by shortening horizons for retaliatory behavior. Evidence from races indicates that term-limited incumbents engage less in destructive tactics, fostering cleaner competitions and potentially higher-quality debates.

Evidence of Adverse Consequences

Empirical analyses of legislatures with term limits demonstrate a significant reduction in legislative expertise and specialization, as inexperienced lawmakers lack the tenure to develop deep knowledge, leading to diminished and effectiveness in . For instance, studies show term-limited legislators sponsor fewer bills, perform less effectively in committee roles, and miss more floor votes compared to those without such restrictions. In states like , where term limits took effect after voter approval in 1990, this has resulted in rushed policymaking and in legislation, prolonging the time required to enact stable, well-considered policies. Term limits exacerbate reliance on external actors, shifting power from elected officials to lobbyists, unelected staff, bureaucrats, and governors who possess greater institutional continuity. A comprehensive 50-state survey conducted in revealed heightened lobbyist influence in term-limited environments, driven by lawmakers' reduced policy acumen and incentives to cultivate post-office networks, including through a more active between legislatures and interest groups. Political scientists note that this dynamic undermines legislative independence, as term-limited members prioritize short-term alliances over long-term constituent representation, further eroding oversight functions observed in states like . On , term limits correlate with shortsighted , including higher taxation, spending, and borrowing, as transient legislators favor immediate outcomes over sustainable . controlling for economic and institutional variables finds that states with legislative term limits experience elevated levels and reduced , attributing these effects to diminished legislative capacity for complex budgeting. Additionally, term limits have been linked to increased legislative polarization in affected states, amplifying partisan gridlock and instability. These patterns persist despite proponents' claims, with evidence indicating no substantial mitigation of or entrenchment, and instead potential amplification of special interest sway.

Key Studies and Comparative Data

A 2022 peer-reviewed study examining U.S. state-level data found that stricter legislative term limits increase the frequency of incidents by approximately 20-30% relative to looser limits or no limits, as reduced tenure diminishes reputational incentives against detection; however, the expected cost per incident decreases due to constrained opportunities for large-scale graft, yielding a net ambiguous effect on overall levels. A complementary 2023 of U.S. states, using as a proxy for aggregate costs via negative growth- correlations established in prior literature, estimated that term limits elevate 's economic burden by limiting experienced oversight, with term-limited states showing 0.5-1% lower annual GDP growth on average compared to non-term-limited peers after controlling for institutional and economic variables. Comparative data from U.S. states reveal stark differences in legislative dynamics: among the 15 states with active term limits as of 2024 (, , , , , , , , , , , , , , and ), average legislator tenure averages 4-6 years versus 8-10 years in the 35 non-term-limited states, correlating with heightened reliance on lobbyists and staff for policy expertise. A 2011 econometric evaluation of state legislatures post-term-limit adoption (1990s-2000s) documented elevated fiscal deficits in term-limited states, with per capita debt rising 10-15% more than in control states, attributed to inexperienced lawmakers prioritizing short-term spending over long-term budgeting. On competence and policy outcomes, a study disentangling reelection incentives from incumbent skill using term-limit discontinuities showed that states with binding limits experience 1-2% lower annual and higher borrowing costs under term-limited incumbents versus reelection-eligible ones, as the latter exert greater effort on voter-aligned . Term limits also disrupt policy continuity, with term-limited legislatures passing 15-20% more narrowly targeted bills (e.g., district-specific projects) than non-limited ones, per legislative output analyses from 1995-2010, reflecting reduced and increased turnover-driven opportunism. Globally, empirical comparisons of presidential term limits remain sparser due to confounding factors like regime type, but a 2021 dataset of 100+ developing democracies (1960-2020) indicated that strict two-term limits correlate with 5-10% higher post-tenure in compliant cases versus evasion-prone systems, though causation is muddied by selection effects in stable democracies. In and , where 80% of constitutions mandate limits as of 2020, adherence reduces incumbency advantages in subsequent elections by 15-25% compared to unlimited systems, fostering but occasionally yielding volatility from churn. These findings underscore term limits' trade-offs: curbing entrenchment at the expense of expertise, with U.S. subnational variation offering the most robust causal evidence due to quasi-experimental state adoptions.

Evasions and Violations

Common Circumvention Tactics

Politicians subject to term limits have frequently resorted to legal, procedural, and institutional maneuvers to prolong their influence, often undermining the intended constraints on power concentration. These tactics exploit ambiguities in constitutional language, leverage legislative majorities, or manipulate electoral processes, with empirical analyses identifying patterns across democratic and semi-authoritarian regimes. A comprehensive of 226 global presidential term limit evasion attempts from 1960 to found that incumbents succeeded in extending their rule in approximately one-third of cases, primarily through formal changes to legal frameworks rather than outright coups. Constitutional amendments or resets. The most prevalent strategy involves altering the to either extend term lengths, eliminate limits, or retroactively reset the of prior terms served. This approach accounted for 66 percent of evasion efforts in the dataset, often enacted via controlled legislative votes or referendums lacking robust opposition. For instance, in 2018, Russia's approved amendments under President that effectively reset his term , allowing him to potentially serve until 2024 and beyond, following his earlier 2008-2012 stint as to sidestep limits. Similar resets occurred in , where Paul Kagame's allies amended the in 2015 to shorten terms but grandfather in his prior service, enabling a third overall term starting in 2017. Role-switching and proxy arrangements. Incumbents may temporarily vacate the presidency for a subordinate role, such as , while installing a loyal successor who later yields power back, effectively preserving influence without formally violating limits. This tactic, observed in 12 percent of evasion cases, relies on constitutional provisions allowing role fluidity. Putin's 2008 transition to exemplifies this, as he retained control through Dmitry Medvedev's presidency before reclaiming the office in 2012 amid supportive constitutional tweaks. In , Colombia's Álvaro Uribe pursued a 2010 third-term bid via legislative approval of a , though it failed after intervention; earlier, he secured a 2006 second term through a 2004 overturned ban. Judicial reinterpretations and proxy candidates. Courts sympathetic to the incumbent may reinterpret term limits to exclude non-consecutive service or prior interim roles, while proxies—such as family members or close allies—run as placeholders to maintain dynastic or factional continuity. In Bolivia, Evo Morales obtained a 2017 Supreme Court ruling declaring term limits non-absolute under international human rights conventions, permitting his failed 2019 fourth-term candidacy. Proxy tactics appear in African contexts, where leaders like Guinea's Alpha Condé pushed 2020 constitutional referendums to reset terms, though subsequent protests highlighted risks of instability. In U.S. states with legislative term limits, such as Michigan and California, officials often circumvent by seeking different offices (e.g., from state house to senate or governorship) or backing family successors, though data shows this "office hopping" increases turnover without fully evading limits' intent. Referendums and legislative repeals. Controlled public votes or legislative actions can repeal or suspend limits, presented as responses to "national needs." Five African countries reinstated limits after prior abolitions, but evasions persist via referendums, as in Côte d'Ivoire under Alassane Ouattara's third-term pursuit. In U.S. states like and , legislatures repealed voter-approved limits in the via statutory changes, citing administrative burdens, though courts later invalidated some efforts. These methods succeed more in weakly institutionalized settings, where opposition fragmentation allows passage without broad consensus.

Prominent Case Studies

In , President evaded constitutional term limits by transitioning to the role of under President from May 2008 to May 2012, following his two consecutive presidential terms from 2000 to 2008, which preserved his political influence while adhering to the formal two-term restriction. He returned to the in 2012 for a six-year term, extended by a 2012 law, and further circumvented limits through 2020 constitutional amendments approved in a July , which reset his prior terms and allowed two additional six-year terms, potentially extending his rule until 2036 amid reports of irregularities and state incentives for approval. China's orchestrated the abolition of presidential term limits in March 2018, when the amended Article 79 of the to remove the two-consecutive-term cap originally instituted in , passing the measure by a vote of 2,958 to 2 and enabling indefinite leadership. This reform aligned the presidency with Xi's unchallenged control over the , where no formal term limits apply to the general secretary role he has held since , consolidating power previously distributed under Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao reforms to prevent lifelong rule. In , Daniel Ortega's Sandinista-dominated repealed presidential term limits on January 29, 2014, via constitutional amendments that eliminated re-election bans and reduced the vote threshold for victory from 35% to a simple plurality, allowing his indefinite candidacy after prior terms from to and a 2007 return. Ortega secured re-elections in and , with subsequent reforms extending his current term to 2027 without elections and designating Vice President as co-president, amid international criticism of judicial capture and opposition suppression. Venezuela's amended the 1999 constitution through a 2009 referendum, reversing a prior two-term limit to permit indefinite re-election, with 54.36% approval in a vote marked by opposition abstention and state media dominance, enabling his 2012 victory before his 2013 death. His successor has since maintained this framework through electoral control, extending the evasion pattern despite and sanctions. In , evaded a 2009 referendum rejecting further terms by obtaining a 2017 Plurinational ruling that interpreted term limits as incompatible with international treaties, allowing his 2019 candidacy despite two prior terms from 2006 to 2019, which sparked protests, military intervention, and his resignation amid fraud allegations before a new . This judicial maneuver, later reversed by a 2023 constitutional reaffirmation of limits, highlighted reliance on loyal courts to reinterpret bans rather than outright .

Contemporary Debates and Proposals

United States Federal Initiatives

Efforts to impose term limits on members of the Congress have centered on proposed constitutional amendments, as the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995) that states cannot unilaterally add qualifications for federal officeholders beyond those in the Constitution. Unlike the presidency, which is limited to two terms by the Twenty-second Amendment ratified in 1951, no such restrictions apply to senators or representatives. Federal legislative initiatives have included joint resolutions for amendments limiting members to three two-year terms (six years total) and senators to two six-year terms (twelve years total), though none have achieved the required two-thirds majority in both chambers for proposal to the states. In the 119th (2025-2026), House Joint Resolution 12, introduced by Representative (R-SC) on January 3, 2025, proposes a establishing these term limits for sitting members, with the limits applying prospectively after ratification. Similarly, House Joint Resolution 5, also introduced on January 3, 2025, by Representative (R-AZ), seeks identical restrictions on congressional service. These resolutions garnered significant cosponsorship, with H.J.Res. 12 supported by 98 members, primarily Republicans, reflecting ongoing partisan support for the measure amid criticisms of entrenched incumbency. In the , Senator (R-TX) and Representative Norman introduced a companion on August 1, 2025, limiting senators to two terms and House members to three, emphasizing the need to curb career politicians' influence. Earlier federal efforts include from the 104th (1995), which examined term limits following state initiatives, and (1997), advocating for a twelve-year cap on congressional service. Proponents argue these limits would enhance turnover and reduce special interest capture, as outlined in analyses by organizations like , though critics contend they could diminish institutional expertise without addressing underlying incentives for long tenure. As of October 2025, no such has advanced beyond committee referral in recent sessions, requiring subsequent by three-fourths of states for enactment. Parallel to direct congressional action, advocacy groups such as U.S. Term Limits have pursued an Article V convention mechanism, urging state legislatures to apply for a limited convention to propose a term limits amendment, bypassing . By 2025, resolutions were introduced in at least 20 states, with progress toward the 34-state threshold needed to trigger a convention, though federal courts have not yet ruled on the specificity of such applications. This state-driven approach represents an indirect federal initiative under the Constitution's amendment process, distinct from legislative proposals but aimed at the same outcome.

State-Level and Judicial Developments

In 2020, Arkansas voters approved Issue 2 by a margin of 53.5% to 46.5%, modifying existing legislative term limits to allow up to three four-year terms in the House of Representatives and two four-year terms in the Senate over a non-consecutive lifetime, rather than strictly limiting consecutive service. This adjustment, which took effect for the 2021 elections, enabled legislators to return after a break, extending potential careers beyond prior restrictions of six years in the House and eight in the Senate.) North Dakota marked a rare expansion of term limits in 2022, when voters approved Constitutional Measure 1 with 55% support in the June , imposing lifetime limits of 12 years total for state legislators (limited to eight years in one chamber and four in the other) and extending gubernatorial limits to three consecutive terms. The measure aimed to prevent career politicians but faced immediate legislative resistance; in April 2025, the state legislature passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 4007, placing a 2026 ballot measure to loosen these limits by allowing four complete terms (effectively extending service before ineligibility).) Other states have proposed adjustments amid ongoing debates. qualified a for the 2026 ballot to extend unicameral legislative term limits from two to three consecutive four-year terms, reflecting efforts by incumbents to prolong service in the nation's only single-chamber legislature. Meanwhile, 15 states maintain legislative term limits adopted primarily in the , with no net additions since 2000, though these rules influenced 2025 elections by term-limiting over 2,125 lawmakers across cycles from 2010 to 2024, disproportionately affecting Republicans (294 more than Democrats). Judicial interventions in state term limit disputes have been infrequent in recent decades. Between 1994 and 2002, courts in four states— (1995), Washington (1994), (1997), and (2002)—invalidated voter-approved legislative term limits, ruling them unconstitutional under state provisions barring additional qualifications for office or violating single-subject rules for initiatives. These decisions preserved open candidacies but did not extend to overturning limits in other states. No comparable state-level judicial challenges or reversals have succeeded since, allowing term limits to persist in , , , , , , , , , and , among others. State-level actions have also intersected with federal term limit advocacy. As of October 2025, 19 states have enacted resolutions applying for an Article V constitutional convention specifically to propose congressional term limits, with recent passages in states like underscoring gubernatorial involvement in the campaign. Such efforts highlight state legislatures' role in bypassing federal inaction, though they fall short of the 34 states required to trigger a convention. Presidential term limits have become a standard feature in many democracies since the mid-20th century, particularly in presidential and semi-presidential systems, where they typically restrict leaders to two consecutive terms to mitigate risks of authoritarian consolidation. As of 2025, approximately 80% of countries with directly elected presidents impose such limits, often modeled after the U.S. two-term precedent established by the 22nd Amendment in 1951. In contrast, parliamentary systems rarely enforce term limits on prime ministers or cabinet members, as executive accountability relies on legislative confidence votes and electoral cycles rather than fixed personal tenure caps; examples include the , , and , where no statutory limits exist for heads of government. Adoption of term limits surged in post-colonial and during the 1990s democratic transitions, with over 40 African nations and most Latin American states enshrining them in constitutions to curb the dictatorships of prior eras. However, empirical trends reveal persistent evasion tactics, especially in , where leaders in at least 18 countries since 2000 have sought constitutional amendments or judicial reinterpretations to extend stays in power, correlating with elevated indices and coup risks. In , similar patterns emerged, with presidents in , , and successfully dismantling limits through allied legislatures or referenda between 2007 and 2018, often justified as necessary for policy continuity amid economic volatility. Reform efforts to abolish or weaken limits have accelerated in recent years, exemplified by El Salvador's July 2025 constitutional overhaul under President , which eliminated reelection barriers via a vote in the unicameral assembly, enabling indefinite tenure despite prior single-term restrictions. In , international democracy assistance has occasionally bolstered resistance to such maneuvers, as seen in Burkina Faso's 2022 rejection of extensions amid donor pressure, though successes remain limited against domestic incumbency advantages. Conversely, pushes to introduce or strengthen limits persist in hybrid regimes; Rwanda's 2015 referendum extended President Paul Kagame's eligibility despite evasion precedents, while European parliamentary discussions since 2020 advocate informal norms or age caps to address entrenchment in bodies like the . These efforts highlight a causal tension: limits foster rotation but invite circumvention when incumbents dominate institutions, underscoring the need for independent judiciaries to enforce them effectively.

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  91. https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-help-protect-democracy-long-ones-can-be-dangerous-243620
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