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Turkish Land Forces
Türk Kara Kuvvetleri
Emblem of the Turkish Land Forces
Founded8 November 1920 (104 years ago) (1920-11-08); as the Army of the Grand National Assembly[1][2]
1 July 1949 (76 years ago) (1949-07-01); as the Turkish Land Forces Command[3][4]
Country Turkey
TypeArmy
RoleLand warfare
Size401,500 (official TAF figure)
380,000 (CIA, active duty only)[5]
Part ofTurkish Armed Forces
MottosEtkin, Caydırıcı, Saygın 'Effective, Deterrent, Respectable'[citation needed]
ColorsGold & maroon   
MarchHarbiye Marşı[citation needed]
Anniversaries28 June[note 1]
EquipmentList of equipment of the Turkish Land Forces
EngagementsList of wars involving Turkey
Websitewww.kkk.tsk.tr/en/
Commanders
Commander-in-chiefPresident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Minister of National DefenceMinister Yaşar Güler
Chief of the General StaffGeneral Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu
CommanderGeneral Metin Tokel
Chief of StaffLt. Gen. Veli Tarakcı [tr]
Insignia
Army aviation roundel

The Turkish Land Forces (Turkish: Türk Kara Kuvvetleri) is the main branch of the Turkish Armed Forces responsible for land-based military operations. The army was formed on 8 November 1920, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Significant campaigns since the foundation of the army include suppression of rebellions in Southeast Anatolia and East Anatolia from the 1920s to the present day, combat in the Korean War, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the current Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war, as well as its NATO alliance against the USSR during the Cold War. The army holds the preeminent place within the armed forces. It is customary for the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces to have been the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces prior to his appointment as Turkey's senior ranking officer.

Alongside the other two armed services, the Turkish Army has frequently intervened in Turkish politics, a custom that is now regulated to an extent by the reform of the National Security Council. It assumed power for several periods in the latter half of the 20th century. It carried out coups d'état in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Most recently, it maneuvered the removal of an Islamic-oriented prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997.[8]

From late 2015, the Turkish Army (along with the rest of the Armed Forces) saw its personnel strengths increased to a similar level as the previous decade. Factors that contributed to this growth include the Turkish occupation of northern Syria, as well as a renewal of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict.[9][10][11]

History

[edit]
Main article: Military history of Turkey

The Turkish Army traces its origin to the Ottoman Army. A theory accepted officially was that the Ottoman Armed Forces had been founded in 1363, when the Pençik corps (the predecessor of the Janissary Corps, the first full time professional military force established in Europe after the Roman legions) had been formed and, in this context, on 28 June 1963, it celebrated the 600th anniversary of its foundation.[12] In the same year, one of the prominent Pan-Turkists, Nihal Atsız, asserted that the Turkish Army had been founded in 209 BC, when Modu Chanyu of the Xiongnu is thought to have formed an army based on the decimal system.[6][13] In 1968, Yılmaz Öztuna proposed this theory to Cemal Tural, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey at the time.[14] In 1973, when the Turkish Army celebrated the 610th anniversary of its foundation, Nihal Atsız published his claim again.[13][15][verification needed] After the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, the Turkish Army formally adopted the date 209 BC as its year of foundation.[16]

The foundations of the modern Turkish Army were laid during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. After the Janissary Corps, which was outdated and could not adapt to the times, was abolished with the Auspicious Incident (15 June 1826), Sultan Mahmud II ordered the establishment of Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (Victorious Soldiers of the Prophet Muhammad). By embarking on a rapid modernization effort that took the military and technical developments in Europe as an example, the new army decree was approved by Sultan Mahmud II on 7 July 1826, and the Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediyye Army, the modern army of the empire, was established.[17] After this date, Sultan Mahmud II accelerated his reform efforts and started to establish schools and institutions to support the new army. The Seraskerlik institution, a high military command, was established by Mahmud II in 1826 to fulfill the duties of the commander-in-chief, and on 14 March 1827, Imperial Military School of Medicine, which is the basis of Turkey's first medical faculty and modern military hospital Gülhane Training and Research Hospital, was established to meet the army's need for physicians and surgeons. Harbiye Military School was later established in 1834 as a modern officer school modeled on the French and Prussian armies, taught by European instructors.[18][19]

The name of the army was changed to Asâkir-i Nizâmiye-i Şâhâne (Royal Regular Soldiers) by Sultan Abdülmecid on 14 June 1843. From this date onwards, the army began to be known simply as the Nizami Ordu (Regular Army).[20] Kuleli Military High School was opened in 1845. In 1848, Erkan-ı Harbiye Military Academy was opened to train Staff Officers.[21] In 1880, Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umûmiye Riyaseti, which is equivalent to today's General Staff, was established. In 1908, the name of the Seraskerlik institution was changed to the Ministry of War and the reform efforts reached their peak.[22]

War of Independence

[edit]
Turkish Armed Forces
Leadership
Branches
History
Special Forces
Member of
Current foreign deployments and missions
Main article: Turkish War of Independence

The Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919 – 24 July 1923) was a series of military campaigns waged by the Turkish National Movement after parts of the Ottoman Empire were occupied and partitioned following its defeat in World War I. These campaigns were directed against Greece in the west, Armenia in the east, France in the south, loyalists and separatists in various cities, and British and Ottoman troops around Constantinople (İstanbul).[23]

The ethnic demographics of the modern Turkish Republic were significantly impacted by the earlier Armenian genocide and the deportations of Greek-speaking, Orthodox Christian Rum people.[24] The Turkish National Movement carried out massacres and deportations to eliminate native Christian populations—a continuation of the Armenian genocide and other ethnic cleansing operations during World War I.[25] Following these campaigns of ethnic cleansing the historic Christian presence in Anatolia was destroyed, in large part, and the Muslim demographic had increased from 80% to 98%.[24]

While World War I ended for the Ottoman Empire with the Armistice of Mudros, the Allied Powers occupied parts of the empire and sought to prosecute former members of the Committee of Union and Progress and others involved in the Armenian genocide.[26][27] According to the terms of the agreement, it was decided to limit the number of soldiers in the Turkish army to 50 thousand.[28] Ottoman military commanders therefore refused orders from both the Allies and the Ottoman government to surrender and disband their forces. This crisis reached a head when Sultan Mehmed VI dispatched Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a well-respected and high-ranking general, to Anatolia to restore order.

With Anatolia in practical anarchy and the Ottoman army being questionably loyal in reaction to Allied land seizures, Mehmed VI established the military inspectorate system to reestablish authority over the remaining empire. Encouraged by Karabekir and Edmund Allenby, he assigned[29] Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) as the inspector of the Ninth Army Troops Inspectorate –based in Erzurum– to restore order to Ottoman military units and to improve internal security on 30 April 1919.[30] Mustafa Kemal was a well known, well respected, and well connected army commander, with much prestige coming from his status as the "Hero of Anafartalar"—for his role in the Gallipoli Campaign—and his title of "Honorary Aide-de-camp to His Majesty Sultan" gained in the last months of WWI. He was a nationalist and a fierce critic of the government's accommodating policy to the Entente powers. His new assignment gave him effective plenipotentiary powers over all of Anatolia which was meant to accommodate him and other nationalists to keep them loyal to the government.[31] Mustafa Kemal became an enabler and eventually leader of Turkish National Movement against the Ottoman government, Allied powers, and Christian minorities. On 3 May 1920, Birinci Ferik Mustafa Fevzi Pasha (Çakmak) was appointed the Minister of National Defence, and Mirliva İsmet Pasha (İnönü) was appointed the Minister of the Chief of General Staff of the government of the Grand National Assembly (GNA).[32] The modern Turkish Army has its foundations in nine remnant Ottoman Army corps.

In an attempt to establish control over the power vacuum in Anatolia, the Allies persuaded Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to launch an expeditionary force into Anatolia and occupy Smyrna (İzmir), beginning the Turkish War of Independence. A nationalist Government of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), led by Mustafa Kemal, was established in Ankara when it became clear the Ottoman government was backing the Allied powers. The Allies soon pressured the Ottoman government in Constantinople into suspending the Constitution, shuttering the Chamber of Deputies, and signing the Treaty of Sèvres, a treaty that the "Ankara government" declared illegal.

In the ensuing war, Kuva-yi Milliye irregular militia defeated the French forces in the south, and undemobilized units went on to partition Armenia with Bolshevik forces, resulting in the Treaty of Kars (October 1921). The Western Front of the independence war was known as the Greco-Turkish War, in which Greek forces at first encountered unorganized resistance. The Turkish military units that were hastily formed in 1920 consisted of 20 infantry divisions in eight corps. The number of soldiers in the units was small. The divisions consisted of three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment.[28] However İsmet Pasha's organization of militia into a regular army paid off when Ankara forces fought the Greeks in the First and Second Battle of İnönü. The Greek army emerged victorious in the Battle of Kütahya-Eskişehir and decided to attack Ankara, stretching their supply lines. On 3 August 1921, the GNA fired İsmet Pasha from the post of Minister of National Defence because of his failure at the Battle of Afyonkarahisar–Eskişehir and on 5 August, just before the Battle of Sakarya, appointed the chairman of the GNA Atatürk as commander-in-chief of the Army of the GNA. The Turks checked the Greek advance in the Battle of Sakarya and counter-attacked in the Great Offensive, which expelled Greek forces from Anatolia in the span of three weeks. On 1 August 1922, the Western Front Command had a force of 200,000 men, consisting of 23 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, ready for the offensive.[28] On August 26, 1922, the Army of the Grand National Assembly[33][34] (Büyük Millet Meclisi Ordusu) launched the general offensive known as the Great Offensive (Büyük Taarruz) against the Greek forces around Kara Hisâr-ı Sâhip. Nurettin Pasha's 1st Army and Yakup Şevki Pasha's 2nd Army encircled the main body of Major General Nikolaos Trikoupis's group and defeated it near Dumlupınar. Fahrettin Pasha's V Cavalry Corps entered Smyrna (İzmir) on September 9, 1922. Şükrü Naili Pasha's III Corps entered Constantinople (Istanbul) peacefully on October 6, 1923. Subsequent to the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the Army of the GNA was reorganized. According to the "Hazar Project" dated August 5, 1923, the Turkish Land Forces were organized as three army inspectorates, nine corps, 18 infantry divisions, and three cavalry divisions, and this structure continued until the 1970s. Later, after the tensions with Greece, it was decided to establish a fourth army.[28]

The war effectively ended with the Turkish capture of Smyrna and the Chanak Crisis, prompting the signing of the Armistice of Mudanya.

The Grand National Assembly in Ankara was recognized as the legitimate Turkish government, which signed the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. The Allies evacuated Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, the Ottoman government was overthrown and the monarchy abolished, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (which remains Turkey's primary legislative body today) declared the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. With the war, a population exchange between Greece and Turkey,[35] the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, and the abolition of the sultanate, the Ottoman era came to an end, and with Atatürk's reforms, the Turks created the modern, secular nation-state of Turkey. On 3 March 1924, the Ottoman caliphate was also abolished.

Commanders of the Turkish Army during the Turkish War of Independence
Turkish soldiers in a trench waiting for the order to attack with fixed bayonets on their rifles

First Kurdish rebellions and lead-up to Second World War

[edit]
See also: Kurdish rebellions in Turkey

There were several Kurdish rebellions in the South-East of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, the most important of which were the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion and the 1937 Dersim rebellion.[36][37] All were suppressed by the TAF, sometimes involving large-scale mobilisations of up to 50,000 troops.[38] Associated atrocities against civilians include the Zilan massacre.[39]

In 1935, Turkey purchased 60 T-26 modified 1933 light tanks from the USSR (also, two twin-turreted T-26 mod. 1931 were presented to the Turkish government in 1933–1934), along with about 60 BA-6 armoured cars to form the 1st Tank Battalion of the 2nd Cavalry Division at Lüleburgaz.[40] The Armoured Brigade of the Turkish Army consisted of the 102nd and the 103rd Companies armed with the T-26 mod. 1933 tanks (four platoons in a company, five tanks in the platoon) at the end of 1937. The reserve group of the brigade had 21 T-26 tanks also. At the beginning of 1940, the Turkish Army had the Armoured Brigade in Istanbul, which belonged to the 1st Army, and the 1st Tank Battalion, which belonged to the 3rd Army. Turkish T-26 tanks were taken out of service in 1942.[41][42]

The Annual Report of the British Embassy in Ankara for 1937 said that the Army's manpower included 22 divisions but "progress in mechanization was slow."[43] The shortage of tanks and other armoured vehicles was marked: "units are known to have been transported from Thrace to Anatolia for manoeuvres and reviews." The total strength of the forces was given as 120,000. Exercises were held in the İzmir area to practice defence against a landing from a hostile country "tacitly recognized as Italy." Separately, when war broke out, another report said that the motorised transport of the army consisted of 28 different types of old lorries.

World War II

[edit]

During World War II, Turkey mobilized more than a million personnel. The Turkish Army order of battle in 1941 shows a number of formations. Turkey had been severely stretched by its actions in World War I and the leadership wished to avoid such a costly commitment. The Army was also poorly equipped and somewhat rigidly out-of-date. Neutral for most of the war, Turkey declared war on Nazi Germany in February 1945, after being given an ultimatum by the Allies of World War II to do so by March 1, 1945, if Turkey wanted a seat in the future United Nations.[44]

German picture depicting the uniforms of the Turkish Army in World War II

Cold War era

[edit]

In August 1947, the American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (later prefixed Joint, thus becoming JAMMAT) was established in Ankara. Hastened by the Soviet threat during the Turkish Straits crisis, large amounts of United States military aid began arriving.[45] JAMMAT began giving significant amounts of advice on the reorganisation and modernisation of the Turkish Army.[46]

In December 1948, the Turkish Army was described as three armies, 13 army corps, 35 infantry divisions; three cavalry divisions, six armoured brigades, and four fortress commands at 33% of war strength; and 309,300 strong. There were also additional security troops.[47]

The command of the Turkish Army was formed on July 1, 1949, and Nuri Yamut was appointed as the first commander of the Turkish Army.[3] After Turkey joined NATO, U.S. M24 Chaffee light tanks (238)[48] and M47 Patton medium tanks began arriving.

Korean War

[edit]

The Turkish Army participated in the Korean War as a member state of the United Nations. Of the 5,000 soldiers of the Turkish Brigade there, 731 were killed. They fought in the Battle of Wawon where it was credited with saving the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division from encirclement.[49] The brigade also fought at Gimnyangjang-ni, 'Operation Ripper,' or the Fourth Battle of Seoul, and the Battle of the Hook.

"By 1960, with the military already deeply involved in political affairs because of the government's use of martial law to enforce its policies, the senior command concluded that the government had departed from Kemalist principles and that the republic was in imminent danger of disintegration. On May 27, 1960, Turkish army units, under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, Cemal Gürsel, seized the principal government buildings and communications centers and arrested President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and most of the DP representatives in the Grand National Assembly, as well as a large number of other public officials. Those arrested were charged with abrogating the constitution and instituting a dictatorship. The coup was accomplished with little violence and was accepted quickly throughout the country."[50]

The Turkish Land Forces became deeply involved in Counter-Guerrilla covert preparation for resistance. Counter-Gurrilla was the Turkish component of the US/NATO "Operation Gladio" covert preparations against any Soviet/Warsaw Pact occupation of Western Europe. During the 1970s, the Special Warfare Department was run by General Kemal Yamak. In his memoirs he stated that the United States had set aside around $1m worth of support; part munitions, part money. This arrangement continued until 1973–1974, when Yamak decided the munitions did not meet the department's needs. Yamak wrote the Americans said that the U.S. were footing the bill, and therefore could choose the munitions. Yamak left the meeting and expressed his concerns to the Chief of General Staff, Semih Sancar, and the agreement was subsequently annulled.[51][52]

Turkish invasion of Cyprus

[edit]
Main article: Turkish invasion of Cyprus

In July 1974, Turkey landed substantial forces suddenly in Cyprus. The invasion followed a coup organized by EOKA-B and led by Nikos Sampson who ousted the democratically elected Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III in order to establish Enosis (Union) between Cyprus and Greece. The coup was backed by the Greek military junta in Athens.

The 1974 Turkish military operations in Cyprus can be divided into two distinct Turkish offensives, the first being "Atilla 1", which commenced in the early hours of 20 July 1974, with an amphibious landing force, directed by the 6th Corps, forming a beachhead at Kyrenia's Five Mile Beach. It comprised only infantry troops, but was supported by rolling air and naval artillery attacks, and met with limited resistance from the Cyprus National Guard, which was in disarray as a result of the 15 July 1974 coup. The majority of fighting ceased on 23 July, though sporadic clashes continued after this date until 14 August.[53] "Atilla 1" successfully achieved its objective of forming a bridgehead with the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Agyrta-Nicosia.[54]

The second Turkish offensive began on August 14, 1974, as Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met in Geneva to discuss the situation on the island. Though a United Nations ceasefire was in place (several had already been disregarded),[54] the Turkish Army, massively reinforced from weeks of build-up, launched an all-out surprise attack on ill-prepared Greek Cypriot and Greek units. With little answer to the masses of armour, mechanised units, artillery, and air support that the Turks could bring to bear, virtually all Greek Cypriot defences collapsed in a matter of days, and by August 16, 1974, Turkish forces, spearheaded by the 28th and 39th Infantry Divisions, had extended to capture some 37% of the island, including the towns of Famagusta, Varosha and Morphou.[55]

The conflict in Cyprus resulted in the de facto division of the island between the Turkish Cypriot controlled north and the Greek Cypriot controlled south. Turkey still maintains troops in Cyprus, since a political solution could not yet be achieved and since many members of the Turkish Cypriot community fear a return to the intercommunal violence which occurred between 1963 and 1974.[56]

Historical units and structure

[edit]
Selimiye Barracks (1828) in Istanbul is the headquarters of the First Army of the Turkish Land Forces.

The modern Turkish Army has its foundations in nine remnant Ottoman Army corps[note 2] after the Armistice of Mudros at the end of World War I. After the rise of Turkish resistances, Kâzım Pasha's XV Corps was the only corps which at that time had any combat value.[57]

The Turkish Army has since the mid-1960s operated on a corps-division-brigade system, with a varying number of divisions and brigades assigned to a corps. The IISS Military Balance 1966–67 recorded a total strength of 360,000, with 16 infantry divisions (14 NATO assigned), 4 armoured brigades (Zırhlı tugay) with M47 Patton tanks, armoured cavalry regiments, and two parachute battalions.[58] It appears that infantry training divisions included the 57th in Manisa, which Kemalettin Eken [tr] commanded between the years 1965 to 1967. At some point in the 1960s the Army apparently utilised the Pentomic structure for a period, before adopting the American ROAD divisional organisation.[59] Back in the early 1970s, there was a 6th Infantry Division based at Istanbul.[60]

The U.S. Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey, written by Thomas Roberts, said in late 1968 that the army had 425,000 men (p. 385), three field armies (First: Istanbul, Second: Konya, Third: Erzurum), thirteen infantry divisions, one armoured division (with M-47s and M-48s), four armoured brigades (M47 Patton tanks), two armoured cavalry regiment, two mechanised infantry brigades, and two parachute battalions.[61] There was a trained reserve of 450,000.

In 1971, the Army with the other branches of the Armed Forces imposed the military memorandum to change the civilian government's policies.

According to official British military reports in 1974, the Turkish Army included the First Army (2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 15th Corps), Second Army (4th, 6th, and 7th) and Third Army (8th, 9th and 11th Corps). There were also three Interior Zones with three recruit training divisions and four recruit training brigades.[59] For a long period, these formations were grouped under the NATO headquarters Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) in İzmir, led by a Turkish Army four-star General.

In mid-1982, the Army had two mechanised infantry divisions, and fourteen Infantry Divisions, six armoured brigades, and four mechanised brigades, with 3,000 M48 MBTs, 500 M47 MBTs, as well as 50 Leopard 1A3s, plus another 20 on order, for a total of 3550 main battle tanks.[62] There were another 100 M26 Pershing heavy tanks.

Until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the Army had a static defense mission of countering any possible attack on Thrace by Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces and deterring Greece, and any attack by the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District on the Caucasus frontier. The Third Army was responsible for holding the Caucasus line with about a third of the Army's total strength of one armoured, two mechanised, and fourteen infantry divisions (1986 data).[63] Soviet forces immediately facing the Third Army in the Caucasus were the 31st Army Corps in the Georgian SSR and the 7th Guards Army in the Armenian SSR. Together the 31st Corps and 7th Guards Army had six divisions (roughly three Category "B" and three "C")[64] plus some immobile fortified defence areas.

Nigel Thomas's NATO Armies 1949–87, published in 1988, attributed the 2nd, 3rd Corps, 5th, and 15th Corps to the First Army; the 6th and 7th Corps to the Second Army, the 4th, 8th, and 9th Corps to the Third Army, and the 11th Corps to the Aegean Army. He wrote that the 11th Corps comprised the 28th and 39th Divisions.[65]

"During 1992 the army introduced a sweeping reorganization, shifting from a predominantly divisional and regimental structure to one based on corps and brigades. The personnel strength of the army was reduced in 1994 to about 393,000 (including about 345,000 conscripts)."[66] When the General Staff attempted to shift 120,000 troops to the frontier with Iraq in 1990, they discovered that there were serious deficiencies in the Army's ability to respond to crises that could erupt suddenly in distant regions.[66]

After the fall of the Soviet Union, LANDSOUTHEAST in İzmir became Joint Command Southeast for a period;[67] it became Allied Air Component Command Izmir in 2004.[68] The headquarters' land-focused roots were revived in the 2010s when NATO's two air commands were reduced into one (at Ramstein, Germany) and Allied Land Command was established at the site.

Lieutenant General Zafer Özkan, the last commander of the 15th Corps in Izmit, retired after serving for two years in August 2005.[69] At that time, the corps was converted to the level of a division.

The TLF has seen frequent recent combat within Turkey and beyond its borders. It is fighting a conflict in south-eastern Turkey against the prolonged Kurdish PKK insurgency, and monitoring ISIS, Russian intervention in Syria, the Kurdish YPG, as well as multiple other elements, in Syria. The TLF took responsibility for Kabul from the British soon after the beginning of the International Security Assistance Force deployments in 2002–2003. It continued to command Regional Command Capital in Kabul for a long period.

Updating equipment

[edit]
See also: List of equipment of the Turkish Land Forces
TAI/AgustaWestland T129 ATAK
TAI T929 ATAK 2
Altay MBT
Otokar Tulpar IFV
Otokar Cobra II
BMC Kirpi MRAP

Towards the end of the 1980s, a restructuring and modernization process has been initiated by the Turkish Armed Forces, which still continues today. The final goal of Turkey is to produce indigenous military equipment and to become increasingly self-sufficient in terms of military technologies.[70]

The then-Army Commander, Gen. Büyükanıt, said of further modernization efforts in 2006:

The Land Forces aim at being equipped with new opportunities and capabilities in order to carry out its duty in full strength against a large variety of threats, varying from classical threats to asymmetrical ones.

The targets for our land forces are to be realized through 'Forces 2014' project. This project aims to shrink the forces without undermining its combat capabilities. On the contrary, under the plan, the efficiency of the force will increase.

Within this period of time, the Land Forces will gradually decrease by 20 to 30 percent in terms of the number of personnel and forces formations. It will be equipped with modern arms and war devices as the distinct features of this new formation. Thus the battle capability will be given to high-ranking brigades. Moreover, with the Combat Zone Management System, the land tactical map will be numerically formed in real-time or close to real-time and a constant tracking will be provided.

— Büyükanıt (The New Anatolian, Evren Değer, 10 August 2006)[71]

At present, the primary main battle tanks of the Turkish Army are the Leopard 2A4 and the M60T. There are also around 400 Leopard 1 and 750 M60 Patton variants in service (excluding the M60T which were upgraded with the 120 mm MG253 guns), but the Turkish Army retains a large number of older vehicles. More than 2,800 M48 Pattons are still in service (upgraded with the 105 mm M68 guns) though only around 1,300 of these are stored as reserve MBTs.[72] The rest of the M48s are mostly transformed into other types of military vehicles (such as cranes, MBT recovery vehicles and logistical support vehicles) or used as spare parts resources.

Turkey plans to build a total of 1,000 new Otokar Altay MBTs, in four separate batches of 250 units, with the MİTÜP Turkish National Tank Project.[73] The tanks will be produced by the Turkish firm Otokar, and share some of the systems that are used in the K2 Black Panther main battle tank of South Korea.

Turkey has signed an agreement with the US to buy fourteen CH-47F Chinook helicopters, for $400 million. Because of financial constraints, however, the Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry, or SSM, Turkey's procurement agency, later wanted to only buy six CH-47Fs, five for the Army and one for the Special Forces, leaving a decision on the remaining eight platforms for the future. Contract negotiations between the SSM, the U.S. government and Boeing were launched in July 2011.[74]

The length of compulsory military service is six months for private and non-commissioned soldiers (the service term for reserve officers chosen among university or college graduates is 12 months). All male Turkish citizens over the age of 20 are required to undergo a one-month military training period, but they can obtain an exemption from the remaining five months of their mandatory service with a paid exemption option.[75]

Turkey has chosen a Chinese defence firm to co-produce a US$4 billion long-range air and missile defence system FD-2000, rejecting rival bids from Russian, US and European firms. The Turkish defence minister announced the decision to award the contract to China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp (CPMIEC) in a statement on Thursday, September 26, 2013.[76][77] NATO has said that missiles should be compatible.[78]

In 2017, Turkey has bought the anti-aircraft S-400 missile system from Russia.[79]

Structure

[edit]

The structure of the Turkish Army has historically had two facets: operational and administrative. The operational chain consists of the field fighting formations, and the administrative the arms and service branches – infantry, armour, artillery etc.

Operational organisation

[edit]

The army's 14 armoured brigades were the most powerful brigades after the reorganization of the early 1990s; each includes 2 armoured, 2 mechanised infantry and 2 self-propelled artillery battalions.[80] In late 1994, the 17 mechanised brigades each have 1 armoured, 2 mechanised and one artillery battalion. The army's nine infantry brigades each had 4 infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, while the 4 commando brigades had 3 commando battalions.

From 1992 the Army began to change from a corps-division-regiment structure to a corps-brigade arrangement, retaining only three divisions.[80] Divisions remained on Cyprus and for certain special other cases, such as for NATO's reaction forces. In accordance with NATO's new strategy in the early 1990s, Turkey agreed to commit forces to NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Therefore, the decision was made to create a new division. The old 1 Inf Div which had been abolished many years ago was reactivated and renamed as 1 TU Mech Inf Div and attached to 4 TU Corps on 30 November 1993.[81] This division appears to have been replaced within 3rd Corps by the 52nd Armoured Division, formed later on.

The Military Balance, 1994–1995 also lists the following units: the Presidential Guard Regiment, an infantry regiment, 5 border defense regiments (Brigades (?)), and 26 border defense battalions. The fate of these independent units under the reorganization remains unclear.

In late 2002, the 3rd Corps, with its headquarters near Istanbul, was certified as one of the six NATO High Readiness Force-Land (HRF-L) headquarters and gained the additional title of the Rapidly Deployable Turkish Corps (RDTC). A year later, Jane's Defence Weekly reported on 9 July 2003 that as part of force restructuring, its 4 existing armies would be reorganized into a Western Army, in Istanbul, and the Eastern Army would replace 2nd Army in Malatya.[82] This plan does not appear to have been carried out.

The Army announced plans in mid-2004 to abolish four brigades across Turkey.[83] The arms and equipment of the brigades closed were to be kept in depots. The plan involved the disbandment of:

  • The 33rd Mechanized Brigade in Kırklareli on the north-west border
  • The 7th Mechanized Brigade in Kars/Kağızman near the eastern border with Armenia
  • The 10th Infantry Brigade in Van/Erciş on the eastern border with Iran
  • The 9th Armoured Brigade in Çankırı in central Anatolia

The IISS Military Balance 2008 listed the Turkish Land Forces with four Army headquarters (HQ), 10 corps HQ, 17 armoured brigades, 15 mechanised infantry brigades, two infantry divisions, 11 infantry brigades, one Special Force command HQ, five commando brigades, one combat helicopter battalion, four aviation regiments, three aviation battalions (totalling 1 transport and 2 training battalions), and 4 training/artillery brigades.[72]

By 2022 the force included four army HQs, nine corps HQs, eight commando brigades, one mountain commando brigade, one commando regiment, one armoured division, seven armoured brigades, two mechanised divisions, 14 mechanised brigades, one motorised infantry division with three motorised regiments, seven motorised infantry brigades, two artillery, one training artillery brigades, six artillery regiments, two engineer regiments, four aviation regiments, and four aviation battalions.[84]

List of formations and units

[edit]
See also: List of formations of the Turkish Army 2008
Turkish Land Forces is located in Turkey
2 (1)
2 (1)
3 (1)
3 (1)
5 (1)
5 (1)
6 (2)
6 (2)
7 (2)
7 (2)
8 (2)
8 (2)
4 (3)
4 (3)
9 (3)
9 (3)
Aegean Army
class=notpageimage|
Turkish Army corps locations (2008)
Key: 2 (1) – 2nd Corps, 1st Army

A basic organigram on the official Turkish Land Forces (Turkish: Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı (KKK)) website shows the First, Second, Third, and Aegean Armies, the 4th Corps, the force in Northern Cyprus, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Logistics Command as directly subordinated to the Chief of the Land Forces.

Honorary guards at Anıtkabir

The Turkish Army is organised into the following commands:[85]

Administrative branches

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List of commanders

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Main article: List of commanders of the Turkish Land Forces

Equipment

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Main article: List of equipment of the Turkish Land Forces

The Ottoman and Turkish Armies (TLF) have used a wide range of equipment and vehicles in the 20th and 21st centuries. Among them was the venerable and reliable Vickers machine gun, introduced after World War I.[90]

Insignia and ranks

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Main article: Military ranks of Turkey
See also: Ranks and insignia of NATO

Turkish Land Forces has NATO-compatible rank system.

Officers 1-10 (OF 1-10)
NATO code OF-10 OF-9 OF-8 OF-7 OF-6 OF-5 OF-4 OF-3 OF-2 OF-1
 Turkish Land Forces[91]
Mareşal Orgeneral Korgeneral Tümgeneral Tuğgeneral Albay Yarbay Binbaşı Yüzbaşı Üsteğmen Teğmen Asteğmen
Other Ranks 1-9 (OR 1-9)
NATO code OR-9 OR-8 OR-7 OR-6 OR-5 OR-4 OR-3 OR-2 OR-1
 Turkish Land Forces[91]
 No insignia
Astsubay kıdemli başçavuş Astsubay başçavuş Astsubay kıdemli üstçavuş Astsubay üstçavuş Astsubay kıdemli çavuş Astsubay çavuş Astsubay astçavuş Uzman çavuş Çavuş Uzman onbaşı Onbaşı Er
  • Non-Turkish speakers might like to know that OF3, OF2, and OR2 literally translates as "Head of 1000", "Head of 100", and "Head of 10", respectively.
[edit]
  • KFOR patrol
    KFOR patrol
  • A Turkish scout scales Mt. Ljuboten during a Best Mountain Warrior Competition in 2021
    A Turkish scout scales Mt. Ljuboten during a Best Mountain Warrior Competition in 2021
  • British and Turkish soldiers train during the Steadfast Defender 2024 NATO exercise
    British and Turkish soldiers train during the Steadfast Defender 2024 NATO exercise
  • A Spanish soldier shows his armory to Turkish troops at a static display of equipment during the Steadfast Defender 2021 NATO exercise
    A Spanish soldier shows his armory to Turkish troops at a static display of equipment during the Steadfast Defender 2021 NATO exercise
  • A Turkish soldier with KFOR's Regional Command-East
    A Turkish soldier with KFOR's Regional Command-East

Footnotes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Turkish Land Forces

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from Grokipedia
The Turkish Land Forces (Türk Kara Kuvvetleri) is the primary land warfare branch of the Turkish Armed Forces, tasked with defending the Republic of Turkey's territorial integrity, deterring aggression, and conducting ground operations to protect national interests as mandated by the constitution and relevant legislation. Established in its modern form in 1949, its historical roots trace to ancient Turkic military traditions dating to 209 BC under Mete Han, evolving through Ottoman janissary corps and into the republican era army that played pivotal roles in the Turkish War of Independence and subsequent NATO-aligned defenses. Comprising the largest component of Turkey's military, the Land Forces maintain approximately 350,000 active personnel, supported by conscription and professional units, organized into four field armies (First, Second, Third, and Aegean) headquartered across strategic regions for rapid response to threats from , , and the Aegean. Equipment includes over 3,000 main battle tanks (primarily variants and indigenous Altay prototypes), thousands of armored vehicles, and artillery systems, with ongoing modernization emphasizing domestic production to reduce foreign dependency. The force structure prioritizes mechanized infantry, special operations, and border security brigades, enabling sustained counterinsurgency and expeditionary capabilities. Notable for effective cross-border operations against PKK militants in Iraq and Syria—eliminating thousands of insurgents since the —the Forces have demonstrated resilience in engagements like (2016) and (2018), securing buffer zones while integrating drone-supported tactics. However, the branch faced profound restructuring following the July 2016 coup attempt, which involved elements of the and prompted dismissals of over 29,000 personnel, including 81% of top officers, on grounds of suspected Gülenist affiliations, severely disrupting command chains but ultimately enabling purges of perceived internal threats and a subsequent buildup of loyalist forces that sustained operational tempo. This episode underscores the army's dual role in national security and domestic politics, with post-purge recruitment focusing on ideological alignment alongside combat proficiency.

History

Establishment and Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923)

Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in and the on , 1918, Allied forces occupied key territories, including and Smyrna (Izmir), prompting the emergence of local resistance groups known as , or National Forces. These irregular militias, composed of demobilized Ottoman soldiers, civilians, and volunteers, formed spontaneously to counter invasions, particularly the Greek landing at Smyrna on May 15, 1919. Lacking centralized command and formal structure, the relied on guerrilla tactics against superior Allied-backed armies, achieving initial successes in delaying advances but proving insufficient for sustained conventional warfare. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, leveraging his military reputation from Gallipoli, initiated organized resistance upon landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, under pretext of suppressing unrest but aiming to rally nationalist elements. He convened the Erzurum Congress on July 23, 1919, which resolved to establish a unified national army and reject the partition outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920). The subsequent Sivas Congress in September 1919 expanded this framework, coordinating regional forces and laying groundwork for a sovereign government. These efforts culminated in the opening of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara on April 23, 1920, which assumed supreme military authority, declared itself the legitimate government, and began conscription to bolster defenses. The transition to a regular occurred progressively from mid-1920, as the GNA integrated units into disciplined formations under officers, with the process accelerating after the Battle of Inönü in 1921 demonstrated the need for structured forces. By 1920, the nascent Turkish numbered approximately 86,000 personnel, equipped with salvaged Ottoman weaponry and Soviet , defensive victories that preserved Anatolian heartlands. This reorganization addressed the irregulars' limitations, such as poor and indiscipline, fostering a cohesive capable of offensive operations, including the of August 1922 that expelled Greek armies from Anatolia. The Turkish land forces' during this period was marked by pragmatic , drawing on Ottoman remnants while rejecting Sultanate loyalty amid its with occupiers. Key figures like İsmet Pasha and Fevzi Çakmak coordinated corps-level commands, with the army expanding to over by through mandatory service and volunteer influxes. The war concluded with the on , and the on , securing independence and formalizing the Republic's territorial integrity, thus solidifying the land forces as the core of the new state's defense apparatus.

Interwar Period and World War II (1923–1945)

Following the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, the Turkish Land Forces underwent reorganization into three army inspectorates comprising nine corps, alongside infantry and cavalry divisions, utilizing renovated equipment confiscated from the War of Independence era. Military factories were established in Ankara for repairs and production, enabling domestic supply of essentials within 16 years, while a Department of Science and Art monitored foreign technological advancements. The first tank unit was formed in Lüleburgaz in 1934, marking initial mechanization efforts, and the Military Academy relocated to Ankara in 1936 to centralize officer training. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leadership, the Land Forces maintained a defensive posture, bolstered by increasing armament expenditures and strategic infrastructure like railways, positioning the army as the strongest in the Balkans and Western Asia. Turkey pursued regional pacts, including the Balkan Entente of 1934 and the Saadabad Pact of 1937, which emphasized collective security without direct military commitments, aligning with a policy of neutrality and internal consolidation over expansion. The army's peacetime structure of 10 corps focused on border defense, with limited modernization constrained by economic priorities and post-war recovery. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Turkey adopted strict neutrality, avoiding belligerency despite pressures from Axis and Allied powers, and expanded the Land Forces by increasing peacetime corps to 15 to prepare for potential expeditionary roles. Reinforcements targeted western Anatolia and eastern borders, incorporating parachute units, enhanced communications, engineer formations, armored brigades, survey regiments, heavy machine gun companies, additional artillery batteries, and transportation assets, while mobilizing reserves across all branches. This buildup, coupled with a non-aggression treaty with Germany in June 1941, hedged against invasion risks without committing to combat. Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945, fulfilling nominal requirements for United Nations membership, but the Land Forces saw no active deployment, preserving manpower and resources amid wartime shortages. Neutrality ensured strategic autonomy, with the army's defensive orientation deterring aggression from neighboring combatants, though equipment remained largely outdated, relying on refurbished Ottoman-era stocks supplemented by limited imports.

Cold War Era and International Engagements (1945–1990)

Following World War II, shifted from neutrality toward alignment with the West amid Soviet demands for territorial concessions and basing rights in prompting the to provide $400 million in economic and under the announced on 1947. This assistance supported the modernization of the Turkish armed forces, including the land forces, which maintained a large conscript-based structure emphasizing infantry and cavalry units to deter regional threats. By 1948, the Turkish Army comprised three field armies, 13 corps, 35 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and six armored brigades, reflecting its emphasis on mass mobilization over advanced mechanization at the outset of the . Turkey's commitment to anti-communist efforts was demonstrated by its dispatch of the 1st Turkish Brigade to the Korean War, with over 5,000 troops arriving in Pusan on October 17, 1950, as part of United Nations forces under the 25th Infantry Division. A total of approximately 15,000 Turkish soldiers served in Korea between 1950 and 1953, suffering 721 killed and over 2,000 wounded in battles such as Wawon and the Ch'ongch'on River, where the brigade's bayonet charges earned praise from U.S. commanders for halting Chinese advances. This contribution, motivated by strategic alignment with the West, directly facilitated Turkey's accession to NATO on February 18, 1952, positioning its land forces as a critical component of the alliance's southeastern flank against potential Warsaw Pact incursions. As a NATO member, the Turkish Land Forces underwent reorganization and enhancement through U.S.-led programs like the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), established in the early 1950s, which introduced American doctrine, training, and equipment such as M47 Patton tanks to transition from a manpower-heavy force to one capable of mechanized operations. By the 1960s, the army had grown into NATO's second-largest ground force, with ongoing U.S. military aid—averaging among the highest globally—sustaining its readiness for conventional warfare scenarios, though domestic political instability and the 1964 Johnson Letter strained relations. Participation in NATO exercises reinforced interoperability, focusing on defending Thrace and eastern Anatolia from Soviet or Bulgarian threats, while the forces maintained a defensive posture amid Greek-Turkish tensions. The most significant international engagement occurred during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, when Turkish Land Forces executed Operation Yıldırım (Atilla II in Western nomenclature) in response to the Greek junta-backed coup against President Makarios on July 15. In the initial phase on July 20, approximately 6,000 paratroopers and marines from the 6th Infantry Division, supported by amphibious landings near Kyrenia, secured a bridgehead against Greek Cypriot National Guard resistance, capturing about 3% of the island before a UN ceasefire on July 22. The second offensive, launched August 14 after the collapse of Geneva talks, involved 40,000 troops from multiple divisions, including armored units with M47 tanks, advancing southward to partition the island and control 36-37% of its territory by August 18, with Turkish casualties estimated at 500-600 killed. This operation, justified by Turkey as enforcing the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, led to a U.S. arms embargo from 1975 to 1978, which hampered further mechanization but underscored the land forces' capability for rapid projection and combined arms maneuvers. Throughout the 1980s, the army focused on internal stability post-1980 coup while sustaining NATO commitments, though procurement shifted toward self-reliance amid embargo effects.

Post-Cold War Conflicts and Insurgencies (1990–2015)

The Turkish Land Forces focused predominantly on counter-insurgency operations against the (PKK), a Marxist-Leninist separatist group that launched an armed campaign in southeastern starting in but escalated significantly in the 1990s with increased attacks on and civilians. Throughout the period, the Land Forces conducted extensive domestic operations to secure rural and urban areas, involving infantry sweeps, village relocations for tactical denial of PKK sanctuary, and fortified border deployments, resulting in heavy casualties on amid terrain challenges and guerrilla tactics. By the mid-1990s, these efforts had neutralized numerous PKK networks within Turkey, though the group's persistence required sustained high troop commitments, with estimates of over soldiers rotated annually in the southeast. Cross-border incursions into northern Iraq formed a core component of the Land Forces' strategy to dismantle PKK rear bases in the Qandil Mountains and other border sanctuaries, peaking in the 1990s with 42 documented operations authorized by Ankara. Operation Steel (Çelik Harekâtı), launched on March 20, 1995, exemplified this approach, deploying approximately 35,000 troops—primarily mechanized infantry and special forces—across the border until May 4, targeting up to 50 PKK camps and destroying infrastructure while minimizing civilian involvement through coordinated air and artillery support. Subsequent operations, such as those in 1997 (Operation Hammer), extended penetration depths to 100 kilometers, establishing temporary security zones and compelling PKK withdrawals, though logistical strains and Iraqi government protests limited durations to weeks. These raids disrupted PKK logistics and recruitment, contributing to a tactical decline by the late 1990s, particularly after the February 15, 1999, capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya by Turkish intelligence and special operations units, which fragmented command structures. In the 2000s, Forces operations shifted toward selective raids and intelligence-driven strikes amid intermittent PKK ceasefires, including a 1999-2004 lull and a 2013 truce, but resumed intensity after 2004 attacks and fully escalated by 2011 with ground pursuits into using rapid-reaction brigades equipped with armored By 2007-2008, operations like Güneş involved thousands of troops in hot neutralizing key PKK figures and supply lines, though persisted, with PKK ambushes causing disproportionate losses relative to conventional sizes. The period saw over 6,000 Turkish security personnel killed in total PKK-related fighting since 1984, underscoring the insurgency's toll on Land Forces manpower and doctrine evolution toward village protection teams and border walls. International engagements were secondary, with Land Forces contingents—infantry battalions totaling around 1,000 personnel—deployed to Somalia (UNOSOM II, 1993), Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR from 1995), and Kosovo (KFOR from 1999) for stabilization amid ethnic insurgencies, providing reconnaissance and quick-reaction forces without major combat. During the 1991 Gulf War, Land Forces massed divisions along the Iraqi border to counter potential Saddam Hussein incursions but avoided offensive actions, focusing on defensive postures amid coalition air operations from Incirlik base.

Contemporary Operations (2015–present)

The Turkish Land Forces intensified counter-insurgency efforts against the (PKK) following the of a in 2015, engaging in urban operations in southeastern Turkey, including sieges in cities such as Sur, , and during 2015–2016. These operations involved and clearing PKK barricades and improvised devices, resulting in the neutralization of over 1,000 PKK militants according to Turkish reports, though independent estimates from the indicate at least 1,501 Turkish personnel killed nationwide since 2015, including 1,065 soldiers. The Land Forces employed armored like ACV-15s and M60 tanks for urban assault, prioritizing the restoration of state control in Kurdish-majority areas amid accusations of excessive force from human rights groups, which Turkish authorities attributed to PKK tactics embedding fighters in civilian zones. Cross-border operations in northern Iraq expanded with the Claw series starting in May 2019, targeting PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains and Hakurk regions to disrupt logistics and command structures. Operation involved ground incursions supported by artillery and drones, establishing permanent military outposts; subsequent phases like (June 2020) and (April 2022–present) extended into Zap, Metina, and Avasin-Basyan areas, with Turkish reports claiming over 1,400 PKK militants neutralized by late 2022. Land Forces units, including commando brigades, conducted raids on caves and storage sites, reducing PKK cross-border attacks into Turkey by shifting the conflict's focus to Iraqi territory, though PKK sources contested casualty figures and alleged civilian impacts. In Syria, the Land Forces led Euphrates Shield from August 24, 2016, to March 29, 2017, coordinating with Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army factions to seize 2,015 square kilometers along the border from Islamic State forces, clearing 98 kilometers of frontier and destroying hundreds of mines and IEDs. Supported by Leopard 2A4 tanks and artillery, the operation inflicted heavy losses on ISIS—estimated at 3,000 fighters killed per Turkish accounts—while sustaining 68 Turkish soldier fatalities. This was followed by Olive Branch (January 20–March 24, 2018) in Afrin against PKK-affiliated YPG militias, capturing the district with mechanized assaults claiming 4,596 YPG neutralized and 54 Turkish deaths; Peace Spring (October 9–November 17, 2019) then secured a 120-kilometer-deep, 30-kilometer-wide buffer zone east of the Euphrates, employing MLRS rocket systems and infantry to counter YPG defenses. Spring Shield in February–March 2020 responded to Syrian regime advances in Idlib, using Bayraktar TB2 drones alongside ground forces to destroy over 100 Syrian armored vehicles, demonstrating integrated Land Forces capabilities in defensive-offensive maneuvers. Ongoing patrols in these zones, totaling over 8,000 square kilometers under Turkish control by 2025, aim to prevent a contiguous PKK-YPG entity along the border, with cumulative Turkish claims of 16,000+ terrorists eliminated across Syrian operations since 2016. Domestically, Land Forces units played a pivotal role in thwarting the coup attempt by securing key installations against renegade elements, minimizing broader In non-combat roles, the forces deployed over personnel for relief following the earthquakes, conducting search-and-rescue with units and distributing across affected regions. These operations reflect a emphasizing counter-terrorism, and rapid with the Land Forces adapting to hybrid threats through drone integration and emphasis.

Organization and Structure

Operational Formations and Units

The Turkish Land Forces maintain a hierarchical operational structure centered on four field armies, each headquartered in a strategic location and responsible for regional defense, border security, and rapid response capabilities. These armies oversee nine corps, which command the primary tactical formations consisting predominantly of brigades rather than divisions, reflecting a post-Cold War shift toward flexible, brigade-centric organization optimized for both conventional warfare and asymmetric threats such as insurgencies along the Syrian and Iraqi borders. As of assessments around 2016, the force includes approximately 11 armored and mechanized brigades, 11 motorized infantry brigades, five commando brigades, and specialized units like one airborne brigade and one amphibious marine brigade, with artillery, aviation, and engineering elements integrated at corps or army level. The 1st , based in , covers northwestern Turkey including the Thrace region and European borders, emphasizing deterrence against western neighbors; it directs the 1st (), 3rd (), and 5th (Çorlu), which include formations such as the 1st Armored (Babaeski), 54th (), and 2nd Armored (). The 2nd , headquartered in , focuses on southeastern and cross-border operations, commanding the 7th (Diyarbakır), 9th (Çınar), and 19th () with units like the 3rd Armored (Akçakale) and various mechanized and infantry brigades suited for rugged The 3rd in secures the northeastern frontiers, overseeing the 8th () and elements oriented toward mountainous operations against potential incursions. The Aegean Army, established in 1975 and located in Izmir, prioritizes the western coastal and Aegean regions, particularly contingencies involving Greek islands and maritime flanks; it incorporates the 4th Corps (Izmir) and specialized units including commando and infantry brigades for amphibious and rapid deployment roles. Independent operational units augment these armies, including the Command (Gölbaşı) with two special forces brigades for high-value targeting and counter-terrorism, as well as five independent commando brigades distributed across corps for Training and support formations, such as brigades and the Presidential Guard Regiment, provide operational depth without direct field army subordination. This brigade-heavy model, numbering over 40 maneuver brigades in total, enables decentralized command and adaptability, though it has drawn scrutiny for vulnerabilities in sustained high-intensity conflicts due to reliance on older equipment in some units.

Administrative Branches and Support

The administrative and support apparatus of the Turkish Land Forces comprises dedicated commands under the Land Forces Command headquarters in Ankara, focused on sustainment, training, and doctrinal evolution rather than direct combat operations. These entities facilitate the integration of service branches such as logistics, engineering, signals, and medical support into the broader force structure, ensuring operational readiness through centralized management. Central to this framework is the Land Forces Logistics Command (Kara Kuvvetleri Lojistik Komutanlığı), established on an executive basis in to coordinate essential support functions including vehicle and equipment maintenance, ammunition distribution, and transportation across all units. Headquartered in Ankara's Yenikent district, it operates through subordinate directorates and regional depots, such as munitions commands handling storage and issuance, thereby sustained field operations amid Turkey's diverse terrains and ongoing deployments. This command's formation addressed post-Cold War needs for efficient reducing redundancies in decentralized Complementing logistics is the Land Forces Training and Doctrine Command (Eğitim ve Doktrin Komutanlığı, EDOK), originally founded as the Training Command in and redesignated in to incorporate doctrinal responsibilities. Based in , it oversees the professional development of personnel through specialized schools and training brigades, including infantry, artillery, and non-commissioned officer programs, while formulating tactical and strategic guidelines adapted to Turkey's security challenges like counter-insurgency and defense. EDOK's includes facilities for basic and advanced instruction, emphasizing integration of modern technologies and NATO interoperability standards. Specialized support branches operate within these commands or as directorates, providing technical expertise: engineering units manage infrastructure, bridging, and fortification projects; signals branches handle communications networks and electronic warfare support; and medical services deliver field hospitals, evacuation, and preventive care aligned with force health protection doctrines. Air defense, separated as an independent branch via Law No. 4185, falls under artillery oversight but contributes to rear-area . These elements collectively underpin the Land Forces' capacity for prolonged engagements, with ongoing reforms prioritizing indigenous supply chains and digital logistics systems.

Personnel, Training, and Manpower

The Turkish Land Forces comprise approximately 355,000 active personnel, the majority of the Turkish Armed Forces' total active strength of around 425,000 as of 2024, supplemented by roughly 380,000 reserves capable of mobilization. These figures reflect a professional core augmented by conscripts, with the army maintaining NATO's second-largest ground force after the United States. Manpower draws primarily from Turkey's male population aged 20-41, where compulsory service ensures a steady influx, though recent reforms have emphasized shorter terms to balance economic demands with defense needs. Conscription mandates service for all able-bodied Turkish males starting at age 20, typically lasting 6 to 12 months, including an initial one-month basic training phase focused on weapons handling, discipline, and unit integration. A 2019 law revision reduced the standard term to six months for most, with an option for one-month basic training followed by a paid exemption fee granting discharge papers equivalent to full service, aimed at easing burdens on younger workers while retaining potential. Exemptions apply to those with physical or mental disabilities, sole family providers, or extended overseas residency, where a three-week abbreviated program suffices. This system yields an annual cohort of tens of thousands of conscripts, integrated into infantry, armor, and support roles, though retention of skilled personnel remains challenged by post-service emigration and civilian opportunities. Officer commissioning occurs through the Turkish Military Academy (Kara Harp Okulu) in Ankara, a four-year institution blending academic curricula in engineering, military science, and leadership with rigorous physical and tactical training to produce lieutenants for army service. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) undergo specialized programs at dedicated schools, emphasizing technical skills and small-unit leadership, while advanced staff training at the Turkish War Academies prepares senior ranks for operational planning. Recent purges and academy reforms post-2016 coup attempt have shifted officer demographics, with over 76% now graduates of restructured military high schools emphasizing loyalty and ideological alignment, potentially impacting institutional experience amid reported shortages in specialized staff roles—such as only 63 of 199 active generals holding staff qualifications as of 2024. Joint exercises with NATO allies and domestic counter-insurgency drills further hone capabilities, prioritizing adaptability in asymmetric threats.

Military Doctrine and Capabilities

Core Doctrine and Strategic Priorities

The core doctrine of the Turkish Land Forces centers on a defensive posture aimed at safeguarding national and unity against external threats, with an emphasis on deterrence through superior readiness and rapid response capabilities. This approach integrates principles with interoperability standards, prioritizing mass mobilization, armored and operations to counter potential invasions or incursions, particularly along contested borders with and While traditionally reactive, the doctrine has evolved to incorporate pre-emptive elements, allowing for proactive neutralization of imminent dangers, as evidenced by cross-border operations to disrupt terrorist safe havens. Strategic priorities reflect Turkey's geopolitical position, focusing foremost on border security and counter-insurgency to combat groups like the PKK and its affiliates, which have conducted attacks resulting in over 40,000 deaths since 1984. The Land Forces allocate significant resources to asymmetric warfare tactics, including village protection operations, intelligence-driven raids, and fortified frontier defenses along the 911-kilometer Syrian and 384-kilometer Iraqi borders, where spillover from conflicts has enabled terrorist infiltration. Concurrently, priorities encompass alliance commitments, such as contributing to 's southeastern flank defense through exercises like Anatolian Eagle and deployments in missions like Resolute Support in Afghanistan, where Turkish ground units provided training and security until 2021. In the 2020s, strategic emphasis has shifted toward enhancing expeditionary capabilities and hybrid threat mitigation, driven by operations in Syria—such as (2016–2017), (2018), and (2019)—which secured over 8,000 square kilometers and displaced ISIS and YPG forces. This includes integrating unmanned systems with ground maneuvers for real-time intelligence and fire support, alongside domestic production to reduce foreign dependency, as outlined in the Defense Industry Presidency's 2019–2023 plan aiming for 70% localization in key systems. Overall, these priorities balance internal stability against PKK threats with external deterrence, informed by Turkey's assessment of regional instability rather than unverified alliance narratives.

Counter-Insurgency and Asymmetric Warfare Focus

The Turkish Land Forces have prioritized counter-insurgency (COIN) and doctrines since the onset of the (PKK) in 1984, adapting from orientations to address guerrilla tactics, hit-and-run attacks, and cross-border sanctuaries in and Syria. This shift emphasizes proactive elimination of threats at their source, integrating special operations, area control, and technological enablers to counter non-state actors employing for ambushes and denial. Central to this focus is the "field domination doctrine," formalized in 1991 following a 1993 reorganization, which transitioned from static garrisons to dynamic "clear and hold" operations using commando brigades and special forces for persistent rural penetration and control in southeastern Turkey's mountainous regions. Tactics include mobile warfare units, intelligence-driven raids, and environmental denial measures—such as controlled forest burns to eliminate PKK cover and mobility—which contributed to depopulating 75% of Tunceli province's countryside by 2000 and destroying approximately 60,000 hectares of terrain to disrupt insurgent sustainment. The doctrine expanded troop deployments from 185,000 to 360,000 personnel by 1995, prioritizing frontier special forces to interdict PKK movements and base areas. The Special Forces Command (Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı, ÖKK), established in , forms the of asymmetric operations, cross-border incursions into northern —such as those in the —to dismantle PKK camps and nodes, often at the invitation of Iraqi authorities. ÖKK units employ frontier observation, direct action, and combined arms with regular Land Forces, leveraging helicopters for rapid insertion in rugged terrain to counter PKK's evasion tactics. This integration has evolved into phased operational designs, as seen in post-2016 campaigns like Operations Euphrates Shield (2016–2017) against ISIS and PKK affiliates, Olive Branch (2018), and Claw series (2019–present) in , which neutralize safe havens through unmanned aerial systems for , precision strikes, and minimal protocols. Doctrinal effectiveness is evident in tactical gains, including impeded PKK territorial control and neutralization of hundreds of militants in Syrian and Iraqi operations, alongside dispersal of insurgent capacities via border securing from Hakkari to Hatay provinces. However, while military measures have militarily degraded PKK infrastructure—evidenced by reduced cross-border incursions post-1999—the persistence of urban attacks and failure to fully eradicate support networks highlight limitations in addressing socio-political drivers, sustaining a conflict that claimed over 40,000 lives by 2025. Recent adaptations incorporate drone swarms and armored mobility for hybrid threats, reflecting a pragmatic strategic culture that balances NATO interoperability with unilateral self-defense under UN Charter Article 51.

Equipment and Modernization

Small Arms and Infantry Systems

The Turkish Land Forces have prioritized indigenous production in their small arms inventory as part of broader military modernization efforts, replacing legacy foreign designs with domestically developed systems. The MPT-76, a 7.62×51mm NATO battle rifle produced by Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi (MKE) and licensees such as Sarsılmaz, serves as the primary service rifle, designed to supplant the Heckler & Koch G3 after rigorous testing across 42 international standards. Over 70,000 MPT-76 rifles have been delivered to Turkish forces, emphasizing reliability in diverse operational environments including counter-insurgency operations. Complementing the MPT-76, the MPT-55 variant chambered in 5.56×45mm NATO provides a lighter option for specialized units such as commandos, facilitating greater ammunition capacity and reduced weight for prolonged engagements. Additional carbines like the Kale KCR556 support close-quarters roles within infantry formations. Machine guns include the domestically modernized MMT, an upgraded PKM design in 7.62×51mm for squad automatic fire, valued for its lightweight construction and maneuverability relative to alternatives like the MG3. Heavy machine guns such as the Sarsılmaz SAR 762 MT, a 12.7mm system with a 1,200-meter effective range, enhance vehicular and fixed-position firepower. Sidearms consist primarily of 9mm pistols from local manufacturers, with Sarsılmaz SAR9 models adopted for general issue and special operations due to their high-capacity magazines and ergonomic design meeting NATO specifications. Canik METE series pistols, striker-fired and polymer-framed, have entered service across branches, including land forces equivalents, prioritizing modularity and short-recoil reliability. Sniper systems feature the Bora-12 in 12.7mm for gendarmerie counter-terrorism, extending precision engagement ranges beyond standard infantry rifles. These procurements reflect a strategic shift toward self-sufficiency, with contracts signed in 2024 to phase out select foreign weapons in favor of Turkish equivalents, bolstering logistical independence amid ongoing regional threats.

Armored Vehicles and Main Battle Tanks

The Turkish Land Forces operate a main battle tank (MBT) fleet exceeding 3,000 units, predominantly comprising upgraded Cold War-era platforms alongside a small number of modern Leopard 2A4 tanks acquired from Germany. The inventory includes approximately 350 Leopard 2A4 MBTs, which form the most capable element of the fleet, equipped with advanced fire control and armor upgrades. The majority consists of M60 series tanks, such as the M60T Sabra variants upgraded with Israeli assistance to feature 120mm guns, reactive armor, and improved electronics, numbering over 1,000 units. Older M60A1 and A3 models persist in service, though many undergo local modernization programs to extend operational life. Indigenous efforts center on the Altay MBT, developed by Otokar and produced by BMC, featuring a 120mm smoothbore gun, composite armor, and active protection systems like Aselsan's AKKOR. Mass production commenced on September 5, 2025, with the first three Altay T1 tanks scheduled for delivery to the Land Forces on October 28, 2025. Plans envision an initial batch of 250 units, scaling to 1,000 total, powered initially by imported engines before transitioning to domestic BATU units. Modernization of existing Leopard 2A4s includes integration of the AKKOR active protection system, tested successfully in 2025, to counter anti-tank threats. Beyond MBTs, the Land Forces employ a range of fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and MRAPs for mechanized operations. The ACV-15 family, produced by FNSS, serves as the primary IFV and APC, with over 1,000 units in service following capability enhancement programs initiated in 2023 that include upgraded sensors and Otokar Cobra II 4x4 ordered in 2016 for $120.8 million, provide light armored mobility with anti-tank variants entering BMC's Kirpi MRAPs and Otokar Tulpar IFVs represent ongoing domestic production, with the latter in testing for future tracked mechanized forces. The overall armored vehicle count surpasses 9,000, emphasizing protected mobility for counter-insurgency and conventional roles.

Artillery, Engineering, and Support Equipment

The Turkish Land Forces maintain a mix of self-propelled, towed, and rocket artillery systems to provide fire support in conventional and asymmetric operations. The primary self-propelled howitzer is the T-155 Fırtına, a 155 mm/52-caliber system derived from the South Korean K9 Thunder, locally produced by Turkish firms including Otokar and Roketsan. It features a maximum range of 40 km with standard ammunition, an automatic loader enabling up to eight rounds per minute in bursts, and mobility via a 1,000 hp MTU diesel engine allowing speeds of 66 km/h. The upgraded Fırtına II variant incorporates enhanced automation and extended range capabilities. Complementing this are legacy systems like the American M52 and M44 155 mm howitzers, contributing to a total self-propelled artillery inventory approaching 1,100 units across types. Towed artillery includes over 500 M114 155 mm howitzers, which provide support with a range of approximately 14.6 km using standard rounds, though they are being supplemented by modern indigenous designs such as the T-155 Panter 155 mm/52-caliber howitzer for improved range and mobility. Heavier fire support is available via M115 203 mm howitzers for long-range bombardment. Multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) form a key long-range strike element, with the T-300 Kasırga (also known as TRG-300 Tiger) delivering 300 mm guided rockets up to 120 km, mounted on a MAN 6x6 chassis for rapid deployment against high-value targets like artillery positions or command nodes. The smaller T-122 Sakarya 122 mm MLRS offers shorter-range saturation fire comparable to systems like the Soviet BM-21 Grad. Engineering equipment supports mobility and obstacle clearance, including the SYHK Amphibious Assault Bridge system delivered to the Land Forces' Corps of Engineers for rapid river crossings and amphibious operations. Mine countermeasures feature the YENER detection deployed in exercises for identifying and neutralizing unexploded ordnance and improvised devices. Additional assets include bulldozers, excavators, and armored engineer derived from and M48 for breaching and tasks. Support equipment emphasizes logistics and sustainment, with the DERMAN armored providing protected for and recovery operations across rough BMC produces tactical wheeled vehicles and trucks under programs like DROPS for handling and enhancement, bolstering the army's operational in extended campaigns. These systems align with Turkey's push for domestic production to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers.

Ongoing Modernization Initiatives

The Turkish Land Forces are advancing indigenous production of the Altay main battle tank (MBT), with serial production commencing on September 5, 2025, at BMC's facility in Ankara. This third-generation MBT features a 120mm smoothbore gun, advanced composite armor, and a new indigenous powerpack to address prior engine supply issues, enabling enhanced mobility and firepower. Initial deliveries include three units in 2025, scaling to 11 in 2026 and 41 in 2027, as part of an initial order for 250 tanks, with long-term plans for up to 1,000 to modernize the fleet amid regional threats. Parallel upgrades target legacy M60 series tanks through ASELSAN's FIRAT-M60T and TİYK-M60T programs, localizing fire control systems like VOLKAN-M, integrating command-information systems, and enhancing armor and survivability. First modernized M60T tanks were delivered in early 2024, with ongoing work to upgrade approximately 170 M60TM variants, proven effective in cross-border operations against insurgent forces. These efforts prioritize cost-effective extensions of existing inventory while transitioning to domestic platforms. Infantry fighting vehicle modernization includes Otokar's , a tracked platform designed to support Altay operations with modular turrets (e.g., 25mm unmanned or 120mm configurations) for troop transport and fire support. The Land Forces require up to 2,962 new light armored vehicles, with variants undergoing firing tests and export evaluations signaling domestic procurement potential exceeding 200 units. Complementing this, FNSS initiated production of PARS ALPHA 8x8 and 6x6 wheeled vehicles in February 2025, introducing next-generation modularity for reconnaissance and combat roles into the inventory for the first time. In 2025, the of Defense Industries (SSB) contracted BMC and FNSS for a , focusing on advanced armored platforms to further localize production and integrate emerging technologies like AI-assisted systems and exoskeletons for enhanced soldier capabilities. These initiatives, part of over 200 SSB projects, aim for strategic autonomy by reducing foreign dependencies, with 2025 goals including at least three Altay deliveries amid a defense budget emphasizing self-reliance driven by past embargoes and asymmetric threats.

Major Operations and Engagements

International Deployments and Alliances

The Turkish Land Forces, as part of Turkey's commitments as a founding member of since 1952, have participated extensively in Alliance-led operations, emphasizing defense and in and beyond. Turkey's ground forces have contributed personnel to missions in the , including the (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina starting in 1995, as well as the (KFOR), where Turkish units maintain for communities amid ethnic tensions. In September 2025, a Turkish Land Forces unit completed its rotation in KFOR, with Turkey assuming command of the mission on October 3 for a one-year term, deploying specialized infantry and support elements to deter instability. Beyond NATO, the Turkish Land Forces have supported operations in from 2002 onward, providing non-combat logistical units, reconstruction teams, and training for over 1,900 Afghan National Army personnel, while contributing €1.5 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund and $2 million to helicopter initiatives. In , Turkish ground elements have focused on capacity-building, including training programs for local security forces against insurgent threats, aligned with broader counter-terrorism partnerships. The forces also engage in , contributing military observers, police, and troops to seven active missions as of recent reports, such as the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the and the , totaling hundreds of personnel in stabilization roles. Bilateral and regional partnerships supplement these multilateral efforts, with the Turkish Land Forces conducting exercises and exchanges, such as intensified programs with units in 2024 to enhance . Recent agreements ratified in 2025 with , , and facilitate defense pacts, including rotations and maneuvers in the to counterbalance regional rivalries. High-level engagements, like the November 2024 visit by Turkish Land Forces staff to U.S. and headquarters in , underscore ongoing transatlantic ties for shared . These deployments reflect Turkey's strategic emphasis on expeditionary capabilities, though participation remains selective, prioritizing missions that align with interests over expansive global commitments.

Domestic and Cross-Border Counter-Terrorism Operations

The Turkish Land Forces have engaged in sustained domestic counter-terrorism operations against the , a designated terrorist organization responsible for attacks on military personnel and civilians since its insurgency began in 1984. Following the of peace negotiations in 2015, the Land Forces shifted to intensive urban and rural clearance missions in southeastern provinces such as , , and Hakkari, employing , units, and armored vehicles to dismantle PKK barricades and tunnels in urban centers like Sur and . These operations, often conducted under and involving coordinated assaults with police and , neutralized hundreds of PKK fighters in the initial urban phase from late 2015 to mid-2016, though they resulted in substantial infrastructure damage and civilian evacuations exceeding 300,000 people across affected districts. By 2017, fighting transitioned to rural ambushes and mountain pursuits, with the Land Forces establishing permanent bases and conducting patrols to prevent PKK regrouping, contributing to over 4,800 confirmed PKK militant deaths nationwide from July 2015 onward as verified by independent monitoring. Cross-border operations into northern target PKK rear bases in regions like the and Hakurk, where the group maintains and facilities beyond Turkey's reach domestically. The Forces spearheaded ground incursions during Operation Claw, launched on May 27, 2019, deploying brigades alongside air and support to seize and destroy caves used by PKK fighters, resulting in at least 96 PKK personnel killed or captured in the initial phase. Subsequent phases, including Claw-2 (July 2019), Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger (June 2020), and Claw-Lock (April 2022), involved sustained ground presence with advances into Duhok and governorates, neutralizing over 1,200 PKK militants by late 2022 through direct engagements and cave clearances, despite losses such as six soldiers killed in August 2023 clashes. These efforts, supported by parliamentary mandates renewed through October 2028, aimed to degrade PKK operational capacity, with Turkish forces maintaining dozens of outposts for ongoing surveillance and raids. In Syria, Forces operations focus on countering PKK-affiliated groups like the YPG, viewed by as extensions enabling cross-border attacks. (August 2016–March 2017) marked the first major ground incursion, with Forces units crossing into northern Aleppo province, utilizing tanks, artillery, and teams to support Syrian proxies in capturing over 2,000 square kilometers, including Jarablus and while eliminating ISIS and YPG threats along the border. Follow-on missions, such as – 2018) in Afrin and (October–November 2019) east of the involved mechanized infantry assaults and raids to secure a 30-kilometer-deep buffer zone, displacing YPG fighters and preventing a contiguous "terror corridor" linked to PKK sanctuaries in Iraq. These ground-heavy campaigns, integrated with air support, have sustained Turkish control over approximately 8,000 square kilometers in northern Syria as of 2025, with Forces rotations ensuring border security amid ongoing YPG incursions. The PKK's announced dissolution of its armed struggle on May 12, 2025, followed intensified cross-border pressure, though Turkish operations continue to verify clearance of residual threats.

Controversies and Criticisms

Human Rights Allegations in Conflict Zones

Turkish Land Forces operations against the PKK) and affiliated groups in southeastern Turkey from to involved urban in Kurdish-majority cities such as , Sur, and , where allegations emerged of excessive leading to deaths. A report documented over fatalities from Turkish security forces' actions, including indiscriminate shelling and the destruction of residential areas during curfews imposed to dismantle PKK urban strongholds. The Turkish government maintained that these measures targeted PKK militants embedding in civilian infrastructure, with military statements emphasizing precision to minimize collateral damage, though independent verification of casualty figures remains contested due to restricted access for observers. In cross-border operations in northern Iraq, such as Operation Claw-Lightning launched in June 2019 and Claw-Lock in April 2022, Turkish ground incursions and artillery strikes against PKK bases have been accused of causing civilian displacement and injuries. Reports indicate over 1,500 civilians evacuated from 22 villages near the border, with at least four non-combatants wounded by shelling, prompting local Kurdish authorities to decry the operations as disproportionate. Turkish defense officials countered that intelligence-driven raids neutralized dozens of PKK fighters while avoiding populated areas, dismissing broader casualty claims as PKK propaganda and citing the recovery of abducted Turkish civilians from militant hideouts during Claw operations. The PKK, designated a terrorist organization by , the , and the , has itself been documented abducting civilians in the region, complicating attribution of all harms to Turkish forces. Operations in northern Syria, including , , and , targeted remnants and PKK-linked , but drew allegations of war crimes such as indiscriminate and support for proxy militias committing abuses. reported potential violations by Turkish forces and allied groups, including arbitrary detentions and shelling that killed civilians in Afrin and , with Turkey bearing for over 100 documented cases of mistreatment in occupied territories as of 2024. Turkish authorities rejected these findings, asserting that operations liberated areas from terrorist control and prevented PKK cross-border attacks, with military briefings highlighting the neutralization of thousands of militants and denial of any intentional civilian targeting. Investigations into specific incidents, such as the 2018 mutilation of a female corpse in Afrin attributed to proxies rather than Turkish troops, underscore challenges in delineating responsibility amid alliances with non-state actors. Across these zones, nongovernmental organizations like and have highlighted patterns of , including inadequate probes into claims, though their reports often rely on accounts from affected communities with potential sympathies toward Kurdish militants. assessments note credible reports of force but also PKK-initiated , such as ambushes and bombings that have killed of personnel and civilians since 2015. judicial reviews of operations have resulted in few convictions of personnel, attributed by officials to rigorous , while critics argue this reflects systemic underreporting.

Political Influence and Internal Military Dynamics

The Turkish Land Forces, historically a pillar of the Turkish Armed Forces' political autonomy, exerted significant influence over civilian governments as self-appointed guardians of secular Kemalism, intervening through coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and a 1997 memorandum that ousted an Islamist-led coalition. This role stemmed from the military's foundational ties to the Republic's establishment, positioning it as a veto player against perceived threats to Atatürk's principles, though such interventions often prioritized institutional privileges over democratic stability. Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments since 2002, however, this influence eroded through legal actions like the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials (2007–2013), which convicted hundreds of officers on charges of plotting against the government, effectively dismantling Kemalist factions within the officer corps. The failed coup on , attributed to a within the linked to the Gülen movement, marked a decisive shift toward dominance, particularly over the Forces, which mobilized tanks and troops in and during the operation. In response, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan oversaw extensive purges: approximately 81% of top military officers, including 1,524 of 1,886 staff officers across the armed forces, were dismissed or prosecuted, with the Land Forces—comprising the bulk of personnel—bearing the heaviest losses, such as the removal of key army commanders and over 40% of its generals. These measures, enacted via decree-laws under a state of emergency until 2018, restructured command chains by subordinating the General Staff to the civilian Defense Ministry and introducing loyalty oaths, fundamentally altering internal dynamics from merit-based advancement to ideological alignment with the executive. Post-2016 reforms have entrenched political oversight, with promotions in the Forces increasingly predicated on demonstrated to Erdoğan rather than operational expertise, as evidenced by 2025 evaluations where ideological superseded battlefield records. This "coup-proofing" has suppressed factionalism—previously divided along secularist-Islamist lines—but critics argue it has politicized the force, prioritizing regime over and fostering a homogenized officer less independent from AKP directives. While enhancing short-term stability against internal threats, such dynamics have raised concerns about long-term , with reports indicating persistent vacancies in senior Forces roles filled by less experienced loyalists.

Recent Developments

Technological and Industrial Advancements

The Turkish Land Forces have pursued indigenous production of armored vehicles to enhance self-reliance amid historical procurement challenges. Mass production of the Altay main battle tank (MBT), developed by BMC, commenced in September 2025 following resolution of engine supply issues through domestic alternatives. The initial batch includes three Altay T1 variants for delivery to the army by late 2025, with production scaling to 11 units in 2026, 41 in 2027, and 30 in 2028, totaling 85 tanks by 2028. Equipped with a 120mm smoothbore gun, advanced fire control systems, and composite armor, the Altay aims to replace aging M60 models while meeting NATO standards. Advancements in wheeled and tracked armored platforms emphasize modularity and survivability. Otokar’s Cobra II 4x4 vehicle features enhanced protection against mines and ambushes, integrated with remote weapon stations for urban operations. BMC’s Kirpi MRAP has seen upgrades for hybrid propulsion, while FNSS develops counter-drone systems and hybrid technologies for tracked vehicles like the PARS III, improving mobility and reducing logistical dependencies. These platforms incorporate ASELSAN electronics for electro-optical sensors and fire control, enabling networked warfare capabilities. Roketsan and ASELSAN contribute through precision-guided munitions and turret systems tailored for land forces modernization. ’s MZK armored turret, deployed on upgraded M60A3 tanks since 2023, supports 105mm guns with stabilized optics for enhanced accuracy. ASELSAN’s 2025 investments, including a $1.5 billion Oğulbey Technology Base, expand production of land-based systems like radar-integrated air defense and AI-driven targeting modules. At IDEF 2025, ASELSAN unveiled the Göktan ground-based precision strike system, bolstering artillery integration with Turkish forces. These developments reflect a strategic pivot toward domestic R&D, with exports validating technological maturity despite initial delays from foreign dependencies.

Structural and Leadership Reforms

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the Turkish Land Forces implemented sweeping structural reforms to consolidate authority over the and remove suspected sympathizers of the Gülen movement. decree-laws issued in the aftermath led to the dismissal of approximately 1,500 officers from the Land Forces alone, part of broader purges affecting over 8,000 personnel across the , significantly altering the and reducing the number of high-ranking generals from 357 to around 200 by 2018. These measures, enacted under a until July 2018, restructured unit commands by reassigning loyal officers and disbanding units deemed compromised, while subordinating education and more directly to the Ministry of National Defense. A pivotal institutional change was the establishment of the National Defense University (Milli Savunma Üniversitesi) in 2017 via Law No. 6850, which merged the separate Land Forces academies—such as the —with those of the other services under a unified framework led by a civilian president appointed by the government. This reform aimed to standardize officer training, emphasize ideological alignment with state policies, and reduce the military's autonomy in education, replacing the prior system of four-year preparatory schools followed by branch-specific academies. Concurrently, the General Staff's role was diminished relative to the Defense Ministry, with Land Forces operations increasingly integrated into presidential oversight mechanisms established after the 2017 constitutional referendum. Leadership reforms intensified with the 2018 shift to a presidential system, empowering the President as chair of the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, or YAŞ) to directly influence promotions, retirements, and appointments in the Land Forces. In June 2025, Law No. 7538 granted the President unilateral authority to modify time-in-rank requirements for advancements, previously fixed by statute (e.g., minimum three years as brigadier general for major general), enabling accelerated or delayed promotions to address personnel shortages. By July 2025, further legislation allowed extensions of the retirement age for top commanders from 67 to 72 years, applied selectively to retain experienced leaders amid a reported crisis in mid-level staff officers, where promotions have increasingly drawn from older cohorts due to post-2016 attrition. Critics, including independent analysts, argue these changes prioritize political reliability over merit, as evidenced by YAŞ decisions favoring officers with records of loyalty during domestic operations, though government officials maintain they enhance operational readiness. In August 2025, the YAŞ meeting under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan triggered a major reshuffle in the Forces and broader command: General Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, former Forces since 2023, was elevated to , succeeding General Metin Gürak after his abbreviated two-year term; Bayraktaroğlu's appointment reflects a of promoting Forces leaders to top posts, with five of the last seven Chiefs originating from commands. Within the Forces, Generals Bahtiyar Ersay ( ) and Rafet Dalkıran were promoted to full generals, filling vacancies in key regional commands amid ongoing counter-terrorism demands. These adjustments, occurring annually in August, have stabilized the structure post-purges but coincided with reports of over 20% vacancies in colonel-level positions as of mid-2025, prompting reliance on temporary assignments and contract personnel.

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