Hubbry Logo
Virginius AffairVirginius AffairMain
Open search
Virginius Affair
Community hub
Virginius Affair
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Virginius Affair
Virginius Affair
Virginius Affair
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Virginius Affair
The "Virginius", with portraits of General Bernabé Varona and General William A.C. Ryan, executed by the Spanish Governor at Santiago de Cuba. The Graphic, 1873.
DateOctober 30 – November 8, 1873 (1873-10-30 – 1873-11-08)
LocationSantiago de Cuba
Participants
  • United States
  • United Kingdom
  • Spain
OutcomePeace negotiation
Deaths53

The Virginius Affair was a diplomatic dispute that played out between October 1873 and February 1875 between the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. Virginius was a fast American ship that had been hired by Cuban insurrectionists to land men and munitions in Cuba during the Ten Years' War, the first of three late-19th century uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba. The ship was captured by the Spanish, who wanted to try the men onboard (many of whom were American and British citizens) as pirates and execute them. The Spanish executed 53 men in Santiago de Cuba, but stopped when the British government intervened.

Through the first month of the affair there was agitation for war in both the United States and Spain, but as more was learned tensions faded on both sides, and the threat of war had largely evaporated by the end of December. However, it took more than a year after that for the final details to be settled, largely because of the ineffectiveness of the original American envoy to Spain, Daniel Sickles, and two turnovers of the Spanish government. In the end the Spanish government compensated British families for the deaths of British citizens, and subsequently newly appointed US consul Caleb Cushing ended the episode by negotiating for reparations to be paid to the families of the remainder of the executed men, American or otherwise. The settlement of the issue through diplomacy represented a major achievement for US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish.

Ten Years' War

[edit]

After the American Civil War, the island country of Cuba under Spanish rule was one of the few Western Hemisphere countries where slavery remained legal and was widely practiced.[1] On October 10, 1868, an uprising by Cuban landowners that became known as the Ten Years' War began, with Carlos Manuel de Céspedes claiming the title of President of Cuba in Arms..[2] The Spanish, led initially by the Captain-General of Cuba, Francisco de Lersundi y Hormaechea, used the military to try to suppress the rebellion.[3] In 1870, American Secretary of State Hamilton Fish persuaded President Grant not to recognize Cuban belligerency, and the United States maintained an unstable peace with Spain.[4]

As the Cuban war continued, international support for the insurgency began to arise, with war bonds being sold in the US to support the rebellion.[5] One of the Cubans' American supporters was John F. Patterson, who, in 1870, bought a former Confederate blockade runner, the Virgin, that was laid up at the Washington Navy Yard, and renamed her Virginius.[6] The legality of Patterson's purchase of Virginius would later come to national and international attention.[7] The Cuban rebellion ended in an 1878 armistice after Spanish general Arsenio Martínez-Campos pardoned all Cuban rebels.[8]

Virginius

[edit]

Virginius was a small, high-speed side-wheel steamer built to serve as a blockade runner, operating between Havana and Mobile, Alabama, for the Confederacy during the Civil War.[9][10] Originally built as Virgin by Aitken & Mansel of Whiteinch, Glasgow in 1864, she became a prize of the United States when captured on April 12, 1865.[9] In August 1870, Virginius was purchased by an American, John F. Patterson, acting secretly as an agent for Cuban insurgent Manuel de Quesada and two US citizens, Marshall O. Roberts and J.K. Roberts.[9] The ship was originally captained by Francis Sheppherd. Both Patterson and Shepphard immediately registered the ship in the New York Custom House, having paid $2,000 to be bonded. However, no sureties were listed.[11] Patterson took a required oath attesting that he was the sole owner of Virginius. The secret purpose of purchasing Virginius was to transport men, munitions, and supplies to aid the Cuban rebellion. She operated in this role for three years under the protection of US naval ships, including USS Kansas and USS Canandaigua.[10] The Spanish said that it was an outlaw ship and aggressively sought to capture it.[10][11]

Capture, trial, and executions

[edit]
Joseph Fry, captain of Virginius, whom Spain executed for bringing arms to Cuban rebels
Captain Fry takes leave of his companions

Captain Joseph Fry was made the new captain of Virginius in October 1873.[12] Fry had served in the US Navy for 15 years before joining the Confederacy during the Civil War. Fry rose to the rank of Commodore in the Confederate Navy. With the war's end in 1865, Fry found himself underemployed. He took charge of Virginius while she was moored at Kingston, Jamaica. By this time she was badly in need of repair, with boilers that were breaking down.[13] As most of the previous crew had deserted, Fry recruited a new crew of 52 American and British men, many of them inexperienced (three being under 13 years of age[12]) and not aware that Virginius was supporting the Cuban rebellion. The ship took on 103 native Cuban soldiers who had arrived on a steamer from New York. The US Consul at Kingston, Thomas H. Pearne, had warned Fry that he would be shot if captured. However, Fry did not believe the Spanish would shoot a blockade runner.[14] In mid-October, Captain Fry, accompanied by his four most prominent passengers, Pedro de Céspedes (brother of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes), Bernabé Varona, Jesús del Sol, and William A.C. Ryan, took Virginius to Haiti and loaded the ship with munitions.[15] On October 30, Virginius sailed to Comito to pick up more weapons and then, on the same day, started toward Cuba. The Spanish had been warned when Virginius left Jamaica and sent out the warship Tornado to capture the vessel.[12]

On October 30, 1873 Tornado spotted Virginius on open water 6 miles (9.7 km) from Cuba and gave chase. Virginius was heavily weighted, and the stress from the boilers caused the ship to take on water, significantly slowing any progress.[16] As the chase continued, Tornado, a fast warship, fired on Virginius several times, damaging the top deck. Captain Fry surrendered Virginius, knowing that, with his ship's overworked boilers and leaking hull, he could not outrun Tornado on the open sea. The Spanish quickly boarded and secured the ship, taking the crew and its passengers prisoner and sailing the ship to Santiago de Cuba.[17]

Depiction of the execution[18]

The Spanish immediately ordered all aboard to be put on trial as pirates.[19] The entire Virginius crew, both American and British citizens, as well as the Cuban insurgents, were found guilty by a court martial and were sentenced to death. The Spanish ignored the protest of the US vice-consul, who attempted to give American citizens legal aid. On November 4, 1873, the four insurgent leaders aboard were executed by firing squad without trial, having already been condemned as a pirates. After the executions, the British vice-consul at Santiago, concerned by the fact that one of the individuals killed, George Washington Ryan, claimed British citizenship, wired Jamaica to ask for aid from the Royal Navy to stop further executions.[20] Hearing news of the ship's capture and the executions, Altamont de Cordova, a Jamaican resident, was able to get British Commodore A.F.R. de Horsey to send the sloop HMS Niobe under Sir Lambton Loraine, 11th Baronet to Santiago to stop further executions.[21] On November 7, an additional 37 men, including Captain Fry, were executed by firing squad.[22] The executioners' aim was said to have been bad, so they finished the job in a grisly fashion, decapitating them and trampling their bodies with horses. On November 8, twelve more crew members were executed; but at this point the USS Wyoming, under the command of Civil War Naval hero William Cushing, and HMS Niobe both reached Santiago.[23] The carnage stopped on the same day, as Cushing (and possibly the British Captain Lorraine) warned local commander Juan N. Burriel that he would bombard Santiago if there were any more executions, leaving the final death toll at 53. In an interview that Burriel requested with Sir Lambton Lorraine, he attempted to shake hands with the English captain, who stood straight and exclaimed, "I will not shake hands with a butcher".

African Chain-gang moving the bodies to the mule carts[18]

US public reaction

[edit]

The initial press reaction to the capture of Virginius was muted, but as news of executions poured into the nation, certain newspapers became aggressive in promoting war, or at least formal recognition of Cuban belligerency.[24] The New York Times opined that if the executions of Americans from Virginius were illegal, war needed to be declared.[25] The New York Tribune asserted that actions of Burriel and the Cuban Volunteers necessitated "the death knell of Spanish power in America."[25] The New York Herald demanded Secretary Hamilton Fish's resignation and the recognition by the US of Cuban belligerency.[25] The National Republican, believing that war with Spain was imminent, encouraged the sale of Cuban bonds.[26] The American public considered the executions to be a national insult and rallied for intervention. Protest rallies took place across the nation in New Orleans, St. Louis, and Georgia, encouraging intervention in Cuba and vengeance against Spain.[27]

The British Minister to the United States, Sir Edward Thornton, believed the American public was ready for war with Spain.[28] A large rally in New York's Steinway Hall on November 17, 1873, led by future Secretary of State William Evarts, took a moderate position, and the meeting adopted a resolution that war would be necessary, yet regrettable, if Spain chose to "consider our defense against savage butchery as a cause of war...."[29]

US diplomatic response

[edit]

Hamilton Fish and State Department

[edit]
Hamilton Fish, US Secretary of State

On Wednesday, November 5, 1873, the US Consul-General in Havana, Henry C. Hall, informed the US State Department that Virginius had been captured.[30] Secretary of State Hamilton Fish believed the Virginius was just another ship captured aiding the Cuban rebellion; no one in the American administration was yet aware of the first four executions[30] However, with Cuba heading the agenda of the November 7 meeting of the American cabinet, news came in during the meeting of the deaths of Ryan and the three Cubans.[31] The Cabinet agreed that the executions would be "regarded as an inhuman act not in accordance with the spirit of the civilization of the nineteenth century."[32] On November 8, Fish met with Spanish minister Don José Polo de Bernabé and discussed the legality of the capture of Virginius.[33]

On November 11, Grant's Cabinet decided that war with Spain was not desirable, but intervention in the rebellion on the side of Cuba remained possible.[34] On November 12, five days after the event, Fish received the devastating news that 37 additional men had been executed.[35] Fish ordered US Minister to Spain Daniel Sickles to protest the executions and demand reparations for any persons considered US citizens who were killed.[35] On November 13, Fish formally protested to Polo and stated that the US had a free hand on Cuba because of the Virginius Affair.[35] On November 14, Grant's cabinet agreed that if US reparation demands were not met, the Spanish legation would be closed. That day a report came into the White House that more crew members had been shot, but it turned out that "only" twelve additional people had been executed.[36] On November 15, Polo visited Fish and stated that Virginius was a pirate ship and that her crew had been a hostile threat to Cuba.[37] Fish, although doubtful that the ship really represented US territory because of questions about its ownership, was determined to stand up for the nation's honor by demanding reparations from Spain.[38]

On the same day, a cable was sent to Sickles by Fish, ordering the envoy to demand the return of Virginius to the US, the release of all survivors into American custody, a salute from Spain to the US flag, punishment for the perpetrators, and reparations for families.[39]

Emilio Castelar, President of Spain

Negotiations in Spain between Sickles and Minister of State José de Carvajal became heated, and progress towards a settlement became unlikely.[40] The Spanish press, as belligerent as its American counterparts, openly attacked Sickles, the US, and Britain, hoping to precipitate war between the three countries.[41] While the Sickles-Carvajal negotiations were breaking down, President Emilio Castelar decided to bypass this channel and allow Fish and Polo, in Washington, to take the lead in settling the dispute.[42] On Thanksgiving Day, November 27, Polo proposed to Fish that Spain would give up the Virginius and the remaining crew if the US would investigate the legal status of its ownership.[43] Both Fish and Grant agreed to Polo's suggestion, and that the Spanish salute to the US flag could be dispensed with if Virginius was found not to have legal US private citizen ownership.[43] On November 28, Polo and Fish met at the State Department and signed a formal agreement that required the return of Virginius and crew, an investigation by both governments of the legal ownership of Virginius, and any crimes committed by the Spanish Volunteers.[44]

The threat of war between the two countries had been averted through negotiations, but the time and place of the surrender of the Virginius and the remaining crew remained undetermined for several days.[45] On December 5, Fish and Polo signed an agreement that Virginius, with the US flag flying, would be turned over to the US Navy on December 16 at the port of Bahía Honda.[46] Sickles, having lost the confidence of Grant and Fish, resigned on December 20, 1873.[47] On January 6, 1874, after advice from Fish on a replacement for Sickles, Grant appointed eminent attorney and Spanish scholar Caleb Cushing as Minister to Spain.[48]

Virginius and crew returned

[edit]
The Surrender of the Virginius in Bahia Honda

On December 16, Virginius, now in complete disrepair and taking on water, was towed out to open sea with the US flag flying to be turned over to the US Navy. US Captain W.D. Whiting on board USS Despatch agreed with Spanish Commander Manuel de la Cámara to turn over Virginius the following day.[49] On December 17, at exactly 9:00 a.m., Virginius was formally turned over to the US Navy without incident.[50] The same day, after an investigation, US Attorney General George H. Williams ruled that the US ownership of Virginius had been fraudulent and that she had no right to fly the US flag; however, Spain had no right to capture Virginius and her crew on the open sea.[51]

At 4:17 a.m., on December 26, while under tow by USS Ossipee, Virginius foundered off Cape Fear[52] en route to the United States.[53] Her 91 remaining crewmen, who had been held as prisoners under harsh conditions, were handed over to Captain D.L. Braine of Juanita and were taken safely to New York City.[54]

Reparations awarded

[edit]
Caleb Cushing, U.S. Consul to Spain

On January 3, 1874, Spanish President Emilio Castelar was voted out of office and replaced by Francisco Serrano.[55] Cushing, who had replaced Sickles as US Consul to Spain, stated that the US had been fortunate that Castelar, a university scholar, had been President of Spain, given that his replacement, Serrano, might have been more apt to go to war over the affair.[56] Cushing's primary duty was to get Spanish reparations for Virginius family victims and punishment of Burriel for the 53 Santiago executions.[57] Cushing met with Serrano in May on June 26, and on July 5 he wrote to Fish that Spain was ready to make reparations.[58] In October, Cushing was informed that President Castelar had secretly negotiated reparations between Spain and Britain that totaled £7,700, but black British citizen families were given less money.[59] On November 7, Grant and Fish demanded $2,500 from Spain for each US citizen shot, regardless of race.[59] On November 28, 1874, Fish instructed Cushing that all Virginius crew members not considered British would, for the purpose of reparations, be considered American.[60]

Spanish Consul Antonio Mantilla, Polo's replacement, agreed with the reparations. Grant's 1875 State of the Union Address announced that reparations were near, quieting anger over the Virginius affair.[60] Payment of reparations, however, was put on hold as Spain changed governments on December 28, from a republic back to a monarchy. Alfonso XII became King of Spain on January 11, 1875.[60]

On January 16, Cushing met with the new Spanish state minister Castro, urged settlement before the US Congress adjourned, and noted that reparations would be a minor matter compared to an all-out war between Spain and the US.[61]

Under an agreement of February 7, 1875, signed on March 5, the Spanish government paid the US an indemnity of $80,000 for the execution of the Americans.[62] Burriel's Santiago executions were acknowledged as illegal by Spain, and President Serrano and King Alfonso condemned him.[63] The case against Burriel was taken up by the Spanish Tribunal of the Navy in June 1876. However, Burriel died on December 24, 1877, before any trial could occur.[64]

In addition to the reparations, a private indemnity was given to Captain Fry's financially troubled family in St. Louis, who had been unable to pay rent and had no permanent place to live.[65]

Aftermath

[edit]

When the Virginius affair first broke out, a Spanish ironclad—the Arapiles—happened to be anchored in New York Harbor for repairs, leading to the uncomfortable realization on the part of the US Navy that it had no ship capable of defeating such a vessel. The weakness of the US Navy was further emphasized by the scandalously poor showing of an American fleet that had been assembled in response to the crisis during maneuvers conducted in Florida waters in February and March of 1874, after the worst of the crisis had passed.[66] US Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson had, since coming into office in 1869, pushed for the construction of at least some up-to-date ships, but had been rebuffed by Congress, and even now, in the wake of the Virginius crisis, monies for new construction were denied. Robeson therefore took it upon himself to order the construction of five new twin-turreted monitors without Congressional approval, paying for them, at first, using money allocated for the refurbishing of numerous ships, and disguising this act by turning five deteriorating Civil War-era monitors--USS Puritan, and four ships of the Miantonomoh class--over to the builders. The new ships were given the same names as the old ones, but were represented to Congress and the public as actually being the old vessels, thoroughly overhauled. As supplemental payment the shipbuilders were allowed to scrap the five old vessels and keep the proceeds from the sale of the scrap metal; later dozens of additional ships that had been deemed beyond repair were also turned over to the shipbuilders for scrapping, as further payment.[67] This duplicitous effort to strengthen the navy did not, in the end, pay off: after Robeson left office in 1877 his successor, upon learning about what Robeson had done, halted construction of the new ships. They were, ultimately, completed, but not until the 1890s, by which time they were thoroughly obsolete. The Virginius war scare had not led to any sort of naval resurgence--no such resurgence would occur for another decade--but the five new ironclads would be completed in time to take part in the Spanish–American War of 1898.

References

[edit]

Sources

[edit]
  • Bradford, Richard H. (1980). The Virginius Affair. Boulder: Colorado Associate University Press. ISBN 0870810804.
  • Soodalter, Ron (2009). "To The Brink In Cuba 1873". Military History. 26 (4): 62–67.
  • Swann, Leonard Alexander (1965). John Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur: the Years as Naval Contractor, 1862–1886. — U.S. Naval Institute. (reprinted: 1980. Ayer Publishing). ISBN 9780405130786.

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Virginius Affair

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Virginius Affair was a diplomatic crisis of in which Spanish authorities captured the filibustering steamer Virginius—flying a fraudulent flag while transporting arms and insurgents to support Cuban rebels against Spanish rule—and executed its captain, Joseph Fry, along with 52 crew members and passengers in , precipitating heightened tensions that brought the and to the brink of . The incident unfolded amid Cuba's (1868–1878), where the Virginius, a former Confederate repurposed for covert operations, was pursued and seized on October 31 by the Spanish warship approximately 23 miles from , after which the prisoners faced summary trials for violating Spanish sovereignty and neutrality laws. The executions, conducted by firing squad at the Santiago slaughterhouse wall between November 4 and 7, targeted individuals of various nationalities, including , Britons, and Cubans, sparking outrage in the United States where public sentiment demanded retaliation and the Grant administration mobilized naval forces, including the USS Tennessee, to enforce demands for the release of the surviving 14 and the vessel itself. pursued vigorous diplomacy, leveraging British mediation—given the execution of British subjects aboard—to pressure , which ultimately complied by surrendering the stripped Virginius in 1873 and releasing the survivors under escort. Resolution came through arbitration and indemnity payments; Spain provided $80,000 to compensate families of the executed in late , with further settlements addressing British claims, averting open conflict but underscoring the fragility of U.S. neutrality enforcement and Spanish colonial vulnerabilities in . The affair highlighted filibustering's role in exacerbating hemispheric instability and foreshadowed greater U.S. interventionism, as domestic pressures for Cuban independence intensified without direct military engagement.

Historical Context

The Ten Years' War in

The Ten Years' War, spanning 1868 to 1878, began on October 10, 1868, with the Grito de Yara, a proclamation of independence by plantation owner in eastern 's Demajagua sugar mill, where he freed his slaves and rallied Creole elites against Spanish colonial authority. The uprising was precipitated by long-standing Creole frustrations with Spain's extractive policies, including exorbitant taxes that burdened sugar exporters, monopolistic trade restrictions limiting commerce to Spanish ports and stifling diversification into other crops, and exclusion from political decision-making despite 's role as Spain's wealthiest colony. These economic pressures were compounded by fears over Spanish parliamentary debates on slavery's abolition, which threatened the labor system underpinning Creole wealth without offering compensatory autonomy or tariff reforms. Insurgents, organized under the Cuban Liberation Army, employed mambí guerrilla tactics—mobile warfare, ambushes, and scorched-earth denial of resources to Spanish forces—concentrated in Oriente province's rugged terrain, while urban unrest sporadically erupted in and other centers. Spanish responses involved deploying over 100,000 troops, implementing brutal countermeasures such as plantation burnings to starve rebels, summary executions, and forced civilian displacements that foreshadowed later reconcentration strategies, resulting in widespread atrocities including mass killings and property destruction. Early negotiation attempts, amid Spain's domestic Gloriosa revolution of 1868, yielded no concessions, prolonging the conflict through failed truces and escalating reprisals. The war's scale was immense, claiming an estimated 200,000 lives—primarily ns and Spaniards from direct combat, disease, and starvation—and inflicting economic ruin on eastern through razed infrastructure and disrupted agriculture, though it ultimately stalled without full due to internal divisions and resource shortages. Its proximity to the , just 90 miles north, stirred American public sympathy for anti-colonial struggle, akin to their own founding war, and incentivized private filibustering ventures—unauthorized expeditions and arms shipments from U.S. ports—that contravened the Neutrality Act of 1818 by aiding insurgents without official sanction. These violations, often tolerated amid lax enforcement, underscored 's strategic allure to U.S. commercial interests eyeing expanded trade and potential annexation, setting precedents for foreign meddling in the island's affairs.

US Neutrality and Filibustering Activities

In response to the outbreak of the Ten Years' War in Cuba on October 10, 1868, President Ulysses S. Grant's administration issued a on August 23, 1869, affirming the ' obligation under to refrain from aiding or abetting either belligerent party in the conflict. This policy, enforced through the Neutrality Act of 1818 and subsequent statutes, prohibited the outfitting of vessels or recruitment of personnel within territory for filibustering expeditions, with violations punishable by fines, imprisonment, or forfeiture of ships as piratical craft. Despite these measures, enforcement proved challenging due to widespread public sympathy for Cuban insurgents and the decentralized nature of private shipping operations along the East Coast and Gulf ports. Filibustering activities persisted as a carryover from mid-19th-century adventurism, exemplified by earlier expeditions like those of in 1850–1851, which sought to annex but ended in failure and executions by Spanish authorities. By the 1860s and 1870s, American entrepreneurs repurposed blockade-running schooners from the Civil War—vessels designed for speed and evasion—to transport arms, ammunition, and volunteers to rebels, often departing from New York, , or Mobile under U.S. registry to claim protection. These operations faced risks of interdiction by Spanish naval patrols, who treated captured filibusters as pirates under international maritime law, leading to trials and hangings; U.S. courts occasionally convicted organizers, as in the 1870 case of The v. Greathouse and Willis, but prosecutions were inconsistent amid regional sentiments favoring independence. Underlying these ventures were economic incentives tied to Cuba's sugar industry, which supplied over 80% of U.S. sugar imports by the late 1860s and involved substantial in plantations and refineries, particularly from Southern investors seeking to expand markets post-Civil War. Anti-Spanish resentment, fueled by memories of harsh colonial policies and the war's disruptions to , encouraged private circumvention of neutrality, with Spanish seizures of suspected vessels—such as multiple incidents in 1869–1872—prompting U.S. diplomatic protests over alleged violations of neutral rights on the high seas but stopping short of escalation. These pre-1873 confrontations established a pattern of tension, where official U.S. restraint clashed with adventurist impulses, testing the limits of neutrality without provoking open conflict.

The Ship Virginius

Origins and Technical Specifications

The SS Virgin, later known as Virginius, was built in , , in specifically as a to supply the Confederacy during the . Constructed as an iron-hulled sidewheel steamer on the Clyde, it incorporated design features optimized for evasion, including a low freeboard of approximately from to deck, which reduced its silhouette against patrols, and propulsion suited for rapid coastal maneuvers. These attributes—high speed potential, shallow operational draft for shallow-water access, and auxiliary sailing capability under schooner-like rigging—enabled it to slip through blockades by prioritizing velocity over heavy armament or cargo volume. Following the Confederate defeat, the vessel was repurposed for peacetime duties, serving as the U.S. revenue cutter Virgin from 1867 to 1870, enforcing customs and navigation laws along American coasts. In 1870, it was acquired in New York by American intermediaries acting for insurgent leaders, including General Manuel Quesada, and renamed Virginius while retaining U.S. registry. This transaction, documented in shipping articles for voyages from U.S. ports, involved nominal ownership under figures like New York merchant William A. Roberts, though its immediate redirection toward filibustering arms shipments to rebels prompted later disputes over the authenticity of its American papers and compliance with U.S. neutrality statutes. Technically, the Virginius measured over 200 feet in length with a displacement of 491 tons, making it agile for blockade-running derivatives like operations. Lightly armed with small defensive cannons and crewed initially by American sailors under contracts for "merchant" service, its sidewheel engines and iron construction allowed speeds estimated at 12-15 knots under favorable conditions, though exact performance varied with load and weather. These specifications, inherited from its wartime origins, facilitated its adaptation for high-risk coastal interdiction without major refits, underscoring the ambiguities in transitioning a former combat vessel to ostensibly civilian roles.

Acquisition and Cuban Operations

In August 1870, William A. Patterson, acting as a nominal owner on behalf of Cuban revolutionary leader General Manuel Quesada and the Cuban junta in New York, purchased the steamer Virgin—a former Confederate —for approximately $16,000, using funds raised from Cuban exiles including Marshall O. Roberts and William Hurlbut. The vessel was overhauled, renamed Virginius, and registered under the American flag with papers obtained through questionable means, including affidavits attesting to its intended use in legitimate trade despite its repurposing for filibustering. This acquisition aligned with broader efforts by Cuban insurgents during the Ten Years' War to procure fast steamers for smuggling arms and expeditionary forces past Spanish naval patrols enforcing a around . The Virginius departed New York on October 4, 1870, initiating a series of covert voyages through 1873 that transported munitions, rifles, and armed filibusters to rebel forces, primarily landing cargoes and personnel along the southeastern Cuban coast near to support insurgent operations against Spanish control. These runs, numbering at least several documented expeditions over the period, involved evading Spanish cruisers through speed and stealth, with one notable success in delivering a full contingent and arms shipment ashore despite close pursuits. Losses occurred, including damage from rough seas and occasional groundings that necessitated repairs in the United States, but the ship repeatedly returned to New York for refitting and reloading with sourced from American sympathizers. Crew composition on these operations typically comprised around 50-100 men per voyage, blending American adventurers—many former Confederate sailors drawn by pay and anti-Spanish sentiment—with British mercenaries experienced in blockade-running, alongside insurgents as passengers and fighters; this multinational makeup blurred distinctions between privateering under unrecognized belligerency and outright , as the expeditions operated without formal letters of marque. From the Spanish perspective, the Virginius' activities constituted direct violations of the island's and , rendering the vessel and its cargoes liable to capture as lawful prizes of war, irrespective of its nominal U.S. registry, which Spanish authorities dismissed as fraudulent cover for aiding . Such operations exacerbated tensions, as Spain maintained that neutral flags did not shield filibusters engaged in hostile acts against belligerent commerce and territory.

The Incident

Final Voyage and Capture

The Virginius departed New York on October 4, 1873, laden with over 150 filibusters, along with arms and ammunition destined for Cuban rebels during the Ten Years' War. The vessel, under the command of American Captain Joseph Fry, sailed ostensibly as a merchant ship but in violation of U.S. neutrality laws prohibiting aid to insurgents. After stopping at , to load additional munitions, the Virginius set course for on October 30. Spanish authorities, alerted to the ship's movements, dispatched the ironclad Tornado to intercept her. On October 31, approximately 40 miles off the Jamaican coast, the Tornado sighted the Virginius and initiated pursuit. The chase lasted eight hours, during which the heavily loaded and mechanically strained Virginius—suffering from engine inefficiencies and leaks—failed to outpace the faster Spanish vessel. The Tornado fired warning shots, boarded the with armed parties, and disarmed the crew without resistance. Spain justified the seizure on grounds of piracy, citing the Virginius's irregular documentation, fraudulent U.S. flag, and cargo of contraband munitions supporting rebellion against Spanish sovereignty. The captured ship, with Fry and her passengers held as suspects, was towed to , arriving November 1; no formal prize court adjudication followed, as authorities classified the vessel and company as pirate elements under international maritime law.

Trial, Executions, and Atrocities

Following the capture of the Virginius on October 31, 1873, Spanish authorities in conducted a hasty starting November 1. The 155 crew members and passengers were charged with and filibustering for aiding Cuban insurgents during the Ten Years' War, resulting in death sentences for all without provision for meaningful defense or appeal. Captain General Juan Núñez de Burriel, seeking to deter further expeditions, ordered the summary proceedings, which deviated from established legal norms by denying typically extended even to combatants and disregarding potential neutrality claims under the vessel's claimed U.S. , though its registry was fraudulent. Executions by firing squad began on November 4, 1873, at 6 a.m., with four senior Cuban insurgent officers—Generals Bernabé Varona, Pedro Céspedes, and others—shot publicly before assembled troops and volunteers. Over the next three days, 53 prisoners in total were executed in spectacles amid growing crowds, culminating on November 7 with Captain Joseph Fry and 36 crew members facing the squad; Fry, an American, was killed early in the sequence despite his rank. Among the executed were numerous Americans and at least four Britons, violating consular protections asserted by the U.S. and U.K. Contemporary accounts detailed atrocities beyond the executions, including mob of corpses—dragged through streets, mutilated, and trampled by at the Santiago slaughterhouse—reflecting Burriel's intent for exemplary terror to suppress rebellion, though such measures underscored the desperation of Spain's colonial enforcement amid insurgency. The remaining roughly 82 survivors avoided death only after British naval intervention halted further killings on November 8, enabling their eventual release.

Reactions and Pressures

US Public Outrage and War Fever

The news of the Virginius's capture on , 1873, and the subsequent executions of 53 crew members, including at least 36 Americans, by Spanish authorities in on November 7 reached the by November 10, igniting widespread public indignation. Major newspapers amplified the horror, with the New York Herald labeling the killings "Spanish butchery" and publishing sensational accounts that portrayed the victims as martyrs to tyranny, thereby stoking demands for naval mobilization and military retaliation against . Editorials in the Herald explicitly called for war, the resignation of , and U.S. recognition of Cuban belligerency status to legitimize further to insurgents. This media-driven frenzy translated into grassroots agitation, as citizens in organized mass meetings and began enrolling volunteers for potential expeditions to , with excitement building to the point that a planned rally on was postponed amid fears of uncontrolled escalation. Similar public demonstrations erupted in southern ports like New Orleans, where local fervor reflected sympathy for the Cuban rebels and outrage over the summary trials and executions, viewed as barbaric violations of neutral rights. Both Democratic and Republican voices joined the chorus for intervention, pressuring the Grant administration amid a post-Civil War surge in national confidence that emboldened calls for asserting U.S. power in the hemisphere. Prominent naval figures, including Admiral , fueled the war fever through private advocacy for confrontation, as evidenced in his correspondence assessing the high likelihood of hostilities with and urging preparations to exploit the crisis. The executed Americans, such as Captain Joseph Fry, were lionized in press narratives as heroic defenders against Spanish despotism, intensifying a sentiment that equated restraint with national dishonor and briefly elevating Cuban independence as a proxy for American . This domestic pressure peaked in late November 1873, with the collective outrage described contemporaneously as reaching "fever heat," though it subsided as diplomatic channels opened without immediate combat.

British Government and Public Response

The executions of British subjects among the Virginius crew, including several seamen, elicited formal protests from the British Foreign Office to Spain, decrying the summary trials and killings as violations of international norms and consular protections. Spanish press reports on November 19, 1873, highlighted the measured language of the British note, which demanded accountability for the deaths without escalating to threats of force. The Gladstone cabinet, while condemning the acts as barbaric and inconsistent with 19th-century standards of justice, adopted a restrained approach to avoid broader entanglement in the Cuban conflict, prioritizing diplomatic leverage over military confrontation despite underlying sympathies for weakening Spanish imperial hold. British public sentiment mirrored transatlantic indignation, with London newspapers portraying the executions as an affront to Anglo-Saxon values of and personal , fueling calls for firm action short of . Coverage in outlets like and emphasized the humanitarian outrage and questioned Spain's fitness to govern colonies, though editorials urged proportionality to safeguard British interests in the . In a practical display of resolve, the arrival of HMS Niobe at on December 3, 1873, under Sir Lambton Loraine, prompted Spanish authorities to transfer surviving British crew members aboard and halted additional executions, averting further loss of life among foreign nationals. This naval presence underscored Britain's commitment to protecting its citizens without broader demonstrations or blockades, reflecting a balance between assertive diplomacy and aversion to colonial overreach informed by recent imperial experiences. Britain maintained informal alignment with U.S. diplomatic efforts via ambassadors in , jointly pressing for redress and crew releases, though without joint ultimatums or explicit military coordination to preserve neutrality.

Diplomatic Resolution

Hamilton Fish's State Department Strategy

Secretary of State Hamilton Fish adopted a strategy of measured diplomatic pressure and intelligence assessment to avert war with Spain over the Virginius incident, prioritizing the United States' military limitations following post-Civil War demobilization. The U.S. Navy in 1873 consisted primarily of outdated wooden vessels, with many ships laid up or obsolete amid budget constraints and lack of modernization, rendering the fleet unprepared for sustained conflict against a European power. Fish counseled President Ulysses S. Grant against declaring war or recognizing Cuban belligerency, despite hawkish sentiments in the cabinet and mounting public fervor, arguing that rash action would invite defeat without clear strategic gains. To bolster readiness and gather intelligence, directed the dispatch of U.S. naval assets, including ordering the USS Kansas to for reconnaissance on Spanish movements and potential escalation in Cuban waters. He initiated discreet communications with Spanish Minister to the José Polo de Bernabé, probing Madrid's intentions while avoiding premature ultimatums that could provoke hostilities. Fish's approach balanced condemnation of Spanish excesses with acknowledgment of U.S. complicity in filibustering, which contravened American neutrality proclamations prohibiting aid to Cuban insurgents. While viewing the Virginius as an illegitimate vessel improperly claiming U.S. registry to evade neutrality laws, he maintained that the executions of purported American citizens—conducted without —constituted disproportionate barbarity warranting reparations and , without conceding the expedition's lawfulness. This principled stance sought for victims while preserving U.S. legal credibility. In his annual message to on December 1, 1873, Grant, guided by , sharply criticized 's handling of the affair as a violation of civilized norms but refrained from endorsing belligerency or intervention, instead calling for diplomatic resolution to safeguard American interests peacefully. This messaging underscored 's overarching goal: leveraging and naval posturing to extract concessions from without committing to .

Negotiations with Spain

The Spanish government, operating under the fragile First Republic proclaimed in February 1873 after King Amadeo I's abdication, confronted profound internal turmoil during the negotiations, including the ongoing Ten Years' War in Cuba and the Carlist insurgency in the mainland, which strained military and financial resources while heightening fears of a U.S. invasion that could exacerbate these crises. Emilio Castelar, who assumed the presidency on September 18, 1873, prioritized averting escalation with the United States to preserve the republic's tenuous hold on power, as further conflict risked collapse amid domestic divisions. Bilateral discussions commenced in between U.S. Minister Daniel E. Sickles and Spanish Foreign Minister José de Carvajal y Resíno in November 1873, where Sickles demanded the immediate release of surviving American crew members, return of the Virginius, a formal apology, disavowal of the executions, and punishment of Cuban authorities responsible for the atrocities. countered by presenting evidence that the Virginius operated as a filibustering vessel with fraudulent U.S. papers, arguing it constituted ineligible for and justifying the capture under . These exchanges grew acrimonious, with Carvajal insisting on a joint investigation into the ship's status, leading to a deadlock by late November as resisted unconditional concessions. Castelar redirected efforts to Washington, empowering Spanish Minister Admiral Joaquín José Polo de Bernabé to negotiate directly with starting in late November 1873, where U.S. insistence on swift clashed with Spanish proofs of the vessel's illicit arms shipments and recruitment of insurgents. maintained that the executions violated neutral rights and demanded reparations, while Polo yielded incrementally on crew releases to forestall U.S. military action, though Spain continued to highlight the Virginius's role in aiding Cuban rebels as a basis for . This phase underscored Spain's strategic retreat, driven by the republic's inability to sustain multiple theaters of war against a mobilized U.S. adversary. Great Britain played a subtle mediating role, with Foreign Secretary Lord Granville privately urging toward compliance through diplomatic channels and leveraging the Royal Navy's presence to signal collective European interest in , particularly after protests over executed British subjects aboard the Virginius. British pressure complemented U.S. demands without formal arbitration, emphasizing to the risks of alienating major powers amid its domestic vulnerabilities. The impasse persisted from December 1873 into early 1875, exacerbated by Spanish delays in implementation and internal republican upheavals, until U.S. naval reinforcements under John Rodgers—commanding the North Atlantic Station with strengthened squadrons in the —signaled readiness for enforcement, compelling further Spanish accommodations to avert confrontation.

Agreement: Ship Return, Crew Release, and Reparations

The diplomatic settlement between the and , reached through negotiations concluded in early , was formalized in a protocol that addressed the core American demands arising from the capture and executions aboard the Virginius. Under the terms, Spain agreed to return the vessel to United States custody, release all surviving crew members and passengers held in Cuban prisons, and provide limited to the families of the executed American citizens. The Virginius was surrendered in a stripped condition, devoid of its original armaments, equipment, and much of its fittings, reflecting Spain's effort to neutralize its utility as a filibustering vessel while complying with the restitution requirement. The ship departed Cuban waters under neutral arrangements facilitated by British mediation to ensure safe passage to a U.S. port, arriving without further incident and effectively ending Spanish control over the craft. Surviving crew and passengers, numbering approximately 50 individuals who had avoided execution, were promptly liberated and repatriated to the via arranged transport. Spain committed to an indemnity of $80,000, payable directly to the U.S. government for distribution exclusively to the estates and families of the four confirmed American victims executed by Spanish authorities in —Captain Joseph Fry and three crew members—rather than encompassing wider claims for property damage, broader crew losses, or other U.S. interests. This amount was calculated based on verified estates and immediate family entitlements, as determined by U.S. consular assessments, and was disbursed through the Department of State shortly after the protocol's execution on , 1875. The settlement included no explicit apology from , though the concessions represented an implicit acknowledgment of procedural irregularities in the handling of the U.S.-flagged vessel; in exchange, the relinquished all further demands related to the incident.

Aftermath and Legacy

Short-Term Consequences for Involved Parties

In Spain, the government disavowed the summary executions ordered by General Juan Burriel as illegal under , but promises to punish responsible officers, including Burriel, were never fulfilled; instead, Burriel received a promotion, reflecting limited accountability and no fundamental shift in colonial policy toward . Burriel died on December 24, 1877, before any trial could proceed. The affair embarrassed amid its fragile First Republic (1873–1874), yet reinforced determination to suppress the Cuban insurgency, with the Ten Years' War persisting until the 1878 Pact of Zanjón without concessions to rebels. In Cuba, the Virginius executions fueled rebel propaganda depicting Spanish forces as barbaric, contributing to narratives of colonial oppression that sustained insurgent resolve during the ongoing conflict, though direct evidence of a morale surge remains anecdotal amid the war's attrition. Spanish authorities intensified coastal vigilance post-crisis to intercept further filibuster shipments, temporarily disrupting arms flows from U.S. ports and complicating rebel logistics, even as the broader rebellion endured without decisive gains until 1878. U.S.-Spain relations stabilized temporarily after the December 1873 agreement, under which Spain returned the Virginius and 12 surviving crew members to American custody on December 26, alongside an $80,000 indemnity to families of executed U.S. citizens. This outcome vindicated the Grant administration's restraint, as Hamilton Fish's diplomacy averted war despite domestic war fever, preserving neutrality in the Cuban conflict while demonstrating effective gunboat pressure without escalation.

Impact on US Naval Policy and Preparedness

The Virginius Affair exposed the profound weaknesses in the , which had deteriorated significantly after the Civil War due to budget cuts and neglect, leaving it with a small fleet dominated by wooden vessels and early steamships that were outmatched by Spain's ironclad warships. The 's feeble response during the —limited to diplomatic protests and reliance on British mediation rather than naval —highlighted its inability to protect American interests or deter aggression in the , as Spanish forces easily captured the filibustering vessel without fear of retaliation. This vulnerability contrasted sharply with Spain's possession of modern armored cruisers, prompting internal naval assessments that the U.S. fleet lacked the speed, firepower, and endurance needed for contemporary warfare. The incident accelerated advocacy for naval modernization, serving as a key precipitant for reforms in the late and amid recurring war scares. Under Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt (1881–1882), the crisis's lessons informed the creation of the first Naval Advisory Board in 1881, which recommended replacing obsolete hulls with steel-constructed vessels equipped with advanced guns and machinery to restore offensive capabilities. Congress responded with initial appropriations in 1883 for the "ABCD" ships—four steel-protected cruisers and gunboats—that marked the onset of the "New Navy," shifting from defensive coastal forces to a blue-water fleet capable of . These developments influenced strategic thought, including Alfred Thayer Mahan's seminal 1890 work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, which drew on episodes like the Virginius crisis to argue for concentrated naval investment as essential to national security and commerce protection. By demonstrating the risks of naval complacency—such as near-war with a peer competitor despite public outrage—the affair helped build congressional consensus for sustained funding, averting operational failures in subsequent conflicts like the 1898 Spanish-American War, where the modernized fleet enabled decisive victories at Manila Bay and Santiago.

Long-Term Historical Debates and Controversies

The classification of the Virginius as a filibustering pirate vessel versus a legitimate commerce raider remains a point of historical contention. Spanish officials justified the seizure on October 31, 1873, by citing the ship's irregular documentation, including fraudulent use of the American flag despite its purchase in 1870 by Cuban insurgent leader General Manuel Quesada using junta funds, and its proven role in transporting arms and fighters to rebels during the Ten Years' War. American courts in 1873 confirmed Cuban ownership, supporting the Spanish characterization of it as non-neutral property subject to capture as a filibuster operation rather than protected commerce. Pro-Cuban sympathizers in the United States, however, contended that such expeditions aligned with broader interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, framing the ship as aiding legitimate anti-colonial resistance against Spanish imperial overreach, though this view overlooked the vessel's lack of formal belligerent status and its provocative smuggling of munitions like 300 rifles and 300,000 cartridges that escalated tensions. Debates over the legality of the executions of 53 crew members, including 36 Americans and Britons, center on Spanish adherence to international norms. Spanish commanders under General Juan Burriel claimed the actions enforced Cuba's against insurgent supply lines, conducting summary military trials in on November 4 and 7, 1873. Critics, including U.S. diplomats, argued the killings were extrajudicial, as the capture occurred outside the effective zone near Bahia Honda and bypassed mandatory prize court adjudication required under maritime law to determine neutral status or before condemnation or execution. This procedural failure, evidenced by the absence of despite precedents like the Florida case, breached established customs for neutral vessels, leading to U.S. demands for $80,000 per American victim's family in reparations by March 1875. U.S. diplomatic restraint under Secretary has been praised as prudent realism, securing the ship's return, survivor releases, and indemnities without conflict, given the navy's post-Civil War —marked by unmodernized wooden vessels and insufficient fleets against 's more capable squadron in 1873. Hawkish retrospectives decry it as a forfeited chance to hasten Cuban independence, potentially weakening earlier, but this ignores causal realities: provocations invited retaliation, and U.S. unreadiness risked defeat, as the fleet's material weaknesses persisted until the 1880s modernization. Later scholarship critiques overemphasis on U.S. pacifism by highlighting filibusters' direct causation of the crisis through repeated incursions, while noting Spanish colonial tactics like early reconcentration relocations during the Ten Years' War disproportionately affected non-white populations, including black crew members among the executed, though primary accounts show executions targeted insurgents regardless of race rather than systematic bias. This balances narratives that portray Spanish actions as uniquely barbaric, underscoring mutual escalations in a civil war context where neutrality violations invited severe responses.

References

  1. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-s-cold-war-with-spain.htm
  2. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d741
  3. https://www.spanamwar.com/virginius.htm
  4. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d722
  5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1875v02/d279
  6. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1998/october/time-capsule-1873
  7. https://scholarworks.brandeis.edu/esploro/outputs/graduate/A-Fruitful-Source-of-Trouble-The/9923880047501921
  8. https://aura.american.edu/articles/thesis/The_Virginius_affair/23835750
  9. https://aaregistry.org/story/cubas-ten-years-war-begins/
  10. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/cubas-ten-years-war
  11. https://www.pbs.org/crucible/tl1.html
  12. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ten_Years%25E2%2580%2599_War
  13. https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ten-years-war-1868-1878
  14. https://www.historyworld.net/history/Cuba/97
  15. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2365&context=fhq
  16. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/territorial-expansion
  17. https://hnoc.org/publishing/first-draft/1850s-narciso-lopez-and-fellow-filibusters-launched-cuban-invasions-new
  18. https://explorion.net/cuba-old-and-new/xi-filibustering
  19. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/june-13-1870-message-regarding-insurrection-cuba
  20. https://gitmomemory.org/timeline/shaping-an-empire/cuban-sugar-and-us-intervention/
  21. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-63000/NH-63845.html
  22. http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/matanzas/Virginius-2.htm
  23. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d747
  24. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d715
  25. http://www.cubagenweb.org/mil/grande/virginius.htm
  26. https://www.navygeneralboard.com/rise-of-the-united-states-navy-part-one-the-virgnius-affair/
  27. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1925/january/international-incident
  28. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/virginius.htm
  29. https://www.nytimes.com/1873/12/28/archives/cuban-affairs-the-virginius-the-vessel-condemned-as-a-legal-prize.html
  30. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1875v02/d256
  31. https://www.heritage-history.com/index.php?c=read&author=morris&book=spain&readAll=true
  32. http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl2a.htm
  33. https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/virginius.htm
  34. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1896/october/right-search-and-its-limitation-time-peace
  35. http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/matanzas/Virginius-3.htm
  36. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1875v02/d257
  37. https://okellyarchive.com/sites/default/files/documents/reporting-cuba/433_1873-12-22_5.pdf
  38. https://sk.sagepub.com/ency/edvol/encyclopedia-of-us-latin-american-relations/chpt/virginius-affair-1873
  39. http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/matanzas/Burriel.htm
  40. https://www.executedtoday.com/2017/11/07/1873-captain-joseph-fry-and-36-crew-of-the-virginius/
  41. https://potus-geeks.livejournal.com/1798674.html
  42. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d721
  43. http://historyofcuba.com/history/matanzas/Virginius-4.htm
  44. https://www.nytimes.com/1873/11/11/archives/the-virginius-affair-the-massmeeting-postponed-enrollment-of.html
  45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4231148
  46. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/230469871.pdf
  47. https://www.universityarchives.com/auction-lot/admiral-david-dixon-porter-readies-u.s.-navy-for_1FF43ED8CF
  48. https://www.nytimes.com/1873/11/20/archives/the-virginius-question-in-spain-the-british-protest-demand-for-the.html
  49. https://read.dukeupress.edu/hahr/article-pdf/37/3/296/786810/0370296.pdf
  50. https://www.nytimes.com/1873/11/28/archives/the-virginius-outrage-comments-of-the-english-press.html
  51. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/The_Economist_1873-11-29-_Vol_31_Iss_1579_%2528IA_sim_economist_1873-11-29_31_1579%2529.pdf
  52. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/spanish-american-war-war-plans-and-impact-on-u-s-navy.html
  53. http://www.potterhistory.com/hamilton-fish.html
  54. https://urprojects.lib.rochester.edu/s/seward/item/63331
  55. https://www.americanheritage.com/1873-one-hundred-and-twenty-five-years-ago-1
  56. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fifth-annual-message-3
  57. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hamilton-Fish
  58. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d728
  59. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d631
  60. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/d695
  61. https://www.britannica.com/event/Virginius-affair
  62. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44638276
  63. https://cna.org/reports/2021/08/Sea-Changes-Transforming-US-Navy-Deployment-Strategy-1775-2002.pdf
  64. https://millercenter.org/president/arthur/essays/hunt-1881-secretary-of-the-navy
  65. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1905/january/founder-new-navy
  66. https://asset.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/DKOGDBQKDTSOQ8U/R/file-6eaa9.pdf
  67. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1898/april/international-law-naval-captures
  68. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1973/november/1873-best-was-yet-be
  69. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1913/september/half-century-naval-administration-america-1861-1911
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.