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Abstract and concrete
Abstract and concrete
Abstract and concrete
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In philosophy and the arts, a fundamental distinction exists between abstract and concrete entities. While there is no universally accepted definition, common examples illustrate the difference: numbers, sets, and ideas are typically classified as abstract objects, whereas plants, dogs, and planets are considered concrete objects.[1]

Philosophers have proposed several criteria to define this distinction:

  1. Spatiotemporal existence – Abstract objects exist outside space-time, while concrete objects exist within space-time.
  2. Causal influence – Concrete objects can cause and be affected by other entities (e.g., a rock breaking a window), whereas abstract objects (e.g., the number 2) lack causal powers and do not cause anything to happen in the physical world.
  3. Metaphysical relation – In metaphysics, concrete objects are specific, individual things (particulars), while abstract objects represent general concepts or categories (universals).
  4. Ontological domain – Concrete objects belong to the physical realm (or both the physical and mental realms), whereas abstract objects belong to neither.[2][3][4]

Another view is that it is the distinction between contingent existence versus necessary existence; however, philosophers differ on which type of existence here defines abstractness, as opposed to concreteness. Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete,[1] such that most interpretations agree, for example, that rocks are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects.

Abstract objects are most commonly used in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, and semantics. They are sometimes called abstracta in contrast to concreta. The term abstract object is said to have been coined by Willard Van Orman Quine.[5] Abstract object theory is a discipline that studies the nature and role of abstract objects. It holds that properties can be related to objects in two ways: through exemplification and through encoding. Concrete objects exemplify their properties while abstract objects merely encode them. This approach is also known as the dual copula strategy.[6]

In philosophy

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The type–token distinction identifies physical objects that are tokens of a particular type of thing.[7] The "type" of which it is a part is in itself an abstract object. The abstract–concrete distinction is often introduced and initially understood in terms of paradigmatic examples of objects of each kind:

Examples of abstract and concrete objects
Abstract Concrete
Tennis A tennis match
Redness Red light reflected off of an apple and hitting one's eyes
Five Five cars
Justice A just action
Humanity (the property of being human) Human population (the set of all humans)

Abstract objects have often garnered the interest of philosophers because they raise problems for popular theories. In ontology, abstract objects are considered problematic for physicalism and some forms of naturalism. Historically, the most important ontological dispute about abstract objects has been the problem of universals. In epistemology, abstract objects are considered problematic for empiricism. If abstracta lack causal powers and spatial location, how do we know about them? It is hard to say how they can affect our sensory experiences, and yet we seem to agree on a wide range of claims about them.

Some, such as Ernst Mally,[8] Edward Zalta[9] and arguably, Plato in his Theory of Forms,[9] have held that abstract objects constitute the defining subject matter of metaphysics or philosophical inquiry more broadly. To the extent that philosophy is independent of empirical research, and to the extent that empirical questions do not inform questions about abstracta, philosophy would seem especially suited to answering these latter questions.

In modern philosophy, the distinction between abstract and concrete was explored by Immanuel Kant[10] and G. W. F. Hegel.[11]

Gottlob Frege said that abstract objects, such as propositions, were members of a third realm,[12] different from the external world or from internal consciousness.[1] (See Popper's three worlds.)

Abstract objects and causality

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Another popular proposal for drawing the abstract–concrete distinction contends that an object is abstract if it lacks causal power. A causal power has the ability to affect something causally. Thus, the empty set is abstract because it cannot act on other objects. One problem with this view is that it is not clear exactly what it is to have causal power. For a more detailed exploration of the abstract–concrete distinction, see the relevant Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article.[9]

Quasi-abstract entities

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In the 2010s, there was some philosophical interest in the development of a third category of objects known as the quasi-abstract. Quasi-abstract objects have drawn particular attention in the area of social ontology and documentality. Some argue that an over-adherence to the platonist duality of the concrete and the abstract has led to a large category of social objects having been overlooked or rejected as nonexistent because they exhibit characteristics that the traditional duality between concrete and abstract regards as incompatible.[13] Specifically, the ability to have temporal location, but not spatial location, and have causal agency (if only by acting through representatives).[14] These characteristics are exhibited by a number of social objects, including states of the international legal system.[15]

Concrete and abstract thought in psychology

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Jean Piaget uses the terms "concrete" and "formal" to describe two different types of learning. Concrete thinking involves facts and descriptions about everyday, tangible objects, while abstract (formal operational) thinking involves a mental process.

Abstract idea Concrete idea
Dense things sink. It will sink if its density is greater than the density of the fluid.
You breathe in oxygen and breathe out carbon dioxide. Gas exchange takes place between the air in the alveoli and the blood.
Plants get water through their roots. Water diffuses through the cell membrane of the root hair cells.

See also

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References

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Sources

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  • Zalta, Edward N. (1983). Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Synthese Library. Vol. 160. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company. ISBN 978-90-277-1474-9.
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Abstract and concrete

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In philosophy, the distinction between abstract and concrete pertains to the nature of entities, where abstract objects—such as numbers, propositions, and universals—are characterized by lacking spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy, in contrast to concrete objects, which possess spatial and temporal properties and can interact causally with the physical world. This dichotomy, often traced to ancient thinkers but formalized in modern metaphysics, raises fundamental questions about ontology, including whether abstract objects exist independently or depend on human minds. In , the abstract-concrete divide manifests in the classification of nouns, with concrete nouns denoting tangible, perceptible entities (e.g., "apple" or "river") that can be experienced through the senses, while abstract nouns refer to intangible ideas, qualities, or states (e.g., "" or "") that lack physical form. This categorization aids in grammatical analysis and semantic understanding, though definitions vary due to the inherent of "abstract," leading to diverse identification methods such as morphological markers, derivational patterns, and contextual usage. Linguists emphasize that even concrete nouns involve some abstraction from sensory experiences, blurring strict boundaries in language structure. From a cognitive science perspective, abstract and concrete concepts differ in their formation and neural processing: concrete concepts rely on rich sensory-motor simulations grounded in perceptual experiences (e.g., visualizing a "dog"), whereas abstract concepts (e.g., "truth") draw on linguistic, social, and metaphorical associations without direct sensory referents. Research highlights that abstraction occurs through aggregating commonalities across experiences, facilitated by brain regions like the anterior temporal lobe for categorical knowledge, and that language plays a crucial role in refining abstract representations. This distinction influences learning, memory, and reasoning, with concrete concepts generally easier to acquire due to their embodied basis.

Core Concepts

Definitions of Abstract and Concrete

In philosophy, abstract entities or concepts are defined as those lacking physical existence, spatial-temporal location, and direct sensory perception. They include paradigmatic cases such as numbers, which exist independently of material instantiation; universals, like the property of triangularity shared across instances; and propositions, which express truth-bearing contents without embodiment. In contrast, concrete entities possess physical existence, occupy positions in space and time, and are accessible through sensory experience. These encompass individual objects, such as a specific chair, and particular events, like a historical battle, which can interact causally within the physical world. The etymological roots of these terms reflect their conceptual separation. "Abstract" originates from the late 14th-century Latin abstractus, the past participle of abstrahere ("to draw away" or "detach"), indicating a process of isolating general features from specific particulars. Similarly, "concrete" derives from the late 14th-century Latin concretus, past participle of concrescere ("to grow together"), denoting something composite, actual, and bound to material reality rather than detached generality. Representative examples illustrate these definitions: abstract items include , as an ideal norm without physical form, and redness, as a universal quality not tied to any single instance. Concrete counterparts are a apple, a tangible object with sensory attributes and spatiotemporal position, and a specific , an observable event unfolding in time and place.

Key Distinctions and Examples

The primary distinctions between abstract and concrete entities center on their ontological characteristics: concrete entities possess particularity, occupy specific locations in space and time, and exert causal influence on the world, whereas abstract entities lack these attributes, being non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This demarcation highlights how concrete objects interact directly with their environment through physical or event-based mechanisms, while abstract ones exist independently of such interactions, often as universals or structures shared across instances. Illustrative examples clarify these boundaries. Consider a wooden in a : it is because it has a unique identity, exists at a definite spatiotemporal , and can cause effects such as bearing weight or blocking . By contrast, the abstract notion of "chairness"—the that multiple chairs instantiate—lacks individuality, cannot be located in space or time, and does not directly interact causally, serving instead as a conceptual commonality. Similarly, in , the abstract set {1, 2, 3} is a non-spatiotemporal without causal powers, differing from a collection of three physical apples, which occupies , can rot or be eaten, and participates in causal chains. The abstract-concrete divide forms a spectrum rather than a strict binary, with degrees of evident in various entities. Fully items include tangible physical objects like rocks or animals, grounded in immediate sensory and causal reality. At the opposite end lie pure abstracts such as numbers or propositions, entirely detached from spatiotemporal constraints. Borderline cases, like fictional entities (e.g., the character ), illustrate overlaps: they lack physical instantiation and causal efficacy but possess descriptive content akin to abstract structures, often classified as abstract artifacts created through linguistic practices. A common misconception equates all non-physical entities with the abstract category, overlooking views where certain non-physical items qualify as concrete. For instance, particular mental states or events—such as a specific episode of pain experienced at a given moment—may be deemed concrete in ontologies that emphasize their causal roles and temporal particularity, distinguishing them from atemporal abstracts like general concepts.

Philosophical Perspectives

Abstract Objects in Ontology

In ontology, abstract objects are defined as non-spatiotemporal and acausal entities that lack location in space or time and do not participate in causal interactions, such as numbers, properties, or Platonic forms. These entities contrast with concrete objects, like physical particulars, by existing independently of sensory experience or material instantiation. The primary philosophical defense of abstract objects' existence comes from realism, particularly , which posits that such entities inhabit a separate realm of objective reality. Plato's , articulated in works like , describes these as eternal, unchanging ideals—such as the Form of or —that transcend the imperfect, changing world of sensible concretes and serve as paradigms for all instances. This view was advanced in by Gottlob Frege's , which argues that numbers are objective abstracta, neither psychological ideas nor empirical aggregates, but logical objects discoverable through reason, as detailed in his (1884). Frege's position underscores the indispensability of abstracts for mathematical truths, supporting their independent existence. Opposing realism, rejects the to abstract objects, viewing them as mere linguistic conveniences or names without independent reality, thereby adhering to Ockham's razor by eliminating unnecessary entities from one's . William of Ockham's medieval formulation of this principle exemplifies the nominalist strategy, prioritizing over posited universals or abstracts. , in critiquing , further bolstered anti-realist sentiments by arguing for the of forms within substances, as in Metaphysics, where universals exist only as abstracted from rather than as separate entities. offers a middle ground, positing abstracts as mind-dependent constructs, existent only in thought, thus avoiding both Platonist independence and strict nominalist denial.

Concrete Objects and Causality

In , concrete objects are defined as spatiotemporal endowed with causal powers, distinguishing them from abstract entities that lack location in space and time. These objects, such as physical bodies or events, exist independently and can exert influence on one another through interactions. In Aristotelian terms, concrete objects align with substances, which are the fundamental entities or primary beings that underlie change, serve as subjects of predication, and possess the capacity for independent existence and action. The causality principle highlights how concrete entities engage in interactions primarily through efficient causes, where one object produces effects in another via direct influence. This view is central to David Hume's empiricism, which grounds causation in the observed constant conjunction of concrete events—such as the motion of one imparting to another—rather than any intrinsic necessity or hidden powers beyond sensory experience. Hume argued that our understanding of causation arises solely from repeated of such spatiotemporal occurrences, emphasizing the empirical observability of concrete causal relations. John Locke's provides historical context by differentiating primary and secondary qualities to clarify the basis of sensory knowledge. Primary qualities—solidity, extension, figure, motion, and number—are objective, inseparable properties of bodies that resemble the simple ideas they produce in the perceiver's mind, directly tied to the material structure of objects. Secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds, and tastes, are instead powers in objects to generate varied sensory ideas in observers, depending on the arrangement of primary qualities in insensible particles; this distinction separates the , mind-independent reality of objects from the abstract ideas abstracted from sensory data. Metaphysical debates often center on the problem of abstract causation, which underscores the causal efficacy of concrete objects by contrast: abstracts, being non-spatiotemporal, cannot cause concrete events, as illustrated by the intuition that the abstract number 2 does not bring about the existence of two physical apples. This acausality of abstracts challenges Platonist ontologies, prompting solutions like trope theory, where properties are reconceived as concrete, particular instances (tropes) unique to each object—such as the specific redness of one apple—endowing them with causal powers and avoiding the need for causally inert abstract universals.

Quasi-Abstract Entities

In certain areas of , particularly , the of quasi-abstract entities has emerged since the as a proposed category for objects that blend features of abstract and concrete entities. These are typically non-concrete but exhibit some causal or relational involvement through practices or conventions, challenging strict dichotomies in specific contexts like . Examples include social constructs such as states, which are argued to exist as quasi-abstract entities created through documentary acts, like declarations, that generate them performatively without being fully spatiotemporal objects. Fictional characters in or may also qualify, possessing abstract narrative structures yet influencing concrete culturally and psychologically. exemplifies this blend, embodying abstract value and rules manifested in concrete forms like currency, enabling causal roles in exchanges via collective practices. Theories addressing such entities include documentary theory, which posits that performative documents bring quasi-abstract social objects into being. David Armstrong's immanent realism reinterprets universals as properties immanent within particulars, realized through tropes that bridge generality with location, though not always termed quasi-abstract. These approaches aim to resolve ontological tensions by grounding abstract-like features in or social substrates. Criticisms of quasi-abstract entities center on their failure to decisively resolve ontological tensions, as they often blur distinctions without clarifying commitments; for example, W.V.O. Quine's criterion of , which identifies existence with quantification over entities in the regimented best theory of the world, suggests that positing quasi-abstracts merely complicates without eliminating skepticism toward any non-concrete posits. This view holds that such hybrids do not evade Quinean scrutiny, as theories invoking them still bind variables over ambiguously abstract elements, potentially inflating without empirical justification.

Psychological Dimensions

Abstract Versus Concrete Thinking

In psychology, abstract thinking is defined as the cognitive process of generalizing from specific instances, engaging in hypothetical reasoning, and conceptualizing ideas beyond immediate sensory input. This mode enables individuals to identify patterns, draw inferences, and consider possibilities not tied to physical . Concrete thinking, by contrast, emphasizes literal interpretation of tangible, observable facts, relying on sensory-based processing and direct experience without extending to broader generalizations or hypotheticals. Key theoretical models highlight these distinctions in cognitive styles. Jean Piaget's formal operational stage, emerging around adolescence, marks the development of abstract thinking through systematic hypothesis testing and deductive logic, allowing for reasoning about abstract principles without concrete referents. Jerome Bruner's framework posits two primary modes of thought: the paradigmatic mode, which is abstract and pattern-seeking, focused on logical categorization and empirical verification, versus the narrative mode, which is more concrete and context-bound, emphasizing stories and sequential events to make sense of human experience. Similarly, Robert J. Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence contrasts analytical intelligence—abstract, involving evaluation and comparison of ideas—with practical intelligence, which is concrete and oriented toward adapting to everyday environmental demands through tacit knowledge. Illustrative examples underscore these differences. A engaging in concrete thinking might describe a solely by its visible elements, such as "red circles on a background," focusing on literal shapes and colors. In abstract thinking, the same individual would interpret deeper symbolism, like "the circles representing cycles of life amid emotional turmoil," connecting the artwork to universal themes. These styles influence problem-solving and , with abstract approaches fostering through ideation and ones ensuring practical execution. Clinically, pronounced concrete thinking appears in certain neurodevelopmental and psychiatric conditions, impairing social and interpretive functions. In autism spectrum disorders, individuals often display literal language processing and challenges with metaphors, leading to concrete interpretations that hinder understanding of implied meanings. In , concrete thinking manifests as deficits in proverb interpretation or abstraction tasks, where patients respond literally rather than inferentially, contributing to disorganized thought and social dysfunction. Such patterns suggest that excessive concreteness limits , though interventions like can promote shifts toward more abstract processing.

Development and Assessment of Abstract Thought

The development of abstract thought in children follows distinct stages as outlined in Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development. During the concrete operational stage, typically from ages 7 to 11, children can perform logical operations on tangible objects and events but struggle with hypothetical or abstract scenarios, relying instead on direct sensory experience. In contrast, the formal operational stage, beginning around age 11 and extending into adulthood, enables individuals to engage in abstract reasoning, such as hypothesizing outcomes or manipulating symbolic concepts without concrete referents. This progression marks a shift from concrete to abstract thinking, where adolescents and adults can systematically test ideas and consider multiple variables. Lev Vygotsky's sociocultural theory complements Piaget by emphasizing that abstract thinking emerges through social interactions and cultural mediation rather than solely through individual maturation. Vygotsky argued that higher mental functions, including abstraction, develop via the zone of proximal development, where guided support from more knowledgeable others—such as teachers or peers—helps children internalize complex concepts through language and collaborative problem-solving. For instance, pretend play and cultural tools like symbolic representations foster the transition to abstract thought by bridging everyday experiences with generalized ideas. Several factors influence the pace and nature of abstract thought development, including education and cultural context. Formal education accelerates abstraction by introducing symbolic systems like mathematics and science, which encourage logical deduction beyond immediate percepts. Culturally, Western education often prioritizes abstract logic and decontextualized reasoning, such as categorizing objects by abstract attributes, whereas some Indigenous cognitive traditions emphasize relational and concrete interconnections, like holistic environmental narratives, potentially delaying or altering abstract skill acquisition in those frameworks. These differences highlight how cultural practices shape the emergence of abstraction without negating its universality. Assessing abstract thought involves standardized tools and experimental methods to gauge reasoning abilities. , a non-verbal test of and , reliably measures abstract reasoning by requiring participants to identify logical rules in visual sequences, with strong validity for fluid intelligence across ages and cultures. Piagetian tasks, such as conservation experiments—where children determine if quantity remains constant despite changes in appearance (e.g., reshaping clay)—evaluate the transition from to abstract logic, as success indicates reversibility and decentration typically achieved by age 7. Modern neuroimaging techniques, like (fMRI), reveal activation during abstract tasks, such as rule inference or , distinguishing it from processing regions. Contemporary research underscores environmental modulators of abstract thought. Bilingualism enhances cognitive flexibility, enabling better abstraction by promoting perspective-switching and inhibitory control, as evidenced by improved performance on divergent thinking tasks among bilingual children and adults. With aging, abstract thinking declines more noticeably than concrete processing; older adults show reduced prefrontal efficiency in abstract autobiographical recall, while concrete memory remains relatively stable, contributing to preserved daily functioning despite fluid intelligence losses. These findings inform interventions to support lifelong cognitive adaptability.

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