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RAF Bomber Command
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| Bomber Command | |
|---|---|
![]() | |
| Active | 14 July 1936–1968 |
| Country | |
| Branch | |
| Role | Strategic bombing |
| Headquarters |
|
| Motto | Strike Hard Strike Sure[1] |
| Engagements | Second World War |
| Battle honours |
|
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | |
| Aircraft flown | |
| Bomber | 1939: Battle, Blenheim, Hampden, Wellesley, Wellington, Whitley.
1942: Manchester, Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster, Mosquito. 1945: Lincoln 1950: Washington B.1 1951: Canberra. 1955: Vickers Valiant 1956: Avro Vulcan 1958: Handley Page Victor. |
RAF Bomber Command controlled the Royal Air Force's bomber forces from 1936 to 1968. Along with the United States Army Air Forces, it played the central role in the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II. From 1942 onward, the British bombing campaign against Germany became less restrictive and increasingly targeted industrial sites and the civilian manpower base essential for German war production. In total 501,536 operational sorties were flown, 2.25 billion pounds (1.02 million tonnes) of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action. Bomber Command crews also suffered a high casualty rate: 55,573 were killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew, a 44.4% death rate. A further 8,403 men were wounded in action, and 9,838 became prisoners of war.
Bomber Command stood at the peak of its post-war military power in the 1960s, the V bombers holding the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent and a supplemental force of Canberra light bombers. In 1968 it was merged with Fighter Command to form Strike Command.
A memorial in Green Park in London was unveiled by Queen Elizabeth II on 28 June 2012 to commemorate the high casualty rate among the aircrews. In April 2018 The International Bomber Command Centre was opened in Lincoln.
Background
[edit]At the time of the formation of Bomber Command in 1936, Giulio Douhet's slogan "the bomber will always get through" was popular, and figures like Stanley Baldwin cited it. Until advances in radar technology in the late 1930s, this statement was effectively true. Attacking bombers could not be detected early enough to assemble fighters fast enough to prevent them reaching their targets. Some damage might be done to the bombers by anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and by fighters as the bombers returned to base, but that was not as effective as a proper defence. Consequently, the early conception of Bomber Command was as an entity that threatened the enemy with utter destruction. The Italian general Giulio Douhet, author of The Command of the Air, was of that view.[2]
In 1936, Germany's increasing air power was feared by British government planners who commonly overestimated its size, reach and hitting power. Planners used estimates of up to 72 British deaths per tonne (2,200 lb) of bombs dropped, though this figure was grossly exaggerated. As well, the planners did not know that German bombing aircraft of the day (not quite 300 Junkers Ju 52 medium bombers) did not have the range to reach the UK with a load of bombs and return to the mainland. British air officers did nothing to correct these perceptions because they could see the usefulness of having a strong bombing arm.[3]
Early years of the Second World War
[edit]At the start of the Second World War in 1939, Bomber Command faced four problems. The first was lack of size; Bomber Command was not large enough effectively to operate as an independent strategic force. The second was rules of engagement; at the start of the war, the targets allocated to Bomber Command were not wide enough in scope. The third problem was the Command's lack of technology; specifically radio or radar derived navigational aids to allow accurate target location at night or through cloud. (In 1938, E. G. "Taffy" Bowen proposed using ASV radar for navigation, only to have Bomber Command disclaim need for it, saying the sextant was sufficient.[4]) The fourth problem was the limited accuracy of bombing, especially from high level.[5]
When the war began on 1 September 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the neutral United States, issued an appeal to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to military targets.[6] The French and British agreed to abide by the request, provided "that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents".[7] British policy was to restrict bombing to military targets and infrastructure, such as ports and railways which were of military importance. While acknowledging that bombing Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced deliberate bombing of civilian property (outside combat zones) as a military tactic.[8]

The British government did not want to violate its agreement by attacking civilian targets outside combat zones and the French were even more concerned lest Bomber Command operations provoke a German bombing attack on France. Since the Armée de l'Air had few modern fighters and no defence network comparable to the British Chain Home radar stations, this left France powerless before the threat of a German bombing attack. The final problem was lack of adequate aircraft. The Bomber Command workhorses at the start of the war, the Vickers Wellington, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and Handley Page Hampden/Hereford, had been designed as tactical-support medium bombers and none of them had enough range or ordnance capacity for anything more than a limited strategic offensive. Of these the Wellington had the longest range at 2,550 miles (4,100 km).[9]
Bomber Command became even smaller after the declaration of war. No. 1 Group, with its squadrons of Fairey Battles, left for France to form the Advanced Air Striking Force. This action had two aims: to give the British Expeditionary Force some air-striking power and to allow the Battles to operate against German targets, since they lacked the range to do so from British airfields.[10]
In May 1940, some of the Advanced Air Striking Force was caught on the ground by German air attacks on their airfields at the opening of the invasion of France. The remainder of the Battles proved to be horrendously vulnerable to enemy fire. Many times, Battles would set out to attack and be almost wiped out in the process. e.g. 10 May 1940 when a significant number of Battles were shot down or damaged.[11]
Following the Rotterdam Blitz of 14 May, RAF Bomber Command was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on 15 May; the Air Ministry authorized Air Marshal Charles Portal to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces (which were visible at night).[12][13] The first attack took place on the night of 15/16 May, with 96 bombers setting off to attack targets east of the Rhine, 78 of which were against oil targets. Of these, only 24 claimed to have found their targets.[14]
Bomber Command itself soon fully joined in the action; in the Battle of Britain, Bomber Command was assigned to bomb invasion barges and fleets assembling in the Channel ports. This was much less public than the battles of the Spitfires and Hurricanes of RAF Fighter Command but still vital and dangerous work, carried out night after night.[15]
Bomber Command was also indirectly responsible, in part at least, for the switch of Luftwaffe attention away from Fighter Command to bombing civilian targets. A German bomber on a raid got lost due to poor navigation and bombed London. Prime Minister Winston Churchill consequently ordered a retaliatory raid on the German capital of Berlin. The damage caused was minor but the raid sent Hitler into a rage. He ordered the Luftwaffe to level British cities, thus precipitating the Blitz.[16]
Like the United States Army Air Forces later in the war, Bomber Command had first concentrated on a doctrine of "precision" bombing in daylight. When the German defences inflicted costly defeats on British raids in late 1939, a switch to night bombing was forced upon the Command. The problems of enemy defences were then replaced with the problems of night navigation and target-finding. In the early years of the war bombers had to rely on dead reckoning navigation supported by radio fixes and astro-navigation.[17]
Organisation
[edit]Bomber Command began the war with five groups engaged in bombing operations: Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Groups. Initially it comprised only RAF squadrons, although as it expanded, it came to include many squadrons formed by other Commonwealth air forces (under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan) or European countries. At the same time, many individual personnel from a wide range of Allied air forces served within RAF squadrons.
No. 1 Group was temporarily detached and sent to France to provide air cover for the BEF, but returned to the UK and Bomber Command control in 1940, after the fall of France. No. 2 Group consisted of light and medium bombers who, although operating both by day and night, remained part of Bomber Command until 1943, when it was removed to the control of Second Tactical Air Force, to form the light bomber component of that command.
Bomber Command also gained three operational groups during the war: the Pathfinder Force was expanded into No. 8 Group; No. 6 Group, Royal Canadian Air Force, and; No. 100 Group RAF, which specialised in electronic warfare. No. 8 Group, also known as the Pathfinder Force, was activated on 15 August 1942 and began operations on 8 January 1943.[18] It was a critical part of solving the navigational and aiming problems experienced. Bomber Command solved its navigational problems using two methods. One was the use of a range of increasingly sophisticated electronic aids to navigation and the other was the use of specialist Pathfinders. The technical aids to navigation took two forms. One was external radio navigation aids, as exemplified by Gee and the later highly accurate Oboe systems. The other was the centimetric navigation equipment H2S radar carried in the bombers. The Pathfinders were a group of elite, specially trained and experienced crews who flew ahead of the main bombing forces and marked the targets with flares and special marker-bombs. No. 8 Group controlled the Pathfinder squadrons.[18] No. 6 Group RCAF, which was activated on 1 January 1943, was unique among Bomber Command groups, in that it was a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) unit attached to Bomber Command. At its peak strength, 6 Group consisted of 14 operational squadrons and a total of 15 squadrons served with the group during the war.[19][20] In addition, a few other RCAF squadrons served in other, non-RCAF groups in Bomber Command. No. 100 Group RAF, formed on 11 November 1943, was responsible for development, operational trial and use of electronic warfare and countermeasures equipment).[21]
A number of training groups were also part of the command. For example, these included, in June 1944, No. 26 Group RAF and three operational training groups: No. 91 Group RAF,[22] Nos 92 and 93 Groups.
Strategic bombing 1942–1945
[edit]

In 1941, the Butt Report revealed the extent of bombing inaccuracy: Churchill noted that "this is a very serious paper and seems to require urgent attention".[23] The Area Bombing Directive of 14 February 1942 ordered Bomber Command to target German industrial areas and the "morale of...the industrial workers". The directive also reversed the order of the previous year instructing Bomber Command to conserve its forces; this resulted in a large campaign of area bombardment against the Ruhr area. Professor Frederick Lindemann's "de-housing" paper of March identified the expected effectiveness of attacks on residential and general industrial areas of cities. The aerial bombing of cities such as the Operation Millennium raid on Cologne continued throughout the rest of the war, culminating in the controversial bombing of Dresden in 1945.[24]

In 1942, the main workhorse-aircraft of the later part of the war came into service: the four-engined heavies. The Halifax and Lancaster made up the backbone of the Command; they had a longer range, higher speed and much greater bomb load than earlier aircraft. The older four-engined Short Stirling and twin-engined Vickers Wellington bombers were not taken out of service, but moved to less demanding tasks such as mine-laying. The classic aircraft of the Pathfinders, the de Havilland Mosquito, also made its appearance. By 25 July 1943, the Bomber Command headquarters had come to occupy "a substantial set of red brick buildings, hidden in the middle of a forest on top of a hill in the English county of Buckinghamshire".[25]
An offensive against the Rhine-Ruhr area ("Happy Valley" to aircrew) began on the night of 5/6 March 1943, with the first raid of the Battle of the Ruhr on Essen.[26][27] The bombers destroyed 160 acres (65 ha) of the city and hit 53 Krupps buildings. The Battle of Hamburg in mid-1943 was one of the most successful Bomber Command operations, although Harris' extension of the offensive into the Battle of Berlin failed to destroy the capital and cost his force more than 1,000 crews in the winter of 1943–44. In August 1943, Operation Hydra, the bombing of the Peenemünde V-2 rocket facility opened the secondary Operation Crossbow campaign against long-range weapons.[28]
By April 1944, Harris was forced to reduce his strategic offensive as the bomber force was directed (much to his annoyance) to tactical and transport targets in France in support of the invasion of Normandy. The transport offensive proved highly effective. By late 1944, bombing such as Operation Hurricane (to demonstrate the capabilities of the combined British and US bomber forces), competed against the German defences. Bomber Command was now capable of putting 1,000 aircraft over a target without extraordinary efforts. Within 24 hours of Operation Hurricane, the RAF dropped about 22 million pounds (10,000 tonnes) of bombs on Duisburg and Brunswick, the greatest bomb load dropped in a day during the Second World War.[29]
Wesel in the Rhineland, bombed on 16, 17, 18 and 19 February, was bombed again on 23 March, leaving the city "97 percent destroyed". The last raid on Berlin took place on the night of 21/22 April, when 76 Mosquitos made six attacks just before Soviet forces entered the city centre. By this point, most RAF bombing operations were for the purpose of providing tactical support. The last major strategic raid was the destruction of the oil refinery at Vallø (Tønsberg) in southern Norway by 107 Lancasters, on the night of 25/26 April 1945.[30]
Once the surrender of Germany had occurred, plans were made to send a "Very Long Range Bomber Force" known as Tiger Force to participate in the Pacific war against Japan. Made up of about 30 British Commonwealth heavy bomber squadrons, a reduction of the original plan of about 1,000 aircraft, the British bombing component was intended to be based on Okinawa. Bomber Command groups were re-organised for Operation Downfall but the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred before the force had been transferred to the Pacific.[31]
In Europe Bomber Command's final operation was to fly released Allied prisoners of war home to Britain in Operation Exodus.[32]
Casualties
[edit]Bomber Command crews suffered an extremely high casualty rate: 55,573 killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew (a 44.4 per cent death rate), a further 8,403 were wounded in action and 9,838 became prisoners of war. This covered all Bomber Command operations.[33]
A Bomber Command crew member had a worse chance of survival than an infantry officer in World War I; more people were killed serving in Bomber Command than in the Blitz, or the bombings of Hamburg or Dresden.[33] By comparison, the US Eighth Air Force, which flew daylight raids over Europe, had 350,000 aircrew during the war and suffered 26,000 killed and 23,000 POWs.[33] Of the RAF Bomber Command personnel killed during the war, 72 per cent were British, 18 per cent were Canadian, 7 per cent were Australian and 3 per cent were New Zealanders.[34]
Taking an example of 100 airmen:
- 55 killed on operations or died as a result of wounds
- three injured (in varying levels of severity) on operations or active service
- 12 taken prisoner of war (some wounded)
- two shot down and evaded capture
- 27 survived a tour of operations[35]
In total 501,536 operational sorties were flown, 2.25 billion pounds (1.02 million tonnes) of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action.[36]
Harris was advised by an Operational Research Section (ORS-BC) under a civilian, Basil Dickins, supported by a small team of mathematicians and scientists. ORS-BC (under Reuben Smeed) was concerned with analysing bomber losses. They were able to influence operations by identifying successful defensive tactics and equipment, though some of their more controversial advice (such as removing ineffectual turrets from bombers to increase speed) was ignored.[37]
The very high casualties suffered give testimony to the dedication and courage of Bomber Command aircrew in carrying out their orders. The overall loss rate for Bomber Command operations was 2.2 per cent, but loss rates over Germany were significantly higher; from November 1943 – March 1944, losses averaged 5.1 per cent.[38] The highest loss rate (11.8 per cent) was incurred on the Nuremberg raid (30 March 1944).[39] The disparity in loss rates was reflected in that, at times, Bomber Command considered making sorties over France only count as a third of an op towards the "tour" total and crews derisively referred to officers who only chose to fly on the less dangerous ops to France as "François".[40][41] The loss rates excluded aircraft crashing in the UK on return, even if the machine was a write-off and there were crew casualties, which amounted to at least another 15 percent.[42] Losses in training were significant and some courses lost 25 per cent of their intake before graduation; 5,327 men were killed in training from 1939 to 1945.[43]
RAF Bomber Command had 19 Victoria Cross recipients.[44][a]
Effectiveness of operations
[edit]
Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, noted that the larger British bombs were highly destructive. 15 years after the war's end, Speer was unequivocal about the effect,[45][46]
The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion in Europe ... Defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time ... No one has yet seen that this was the greatest lost battle on the German side.
— Albert Speer (1959)
In terms of production decrease resulting from the RAF area attacks, the US survey, based upon limited research, found that in 1943 it amounted to 9 per cent and in 1944 to 17 per cent. Relying on US gathered statistics, the British survey found that actual arms production decreases were a mere 3 per cent for 1943, and 1 per cent for 1944. However they did find decreases of 46.5 per cent and 39 per cent in the second half of 1943 and 1944 respectively in the metal processing industries. These losses resulted from the devastating series of raids the Command launched on the Ruhr Valley. A contrasting view was offered by Adam Tooze that by referring to contemporary sources rather than post-war accounts:[47]
there can be no doubt that the Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy ....
and that in the first quarter of 1943 steel production fell by 448 million pounds (203,209 tonnes), leading to cuts in the German ammunition production programme and a sub-components crisis (Zulieferungskrise). German aircraft output did not increase between July 1943 and March 1944:[47]
Bomber command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.
The greatest contribution to winning the war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich; mostly twin engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns, 20/37 mm. Though the 88 mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was also a deadly destroyer of tanks, and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.[48]
Mine laying operations were a major contribution to the disruption of German naval activities. Aerial minelaying was used on the iron ore routes from Scandinavia and U-boat training areas in the Baltic; in North-West Europe aerial mines sank seven times more ships than naval mines laid from ships.[49]
In operations Bomber Command laid 47,278 mines while losing 468 aircraft; Coastal Command contribution was 936 mines. Bomber Command and Coastal Command minelaying is credited with the loss of 759 vessels totalling 1.62 billion pounds (0.73 million tonnes).[50]
German production was diverted into construction and manning of minesweepers and the deployment of flak batteries to protect ports and estuaries. Around 100 vessels, mostly cargo types and around 11 million pounds (5,080 tonnes), were converted to Sperrbrecher mine barrage breakers to sail ahead of ships leaving harbour and of these about half of were lost to mines.[51]
1946–1968
[edit]Bomber Command acquired B-29 Superfortresses, known to the RAF as Boeing Washingtons, to supplement the Avro Lincoln, a development of the Lancaster. The first jet bomber, the English Electric Canberra light bomber, became operational in 1951. Some Canberras remained in RAF service up to 2006 as photo-reconnaissance aircraft. The model proved an extremely successful aircraft; Britain exported it to many countries and licensed it for construction in Australia and the United States.[52] The joint US-UK Project E was intended to make nuclear weapons available to Bomber Command in an emergency, with the Canberras the first aircraft to benefit. The next jet bomber to enter service was the Vickers Valiant in 1955, the first of the V bombers.[53]
The Air Ministry conceived of the V bombers as the replacement for the wartime Lancasters and Halifaxes. Three advanced aircraft were developed from 1946, along with the Short Sperrin fall-back design. Multiple designs were tried out because no one could predict which designs would be successful at the time. The V bombers became the backbone of the British nuclear forces and comprised the Valiant, Handley Page Victor (in service in 1958) and Avro Vulcan (1956).[54][55]
In 1956 Bomber Command faced its first operational test since the Second World War. The Egyptian Government nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956, and British troops took part in an invasion along with French and Israeli forces. During the Suez Crisis, Britain deployed Bomber Command Canberras to Cyprus and Malta and Valiants to Malta. The Canberra performed well but the Valiant had problems, since it had only just been introduced into service. The Canberras proved vulnerable to attack by the Egyptian Air Force, which fortunately did not choose to attack the crowded airfields of Cyprus (RAF Akrotiri and RAF Nicosia holding nearly the whole RAF strike force, with a recently reactivated and poor-quality airfield taking much of the French force). Bomber Command aircraft took part in operations against Egypt.[56]
Between 1959 and 1963, in addition to crewed aircraft, Bomber Command also gained 60 Thor nuclear intermediate-range ballistic missiles dispersed to 20 RAF stations around Britain in a joint UK-US operation known as Project Emily. During the following twelve years, Bomber Command aircraft frequently deployed overseas to the Far East and Middle East. They served particularly as a deterrent to Sukarno's Indonesia during the Konfrontasi. A detachment of Canberras had a permanent base at Akrotiri in Cyprus in support of CENTO obligations.[57]
Britain tested its first atomic bomb in 1952 and exploded its first hydrogen bomb in 1957. Operation Grapple saw Valiant bombers testing the dropping of hydrogen bombs over Christmas Island. Advances in electronic countermeasures were also applied to the V bombers over the same period and the remaining V bombers came into service in the late 1950s.[58] During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Bomber Command aircraft maintained continuous strip alerts, ready to take off at a moment's notice, and the Thor missiles were maintained at advanced readiness.[59]
By the early 1960s doubts emerged about the ability of Bomber Command to pierce the defences of the Soviet Union. The shooting down of a U-2 spyplane in 1960 confirmed that the Soviet Union did have surface-to-air missiles capable of reaching the heights at which bombers operated. Since the Second World War the philosophy of bombing had involved going higher and faster. With the supersession of high and fast tactics, ultra-low-level attack was substituted. Bomber Command aircraft had not been designed for that kind of attack, and airframe fatigue increased. All Valiants were grounded in October 1964 and permanently withdrawn from service in January 1965.[60]
Bomber Command's other main function was to provide tanker aircraft to the RAF. The Valiant was the first bomber used as a tanker operationally. As high-level penetration declined as an attack technique, the Valiant saw more and more use as a tanker until the retirement of the type in 1965 due to the costs of remediating metal fatigue. With the Victor also unsuited to the low-level role six were converted to tankers to replace the Valiants, before the later conversion of the majority of Victors to tankers. The Vulcan also saw service as a tanker, and was used to bomb the main runway at Port Stanley Airport during the Falklands War.[61]
In a further attempt to make the operation of the bomber force safer, attempts were made to develop stand-off weapons, with which capability the bombers would not have to penetrate Soviet airspace. However, efforts to do so had only limited success. The first attempt involved the Blue Steel missile (in service: 1963–1970). It worked, but its range meant that bombers still had to enter Soviet airspace. Longer-range systems were developed, but failed and/or were cancelled. This fate befell the Mark 2 of the Blue Steel, its replacement, the American Skybolt ALBM and the ground-based Blue Streak programme, which was cancelled in 1960.[62]
RAF Fighter Command and Bomber Command merged in 1968 to form Strike Command. RAF Coastal Command followed in November 1969.[63]
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
[edit]At any one time several air officers served on the staff of Bomber Command and so the overall commander was known as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the most well-known being Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief are listed below with the rank which they held whilst in post.
| No. | Picture | Commanding-in-chief | Took office | Left office | Time in office |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Air Chief Marshal Sir John Steel (1877–1965) | 14 July 1936 | 12 September 1937 | 1 year, 60 days | |
| 2 | Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt (1886–1973) | 12 September 1937 | 3 April 1940 | 2 years, 204 days | |
| 3 | Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal (1893–1971) | 3 April 1940 | 5 October 1940 | 185 days | |
| 4 | Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse (1892–1970) | 5 October 1940 | 8 January 1942 | 1 year, 95 days | |
| – | Air Vice Marshal Jack Baldwin (1892–1975) Acting | 8 January 1942 | 22 February 1942 | 45 days | |
| 5 | Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris (1892–1984) | 22 February 1942 | 15 September 1945 | 3 years, 205 days | |
| 6 | Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley (1891–1970) | 15 September 1945 | 16 January 1947 | 1 year, 123 days | |
| 7 | Air Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders (1894–1987) | 16 January 1947 | 8 October 1947 | 265 days | |
| 8 | Air Marshal Sir Aubrey Ellwood (1897–1992) | 8 October 1947 | 2 February 1950 | 2 years, 117 days | |
| 9 | Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd (1894–1981) | 2 February 1950 | 9 April 1953 | 3 years, 66 days | |
| 10 | Air Marshal Sir George Mills (1902–1971) | 9 April 1953 | 22 January 1956 | 2 years, 288 days | |
| 11 | Air Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst (1905–1995) | 22 January 1956 | 20 May 1959 | 3 years, 118 days | |
| 12 | Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross (1911–2003) | 20 May 1959 | 1 September 1963 | 4 years, 104 days | |
| 13 | Air Marshal Sir John Grandy (1913–2004) | 1 September 1963 | 19 February 1965 | 1 year, 171 days | |
| 14 | Air Marshal Sir Wallace Kyle (1910–1988) | 19 February 1965 | 30 April 1968 | 3 years, 71 days |
Battle honours
[edit]- "Berlin 1940–1945": For bombardment of Berlin by aircraft of Bomber Command.
- "Fortress Europe 1940–1944": For operations by aircraft based in the British Isles against targets in Germany, Italy and enemy-occupied Europe, from the fall of France to the invasion of Normandy.
Memorials
[edit]Singer Robin Gibb led an effort to commemorate those who died during World War II and in April, 2011, it was announced that the £5.6 million needed to build the memorial had been raised.[64] The foundation stone of the Bomber Command Memorial for the crews of Bomber Command was laid in Green Park, London on 4 May 2011.[65]
The memorial was designed by architect Liam O'Connor, who was also responsible for the design and construction of the Commonwealth Memorial Gates on Constitution Hill, near Buckingham Palace. Sculptor Philip Jackson created the large bronze sculpture which stands within the memorial. It consists of seven figures 9 feet (3 m) tall, and represents the aircrew of a Bomber Command heavy bomber.[66] Jackson described the sculpture as capturing "the moment when they get off the aircraft and they've dumped all their heavy kit onto the ground".[67] The memorial was dedicated and unveiled on 28 June 2012 by Queen Elizabeth II.[67][68]

In August 2006, a memorial was unveiled at Lincoln Cathedral.[69]
The International Bomber Command Centre (IBCC) is a memorial and interpretation centre telling the story of Bomber Command. The centre was opened to the public at the end of January 2018, and the official opening ceremony was held on 12 April 2018, as part of the 100th anniversary celebrations of the RAF. The memorial itself consists of a Memorial Spire and an array of walls listing the names of the 57,861 personnel who died in Bomber Command in the Second World War.[70][71]
Medal clasp and proposed medal
[edit]The planned campaign medal for Bomber Command was never struck. The decision not to award a medal for all members of Bomber Command occurred during the short gap between the wartime coalition and Attlee's Labour Government, whilst Churchill was still P.M. This caused Harris to turn down Attlee's subsequent offer of a peerage in protest at this snub; a principled stand which Harris had taken, and declared, at the time the decision not to award a separate campaign medal was made. The Command's raids had tied up huge amounts of Germany's defensive resources - which might have been diverted to the Eastern and Western Fronts and elsewhere - and the physical destruction of war material was considerable. Nevertheless, Churchill, much to Harris's chagrin, made virtually no mention of Bomber Command's campaign in his victory speech on V.E.day. Harris, who was promoted to Marshal of the RAF by the Labour Government in 1946, was persuaded to accept a baronetcy when Winston Churchill became prime minister again in 1951, after Attlee's Labour Government was voted out of office. As of 2018, the battle for a campaign medal continues.[72]

The Military Medals Review was undertaken by Sir John Holmes and published in July 2012.[73] In December 2012, following the review, the British government announced the introduction of a "Bomber Command" clasp to be worn on the 1939–1945 Star.[74] The second such clasp after the "Battle of Britain" which had been instituted in 1945. A clasp rather than a separate medal was preferred because recipients would have already received either the Air Crew Europe Star or the France and Germany Star, and a specific medal would have resulted in “double-medalling”.[75] It is a long-standing principle of the British honours system that "same individual should not be able to receive two campaign medals for the same element of military service"; i.e. double-medalling.[76] The eligibility for the "Bomber Command" clasp is as follows: having already qualified for the 1939–1945 Star, the individual must have served for at least sixty days or one complete tour of operations on a Bomber Command unit and flew at least one operational sortie on a Bomber Command operational unit from the 3 September 1939 to the 8 May 1945 inclusive.[75]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Explanatory notes
[edit]- ^ Seven of the VCs were to members of Dominion air forces and nine were posthumous. Two personnel from the same aircrew received the VC as a result of their actions on 12 May 1940. With the Germans breaking through, 12 Squadron, flying obsolete Fairey Battles, was ordered to attack two bridges on the Albert Canal near Maastricht. The whole squadron volunteered and five aircraft, all that were available, took off. Four Battles were shot down by flak and German fighters, while the fifth staggered back to base heavily damaged. One of the four shot down was piloted by Flying Officer Donald Garland, who dived from 6,000 feet (1,800 m) in the face of intense fire, and succeeded in destroying one of the bridges. He and his observer, Sgt Tom Gray, both received the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross.
Citations
[edit]- ^ Pine 1983, p. 222.
- ^ Wilkinson, Alf. "History of Aviation - Bomber Theory: Air Power Between Two World Wars". Spartacus School net. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007.
- ^ Boyne 2012, p. 19–20.
- ^ Judkins 2012, p. 114.
- ^ Walker 2016, p. 25.
- ^ "Letter from the President of the United States to the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and His Britannic Majesty: Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations". US Government. 1 September 1939. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
- ^ Taylor 2005, p. 105.
- ^ Grayling 2006, p. 24.
- ^ Andrews 1967, p. 16.
- ^ Jackson 1974, p. 17.
- ^ Baughen 2016, pp. 99–100.
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 6.
- ^ Taylor 2005, p. 111.
- ^ Richards 1953, p. 124.
- ^ Richards 1953, pp. 186–187.
- ^ Richards 1953, p. 182.
- ^ O'Dell, Sqn Ldr Robert. "To hat Extent Did Royal Air Force Employment of Electronic Warfare Contribute to the Outcome of the Strategic Night Bomber Offensive of World War II?". Royal Air Force Centre for Air and Space Power Studies. p. 99.
- ^ a b Moyes 1976, p. 348.
- ^ Milberry 1984, p. 166.
- ^ Dunmore & Carter 1991, p. 375.
- ^ Niehorster, Leo. "Bomber Command, RAF, 06.06.1944". niehorster.org.
- ^ Stationed at Morton Hall, Swinderby, 91 Group was merged into No. 21 Group RAF, part of RAF Flying Training Command, on 1 May 1947;"Group No's 20 - 29". Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation. Archived from the original on 28 March 2010. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- ^ Davis, Rob. "Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command 1939–1945". Archived from the original on 15 June 2008. Retrieved 3 July 2008.
- ^ Taylor 2005, pp. 277–288.
- ^ Part I: A Failure of Intelligence Technology Review, 1 November 2006 Archived 2 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Blank, Ralf. "Battle of the Ruhr 1939–1945". Retrieved 3 July 2008.
- ^ March 1943. Campaign Diary. Royal Air Force. 6 April 2005. Wikidata Q131336096. Archived from the original on 6 July 2007. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
- ^ Mets 1997, p. 239.
- ^ Prescher 1955, pp. 90–91.
- ^ "Vallo-Taneberg oil refinery". IBCC Digital Archive. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- ^ Giangreco 2009, p. xvi.
- ^ "The long trip home". RAF Museum. Retrieved 20 May 2016.
- ^ a b c Roberts, Andrew (March 2007). "High courage on the axe-edge of war". The Times. London.[dead link]
- ^ Robertson 1984, p. 216.
- ^ Nor the Years Condemn by Rob Davies Archived 15 June 2008 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Reaping the Whirlwind: Bracknell Paper No 4 A Symposium on the Strategic Bomber Offensive 1939–1945" (PDF). The Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell. 26 March 1993. p. 16. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- ^ A Failure of Intelligence Freeman Dyson, MIT Technology Review
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 334.
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 343.
- ^ Otter 1998, p. 262.
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 275.
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 209, 460–461.
- ^ Hastings 1979, p. 173.
- ^ Cosgrove, Troy. "Bomber Command's 19 Victoria Cross Winners". Archived from the original on 20 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-07-03.
- ^ Staff Air Commodore Henry Probert (obituary), The Times, 14 February 2008
- ^ Momyer, William M. Air power in three wars, DIANE Publishing, ISBN 1-4289-9396-7. pp. 190–192. This book contains a full quotation of the two paragraphs quoted here, and cites the source as Albert Speer. Spandau, The Secret Diaries, New York: Macmillan and Company, 1976, pp. 339–340
- ^ a b Tooze 2007, p. 598.
- ^ "Flak 88 firing Charkow eastern front 1941". World War Photos. Retrieved 23 September 2021.
- ^ Thompson, Wing Commander H. L. (1956). "Chapter 5: With Mine, Bomb, and Torpedo". New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force (Vol. II). The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945. Wellington: Historical Publications Branch.
- ^ Saunders 1954, p. 405.
- ^ Breyer, Siegfried; et al. (1994). Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1935–1945 (in German). Vol. I–IV. Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas. ISBN 978-3-89350-699-6.
- ^ Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore (2005). English Electric Canberra: The History and Development of a Classic Jet. Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-242-1.
- ^ Brookes 2012, p. 12.
- ^ Jones 2000, p. 13–15.
- ^ Kirby & Godwin 2009, p. 168–187.
- ^ Darling 2012, p. 42.
- ^ Lee 1989, p. 172–176.
- ^ Brookes, Andrew (2009). Vulcan Units of the Cold War. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-297-4.
- ^ Scott, Len (April 2017). "Bomber Command and the Cuban Missile Crisis: At the Brink of Armageddon?". Air Power Review. 20 (2). Swindon: Royal Air Force: 142–153. Archived from the original on 11 September 2024.
- ^ "Valiants to be Scrapped." Glasgow Herald, 27 January 1965.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 274–277.
- ^ "The Blue Streak Missile". Hansard. 3 May 1960. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 222.
- ^ News Archive Brothers Gibb
- ^ Bomber Command Memorial foundation stone laid Defence News, 5 May 2011
- ^ "A fitting tribute to the young men of raf bomber command" Archived 29 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine. (2012). Bomber Command Association. Retrieved 28 June 2012.
- ^ a b "Queen unveils RAF Bomber Command memorial". (2012). BBC News Online. Retrieved 28 June 2012.
- ^ Rayner, Gordon (9 March 2012). "Lord Ashcroft donates final £1 million for Bomber Command Memorial". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 10 May 2012. Retrieved 25 May 2012.
- ^ Smith, David (20 August 2006). "RAF tribute stirs up 'war crime' storm". The Observer. London. Retrieved 3 July 2008.
- ^ "International Bomber Command Centre". Retrieved 5 July 2021.
- ^ "A story of Discovery, Education and Remembrance". International Bomber Command Centre. Retrieved 20 October 2022.
- ^ "Campaign medal call for WWII Bomber Command veterans". BBC News. 26 May 2018. Retrieved 25 July 2021.
- ^ "Military medals review: report by Sir John Holmes". GOV.UK. Cabinet Office. 17 July 2012. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
- ^ "Arctic Convoy and Bomber Command veterans to be honoured". GOV.UK. Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. 19 December 2012. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
- ^ a b "Arctic Star and Bomber Command Clasp". Veterans UK. Ministry of Defence. Archived from the original on 5 August 2014. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
- ^ "Awarding military campaign medals: guidance". GOV.UK. Cabinet Office. 27 October 2014. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
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- Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore (2005). English Electric Canberra: The History and Development of a Classic Jet. Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-84415-242-1.
- Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore (1984). To Shatter the Sky: Bomber Airfield at War. Patrick Stephens. ISBN 978-0-85059-678-6.
- Harris, Arthur (1995). Despatch on War Operations (Cass Studies in Air Power). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4692-3.
- Hastings, Max (1979). RAF Bomber Command. Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-39204-2.
- Jackson, R. (1974). Air War over France 1939–40 (1st ed.). London: Ian Allan. ISBN 978-0-7110-0510-5.
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- Mets, David R. (1997) [1988]. Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (paperback ed.). Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-317-0.
- Middlebrook, Martin (1982). The Peenemünde Raid: The Night of 17–18 August 1943. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
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- Peden, Murray (2003). A Thousand Shall Fall : The True Story of a Canadian Bomber Pilot in World War Two. Dundurn Press. ISBN 978-1550024548.
- Pine, L.G. (1983). A Dictionary of Mottoes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN 0-7100-9339-X.
- Rudolf Prescher (1955). Werner Spieß (ed.). Der rote Hahn über Braunschweig: Luftschutzmaßnahmen und Luftkriegsereignisse in der Stadt Braunschweig 1927 bis 1945 (PDF). Braunschweiger Werkstücke (in German). Brunswick: Waisenhaus-Buchdruckerei. doi:10.24355/DBBS.084-201801311138. OCLC 1239810409. Wikidata Q131286971.
- Richards, Denis (1953). Royal Air Force 1939–1945: Volume I The Fight at Odds. History of the Second World War. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Robertson, John (1984). Australia Goes to War. Australia: Doubleday. ISBN 0-86824-155-5.
- Saunders, Hilary St. George (1954). Royal Air Force 1939–1945: Volume III The Fight is Won. History of the Second World War. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Smith, Malcolm (1 March 1990). The Allied Air Offensive. Journal of Strategic Studies. pp. 67–83.
- Taylor, Frederick (2005). Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945. London: Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-7475-7084-1.
- Terraine, John (1985). A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945. Macmillan Publishing Co.
- Tooze, Adam (2007). The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-100348-1.
- Verrier, Anthony (1968). The Bomber Offensive. London: Batsford.
- Walker, J. Samuel (2016). Prompt and Utter Destruction Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-1469628981.
- Webster, Charles; Noble, Frankland (1961). The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945. HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-437-3.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - Wells, Mark K. (1995). Courage and air warfare: the Allied aircrew experience in the Second World War. Routledge.
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (1986). "The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments". Journal of American History. 73 (3): 702–713. doi:10.2307/1902984. JSTOR 1902984.
External links
[edit]- Staff, RAF History – The Second World War A bibliography prepared by the RAF (see the section "Bomber Command and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany")
- Bob Baxter's Bomber Command Archived 27 April 2017 at the Wayback Machine Comprehensive history and research about Bomber Command.
- Bomber Command Memorial Appeal The website looking to raise funds for the Bomber Command Memorial in London.
- Bomber Command Memorial Appeal The donation website for the Bomber Command Memorial in London.
- Timelines of Bomber Command over '42–'45
- Related Newspaper Articles
- RAF Bomber Command at War 1939–45 CD audiobooks (actuality recordings)
- Bomber Command Squadrons
- "Re-arming a Bomber" 1941 Training Film on YouTube
RAF Bomber Command
View on GrokipediaFormation and Background
Interwar Origins and Doctrine Development
The Royal Air Force (RAF) originated from the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service on 1 April 1918, amid World War I experiences with aerial bombing, including German Zeppelin and Gotha raids on Britain that began on 13 June 1917 and intensified thereafter. These events underscored the psychological impact of bombing, influencing early RAF theorists to prioritize offensive strategic air power over defensive or tactical roles to justify the service's independence from army and navy control. Hugh Trenchard, appointed Chief of the Air Staff in 1919 and serving until 1929, became the central figure in this doctrinal evolution, advocating in his 14 August 1919 memorandum for long-range bombing operations aimed at disrupting enemy economies and civilian morale to compel surrender without ground invasion.[5][5] Trenchard's principles emphasized that air forces should focus on independent strategic bombing to target "points of vantage" in enemy hinterlands, predicated on the untested assumption that aerial attacks would shatter national will more rapidly than material destruction alone, drawing from limited World War I data where German raids killed over 1,400 British civilians but failed to induce capitulation. This "morale bombing" concept, which posited cascading societal breakdown from fear and disruption, was formalized in RAF publications such as CD 22 (1922) and AP 1300, the Royal Air Force War Manual (1928), which declared strategic bombing the primary wartime task, asserting that bombers could penetrate defenses without prerequisite air superiority and conduct high-altitude daylight precision strikes. Annual interwar air exercises from 1927 to 1935 repeatedly demonstrated bomber vulnerabilities to interceptors—such as in 1935 when over 50 percent of simulated attackers were "shot down"—yet doctrinal adherence persisted, reinforced by the prevailing view that fighter defenses were inherently inferior to offensive bomber formations.[5][6][6] Parallel to European-focused doctrine, the RAF applied air power in imperial policing during the 1920s, as endorsed by the March 1921 Cairo Conference, where low-cost bombing subdued tribal resistances in Iraq and elsewhere, achieving control with minimal ground troops but validating only coercive rather than decisive strategic effects. By the mid-1930s, escalating European tensions prompted rearmament; Expansion Scheme F (February 1936) targeted 118 bomber squadrons by 1939, emphasizing medium bombers like the Vickers Wellington for long-range operations. Bomber Command was formally established on 14 July 1936, reorganizing the former Western Area into a dedicated strategic entity under Air Marshal Sir John Steel initially, with doctrine unchanged: reliance on unescorted formations delivering 3,000-ton monthly raids to paralyze Germany, despite persistent technical limitations in navigation and bomb accuracy revealed in pre-war trials. This rigid framework, rooted in Trenchard's legacy, prioritized quantity and offensive spirit over adaptability, setting the stage for wartime implementation.[5][1][7]Establishment and Pre-War Expansion
RAF Bomber Command was formed on 14 July 1936 amid the Royal Air Force's restructuring into functional commands—Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, and Training—to streamline operations in response to the rising threat posed by German rearmament and the expansion of the Luftwaffe.[8][9] This reorganization centralized control over all RAF bombing assets, previously dispersed under area-based commands, enabling focused development of strategic bombing capabilities based on the prevailing doctrine that "the bomber will always get through," which emphasized offensive air power as a deterrent.[1][10] Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt assumed the role of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief on 12 September 1937, bringing experience from command in Iraq and India to oversee the command's nascent operations and training.[9] Under his leadership, initial emphasis was placed on night bombing to mitigate defensive risks, reflecting interwar tactical experiments with limited resources.[9] Pre-war expansion accelerated through Air Ministry schemes initiated in 1934, such as Scheme C and subsequent iterations like Scheme F, which targeted a frontline strength of 1,736 aircraft by March 1939, including allocations for heavy bombers. By September 1939, the overall RAF had expanded from 42 squadrons and approximately 800 aircraft in 1934 to 157 squadrons and over 3,700 aircraft, with Bomber Command incorporating new medium bomber types including the Vickers-Armstrongs Wellington, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, and Handley Page Hampden to replace obsolete biplanes like the Fairey Hendon.[11][12] Despite these efforts, persistent shortages in trained personnel, airfields, and modern production lagged behind German advancements, hampering full operational readiness.[9][13] No. 1 Group, formed in May 1936 as a light bomber unit, exemplified early organizational growth, later deploying to France as part of the Advanced Air Striking Force.[14]World War II Operations
Phoney War and Early Offensive (1939–1940)
Following Britain's declaration of war on 3 September 1939, RAF Bomber Command under Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt commenced operations with propaganda leaflet drops over Germany to demoralize the population without risking escalation to civilian bombing. On the night of 3–4 September, ten Whitley bombers from Nos. 51 and 58 Squadrons dispersed leaflets over Hamburg, Bremen, and the Ruhr.[15] The Command's first bombing raid targeted naval assets on 4 September, with ten Blenheim bombers from Nos. 107 and 110 Squadrons striking the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven in the Heligoland Bight, claiming hits on the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer but inflicting limited verified damage; five aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire and fighters. In a concurrent operation, fourteen Wellingtons from Nos. 9 and 149 Squadrons attacked shipping at Brunsbüttel, losing two to defenses.[15][1] Throughout the Phoney War until April 1940, emphasis remained on "Nickel" leaflet raids—codenamed for propaganda dissemination—totaling 18 million leaflets by 27 September, extending to Berlin via No. 10 Squadron Whitleys on 1–2 October, alongside selective anti-shipping strikes conducted mostly at night after daylight losses mounted. Notable actions included eleven Hampdens attacking destroyers near Heligoland on 29 September (five lost) and twenty-four Wellingtons on Heligoland Bight reconnaissance on 18 December (ten lost), highlighting vulnerabilities in unescorted daytime missions and prompting a policy shift to nocturnal operations.[15][16][1] The German invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940 ended restraint, spurring Bomber Command to bomb ports and airfields like Stavanger/Sola, where six Wellingtons from No. 115 Squadron raided on 11–12 April, losing one aircraft amid ongoing daily strikes from Scottish bases.[17] As the Battle of France unfolded from 10 May 1940, Bomber Command supported Allied ground forces with sorties against advancing German columns, bridges, and airfields, but poor bombing accuracy, weather, and defenses inflicted heavy casualties—exacerbating the force's reduction—leading to a full transition to indiscriminate night area attacks on industrial targets by summer's end.[1]Defensive and Retaliatory Phases (1940–1941)
Following the Dunkirk evacuation and the fall of France in June 1940, RAF Bomber Command abandoned daylight precision bombing raids due to unsustainable losses from Luftwaffe fighters and flak, transitioning instead to night operations against German targets. This shift aimed to preserve aircrews and aircraft while maintaining pressure on the enemy, with primary efforts directed at industrial sites, synthetic oil plants, and ports preparing for Operation Sea Lion, the planned invasion of Britain. Medium bombers such as the Vickers-Armstrongs Wellington, Handley Page Hampden, and Armstrong Whitworth Whitley formed the backbone of these missions, operating from forward bases in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire.[1][12] During the Battle of Britain from July to October 1940, Bomber Command flew night sorties to disrupt German invasion preparations, targeting barge concentrations in Channel ports like Ostend and Antwerp, as well as airfields and oil facilities. These raids, often involving 50-100 aircraft, inflicted limited material damage but forced the Luftwaffe to divert resources for defense and contributed to the overall strain on German logistics. On 24 August 1940, an accidental Luftwaffe raid on London prompted immediate retaliation; the following night, 25-26 August, 81 Hampden and Whitley bombers from Nos. 5 Group struck Berlin, aiming at Tempelhof airfield and the Siemens factories, dropping approximately 20 tons of bombs with negligible physical impact due to cloud cover and rudimentary navigation aids, but achieving significant psychological effect by demonstrating Britain's reach. No aircraft were lost in this inaugural Berlin raid, though subsequent missions saw rising attrition.[18][19][20] Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse assumed command on 5 October 1940, succeeding Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, amid escalating German night attacks during the Blitz, which began on 7 September and continued into May 1941. Bomber Command responded with intensified retaliatory strikes on German cities, including repeated Berlin raids in September and October 1940—such as 81 aircraft on 7-8 October—and ports like Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg, seeking to mirror the destruction on British urban centers. However, night bombing accuracy was severely limited, with crews relying on dead reckoning and emerging tools like the Y-Service radio direction finding; a 1941 assessment later revealed that only about 20% of bombs fell within five miles of intended targets. Losses mounted, averaging 3-5% per sortie in late 1940, equating to over 200 aircraft and 1,000 aircrew by year's end, underscoring the campaign's high cost relative to strategic gains, which remained marginal in disrupting German war production or morale.[21][22]Area Bombing Policy and Implementation (1942–1943)
The area bombing policy for RAF Bomber Command was formalized through a directive from the Air Ministry on 14 February 1942, which shifted the primary aim of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany to the morale of the civilian population, particularly industrial workers, by targeting urban built-up areas to induce "dehousing" and disrupt war production support.[23] This change was prompted by the recognition of persistent inaccuracies in night-time precision bombing, as highlighted by the Butt Report released on 18 August 1941.[24] The report, commissioned by an aide to Prime Minister Winston Churchill and conducted by David Bensusan Butt, analyzed reconnaissance photographs from over 100 raids in June and July 1941, finding that only about one in three bombers claiming to have attacked their target reached within 5 miles, dropping to less than one in twenty over Germany proper due to factors like cloud cover, navigation errors, and rudimentary blind-bombing techniques.[25] [26] Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris assumed command of Bomber Command on 22 February 1942 and immediately prioritized the new directive, advocating for concentrated incendiary attacks on cities to maximize firestorm effects and civilian dislocation.[27] To execute large-scale operations, Harris introduced tactical innovations such as the "bomber stream" formation to overwhelm German night fighters and flak defenses, along with the formation of the Pathfinder Force in August 1942 to improve target marking using flares and markers.[28] Early implementation included the first "thousand-bomber raid" under Operation Millennium on the night of 30–31 May 1942 against Cologne, involving 1,047 aircraft (including reserves from training units) that dropped 1,455 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs, destroying 3,330 buildings, killing 469 civilians, and leaving 45,000 homeless in 90 minutes of concentrated attack.[29] [30] Follow-up thousand-bomber raids targeted Essen on 1 June 1942 (about 150 bombers effective due to weather) and Bremen on 25 June 1942, demonstrating the feasibility of massed night operations but also exposing vulnerabilities like high loss rates from collisions and defenses, with 41 aircraft lost over Cologne alone.[30] By late 1942, Bomber Command had conducted over 20 major area attacks, incorporating emerging technologies like the H2S ground-mapping radar introduced in March 1942 to aid navigation in poor visibility.[31] The campaign escalated in 1943 with the Battle of the Ruhr from March to July, featuring intensified raids on industrial cities like Dortmund (12,000 tons of bombs dropped on 23–24 May, creating a fire area of 1.5 square miles), Duisburg, and Wuppertal, where mixed bomb loads emphasized incendiaries to replicate the Cologne fire effects and displace workers from factories.[32] These operations inflicted significant urban destruction—over 100,000 dwellings ruined in the Ruhr alone—but faced criticism from Air Staff for diverting from precision targets, though Harris maintained that morale breaking via area attacks was essential given technical limitations.[33]Combined Offensive and Precision Shifts (1944–1945)
In preparation for the Normandy invasion, RAF Bomber Command participated in the Transportation Plan from 6 March 1944 to mid-August 1944, targeting rail centers, bridges, and airfields in occupied France and Belgium to disrupt German reinforcements. This effort involved contributing to approximately 29,000 Allied sorties by D-Day on 6 June 1944, destroying 37 rail centers and heavily damaging 23 others, which rendered daylight rail movement nearly impossible and isolated supply lines as confirmed by a German Air Ministry report on 13 June 1944.[34] The operations incurred significant French civilian casualties, estimated at around 100,000, highlighting the high collateral cost of these precision-oriented strikes using strategic bombers alongside tactical aircraft.[34] Post-D-Day, Bomber Command shifted to supporting ground forces through tactical bombing, including carpet bombing runs on coastal defenses and rail targets, while maintaining the Combined Bomber Offensive with the USAAF for round-the-clock strategic attacks. RAF forces conducted nighttime raids complementing USAAF daylight precision strikes on industrial and infrastructure targets, with Bomber Command dropping over 191,000 tons of bombs on 87 oil facilities in 109 raids between May 1944 and May 1945.[3] [1] This oil campaign proved highly effective, reducing German aviation fuel production from 170,000 tons per month in April 1944 to zero by March 1945, severely hampering Luftwaffe operations and ground mobility.[3] Advances in navigation aids like H2S radar and the master bomber technique enabled greater accuracy in these precision shifts, though area bombing of cities persisted alongside to disrupt dispersed industries and civilian support for the war effort.[1] In early 1945, operations intensified to support Allied advances, including the controversial raid on Dresden from 13 to 15 February, where 790 Lancasters dropped over 2,000 tons of bombs in two waves on 13 February, creating a firestorm that devastated the city center, rail yards, and arms factories to impede reinforcements to the Eastern Front.[35] The attack, coordinated with USAAF follow-ups, resulted in an estimated 25,000 to 35,000 deaths, primarily civilians, amid refugee overcrowding, though it aligned with directives to degrade German transport and morale in the war's final phase.[35] Overall, these combined and precision-focused efforts, despite heavy aircrew losses totaling around 55,000 for Bomber Command, contributed to collapsing German production and mobility, accelerating the end of the European war by May 1945.[2][1]Command Structure and Resources
Hierarchical Organization
RAF Bomber Command's structure positioned the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), an Air Chief Marshal, at the top, directing strategy and operations from headquarters at RAF High Wycombe and reporting to the Air Ministry's Air Staff.[1]
Operational groups formed the next tier, each led by an Air Vice-Marshal as Air Officer Commanding (AOC), responsible for coordinating squadrons within their jurisdiction, often aligned by aircraft type or specialized role. In 1939, six groups operated under Bomber Command, expanding to eight by 1945 to accommodate growth and new functions like pathfinding and electronic countermeasures.[36][1]
From March 1943, groups administered bases—groupings of a main airfield and satellite stations commanded by Air Commodores—to streamline logistics and maintenance, while individual stations, led by Group Captains, typically hosted two flying squadrons. Squadrons, commanded by Wing Commanders, served as the core tactical units, subdivided into two or three flights of about eight aircraft each under Squadron Leaders.[36]
Key groups included No. 1, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 5 for heavy bomber operations with Lancasters and Halifaxes; No. 6 (Royal Canadian Air Force) for Canadian-manned squadrons; No. 8 (Pathfinder Force), established August 1942 for target marking; and No. 100 for radio countermeasures. This expansion supported over 108 squadrons and 1,500 aircraft by 1945, compared to 23 squadrons and 280 aircraft in September 1939.[36][1][37]
Aircraft, Bases, and Logistics
RAF Bomber Command initially relied on twin-engined medium bombers such as the Vickers Wellington, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, and Handley Page Hampden, with approximately 280 aircraft across 23 squadrons at the outbreak of war in September 1939.[1] These types, limited by range and payload, conducted early operations but suffered high losses due to inadequate defensive armament and navigation capabilities. By late 1940, the command transitioned to four-engined heavy bombers to meet the demands of strategic bombing, starting with the Short Stirling entering service in December 1940, followed by the Handley Page Halifax in November 1940 and the Avro Lancaster in March 1942.[1] The Stirling, the first heavy bomber operational with Bomber Command, featured four Bristol Hercules radial engines, a maximum speed of 282 mph at 12,500 feet, and a range of 2,330 miles, though its performance was hampered by a low service ceiling and operational height limitations that exposed it to flak.[38] Production totaled around 2,347 units, but it was phased out by 1943 in favor of superior types due to handling issues and vulnerability.[39] The Halifax, powered by four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines with a 103-foot wingspan, offered a typical bomb load of 5,800 pounds and a range of 1,860 miles with standard fuel, serving as a reliable workhorse with over 6,000 built.[40] The Lancaster emerged as the command's premier bomber, capable of carrying up to 14,000 pounds in standard configuration or specialized loads like the 22,000-pound Grand Slam bomb, with production exceeding 7,300 aircraft; its spacious bomb bay and high speed of around 287 mph enabled versatile operations including precision attacks.[41]| Aircraft Type | Engines | Max Bomb Load (lb) | Production Numbers | Service Entry |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short Stirling | 4 × Bristol Hercules | 14,000 | ~2,347 | Dec 1940 |
| Handley Page Halifax | 4 × Rolls-Royce Merlin | 13,000 | ~6,176 | Nov 1940 |
| Avro Lancaster | 4 × Rolls-Royce Merlin | 22,000 (special) | ~7,377 | Mar 1942 |


