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Mexico–United States border
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| Mexico–United States border | |
|---|---|
The border between Mexico and the United States spans six Mexican states and four U.S. states. | |
| Characteristics | |
| Entities | |
| Length | 3,145 kilometers (1,954 mi) |
| History | |
| Established | September 28, 1821 Declaration of Independence (Mexico) |
| Current shape | April 18, 1972 Boundary Treaty of 1970 |
| Treaties | Adams–Onís Treaty, Treaty of Limits, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Gadsden Purchase |
| Notes | It is the busiest border in the Western Hemisphere |


The international border separating Mexico and the United States extends from the Pacific Ocean in the west to the Gulf of Mexico in the east. The border traverses a variety of terrains, ranging from urban areas to deserts. It is the most frequently crossed border in the world with approximately 350 million documented crossings annually. Illegal crossing of the border to enter the United States has caused the Mexico–United States border crisis. It is one of two international borders that the United States has, the other being the northern Canada–United States border; Mexico has two other borders: with Belize and with Guatemala.
Four American Sun Belt states border Mexico: California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. One definition of Northern Mexico includes only the six Mexican states that border the U.S.: Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora and Tamaulipas.[1] The total length of the continental border is 3,145 kilometers (1,954 miles). From the Gulf of Mexico, it follows the course of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) to the border crossing at Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and El Paso, Texas. Westward from El Paso–Juárez, it crosses vast tracts of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts to the Colorado River Delta and San Diego–Tijuana, before reaching the Pacific Ocean.[2]
Geography
[edit]
The Mexico–United States border extends 3,145 kilometers (1,954 miles), in addition to the maritime boundaries of 29 km (18 mi) into the Pacific Ocean and 19 km (12 mi) into the Gulf of Mexico.[3][4] It is the tenth-longest border between two countries in the world.[5]
The Mexico–U.S. border begins at the Initial Point of Boundary Between U.S. and Mexico, which is set one marine league (three nautical miles) south of the southernmost point of San Diego Bay. The border then proceeds for 227 km (141 mi) in a straight line towards the confluence of the Colorado River and Gila River.[6][7] The border continues southwards along the Colorado River for 39 km (24 mi), until it reaches a point 32 km (20 mi) south of the Gila River confluence. The border then follows a series of lines and parallels totaling 859 km (534 mi). First, it follows a straight line from the Colorado River to the intersection of the 31° 20′ parallel north and the 111th meridian west. It then proceeds eastwards along the 31° 20′ parallel north up to a meridian 161 km (100 mi) west of the point where the Rio Grande crosses the 31° 47′ parallel north,[7] It then proceeds northwards along that meridian up to the 31° 47′ parallel north and then eastwards along that parallel until it meets the Rio Grande.[8]
According to the International Boundary and Water Commission,[2] the continental border then follows the middle of the Rio Grande—according to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the two nations, "along the deepest channel" (also known as the thalweg)—a distance of 2,020 km (1,255 mi) to its mouth at the Gulf of Mexico.[7] The Rio Grande frequently meanders along the Texas–Mexico border. As a result, the U.S. and Mexico have a treaty by which the Rio Grande is maintained as the border, with new cut-offs and islands being transferred to the other nation as necessary. The Boundary Treaty of 1970 between Mexico and the U.S. settled all outstanding boundary disputes and uncertainties related to the Rio Grande border.
The U.S. states along the border, from west to east, are California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The Mexican states along the border are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. Among the U.S. states, Texas has the longest stretch of the border with Mexico, while California has the shortest. Among the states in Mexico, Chihuahua has the longest border with the U.S., while Nuevo León has the shortest. Along the border are 23 U.S. counties and 39 Mexican municipalities.
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The start of the border fence in the state of New Mexico – just west of El Paso, Texas
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U.S. Border Patrol helicopter along El Camino del Diablo, Arizona–Sonora border, 2004
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Border between Nogales, Arizona, on the left, and Nogales, Sonora, on the right
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On the left: Nogales, Arizona; on the right, Nogales, Sonora
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Beach in Tijuana at the border in 2006
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A CBP Border Patrol vehicle sitting near Mexico–U.S. border
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View of the Cross Border Xpress (CBX) bridge from parking lot on U.S. side, with Tijuana Airport on the left and the CBX U.S. terminal on the right
History
[edit]Prior to the Mexican–American War
[edit]
In the mid-16th century, after the discovery of silver, settlers from various countries and backgrounds began to arrive in the area. This period of sparse settlement included colonizers from different backgrounds. The area was part of New Spain. In the early 19th century, the U.S. bought the lands known as the Louisiana Purchase from France and began to expand steadily westward.[9]
After the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the border between the U.S. and New Spain was not clearly defined. The border was established in the 1819 Adams–Onís Treaty between the U.S. and Spain, which specified northern and eastern borders. Mexico gained its independence from Spain, and the border was reaffirmed in the 1828 Treaty of Limits.
Mexico attempted to create a buffer zone at the border that would prevent possible invasion from the north. The Mexican government encouraged thousands of their own citizens to settle in the region that is now known as Texas and even offered inexpensive land to settlers from the U.S. in exchange for populating the area. The influx of people did not provide the defense that Mexico had hoped for and instead Texas declared its independence in 1836, which lasted until 1845 when the U.S. annexed it.
Establishment of current border
[edit]
The constant conflicts in the Texas region in the mid-19th century eventually led to the Mexican–American War, which began in 1846 and ended in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In the terms of the peace treaty, Mexico lost more than 2,500,000 square kilometers (970,000 sq mi) of land, 55%[10] of its territory, including all of what is today California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada and parts of what is Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, and Oklahoma. In addition, all disputes over Texas and the disputed territory between Rio Grande and Rio Nueces were abandoned. The exact border was established by surveyors from both countries, who interpreted the treaty as they completed the United States and Mexican Boundary Survey.[6]
Five years later, the Gadsden Purchase completed the creation of the current U.S.–Mexico border. The purchase was initially to accommodate a planned railway right-of-way. These purchases left approximately 300,000 people living in the once disputed lands, many of whom were Mexican nationals. Following the establishment of the current border, several towns sprang up along this boundary, and many of the Mexican citizens were given free land in the northern regions of Mexico in exchange for returning and repopulating the area.[11]
Later history
[edit]
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and another treaty in 1884 were the agreements originally responsible for the settlement of the international border, both of which specified that the middle of the Rio Grande was the border, irrespective of any alterations in the channels or banks. The Rio Grande shifted south between 1852 and 1868, with the most radical shift in the river occurring after a flood in 1864. By 1873 the moving river-center border had cut off approximately 2.4 square kilometers (590 acres) of Mexican territory in the El Paso-Juarez area, in effect transferring the land to the U.S.. By a treaty negotiated in 1963, Mexico regained most of this land in what became known as the Chamizal dispute and transferred 1.07 km2 (260 acres) in return to the U.S. Border treaties are jointly administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), which was established in 1889 to maintain the border, allocate river waters between the two nations, and provide for flood control and water sanitation. Once viewed as a model of international cooperation, in recent decades the IBWC has been heavily criticized as an institutional anachronism, by-passed by modern social, environmental and political issues.[4] In particular, jurisdictional issues regarding water rights in the Rio Grande Valley have continued to cause tension between farmers along the border, according to Mexican political scientist Armand Peschard-Sverdrup.[12][13]
The economic development of the border region on the Mexican side of the border depended largely on its proximity to the U.S., because of its remoteness from commercial centers in Mexico. During the years of Mexican President Porfirio Díaz, between 1876 and 1910, the border communities boomed because of close ties to the U.S. and the Mexican government's support for financial investments from the U.S.[14] Railroads were built that connected the northern Mexican states more to the U.S. than to Mexico, and the population grew tremendously. The mining industry also developed, as did the U.S.'s control of it. By the early 20th century companies from the U.S. controlled 81% of the mining industry and had invested US$500 million in the Mexican economy overall, 25% of it in the border regions.[15]
The U.S. Immigration Act of 1891 authorized the implementation of inspection stations at ports of entry along the Mexican and Canadian borders. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1917 required the passing of a literacy test and a head tax by Mexicans wanting to enter the U.S. legally; however, during World War I, when labor shortages grew, the provisions were temporarily suspended. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 established the U.S. Border Patrol.[16]
The Mexican Revolution, caused at least partially by animosity toward foreign ownership of Mexican properties, began in 1910. The revolution increased the political instability in Mexico but did not significantly slow U.S. investment. It did reduce economic development within Mexico, however, and the border regions reflected this. As the infrastructure of communities on the U.S. side continued to improve, the Mexican side began to fall behind in the construction and maintenance of important transportation networks and systems necessary to municipal development.[15]
Although the Mexican Revolution caused insecurity in Mexico, it also strained U.S.–Mexico relations. With the Mexican Revolution lasting for 10 years, ending in 1920, and World War I simultaneously occurring between 1914 and 1918, the division between the U.S. and Mexico began to polarize the two nations. Constant battles and raids along the border made both authorities nervous about borderland security. The Zimmerman Telegram, a diplomatic cable sent by Germany but intercepted and decrypted by British intelligence, was meant to bait Mexico into war with the U.S. in order to reconquer what was taken from them during the Mexican-American War. This inspired the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor suspicious activities and potential violence at the border.[17] Within 10 years, frequent provocations caused border towns to transform into battlefields, which intensified transborder restrictions, brought federal soldiers to patrol the border, and caused the construction of fences and barriers between border towns. When the battles concluded, restrictions for crossing the border were relaxed and most soldiers were sent home; however, the fences remained as a physical reminder of the division between the two nations. As years passed, more fences and higher barriers were established as attentions focused on the boundary demarcation between the U.S. and Mexico.[18]
The first international bridge was the Brownsville & Matamoros International Bridge built in 1910. The first barrier built by the U.S. was between 1909 and 1911 in California, the first barrier built by Mexico was likely in 1918; barriers were extended in the 1920s and 1940s.[19]
The Banco Convention of 1905 between the U.S. and Mexico allowed, in the event of sudden changes in the course of the Rio Grande (as by flooding), for the border to be altered to follow the new course.[20] The sudden changes often created bancos (land surrounded by bends in the river that became segregated from either country by a cutoff, often caused by rapid accretion or avulsion of the alluvial channel), especially in the lower Rio Grande Valley. When these bancos are created, the International Boundary and Water Commission investigates if land previously belonging to the U.S. or Mexico is to be considered on the other side of the border.[21] In all cases of these adjustments along the Rio Grande under the 1905 convention, which occurred on 37 different dates from 1910 to 1976, the transferred land was small (ranging from one to 646 acres) and uninhabited.[22][23][24]
The Rio Grande Rectification Treaty of 1933 straightened and stabilized the river boundary through the highly developed El Paso-Juárez valley. Numerous parcels of land were transferred between the two countries during the construction period, 1935–1938. At the end, each nation had ceded an equal area of land to the other.[25][26]
The Boundary Treaty of 1970 transferred an area of Mexican territory to the U.S., near Presidio and Hidalgo, Texas, to build flood control channels. In exchange, the U.S. ceded other land to Mexico, including five parcels near Presidio, the Horcon Tract and Beaver Island near Roma, Texas. On November 24, 2009, the U.S. ceded 6 islands in the Rio Grande to Mexico. At the same time, Mexico ceded 3 islands and 2 bancos to the U.S. This transfer, which had been pending for 20 years, was the first application of Article III of the 1970 Boundary Treaty.[27][28][29]
Border crossing checkpoints
[edit]The border separating Mexico and the U.S. is the most frequently crossed international boundary in the world,[30][31] with approximately 350 million legal crossings taking place annually.[30][32][33]
Border crossings take place by roads, pedestrian walkways, railroads and ferries. From west to east, below is a list of the border city "twinnings"; cross-border municipalities connected by one or more legal border crossings.

- San Diego, California (San Ysidro) – Tijuana, Baja California (San Diego–Tijuana Metro)
- Cross Border Xpress, Otay Mesa, California – Tijuana International Airport, Baja California
- Otay Mesa, California – Tijuana, Baja California
- Tecate, California – Tecate, Baja California
- Calexico, California – Mexicali, Baja California
- Andrade, California – Los Algodones, Baja California
- San Luis, Arizona – San Luis Río Colorado, Sonora
- Lukeville, Arizona – Sonoyta, Sonora
- Sasabe, Arizona – Altar, Sonora
- Nogales, Arizona – Nogales, Sonora
- Naco, Arizona – Naco, Sonora
- Douglas, Arizona – Agua Prieta, Sonora
- Antelope Wells, New Mexico – El Berrendo, Chihuahua
- Columbus, New Mexico – Palomas, Chihuahua
- Santa Teresa, New Mexico – San Jerónimo, Chihuahua
- El Paso, Texas – Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua (El Paso-Juarez)
- Fabens, Texas – Práxedis G. Guerrero, Chihuahua municipality
- Fort Hancock, Texas – El Porvenir, Chihuahua
- Presidio, Texas – Ojinaga, Chihuahua
- Del Rio, Texas – Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila
- Eagle Pass, Texas – Piedras Negras, Coahuila
- Laredo, Texas – Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas
- Laredo, Texas – Colombia, Nuevo León
- Falcon Heights, Texas – Presa Falcón, Tamaulipas
- Roma, Texas – Ciudad Miguel Alemán, Tamaulipas
- Rio Grande City, Texas – Ciudad Camargo, Tamaulipas
- Los Ebanos, Texas – Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Tamaulipas
- Mission, Texas – Reynosa, Tamaulipas
- Hidalgo, Texas – Reynosa, Tamaulipas
- Pharr, Texas – Reynosa, Tamaulipas
- Donna, Texas – Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas
- Progreso, Texas – Nuevo Progreso, Tamaulipas
- Los Indios, Texas – Matamoros, Tamaulipas
- Brownsville, Texas – Matamoros, Tamaulipas
The total population of the borderlands—defined as those counties and municipios lining the border on either side—stands at some 12 million people.
Tijuana-San Ysidro border
[edit]
The San Ysidro Port of Entry is located between San Ysidro, California and Tijuana, Baja California. Approximately 50,000 vehicles and 25,000 pedestrians use this entry daily.[34] In the U.S., I-5 crosses directly to Tijuana, and the highway's southern terminus is this crossing. In 2005, more than 17 million vehicles and 50 million people entered the U.S. through San Ysidro.[35][36][37][38] Among those who enter the U.S. through San Ysidro are transfronterizos, American citizens who live in Mexico and attend school in the U.S.[39]
It has influenced the every day lifestyle of people that live in these border towns.[40] Along the coast of Baja California, there are neighborhoods of Americans living in Tijuana, Rosarito Beach, and Ensenada, whose residents commute to the U.S. daily to work.[41] Additionally, many Mexicans also enter the U.S. to commute daily to work.[42] In 1999, 7.6% of the labor force of Tijuana was employed in San Diego.[43]

The average wait time to cross into the U.S. is approximately an hour.[44] The thousands of vehicles that transit through the border every day is causing air pollution in San Ysidro and Tijuana.[45] The emission of carbon monoxide (CO) and other vehicle related air contaminants have been linked to health complications such as cardiovascular disease, lung cancer, birth outcomes, premature death, obesity, asthma and other respiratory diseases.[46] The high levels of traffic collusion and the extended wait times has affected the mental health, stress levels, and aggressive behavior of the people who cross frequently.[46] The San Ysidro border is heavily policed, separated by three walls, border patrol agents and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.[47]
Tijuana is the next target for San Diegan developers because of its fast-growing economy, lower cost of living, cheap prices and proximity to San Diego.[48] While this would benefit the tourist aspect of the city, it is damaging to low-income residents that will no longer be able to afford the cost of living in Tijuana.[49] Tijuana is home to many deportees from the U.S., many who have lost everything and do not have an income to rely on and are now in a new city in which they have to quickly adapt in order to survive.[50] San Diego developers would bring many benefits to Tijuana, but deportees and the poor run the risk of being impacted by the gentrification of Tijuana.[51]
In fiscal year 2023, the San Diego sector experienced a significant increase in migrant encounters, averaging approximately 20,000 per month. Seasonal spikes were observed, with monthly encounters ranging from around 16,000 to over 28,000. This activity reflects the sector's ongoing role as a major corridor for migration, influenced by shifting enforcement strategies, regional instability, and evolving U.S. border policies.[52]
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
[edit]In late 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a rule regarding new identification requirements for U.S. citizens and international travelers entering the U.S. implemented on January 23, 2007. This final rule and first phase of the WHTI specifies nine forms of identification, one of which is required to enter the U.S. by air: a valid passport; a passport card; a state enhanced driver's license or state enhanced non-driver ID card (available in Michigan, New York, Vermont, and Washington[53]) approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security; a trusted traveler program card (Global Entry, NEXUS, FAST, or SENTRI); an enhanced tribal identification card; a Native American Tribal Photo Identification Card; Form I-872 – American Indian Card; a valid Merchant Mariner Document when traveling in conjunction with official maritime business; or a valid U.S. military identification card when traveling on official orders.[54][55][56][57]
In August 2015, Mexico began enforcing a rule that all foreign citizens that plan to stay in the country for more than seven days or are travelling on business will have to pay a 330 pesos ($21) fee and show their passport.[58][59][60]
Veterinary inspections
[edit]
When animals are imported from one country to another, there is the possibility that diseases and parasites can move with them. Thus, most countries impose animal health regulations on the import of animals. Most animals imported to the U.S. must be accompanied by import permits obtained in advance from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and/or health certification papers from the country of origin.
Veterinary inspections are often required, and are available only at designated ports;[61] advance contact with port veterinarians is recommended.[62] Animals crossing the U.S.–Mexico border may have a country of origin other than the country where they present for inspection. Such animals include those from the U.S. that cross to Mexico and return, and animals from other countries that travel overland through Mexico or the U.S. before crossing the border.

APHIS imposes precautions to keep out several equine diseases, including glanders, dourine, equine infectious anemia, equine piroplasmosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and contagious equine metritis.[63] APHIS also checks horses to prevent the introduction of ticks and other parasites. In the Lower Rio Grande Valley, U.S. Department of Agriculture inspectors look for horses and livestock that stray across the border carrying ticks. These animals are often called wetstock, and the inspectors are referred to as tickriders.[64]
Per APHIS, horses originating from Canada can enter the U.S. with a Canadian government veterinary health certificate and a negative test for EIA.[63] Horses from Mexico must have a health certificate; pass negative tests for EIA, dourine, glanders, and EP at a USDA import center; and undergo precautionary treatments for external parasites at the port of entry. Horses from other Western Hemisphere countries must have the same tests as those from Mexico and, except for horses from Argentina, must be held in quarantine for at least seven days as a check for VEE.
APHIS imposes similar testing and certification requirements on horses from other parts of the world but without the quarantine for VEE. These horses are held in quarantine—usually three days—or until tests are completed. Because the disease equine piroplasmosis (equine babesiosis) is endemic in Mexico but not established in the U.S.,[65] transportation of horses from Mexico to the U.S. requires evaluation of horses for the presence of this disease. A leading exception to this rule is the special waiver obtained by riders participating in the Cabalgata Binacional Villista (see cavalcade).
Import from the U.S. to Mexico requires evidence within the prior 45 days of freedom from EIA, among other requirements.[66]
US security
[edit]Background
[edit]
Data from the U.S. Border Patrol Agency's 2010 annual report shows that among the total number of border crossings without documentation from various countries into the U.S., 90% were from Mexico alone. In addition, there are more than 6 million undocumented Mexican nationals residing in the U.S.[67] The border has a very high rate of documented and undocumented migrant crossings every year. With such a high rate of people crossing annually to the U.S., the country has invested in several distinct security measures.
In 2010, President Barack Obama signed an appropriation bill which gave the Customs and Border Protection, specifically the Border Patrol, 600 million dollars to implement and improve security. The U.S. government has invested many millions of dollars on border security, although this has not stopped undocumented immigration in the U.S.[68] In June 2018, the U.S. government announced installation of facial recognition system for monitoring immigrant activities.[69]
Border enforcement
[edit]
The Border Patrol was created in 1924 with its primary mission to detect and prevent the illegal entry of immigrants into the U.S. Together with other law enforcement officers, the Border Patrol maintains the U.S.' borderlands—regulating the flow of legal immigration and goods while patrolling for undocumented migrants and trafficking of people and contraband. The present strategy to enforce migration along the U.S.–Mexico border is by the means of "prevention through deterrence". Its primary goal is to completely prevent undocumented immigrants from entering the U.S. from Mexico rather than apprehending the unauthorized who are already in the country. As assertive as it was, "prevention through deterrence" was arguably unsuccessful, with a doubling in size of undocumented immigrants population during the two decades leading up to 2014.[70][71]
In 2012, Border Patrol agents made over 364,000 arrests of people illegally entering the country. Several regional border control operations were implemented, including Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego; Operation Hold the Line in El Paso; Operation Rio Grande in McAllen; Operation Safeguard in Tucson; and the Arizona Border Control Initiative along the Arizona Borderlands.[72][73][71]
According to Vulliamy, one in five Mexican nationals will visit or work in the U.S. at one point in their lifetime.[74] As of 2010, the border is guarded by more than 20,000 Border Patrol agents, more than at any time in its history.[75] The border is paralleled by U.S. Border Patrol interior checkpoints on major roads generally between 40 and 121 km (25 and 75 mi) from the U.S. side of the border, and garitas generally within 50 km (31 mi) of the border on the Mexican side.[76][77][78]

There are an estimated half a million illegal entries into the U.S. each year.[79]
Undocumented labor contributes $395 billion to the economy every year. While the U.S. is in favor of immigration, the increase in undocumented immigration has given border-crossing a negative image. There are around 11.5 million undocumented workers in the U.S. today, and 87% of undocumented immigrants have been living in the U.S. for more than 7 years.[72] Local economies that develop on the Mexican side capitalize not only on available skills but also on available, usually discarded, materials. Small businesses trade in clothes that are purchased by the pound and cardboard from the U.S. Some items, like the used tires found everywhere along the border, are made into certain items that support local economies and define a border.[73]
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 was passed providing for the construction of 1,127 km (700 mi) of high-security fencing. Attempts to complete the construction of the Mexico–United States barrier have been challenged by the Mexican government and various U.S.–based organizations.
In January 2013, the Government Accountability Office released a report stating that the U.S. Border Patrol intercepted 61% of individuals illegally crossing the border in 2011, which translates to 208,813 individuals not apprehended.[80] 85,827 of the 208,813 would go on to illegally enter the U.S., while the rest returned to Mexico and other Central American countries.[80] The report also shows that the number of illegal border crossings has dropped.[80]
This graph was using the legacy Graph extension, which is no longer supported. It needs to be converted to the new Chart extension. |
The apprehensions per (fiscal) year are shown in the graph; they reached a maximum of over 1.643 million in the year 2000.[81] Similar numbers had been reached in 1986 with over 1.615 million.[81]
The increase of border security throughout the years has progressively made crossings at the U.S.–Mexico border more dangerous, which has developed a human rights crisis at the border. The number of migrant deaths occurring along the U.S.–Mexico border has dramatically increased since the implementation of the funnel effect.[82] Along the Arizona-Mexico border, only seven migrant deaths were recorded in 1996; however, the remains of over 2,000 migrants were discovered from 2001 to 2012. Since the majority of deaths occur in rural areas, where extreme temperatures are common, it is likely the number of recorded deaths are far below the total. Because of the harsh, inaccessible terrain, human remains may not be found for years or ever.[83]
The Human Rights Watch cited on April 22, 2020, that a U.S.–Mexico border shutdown could be expected following the COVID-19 public health emergency. According to HRW, the new rule introduced by the CDC overlooks the fact that the U.S. is obligated to protect refugees from return to conditions threatening prosecution, as per treaties.[84]
In May 2023, the United States officially ended the use of Title 42, a public health measure enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic to rapidly expel migrants at the border. With the expiration of Title 42, authorities resumed removals under Title 8, which includes formal deportation proceedings and multi-year reentry bans for repeat offenders.[85]
In February 2025, migrant arrests at the Mexico-United States border were projected to reach a record low, with U.S. Border Patrol expecting around 8,500 apprehensions, according to the Department of Homeland Security. This decline followed President Donald Trump’s return to office on January 20, when he implemented strict immigration policies, including an asylum ban and increased military presence at the border. The American Civil Liberties Union challenged the ban in court. The previous record low was in April 2017, early in Trump’s first term. Arrests had previously dipped at the start of his 2017–2021 presidency before rising again in later years.[86]
Barrier
[edit]The U.S. government had plans in 2006, during the Bush administration, to erect a border fence along the Mexico–U.S. border. The controversial proposal included creating many individual fences. Almost 966 km (600 mi) of fence were constructed, with each of the individual fences composed of steel and concrete.[74] In between these fences are infrared cameras and sensors, National Guard soldiers, and SWAT teams on alert, giving rise to the term "virtual fence".[74] Construction on the fence began in 2006, with each mile costing the U.S. government about $2.8 million.[87] In 2010, the initiative was terminated because of costs, after having completed 1,030 km (640 mi) of either barrier fence or vehicle barriers, that were either new or had been rebuilt over older, inferior fencing. The Boeing-built SBI-net systems of using radar, watchtowers, and sensors (without a fence or physical barrier) were scrapped for being over budget, full of glitches, and far behind schedule.[88]
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Portion of border near Jacumba, California, in 2003
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Portion of border near Jacumba, California, in 2009 with enhanced security
Border incursions
[edit]
According to the U.S. Border Patrol, apprehensions of Central Americans at the border reduced from 70,000 to 55,000 attempted illegal migrants from 2007 to 2011. Thereafter, the number of apprehensions increased dramatically to 95,000 in 2012, 150,000 in 2013 and 220,000 in 2014. The increased apprehensions could have been the result of improved border security or a dramatic rise in attempted crossings, or both.[89]
In the fiscal year of 2006, there were 29 confirmed border incursions by Mexican government officials, of which 17 were by armed individuals. Since 1996, there have been 253 incursions by Mexican government officials.[90][91][92] In 2014 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security informed California Representative Duncan D. Hunter that since 2004, there have been 300 documented border incursions, which resulted in 131 individuals being detained.[93]
On August 3, 2008, Mexican military personnel crossed into Arizona from Mexico and encountered a U.S. Border Patrol agent, whom they held at gunpoint. The soldiers later returned to Mexico, as backup Border Patrol agents came to investigate.[94]
Disagreements over need for more resources
[edit]Proponents of greater spending on the border argue that continuing the buildup is necessary because of increased violence and drug trafficking from Mexico spilling into the U.S.[95] However, critics such as the Washington Office on Latin America have argued that the diminishing number of border crossings can only be partially attributed to U.S. security measures. Unintentional factors, such as a weakened U.S. economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the Mexican drug war have made attempting illegal border crossings more risky and less rewarding.[96]
Trump administration
[edit]
In 2016, Republican nominee for president Donald Trump proposed building a border wall to control immigration. He declared that, as president, he would force Mexico to "pay for it."[97][98] On January 25, 2017, several days after his inauguration and two days in advance of a planned meeting in Washington, D.C., with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, new U.S. president Trump signed Executive Order 13767 to enable the building of the wall.[99] Peña Nieto denied that Mexico would pay for the wall and declined the meeting.[100] Shortly after, Trump announced that he intended to impose a 20% tariff on Mexican goods.[101] Mexico did not make any payments.[102]
On September 20, 2017, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra filed a lawsuit alleging that the Trump administration has overstepped its powers in expediting construction of a border wall.[103][104] As of the end of 2017, Mexico had not agreed to pay any amount toward the wall, no new tariffs on Mexican goods had been considered by the U.S. Congress,[105] the U.S. Congress had not appropriated funding for a wall, and no further wall construction had started beyond what was already planned during the Obama administration.[105]
In June 2018, the Trump administration established a new policy of separating parents from their children at the Mexican border. People asking for asylum at official ports of entry were "being turned away and told there's no room for them now."[106] The U.S. and Mexico mutually placed tariffs on each other's exports.[107]

On November 8, 2018, the Trump administration announced new rules to deny asylum to anyone who crosses into the U.S. illegally from any nation, at Trump's discretion. This was based on the Supreme Court decision of Trump v. Hawaii and the presidential powers of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.[108] Trump signed a proclamation the next day to specify that people crossing the Mexican border illegally would not qualify for asylum; he called the march of migrants from Central America towards the U.S. a "crisis".[109] Civil rights groups strongly criticized the move, and several groups, including the Southern Poverty Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to challenge the proclamation.[109] Judge Jon S. Tigar ruled in favor of the advocacy groups on November 20, 2018, placing an injunction on the administration to delay implementation of the rule.[110] The administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a divided 2–1 panel ruled that the new asylum rules were inconsistent with existing law and upheld the injunction.[111] On December 21, 2018, the Supreme Court declined to hear the administration's challenge, leaving the injunction in place and preventing the asylum ban from being enforced.[112]
During the 2018 fiscal year, U.S. border agents arrested 107,212 people traveling in families, a record-high number. During the following five months (October 2018 through February 2019), that record was shattered by the arrest of 136,150 people traveling in families.[113] On March 31, 2019, Trump threatened to close the border, cutting off trade between the countries.[114] On April 4, Trump said that instead he would give Mexico a year to stop illegal drugs from coming into the U.S. If this did not happen, he said tariffs on automobiles would be used first, and then closing of the border.[115]
During Donald Trump's 2024 presidential campaign and subsequent return to office in 2025, immigration policy at the U.S.–Mexico border has remained a central focus of his administration. Building on earlier initiatives, the administration has implemented a series of enforcement measures aimed at reducing unauthorized border crossings, enhancing border security infrastructure, and increasing deportations of undocumented individuals. These actions included executive orders to shut down legal entry appointment systems, suspend refugee admissions, deploy the military to the border, and reinstate policies such as "Remain in Mexico."[116]
Proposed wall
[edit]
While running for president, Trump estimated that a border wall would cost $8 to $12 billion[117] and that he could force Mexico to pay for it. Cost estimates of the proposed wall vary widely. In early 2017, shortly after Trump took office, the DHS estimated the cost at $22 billion,[118] while Democratic staff on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee estimated $70 billion to build the wall and $150 million in annual maintenance.[119]
In the summer of 2017, four major construction companies planned to bid for the contract. The Customs and Border Protection agency budgeted $20 million to hire these companies to build half-million-dollar prototypes of the wall. At this time, Congress had only approved $341 million to maintain the existing wall; no funds had been allocated to build new sections of wall.[120] The DHS recommended that the wall's height should be between 5.5 and 9.1 m (18 and 30 ft) and its depth should be up to 1.8 m (6 ft) to deter drug traffickers from building tunnels.[121]
During the Trump administration, 732 km (455 mi) were added to barrier between the two countries. The construction of the wall has been halted by President Joe Biden as he canceled the national emergency declaration, originally used by Trump.[122]
Biden administration
[edit]The U.S. Border Patrol detained more than 1.7 million migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border illegally in fiscal year 2021, the highest number ever recorded.[123][124] A greater demographic diversity of southwest border apprehensions was noted in 2021.[125]
On October 31, 2023, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas testified before the Senate Homeland Security Committee that more than 600,000 people illegally made their way into the United States without being apprehended by border agents during the 2023 fiscal year.[126]
On January 17, 2024, a Republican-led non-binding resolution denouncing the Biden-Harris administration's handling of the U.S. southern border passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 225–187, with 211 Republicans and 14 Democrats supporting it.[127][128][129]
On February 8, 2024, a group of 24 House Republicans wrote a letter[130] to urge President Biden not to federalize the Texas National Guard in the midst of Texas wanting to crack down on the spike of illegal immigration on the U.S.-Mexico border.[131]
On February 13, 2024, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas was impeached on a 214–213 party-line vote by the United States House of Representatives over his handling of the Mexico–United States border.[132]
On July 25, 2024, the United States House of Representatives voted 220–196 to pass another Republican-led resolution condemning the Biden-Harris administration for their handling of the U.S. southern border. Six Democrats, all in electorally competitive districts, voted with all Republicans in the House to pass the resolution. Democratic Caucus Chair Pete Aguilar said Republicans were playing politics and that the resolution "isn't moving the needle with voters," so members vote how they need to vote.[133][134]
Migrant deaths and humanitarian concerns
[edit]Border Patrol has reported more than 10,000 migrant deaths along the border between 1994 and 2024, but human rights groups believe that the total number of migrant deaths could be as high as 80,000.[135][136]
Border Patrol activity is concentrated around border cities such as San Diego and El Paso which have extensive border fencing. This means that the flow of illegal immigrants is diverted into rural mountainous and desert areas, leading to several hundred migrant deaths along the Mexico–U.S. border of those attempting to cross into the U.S. from Mexico illegally and vice versa.[79]
In order to effectively enforce border protection, the policies and regulations of the U.S. have sought to make border crossings more hazardous, creating a "funnel effect."[137] The tactic was meant to discourage migration from Mexico into the U.S. by forcing migrants to travel further around barriers where the terrain and weather are more risky, but the strategy was not as successful as initially planned.[138] As a result, the effect funneled more immigrants to their death even with the assistance of coyotes (smugglers). Not only has this approach caused fatalities throughout the U.S.–Mexico border, but it has even stirred up a nuisance for documented immigrants and American citizens. There has been general concern about the Border Patrol and other agencies abusing their authority by racial profiling and conducting unwarranted searches outside the exception of the 40 km (25 mi) border zone, but still within the 161 km (100 mi) border zone.
In June 2019, the body of Óscar Alberto Martínez and his 23-month-old daughter, Angie Valeria, were found dead in the Rio Grande River. The family was from El Salvador, attempting to cross from Mexico into the U.S. near Brownsville, Texas.[139]
In 2022, the U.S.–Mexico border was recorded as the world's deadliest land migration route. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) documented 686 deaths and disappearances that year, attributed to heat exposure, drowning, and dangerous terrain.[140]
Distribution of natural resources across the border has also been a major challenge, particularly for water use and water quality. Toxic sewage flowing into Mexico, and over-consumption of water from the Colorado River Basin and middle-lower Rio Grande have been central to the conflict. Large-scale infrastructure investments may be necessary to address the growing water and energy issues in this arid region.[141]
Humanitarian assistance along the border
[edit]
Humanitarian groups such as Humane Borders, No More Deaths, and Samaritans provide water in order to reduce deaths of immigrants who are journeying through the Arizona desert.[142] A policy passed in 2010 by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife federal agency allows water drums to be placed on roads of disturbed areas.[142]
No More Deaths (No Más Muertes) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) headquartered in Tucson that is designed to assist in ending death and suffering of immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico border by upholding fundamental human rights. Elemental services of No More Deaths is to provide humanitarian assistance, giving food and first aid treatment, witness and respond to human rights abuses, encouraging humane immigration policy, and making phone calls to relatives of immigrants.[143] Since its founding in 2004, No More Deaths has provided assistance to thousands of migrant border crossers; however the Border Patrol and other public land agencies near the U.S.–Mexico border have challenged the efforts of various humanitarian groups, by following immigrants to a medical volunteer camp and raiding it.[144] Humanitarian groups along the border have been tested by Border Patrol and other agencies, however the authority of the Trump administration has introduced a new tier of restriction through surveillance, harassment, and intimidation to border relief efforts.[145]

Incidence rates of HIV and tuberculosis are higher in border towns such as El Paso and Ciudad Juárez than at the national level in both countries. The Nuestra Casa Initiative tried to counter the health disparities by using a cross-border strategy that moved around an exhibit prominent in various museums and universities.[146][147] Similarly, special action groups as part of the Border Health Strategic Initiative created by the University of Arizona with other groups helped create a healthier Hispanic community in Arizona border towns by creating policy and infrastructure changes.[148] These groups provided humanitarian assistance to counter the prominence of Type 2 diabetes among the Hispanic community by acquiring a grant for new walking trails and encouraging public elementary schools to provide healthier food choices for students.[148]
Immigrants are considered easy targets by gang members, because they do not have the strength to resist aggressive offenders and end up left with nothing. In June 2018, U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions disqualified victims of gangs or domestic violence to be reasonable causes for asylum seekers.[149]

Not only do these Hispanic communities face health inequalities, but political inequalities as well.[150] The need for political change was so huge that it has encouraged Hispanic women to engage in activism at a local level. The Neighborhood Action Group in Chula Vista, California, is one of the groups that attracted the help of local Hispanic women to implement a feminist perspective in activism in spite of the social and economic obstacles as well as Assembly Bill No. 775, 2005 that prohibited children being used as interpreters.[151] These humanitarian groups have implemented various strategies to pursue their goals that ultimately try to counter the number of immigrant deaths and abuses in immigrant detention even if it means the criminalization and higher levels of discrimination against them.[152]
In Mexico, most humanitarian groups focus on assisting the deportees. As rates of deportation increase, "the deportation of many individuals is becoming more and more notable" in the streets of Mexico cities.[153] As a result, many humanitarian groups have formed in Mexican cities where undocumented individuals are deported such as Nogales, Sonora. The humanitarian groups consist of faith-based communities and primarily non-profit organizations that assist deportees, many of whom do not have any resources with them such as money, food, or family information, and who would otherwise become homeless and emotionally and psychologically devastated.[154][155] Contributing factors that might have caused them to be devastated can either be that they were separated from "their family members or the inability to work legally in the United States".[156] Therefore, the primary purpose of the humanitarian groups on the Mexico side of the border is to create a pathway for transitional support such as providing the deportees food, shelter, clothing, legal help and social services.[153] In addition, there are humanitarian groups that provides meals and shelter to deportees according to their deportation documents. Humanitarian groups along the border in Mexico are El Comedor, Nazareth House, Camino Juntos, La 72, and FM4: Paso Libre.
In June 2019, 300 migrant children were moved from a detention facility in Clint, Texas, after a group of lawyers who visited reported unsafe and unsanitary conditions.[157] Democratic members of the House of Representatives introduced legislation that would aid the humanitarian crisis by giving $4.5 billion to emergency spending to address the humanitarian crisis at the border, with significant funding for priorities including legal assistance, food, water, and medical services, support services for unaccompanied children, alternatives to detention, and refugee services.[158][159]
US border zone policies
[edit]Per the La Paz Agreement, the official "border area" extends 100 km (62 mi) "on either side of the inland and maritime boundaries" from the Gulf of Mexico west into the Pacific Ocean.[160]
100-mile border zone
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2015) |

The U.S. has established a 161 km (100 mi) border zone which applies to all U.S. external borders including all coasts, in effect covering two-thirds of the U.S. population,[161] including a majority of the largest cities in the U.S. and several entire states (namely Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island).[162] The border zone was established by the U.S. DOJ in its interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.[162] Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials have authority to stop and search within this zone and are authorized to enter private property without a warrant within 40 km (25 mi) of the border as well as establish checkpoints.[162][163]
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable search and seizure. However, under the border search exception, this protection does not fully apply at borders or border crossings (also known as ports of entry) or in the border zone. This means that much of the U.S. population is subject to CBP regulations including stop and search. There are some limits to CBP officials' ability to stop and search. For instance CBP officials are not allowed to pull anyone over without a reasonable suspicion of immigration violation or crime, or search vehicles without warrant or probable cause.[162] The ACLU, however, found that CBP officials routinely ignore or misunderstand the limits of authority, and this is compounded by inadequate training, lack of oversight and failure to hold officials accountable for abuse—incidence of abuse is common.[162]
Secure Border Initiative
[edit]This section relies largely or entirely upon a single source. (June 2018) |

A National Border Patrol Strategic Plan was first developed in 1994; it was then updated in 2004 and 2012. In 2004, the updated strategy focused on command structures, intelligence and surveillance, enforcement and deployment of U.S. Border Patrol agents to better respond to threats at the border. The strategic planning led to broader policy development for the DHS which led to the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) in 2005 to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal migration. The main components of SBI dealt with staffing concerns, removal capacity, surveillance and tactical infrastructure and interior enforcement.[164] The aim of this initiative is to overcome the limitations of physical barriers through the use of surveillance technologies known as "SBInet."[165] The SBInet technology has not worked as well as potentially intended, facing a number of technical issues that have limited its effectiveness.[165] Part of the initiative also focused on increasing detention and removal capacity, with an objective to add an additional 2,000 beds to detentional facilities.[166] With expansion of detention and removal capabilities this was also the objective to end the "catch and release" process that had been occurring previously.[166] An additional component was "high consequence enforcement", which was not the subject of a formal public policy document. There was the allowance, historically, for voluntary returns of individuals apprehended at the border by Border Patrol agents. These voluntary returns, after the SBI of 2005, were limited to three "high consequence outcomes".[164]
One "high consequence outcome" was formal removal, which meant the individual would be deemed ineligible for a visa for at least five years and subject to criminal charges if caught re-entering illegally. The Immigration and Nationality Act permitted aliens to be formally removed with "limited judicial processing" known as expedited removal. The DHS has expanded between 2002 and 2006, expedited removal for "certain aliens that entered within previous two weeks and were apprehended within 161 km (100 mi) of the border".[164][page needed]
Another "high consequence outcome" is the increase in criminal charges. The DHS has also worked with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to increase the number of apprehended individuals crossing the border illegally who are charged with criminal offenses. Most of these cases are prosecuted under Operation Streamline.[164] The third "high consequence outcome" is known as remote repatriation. This is the return of apprehended Mexicans to remote locations by Border Patrol rather than the nearest Mexican port of entry.[164]
Operation Streamline
[edit]
Operation Streamline refers collectively to zero-tolerance policies implemented at the Mexico–U.S. border that seek to remove illegal immigrants through an expedited process if they have arrived with missing or fraudulent identification or have previously been convicted for an immigration crime.[167] It was first implemented in Del Rio, Texas, in 2005.[168] The program has since expanded to four out of the five federal judicial districts on the U.S.–Mexico border: Yuma, Arizona; Laredo, Texas; Tucson, Arizona; and Rio Grande Valley, Texas.[167][169]
Previously, immigrants apprehended at the border were either given the option to voluntarily return to their home country or they were placed in civil immigration proceedings.[167] After Operation Streamline was implemented, nearly all people apprehended at the border who are suspected of having crossed illegally are subject to criminal prosecution.[169] Defendants who are charged with crossing into the U.S. illegally are tried en masse to determine their guilt.[168] Defense attorneys often are responsible for representing up to 40 immigrants at once.[168] Around 99% of defendants in Operation Streamline proceedings plead guilty.[167] The defendants are charged with a misdemeanor if convicted of crossing the border illegally for the first time and a felony if it is a repeat offense.[168]
In December 2009, it was decided in United States v. Roblero-Solis that en masse judicial proceedings like those in Operation Streamline violated Rule 11 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 states that the court must determine that a guilty plea is voluntarily made by addressing the defendant personally in court. The Roblero-Solis case determined that "personally" means that the judge must address the defendant in a person-to-person manner. Though many courts have changed their procedures to adapt to the ruling, there are still forms of en masse trials practiced at the border.[168]

Proponents of Operation Streamline claim that the harsher prosecution has been an important factor in deterring immigrants from crossing the border illegally. Apprehensions have decreased in certain sectors after 2005, which is seen as a sign of success. For example, the Del Rio sector saw a decline from 2005 to 2009 of 75% (from 68,510 to 17,082). Similarly, apprehensions declined in Yuma by 95% (from 138,438 to 6,951) from 2006 to 2009.[169]
Criticisms of Operation Streamline point to the program's heavy use of federal court and enforcement resources as a negative aspect.[169] In addition, the prosecution of all illegal border crossings takes the focus away from prosecuting more serious crimes.[169] They claim that the program's cost is too high for the effectiveness of the work it is accomplishing.[168] In response to the claim that Operation Streamline is an effective deterrent, critics of the program claim that the incentives to cross the border in order to work or be with family are much stronger.[168]
Environment
[edit]The Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, known as the La Paz Agreement, was signed into law on August 14, 1983, and became enforceable on February 16, 1984.[170] This agreement to protect the environment is the political foundation between the U.S. and Mexico for 4 subsequent programs. Each program has addressed environmental destruction in the border region resulting from the rise of the maquiladora industries, those who migrated to northern Mexico to work in the industries, the lack of infrastructure to accommodate the people, Mexico's lax regulations concerning all these factors, the resulting spillover into the U.S., and the U.S.'s own environmentally destructive tendencies. The programs were: IBEP (1992), Border XXI (1996), Border 2012 (2003) and Border 2020 (2012).[171]
This section
relies largely or entirely on a single source. (June 2018) |

In 2006, during the presidency of George W. Bush, Congress approved Secure Fence Act which allowed the Department of Homeland Security to erect a border fence along the U.S.–Mexico border. Congress also approved a different law called the REAL ID Act which gave the Department of Homeland Security the approval to build the wall without taking into consideration the environmental and legal issues related to the wall. The U.S. Congress insisted that the act was passed for the sake of national security of the U.S.[172]
According to a delegation of Arizona park and refuge managers, wildlife biologists, and conservationists who studied the U.S. and Mexico border concluded that building a wall along the Mexico border would also have negative impacts on the natural environment in the region. They argued that the border wall would negatively affect the wildlife in the Sonoran Desert including plants and animals. Naturally, animals do not tend to stay in one place and instead, they expedite to various places for water, plants, and other means in order to survive. The wall would restrict animals to a specific territory and would reduce their chances of survival. According to Brian Segee, a staff attorney with Wildlife Activists says that except high flying birds, animals would not be able to move to other places because of the wall along the border. For instance, participants in this study argued that some species such as javelinas, ocelots, and Sonoran pronghorn would not be able to freely move along the border areas. It would also restrict the movement of jaguars from Sierra Madre occidental forests to the southwestern parts of the U.S. According to Brian Nowicki, a conservation biologist at the Center for Biological Diversity, there are 30 animal species living in the Arizona and Sonora that face danger.[172] In 2021, an endangered Mexican gray wolf was stopped from crossing from New Mexico into Mexico by a section of border wall.[173]
Drug trafficking
[edit]Mexico is estimated to be the world's third largest producer of opium with poppy cultivation. It also is a major supplier of heroin and the largest foreign supplier of marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine to the U.S. market.[174][175] According to the DEA, about 93% of the cocaine in the United States came from Colombia and was smuggled across the border between Mexico and the United States. In 2017, the INL estimated that "between 90 and 94 percent of all heroin consumed in the United States comes from Mexico."[176] These drugs are supplied by drug trafficking organizations. The U.S. government estimates that Mexican drug cartels gain tens of billions of dollars each year from drug sales in the U.S. alone.[177]
Border towns on the Mexico–United States border have been negatively affected by the opioid crisis in the United States. According to César González Vaca, head of the Forensic Doctor's Service in Baja California, "It seems the closer we are to the border, the more consumption of this drug we see."[178][179] In 2021, around 80,411 people died from opioid overdoses in the United States.[180] Many of the deaths are from an extremely potent opioid, fentanyl, which is trafficked from Mexico.[178][181] The drug is usually manufactured in China, then shipped to Mexico, where it is processed and packaged, which is then smuggled into the United States by Mexican drug cartels.[182] In 2023, the Biden administration announced a crackdown on members of the Sinaloa Cartel smuggling fentanyl into the United States.[183]
Transborder students
[edit]This article needs additional citations for verification. (May 2019) |

Many schools near the border in America have students that live on the Mexican side of the border. These students are "transborder students", as they live in Mexico but are enrolled in the U.S. education system. There are thousands of elementary through high school students that cross the Mexican-American border. They are known to wake up in the early hours of the morning to make their way to the border, where they wait in long lines to cross into the U.S. After crossing the border, the students find a ride to school. Many students come to America for the opportunity, because it has a more developed and organized educational system. Students who go to school in America have a better chance of reaching higher education in the U.S. In many parts of Mexico, compulsory education ends at age sixteen. Many of the transborder students are natural-born U.S. citizens. Students that were born in America have the right to American education, even if they do not live in the U.S. In places like the San Diego and Tijuana border, it is much cheaper to live in Mexico. San Diego has a high cost of living and one of the highest student homeless rates in the country, so many families move to Tijuana because it is more affordable to raise a family.
In order to prevent Mexican children from illegally coming to America for education, some bordertown schools require official documentation (bills, mail, etc.) from students. This is to ensure that only students that are entitled to an education in the U.S. receive one.
In Brownsville, a city on the southern border of Texas, a court ruled that school districts cannot deny students education if they have the proper paperwork. Many transborder students who live in these districts with these requirements will use extended family members' addresses to prove their residency. Questions about the legitimacy of student residency have risen since the Trump administration took office in 2017, making it riskier to cross the border for education.
These transborder students also raise questions about the acquisition of healthcare, as most Mexican students who attend university in the U.S. who also have family across the border are known to use the Mexican healthcare system instead of U.S. or university sources.[184] The opposite case was also studied, seeking to find if U.S. students and citizens outsource their medical care from Mexican hospitals; however it was concluded that the use of, "cross-border healthcare diminishes significantly with English language acquisition."[184]
Also researched is the impact of changing education for those children who attended school in the U.S. prior to deportation, and are now readjusting to a new education system within Mexico. In one study, when repatriated children were asked about how their world perspectives were changed once they returned to Mexico, they spoke to three main areas, "shifting identities, learning and losing named language, and schooling across borders."[185] The most frequent point mentioned in terms of changing schooling is the difficulty to adapt to a system in which they are unfamiliar, in a named language they might have lost, and where there is minimal continuity in the methodology of teaching. It is suggested in this study that while the U.S. has a long history of teaching immigrant students, along with tried and tested assimilation programming to support foreign children in U.S. border schools, Mexican systems do not, making the change nearly impossible for newly deported students to learn.[185] While the Mexican Secretariat of the Public has vowed to change the legislation surrounding this issue, bilingual education is still only awarded to expensive private schools.[185]
See also
[edit]- Indigenous conflicts on the Mexico–United States barrier
- 2017 Mexico–United States diplomatic crisis
- Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005
- Border War (1910–19)
- Canada–United States border
- Illegal drug trade in the United States
- Illegal immigration to Mexico
- Illegal immigration to the United States
- List of municipalities (municipios) and counties on the Mexico–United States border
- Mexico–United States international park
- Mexico–United States relations
- Operation Jump Start
- Operation Phalanx (2010–2016)
- Roosevelt Reservation
- Spillover of the Mexican drug war
- Secure Fence Act of 2006
- Sexual assault of migrants from Latin America to the United States
- Treaty of Limits (Mexico–United States)
- United States Border Patrol interior checkpoints
Notes
[edit]- ^ Mize, Ronald L.; Swords, Alicia C. S. (2010). Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to NAFTA. University of Toronto Press. p. 175. ISBN 978-1-4426-0158-1.
- ^ a b "The International Boundary and Water Commission - Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems". Archived from the original on September 24, 2015. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
- ^ "Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary between the United States of America and México" (PDF). November 23, 1970. Retrieved December 7, 2014.
- ^ a b McCarthy, Robert J. (Spring 2011). "Executive Authority, Adaptive Treaty Interpretation, and the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.–Mexico". Water Law Review: 3–5. SSRN 1839903.
- ^ "Countries With the Longest Land Borders". WorldAtlas. August 2019. Retrieved November 1, 2019.
- ^ a b Levanetz, Joel. "A Compromised Country: Redefining the U.S.-Mexico Border" (PDF). San Diego History Center. Retrieved August 27, 2019.
- ^ a b c "United States Section Directive" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on October 15, 2011. Retrieved November 11, 2011.
- ^ "Gadsden Purchase". Pima County Public Library. Retrieved August 30, 2019.
- ^ Martínez, Oscar J. (1988). Troublesome Border. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. ISBN 978-0-8165-1104-4.
- ^ "Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo". Ourdocuments.gov. 1848. Retrieved December 6, 2014.
- ^ Byrd, Bobby; Mississippi, Susannah, eds. (1996). The Late Great Mexican Border: Reports from a Disappearing Line. El Paso: Cinco Puntos Press. ISBN 978-0-938317-24-1.
- ^ Peschard-Sverdrup, Armand (2003). U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Water Management: The Case of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo (1 ed.). Center for Strategic & International Studies. ISBN 978-0-89206-424-3.
- ^ Yardley, Jim (April 19, 2002). "Water Rights War Rages on Faltering Rio Grande". The New York Times. Retrieved April 5, 2020.
- ^ Hart, John M. (2000). "The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920". Oxford History of Mexico. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 433–466. ISBN 978-0-19-511228-3.
- ^ a b Lorey, David E. (1999). The U.S.-Mexican Border in the Twentieth Century. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc. ISBN 978-0-8420-2756-4.
- ^ "Some Events in the History of Mexico and the Border". The Journal of American History. 86 (2): 453–454. 1999. doi:10.2307/2567039. JSTOR 2567039.
- ^ Sherman, John W. (Fall 2016). "Fascist 'Gold Shirts' on the Río Grande: Borderlands Intrigue in the Time of Lázaro Cárdenas". Journal of South Texas. 30: 8–21.
- ^ St. John, Rachel (2011). Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 4. ISBN 978-0-691-15613-2.
- ^ John, Rachel St. "The Raging Controversy at the Border Began With This Incident 100 Years Ago". Smithsonian Magazine.
- ^ "Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Elimination of the Bancos in the Rio Grande from the Effects of Article II of the Treaty of November 12, 1884" (PDF). June 5, 1907. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 9, 2015. Retrieved April 19, 2015.
- ^ Metz, Leon C. (June 12, 2010). "Bancos of the Rio Grande". Handbook of Texas Online. Texas State Historical Association. Archived from the original on October 27, 2016. Retrieved July 13, 2015.
- ^ "IBWC Minutes". International Boundary and Water Commission. Retrieved September 11, 2017.
- ^ "USA-Mexico Bancos Map". Retrieved September 11, 2017.
- ^ Mueller, Jerry E. (1975). Restless River, International Law and the Behavior of the Rio Grande. Texas Western Press. p. 64. ISBN 978-0-87404-050-0.
- ^ International Boundary and Water Commission. "Minutes 144" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on March 8, 2016. Retrieved June 12, 2015.
- ^ International Boundary and Water Commission. "Minutes 158" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on March 8, 2016. Retrieved June 12, 2015.
- ^ "Maritime Boundaries". United States Department of State. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
- ^ "Minutes between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC". International Boundary and Water Commission. Archived from the original on July 13, 2015. Retrieved January 6, 2016.
- ^ "Minute 315: Adoption of the Delineation of the International Boundary on the 2008 Aerial Photographic Mosaic of the Rio Grande" (PDF). International Boundary and Water Commission. November 24, 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 11, 2016. Retrieved June 13, 2016.
- ^ a b Golson, Barry; Thia Golson (2008). Retirement Without Borders: How to Retire Abroad – in Mexico, France, Italy, Spain, Costa Rica, Panama, and Other Sunny, Foreign Places. New York, New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 75. ISBN 978-0-7432-9701-1. Retrieved March 9, 2011.
- ^ Glenday, Craig (2009). Guinness World Records 2009. Random House Digital, Inc. p. 457. ISBN 978-0-553-59256-6. Retrieved March 9, 2011.
- ^ "US, Mexico open first new border crossing in 10 years". AFP. Washington. January 12, 2010. Archived from the original on February 28, 2014. Retrieved December 3, 2012.
The US–Mexico border is the busiest in the world, with approximately 350 million crossings per year.
- ^ "The United States–Mexico Border Region at a Glance" (PDF). United States–Mexico Border Health Commission. New Mexico State University. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 15, 2012. Retrieved December 3, 2012.
In 2001, over 300 million two-way border crossings took place at the 43 POEs.
- ^ "A Day at the Busiest Border Crossing in the World". POLITICO Magazine. February 16, 2017. Retrieved July 27, 2018.
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References
[edit]- Arbelaez, Harvey, and Claudio Milman. "The New Business Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean". International Journal of Public Administration (2007): 553
- Arbelaez, Harvey; Milman, Claudio (2000). "The new business environment of latin america and the caribbean". International Journal of Public Administration. 23 (5–8): 553–562. doi:10.1080/01900690008525475. ISSN 0190-0692. S2CID 154543297.
- Kelly, Patricia, and Douglas Massey. "Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration". The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political Science 610 (2007): 98–118.
- Fernández-Kelly, Patricia; Massey, Douglas S. (2016). "Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 610 (1): 98–118. doi:10.1177/0002716206297449. ISSN 0002-7162. S2CID 154846310.
- Miller, Tom. On the Border: Portraits of America's Southwestern Frontier, 1981.
- Thompson, Olivia N. (2009). "Binational Water Management: Perspectives of Local Texas Officials in the U.S.–Mexico Border Region". Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 313.
- Thompson, Olivia N. (2009). "Binational Water Management: Perspectives of Local Texas Officials in the U.S.–Mexico Border Region". Applied Research Projects. (Paper 313). hdl:10877/3758.
- Andrew Becker and Agustin Armendariz. "California Border Crossing: San Ysidro Port of Entry Is the Busiest Land Border in the World". HuffPost social reading, article on California watch. (2012)
- Prampolini, Gaetano, and Annamaria Pinazzi (eds.). "The Shade of the Saguaro/La sombra del saguaro" Part IV 'About the Border'". Firenze University Press Firenze University Press (2013): 461–517.
Further reading
[edit]- Feldman, Megan (October 16, 2008). "Border Town". Dallas Observer.
- Jeremy Slack, Daniel E. Martínez, Scott Whiteford, eds. The Shadow of the Wall: Violence and Migration on the U.S.-Mexico Border. University of Arizona Press, 2018. ISBN 978-0816535590.
External links
[edit]- U.S.–Mexico Business Council
- About binational health – United States–Mexico Public Health – CDC
- Border Stories: a mosaic documentary on the U.S.–Mexico Border
- Status of Mexican Trucks in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions Congressional Research Service
- A Continent Divided: The U.S.–Mexico War, Center for Greater Southwestern Studies, the University of Texas at Arlington
- Josh Begley, Best of Luck with the Wall – a short film constructed from satellite imagery that traces the length of the border
- David Taylor, The Journey to Border Monument Number 140 – photographs and description of the obelisks that mark the border
- The Guardian, The Guardian – photographs and feature-length film that follows the infrastructure of the border from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean
Mexico–United States border
View on GrokipediaGeography
Physical features and terrain
The Mexico–United States border measures 1,954 miles (3,145 km) from the Pacific Ocean at Tijuana, Baja California/San Diego, California, to the Gulf of Mexico at Matamoros, Tamaulipas/Brownsville, Texas.[11] It spans four U.S. states—California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas—and encompasses diverse terrain including coastal plains, deserts, mountains, and river valleys.[12] The region features arid landscapes with sparse vegetation, low precipitation, and elevation variations from sea level to over 7,000 feet (2,134 m) in areas like Big Bend.[13] In California and Arizona, the border crosses urban coastal zones near San Diego-Tijuana and transitions into the Sonoran Desert's flat expanses, sand dunes, and rugged mountain foothills, such as those in the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument.[14] Arizona and New Mexico segments include the Chihuahuan Desert's basin-and-range topography with steep escarpments and isolated peaks, complicating traversal due to extreme aridity and rocky outcrops.[15] These areas support desert scrub ecosystems adapted to minimal rainfall, averaging less than 10 inches (254 mm) annually.[13] The Texas portion follows the Rio Grande for approximately 1,255 miles (2,019 km) from El Paso to the Gulf, forming deep canyons in the Big Bend region where walls rise up to 1,500 feet (457 m) in Santa Elena Canyon and even greater in Boquillas Canyon.[16] Here, the terrain shifts from narrow, steep-walled gorges with high-gradient flows to broader alluvial valleys with slower currents, wetlands, and resacas (oxbow lakes) in the lower Rio Grande Valley.[17][15] Coastal marshes and tidal flats mark the eastern terminus, influenced by Gulf tides and sediment deposition.[12]Length, demarcation, and markers
The Mexico–United States border extends 1,954 miles (3,145 km) from the Pacific Ocean at the California–Baja California boundary to the Gulf of Mexico at the Rio Grande's mouth.[1][18] Of this total, approximately 1,255 miles (2,020 km) follow the centerline of the Rio Grande (known as Río Bravo del Norte in Mexico) from its Gulf outlet to a point near El Paso, Texas, with the remaining 699 miles (1,125 km) comprising fixed overland segments through Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.[19] The river channel's midline serves as the legal boundary along the fluvial portion, subject to adjustments for natural shifts via avulsion (sudden channel changes) or accretion (gradual sediment deposition), as administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).[19] Beyond the Rio Grande, the demarcation traces straight lines, parallels, and meridians defined in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 1853 Gadsden Purchase, traversing varied terrain including deserts, mountains, and urban areas.[20] Physical markers delineate the land boundary, consisting primarily of enduring monuments erected by joint U.S.-Mexico survey commissions in the mid-19th century to fix the line post-treaty.[21] These include pyramid- and obelisk-shaped stone or concrete pillars, often inscribed with bilateral emblems and numbers, spaced at intervals of about one mile along non-river segments; the westernmost, Monument No. 258, stands near the Pacific coast between San Diego and Tijuana.[21] The IBWC maintains these markers—totaling over 250—and conducts periodic resurveys to preserve boundary integrity against erosion, vandalism, or displacement.[22] In contemporary contexts, temporary or supplementary indicators such as surveyed posts, signage, and vehicle barriers reinforce demarcation in high-traffic zones, though primary reliance remains on the historical monuments for legal delineation.[19]History
Indigenous and colonial antecedents
Prior to European contact, the region encompassing the future Mexico–United States border was inhabited by diverse indigenous groups whose territories and movements were not delimited by fixed boundaries but shaped by ecology, kinship networks, and seasonal migrations. Sedentary agricultural societies, such as the Ancestral Puebloans (including those along the Rio Grande Valley), developed farming practices as early as 2000 BCE, cultivating corn and residing in multi-story stone and adobe structures that supported stable communities.[23] In contrast, nomadic or semi-nomadic groups like the Apache, Comanche, Ute, and various Coahuiltecan bands roamed the arid plains and deserts, relying on hunting, gathering, and raiding for sustenance, with fluid ranges extending across what are now the southwestern United States and northern Mexico.[24] Natural features such as the Rio Grande served as corridors for trade and migration rather than barriers, facilitating interactions among tribes from Mesoamerica northward, though intergroup conflicts over resources were common.[25] Spanish colonization introduced the first European efforts to impose administrative divisions on this frontier, establishing New Spain's northern provinces— including Nueva Vizcaya, New Mexico, Texas (Tejas), and Alta California—to secure territory against rival powers and indigenous resistance. Exploration began with Juan de Oñate's 1598 expedition founding settlements in New Mexico, followed by missions and presidios in Texas from the 1680s, such as those near El Paso and the San Antonio missions established between 1718 and 1731 to convert and pacify local groups like the Coahuiltecan.[26][27] These outposts employed a tripartite system of religious missions for indigenous conversion and labor, military presidios for defense, and civil pueblos for settlement, aiming to extend control northward from central Mexico but often limited to isolated enclaves amid vast uncontrolled expanses.[27] Persistent indigenous opposition, particularly from Athabaskan-speaking Apache and Shoshonean Comanche, undermined Spanish hegemony through sustained raids that depopulated frontiers and disrupted supply lines. Comanche incursions into New Mexico and Texas escalated from the early 1700s, with over a hundred documented raids in the 1770s alone, capturing horses, captives, and goods while exploiting Spanish firearms obtained via trade with Anglo settlers.[28] Apache groups similarly conducted guerrilla warfare across the frontier, prompting Spanish counter-campaigns but resulting in high costs and limited territorial gains, as evidenced by the 1758 destruction of the San Sabá mission in Texas by Comanche-led forces.[29] This instability fostered vague, contested boundaries reliant on rivers like the Rio Grande for informal demarcation, prefiguring post-independence disputes as Mexico inherited a sparsely governed north vulnerable to U.S. expansion.[30]Mexican-American War and Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
The border dispute between the United States and Mexico intensified following the U.S. annexation of Texas on December 29, 1845, with Texas claiming the Rio Grande as its southern boundary while Mexico insisted on the Nueces River, leaving a contested strip of territory between the two rivers.[4] President James K. Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor's forces into this disputed area in July 1845 to assert the Rio Grande claim, and dispatched diplomat John Slidell in November 1845 to negotiate the purchase of the contested borderlands along with California and New Mexico for up to $30 million plus settlement of U.S. claims; Mexico's government rejected the mission by May 1846, citing the annexation as casus belli.[4] On April 25, 1846, Mexican cavalry crossed the Rio Grande and ambushed a U.S. patrol near Thornton, killing or wounding 16 American soldiers in what Polk described as an invasion of U.S. soil, prompting him to request a declaration of war from Congress on May 11; war was formally declared on May 13, 1846.[4] U.S. forces achieved decisive victories through amphibious landings, advances into northern Mexico, and the capture of Mexico City by General Winfield Scott on September 14, 1847, after battles including Palo Alto (May 8, 1846), Monterrey (September 20–24, 1846), Buena Vista (February 22–23, 1847), and Chapultepec (September 12–13, 1847); American casualties totaled approximately 1,721 killed in action and over 11,000 from disease, while Mexican losses exceeded 25,000 including prisoners.[31][32] Mexico's fragmented leadership and military disarray, exacerbated by internal political instability following independence, prevented effective resistance, leading to armistice negotiations in January 1848.[4] The resulting Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on March 10, 1848, ended the war and defined the initial U.S.-Mexico border.[33] Article V delineated the boundary commencing one marine league south of San Diego Bay in the Pacific Ocean, proceeding north to 32°30' N latitude then east to the Colorado River, southward along the Colorado to its confluence with the Gila River, and eastward along the Gila to its junction with the Rio Grande near present-day Ciudad Juárez, thereafter following the Rio Grande's main channel southeast to the Gulf of Mexico, thereby confirming the Rio Grande as the Texas-Mexico divide and ceding roughly 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory—including present-day California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and portions of Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming—to the United States.[33][34] In exchange, the U.S. paid Mexico $15 million and assumed up to $3.25 million in claims by American citizens against Mexico, though surveys later revealed ambiguities in riverine boundaries requiring future adjustments.[33] This delineation shifted the international frontier dramatically southward from prior Spanish colonial lines, facilitating U.S. continental expansion while leaving Mexico economically strained and territorially diminished.[4]Gadsden Purchase and 19th-century adjustments
The Gadsden Purchase addressed persistent ambiguities in the Mexico–United States border stemming from the United States and Mexican Boundary Survey of 1848–1855, which had revealed discrepancies in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo's delineation, including overlapping claims in the Mesilla Valley and the need for a more southerly route for a transcontinental railroad.[3][35] President Franklin Pierce appointed James Gadsden as minister to Mexico in 1853 with instructions to acquire up to 120,000 square miles south of the existing New Mexico Territory boundary for $15 million, though negotiations focused on smaller parcels to resolve disputes and secure rail access below the 32nd parallel.[3] Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna, facing financial pressures, agreed to cede territory despite domestic opposition viewing it as a further loss after 1848.[3] The treaty was signed on December 30, 1853, in Mexico City, transferring 29,670 square miles of land—encompassing the southern portions of present-day Arizona and New Mexico—for $10 million, paid in two installments: $7 million upon ratification and $3 million after the boundary survey.[3][36] Article I redefined the border segment, commencing at 31°47' north latitude on the Rio Grande, extending west 100 miles, then south to 31°20' north, along that parallel to the 111th meridian, and northward to the Colorado River about 20 miles below its confluence with the Gila River, thereby eliminating Mexican enclaves and aligning the line for practical transit.[36] The U.S. Senate approved a revised version on April 25, 1854, which reduced the land area and excluded provisions for Native American reservations, with final ratification exchanges occurring on June 30, 1854.[3] Joint commissioners surveyed and marked the new boundary within three months of ratification, as required by Article II, establishing permanent monuments along the purchased strip.[36] Further 19th-century adjustments arose from the need to maintain and clarify the full border amid erosion, disputes, and incomplete markings from earlier surveys.[20] In response to a 1882 convention—revived in 1889—the United States and Mexico created the temporary International Boundary Commission (IBC) on March 1, 1889, tasked with inspecting existing monuments, resurveying the line west of the Rio Grande, and recommending additional markers to prevent encroachments.[20] From 1891 to 1896, under U.S. Commissioner John Whitney Barlow and Mexican counterpart Jacobo Blanco, the IBC conducted a comprehensive resurvey, repaired deteriorated markers, and erected new obelisks and pyramids, expanding the total from 52 to 258 monuments spaced approximately one mile apart.[20][21] These granite and iron structures, often inscribed with dates and national symbols, provided enduring physical demarcation, resolving minor territorial ambiguities and stabilizing the border configuration until the 20th century.[21][35]20th-century shifts and modern delineations
The boundary between the United States and Mexico, largely fixed by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 1853 Gadsden Purchase, experienced adjustments in the 20th century primarily due to the Rio Grande's meandering course, which follows the thalweg (deepest navigable channel) principle established in earlier conventions. The 1905 Banco Convention addressed disputes over riverine islands (bancos) formed by avulsion and accretion, stipulating that such features remain with the riparian state where they originated unless exchanged by mutual agreement; this resolved numerous small territorial claims along the lower Rio Grande without major delineations but set precedents for future stabilizations.[20] A prominent dispute arose from 19th-century floods that shifted the Rio Grande south of El Chamizal, a 600-acre tract near El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, placing Mexican-owned land north of the river by 1864. Initial arbitration in 1911 favored Mexico, but implementation stalled amid U.S. domestic opposition; diplomatic negotiations intensified in the mid-20th century, culminating in the 1963 Chamizal Convention, ratified by both nations, which transferred 437 acres to Mexico and 193 acres to the U.S. in exchange, accompanied by a rectified river channel to prevent recurrence. Construction of the Chamizal Canal, completed in 1968, permanently fixed the boundary in this sector, demonstrating binational engineering to enforce causal stability over natural fluvial dynamics.[37][38] Mid-century efforts further mitigated river-induced shifts through rectification projects, such as the 1930s canalization of the Rio Grande around El Paso-Juárez, which encased the channel in concrete to control flooding and anchor the thalweg against erosion or avulsion. The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), evolving from 1889 origins, coordinated these works under the 1884 Boundary Convention's framework, surveying and marking boundaries with monuments while prioritizing empirical hydrology over contested legal interpretations.[20][39] The 1970 Boundary Treaty marked the era's capstone, resolving lingering issues from river cut-offs and bancos by establishing fixed lines in 37 affected sectors along the Rio Grande, impacting approximately 215 such features and eliminating future thalweg variability through agreed demarcations and land swaps totaling over 1,000 acres. This treaty, administered by the IBWC, shifted delineations from fluid river channels to static coordinates in problematic zones, reflecting a pragmatic recognition that unchecked natural changes undermined bilateral certainty.[20] In modern delineations, the IBWC maintains the 3,145-kilometer border through ongoing surveys, monument preservation, and digital mapping, incorporating GPS and geospatial technologies since the late 20th century for sub-meter precision. Orthophoto-based international boundary maps, updated as recently as 2012, delineate terrestrial, riverine, and Colorado River segments, ensuring verifiable fixes against erosion or disputes; these efforts underscore causal interventions like levees and channels as essential to preserving the boundary's integrity amid environmental pressures.[40][20]Border Infrastructure
Physical barriers and fencing
The physical barriers along the Mexico–United States border consist primarily of vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing designed to impede unauthorized crossings and vehicular incursions. Vehicle barriers, typically 4 to 6 feet high and constructed from steel posts spaced to block automobiles while allowing pedestrian and wildlife passage, cover approximately 300 miles, concentrated in rural areas of Arizona and New Mexico.[41] Pedestrian fencing, including 18- to 30-foot-high steel bollard walls—hollow vertical slats filled with concrete for structural integrity and topped with anti-climbing plates—comprises the majority of barriers, often paired with secondary fencing, access roads, and lighting in urban sectors.[42] These structures are not continuous across the 1,954-mile border but are deployed strategically along high-traffic zones, such as the Rio Grande Valley in Texas and the San Diego region in California, where Normandy-style fencing (mesh panels on steel frames) supplements bollards in flood-prone areas.[41] Initial fencing efforts began in the early 1990s with short segments of chain-link barriers in San Diego, California, extending to about 14 miles by 1996 to redirect migrant traffic away from populated areas.[41] The Secure Fence Act of 2006, signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2006, authorized and funded up to 700 miles of barriers, including 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicle barriers, primarily along the southwestern border.[43] Implementation under the Department of Homeland Security resulted in approximately 654 miles of total barriers by 2011, with construction focused on sectors like Tucson, Arizona (223 miles added) and El Paso, Texas (107 miles).[44] During the Trump administration from 2017 to 2021, approximately 458 miles of new primary pedestrian barriers were constructed, including 80 miles of entirely new wall and the remainder as replacements for older vehicle barriers, utilizing designs such as 30-foot bollard panels with integrated sensors.[45] The Biden administration halted new construction via executive order on January 20, 2021, redirecting funds to environmental remediation and technology, though court rulings compelled completion of 40-50 miles using prior appropriations by late 2024, including segments in Texas and Arizona.[46] As of October 2025, under renewed Trump administration directives, the total barrier mileage stands at about 778 miles, with $4.5 billion in contracts awarded for 230 additional miles of integrated barriers and 400 miles of supporting technology, targeting gaps in Texas and California sectors.[47][48] Construction incorporates corrosion-resistant materials like corten steel to withstand environmental stresses, though maintenance challenges persist in riverine sections prone to erosion.[49]Ports of entry and crossing checkpoints
The ports of entry along the Mexico–United States border consist of 28 official land facilities designated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for processing legal entries of vehicles, pedestrians, rail cargo, and commercial shipments across California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.[50] These ports handle the vast majority of authorized cross-border movement, including over 200 million vehicles and pedestrians annually in recent years, while facilitating approximately $800 billion in two-way trade as of fiscal year 2023.[51] CBP officers at these locations conduct inspections for admissibility, contraband, and compliance with trade regulations, utilizing technologies such as non-intrusive scanners and canine units to screen approximately 1.2 million cargo containers yearly.[52] Among the busiest ports, San Ysidro in California processes the highest volume of passenger vehicles, with 15,845,661 cars entering the United States from Mexico in 2023, reflecting its role as a primary commuter and tourism gateway despite occasional wait times exceeding two hours during peak periods.[53] Laredo, Texas, stands out for commercial traffic, managing over 3 million truck crossings in 2023 and serving as a hub for North American supply chains under the USMCA agreement.[53] Other significant ports include Otay Mesa (California) for freight, Nogales (Arizona) for produce imports, El Paso (Texas) for both passenger and rail traffic, and Hidalgo (Texas) for pedestrian and vehicle flows, collectively accounting for more than 80% of southwest border land entries.[52]| Port of Entry | State | Primary Focus | Notable 2023 Traffic |
|---|---|---|---|
| San Ysidro | California | Passenger vehicles/pedestrians | 15.8 million vehicles entering U.S.[53] |
| Laredo | Texas | Commercial trucks/rail | Over 3 million trucks[53] |
| Otay Mesa | California | Freight/cargo | Major container processing hub[52] |
| El Paso | Texas | Mixed vehicle/pedestrian/rail | High commuter volume[52] |
Surveillance technologies and systems
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) deploys the Border Surveillance Systems (BSS), a suite of technologies integrating fixed and mobile video surveillance, thermal imaging devices, radar, ground sensors, and range finders to detect and interdict illegal crossings along the U.S.-Mexico border.[55] These systems support CBP's mission by providing real-time situational awareness, enabling agents to respond to detected threats without constant physical presence in remote areas.[56] Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) consist of fixed camera towers equipped with day/night cameras, infrared sensors, and radar, often mounted on monopoles with sensor arrays for 360-degree coverage.[57] As of October 2024, approximately 30 percent of RVSS towers were non-operational due to maintenance failures, highlighting persistent reliability challenges despite ongoing upgrades.[58] In contrast, Autonomous Surveillance Towers (AST), which incorporate AI-driven analytics to distinguish between humans, vehicles, and animals, have been expanded in sectors like Big Bend, with two additional units deployed in November 2024 to provide mobile, solar-powered monitoring over a 3-mile radius.[59][60] Ground-based sensors, including seismic and magnetic detectors buried along high-traffic zones, complement aerial and tower systems by alerting operators to movement, while unmanned aerial systems (drones) and aerostats offer overhead reconnaissance with electro-optical and infrared payloads.[61] CBP's integration of artificial intelligence processes data from these sources—radar, video, and infrared—to automate threat classification and tracking, as seen in solicitations for AI-enhanced mobile surveillance trucks capable of deploying in urban and rural border environments.[62][63] Commercial systems like Anduril's Sentry towers employ multi-sensor fusion with AI for autonomous detection across land domains, relaying alerts to CBP command centers for rapid response.[64] Empirical assessments, including Department of Homeland Security evaluations, indicate that while these technologies enhance detection rates in instrumented areas, factors such as terrain variability and evasion tactics limit overall interdiction efficacy, with historical data showing incomplete coverage across the 1,954-mile border.[65][66]Security and Enforcement Policies
US agencies and operational strategies
The primary U.S. agency tasked with securing the Mexico–United States border is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operating under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CBP's efforts focus on preventing terrorism, illegal immigration, and smuggling, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) specifically responsible for interdicting unlawful entries between the 28 designated ports of entry along the 1,954-mile southwest border. USBP divides operations into nine sectors covering this region, each managed by a chief patrol agent and subdivided into stations for tactical deployment.[67][68] USBP employs a range of ground-based and technological tactics to enforce border control. Core activities include line watch patrols directly along the border fence or demarcation line, sign cutting to detect and track footprints or disturbances indicating recent crossings, and fixed interior checkpoints on major highways to inspect vehicles for concealed migrants or contraband. Specialized units conduct marine interdictions along the Rio Grande, horse and bicycle patrols in rugged terrain, and all-terrain vehicle operations in remote areas, supplemented by aircraft for aerial surveillance. Agents integrate non-intrusive technologies such as ground sensors, remote video surveillance systems, and night-vision goggles to monitor high-traffic zones and respond to alerts.[67] The 2025–2029 USBP Strategy outlines a structured operational framework built on three goals: enhancing impedance and denial through layered barriers, autonomous surveillance towers, and data-driven analytics to achieve near-100% real-time detection and apprehension of crossers under zero-tolerance policies; attaining organizational excellence via accelerated recruitment, mandatory training completion rates of 100% for mission-critical skills, and improved agent retention; and bolstering interagency collaboration, including intelligence fusion centers and joint task forces with entities like the Drug Enforcement Administration for narcotics interdiction. This strategy prioritizes consequence delivery, such as swift prosecution referrals, to deter repeat attempts, while leveraging predictive modeling to allocate resources dynamically.[69] Complementary agencies include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which handles interior enforcement and removals following USBP apprehensions, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which supports counter-smuggling operations through shared intelligence and joint interdictions. U.S. Northern Command provides non-enforcement assistance, such as mobile ground-based monitoring by service members to detect movements, freeing USBP agents for direct interventions. These efforts emphasize risk-based targeting over blanket patrols to optimize limited resources amid persistent smuggling threats.[68][70]Evolution of enforcement measures
Mounted watchmen from the U.S. Immigration Service began patrolling the Mexico–United States border as early as 1904 to curb illegal entries, primarily on horseback with limited resources.[71] The U.S. Border Patrol was formally established on May 28, 1924, under the Immigration Act of 1924, initially comprising six agents tasked with interdicting undocumented migrants and smugglers amid rising cross-border traffic during Prohibition.[71] Enforcement remained sporadic and underfunded through the mid-20th century, focusing on reactive apprehensions rather than prevention, with operations peaking during events like the 1954 "Operation Wetback," which involved mass deportations of over 1 million individuals through coordinated sweeps by Immigration and Naturalization Service agents.[72] The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) marked a shift by legalizing approximately 3 million undocumented immigrants while introducing employer sanctions and allocating funds for additional Border Patrol agents, aiming to deter future illegal hiring and crossings.[73] Enforcement intensified in the 1990s with the "prevention through deterrence" strategy, concentrating agents and barriers in high-traffic urban areas to funnel migrants into more dangerous remote deserts and rivers, where natural barriers and increased lethality would discourage attempts.[74] Key implementations included Operation Hold the Line in El Paso (1993), which deployed 400 agents along 20 miles of border fencing, and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego (1994), which reduced apprehensions in that sector by over 75% within four years through added lighting, cameras, and patrols.[71] Post-9/11 reforms centralized enforcement under the Department of Homeland Security (created in 2002), merging the Border Patrol into U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in 2003, which expanded personnel to over 20,000 agents by 2010 and integrated anti-terrorism priorities with immigration control.[68] The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) bolstered this by authorizing tripled fencing in high-traffic zones, expedited removals, and penalties for repeat offenders, while the 2006 Secure Fence Act mandated 700 miles of physical barriers, leading to construction of vehicle and pedestrian fencing across urban sectors.[73] Technological advancements, including ground sensors, drones, and the short-lived Secure Border Initiative's "virtual fence" (deployed 2008–2011), supplemented patrols, though evaluations noted mixed efficacy due to maintenance issues and evasion tactics.[75] In the 2010s, strategies emphasized consequence delivery, such as Operation Streamline (expanded from 2005), which prosecuted migrants en masse for illegal entry, imposing jail time before deportation to raise recidivism costs.[73] The Trump administration (2017–2021) accelerated barrier construction, adding 458 miles of new or replacement fencing, implemented the Migrant Protection Protocols ("Remain in Mexico") requiring asylum seekers to await hearings in Mexico, and invoked Title 42 public health expulsions, expelling over 2.8 million encounters from March 2020 to May 2023.[68] The Biden administration initially halted wall construction and expanded catch-and-release via parole programs but faced record encounters exceeding 2.4 million in fiscal year 2023, prompting reinstatements of Title 42 until its expiration and eventual executive actions in June 2024 restricting asylum when daily crossings averaged over 2,500.[68] By 2025, following the second Trump administration's inauguration, enforcement reverted to zero-tolerance policies, declaring a national border emergency, resuming wall projects, and imposing tariffs to pressure Mexico on migration control, aligning with the Border Patrol's 2025–2029 strategy prioritizing operational control through layered deterrence, intelligence-driven patrols, and rapid removals.[76] [77] This evolution reflects a progression from ad hoc patrols to resource-intensive, multi-layered systems combining physical obstacles, personnel surges, and policy levers, though empirical data indicate persistent challenges in achieving full deterrence amid adaptive smuggling networks.[78]Empirical effectiveness of barriers and patrols
Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have empirically reduced unauthorized crossings in targeted high-traffic sectors. In the Yuma sector of Arizona, the construction of approximately 72 miles of fencing between 2005 and 2008 resulted in a 90% decrease in Border Patrol apprehensions compared to pre-construction levels.[79] Similarly, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which authorized over 700 miles of barriers, was associated with a 39% decline in migration flows proximate to newly fenced areas, deterring an estimated 41,500 migrants per quarter.[80] These outcomes stem from barriers' capacity to impede rapid foot crossings, providing agents time for interception, though smugglers have adapted with tools like ladders and saws in some instances. Despite localized successes, barriers frequently displace crossings to unfenced remote or rugged terrain rather than eliminating them entirely. Following Operation Gatekeeper's fencing expansions in the San Diego sector starting in 1994, apprehensions there fell steadily through 2004 amid a 150% increase in manpower and technology deployment, but total southwest border apprehensions remained stable at around 1.2 million annually as flows shifted to sectors like Tucson.[81] Peer-reviewed analyses confirm this pattern, attributing only about 5% of the overall decline in Mexican nationals residing unlawfully in the U.S. from 2005 to 2015 to border fencing, with economic factors exerting stronger influence on net migration.[82] Displacement increases migrant risks, including fatalities, without proportionally curbing aggregate attempts. U.S. Border Patrol agents have bolstered enforcement effectiveness through scaled-up presence and operations. Agent numbers expanded from roughly 4,000 in the early 1990s to over 19,000 by fiscal year 2016, correlating with improved sector-level metrics; eight of nine southwest sectors showed enhanced "effectiveness rates" (a composite of detection, interdiction, and mission performance) per Government Accountability Office analysis of Border Patrol data.[83] The estimated success rate for unlawful entries—defined as undetected crossings—dropped from 33% in 2006 to 13% in 2011, reflecting higher deterrence from patrols, sensors, and checkpoints.[84] Per-agent apprehension costs rose from $656 in fiscal year 2000 to $10,831 in 2018, indicating fewer crossings per agent amid intensified coverage, though raw encounter volumes fluctuate with global push factors.[85] Integrated barriers and patrols yield synergistic effects by channeling crossings into surveilled corridors, facilitating higher detection amid adaptation challenges. Congressional Research Service evaluations note that combined infrastructure and personnel have reduced successful evasions in fortified zones, though undetected "gotaways" persist, estimated at hundreds of thousands annually during peak periods like fiscal year 2023.[83] Recent fiscal year 2025 data reflect historically low southwest border encounters—dropping below 30,000 monthly in mid-year—attributable in part to sustained barrier-patrol frameworks alongside bilateral Mexican interdictions, underscoring that while empirically effective for containment, barriers and patrols alone do not address upstream drivers like cartel facilitation or economic disparities.[86] Studies from sources including the Department of Homeland Security affirm these measures' role in elevating crossing costs and risks, though pro-open-border analyses often emphasize displacement over net deterrence.[87]Migration and Cross-Border Flows
Legal trade, commerce, and authorized movement
Legal trade and commerce across the U.S.-Mexico border occur primarily through designated ports of entry, where U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers inspect and clear goods, vehicles, and individuals under established regulations. These ports handle the bulk of bilateral economic exchange, with trucks, rail cars, and maritime vessels transporting commodities such as automobiles, electronics, agricultural products, and petroleum derivatives. In fiscal year 2024, U.S. goods trade with Mexico totaled approximately $840 billion, encompassing $334 billion in exports and $506 billion in imports, positioning Mexico as the United States' largest trading partner by volume.[88] This commerce supports integrated supply chains, particularly in manufacturing sectors like automotive assembly, where components cross the border multiple times during production.[5] The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), governs much of this trade by reducing tariffs and enforcing rules of origin to ensure regional value content. USMCA provisions have facilitated a 37% increase in intra-regional goods and services trade since implementation, driven by enhanced digital trade rules, labor protections, and environmental standards that promote cross-border investment in sectors like advanced manufacturing.[89] Key ports, such as Laredo, Texas—the busiest for freight—processed over $300 billion in trade value in 2023, with trucks accounting for the majority of northbound cargo, including vehicles and machinery. Rail lines, comprising eight dedicated crossings, transport bulk goods like grains and minerals, contributing to efficient logistics amid rising volumes.[90] Authorized movement of people complements commercial flows, with millions of legal entries annually for tourism, business, family reunification, and temporary work under visa categories like B-1/B-2 for visitors or TN for professionals. Pre-pandemic data from 2019 recorded over 275 million inbound land crossings from Mexico at ports of entry, including pedestrians and vehicles facilitating daily commuters and shoppers.[91] Although volumes dipped during COVID-19 restrictions, recovery in 2024 saw ports like San Ysidro, California, handle 14.8 million vehicle entries, underscoring the border's role in routine authorized mobility.[92] Approximately 55 active land ports, spanning 43 roadways, eight rail connections, and one ferry, enable this activity while CBP employs risk-based screening to expedite low-risk traffic and scrutinize potential violations.[93] Over $1.2 million in goods value crosses every minute on average, highlighting the border's centrality to North American economic interdependence.[93]Illegal entry trends and empirical statistics
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) primarily measures illegal entry attempts at the southwest border through encounters, which encompass U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) apprehensions between ports of entry and Office of Field Operations (OFO) inadmissibles at ports.[7] In fiscal year (FY) 2024 (October 1, 2023–September 30, 2024), southwest land border encounters totaled approximately 2.1 million, including 1.5 million USBP apprehensions between ports.[7] [94] This marked a decline from the FY 2023 peak, where monthly encounters exceeded 370,000 in December 2023, driven by factors including policy shifts and regional migration pressures.[95] Encounters surged post-2021, totaling over 10.8 million nationwide from FY 2021 through FY 2024, with more than 8.7 million at the southwest border.[94] Prior to this, annual southwest encounters averaged under 1 million during FY 2017–2020.[9] By September 2024, USBP recorded about 53,900 encounters between ports, reflecting a downward trend that accelerated into FY 2025.[96] In May 2025, encounters dropped to 8,725 between ports, a 93% decrease from May 2024 levels, with July 2025 detecting around 4,600 attempted crossings.[97] [98] June 2025 saw the lowest recorded monthly illegal crossings in CBP history.[99]| Fiscal Year | Southwest Land Border Encounters (Millions) |
|---|---|
| FY 2021 | ~1.7 |
| FY 2022 | ~2.4 |
| FY 2023 | ~2.7 |
| FY 2024 | ~2.1 |
Asylum claims, apprehensions, and removals
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) records apprehensions primarily through encounters at the southwest land border, encompassing U.S. Border Patrol Title 8 apprehensions between ports of entry and Office of Field Operations inadmissibles at ports, with historical peaks exceeding 2 million annually during fiscal years 2021–2024 due to surges in irregular crossings from Central America, Venezuela, and other regions.[7] In fiscal year 2024 (October 2023–September 2024), encounters totaled approximately 2.5 million before declining sharply, with monthly figures dropping from a record 249,741 in December 2023 to under 50,000 by late 2024 amid enhanced Mexican interdictions and U.S. policy adjustments like expanded expedited removals.[103] [104] By fiscal year 2025, encounters plummeted further under stricter enforcement, reaching 25,243 total in June (including 6,070 southwest apprehensions) and 8,386 Border Patrol apprehensions in October, levels unseen since 1970 and 95% below prior monthly averages.[105] [106] Among encountered migrants, a significant portion—often over 70% in peak years—express intent to seek asylum, triggering credible fear screenings by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to assess eligibility for withholding removal under Title 8 or the Convention Against Torture.[107] In fiscal year 2024, DHS conducted over 152,000 credible fear interviews since May 2023, reflecting the volume of defensive asylum claims from border crossers released into the U.S. pending hearings amid a backlog exceeding 1 million cases by mid-2023.[108] Empirical outcomes show low legitimacy, with overall asylum grant rates at approximately 14% in fiscal year 2023 and declining to 35.8% by October 2024 in immigration courts, where judges denied 74–76% of cases in early 2025; only 54,350 asylees were granted status nationwide in 2023, many affirmatively rather than defensively from border claims.[109] [110] [111] This disparity indicates widespread misuse of asylum pathways by economic migrants, as pass rates for initial credible fear screens (often 75–80% in surges) far exceed final merits grants, incentivizing entries via "catch and release" practices that strain resources.[112] Removals and repatriations, handled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations, rose to over 700,000 by DHS in fiscal year 2024—the highest since 2010—including 271,484 formal removals to more than 192 countries, with 32.7% involving criminal convictions and a focus on recent border crossers via expedited processes.[113] [114] Of these, the majority targeted southwest border arrivals, with returns to Mexico comprising a substantial share; policies like Title 42 expulsions (ended May 2023) and subsequent bilateral agreements with Mexico facilitated rapid turnbacks, reducing interior releases and enabling higher removal rates relative to encounters compared to pre-2021 lows.[115] In fiscal year 2025, continued low encounters correlated with sustained high removal efficiency, though backlogged asylum cases persist as a vector for prolonged stays absent swift adjudication reforms.[116]| Fiscal Year | Southwest Border Encounters (Approximate) | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 850,000 | Pre-surge baseline[7] |
| 2021 | 1.7 million | Initial post-Title 42 surge[117] |
| 2023 | 2.5 million | Peak monthly highs[7] |
| 2024 | 2.0+ million (declining) | Policy shifts reduce flows[103] |
| 2025 (partial) | <100,000 monthly average | Historic lows post-enforcement[106] |
Drug Trafficking and Cartel Activities
Smuggling routes and methods
Mexican cartels, particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel, dominate drug smuggling operations across the Mexico–United States border, controlling clandestine production labs in Mexico and established land-based corridors into the United States for fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin.[118] These routes primarily traverse the 1,954-mile southwestern border, with high-traffic sectors including San Diego-Tijuana, El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, and Tucson-Nogales, where cartels exploit terrain variations from urban crossings to remote deserts and rivers.[119] In fiscal year 2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seized 241,000 pounds of illicit drugs along this border, both at and between ports of entry (POEs), underscoring the scale of these pathways.[120] Over 90% of fentanyl interdictions occur at POEs, where smugglers—often U.S. citizens or legal residents recruited by cartels—conceal small, high-value loads in passenger vehicles, commercial trucks, or pedestrian crossings using hidden compartments in tires, fuel tanks, firewalls, after-market voids, or body cavities.[121][122] For instance, in June 2025, CBP reported seizing 742 pounds of fentanyl nationwide, with the majority at southern POEs via such vehicular methods, reflecting a 3% increase from May amid intensified inspections.[99] Between POEs, cartels shift to lower-volume tactics like backpack carriers navigating remote areas or ultra-light aircraft drops, though these account for fewer seizures due to the drug's compact nature favoring POE concealment.[119] Subterranean tunnels represent a sophisticated method for bulk smuggling, historically used for marijuana but adapted for harder drugs; these engineered passages, often equipped with ventilation, rails, and electricity, extend from Mexican urban sites to U.S. warehouses or lots.[124] In June 2025, Border Patrol discovered an incomplete narcotics tunnel from a Tijuana residence to a San Diego commercial warehouse, exemplifying ongoing cartel innovation despite detection risks from ground sensors and seismic monitoring.[125] Cartels supplement land routes with air and maritime vectors, including sea cargo from Pacific ports and small aircraft evading radar, forming a diversified network to evade patrols.[119] Human smuggling routes overlap with drug corridors, as cartels charge migrants $7,000–$18,000 for guided treks across the same desert and river paths, sometimes using migrants as decoys to distract from drug loads, though fentanyl's portability reduces reliance on pedestrian mules compared to bulkier substances like methamphetamine.[126][118] Seizure data indicate that while POE dominance persists for synthetics, between-POE methods persist in high-violence plazas controlled by cartels, enabling adaptive responses to enforcement.[121]Fentanyl crisis and synthetic opioid influx
The influx of synthetic opioids, particularly illicit fentanyl, across the Mexico–United States border has fueled a public health crisis in the United States, with fentanyl implicated in the majority of opioid-related overdose deaths. In 2023, synthetic opioids like fentanyl were involved in approximately 72,776 overdose fatalities, contributing to over 105,000 total drug-involved deaths nationwide, of which nearly 70% involved opioids.[127][128][129] Preliminary data for 2024 indicate a decline to around 48,422 fentanyl-related deaths, reflecting a broader 27% drop in overall overdose fatalities to about 80,400, though the scale remains unprecedented and primarily driven by illicitly manufactured fentanyl rather than diverted pharmaceuticals.[130][131] Mexican transnational criminal organizations, notably the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels, dominate the production of illicit fentanyl destined for the U.S. market, synthesizing it in clandestine laboratories within Mexico using precursor chemicals predominantly sourced from China.[118][132] These precursors, such as 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and norfentanyl, are shipped from Chinese manufacturers to Mexican ports or overland, where cartels process them into finished fentanyl powder or counterfeit pills pressed to resemble legitimate opioids like oxycodone.[133][134] This shift to Mexican production intensified after 2013–2014, when direct shipments from China via mail declined due to U.S. and international pressure, redirecting the supply chain through Mexico as cartels adapted to exploit demand for cheap, potent synthetics.[135] Trafficking occurs primarily through legal ports of entry along the border, where over 90% of interdicted fentanyl is seized, often concealed in low-concentration, high-volume loads within passenger vehicles, commercial trucks, or personal effects driven by U.S. citizens or legal residents recruited by cartels.[121][133] U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported seizing 26,718 pounds of fentanyl in fiscal year 2023, decreasing to 21,148 pounds in 2024 amid enhanced inspections, with monthly figures such as 1,148 pounds in December 2024.[136][137] While smaller quantities evade detection between ports via foot, drones, or tunnels, the concentrated form of fentanyl—typically as powder or pressed pills—facilitates concealment in vehicular traffic at checkpoints rather than pedestrian crossings, underscoring the challenge of inspecting the millions of daily legal crossings.[138][120] Enforcement efforts, including CBP's Frontline Against Fentanyl initiative, have escalated seizures by over 850% since 2019 through advanced scanning, canine units, and intelligence sharing, yet the purity and volume of fentanyl enable tiny amounts—mere milligrams—to cause lethal overdoses, amplifying the crisis's impact.[121] Bilateral U.S.-Mexico cooperation targets precursor flows and cartel labs, but persistent cartel violence and corruption in Mexico hinder eradication, with U.S. policy emphasizing disruption of Chinese precursor exports alongside border interdiction.[139][140] The border's role as the primary conduit for this synthetic opioid surge highlights causal links between unchecked transnational trafficking networks and domestic overdose epidemics, independent of migration patterns.[118]Cartel violence spillover and interdiction efforts
Mexican drug cartels have increasingly directed violence toward U.S. Border Patrol agents and civilians near the border, manifesting in drone incursions, gunfire, and assaults rather than widespread crime in U.S. communities. Between early 2024 and mid-2025, cartels deployed drones over 60,000 times within 500 meters of the U.S. border, averaging 328 daily flights that pose risks to agent safety through surveillance and potential explosive payloads.[141] In January 2025, agents in Fronton, Texas, exchanged gunfire with suspected cartel gunmen across the Rio Grande, highlighting escalating cross-border confrontations.[142] Similarly, on January 23, 2025, suspected cartel members robbed and shot a U.S. citizen in the Jacumba Wilderness area near the California border.[143] By February 2025, reports indicated cartels ordering "suicide drone" attacks with explosives on agents to disrupt enforcement.[144] Despite these targeted incidents, empirical data show limited spillover into elevated general crime rates in U.S. border cities, which maintain violent crime levels below national averages. In 2024, cities like El Paso (rate of 278.41 per 100,000), Laredo (365.84), and others reported declines, with combined rates for Texas border metros at 356.5 per 100,000—lower than the U.S. average—and homicide rates near historic lows.[145][146] FBI statistics confirm Texas border areas as among the safest U.S. metros, attributing stability to robust local policing rather than unchecked cartel influence.[147] This contrasts with Mexican border cities, where cartel turf wars drive homicide rates dozens of times higher, suggesting U.S. enforcement and geographic separation contain broader spillover.[148] U.S. interdiction efforts against cartels emphasize multi-agency operations, seizures, and targeted arrests, coordinated by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In July 2025, a joint ICE-led strike arrested 676 individuals linked to Mexican cartels, seizing $12 million in currency, 467 kilograms of cocaine, and other narcotics.[149] CBP's fiscal year 2025 enforcement data report historic lows in apprehensions alongside increased detections of cartel tactics like drone usage, enabling proactive responses.[9] The DEA's 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment underscores cartels' role in U.S. violence but notes interdictions disrupting supply chains, including fentanyl precursors trafficked via Mexico.[118] Joint U.S.-Mexico initiatives, such as intelligence sharing through the El Paso Intelligence Center, target cartel finances and weapons flows, though Mexican reluctance limits direct cross-border raids.[150] Effectiveness is evident in reduced migrant encounters and drug seizures, but experts argue supply-side strategies alone fail against adaptive cartel methods like maritime and precursor chemical smuggling.[151]Economic Impacts
Trade benefits under USMCA and predecessors
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), effective January 1, 1994, eliminated tariffs on most goods traded between the United States and Mexico, spurring a rapid expansion in bilateral commerce through integrated cross-border supply chains, particularly in automotive, electronics, and apparel manufacturing. U.S.-Mexico goods trade volume surged from $81 billion in 1993 to $614 billion by 2016, with much of the growth attributable to reduced trade barriers that lowered production costs and boosted productivity in export-oriented industries.[152][153] This expansion supported over five million U.S. jobs tied to exports to Mexico by the late 2010s, while enabling Mexico to specialize in labor-intensive assembly, with maquiladora operations along the border processing intermediate goods efficiently via streamlined customs under NAFTA's rules of origin.[152] NAFTA's framework facilitated daily cross-border truck traffic exceeding 100,000 loads by the 2010s, concentrating economic activity in border gateways like Laredo and El Paso, where trade volumes accounted for a disproportionate share of national totals—Laredo alone handled over $300 billion in annual trade by 2019. Empirical analyses attribute roughly $630 billion in cumulative U.S. import and export growth to NAFTA through 2014, driven by causal linkages such as tariff elimination and investor protections that encouraged foreign direct investment in Mexico's export platforms.[5][154] The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced NAFTA on July 1, 2020, retained core tariff-free access while enhancing trade facilitation through Chapter 7 provisions on customs administration, including mandatory risk-based inspections and electronic single-window systems to minimize border delays. These updates reduced non-tariff barriers, with U.S.-Mexico goods trade reaching $839.5 billion in 2024—$334 billion in U.S. exports and $505.5 billion in imports—reflecting continued integration amid post-pandemic supply chain resilience.[155][156] USMCA's higher de minimis shipment thresholds (up to $800 for U.S. imports from Mexico) streamlined e-commerce and low-value parcel flows, cutting clearance times and costs for small businesses, while rules-of-origin upgrades in sectors like automobiles mandated 75% North American content to incentivize regional production over offshoring.[155][157] In agriculture, USMCA preserved duty-free access for over 90% of U.S. farm exports to Mexico, the largest market absorbing $28 billion annually by 2023, with biotechnology and dairy provisions resolving prior disputes to sustain border-adjacent agro-exports from states like Texas and California. Overall, these agreements have causally linked border infrastructure investments—such as expanded ports of entry—to trade efficiency, with U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data showing NAFTA-era precursors contributing to a tripling of real GDP per capita convergence between the two economies by 2018, though benefits accrued unevenly due to adjustment costs in import-competing sectors.[158][159]Fiscal costs of illegal migration and enforcement
The United States federal government expends billions annually on border enforcement and interior immigration operations. In fiscal year 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was allocated $19.8 billion to support border patrol agents, technology deployments, and apprehension processing along the Mexico–United States border.[160] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) received approximately $9.6 billion in fiscal year 2024 for detention, removals, and interior enforcement activities, with budgets nearly tripling since the agency's creation in 2003.[161] Recent legislative actions, including a September 2025 funding package, directed an additional $170 billion over multiple years toward expanded detention capacity, deportation operations, and personnel hiring for these agencies.[162] These expenditures reflect efforts to interdict illegal entries, with CBP alone accounting for the majority of Department of Homeland Security's border security outlays. Illegal migration imposes substantial fiscal burdens on federal, state, and local governments, primarily through public services utilization exceeding tax contributions from undocumented populations. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), drawing on U.S. Census and government expenditure data, estimated in 2023 that gross annual costs totaled $150.7 billion, encompassing education ($78 billion, largely for children of illegal immigrants), medical care ($42 billion via uncompensated emergency services and Medicaid), welfare programs ($24 billion), and law enforcement/justice system ($19 billion).[163] After subtracting approximately $32 billion in taxes paid by illegal immigrants, the net fiscal drain reached $182 billion, equating to $1,156 per U.S. taxpayer.[163] Federal-level spending on benefits and services for illegal aliens alone approached $66.5 billion in 2023, including Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program outlays and refundable tax credits.[164] State and local governments bear a disproportionate share of these costs, particularly for K-12 education and healthcare, where eligibility restrictions are limited. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected in June 2025 that the 2021–2023 immigration surge—estimated to include millions of undocumented entrants—added about $16 billion in state and local spending for education, Medicaid, and other services in 2023 alone, partially offset by $4–5 billion in additional tax revenues, resulting in a net budgetary pressure of roughly $11–12 billion.[165] This surge effect compounds longer-term drains, as undocumented households contribute $96.7 billion in total taxes (federal, state, and local) annually but consume services at higher rates due to lower average education levels and larger family sizes.[166] Estimates vary by source, with restrictionist analyses like FAIR's emphasizing uncompensated costs and empirical breakdowns from Census-derived population figures (around 15.5 million illegal immigrants in 2022), while some analyses dispute the net drain magnitude but acknowledge short-term state-level deficits.[167][168]| Cost Category (FAIR 2023 Estimate) | Annual Gross Cost (Billions USD) |
|---|---|
| Education | $78 |
| Medical | $42 |
| Welfare | $24 |
| Justice/Enforcement | $19 |
| General Government | $11 |
| Total Gross | $150.7 |
Labor markets, remittances, and wage effects
The influx of Mexican migrants into the United States has primarily augmented the supply of low-skilled labor in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and personal services, where Mexican immigrants constituted a significant share of the workforce as of 2023.[170] Empirical research exploiting exogenous variations in migration flows, such as those induced by the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, demonstrates that such inflows increase the relative supply of low-skilled labor, leading to short-term declines in wages for native low-skilled workers by approximately 2-4% in high-immigration locales, alongside upward pressure on housing costs.[171] Long-term analyses, accounting for skill complementarity and native labor adjustments, estimate that sustained Mexican immigration since the 1980s has depressed real wages for U.S. workers without high school diplomas by 3-5%, with effects concentrated among prior immigrants and minorities in similar occupations due to direct competition.[172] Conversely, periods of reduced Mexican migration, such as during the 2008-2009 recession when repatriations accelerated, have been associated with improved employment prospects and occupational mobility for native workers in affected U.S. regions, underscoring the substitutability between Mexican immigrant and low-skilled native labor.[173] While aggregate U.S. economic output expands with immigration—driven by complementary high-skilled labor and entrepreneurial activity—the localized and skill-specific wage suppression highlights distributional costs borne by less-educated natives, a finding robust across instrumental variable approaches but often understated in studies reliant on simple correlations that overlook endogenous native responses.[172][174] Remittances from Mexican workers in the United States form a critical economic channel, totaling a record $64.7 billion in 2024, with the U.S. originating approximately 97% of these transfers, equivalent to 3.5-4% of Mexico's GDP and surpassing foreign direct investment in scale.[175][176] These funds, averaging $300-400 per transaction and concentrated in central and southern Mexican states, finance household consumption, education, and microenterprises, reducing poverty rates by up to 10 percentage points in recipient communities while stabilizing rural economies amid domestic underemployment.[177][178] However, remittances can induce moral hazard effects, lowering labor force participation among prime-age adults in migrant-sending households by 5-10% through income substitution, potentially perpetuating dependency and constraining Mexico's domestic productivity growth.[178] In Mexico, net emigration to the U.S. border regions contracts the local labor supply, exerting upward pressure on wages for non-migrants—estimated at 1-2% annual increases in high-emigration municipalities—while remittances amplify household incomes and enable selective human capital investments, though overall skill selectivity remains low given the predominance of low-education outflows.[172] This dynamic has contributed to wage convergence between migrant-sending areas and urban centers, but it also correlates with reduced formal sector participation and heightened informality, as remittance-dependent households prioritize leisure or self-employment over wage labor.[179] Bilateral labor mobility thus sustains Mexico's export of surplus workers while importing capital via remittances, yet it risks entrenching structural unemployment absent complementary domestic reforms.[180]Social and Cultural Dimensions
Transborder communities and indigenous groups
Transborder communities along the Mexico–United States border consist of paired urban areas where economic, familial, and social ties span the international line, fostering interdependence despite enforcement measures. Major examples include the El Paso–Ciudad Juárez metropolitan area, with a combined population exceeding 2.8 million as of recent estimates, and the San Diego–Tijuana region, encompassing over 5 million residents, where daily cross-border commuting supports labor markets, retail, and services.[14] These binational hubs emerged from historical trade routes and proximity, with residents historically relying on porous movement for work and family visits, though post-1993 enforcement operations like El Paso's "Hold the Line" reduced unauthorized crossings by concentrating patrols.[181] Approximately 19 million people reside in the broader U.S. southern border counties, many engaged in transborder activities that integrate Mexican manufacturing with U.S. consumption.[14] Indigenous groups predating the border's establishment face division of ancestral lands, with the Tohono O'odham Nation most prominently affected, its territory bisected by the 1853 Gadsden Purchase that ceded southern Arizona to the United States while leaving portions in Sonora, Mexico.[182] The nation comprises about 34,000 enrolled members, including over 2,000 living south of the border, whose traditional practices—such as seasonal migrations for saguaro fruit harvesting and family ceremonies—require crossing the 74-mile shared boundary without regard for the artificial line imposed by treaties.[183] Other divided tribes include the Yaqui, Cocopah, Kumeyaay, Pai, Apache, and Kickapoo, whose lands were fragmented by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and subsequent agreements, disrupting kinship networks and resource access.[184] Border infrastructure, including barriers erected since the 1990s and expanded under subsequent administrations, has impeded these groups' mobility, prompting the Tohono O'odham to secure U.S. government waivers allowing members to cross using tribal identification rather than passports, though physical walls and patrols still hinder unescorted travel for cultural events.[185] Tribal leaders assert the boundary as an "imaginary line" irrelevant to pre-colonial sovereignty, with enforcement often exacerbating isolation rather than addressing external threats like cartel incursions on reservation lands.[186] In response, the nation maintains internal checkpoints and collaborates selectively with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, balancing security with traditional rights amid ongoing territorial claims.[187]Public safety, crime rates, and victimization data
Violent crime rates in U.S. cities along the Mexico–United States border have consistently been lower than or comparable to the national average in recent years. In 2024, several border communities, including those in Texas, reported violent crime rates below the national figure, which itself reached 20-year lows. For instance, FBI data for fiscal year 2024 showed Texas border cities like El Paso and Laredo with lower violent crime rates than the U.S. average, though slight upticks occurred in some areas amid broader national declines. Analyses of 11 border cities from earlier periods, such as 2019, similarly found average violent crime rates of 338.5 per 100,000 residents, below the national rate of 380.7.[145][146][188] Empirical studies on immigration's impact indicate that undocumented immigrants do not elevate overall crime rates in border states or communities. Research from the Migration Policy Institute reviews multiple datasets showing immigrants, including undocumented ones, commit crimes at lower rates than native-born populations and do not increase local crime in receiving areas. Cato Institute analysis of incarceration data from 2010–2023 found illegal immigrants' conviction rates for violent crimes lower than natives' in Texas, a key border state, though measurement challenges persist due to incomplete federal and state tracking of immigration status. Conversely, Heritage Foundation reports highlight federal data on criminal noncitizens encountered at the border, noting over 275,000 such individuals in April 2023 alone, many with prior convictions, suggesting undercounted risks in specific categories like drug and human smuggling offenses.[189][190][191]| Metric | Border Cities (e.g., TX/AZ/NM, 2024) | National U.S. Average (2024) |
|---|---|---|
| Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000) | Below average in most TX cities; varies in NM | ~380 (pre-2024 baseline, declining) |
Health and disease transmission risks
The irregular migration across the US-Mexico border presents health risks through the potential introduction and spread of infectious diseases, exacerbated by limited screening for many undocumented entrants and conditions in US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) holding facilities. Migrants from regions with higher disease prevalence, including parts of Latin America, often arrive without comprehensive medical evaluations, while overcrowding in processing centers—where detainees may be held in close proximity—facilitates transmission of respiratory pathogens.[200][201] The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has documented enhanced spread of influenza and other respiratory viruses in such crowded settings, with border facilities reporting elevated illness rates during peak migration periods.[201] Tuberculosis (TB), a persistent concern, shows disproportionate incidence among foreign-born populations, who accounted for approximately 73% of the 8,921 reported US cases in 2022, despite comprising about 13% of the population. Undocumented migrants, lacking routine pre-entry screening required for legal immigrants, contribute significantly to this burden, particularly in border states like California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, where two-thirds of foreign-born TB cases originate.[202] Recent surges in border encounters—over 2.4 million in fiscal year 2023—have correlated with a 20% rise in US TB cases from 2020 to 2023, with some analyses attributing the uptick partly to mass migration from high-prevalence countries.[203] Active TB disease renders individuals inadmissible under US law, yet undetected cases among irregular migrants pose ongoing risks to public health infrastructure and communities near entry points.[203][202] COVID-19 transmission risks peaked during the pandemic in CBP facilities, where rapid processing of large migrant groups led to outbreaks among detainees and staff. A 2019 CDC investigation into respiratory illnesses at border stations highlighted vulnerabilities, with subsequent reports confirming higher infection rates in overcrowded environments post-2020.[201][204] By mid-2021, facilities in Texas and Arizona experienced clusters, prompting temporary policy adjustments like Title 42 expulsions, though releases into communities without full isolation contributed to localized spread.[205] Regional outbreaks, such as the 2025 measles resurgence in Mexico with over 3,900 confirmed cases by August, heighten cross-border importation risks, given the disease's high contagiousness and incomplete vaccination coverage among some migrant groups.[206] The US reported 1,356 measles cases in the same period, including import-related incidents, with border proximity facilitating potential transmission via unvaccinated travelers or asylum seekers.[207] Other vector-borne diseases like Chagas, endemic in Latin America, have been detected in migrant screenings, underscoring gaps in routine testing for irregular flows.[208] Overall, these dynamics strain US surveillance systems, with CDC efforts focused on binational coordination to mitigate spillover, though empirical data indicate persistent challenges tied to volume and enforcement limitations.[209]Environmental Effects
Wildlife corridors and habitat disruption
The construction of physical barriers along the United States–Mexico border, including fences and walls spanning over 700 miles as of 2024, has fragmented habitats and impeded wildlife movement across critical corridors in regions such as the Sonoran Desert and Sky Island ecosystems.[210] These structures, often 18 to 30 feet high with anti-climb features, block access to water, foraging areas, and mating grounds, leading to behavioral changes and reduced gene flow among populations.[211] A 2024 camera-trap study in Arizona documented an 86% reduction in successful wildlife crossings at solid wall sections compared to pre-existing vehicle barriers, with only 9% of interactions resulting in animals scaling or passing through.[212] Large mammals like jaguars (Panthera onca), ocelots (Leopardus pardalis), and mountain lions (Puma concolor) are particularly vulnerable, as the border bisects their dispersal routes between Mexico's core populations and sparse U.S. habitats.[210] Jaguars, listed as endangered under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, rely on cross-border corridors for genetic diversity; barrier-induced isolation exacerbates inbreeding risks in northern subpopulations, with detections north of the border declining post-construction.[213] Similarly, ocelots in South Texas face habitat severance, where walls have reduced movement and increased road mortality, contributing to fragmented subpopulations numbering fewer than 100 individuals.[214] The border traverses habitats for at least 83 threatened or endangered species, including Sonoran pronghorn (Antilocapra americana sonoriensis) and Mexican gray wolves (Canis lupus baileyi), whose migrations are curtailed, potentially hindering adaptation to climate-driven habitat shifts.[211] Mitigation efforts, such as small wildlife passages under walls, have shown limited efficacy; while they facilitate crossings for species like coyotes (Canis latrans) and collared peccaries (Pecari tajacu), larger or less agile animals experience near-total blockade, with overall permeability remaining low.[210] Habitat disruption extends beyond barriers to associated infrastructure, including patrol roads and lighting, which degrade riparian zones and increase edge effects, altering mammal diversity gradients in the Sonoran Desert.[215] Empirical monitoring indicates that without restored connectivity—via gates or selective removals—long-term population viability for wide-ranging species will decline due to demographic stochasticity and reduced resilience.[214]Water resources and pollution from crossings
Illegal border crossings along the Mexico–United States border generate significant pollution through discarded items such as plastic bottles, clothing, backpacks, food packaging, and improvised rafts, which accumulate in riverbanks, trails, and staging areas, eventually entering waterways like the Rio Grande.[216] Human waste from migrant campsites and crossings further contributes to fecal contamination, introducing pathogens such as E. coli into surface and groundwater sources in arid border regions.[217] These pollutants stem directly from the volume of crossings, with estimates indicating approximately seven pounds of trash per prevented entrant based on observed debris patterns in high-traffic zones.[216] The Rio Grande, which delineates much of the Texas–Mexico border, experiences direct deposition of migrant-generated waste during crossings, exacerbating existing agricultural and municipal pollution with non-biodegradable plastics and organic refuse that leach chemicals into the river.[218] In areas like the Rio Grande Valley, pedestrian traffic from crossings creates erosion-prone trails that funnel trash into the waterway, while discarded items from raft crossings add to sediment and debris loads.[219] Similar impacts occur along the San Pedro River in Arizona, where migrant trails lead to waste accumulation in riparian habitats, threatening aquifer recharge in water-scarce environments.[220] This pollution degrades water quality by elevating bacterial levels and microplastic concentrations, posing risks to aquatic ecosystems, wildlife, and downstream human users reliant on the Rio Grande for irrigation and municipal supply.[221] Pathogens from human waste contaminate habitats in national wildlife refuges, such as Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge, where illegal traffic has historically led to detectable fecal coliform spikes in local streams.[220] Non-biodegradable trash persists in the environment, entangling wildlife and releasing toxins over time, with millions of pounds reported littering border areas as of 2024.[221] Mitigation efforts include U.S. Customs and Border Protection's environmental stewardship programs, which document reduced trash and erosion following barrier construction that curtails unauthorized pedestrian crossings.[219] Volunteer cleanups and state initiatives in Texas and Arizona have removed substantial debris, though the scale of crossings—exceeding 2 million encounters in fiscal year 2024—continues to outpace removal capacities, perpetuating pollution cycles.[94] Bilateral environmental agreements, such as Border 2025, aim to address transboundary waste but have limited focus on migrant-sourced pollution amid broader enforcement challenges.[222]Legal Framework and Bilateral Relations
Foundational treaties and sovereignty issues
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848, concluded the Mexican-American War and established the initial framework for the U.S.-Mexico border by ceding approximately 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory to the United States, including present-day California, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona and New Mexico, and parts of Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, and Oklahoma.[33] The treaty defined the boundary line starting from the Gulf of Mexico, following the Rio Grande (known as the Río Bravo del Norte in Mexico) westward to its source, then proceeding north along specified parallels and meridians to the Pacific Ocean, thereby affirming U.S. sovereignty over the ceded lands while recognizing Mexico's retention of sovereignty south of the line.[223] To implement this, the treaty created joint U.S.-Mexico commissions for surveying and marking the boundary, laying the groundwork for ongoing binational cooperation through what became the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).[224] Subsequent adjustments addressed ambiguities in the 1848 delineation, particularly in arid regions where surveys proved challenging. The Gadsden Purchase, formalized by the Treaty of Mesilla on December 30, 1853, involved the United States acquiring roughly 29,670 square miles of land in southern Arizona and New Mexico from Mexico for $10 million (after an initial $15 million offer was reduced due to Mexican internal instability), primarily to facilitate a southern transcontinental railroad route and resolve disputes over the imprecise western extension of the border near the Gila River.[225] This transaction finalized the continental border's current configuration, extending U.S. sovereignty southward and clarifying Mexico's northern limits, though it divided indigenous lands such as those of the Tohono O'odham without their consent.[4] Sovereignty issues have periodically arisen due to the Rio Grande's dynamic nature, as the treaty specified the river's main channel as the boundary, subject to changes from floods and erosion—a principle of international law distinguishing avulsion (sudden shifts preserving original sovereignty) from accretion (gradual changes altering boundaries).[20] The Chamizal tract near El Paso, Texas, exemplifies this: a 1864 flood shifted the river southward, placing 600 acres of U.S.-claimed land on the Mexican side, leading to a century-long dispute over sovereignty.[226] Resolved by the 1963 Chamizal Convention, the agreement saw the U.S. cede 437 acres to Mexico in exchange for 193 acres of Mexican land, with both nations constructing a concrete-lined channel to stabilize the boundary, ratified by the U.S. in 1964 and affirming mutual sovereignty through adjusted demarcations.[37] Further treaties have maintained sovereignty amid environmental changes, including the 1889 Boundary Convention for resurveying and the 1970 Boundary Treaty, which settled remaining uncertainties by allocating river islands and thalwegs while prohibiting obstructions to navigation or flow that could impinge on territorial integrity.[227] These instruments underscore that while the border's legal foundation remains intact, sovereignty enforcement relies on binational mechanisms like the IBWC, which has adjudicated over 100 river rectification projects since 1848 to prevent unilateral alterations.[224] No major unresolved territorial claims persist, though debates over modern infrastructure—such as border barriers potentially altering watercourses—invoke these treaties' prohibitions on sovereignty-threatening diversions.[228]US internal policies and zone regulations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) maintains authority to conduct warrantless stops, boardings, and searches of vehicles, vessels, and trains within a designated border zone extending 100 air miles inland from the U.S.-Mexico boundary, as established by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This provision permits CBP agents to interrogate individuals regarding immigration status and search for undocumented persons without probable cause or a warrant in this area, a regulation formalized in 8 CFR § 287.1(a)(1), which defines "reasonable distance" from the border as 100 air miles. The zone encompasses approximately 200 million residents, including major population centers like San Diego, Tucson, and El Paso, enabling routine interior enforcement operations distinct from port-of-entry inspections.[229] CBP operates fixed and mobile checkpoints within the zone to verify citizenship or immigration status, a practice affirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), which upheld brief stops at interior checkpoints for immigration inquiries based on the government's compelling interest in border control. Agents require reasonable suspicion for secondary inspections but may refer vehicles for further scrutiny without individualized cause at primary checkpoints. These operations have intercepted thousands of undocumented migrants annually; for instance, CBP reported over 1.7 million apprehensions in fiscal year 2024 within the southwest border sector, many stemming from zone checkpoints. Limitations include prohibitions on warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances, as reinforced by the Fourth Amendment, though critics argue the zone's breadth erodes constitutional protections without commensurate oversight.[229][230] Expedited removal, authorized under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)), allows CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers to deport certain inadmissible aliens arriving at or near the border without a hearing before an immigration judge, applicable within the 100-mile zone and beyond under expanded designations. Eligible individuals include those apprehended without valid entry documents or who misrepresent identity, with credible fear screenings offered only if asylum claims are raised; in fiscal year 2023, over 40% of southwest border encounters resulted in expedited removals or expulsions. As of January 21, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security extended this process nationwide to any undocumented person unable to prove two years' continuous U.S. presence, reversing prior geographic and temporal limits to prioritize enforcement resources near the border. This policy excludes U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and unaccompanied minors under specific protections.[231][232] Additional zone regulations govern customs enforcement, prohibiting unauthorized merchandise transport and enabling seizure of contraband under 19 U.S.C. § 1581, with CBP maintaining ports of entry for regulated crossings. Federal law also mandates operational control metrics, including barriers and technology deployment, as directed by the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-367), which authorized 700 miles of fencing and vehicle barriers along priority sectors, supplemented by sensors and patrols. State-level policies in border areas, such as Texas's Operation Lone Star initiated in 2021, complement federal efforts with deployments of National Guard units for surveillance, though these remain subordinate to CBP primacy under 8 U.S.C. § 1103.[1][230]Mexico-US cooperation and diplomatic tensions
Bilateral security cooperation between Mexico and the United States has centered on initiatives like the Mérida Initiative, launched in 2008, which provided over $3.5 billion in U.S. assistance for equipment, training, and institutional reforms to combat drug trafficking and organized crime affecting the border region.[233] This program emphasized intelligence sharing, border interdiction technology, and judicial reforms, contributing to joint operations that disrupted cartel networks, though evaluations noted persistent challenges in reducing violence due to Mexico's internal governance issues. Cooperation extended to environmental border management under the 1983 La Paz Agreement, addressing sanitation and pollution in shared waterways, with joint projects improving wastewater treatment infrastructure along the border.[234] In migration management, U.S.-Mexico agreements have intensified since 2019, including Mexico's deployment of National Guard units to its southern border under pressure from U.S. tariff threats, resulting in a sustained decline in irregular crossings; by 2025, apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border reached a 55-year low, with an 85% drop in irregular migration through Mexico in the first eight months of the year.[235] Under the Biden administration, pacts focused on addressing migration root causes through economic aid to Central America, while the second Trump term saw Mexico commit 10,000 additional troops to patrol its side of the border, alongside U.S. resumption of the Migrant Protection Protocols requiring asylum seekers to await proceedings in Mexico.[236] A September 2025 joint statement reaffirmed reciprocity in security efforts, including fentanyl interdiction and human smuggling disruptions.[237] Diplomatic tensions have arisen primarily over uneven burdens in migration enforcement and water allocation under the 1944 treaty governing the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, which mandates Mexico deliver 1.75 million acre-feet annually from the Rio Grande basin to the U.S. Mexico accrued significant water debts during droughts, leading to U.S. refusals in March 2025 to release Colorado River water to Tijuana amid shortages affecting over 2 million residents, marking the first such denial in over 50 years.[238][239] In November 2024, a compromise allowed Mexico to offset debts with future deliveries and infrastructure investments, but Texas farmers reported $500 million in losses from shortfalls, exacerbating bilateral friction.[240] U.S. policies like the Migrant Protection Protocols strained relations by requiring Mexico to host tens of thousands of asylum seekers, with Mexico protesting humanitarian conditions and cartel violence risks, though compliance averted tariffs in 2019 and supported crossing reductions.[241] Renewed U.S. tariff threats in early 2025 under the second Trump administration targeted Mexico's migration controls and fentanyl flows, prompting President Sheinbaum's government to enhance southern enforcement but drawing criticism for sovereignty infringements.[242] These episodes highlight causal asymmetries, where U.S. leverage via trade dependencies compels Mexican action, yet persistent cartel dominance and upstream migration drivers limit long-term efficacy, as evidenced by fluctuating encounter data despite cooperative peaks.[243]Controversies and Policy Debates
Arguments for and against physical barriers
Proponents of physical barriers, including fencing and walls, assert that such structures demonstrably reduce illegal border crossings in targeted areas by impeding direct access and enabling more efficient patrolling and surveillance. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data from the San Diego sector illustrate this effect: prior to barrier construction in the 1990s, annual apprehensions exceeded 500,000, but fell to approximately 27,000 following implementation of fencing and infrastructure enhancements.[41] Similar outcomes occurred in the Yuma sector, where barriers contributed to a near-elimination of large migrant groups (over 100 persons) in fiscal year 2019 compared to 12 such events in prior years with older fencing.[42] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has documented a 79% decrease in apprehensions in specific zones post-barrier completion, attributing this to disrupted smuggling networks that rely on pedestrian crossings.[42] Empirical analyses, such as those examining Mexican municipal data, estimate that fence construction reduces migration rates by 27% in directly affected areas and up to 15% in adjacent zones, reflecting deterrence effects on potential crossers.[244] Advocates further emphasize national security benefits, arguing that barriers complement agent deployment by concentrating resources on breaches rather than vast open terrain, thereby mitigating risks from unvetted entrants including criminals and terrorists. CBP reports highlight barriers' role in preventing vehicle-based smuggling and facilitating rapid response, with sectors featuring extensive fencing showing lower per-mile apprehension rates than unfenced expanses.[41] While not eliminating all crossings—due to adaptations like tunneling or remote desert routes—barriers have proven cost-effective locally when compared to manpower-intensive alternatives; for instance, pre-barrier San Diego required far higher agent numbers to achieve similar control.[41] Proponents, including DHS officials, contend that these structures enhance overall border integrity, as evidenced by sustained low apprehension levels in fortified sectors amid fluctuating national trends.[42] Critics, often from immigration advocacy organizations, argue that physical barriers yield diminishing returns and fail to address root drivers of migration, with migrants simply relocating to less fortified sectors like Big Bend, where terrain deters crossings more than fencing.[245] Such groups cite overall southwestern border apprehensions rising in some periods despite barrier expansions, interpreting this as evidence of ineffectiveness, though CBP attributes fluctuations primarily to policy enforcement rather than infrastructure alone.[87] Construction costs represent another frequent objection: estimates for remaining unfenced segments range from $15 billion to $25 billion, excluding maintenance, with critics like the American Immigration Council— an organization advocating for expansive immigration policies—claiming barriers divert funds from superior alternatives such as technology or port inspections.[246] [246] Opponents also highlight limitations against drug smuggling, noting CBP data that over 90% of fentanyl seizures occur at ports of entry via vehicles or cargo, primarily by U.S. citizens, rather than pedestrian crossings amenable to barriers.[135] [138] Some peer-reviewed studies link barriers to elevated migrant mortality by funneling crossings into remote deserts, estimating an additional 1,000 deaths in Mexico-attributable zones from 2007–2011 due to rerouted paths.[247] However, these analyses often overlook deterrence benefits, as total crossing attempts decline in walled areas, potentially averting more fatalities than those displaced; CBP records show sector-specific death rates varying independently of fencing density, influenced more by weather and smuggling tactics.[41] Critics' emphasis on symbolic or environmental drawbacks notwithstanding, government operational data underscores barriers' tactical value in layered enforcement, though comprehensive security requires integration with personnel, sensors, and legal measures.[42]Secure borders vs. open migration perspectives
Proponents of secure borders argue that robust enforcement, including physical barriers and increased patrols, is essential for preserving national sovereignty and mitigating the adverse effects of uncontrolled migration across the U.S.-Mexico border. Empirical data indicate that illegal immigration imposes significant fiscal burdens on U.S. taxpayers, with estimates showing that the average newly arrived illegal immigrant generates a net lifetime fiscal cost of approximately $130,000 in adjusted present value terms, primarily due to utilization of public services like education, healthcare, and welfare exceeding tax contributions.[248] This strain is exacerbated at the state and local levels, where illegal immigrants are documented as a net drain, receiving more in government benefits than they pay in taxes.[168] Secure borders advocates further emphasize public safety, citing U.S. Customs and Border Protection data on criminal non-citizens, which recorded thousands of convictions for serious offenses such as homicide, assault, and drug trafficking among apprehended individuals in fiscal years 2021–2024.[249] The fentanyl crisis underscores these concerns, with over 90% of seizures occurring at the southwest border; in fiscal year 2024 through August, authorities intercepted more than 19,600 pounds of the synthetic opioid, equivalent to hundreds of millions of lethal doses, primarily smuggled via vehicles and pedestrians evading formal ports of entry.[121] [250] From a first-principles standpoint, unrestricted entry undermines the rule of law and incentivizes further violations, as evidenced by deterrence studies showing that heightened enforcement reduces illegal crossings, though with diminishing returns amid persistent demand drivers like economic disparities.[251] Critics of lax policies, including former President Trump, contend that open migration facilitates cartel exploitation, human trafficking, and wage competition for low-skilled American workers, with research indicating that influxes of low-skilled immigrants depress wages for native-born high school dropouts by 3–5% in affected labor markets.[252] [253] Advocates for more open migration policies assert that facilitating legal pathways and reducing barriers would harness economic complementarities, filling labor shortages in sectors like agriculture and construction while boosting overall GDP through increased productivity and consumer spending.[254] Organizations such as the Economic Policy Institute argue that immigrants, including those from Mexico, tend to complement rather than substitute native workers, with effects on U.S. wages ranging from neutral to slightly positive when accounting for skill diversity.[254] Proponents, including some libertarian think tanks, highlight lower incarceration rates among undocumented immigrants compared to U.S.-born citizens in certain analyses, suggesting minimal public safety risks and potential cultural revitalization in receiving communities.[190] Humanitarian rationales emphasize asylum rights and family reunification, positing that streamlined processing at the border could alleviate irregular crossings while aligning with international obligations.[255] However, these claims warrant scrutiny given source biases; studies minimizing crime impacts often emanate from advocacy-aligned entities, while fiscal analyses from outlets like the Cato Institute acknowledge higher offending rates for illegal immigrants in specific jurisdictions, such as Texas, where incarceration data reveal rates 50–100% above natives for certain offenses.[190] Economically, while high-skilled immigration yields net positives, low-skilled inflows—predominant in Mexico-U.S. migration—correlate with persistent fiscal deficits and localized wage stagnation, challenging narratives of unqualified benefits.[256] Ultimately, open migration perspectives overlook causal links between porous borders and escalated drug trafficking, as fentanyl precursors originate predominantly from China via Mexican cartels, with seizures underscoring the border's role as a vulnerability rather than a solution through liberalization.[133]Humanitarian claims versus national security imperatives
Humanitarian advocates emphasize the perils faced by migrants attempting irregular crossings, citing violence, poverty, and persecution in origin countries as drivers necessitating asylum access and reduced enforcement. The U.S.-Mexico border has been documented as the world's deadliest land migration route, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recording 686 migrant deaths and disappearances in 2022 alone, primarily from dehydration, drowning, and exposure in remote desert areas.[257] U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data corroborates this, reporting over 8,000 migrant deaths along the southwest border since 1998, averaging about 364 annually, often exacerbated by smugglers directing migrants through hazardous terrains to evade patrols.[258] [259] Proponents of lenient policies argue that stricter measures, such as barriers or expedited removals, increase these risks by funneling migrants into deadlier paths, framing enforcement as a causal factor in fatalities rather than a response to unauthorized entries. Counterarguments highlight that many crossings stem from economic motivations rather than verifiable persecution qualifying for asylum under U.S. law, which requires well-founded fear of harm based on protected grounds like race or political opinion. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) affirmative asylum grant rates hover around 30-40% overall, but defensive claims at the border—filed by apprehended migrants—often yield lower approvals, with data indicating that the majority of applicants from Central America and Mexico fail to meet evidentiary thresholds after hearings.[260] This suggests systemic abuse of asylum processes, where valid refugees are outnumbered by economic opportunists, as evidenced by CBP encounters exceeding 2.4 million in fiscal year 2023 alone, predominantly single adults from non-persecutory contexts.[7] Such patterns undermine humanitarian rationales for open access, as causal realism points to pull factors like U.S. welfare benefits and lax interior enforcement incentivizing mass migration over genuine protection needs. National security imperatives prioritize border control to mitigate threats from uncontrolled inflows, including drug trafficking, terrorism, and public safety risks. Fentanyl, largely sourced from Mexican cartels using Chinese precursors, has driven U.S. overdose deaths surpassing 100,000 annually; CBP seized over 19,600 pounds in fiscal year 2024 through August, with 86% occurring at ports of entry amid heightened pedestrian and vehicle traffic linked to migrant surges.[121] [136] While seizures between ports are lower, the overall volume correlates with encounter spikes, as cartels exploit diversions created by migrant rushes to smuggle narcotics, underscoring how porous enforcement enables lethal flows responsible for synthetic opioid epidemics.[261] Terrorism risks further justify stringent measures, with CBP encountering 382 individuals on the terrorist watchlist at the southern border since fiscal year 2021, a ninefold increase from prior years, including nationals from adversarial states.[262] [263] Although most are apprehended, release policies under resource constraints have allowed some into the interior pending vetting, heightening vulnerabilities in an era of global jihadist threats. On crime, aggregate studies indicate undocumented immigrants have conviction rates 37% lower than U.S.-born citizens in certain analyses, yet federal data reveals over 13,000 criminal noncitizen arrests by CBP in fiscal year 2024 for offenses like assault and drug trafficking, with incarceration metrics potentially understating impacts due to local sanctuary policies limiting cooperation.[264] [52] High-profile cases, such as murders by released border crossers, illustrate discrete risks not captured in broad statistics, reinforcing imperatives for vetting to preserve sovereignty and deter cartel-enabled chaos. The tension arises from zero-sum dynamics: accommodating humanitarian inflows empirically correlates with amplified security costs, as evidenced by fiscal year 2021-2024 encounter peaks straining CBP resources and enabling got-aways estimated in the millions.[7] Prioritizing unverified claims over verifiable threats erodes deterrence, perpetuating cycles of exploitation by smugglers and undermining state capacity to enforce laws, a foundational principle of national self-preservation. Mainstream media and advocacy sources often amplify humanitarian narratives while minimizing security data, reflecting institutional biases that privilege empathy over empirical trade-offs.[104]Recent Developments (2021–2025)
Biden administration policies and migrant surges
The Biden administration, upon assuming office on January 20, 2021, implemented several policy shifts at the U.S.-Mexico border, including an immediate suspension of border wall construction initiated under the prior administration, termination of the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP, commonly known as "Remain in Mexico"), and expansion of practices allowing many apprehended migrants to be released into the United States pending immigration hearings rather than detained.[265] [241] The MPP, which required certain asylum seekers to await U.S. court proceedings in Mexico, had reduced irregular crossings by deterring frivolous claims; its termination was justified by the administration as restoring due process but correlated with immediate upticks in asylum filings processed domestically.[241] Title 42, a public health expulsion authority invoked in March 2020 under the prior administration and continued by Biden until May 11, 2023, enabled rapid returns of over 2.8 million migrants without asylum processing during the COVID-19 period, masking some underlying migration pressures.[266] [267] These policy alterations preceded and coincided with unprecedented surges in migrant encounters at the southwest land border, as reported by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Fiscal year (FY) 2021 encounters totaled 1.73 million, escalating to 2.21 million in FY2022 and 2.48 million in FY2023, with FY2024 reaching approximately 2.4 million despite later restrictions—cumulatively over 8.8 million southwest border encounters from FY2021 through FY2024, dwarfing pre-2021 levels (e.g., 405,000 in FY2020).[7] [94] Monthly peaks included over 300,000 encounters in December 2023, driven largely by single adults from diverse nationalities beyond traditional sources like Central America.[7] Of these, CBP released millions into the U.S. interior via notices to appear or parole, including through programs like the CBP One app for scheduling appointments and humanitarian parole for up to 30,000 nationals monthly from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV), which processed over 500,000 entries by mid-2024 but was criticized for creating additional pull factors amid ongoing illegal crossings.[94] [268]| Fiscal Year | Southwest Land Border Encounters |
|---|---|
| FY2020 | 405,036 |
| FY2021 | 1,734,686 |
| FY2022 | 2,214,652 |
| FY2023 | 2,475,669 |
| FY2024 | ~2,400,000 (preliminary) |
Trump second-term enforcement and wall resumption
![US-Mexico border wall construction][float-right] Upon inauguration on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued executive orders directing the resumption of stringent border enforcement measures, including the declaration of a national emergency at the southern border and the policy to "faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible and removable aliens."[76][270] These actions prioritized the removal of illegal entrants, expanded expedited removal processes, and mobilized federal resources for interior enforcement by agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[271] By October 2025, ICE arrests had doubled compared to prior periods, though deportations faced logistical challenges prompting internal agency restructuring to accelerate operations.[272][273] Border wall construction resumed promptly, with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) awarding the first contract of the second term on March 13, 2025, for 7 miles of new barrier at a cost of $70 million.[274] A subsequent contract followed for 27 miles in Arizona, supported by a Department of Homeland Security waiver issued on April 9, 2025, exempting projects from certain environmental regulations to expedite building.[275][276] These efforts aimed to close gaps in high-traffic areas, building on prior construction while addressing vulnerabilities exploited during previous administrations. Enforcement outcomes included sharp declines in illegal crossings, with southwest border encounters dropping to 8,725 in May 2025—a 93% reduction from comparable periods—and reaching all-time lows by July 2025 at approximately 4,600 to 8,000 apprehensions monthly.[97][98] Fiscal year 2025 apprehensions totaled 237,565, the lowest in over 55 years, attributed to deterred migration flows and enhanced Mexican cooperation under U.S. pressure.[277] Fentanyl seizures also trended upward amid increased patrols, though comprehensive data on long-term efficacy remains pending further evaluation.[278]Declines in crossings and fentanyl seizure trends
Following the resumption of stringent enforcement measures in the second Trump administration, including expanded expedited removals, military deployment to the border, and diplomatic pressure on Mexico to curb migrant flows, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recorded sharp declines in southwest land border encounters. In March 2025, encounters fell to under 7,200—the lowest monthly figure in recorded history—reflecting a 95% drop from peak levels in late 2023.[102] By May 2025, total encounters decreased 93% compared to May 2024, with fiscal year 2025 overall plummeting to the lowest annual level since the early 1970s.[97] [279] July 2025 saw just 4,600 detected attempted crossings, a 91.8% reduction from July 2024, attributed to policy deterrence and Mexico's intensified interceptions north of its southern border.[98] These declines contrasted with surges under prior policies, where encounters exceeded 2 million annually in fiscal years 2022–2024, straining resources and enabling "got-away" entries estimated in the hundreds of thousands.[7] Enforcement actions, such as zero releases into the U.S. interior for four consecutive months in 2025 and barriers to asylum claims, correlated with sustained low crossings, though critics from migration advocacy groups argued that underlying migration drivers like violence and economic disparity persisted.[280] [281] Fentanyl seizure trends at the U.S.-Mexico border showed dramatic increases through fiscal year 2023, peaking at 27,023 pounds seized nationwide, with over 90% occurring at legal ports of entry rather than between them.[135] This rise—from negligible amounts pre-2017 to thousands of pounds annually—reflected heightened smuggling via vehicles, pedestrians, and concealed shipments, predominantly by U.S. citizen operatives linked to Mexican cartels.[121] [261] Seizures declined in subsequent years amid broader trafficking disruptions: fiscal year 2024 totaled 21,148 pounds, a 26% drop from 2023, while January–June 2025 saw a 53% reduction compared to the prior year.[136] [139] CBP attributed this partly to enhanced scanning technology, intelligence sharing with Mexico, and reduced overall border traffic limiting smuggling opportunities, though congressional reports noted cartels' adaptations like smaller loads evading detection.[261] Despite the downturn, fentanyl remained the dominant seized opioid, comprising 94% by weight in 2024, underscoring its role in over 70,000 U.S. overdose deaths annually.[282]| Fiscal Year | Fentanyl Seizures (pounds) | Change from Prior Year |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 27,023 | + Peak increase |
| 2024 | 21,148 | -26% |
| 2025 (Jan–Jun) | ~ (53% below 2024 equiv.) | -53% (period comp.) |
References
- https://comptroller.[texas](/page/Texas).gov/economy/fiscal-notes/archive/2023/jan/fentanyl.php
