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Silver tetradrachm depicting Kleomenes III. Reverse: statue of Artemis Ortheia brandishing a spear and holding a bow, ΛΑ(ΚΩΝΩΝ), of Laconia.

Key Information

Cleomenes III (Ancient Greek: Κλεομένης) was one of the two kings of Sparta from 235 to 222 BC. He was a member of the Agiad dynasty and succeeded his father, Leonidas II. He is known for his attempts to reform the Spartan state.

From 229 to 222 BC, Cleomenes waged war against the Achaean League under Aratus of Sicyon. After being defeated by the Macedonians in the Battle of Sellasia in 222 BC, he fled to Ptolemaic Egypt. After a failed revolt in 219 BC, he committed suicide.

Early life

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Cleomenes was born in Sparta to the future Agiad king Leonidas II and his wife Cratesicleia. The exact year of Cleomenes' birth is unknown but historian Peter Green puts it between 265 BC and 260 BC.[1]

Around 242 BC, Leonidas was exiled from Sparta and forced to seek refuge in the temple of Athena after opposing the reforms of the Eurypontid King, Agis IV. Cleomenes' brother-in-law, Cleombrotus, who was a supporter of Agis, became king. Meanwhile, having started his reforms Agis went on a campaign near the Isthmus of Corinth, which presented Leonidas with an opportunity to regain his throne. He quickly disposed of Cleombrotus, and went after Agis who had gone to find sanctuary. After holding out for quite some time, Agis was arrested and executed, along with other family members.[2][3]

Following the execution of Agis, Cleomenes, who was around eighteen at the time, was forced by his father to marry Agis' widow, Agiatis, who was a wealthy heiress. According to legend, Cleomenes was hunting when his father sent him a message telling him to return immediately to Sparta. When he returned to the city, he saw that it was being decorated for a wedding and when he asked his father who was getting married, his father replied that he, Cleomenes, was. It was reported that Cleomenes was doubtful about the marriage because his father had had Agiatis' husband executed. Nevertheless, the marriage went ahead.[4]

Early years

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Cleomenes ascended the throne of Sparta in 235 BC, following the death of his father. Cleomenes had been inspired by Agis as told to him by his lover Xenares[5] and followed through on his reforms.[6] Meanwhile, the Achaean League under the command of Aratus of Sicyon was trying to unite all of the Peloponnese. Upon hearing of Leonidas' death, Aratus began attacking the cities of Arcadia, which bordered Achaea. Plutarch says that Aratus made these moves to discover Sparta's inclinations.[7]

In 229 BC, the cities of Tegea, Mantinea, Caphyae and Orchomenus, who were allied with the Aetolian League, joined Sparta. Historians Polybius and Sir William Smith claim that Cleomenes seized these cities by treachery; however the translator of Plutarch on Sparta, Richard Talbert, claims he did so at their own request.[6][8][9] Later that year, the ephors sent Cleomenes to seize Athenaeum, a fort on the Spartan border with Megalopolis which was being disputed by both cities. Cleomenes seized the fort and improved its fortifications. Meanwhile, the Achaean League summoned a meeting of its assembly and declared war against Sparta.[8] In retaliation for fortifying Athenaeum, Aratus carried out a night attack on Tegea and Orchomenus but when his supporters inside those cities failed to help, he retreated, hoping to remain undetected.[7]

Cleomenes discovered the attempted night attack and sent a message to Aratus asking the purpose of the expedition.[6][9] Aratus replied that he had come to stop Cleomenes from fortifying Athenaeum. Cleomenes response was, "if it's all the same to you, write and tell me why you brought along those torches and ladders."[6][9]

Cleomenean War

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Main article: Cleomenean War
"Upon this, Cleomenes wrote to him, in a familiar way, desiring to know, "Whether he marched the night before." Aratus answered, "That, understanding his design to fortify Belbina, the intent of his last motion was to prevent that measure." Cleomenes humorously replied, "I am satisfied with the account of your march; but should be glad to know where those torches and ladders were marching."
The conversation between Cleomenes and Aratus according to Plutarch.[7]

Cleomenes advanced into Arcadia before being called back by the ephors. When Aratus captured Caphyae, the ephors sent him out again. He ravaged the territory of Argos with an army of 5,000 men before being confronted by the new strategos of the Achaean League, Aristomachos of Argos and his army consisting of 20,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry at Pallantium. Aratus, who accompanied Aristomachos as an adviser, urged him to retreat.[7][9] Smith agrees with Aratus' assessment that 20,000 Achaeans were no match for 5,000 Spartans.[9]

This success greatly encouraged Cleomenes, and when he heard that Aratus was attacking Sparta's ally, Elis, he set off to confront them. The Spartan army fell upon the Achaean army near Mount Lycaeum and routed it.[9][10] Aratus took advantage of a rumour saying that he had been killed in the battle and seized Mantinea. Aratus' victory at Mantinea reduced the Spartans' desire for war and they began to oppose Cleomenes' war effort.

Meanwhile, the Eurypontid King of Sparta, Eudamidas III, who was the son of Agis IV and Agiatis, died.[11] Cleomenes recalled his uncle, who had fled after Agis' execution to Messene, to assume the throne. However, as soon as he returned to Sparta he was assassinated.[12] Cleomenes' part in the assassination is unknown, with Polybius claiming that he ordered it, but Plutarch disagreeing.[13][14]

Having bribed the ephors to allow him to continue campaigning, Cleomenes advanced into the territory of Megalopolis and started to besiege the village of Leuctra. As Cleomenes was besieging the village, an Achaean army under the command of Aratus attacked the Spartans. In the initial attack, the Spartans were repelled. However, Lydiadas of Megalopolis, the cavalry commander, disobeyed Aratus' order not to pursue the Spartans. When the cavalry scattered while trying to cross some difficult terrain, Cleomenes' skirmishers managed to defeat them. Encouraged by this counter-attack, the Spartans charged the main body of the Achaean army and routed them.[9][13]

Confident of his strong position, Cleomenes began plotting against the ephors. After gaining the support of his stepfather, he embarked with him on a whirlwind military expedition against his opponents, and when they requested to stay in Arcadia due to exhaustion he returned to Sparta to carry out his reform plans.[15] When he reached the city, he sent some of his loyal followers to kill the ephors. Four of the ephors were killed, while the fifth, Agylaeus, managed to escape and seek sanctuary in a temple.[9][16][17] Having removed the ephors, Cleomenes began to implement his reforms.

The reforms

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After having removed the ephors, who obstructed his political will, Cleomenes used the character of Lycurgus the lawgiver, which allowed him to legitimize the violence, and he began his reforms. He first handed over all his land to the state; he was soon followed in this by his stepfather and his friends and the rest of the citizens. He divided up all the land and gave an equal lot to every citizen, a unique achievement. The land was pooled and redistributed in equal portion to some 4,000 citizens (although the first Agis plan projected 4,500 citizens). These citizens were half old citizens, the so-called inferiors,[a] and half new citizens who for the most part were mercenaries who fought with the Spartan army. There were also Perioeci granted land for their dedication to Sparta. Those 4,000 citizens enhanced the body of Spartiates (Spartan full citizens), which had dwindled drastically (known as oliganthropia).[18]

For the first time the amount of produce the Helots had to surrender to each klaros-holder[clarification needed] was specified in absolute quantities rather than as a proportion of the annual yield. Cleomenes trained 4,000 Hoplites and restored the ancient Spartan military and social discipline.

The citizens' children were required to pass through an agoge, and the adult citizens had to practise again the old austere diaita centred upon communal living within the framework of the military-minded masses. More significantly, Cleomenes decreed that his new army should follow the model of the Macedonian army, a century after the bitter defeat of the Athenians and Thebans to the Macedonians at Chaeronea. This was characterised by the use of the Macedonian sarissa, a five-meter pike, which performed well over the next two campaigning seasons. Cleomenes completed his reforms by placing his brother, Eucleidas, in charge, making him the first Agiad king on the Eurypontid throne.[13]

Macedonian intervention

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In 226 BC, the citizens of Mantinea appealed to Cleomenes to expel the Achaean garrison from the city. One night, he and his troops crept into the city and removed the Achaean garrison before marching off to nearby Tegea. From Tegea, the Spartans advanced into Achaea, where Cleomenes hoped to force the League to face him in a pitched battle. Cleomenes advanced with his army to Dyme and was met by the entire Achaean army. In the battle, the Spartans routed the Achaean phalanx, killing many of the Achaeans and capturing others. Following this victory, Cleomenes captured the city of Lasium and presented it to the Elians.[6]

The oligarchies opposed the Cleomenian reforms. With Cleomenes' quick victories this opposition increased throughout all the Peloponnese. Cleomenes took Corinth and other strategic places. The Cleomenian reforms, although they were not intended to be applied to the defeated populations, was a significant factor behind the campaign successes of the Spartan king. Indeed, some of the Achaean population wanted to be debt-free and were willing to share their lands for more equity. In reality, Cleomenes did not care that much about the defeated population and chose to negotiate with the oligarchies even if the enmity between Aratus and Cleomenes was too great to enable them to come to an agreement.

After this diplomatic failure, Aratus chose to negotiate with Antigonus III Doson, King of Macedonia, who decided to go to war against Sparta. Despite numerous attempts to break through the defensive line and reach Lechaeum in the Corinth Isthmus, Antigonus' forces failed and suffered considerable losses. At that time Argos rebelled and Cleomenes had to send 2,000 men to deal with the situation. With this lack of men, Cleomenes abandoned the Isthmus and retreated to Mantinea.[14] At this point, Cleomenes could not avoid retreating and letting the Macedonian army advance through Arcadia.

Knowing that Cleomenes had received the money to pay for his mercenaries from Ptolemy, Antigonus, according to Peter Green, seems to have ceded some territory in Asia Minor to Ptolemy in return for Ptolemy withdrawing his financial support of Sparta.[19] After that, Cleomenes entered Megalopolis and destroyed it as well as raided the territory of Argos. The damage caused by those raids was not so much a factor of military domination for Cleomenes but rather a break in the unavoidable defeats of the Spartan army, which could not face the Macedonian army in pitched battle.[14] In 222, at the Battle of Sellasia the Spartans were defeated during which the Macedonian cavalry overcame the Spartan cavalry. The Spartan phalanx was overwhelmed by the deeper ranks of the Macedonian phalanx and almost destroyed, and only a few Spartans escaped from the battle, with Cleomenes at their side.[14]

Defeat, exile and death

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In 222 BC Cleomenes was defeated in the Battle of Sellasia by the Achaeans, who received military aid from Antigonus III Doson of Macedon. Cleomenes returned to Sparta, advised the citizens to submit to Antigonus, and fled to Alexandria to his ally Ptolemy Euergetes of Egypt, hoping for assistance in regaining his throne.

However, when Ptolemy died, his son and successor, Ptolemy Philopator neglected Cleomenes and eventually put him under house arrest. Together with his friends, he escaped his house arrest in 219 BC and tried to incite a revolt. When he received no support from the population of Alexandria, he and his friends avoided capture by committing suicide. The last to kill himself was Panteus, Cleomenes' favourite and right-hand man, who was ordered to make sure everyone was dead before taking his own life. When Panteus struck Cleomenes' ankle with the tip of his blade, he saw that the king was still alive; he kissed him and sat beside him, waiting for his last breath, and then Panteus embraced him and took his own life over the dead body of Cleomenes.[20] Thus died the man who nearly conquered all of the Peloponnese and is described by William Smith as "the last truly great man of Sparta, and, excepting perhaps Philopoemen, of all Greece."[9]

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Primary sources

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  • Plutarch, translated by Richard Talbert, (1988). Life of Agis. New York: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044463-7.
  • Plutarch, translated by Richard Talbert, (1988). Life of Cleomenes. New York: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044463-7.
  • Plutarch, translated by Richard Talbert, (1988). Plutarch on Sparta. New York: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044463-7
  • Polybius, translated by Frank W. Walbank, (1979). The Rise of the Roman Empire. New York: Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044362-2.
  • Pausanias; W. H. S. Jones (trans.) (1918). Description of Greece. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Secondary sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Cleomenes III

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Cleomenes III (c. 260–219 BC) was an Agiad king of who reigned from 235 to 222 BC and pursued radical reforms to revive the city's ancient martial dominance and egalitarian ethos. Influenced by his wife Agiatis, the widow of the reformer Agis IV, and Stoic philosopher Sphaerus, he drew on Lycurgan ideals to abolish the ephorate, redistribute land equally among 4,000 citizen allotments, cancel debts, and enfranchise select and perioikoi, thereby expanding the class and reimposing communal messes (). These measures, enacted around 227 BC after violently eliminating opposition, temporarily bolstered 's army with Macedonian-style tactics and neodamodeis freedmen. Cleomenes launched the Cleomenean War (229–222 BC) against the , securing victories such as the capture of Argos and and initial triumphs over Achaean forces in 228 and 226 BC, which expanded Spartan influence in the . However, the Achaeans allied with Macedon under , culminating in the decisive Spartan defeat at the in 222 BC, where Cleomenes' forces were overwhelmed despite defensive terrain advantages. Fleeing with a small band, he urged Sparta's submission to preserve autonomy, then sought refuge in with Ptolemy III, receiving stipend and honors until Ptolemy IV's accession led to his imprisonment. In around 219 BC, Cleomenes attempted an abortive revolt against Ptolemy IV, but after failure, he and his companions chose suicide by strangulation with their loincloths, marking the end of his bid to restore . His reforms, while innovative in addressing Sparta's oligarchic decay and demographic decline, provoked internal strife and external coalitions that ultimately thwarted revival, though they highlighted the tensions between tradition and adaptation in .

Early Life and Ascension

Family and Upbringing

Cleomenes III was the son of , king of from the , and his wife Cratesicleia. His birth date is uncertain, but ancient accounts place it in the mid-third century BC, with Cleomenes approximately eighteen years old at the execution of Agis IV in 241 BC. As a Spartan royal, he grew up amid the city's declining institutions, where traditional discipline had eroded among the elite, though he retained a personal commitment to austerity and valor. In his youth, Cleomenes studied philosophy under Sphaerus of Borysthenes, a Stoic thinker and pupil of , who visited and instilled in him ideas of and communal order that later informed his reforms. This education diverged from the conventional Spartan agogē, emphasizing rational inquiry over rote martial training, yet complemented his innate boldness and disdain for luxury. Following Agis IV's death, compelled Cleomenes—then too young for marriage by Spartan custom—to wed Agiatis, the wealthy widow of Agis and daughter of Eurydamas from the Eurypontid line, to secure her estate and counter reformist sympathies. Despite initial reluctance, the union fostered affection, and Agiatis acquainted Cleomenes with Agis's vision of redistributing land and reviving Lycurgan equality, planting seeds for his future policies. Cratesicleia supported her son's emerging ambitions with financial resources drawn from her influence.

Rise to Power and Initial Rule

Cleomenes III, a member of Sparta's , was the son of King and ascended to the throne in 235 BC upon his father's death. At approximately 24 years of age, he inherited a kingship amid Sparta's ongoing decline, marked by reduced citizen numbers and that had eroded the traditional equality among Spartiates. Prior to his accession, had arranged Cleomenes' marriage to Agiatis, the wealthy widow of the reformist Agis IV, shortly after Agis' execution around 241 BC. Though initially reluctant due to Leonidas' role in her first husband's death, Agiatis eventually shared details of Agis' unsuccessful attempts to revive Lycurgan institutions, including land redistribution and the restoration of communal messes. This exposure, combined with tutelage from the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus of the Borysthenes, shaped Cleomenes' commitment to similar restorative policies, though he resolved to avoid Agis' fatal openness by proceeding more covertly. In his early reign, Cleomenes perceived widespread degeneracy and idleness among the citizenry, prompting him to seek pretextual wars for discipline and political leverage. By 229 BC, he initiated hostilities against the , beginning with the seizure of the temple precinct of at Belmina near Pallantium, which provoked Achaean retaliation and allowed him to conduct successful skirmishes that enhanced military loyalty and positioned assertively in Peloponnesian affairs. These actions, while not yet encompassing full domestic overhaul, laid groundwork for later radical changes by demonstrating Cleomenes' resolve and rallying support against external threats.

Spartan Decline and Reform Preconditions

State of Sparta in the Early 3rd Century BC

In the early , Sparta faced acute oliganthropia, a chronic shortage of full citizens () that had persisted since the late but intensified after military defeats like Leuctra in 371 BC. Ancient estimates indicate that the Spartiate population, once numbering around 8,000 adult males in 480 BC, had fallen to fewer than 1,000 by the late and hovered at approximately 700 by the mid-3rd century, rendering the traditional citizen-body unable to sustain its historical military obligations or social cohesion. This decline stemmed from high casualties in wars, low birth rates exacerbated by the rigid training system and krypteia practices, and the loss of citizen status through failure to contribute to communal messes (), rather than solely from earthquakes or helot revolts as some ancient sources emphasized. Economically, Sparta's agrarian system, reliant on helot-tilled kleroi (land allotments) theoretically equal under Lycurgan tradition, had devolved into stark inequality. A rhetra attributed to Epitadeus in the 4th century permitted the sale or mortgage of land, enabling wealthy families to accumulate multiple holdings—often through marriages to heiresses—while impoverishing others who could no longer afford syssitia dues of grain, wine, and cheese. By the early 3rd century, a small elite controlled the majority of Laconia's fertile lands, fostering luxury and deviation from austerity, as noted by critics like Aristotle, who linked this concentration to demographic stagnation. The resulting hypomeiones (inferior Spartans) formed a disenfranchised underclass, swelling the ranks of non-citizens and straining the state's fiscal base, which depended on fixed contributions rather than dynamic trade or coinage. Socially, the oligarchic institutions—dominated by a conservative of elders from rich lineages and ephors often beholden to them—resisted adaptation, perpetuating exclusionary citizenship criteria that prioritized mess contributions over merit. This rigidity alienated potential recruits and fueled internal factionalism, evident in the weak position of kings like (r. 309–265 BC), who sought alliances abroad but faced domestic opposition. Helotage remained the backbone of production, but growing disparities risked unrest, as outnumbered citizens by ratios estimated at 7:1 or higher, though no major revolts occurred in this period. Militarily, Sparta could no longer muster its classical of six morai (regiments), each ideally 1,000 strong, forcing reliance on perioecic levies from allied towns and foreign mercenaries, as demonstrated in Areus I's campaigns against Macedonian influence. Defeats, such as at Mantinea in 272 BC against Demetrius II, highlighted vulnerabilities: sparse citizen hoplites lacked the depth to hold lines against larger foes, and the agoge's emphasis on traditional infantry drills proved outdated against evolving Hellenistic tactics like . Isolation from leagues like the rising Achaean further marginalized Sparta, reducing it from hegemon to a peripheral power in the , primed for radical intervention.

Influence of Agis IV

Agis IV, king of from approximately 245 to 241 BC, initiated radical reforms aimed at restoring the traditional Spartan citizen body by abolishing debts and redistributing land to increase the number of homoioi, which had dwindled to fewer than 1,000 families. These measures, drawing on the legendary Lycurgan constitution, sought to eliminate wealth disparities that had undermined 's military prowess since the . Agis' program encountered vehement resistance from entrenched elites and ephors, culminating in his betrayal, imprisonment, and execution in 241 BC under the influence of Cleomenes' father, . Cleomenes III, who became king in 235 BC following Leonidas' deposition, was personally connected to Agis through his to Agis' widow, Agiatis, a wealthy heiress and staunch advocate of the reforms. Initially arranged by Leonidas to consolidate power, the union fostered Cleomenes' admiration for Agis; Agiatis shared detailed accounts of her late husband's virtuous character, philosophical influences from figures like Sphaerus of , and unfulfilled reform agenda, gradually converting Cleomenes to the cause. This exposure instilled in Cleomenes a commitment to self-restraint, simplicity, and egalitarian ideals akin to Agis', though Cleomenes proved more resolute and less hesitant in pursuit. Building on Agis' foundation, Cleomenes implemented a comparable yet intensified program in 227 BC, including comprehensive debt cancellation, division of Spartan territory into roughly 4,000 equal lots for citizen allotments, and the emancipation of to bolster the army, thereby expanding the citizenry to about 4,000. Unlike Agis' aborted efforts, which stalled due to political intrigue and incomplete assembly approval, Cleomenes achieved success through audacious actions such as the of opposing ephors and exile of wealthy adversaries, reflecting a pragmatic adaptation of Agis' vision to overcome institutional barriers. notes Cleomenes' emulation of Agis' magnanimity and temperance, crediting the influence for Cleomenes' rejection of luxury and focus on restoring Sparta's ancestral . This lineage of reformist zeal marked a continuity in Spartan revivalism, though Cleomenes' militarized execution propelled Sparta into external conflicts absent in Agis' tenure.

Domestic Reforms

Economic Redistribution and Social Restructuring

Cleomenes III pursued economic reforms modeled on the purported Lycurgan system to counteract the concentration of land among a shrinking , which had reduced the full citizen body to fewer than 100 Spartiates by the mid-third century BC. After initially suppressing Agis IV's similar proposals in 241 BC, Cleomenes adopted them following the advice of the Megarian philosopher Sphaerus of and amid growing popular support for redistribution. Around 227 BC, he decreed the total cancellation of debts, publicly burning documents and contracts to preclude any claims of repayment, thereby aiming to restore equality and prevent further alienation of citizens from their traditional allotments. The core of the restructuring involved , where Cleomenes confiscated estates from wealthy families and redistributed the territory into equal kleroi (hereditary lots) designed to sustain approximately 4,000 citizen households, each sufficient for a warrior's self-sufficiency without luxury or dependence. This measure sought to revive the homoioi (similars), enabling to field a of that size trained in traditional discipline. To augment manpower, he selectively enfranchised meritorious perioikoi (free non-citizens) and emancipated who volunteered for military service—up to 6,000 reportedly joined his campaigns after promises of —integrating them as auxiliaries or limited citizens to bolster the social base for defense. These changes extended to social institutions, reinstating compulsory communal messes (syssitia) funded by produce from the new lots and reviving the agoge (youth training) to inculcate austerity and martial virtues among the expanded citizenry. While economically disruptive to elites, the reforms temporarily unified Sparta under a revived egalitarian ethos, though they provoked internal opposition from vested interests and external alarm among neighbors fearing a resurgent militarism.

Military and Institutional Overhauls

Cleomenes III initiated his institutional reforms with a coup in 227 BC, during which he executed four of the five ephors and exiled around eighty prominent opponents, effectively abolishing the ephorate that had long curtailed royal authority. He justified this by invoking the Lycurgan constitution, arguing that the ephors had deviated from the original Spartan system by amassing undue power over the kings. In place of the ephors, Cleomenes assumed direct oversight of public affairs, retaining one symbolic seat for himself, which centralized executive power under the monarchy and removed institutional checks that had obstructed prior reform efforts. To bolster the military, Cleomenes redistributed land into approximately 4,000 equal citizen allotments, abolishing debts and incorporating freed and exiles to expand the homoioi class and ensure broader participation in the . He selectively enfranchised around 2,000 —chosen for their valor—by granting freedom to those who could pay five minas, arming them with Macedonian-style equipment including long pikes and shields held by straps rather than traditional grips. This overhaul raised Sparta's effective force to about 4,000-5,000 men, integrating hybrid tactics that combined Spartan discipline with pike innovations to address manpower shortages. Institutionally, Cleomenes restored the , the rigorous youth training system, enforcing communal living, simplicity, and martial education on the expanded citizen body with philosophical guidance from Sphaerus of Borysthenes. These measures aimed to revive the egalitarian ethos of early , countering centuries of oligarchic decay and demographic decline by tying institutional stability to military renewal. The reforms' implementation during ongoing conflicts with the underscored their causal intent: to forge a unified, combat-ready polity capable of regional dominance.

Methods of Implementation and Internal Resistance

Cleomenes III initiated his reforms by deceiving the ephors into authorizing a military expedition against the Achaeans in 227 BC, deploying only a small force to minimize suspicion. Upon his sudden return to , he and his supporters stormed the ephors' quarters during a sacrificial banquet, assassinating four of the five ephors while the fifth, Agylaeus, escaped and sought sanctuary in a temple. This violent purge dismantled the ephorate, an institution that had long obstructed royal initiatives, allowing Cleomenes to abolish it entirely and consolidate power by reserving one ephoral seat symbolically for himself. To neutralize further elite opposition, Cleomenes published a list exiling approximately eighty prominent citizens, primarily wealthy landowners who resisted redistribution, thereby eliminating key voices against the changes without broader civil unrest. With institutional barriers removed, he convened the Spartan assembly, which acclaimed the reforms amid the atmosphere of coerced unity; he then placed his own estates into a common pool, encouraging others to follow, and oversaw the cancellation of debts and division of land into roughly 4,000 equal lots to restore the traditional citizen body. Concurrently, he enrolled about 4,000 new citizens from freed perioikoi and , granting them full rights and subjecting them to rigorous in the revived agoge system, enhanced by the philosopher Sphaerus of , to inculcate Lycurgan discipline. Military implementation involved overhauling the with longer pikes and shields secured by straps for better maneuverability, drawing on Macedonian influences to bolster Sparta's forces for expansion. Internal resistance stemmed chiefly from the entrenched , including figures like his Xenares, who had previously opposed reformist ideas inspired by Agis IV, and the ephors themselves, whose annual elections empowered them to check royal ambitions. The exiled faction represented the socio-economic elite fearing loss of privileges, but Cleomenes' swift use of force and —framing reforms as a return to ancestral equality—garnered acquiescence from the broader assembly, though underlying tensions persisted among traditionalists wary of diluting Spartan exclusivity.

Foreign Policy and Expansion

Objectives Against the Achaean League

Cleomenes III pursued an aggressive foreign policy aimed at restoring over the , viewing the expanding as the primary obstacle to this goal. Following his domestic reforms, which bolstered Sparta's military capacity, Cleomenes sought to subjugate or detach Achaean-aligned cities, thereby dismantling the League's federal structure and supplanting its leader, , as the dominant power in the region. His strategy emphasized rapid conquests of strategic border towns and key urban centers, such as and Argos, to weaken Achaean cohesion and force defections from cities like and Phlius, which he successfully induced to join . In diplomatic overtures, Cleomenes demanded that the Achaeans cede leadership of Greek affairs to Sparta, offering in return the restoration of captives and strongholds while proposing joint control over vital sites like Acrocorinthus to consolidate Peloponnesian defenses under Spartan primacy. This approach reflected a broader objective of unifying the peninsula under Lacedaemonian oversight, echoing Sparta's classical-era dominance but adapted to counter the League's alliances with external powers such as Ptolemaic Egypt and Macedon. By initiating hostilities in 229 BC through incursions into Achaean territory, Cleomenes tested his reformed army's effectiveness while aiming to exploit internal divisions within the League, prioritizing military superiority to achieve territorial expansion and political subordination rather than outright annihilation.

Early Campaigns and Victories

Following the consolidation of his domestic reforms in 227 BC, which included the elimination of the ephorate and redistribution of land to bolster Spartan military strength, Cleomenes III initiated aggressive campaigns against neighboring regions to revive Spartan hegemony in the . These efforts targeted Arcadia and the , exploiting divisions among former allies of and aiming to dismantle the League's growing dominance under . Cleomenes first secured strategic positions in Arcadia, occupying the precinct of at Belbina—a contested border area with —and capturing Methydrium. He then overran parts of and seized Heraea and Alsaea, weakening Achaean influence in the region. Several Arcadian poleis defected or submitted voluntarily: , Orchomenus, Caphyae, Pellené, Pheneus, and Pentelium aligned with , while Leuctra—a dependency of —fell to direct assault. Mantineia, a key Achaean stronghold, was betrayed by pro-Spartan sympathizers and captured intact. In open battle, Cleomenes achieved decisive early victories over Achaean forces. Near Mount Lycaeum in 227 BC, he routed the Achaean army, inflicting heavy casualties and taking numerous prisoners. At Pallantium, he offered pitched battle, compelling the Achaeans to withdraw without engaging. Further south at Dymae in Achaea, Spartan troops shattered the Achaean phalanx, routing the enemy and capturing additional prisoners. These successes, enabled by Cleomenes' reformed army of approximately 6,000 hoplites supplemented by liberated helots, temporarily shattered Achaean resistance and expanded Spartan control over much of Arcadia by late 227 BC.

The Cleomenean War

Major Engagements

Cleomenes III achieved several decisive victories against the in the early phases of the Cleomenean War, leveraging his reformed Spartan army's innovations and aggressive tactics to expand Spartan influence across the . These engagements, primarily in 227 BC, targeted Achaean strongholds in Arcadia and demonstrated Cleomenes' ability to outmaneuver larger coalition forces led by . In the Battle of Mount Lycaeum, fought in 227 BC near the Arcadian sanctuary, Cleomenes ambushed and routed an Achaean army retreating from Eleian territory, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing prisoners while barely escaped. This victory disrupted Achaean defenses in the region and boosted Spartan morale following Cleomenes' domestic reforms. Shortly thereafter, in the same year, Cleomenes engaged Achaean forces at Ladoceia (or Leuctra) near , where his overwhelmed the enemy line, killing the Achaean general Lydiadas of and scattering the survivors. The battle highlighted the effectiveness of Cleomenes' mercenary-integrated tactics against the traditional Achaean levy, enabling subsequent Spartan incursions into Megalopolitan territory. A further engagement occurred around 225 BC at Hecatombaeon near Dyme in western , where Cleomenes utterly defeated an Achaean detachment, securing control over coastal approaches and facilitating Spartan alliances with . These successes allowed Cleomenes to occupy key cities like Argos, , and by 226–225 BC through rapid marches and sieges, though often without major pitched battles, shifting the balance of power until Macedonian intervention reversed Spartan gains.

Strategic Innovations and Turning Points

Cleomenes III's primary strategic involved reforming the Spartan army's composition and to address chronic manpower shortages. By redistributing into approximately 3,000 equal lots and enfranchising thousands of perioikoi and emancipated , he expanded the citizen-soldier base from a few hundred traditional Spartiates to around 20,000 men by 221 BC, enabling a larger and more sustainable force capable of sustained campaigning. He supplemented this with rigorous training to restore ancient discipline and introduced longer pikes akin to the Macedonian , approximately five meters in length, which enhanced the phalanx's reach and effectiveness in close-order combat during the war's early phases. These changes facilitated aggressive tactics emphasizing rapid maneuvers and surprise assaults, yielding initial successes against the starting in 229 BC. Cleomenes cleared Achaean garrisons from Arcadia, defeated League forces at Dyme through direct engagement, and seized and Argos via swift incursions, exploiting mobility from his enlarged army to outpace slower opponents. A pivotal early turning point came in 223 BC with the surprise capture and sack of , a major Achaean stronghold; by infiltrating under cover of night and overwhelming defenders, Cleomenes eliminated a key barrier to Peloponnesian dominance, prompting the League to seek Macedonian aid under and escalating the conflict. The war's decisive turning point occurred at the in 222 BC, where Cleomenes shifted to defensive strategy amid invasion. He fortified hilltop positions on Mounts Olympus and Evas with trenches and barricades to control passes into Laconia, deploying his pike on high ground supported by and mercenaries to block advances along ridges like Dalga. Outnumbered by a combined Macedonian-Achaean force exceeding 28,000—against his roughly 20,000—Cleomenes initially held firm, but Antigonus's coordinated multi-pronged assault, including light-armed troops (5,000 and ) to dislodge flanks, shattered the lines; the Spartans suffered heavy casualties, forcing Cleomenes' flight and collapsing his reformist regime.

Macedonian Intervention and Defeat

Diplomatic Maneuvers and Alliances

Cleomenes III cultivated alliances with external powers to sustain his campaigns against the , particularly securing subsidies and military aid from of , who provided funds for mercenaries and troops as part of a broader strategy to counter Macedonian influence in . This support, building on earlier Spartan-Ptolemaic ties from the (ca. 268–261 BC), enabled Cleomenes to hire Cretan mercenaries from poleis such as , Oaxos, and Rethymnon, bolstering his forces during the Cleomenean War (229–222 BC). In exchange for this assistance, Cleomenes dispatched his mother and children to as hostages, underscoring the depth of his reliance on Ptolemaic backing. Within the Peloponnese, Cleomenes forged a key alliance with , which opposed both Achaean expansion and Macedonian intervention, forming the core of an anti-Achaean coalition that included , Mantinea, Orchomenos, Phigalia, Caphyae, and various Arcadian communities. He maintained amicable relations with , ensuring its neutrality, and initially coordinated with the against common foes. These pacts were reinforced through embassies, kinship networks, and diplomatic arbitration, allowing Cleomenes to detach cities from Achaean control; for instance, after capturing Argos in 227 BC and in 229 BC (expelling its Macedonian garrison), he integrated them into his sphere, though such gains often blended coercion with provisional alliances. As intervened in 224 BC at the invitation of Achaean leader , who had forged a Macedonian-Achaean to halt Spartan dominance, Cleomenes' diplomatic countermeasures faltered. His expansionist policies, including the sack of in 223 or 222 BC, alienated potential partners and prompted broader Greek opposition, while efforts to block Antigonus at the failed due to Macedonian naval maneuvers. III's withdrawal of subsidies in late 222 BC, communicated via messenger, compelled Cleomenes to confront the invaders at Sellasia rather than prolong defensive , marking the collapse of his network.

Battle of Sellasia and Collapse

In the summer of 222 BC, , king of Macedon, allied with the under , invaded Laconia with a combined force totaling approximately 28,000 and 1,200 cavalry, including 10,000 Macedonian phalangites, allied contingents from , , , and , and Achaean troops. , commanding around 20,000 and 1,000 cavalry—comprising Spartan citizens, perioikoi, liberated , and mercenaries—positioned his army defensively at Sellasia, a strategic pass north of , to halt the advance on the city. , drawing from contemporary accounts favorable to the Achaeans, describes Cleomenes' decision to contest the narrow terrain as a calculated risk to leverage Spartan discipline against superior numbers, though later sources like attribute it to overconfidence in his reforms' revitalization of Spartan manpower. Cleomenes divided his forces across two fortified hills, Euas and Olympus, with his brother Eucleidas holding the right wing on Euas against the Macedonians and Illyrians, while Cleomenes himself defended Olympus with the left against Achaean and mercenary troops, supported by Cretan archers and slingers. Antigonus employed a coordinated assault, using visual signals to synchronize attacks: the Macedonian phalanx and Illyrians pressed Eucleidas' position from the front, while mercenaries scaled Olympus under cover. The Achaeans, led by figures like Philopoemen, exploited gaps in the Spartan lines, with light troops harassing from afar before heavy infantry closed in; Polybius credits this multi-pronged tactic, rather than phalanx superiority alone, for breaking the defensive setup, though Spartan counterattacks initially repelled the Macedonians. The battle unfolded with intense close-quarters fighting, where Spartan hoplites inflicted heavy but faltered as Eucleidas' wing collapsed under , prompting a ; Cleomenes' attempted a flanking maneuver but could not stem the tide. Spartan losses reached about 5,000 dead and 2,000 captured, per , though reports higher figures nearing 6,000 killed with few survivors from the core citizenry, reflecting the disproportionate impact on Sparta's limited full-status fighters. Antigonus' forces secured the field, but at the cost of significant attrition among allies, underscoring the Spartans' tenacity despite numerical disadvantage. The defeat precipitated the immediate collapse of Cleomenes' regime: he escaped by night with a small via to Gythium, abandoning without a decisive stand, which portrays as pragmatic flight rather than cowardice. , bereft of its and facing , surrendered unconditionally to Antigonus, who entered the city, reinstated the ephorate, disbanded much of the reformed citizen assembly, and curtailed Cleomenes' land redistributions and helot emancipations without fully razing Spartan institutions. This unraveling exposed the fragility of Cleomenes' internal coalitions, reliant on mercenary loyalty and coerced reforms, as traditional elites and unconquered perioikoi offered minimal resistance to the victors, marking the end of 's brief resurgence as a Peloponnesian hegemon.

Exile, Final Attempts, and Death

Refuge in Egypt

Following his defeat at the in 222 BC, Cleomenes III escaped with a small group of loyal followers, sailing from the port of Gythium to the island of Cythera, then onward via Aegialia and landing in before reaching in Ptolemaic . received the exiled king with measured hospitality, impressed by his reputation and character; Cleomenes was granted an annual pension of 24 talents and assurances of future military support to reclaim the Spartan throne, though no immediate aid materialized. Ptolemy III's death in late 222 BC shifted Cleomenes' fortunes under his successor, , whose court was marked by decadence and intrigue. Initially allowed some liberty in , Cleomenes faced growing suspicion from Ptolemy IV's advisors, exacerbated by accusations from the Spartan exile Nicagoras of Cythera, who claimed Cleomenes plotted against the regime; this led to his confinement to a private residence, where his movements were restricted but he retained a modest allowance. In confinement, Cleomenes cultivated relationships with IV's younger associates and contemplated rebellion, arguing that the Ptolemaic regime's corruption stifled true kingship and that Spartans embodied () worthy of emulation. By around 219 BC, he orchestrated an escape by feigning a celebratory release to intoxicate his guards, freeing himself and thirteen companions; they slew two of the king's men and attempted to rally Alexandrian youth and liberate prisoners from , but found no widespread support amid the city's apathy. With the revolt collapsing, Cleomenes urged his followers to die as free men rather than face recapture, leading them in by self-strangulation; he ensured their deaths before taking his own life, ending his in defiance. Ptolemy IV subsequently ordered Cleomenes' body encased in a leather bag and displayed publicly, while executing his surviving family and associates to quash any lingering sympathy. The primary ancient account of these events derives from 's Life of Cleomenes, which portrays Cleomenes' final acts as emblematic of Spartan resolve amid foreign captivity.

Intrigues and Suicide

Following his defeat at the in 222 BC, Cleomenes III fled with a small group of loyal followers, including his mother Cratesicleia and children, eventually reaching in Ptolemaic after brief stops at Cythera and Aegialia. Initially received with moderate courtesy by , who had ascended the throne after the death of in late 222 BC, Cleomenes gradually earned admiration for his disciplined character and Spartan simplicity, securing an annual pension of 24 talents. promised military support, including ships and funds, to aid Cleomenes in reclaiming , but these commitments were repeatedly deferred amid the king's indulgence in luxury and Sosibius's influence as . Tensions escalated when Cleomenes advised Ptolemy IV against executing his brother Magas, who commanded 3,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries whose loyalty Magas could sway toward Cleomenes if provoked. Sosibius, fearing Cleomenes' influence and potential to destabilize the regime, cultivated distrust; this was intensified by Nicagoras of , who falsely accused Cleomenes of plotting to seize Cyrene after Nicagoras had been rescued by him from . Ptolemy IV, swayed by these intrigues, confined Cleomenes under loose surveillance rather than granting freedom or support for return to . By around 219 BC, perceiving no prospect of restoration and incensed by his , Cleomenes organized a with twelve companions, including Panteus, to incite a revolt in . The plan involved feigning attendance at a public feast to disarm suspicion, then attempting to kill the guards at the prison where Cleomenes was held and rallying the populace to overthrow Ptolemy IV; they aimed to exploit discontent among the Alexandrians and mercenaries. The uprising faltered immediately, as the expected popular support failed to materialize, leaving the group isolated and quickly apprehended. Imprisoned together, Cleomenes and his fellow conspirators chose over prolonged captivity, reportedly tearing their loincloths into strips to hang themselves; Cleomenes urged his companions, stating that "better men than we have given in to their enemies before this, having been betrayed by Fortune or overwhelmed by numbers." Polybius confirms the act as self-inflicted, rejecting claims of murder by Sosibius. Ptolemy IV subsequently ordered the execution of Cratesicleia and Cleomenes' surviving family members, though reports of a serpent manifesting on Cleomenes' corpse later fueled local as a semi-divine figure among some .

Legacy and Historiography

Ancient Perspectives

Plutarch's Life of Cleomenes, composed in the late 1st or early 2nd century AD, offers a sympathetic portrayal of the king as a visionary reformer driven by a desire to revive Spartan austerity and power in emulation of Lycurgus. He depicts Cleomenes as possessing a "generous and great soul," temperate in pleasures yet bold in action, crediting him with executing Agis IV to consolidate reforms like debt cancellation and land redistribution, which expanded citizenship to around 4,000 men by liberating helots and enrolling hypomeiones. Plutarch emphasizes Cleomenes' philosophical influences from Stoicism via Sphaerus of Borysthenes, framing his ephorate abolition and military successes—such as victories at Megalopolis in 223 BC and Ladocium—as steps toward restoring Sparta's hegemony, though ultimately thwarted by betrayal and defeat at Sellasia in 222 BC. This account, drawing on earlier Hellenistic sources like Phylarchus, idealizes Cleomenes as a tragic hero whose virtues outshone his flaws, contrasting him favorably with Roman figures like the Gracchi for bolder egalitarianism. Polybius, in Books 2 and 5 of his Histories (mid-2nd century BC), adopts a more adversarial stance reflective of his sympathies, condemning Cleomenes' campaigns as tyrannical aggressions that destabilized the . He details Cleomenes' surprise attack on in 223 BC, razing the city and prompting Achaean appeals to of Macedon, portraying the Spartan as cunning but hubristic for rejecting diplomacy and relying on mercenary phalanxes over traditional hoplites. While conceding the reforms' role in temporarily revitalizing Sparta's forces to about 10,000 citizens and allies, Polybius attributes the regime's collapse to Cleomenes' strategic errors, such as fighting at Sellasia despite Antigonus' superior numbers (estimated 30,000 Macedonians against 20,000 Spartans), and critiques his Egyptian intrigues as desperate ploys. Polybius' narrative, hostile to monarchic overreach, dismisses pro-Cleomenes accounts like Phylarchus' as sensationalist, prioritizing causal analysis of power balances over moral . Pausanias, in his (2nd century AD), provides factual but terse references to Cleomenes' exploits, noting his early invasion of around 229 BC and violation of the treaty with by sacking , without overt admiration or condemnation. He records Cleomenes as the last effective Agiad king, succeeding in 235 BC and dying in exile circa 219 BC, linking his fall to Macedonian intervention but omitting reform details, possibly reflecting Periegetes' focus on topography over biography. Later epitomators like Justin echo ' view of Cleomenes as a bold expander whose conquests—from Phigalia to Pallantium—overextended Sparta, leading to Sellasia's 5,000 Spartan casualties and regime overthrow. These divergent ancient views—Plutarch's moral elevation versus ' pragmatic critique—highlight Cleomenes' polarizing legacy as either Lycurgan restorer or Peloponnesian disruptor, shaped by authors' ideological lenses.

Modern Scholarly Debates

Modern scholars debate the extent to which Cleomenes III's reforms constituted a genuine restoration of Lycurgan austerity or a revolutionary overhaul driven by personal ambition and pragmatic adaptation to Sparta's demographic crisis. Paul Cartledge argues that the measures, including land redistribution into approximately 4,000 equal lots, debt cancellation, and the enfranchisement of about 3,000 perioikoi and neodamodeis (former helots), represented a radical break from Hellenistic norms, blending traditional Spartan ideals with innovative social engineering to combat oliganthropia—the sharp decline in full Spartiates from around 8,000 in the 5th century BCE to fewer than 700 by the 3rd century. This view contrasts with earlier interpretations emphasizing continuity, as Shimron notes that post-Sellasia (222 BCE), core elements like expanded citizenship and economic equalization persisted, influencing subsequent rulers such as Lycurgus of Sparta (not the legendary lawgiver) and Nabis, rather than being wholly reversed by conservative backlash. A key historiographical contention centers on Cleomenes' manipulation of ancient sources and ideology. While Plutarch's Life of Cleomenes portrays him as a philosophically inspired reformer influenced by Stoic and Cynic ideas—evident in his reinstatement of the agoge and abolition of luxury—Polybius, writing from an Achaean-Macedonian perspective, depicts the reforms as demagogic tyranny masked as populism to consolidate autocratic power. Contemporary analysts, including Kralli, highlight how Cleomenes selectively invoked Lycurgus to legitimize enfranchising helots (up to 10,000 armed as neodamodeis), a move unprecedented in scale that bolstered his army to 20,000 infantry by 227 BCE but alienated traditional elites, questioning whether this was causal realism in addressing Sparta's military obsolescence or opportunistic exploitation of ideological nostalgia. Debates also address the reforms' socioeconomic viability and Cleomenes' strategic miscalculations. Hodkinson and others assess the land reforms' feasibility, suggesting they targeted wealth concentration among a few families (perhaps 100 controlling most ), but lacked mechanisms for sustained productivity, relying on coerced compliance rather than voluntary buy-in, which undermined long-term stability. Critics like those in analyses of the Cleomenean War attribute failure not merely to Antigonus Doson's intervention at Sellasia but to Cleomenes' overextension—victories at (223 BCE) and Pellene expanded influence but provoked a Macedonian-Achaean without securing Ptolemaic aid beyond subsidies—reflecting a causal chain where internal social flux met external hegemonic realities. Recent works frame this as part of a broader "" (243–146 BCE), where Cleomenes' autocratic style—abolishing the ephorate in a 227 BCE coup—prefigured Nabis' policies, challenging narratives of total collapse and emphasizing adaptive resilience in Hellenistic .

Causal Analysis of Successes and Failures

Cleomenes III's early successes stemmed primarily from the rapid expansion of Sparta's citizen-soldier base through his reforms initiated around 227 BCE, which redistributed land into approximately 3,000 equal lots, canceled debts, and enfranchised thousands of and perioikoi, swelling the class from fewer than 700 to over 4,000 men. This influx provided the manpower for aggressive campaigns, enabling victories such as the capture of in 223 BCE and defeats of Achaean forces at Ladoceia and elsewhere, which temporarily secured Spartan dominance in the by exploiting surprise and the weakened state of rivals like the . The reforms' egalitarian appeal, drawing on Lycurgan ideals and Stoic influences from advisor Sphaerus, fostered initial internal cohesion and morale, allowing Cleomenes to neutralize opposition by abolishing the ephorate and consolidating royal authority. However, these gains unraveled due to structural vulnerabilities in Sparta's revamped against Macedonian professionalism, as evidenced by the 222 BCE , where Cleomenes' forces, numbering around 20,000, faced a Macedonian-Achaean coalition exceeding 30,000 under , whose sarissa-equipped pikemen and flanking tactics overwhelmed Spartan positions despite Cleomenes' entrenchments and elite guard. The reforms provoked a broad anti-Spartan alliance, as land redistribution and helot emancipation threatened Peloponnesian elites and Achaean autonomy, drawing in Macedonian intervention that Cleomenes failed to counter through diplomacy, compounded by his rash rejection of peace overtures. Internally, the forced nature of changes bred resentment among traditionalists and uncertainty among new citizens, potentially undermining loyalty, while Sparta's isolation—lacking naval power or sustained external support—left it exposed to superior and numbers; attributes such outcomes to contingent factors like funding shortages, underscoring how Cleomenes' overambitious timeline neglected adaptive military innovations. In exile, failed intrigues in Ptolemaic reflected persistent miscalculations in leveraging personal ties over strategic alliances, culminating in his suicide around 219 BCE amid thwarted revolts.

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