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Climate migration
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Climate migration is a subset of climate-related mobility that refers to movement driven by the impact of sudden or gradual climate-exacerbated disasters, such as "abnormally heavy rainfalls, prolonged droughts, desertification, environmental degradation, or sea-level rise and cyclones".[1] Gradual shifts in the environment tend to impact more people than sudden disasters.[2] The majority of climate migrants move internally within their own countries, though a smaller number of climate-displaced people also move across national borders.[3]
Climate change gives rise to migration on a large, global scale. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that an average of 20 million people are forcibly displaced to other areas in countries all over the world by weather-related events every year.[4] Climate-related disasters disproportionately affect marginalized populations, who are often facing other structural challenges in climate-vulnerable regions and countries.[4] The 2021 White House Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration underscored the multifaceted impacts of climate change and climate-related migration, ranging from destabilizing vulnerable and marginalized communities, exacerbating resource scarcity, to igniting political tension.[5]
Few existing international frameworks and regional and domestic legal regimes provide adequate protection to climate migrants.[4] However, as the UN Dispatch noted, "people who have been uprooted because of climate change exist all over the world — even if the international community has been slow to recognize them as such."[6] As a result, climate migration has been described as "the world's silent crisis", contrasting its global pervasiveness with its lack of recognition and investigation.[7] Estimates on climate-related displacement vary, but all point to an alarming trend. Some projections estimate that around 200 million people will be displaced by climate-related disasters by 2050.[8][9] Some even estimate up to 1 billion migrants by 2050, but these take ecological threats, including conflict and civil unrest as well as disasters, into account.[10][11]
Causes
[edit]Climate migrants refer to those who engage in movement driven by the impact of sudden or gradual climate change, such as "abnormally heavy rainfalls, prolonged droughts, desertification, environmental degradation, or sea-level rise and cyclones".[1] The intensification of natural disasters caused by climate change, has the potential to impact many populations, leading to a significant number of climate migrants. Over the past 50 years, the frequency of disasters has increased by a factor of 5.[12] In addition to more frequent and severe disasters, global warming-induced rising temperatures will lead to more prevalent droughts and snow and ice melting, resulting in higher sea levels.[13][14]
Gradual shifts in the environment tend to impact more people than sudden disasters. Between 1979 and 2008, storms impacted 718 million individuals, whereas droughts affected approximately 1.6 billion.[2] Sudden climatic events like severe storms and natural disasters may destroy critical infrastructure, flood neighborhoods, disrupt transit systems, overburden medical centers, cause food and water shortages, destabilize energy plants, and jeopardize human health and well-being.[15] These events can severely harm communities, making recovery a challenging process. Gradual impacts, such as famines, droughts, and other resource shortages and economic damages brought about by climate change may cause conflict, political instability, climate gentrification, and accumulated negative health effects due to exposure to unhealthy environments.[16][17][18] Droughts and slowly rising temperatures, have more mixed effects, but are more likely to lead to longer-term changes.[19]
Rising sea levels are a frequently addressed concern in environmental discussions. Sea levels are estimated to rise between 90 and 180 centimeters (roughly 3 and 6 feet) by 2100.[20] This means that, progressively, land areas will become submerged. To put it in perspective, on average each year, the sea level has risen 3.7 mm.[20] These data reveal significant threats to coastal cities and ecosystems, potentially displacing many humans.
Climate justice and adaptation
[edit]There are several ways of looking at migration and environmental change. Migration can be a human rights issue or a security issue. The human rights framing suggests developing protection frameworks for migrants. Increased border security may be an implication of treating migration as a national security issue.[21] It is possible to combine both approaches, taking national concerns into account in accordance with human rights.[22]
Climate adaptation projects in preparation for climate hazards and as a response to climate change may increase the climate resilience of communities.[23] However, these projects may inadvertently contribute to climate gentrification—a process where actions to address climate risks lead to the displacement of lower-socioeconomic groups by wealthier communities. Inner coastal cities and areas at higher elevations, traditionally occupied by less affluent populations, are now becoming more desirable due to increasing risks like sea level rise and extreme weather events affecting lower-lying wealthy waterfront properties.[24]
By bolstering resilience, such projects may reduce the degree of migration people feel compelled to undertake due to climate-related challenges. Varying levels of investment are made in supporting the adaptation, resilience, and mobility of neighborhoods, municipalities, and nations in the face of climate change and consequent environmental migration.[25] This is especially important to consider since small island states, rural populations, people of color, low-income communities, the elderly, people with disabilities, coastal urban populations, food and housing insecure households, and developing countries are especially vulnerable to the worst effects of the climate crisis and therefore to environmental migration.[26][18][27][28] Just as individuals and countries do not contribute equally to climate change, they also do not experience the negative effects of the crisis equally.[26] Both short- and long-term impacts of climate change bring under-prepared communities environmental harm and exacerbate existing inequities.[29] People with livelihoods tied to the environment, like those in agriculture, fisheries, and coast-dependent businesses, are also at risk of relocation or job loss due to climate change.[26] If communities cannot adapt adequately, migration might emerge as the primary response.
Climate migrants may migrate internally within their own country or to another country in response to climate change. Most climate migration is internal, meaning movement occurs within an individual's own country, and they do not cross international borders.[30] In 2022 alone, weather-related events led to nearly 32 million internal displacements.[31] In poor countries where individuals are more vulnerable to disasters due to inadequate climate adaptation, individuals will also often lack resources for long-distance migration.[32]
In some cases, climate change constrains migration and people may lose the means to migrate, leading to a net decrease in migration.[33] The migration that does take place is seen as voluntary and economically motivated. In some cases climate change could also exacerbate economic insecurity or political instability as causes for migration beyond temperatures and extreme weather events.[34][35][36] Who moves and who stays when affected by climate change often falls along lines of race and class, as mobility requires some amount of wealth.[37]
Global statistics
[edit]
In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change declared that the greatest single consequence of climate change could be migration, 'with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought'.[38]
The most common projection is that the world will have 150–200 million people displaced by climate change by 2050. Variations of this claim have been made in influential reports on climate change by the IPCC [39] and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,[40] as well as by NGOs such as Friends of the Earth,[41] Greenpeace Germany (Jakobeit and Methmann 2007)[42] and Christian Aid;[43] and inter-governmental organisations such as the Council of Europe,[44] UNESCO,[45] and UNHCR.[46] There has even been an estimate as high as 1.2 billion attributing climate migration to ecological threats, including conflict and civil unrest.[47] This acknowledges that such ecological challenges might instigate conflicts, such as regions disputing over water access.[16] Other reports with more conservative estimates focus solely on the direct effects of climate.
[48]Predictions on climate-induced migration often reflect the population in at-risk regions rather than the actual expected number of migrants, and not considering adaptation strategies or varying levels of vulnerability.[49] However, Hein de Haas has argued that to link the climate change issue "with the specter of mass migration is a dangerous practice based on myth rather than fact. The use of apocalyptic migration forecasts to support the case for urgent action on climate change is not only intellectually dishonest, but also puts the credibility of those using this argument - as well as the broader case for climate change action - seriously at risk".[50] He argued that while "climate change is unlikely to cause mass migration" this also overlooks the fact that the implications of environmental adversity are most severe for the most vulnerable populations who lack the means to move out.[50]
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2023, over 117 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced, with 68.3 million remaining internally displaced within their own countries. A significant proportion of these displacements are linked to environmental and climate-related factors. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that 7.7 million people were living in internal displacement specifically due to disasters in 2023, highlighting the growing role of climate-related events in driving migration. [51]
Furthermore, the IDMC's 2024 Global Report on Internal Displacement highlights that, as of the end of 2023, 7.7 million people across 82 countries and territories were living in internal displacement specifically due to disasters, including those related to climate change. [52]
While climate-related migration is often framed as a remote issue, extreme weather events are already forcing people out of their homes in many parts of the world. In 2021, storms, floods, landslides, wildfires and droughts triggered 23,7 million internal displacements (i.e. displacement within a country), according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. This makes up for 60% of all internal displacements that year.[53]
Statistics by region
[edit]Many discussions around migration are based on projections. Relatively few use current migration data.[54] Migration related to sudden events like hurricanes, wildfires, heavy rains, floods, and landslides is often short-distance, involuntary, and temporary. Slow-impact events such as droughts and slowly rising temperatures have more mixed effects. But they are more likely to lead to longer-term changes.[55]: 1079
Climate-induced migration is a highly complex issue which needs to be understood as part of global migration dynamics. Migration typically has multiple causes, and environmental factors are intertwined with other social and economic factors, which themselves can be influenced by environmental changes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognized that climate change and environmental harm frequently “interact[] with other drivers of displacement” that fit into the established refugee definition.[56]
Additionally, it is maintained that the poor populate areas that are most at risk for environmental destruction and climate change, including coastlines, flood-lines, and steep slopes. As a result, climate change threatens areas already suffering from extreme poverty. "The issue of equity is crucial. Climate affects us all, but does not affect us all equally," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a climate conference in Indonesia.[57]
Africa
[edit]Africa has 80% of the world's refugee population and this number is only set to increase with climate change.[58] Africa is one of the world regions where environmental displacement is critical, largely due to droughts and other climate-related eventualities.[59] The United Nations Environment Programme noted that "No continent will be struck as severely by the impacts of climate change as Africa."[60] Most of the countries in Africa were ranked most vulnerable to climate change and least likely to adapt to its impacts.[61] Existing conflicts, poverty, and displacement in Africa may draw attention away from climate migrants, but it is important to understand that these interrelated challenges often exacerbate the difficulties of those forced to move due to environmental factors.

Drought has become a pressing issue with climate change, and with at least one-third of the population in Africa living in drought prone areas, many of these people are vulnerable.[62] Thus, drought conditions are expected to change the lives of nearly 100 million Africans by 2050.[63] As drought intensifies, it exacerbates desertification, further diminishing the amount of habitable land.[64] Land degradation caused by desertification will have an impact of agricultural productivity, decreasing food security.[65] The connection between desertification and food insecurity is evident in the Sahel region, where between 14.4 and 23.7 million people faced hunger in 2020 and 2021.[66]
Aside from droughts, other parts of Africa experience intensified storms and flooding due to monsoon seasons. In Sudan in 2014 flooding from a storm displaced 159,000 individuals.[67] In Somalia, seasonal rains caused flash flooding in 2023 which displaced nearly a 250,000.[68]
The exacerbation of conflict and displacement in the Lake Chad basin, has been attributed to droughts, floods, and the lake's contraction due to climate change. The dwindling of natural resources is intensifying regional tensions and has led to the displacement of 3 million individuals.[69]
Middle East
[edit]The Middle East is combatting a severe refugee crisis and climate change is set to be influential in creating even more refugees.[70] The leading country in the refugee crisis is Syria, largely due to social conflict. Since 2011, over 14 million Syrians have been displaced.[71] The drought between 2007 and 2010 played a role in exacerbating the Syrian conflict. This period experienced the most severe drought on record, leading to significant agricultural setbacks and prompting numerous farming households to relocate to cities.[72] The drought acted as a catalyst, leading to the Syrian civil war.[73] Such environmental stresses have underscored the idea that many Syrians can be viewed as climate migrants, given that climatic factors indirectly fueled the onset of the Syrian civil war. Back-to-back unprecedented droughts plagued Syrian farmers from 2006 to 2011, resulting in mass migrations from the countryside to the cities where existing infrastructure came under strain. Over one million Syrians have fled the country since the war began, largely resettling in neighboring Turkey.[74] Severe flooding in Pakistan caused massive internal migration in 2022.
Another cause of environmental distress in the Middle East is extreme heat. With its hot desert climate, the Middle east is predicted to reach summertime temperatures as high as 46 °C by 2050.[75] These soaring temperatures have already occurred, although rarely, and have labeled parts of the Middle East as unlivable for humans.[76] Such extreme conditions are expected to increase the number of climate migrants, as people search for cooler and more habitable regions.
Asia and the Pacific
[edit]
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, more than 42 million people were displaced in Asia and the Pacific triggered by sudden onset natural hazards during 2010 and 2011. This figure includes those displaced by storms, floods, and heat and cold waves. Still others were displaced by drought and sea-level rise. Most of those compelled to leave their homes eventually returned when conditions improved, but an undetermined number became migrants, usually within their country, but also across national borders.[77]
A 2012 Asian Development Bank study argues that climate-induced migration should be addressed as part of a country's development agenda, given the major implications of migration on economic and social development. The report recommends interventions both to address the situation of those who have migrated, as well as those who remain in areas subject to environmental risk. It says: "To reduce migration compelled by worsening environmental conditions, and to strengthen the resilience of at-risk communities, governments should adopt policies and commit financing to social protection, livelihoods development, basic urban infrastructure development, and disaster risk management."[78]

Due to rising sea levels, as many as 70,000 people will be displaced in the Sundarbans as early as 2020 according to an estimate by the Center for Oceanographic Studies at Jadavpur University.[79] One expert calls for restoring the Sundarbans’ original mangrove habitats to both mitigate the impacts of rising seas and storm surges, and to serve as a carbon sink for greenhouse gas emissions.[80][81][82]
650 families of Satbhaya in Kendrapara district of Odisha, India who have been displaced by sea level rise and coastal erosion have been a part of the state government of Odisha's pioneering approach to planned relocation at Bagapatia under Gupti Panchayat.[83] While this approach makes provision for homestead land and other amenities, provisioning for livelihoods like agriculture and fishing which are the mainstay for the relocated populations is needed.[84]
In Minqin County, Gansu Province, "10,000 people have left the area and have become shengtai yimin, 'ecological migrants'".[85] In Xihaigu, Ningxia, water shortages driven by climate change and deforestation have resulted in several waves of government-mandated relocations since 1983.[86]
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is one of four atoll nations in the world that are highly vulnerable to sea level rise. Over a third of the population has moved to the US where, according to recent estimates, approximately 30,000 Marshallese reside, particularly in Hawaii, Arkansas and Washington. While few Marshallese migrants in the US cite climate change as the main reason for moving, many do indicate that it influences their decision whether or not to return some day.[87]
North America
[edit]Canada
[edit]Climate change has increased the likelihood and the intensity of wildfires in Canada.[88] The wildfires have posed immediate dangers to several regions, and the ensuing smoke has affected even more regions. 20% of those exposed to the smoke report a worse health due to the poor air quality.[89] Approximately 13% of the population in Canada are considering to migrate due to increase in wildfires strength and occurrence. In Alberta, it is 16%, and in British Columbia 19%. Women under the age of 35 are the most likely to migrate.[90]
California
[edit]
California is confronting a growing forest and wildlife crisis due to wildfire.[91] California has historically been vulnerable to wildfires – at least a third of the worst wildfires in US history have occurred in California.[92] However, climate change – specifically, warmer temperatures and more intense drought seasons – in recent years have dramatically increased the size and intensity of wildfires in the state.[92][91] More than half of the 20 largest California wildfires in modern history occurred between 2018 and 2022. The 2020 wildfires were particularly devastating, burning down more than 4 million acres of land, destroying thousands of buildings, and forcing hundreds of thousands of people to leave their homes.[91]
Evidence suggests that only a small percentage of those affected by the wildfires choose to stay. Only several thousands of the 27,000 residents affected by the 2018 Sierra Nevada fire chose to remain and rebuild. The others chose to migrate either to other parts of California or out-of-state.[93] They face special difficulties with relocation due to lack of fire insurance policies and the state's lack of affordable housing.[94] The state estimates at least 2.5 million homes are needed in the next eight years to catch up to demand.[94]
Alaska
[edit]
There have been 178 Alaskan communities threatened by erosion of their land. The annual temperature has steadily increased over the last fifty years, with Alaska seeing it double (compared to the rate seen across the rest of the United States) to the rate of 3.4 degrees, with an alarming 6.3 degrees increase for the winters over the past fifty years. Many of the communities residing in these areas have been living off the land for generations. There is an eminent threat of loss of culture and loss of tribal identity with these communities.[95]
Between 2003 and 2009, a partial survey by the Army Corps of Engineers identified thirty-one Alaskan villages under imminent threat of flooding and erosion. By 2009, 12 of the 31 villages had decided to relocate, with four (Kivalina, Newtok, Shaktoolik, and Shishmaref) requiring immediate evacuation due to danger of immediate flooding along with limited evacuation options.[96]
However, relocation is proving difficult because there is no governmental institutional framework that exists for the aid of climate refugees in the United States. The Obama administration promised to fund $50.4 billion to help with relocation efforts in 2016.[citation needed]

Louisiana
[edit]Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, home to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw First Nation, is being depopulated with federal grant money, due to saltwater intrusion and sea level rise. This Indigenous Nation residing on the Isle de Jean Charles is facing the effects of climate change. The resettlement of this community of around 100, exists as the first migration of a total community in the state of Louisiana. This state has lost almost 2,000 square miles (5,200 km2) of its coast within the last 87 years and now an alarming rate of almost 16 square miles (41 km2) per year is disappearing. In early 2016, a 48-million-dollar grant was the first allocation of federal tax dollars to aid a community suffering from direct impact of climate change. Louisiana has lost land mass comparable to the size of the state of Delaware revealing land mass loss that is at a rate faster than many places in the world. The resettlement plan for the Isle de Jean Charles is at the forefront of responding to climate change without destroying the community that resides within.[97][98]
Washington state
[edit]
Native American tribes located on the outer coast of the state of Washington's Olympic Peninsula, such as the Quinault Indian Nation village of Taholah, and the Shoalwater Bay Tribe, have been increasingly vulnerable to encroaching sea levels, storm surges and intense rain causing landslides and floods.[99][100] In response, the Quinault Indian Nation conducted a vulnerability assessment and devised a comprehensive relocation plan to move two of its villages – Taholah and Queets, home to 660 tribal members – to higher ground way above the tsunami and flood zones.[99][101] However, relocation is expensive and only possible with federal funding – it is estimated that moving the 471-member Shoalwater Bay Tribe up the mountain could cost half a billion dollars.[102] The Department of the Interior, under the Biden Administration, has created programs designed to help relocate communities affected by climate change and is assessing which tribes to allocate funding to first.[102]
Central America and the Caribbean
[edit]
The people of Central America and the Caribbean are repeatedly faced with severe weather events and climate change will only exacerbate this issue. A large portion of this region lies along the “Dry Corridor”, an arid region that includes areas of Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. The dry corridor is predicted to expand with the onset of climate change. It is currently home to approximately 10 million people, half of whom are subsistence farmers, who rely heavily on stable weather patterns for their livelihoods, making them particularly susceptible to becoming climate migrants in search of more arable land and better living conditions. From 2009 - 2019, two million residents in the dry corridor have experienced hunger because of extreme weather events caused by climate change.[103] Natural weather patterns such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation, or simply “El Niño”, can make dry conditions in this region more extreme. Wet periods following an El Niño weather event can bring torrential rain that results in major flooding and catastrophic landslides. Multiple studies have shown that climate change could result in more frequent extreme El Niños.[104]: 106–107, 111–112
Food security issues are expected to worsen across Central America due to climate change. In August 2019, Honduras declared a state of emergency when a drought caused the southern part of the country to lose 72% of its corn and 75% of its bean production. It is predicted that by 2070, corn yields in Central America may fall by 10%, beans by 29%, and rice by 14%. With Central American crop consumption dominated by corn (70%), beans (25%), and rice (6%), the expected drop in staple crop yields could have devastating consequences. The World Bank predicts that by 2050, climate change-induced migration could displace 1.4 - 2.1 million residents of Central America and Mexico. The highest estimate is that worsening droughts and flooding from climate change could displace up to 4 million people in the region by 2050.[105]
Several weather events in the 21st century have displayed the devastating effects of the El Niño weather pattern and have led to mass displacement and hunger crises. In 2015, due to the strongest El Niño in recorded history, hundreds of thousands of Central American subsistence farmers lost a portion or the entirety of their crops. Throughout 2014 and 2015, El Salvador alone saw over $100 million in damage to crops. In Guatemala, the drought caused a food shortage that left 3 million people struggling to feed themselves, according to a 2015 report authored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP). The Guatemalan government declared a state of emergency as the drought and high food prices led to a hunger crisis during which chronic malnutrition was common among children. By the end of June 2016, it was estimated by the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that 3.5 million people required humanitarian assistance across El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.[104]: 107, 109–111 In 2018, 50% of the 94,000 Guatemalans deported from the United States and Mexico were from these western highlands, an area particularly susceptible to climate change. [103]
The IOM and WFP report also showed the ways in which food insecurity led to migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Pointing out that there are millions of Central Americans living abroad (with over 80% in the United States), the report stated there is a positive correlation between food insecurity and migration from these countries. It also confirmed that crises related to hunger and violence are exacerbated when the region heads into the second consecutive year of an extreme drought.[104]: 113–115
South America
[edit]
Research on South American migration patterns have found multiple connections between climate change and its effect on migration.The effects and results vary based on the type of climatic change, socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics of migrants and the distance and direction of the migration.[106] Since most climate migration studies are done in the developed world, scientists have called for more quantitative research within the developing world, including South America.[107] Migration in South America does not always increase as a result of increased environmental threats but is affected by factors such as climate variability and land suitability. These migrations are typically directed from rural to urban areas. Inter-provincial migration is shown to not be as heavily influenced by environmental changes whereas migration outside of the country of origin is heavily influenced by environmental changes.[107] The results of a climactic event catalyzing migration change depending on the onset of the event, however, climate change related events such as drought and hurricanes augment or increase youth migration. Youth are more likely to migrate as a response to climate-related events. As a result, children who have been displaced are found to travel shorter distances to find work in rural destinations versus further to an urban area.[108] The increase in interest in this topic in the past decade has called for a measure called preventive resettlement. The cases in which preventive resettlement appear appropriate is typically discerned by local and governmental bodies.[109]
Active sea-level rise resulted in the relocation of the people of Enseada da Baleia, a coastal community located on Cardoso Island in southeastern Brazil. The government offered the residents the ability to either relocate to another community on the island or a city on the mainland. Most residents chose to move to a new location that was more inland on the same island and paid for their own expenses of relocation with little government assistance. Brazilian lawyer Erika Pires Ramos argues that the dilemma faced by the residents of Enseada da Baleia illustrates how climate migrants are invisible throughout much of Latin America. Governments must first recognize and identify groups of climate migrants in order to better help them.[110]
The International Organization for Migration estimates that today nearly 11 million South Americans are currently resettling or migrating due to recent and ongoing natural disasters, some of which are climate-induced. Collecting and maintaining data on climate migrants remains a major obstacle for South American governments in preparing and anticipating for migration flows from future climate-induced disasters. Peru passed a national climate change law in 2018 that mandates the government, led by a multi-agency group, to create a plan to mitigate and adapt to future climate migrations. Uruguay already has its own “national resettlement plan” for climate-induced migrations in place.[110]
A few countries like Argentina and Brazil, offer a “disaster-related emergency visa”. In Argentina, the visa came into effect in 2022 includes relocation, housing and integration support provided by civil society.[111]
Some Guna people, such as those in the settlement of Gardi Sugdub, have decided to relocate from islands to the mainland of Panama due to sea level rise.[112]
Europe
[edit]
Estimates put the number of displaced persons in Europe from climate-related events at over 700,000 in the last ten years. Most of the continent's climate-related catastrophes are a result of either flooding or wildfires.The European Union has yet to adopt any continent-wide convention on the status of migrants displaced by climate-related events.
Due to the 2014 Balkan flooding (which is considered to be linked to climate change), some people in Bosnia and Herzegovina migrated to other European countries.[113]

Moldova, with a large rural population dependent on subsistence farming, is one of Europe's most vulnerable countries to the threat of climate change. Increasing erratic weather patterns may lead to crop failures and mass migrations to neighboring countries. In 2010, devastating floods completely submerged the village of Cotul Morii in central Moldova resulting in the evacuation of 440 families. Government authorities mandated that Cotul Morii be reconstructed in a new location 15 kilometers away from the original village which the government officially abandoned. Despite this, over 60 families chose to remain and rebuild their community in the original village even with a lack of running water or electricity. Climate migration researchers emphasize the growing importance of a “right to voluntary immobility”. There are often very sensitive and complicated issues at play when making the decision to relocate an entire population from their home, and many residents may choose to voluntarily opt-out of government efforts.[114]
In Wales, the village of Fairbourne has been cited as an area particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. The local Gwynedd Council has described it as impractical to protect from rising sea levels and proposed managed retreat.[115][116]
Political and legal perspectives
[edit]The International Organization for Migration (IOM) expects the scale of global migration to rise as a result of accelerated climate change.[117] It, therefore, recommends policymakers around the world to take a proactive stance on the matter.[118] Despite the scale of climate migration, current legal protections across the world are ineffective in protecting climate migrants. Few existing international frameworks and regional and domestic legal regimes provide adequate protection to climate migrants.[1] Typically, climate migrants are not legally recognized as refugees and therefore do not enjoy international and domestic refugee law protections.[119] In the Americas, instead of being granted refugee status, individuals displaced by environmental factors are offered humanitarian visas or complementary protection, which do not always provide permanent residence and citizenship pathways.[1] Although the term 'refugee' is legally incorrect, the definition of climate change refugee has been created to address the crisis. Every individuals affected by environmental harm still deserves protection and aid on humanitarian grounds.[120]
A report from the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) therefore recommends the creation of new legal pathways to safety for people moving in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. IRAP's report also recommends that governments develop stronger humanitarian protection for people who are forcibly displaced in a changing climate. The report emphasizes that strengthening the legal protections for climate-displaced persons should be preemptive with increased options for these persons before environmental disasters occur.[4]
The International Law Commission (ILC) provides guidance on the legal protections that climate-displaced persons should enjoy when disasters strikes. ILC's Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters advocates for mass displacement to be included in the definition of “disaster”. The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) recently decided cases wherein the Committee asserted that “the ICCPR obligates states not to return people fleeing life-threatening climate change impacts.” In one of these cases, Teitota v. New Zealand, the UNHRC held that “individuals and groups who have crossed national borders could file subsequent petitions against deportation to the UNHRC, after exhausting domestic options, based on climate change impacts that violate the right to life.”[121] In January 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that "climate refugees fleeing the effects of the climate crisis cannot be forced by their adoptive countries to return to their home counties whose climate is posing an immediate threat."[122]
The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) argued that people who will be forced to move due to climate change currently have no adequate recognition in international law.[123] The EJF contends that a new multilateral legal instrument is required to specifically address the needs of "climate refugees" in order to confer protection to those fleeing environmental degradation and climate change.[124] They have also asserted that additional funding is needed to enable developing countries to adapt to climate change. Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan have argued for the use of the term 'climate exiles' and for international agreements to provide them political and legal rights, including citizenship in other countries, bearing in mind those countries' responsibilities and capabilities.[125][126][127][128]
Global perceptions from possible countries of asylum
[edit]Acceptance of the possibility of environmental migrants may be influenced by other challenges that confront a nation. In Canada, there is public interest in policies that foster planning and accommodations.[129][130][131][132] On 20 September 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada told the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants that plans just for resettlement would not be enough.[133] Sweden which had allowed refugees to seek asylum from areas of war in an open door policy has changed to a policy that is more deterrent of asylum seekers and is even offering money for asylum seekers to withdraw their requests.[134][135] The United States, which was warned under the Obama administration to prepare for climate change and consequent refugees, had more difficulties in doing so under former President Donald Trump, who denied the reality of climate change,[136][137] signed executive orders dismantling environmental protections, ordered the EPA to remove climate change information from their public site, and signaled his administration's unwillingness to anticipate environmental refugees from climate change.[138][139][140]
A nation grants "asylum" when it grants someone freedom from prosecution within its borders. Each country makes its own rules and laws of asylum. The United States, for example, has a system recognized by federal and international laws. France was the first country to constitute the right to asylum. The right to asylum differs in different nations. There is a still fight for the right to asylum in some areas of the world.[141]
In 2021, a French court ruled in an extradition hearing to avoid the deportation of a Bangladeshi man with asthma from France after his lawyer argued that he risked a severe deterioration in his condition, due to the air pollution in his homeland.[142][143] Heavy floods affected Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh in July 2021.[144]
The Biden administration in the United States released several intelligence agency reports in 2021 that sketched out in sweeping language the risks climate change poses to global stability. The reports emphasize the destabilizing effects climate change will take on developing countries including massive rises in food insecurity, worsening droughts, fires and flooding, and sea level rises. Some of the most vulnerable countries, the report concludes, are Guatemala, Haiti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq; countries with weak state institutions that are located in especially climate-vulnerable regions of the world. In February 2021, President Biden signed an executive order “directing the National Security Council to provide options for protecting and resettling people displaced by climate change”.
In an updated report on climate migration released in October 2021, the Biden Administration detailed how the United States government should work to aid and assist climate migrants around the world. The report points to the use of U.S. foreign assistance through active humanitarian support, technical expertise, and capacity building and calls for increased funding to achieve these goals. Emphasizing the “complex interplay between climate change and migration”, the report orients the government's focus to focus on climate migration as a single issue, demanding greater attention and focus in the coming years.[145]
Planning for climate migrants
[edit]
Planning for climate migration entails preparing for the desertion of geographically vulnerable areas as well as for the influx of vulnerable communities into largely urban areas.[28][146] In addressing current issues of environmental migration and preparing for forthcoming ones, experts call for interdisciplinary, locally-informed, equitable, and accessible approaches.[146][18] Cities can explore what being “migrant friendly” might look like, such as offering job training programs, affordable and livable housing, access to green spaces, accessible mass transit systems, and resources to overcome language or cultural barriers.[146] Special investment in both resources and information dissemination can help accommodate the diverse needs of people with disabilities and mental health conditions – both in the immediate moment of a disaster, where some emergency response and early warning systems may not be audiologically or visually accessible, and in the aftermath.[27] Investments in flood barriers and other infrastructure for adaptation can provide physical protections against severe weather. Incorporating these considerations into planning conversations now can assist cities in preparing for the worst effects of climate change before some of the scenarios for climate migration come to occur.[28]
Sustainable development, emergency response mechanisms, and local planning can help mitigate the consequences of climate migration. Mitigation may be too late for many, leaving planned migration as the only option.[147] For people whose livelihoods are closely linked to the stability and health of their environment – like farmers and fishers – migration may become necessary for survival. A recent New York Times and Pulitzer Center article on the issue notes that “by comparison, Americans are richer, often much richer, and more insulated from the shocks of climate change. They are distanced from the food and water sources they depend on, and they are part of a culture that sees every problem as capable of being solved by money...Census data show us how Americans move: toward heat, toward coastlines, toward drought, regardless of evidence of increasing storms and flooding and other disasters...The sense that money and technology can overcome nature has emboldened Americans."[28] This disparity is reflected in the coastal real estate market and development projects. Addressing climate migration issues and climate change as a whole may involve reimagining how, where, and why municipalities develop and urbanize for the future.
In an article written for The Guardian, Gaia Vince outlined what the future of climate migration would look like and how countries can prepare. She cites research from the United Nations estimating that in the next 30 years, over 1 billion climate and environmental migrants will be uprooted from their homes, largely from countries in the Global South. Developed nations in North America and Europe, with aging and declining populations, will benefit from accepting and assimilating these climate migrants into their societies, she argues. Climate migration can be a solution to many of the world's problems, rather than just a problem, according to Vince. Currently, there is no global body or organization devoted exclusively to the issue of climate migration, however, Vince argues that new climate-friendly policies are still possible.[148] Vince points to the rapid European response to enact open-border policies and right-to-work laws for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the 2022 war as an example. The policies arguably saved millions of lives and enabled the migrants to avoid the convoluted and slow-acting bureaucratic hurdles that exist for migrants from other countries. Vince argues that the Ukrainian migrant policy provides a blueprint for how developed countries can adopt policies and contingency plans for climate migrants in the future.
In the UK, research is being done on how climate change's impact on countries that are emigrated to will vary due to the infrastructure of those countries. They want to put into place policies so that those who have to migrate could go throughout Europe, and have solid emergency planning in place so that the people being displaced would have a swift and quick plan of escape once their environment can no longer handle inhabitants-slow or sudden onset.[149] The end goal of this work is to determine the best course of action in the event of various environmental catastrophes.
Society and culture
[edit]A documentary entitled Climate Refugees was released in 2010. Climate Refugees was an Official Selection for the 2010 Sundance Film Festival.[150] More recently, Short Documentary Academy Award Nominee, Sun Come Up (2011), tells the story of Carteret islanders in Papua New Guinea who are forced to leave their ancestral land in response to climate change and migrate to war-torn Bougainville.[151] Since 2007, German artist Hermann Josef Hack has shown his World Climate Refugee Camp in the centers of various European cities. The model camp, made of roughly 1000 miniature tents, is a public art intervention that depicts the social impacts of climate change.[152]
Various works of ecofiction and climate fiction have also featured migration. One of these is The Water Knife by Paolo Bacigalupi, which focuses on climate displacement and migration within the American Southwest.
See also
[edit]- Climate migration and water rights
- Climate refuge
- Economic analysis of climate change
- Effects of climate change on human health
- Extreme event attribution
- International Organization for Migration
- Internally displaced person
- Managed retreat
- Politics of climate change
- Sea level rise
- List of areas depopulated due to climate change
- List of countries by greenhouse gas emissions
- List of sovereign states by immigrant and emigrant population
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- ^ Henry, Devin (21 February 2017). "Trump executive orders to target climate, water rules: report". TheHill. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
- ^ "Trump forces environment agency to delete all climate change references from its website". The Independent. 25 January 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
- ^ "The invisible climate refugees". United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe (UNRIC). Archived from the original on 1 March 2017. Retrieved 1 March 2017.
- ^ Taylor, Diane (15 January 2021). "Air pollution will lead to mass migration, say experts after landmark ruling". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 28 April 2022. Retrieved 18 January 2021.
- ^ Henley, Jon (12 January 2021). "Man saved from deportation after pollution plea in French legal 'first'". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 12 January 2021. Retrieved 18 January 2021.
- ^ "Floods Hit Rohingya Refugee Camps In Southern Bangladesh, Forcing Thousands To Flee". HuffPost. 29 July 2021. Retrieved 8 August 2021.
- ^ Flavelle, Christopher; Barnes, Julian E.; Sullivan, Eileen; Steinhauer, Jennifer (21 October 2021). "Climate Change Poses a Widening Threat to National Security". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
- ^ a b c "Will climate-friendly cities be friendly to climate migrants?". Fix. 25 June 2021. Retrieved 24 November 2021.
- ^ Merone, Lea, and Peter Tait. 2018. “‘Climate Refugees’: Is It Time to Legally Acknowledge Those Displaced by Climate Disruption?” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 42 (6): 508–9. doi:10.1111/1753-6405.12849.
- ^ "The century of climate migration: why we need to plan for the great upheaval". the Guardian. 18 August 2022. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
- ^ Perkiss, Stephanie (2010). "Environmental Refugees: An Accountability Perspective". University of Wollongong: 1–26.
- ^ Climate Refugees at Sundance Film Festival 2010 Archived 28 March 2010 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Sun Come Up: Home[permanent dead link]." Sun Come Up . N.p., n.d. Web. 13 March 2012.
- ^ "Hermann Josef Hack Website". Hermann-josef-hack.de. Archived from the original on 19 July 2011. Retrieved 23 February 2014.
Further reading
[edit]- Gaia Vince (2022). Nomad Century. Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0241522318.
- Wennersten, John R.; Robbins, Denise (2017). Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-02593-7.
External links
[edit]Climate migration
View on GrokipediaConceptual Framework
Definitions and Terminology
Climate migration, also termed climate-induced migration, describes the displacement or relocation of individuals or groups prompted by the adverse impacts of climate change, including gradual changes such as sea-level rise and desertification, or sudden-onset events like intensified storms and floods that render areas uninhabitable or undermine livelihoods.[8][9] This term encompasses both voluntary and forced movements, which may be temporary or permanent, internal or cross-border, though precise attribution to climate factors alone remains challenging due to confounding socioeconomic variables.[10] Environmental migration serves as the broader conceptual umbrella, referring to human mobility driven by environmental degradation irrespective of climatic origins, such as volcanic eruptions or industrial accidents, whereas climate migration specifically attributes the environmental shifts to anthropogenic climate change.[8][11] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) proposes a working definition of environmental migrants as "persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad," with climate migration forming a subset where these changes stem from climate variability or extremes.[12] The phrase "climate refugees" is widely used in public discourse but lacks formal legal recognition, as the 1951 Refugee Convention defines refugees narrowly in terms of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion, explicitly excluding those displaced by environmental factors including climate change.[13][14] This terminological mismatch has sparked debate, with critics arguing it misapplies refugee protections and overlooks the non-persecutory, often gradual nature of climate drivers, while proponents advocate for expanded international frameworks to address protection gaps.[15][16] No unified global definition exists for climate migration, reflecting ongoing scholarly contention over causality, thresholds for "climate-induced," and the interplay with non-environmental push factors like poverty or governance failures.[10][17]Distinction from Economic and Conflict-Driven Migration
Climate migration is conceptually differentiated from economic migration by emphasizing environmental degradation—such as prolonged droughts, sea-level rise, or extreme weather events—as the predominant push factor rendering areas uninhabitable or unsustainable for livelihoods, rather than voluntary pursuit of higher wages, job prospects, or improved living standards in destination areas.[18] Economic migration, by contrast, typically involves rational choice models where individuals weigh opportunity costs and pull factors like urban employment, often in the absence of acute environmental collapse.[19] Empirical analyses, however, reveal substantial overlap, as climate stressors frequently operate through socioeconomic channels, such as reduced agricultural productivity leading to income loss, which mimics economic drivers and complicates causal isolation.[20] Distinguishing climate migration from conflict-driven displacement requires separating movements triggered by direct violence, political persecution, or civil unrest from those arising from climate-exacerbated resource scarcity that may indirectly heighten tensions but does not equate to armed conflict.[21] For instance, while reduced precipitation has been linked to localized conflicts over water or arable land in regions like the Sahel, resulting migrations are often classified as conflict-related under international frameworks like the 1951 Refugee Convention, whereas pure climate migration involves non-violent environmental tipping points, such as coastal erosion displacing communities without warfare.[22] Quantitative studies using panel data across countries indicate that climate variables explain only a fraction of variance in migration flows after controlling for conflict incidence and economic covariates, underscoring that attributions of migration solely to climate overlook confounding governance failures or pre-existing violence.[23] Methodological challenges in attribution persist due to data limitations and endogeneity, where climate impacts amplify vulnerabilities in economically marginal or conflict-prone areas, making it rare to observe "pure" climate migration without intertwined drivers.[3] Peer-reviewed assessments note that while econometric models employing instrumental variables, such as historical climate anomalies, can parse effects—finding temperature rises above 1°C correlating with 0.5-1% increased out-migration in low-income settings—these effects diminish when socioeconomic mediators like poverty or institutional capacity are included, suggesting climate acts more as a catalyst than an independent cause.[20] This interplay implies that policy distinctions, such as granting refugee status, must rely on rigorous, case-specific evidence rather than presumptive climate labeling, as overstated direct causal claims in some advocacy literature fail to account for these complexities.[24]Drivers and Causal Mechanisms
Environmental Triggers
Environmental triggers of climate migration encompass both acute events, such as cyclones, floods, and wildfires, which prompt rapid displacement, and slow-onset processes like sea-level rise and drought-induced desertification, which erode habitability over time. Acute disasters often result in immediate evacuations that can transition to longer-term relocation when recovery proves infeasible. For instance, tropical cyclones in Bangladesh have displaced an average of 110,000 people annually, contributing to 14.7 million internal displacements from disasters between 2014 and 2023.[25][26] Similarly, rare but highly destructive wildfires in the United States have driven out-migration from affected areas, with empirical analysis showing patterns of permanent relocation following major events like the 2018 Camp Fire.[27][28] Slow-onset triggers manifest through gradual environmental degradation that undermines livelihoods, particularly in agriculture-dependent regions. In the Sahel, prolonged droughts from 1987 to 2009 induced rural-to-urban migration in Mali, with panel data from localities indicating that drought events directly increased migration volumes as agricultural viability declined.[29] Across Africa, drought occurrences correlate with human mobility toward urban centers or water sources, though such movements are often temporary unless compounded by resource scarcity.[30] Sea-level rise, exacerbated by subsidence in coastal zones, has led to observed land loss and displacement in areas like coastal Louisiana, where subsidence alone accounts for 11.9–15.1% of Atlantic coast land below projected 2050 sea levels, prompting voluntary relocations in communities such as Isle de Jean Charles.[31][32] Despite these examples, empirical evidence for direct causation remains context-specific, with some studies noting that severe environmental stressors can trap populations by depleting mobility capital, reducing out-migration rates.[33] Peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that while environmental changes alter resource availability—such as reduced crop yields from drought or inundated farmland from floods—they rarely act in isolation, though quantifiable triggers like a 7.2-meter storm surge in Bangladesh's 1991 cyclone displaced over 13 million temporarily.[34][35] Overall, observed displacements tied to these triggers number in the millions annually in vulnerable regions, but long-term migration patterns require disaggregating from economic or conflict drivers.[21]Interacting Socioeconomic Factors
Socioeconomic factors interact with environmental triggers to determine the likelihood and nature of migration in response to climate impacts, often amplifying vulnerability among low-income populations while enabling adaptation in more developed contexts. Empirical analyses indicate that poverty exacerbates displacement risks, as resource-poor households face heightened exposure to hazards like flooding or drought without adequate buffers such as savings or insurance. For instance, a study across Latin American municipalities found that displacements from intense precipitation events were primarily attributable to the interplay of poor household socioeconomic conditions and climatic extremes, rather than climate alone.[36] Similarly, climate-induced stressors tend to worsen global inequality and poverty, particularly in low-latitude regions, prompting outward migration toward higher-latitude areas with greater economic opportunities.[37] Governance quality and institutional capacity further mediate these interactions, with effective environmental policies reducing disaster-related displacement by enhancing preparedness and recovery mechanisms. Research spanning 160 countries demonstrates that stronger governance correlates with lower sensitivity of international migration to temperature anomalies, as it facilitates local adaptation over relocation.[20] In contrast, weak institutions in developing regions limit access to social protection, trapping vulnerable groups in cycles of repeated displacement or immobility, where poverty constrains even short-distance moves.[38] Economic development plays a dual role: higher per capita income and urbanization can mitigate forced migration by funding resilient infrastructure, yet rapid development in hazard-prone areas may inadvertently increase exposure if not paired with risk-informed planning.[39] These factors underscore that climate migration is rarely driven by environmental change in isolation; instead, it emerges from compounded pressures where socioeconomic deficits lower adaptive thresholds. Case studies from the West African Sahel reveal that seasonal migration patterns are intensified by poverty and limited agricultural viability under variable rainfall, with remittances from migrants sometimes serving as a partial adaptation strategy.[40] However, projections suggest that without targeted interventions like improved social safety nets, climate-poverty interactions could elevate internal displacement risks in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia by up to 20-30% under moderate warming scenarios by 2050.[41] This highlights the need for policies addressing root socioeconomic vulnerabilities to curb unmanaged flows, though evidence remains challenged by confounding variables like conflict and labor markets.[24]Empirical Challenges in Attribution
Attributing migration flows directly to climate change faces significant empirical hurdles due to the interplay of multiple causal factors, including economic pressures, political instability, and demographic trends, which often confound isolation of climatic influences. Quantitative studies frequently struggle with endogeneity, where migration alters local environmental conditions or vice versa, necessitating advanced instrumental variable approaches or fixed-effects models that are inconsistently implemented across research.[3] For instance, econometric analyses assuming linear relationships between variables like precipitation anomalies and out-migration rates overlook nonlinear thresholds and feedback loops, leading to biased estimates of climate's marginal contribution.[42][43] Measurement inconsistencies exacerbate these issues: migration is variably defined—ranging from permanent relocation to temporary displacement—while climatic events are proxied by coarse indicators such as average temperature or rainfall deficits, which fail to capture localized extremes or gradual changes relevant to decision-making.[3] Data aggregation from disparate sources, like household surveys and satellite imagery, introduces ecological fallacies when micro-level behaviors are inferred from macro patterns, further obscuring attribution.[3] Contextual mediators, such as adaptive capacity or governance quality, are rarely integrated mechanistically, resulting in overgeneralized claims that attribute disproportionate causality to climate without verifying intervening socioeconomic pathways.[44] Empirical evidence reveals no robust consensus on climate's role in cross-border migration, with meta-analyses finding negligible or inconsistent effects from disasters on international flows, as opposed to internal movements where evidence remains tentative.[42] Attribution to historical climate change is sparse, with estimates of additional internal displacements ranging widely from negligible to 170 million over recent decades, often omitting indirect channels like reduced GDP growth in vulnerable regions.[43] Projections amplify these uncertainties, varying by orders of magnitude (e.g., 0.02 to 9 million international migrants from Africa by 2050), due to unvalidated extrapolations beyond stable historical data and failure to account for migration's system-wide feedbacks.[43] Such variances underscore the need for counterfactual analyses that rigorously disentangle climate signals from entrenched development disparities.[43]Evidence Base
Methodological Approaches
Empirical research on climate migration primarily utilizes quantitative and qualitative methodologies to examine the relationship between environmental changes and human mobility, though establishing causality remains fraught due to confounding socioeconomic factors.[3] Quantitative approaches dominate, categorizing into micro-level studies focusing on individual or household decisions—often via surveys or panel data regressions—and macro-level analyses of aggregate migration flows using econometric models such as gravity equations or fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved heterogeneity.[3][23] These methods integrate climate variables like precipitation anomalies, temperature deviations, or disaster frequency from sources such as satellite imagery or reanalysis datasets (e.g., CRU or ERA5), paired with migration data from censuses, household panels like the Living Standards Measurement Study, or displacement records from organizations like the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.[3][45] To address attribution challenges, researchers employ instrumental variable strategies—using historical climate variability or geological features as instruments for exogenous shocks—or difference-in-differences designs comparing affected versus unaffected regions before and after events like droughts or floods.[23] However, endogeneity persists, as migration can influence local climate adaptation or vice versa, and multicollinearity with economic opportunities or conflict complicates isolation of climate signals; for instance, a 1% increase in rainfall variability might correlate with out-migration in arid zones but not uniformly across contexts.[3][46] Data aggregation issues further hinder reliability, with spatial mismatches between coarse climate grids and fine-scale migration surveys leading to aggregation bias, and temporal discrepancies where short-term displacement data inadequately capture long-term migration.[3] Qualitative methodologies complement these by providing contextual depth through ethnographic interviews, participatory mapping, or historical analogues, revealing indirect pathways like livelihood disruptions rather than direct "push" effects from climate alone.[47] Frameworks such as the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach integrate environmental stressors into broader decision-making models, emphasizing adaptive capacities and non-migration responses like in situ resilience.[45] Piguet (2010) delineates six methodological families: spatial multi-scalar analyses, large-N surveys, historical comparisons, ethnographic studies, simulation modeling, and participatory methods, each suited to dissecting complex interactions but prone to selection bias in case selection.[47] Despite advances, systemic underreporting of internal migration and reliance on self-reported data in surveys undermine generalizability, particularly in data-scarce developing regions.[3][46]Key Quantitative Findings
Empirical studies, including meta-analyses of dozens of quantitative papers, indicate small but positive associations between climatic stressors and migration, though effects are highly heterogeneous and often mediated by socioeconomic factors. A systematic review and meta-analysis of 96 studies encompassing over 3,900 estimates for slow-onset events like droughts and temperature changes found a statistically significant but modest overall positive effect on migration propensity, with high variability across contexts and publication bias potentially inflating results for fast-onset events. Similarly, analyses of drought impacts reveal increased temporary internal migration in rural areas, with effect sizes typically ranging from 0.5% to 2% higher out-migration rates per severe drought episode in affected households, though these diminish over time as adaptation occurs.[48][45] Sudden-onset events such as floods and storms show weaker or insignificant links to sustained migration in many models, with meta-analytic evidence indicating no significant net effect on international flows and primarily short-term internal displacement. For instance, a machine-learning analysis of asylum applications to the European Union from 1999 to 2018 across 175 origin countries demonstrated that climatic indicators like temperature anomalies and drought indices (e.g., SPEI-3) exhibit flat response curves and low variable importance scores in predictive models, performing worse than economic or violence predictors. About 58% of reviewed studies report environmental stressors increasing out-migration, but 68% note net migration effects depend on measurement, with rapid-onset events often leading to return rather than permanent relocation.[49][50][51] Global displacement data attributes around 30.7 million internal displacements in 2020 to weather-related hazards, yet direct causal attribution to anthropogenic climate change remains challenging due to confounding factors like poverty and governance, with peer-reviewed critiques emphasizing that such figures often conflate disaster response with long-term climate-driven trends. Evidence suggests climate impacts are more likely to induce immobility in vulnerable populations by eroding assets needed for movement, rather than mass exodus, challenging narratives of large-scale international "climate refugee" waves. Internal migration dominates, with international effects near negligible in econometric models controlling for confounders.[52][6][3]Qualitative Case Studies
Qualitative case studies of climate migration emphasize personal narratives, community dynamics, and contextual factors that quantitative data often overlook, revealing migration as a multifaceted adaptation strategy rather than solely a response to environmental determinism. These studies typically involve interviews, ethnographic observations, and historical analysis to unpack how individuals perceive and respond to climate stressors amid socioeconomic constraints. For instance, in coastal communities, erosion and inundation prompt discussions of relocation, but decisions hinge on cultural attachments, governance failures, and alternative livelihoods.[53] In Shishmaref, Alaska, an Inupiat community of approximately 600 residents has grappled with accelerating coastal erosion since the 1970s, exacerbated by permafrost thaw and storm surges linked to Arctic warming. Residents voted in 2016 to relocate inland after decades of temporary measures like beach nourishment failed, with erosion rates exceeding 20 feet per year in some areas by the 2000s. Qualitative accounts from tribal leaders and elders highlight the tension between ancestral ties to hunting grounds and the existential threat of village submersion, with failed funding bids underscoring institutional barriers to planned relocation. This case illustrates how climate impacts amplify pre-existing vulnerabilities in remote indigenous settings, yet migration remains contested due to cultural loss aversion.[54][55] Bangladesh's coastal delta regions provide another prominent example, where riverbank erosion and salinity intrusion from sea-level rise—rising about 3-7 mm annually in the Bay of Bengal—have displaced thousands from areas like the Sundarbans mangroves. A 2019 study of households in exposed zones found that proximity to eroding waterways and shrimp aquaculture expansion doubled migration likelihood, with migrants often moving seasonally to urban centers like Dhaka for remittances rather than permanent flight. Interviews revealed adaptive strategies, such as diversified cropping, but also gender disparities, with women facing heightened risks during cyclones like Sidr in 2007, which killed over 3,000 and prompted onward migration. These narratives challenge simplistic "climate refugee" framings, showing migration as embedded in poverty cycles and policy gaps in land tenure.[56][57] In the Sahel region, particularly Mali and Sudan, prolonged droughts since the 1970s have altered pastoralist mobility patterns, with qualitative research documenting shifts from transhumance to settled distress migration amid desertification advancing 1-6 km per year in parts of the zone. Case studies from Fulani herders indicate that reduced rainfall—down 20-30% since 1960—interacts with conflict over shrinking water points, prompting rural-to-urban flows, yet many view temporary migration as resilience-building for herd recovery rather than abandonment. Ethnographic data from 2018-2020 field studies emphasize how remittances fund boreholes and fodder, countering narratives of mass exodus while noting governance failures in resource allocation exacerbate vulnerabilities.[58][59] These cases underscore empirical challenges in isolating climate causation, as socioeconomic drivers like population pressure and weak institutions consistently mediate outcomes, with qualitative evidence suggesting adaptation via mobility often mitigates rather than signals collapse.[60]Scale and Patterns
Global Estimates and Projections
Estimates of climate-induced migration remain highly uncertain due to the multifaceted drivers involved, including economic opportunities, conflict, and policy responses, which complicate isolation of climate's causal role. Most projections focus on internal displacement rather than international border crossings, with global figures ranging from tens to hundreds of millions by mid-century under high-emissions scenarios without significant adaptation. A 2018 World Bank report projected up to 143 million internal migrants by 2050 across Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, driven by slow-onset hazards like water scarcity and crop failure, assuming no major emissions reductions or development interventions.[61] An updated 2021 analysis expanded this to 216 million globally under similar conditions, emphasizing that proactive climate action and poverty reduction could halve these numbers.[62] These estimates derive from gravity models integrating climate impacts on livelihoods with migration baselines, but they have been critiqued for overattributing causality to climate variables while underweighting adaptive capacities and economic pull factors.[6] International climate migration projections are notably lower, often an order of magnitude smaller than internal flows, as barriers like visas, language, and networks favor domestic movement. Empirical models suggest 3–9 million additional cross-border migrants by the late 21st century under moderate warming, primarily from low-income regions to neighboring countries, with effects dwarfed by baseline economic migration.[43] [63] Sensitivities to temperature extremes across 160 countries indicate net increases in emigration from tropical zones but immigration gains in temperate areas, though these represent marginal shifts in existing patterns rather than mass exodus.[20] High-end claims, such as 1.2 billion climate migrants by 2050, have been widely debunked as extrapolations from worst-case sea-level rise without empirical grounding in migration behavior.[17] Longer-term forecasts vary by emissions pathways and adaptation assumptions; for instance, IPCC assessments note amplified displacement risks in vulnerable regions like Africa, with potential 200% increases in human mobility under 1.6°C warming, but stress that climate acts as an amplifier of preexisting vulnerabilities rather than a sole driver.[64] Models incorporating socioeconomic scenarios project internal migration hotspots in river deltas and arid zones, yet underscore methodological limits: forecasts often fail to account for technological adaptations, urban resilience, or policy-induced immobility, leading to overestimations in alarmist narratives.[65] Recent reviews advocate caution, noting that while acute events like floods displace millions annually—e.g., 21.5 million in 2022—chronic climate stressors yield slower, adaptive responses over panic-driven flight.[66] Overall, credible projections converge on modest net increases relative to total global migration, projected at 3–4% annual growth independent of climate, highlighting the need for integrated development strategies over migration-specific alarmism.[17]Internal vs. International Migration
Climate-induced migration overwhelmingly manifests as internal displacement within national borders rather than international cross-border flows. According to the World Bank's Groundswell Part II report, slow-onset climate impacts such as water scarcity, crop failure, and sea-level rise could drive up to 216 million people to migrate internally across six regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America, East Asia and Pacific, North Africa, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia—by 2050 under a high-emissions scenario without adaptation measures.[62] In contrast, projections for additional international climate migrants remain substantially lower; an International Monetary Fund analysis estimates 37 million to 94 million cumulative international migrants attributable to climate variability over the entire 21st century, depending on emissions pathways (RCP 4.5 to 8.5).[4] These figures underscore that internal movements dominate due to their scale, with annual disaster-related internal displacements reaching 32.6 million globally in 2022, 98% linked to weather events exacerbated by climate change.[67] Several factors explain the prevalence of internal over international migration. Internal relocation typically involves shorter distances to relatively safer areas within the same country, reducing economic costs and logistical barriers; for instance, rural populations in drought-prone regions like Sub-Saharan Africa's Sahel often move to nearby urban centers rather than abroad. Legal and administrative hurdles are minimal domestically, as citizens face no visa requirements or border controls, unlike international migration, which demands resources for travel, documentation, and integration into foreign labor markets. Empirical data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre indicate that as of December 2023, 7.7 million people remained in internal displacement from disasters across 82 countries, highlighting persistent domestic patterns without widespread spillover internationally.[8] Moreover, most international migration linked to climate stressors occurs between developing countries (South-South flows), rather than mass movements to high-income nations, as proximity and shared socioeconomic ties favor regional destinations.[68] International climate migration, though less voluminous, arises in contexts of acute uninhabitability, such as small island states facing submersion or extreme aridification rendering territories non-viable. Examples include limited resettlement programs, like New Zealand's acceptance of up to 100 Tokelauans annually or Australia's intake of Tuvalu citizens, but these involve thousands rather than millions, constrained by bilateral agreements and domestic capacities. Projections suggest climate impacts could amplify net international migration by an order of magnitude less than internal flows, with empirical models indicating modest net increases—potentially 10-20 million additional migrants by mid-century—primarily driven by economic pull factors in destination countries rather than pure push from climate alone.[69] Policy barriers, including the absence of dedicated international legal protections for climate-displaced persons under frameworks like the 1951 Refugee Convention, further limit cross-border movements, channeling most affected populations toward internal adaptation or displacement.[17] This disparity emphasizes the need for national-level resilience strategies to address the bulk of climate mobility burdens.Regional Variations
In Sub-Saharan Africa, climate variability such as prolonged droughts in the Sahel region has been associated with increased internal migration, primarily rural-to-urban movements, though empirical studies indicate these patterns are amplified by socioeconomic stressors like poverty and conflict rather than climate alone. A 2023 analysis of household surveys across multiple countries found that experiencing a severe drought in the prior year raised the probability of migration by 1.1 percentage points, with extreme droughts increasing it by 2.8 points, but such movements were often temporary and short-distance.[70] Projections from modeling exercises, such as the World Bank's Groundswell report, estimate up to 86 million internal climate migrants by 2050, yet observed data from 2010–2020 show annual internal displacements due to disasters averaging around 2–3 million, with cross-border migration remaining low at under 10% of total flows.[18] [71] In South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, recurrent flooding and cyclones drive seasonal and internal migration, with empirical evidence linking riverine inundation to temporary rural exodus toward urban centers like Dhaka. A study of panel data from 1988–2005 revealed that positive rainfall shocks reduced short-term migration by enhancing agricultural yields, while negative shocks increased it, but long-term international outflows showed no significant climate signal after controlling for economic factors.[72] Observed displacements from events like Cyclone Sidr in 2007 exceeded 3 million internally, yet adaptation measures such as embankments have moderated subsequent flows, with net migration often circular rather than permanent.[26] World Bank models project 19.9 million internal migrants by 2050, but critiques note these assume static socioeconomic conditions and overlook in-situ resilience.[26] In Latin America, droughts in the Central American dry corridor correlate with elevated out-migration to the United States, where agricultural failures from reduced precipitation have contributed to surges in unauthorized crossings. Analysis of migration data from 2007–2017 indicated that half of U.S.-bound migrants from the region originated from drought-affected areas, with a 2023 study estimating climate shocks amplified cross-border flows by 10–20% during dry spells.[73] [74] However, econometric models emphasize interacting drivers like violence and inequality, with internal rural-to-urban shifts predominating over international ones; projections of 17 million internal migrants by 2050 under high-emission scenarios remain unverified against historical trends showing adaptation via crop diversification.[75] Pacific small island states face sea-level rise projected at 15–30 cm by 2050, yet empirical records show minimal emigration, with populations in nations like Kiribati and Tuvalu stabilizing or growing slightly due to remittances and local adaptations such as raised housing. A 2024 review of census and survey data found no statistically significant climate-driven depopulation, contrasting alarmist forecasts; instead, voluntary migration remains under 1% annually, often for education rather than existential threats.[76] In the Arctic, including Alaskan coastal communities like Shishmaref, permafrost thaw and erosion have prompted relocation planning since the 2000s, with annual shoreline retreat rates of 1–5 meters displacing small groups—e.g., Newtok's partial move initiated in 2019 affecting 400 residents—but broader indigenous populations exhibit high retention through engineered defenses.[77] [78] These cases highlight regional divergence: arid interiors see more pronounced internal flows, while coastal zones rely on localized fixes, underscoring that global warming's migration effects are context-specific and rarely deterministic.[4][20]Legal and Policy Dimensions
International Frameworks
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol define a refugee as someone fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, explicitly excluding those displaced solely by environmental factors such as climate change.[79] This exclusion persists despite advocacy for expansion, as reopening the Convention risks undermining its core protections without guaranteeing inclusion for climate-displaced persons.[80] Consequently, individuals crossing borders due to climate impacts lack automatic refugee status under international law, though some national courts have interpreted environmental degradation as exacerbating persecution on protected grounds in limited cases.[81] Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (established at COP19 in 2013) addresses displacement through its Task Force on Displacement, created in 2015 to develop recommendations for averting, minimizing, and addressing climate-related human mobility.[82] The Task Force emphasizes integrated approaches, including early warning systems, planned relocation, and data collection on displacement risks, but these are non-binding and focus more on internal than cross-border movements.[83] The Cancun Adaptation Framework (COP16, 2010) first acknowledged migration as a potential adaptation strategy to climate impacts, yet it provides no legal obligations for receiving states.[84] The Paris Agreement (2015), under UNFCCC, indirectly references human mobility in its preamble by noting the vulnerability of migrants to climate effects and through Article 8, which links loss and damage to displacement without mandating specific protections or funding for cross-border climate migrants.[85] It builds on the Warsaw Mechanism by operationalizing a displacement coordination facility proposed in earlier negotiations, aimed at supporting emergency relief, appropriate protection, and durable solutions, though implementation remains voluntary and under-resourced.[86] At COP27 (2022), parties established a dedicated Loss and Damage Fund, which includes provisions for addressing displacement but prioritizes finance for vulnerable nations without enforceable migration-specific mechanisms. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM, adopted 2018), a non-binding UN framework endorsed by 164 states, integrates climate factors into its objectives, particularly Objective 2 (addressing drivers like environmental degradation) and Objective 7 (enhancing resilience to disasters and climate change through data sharing and border management).[87] It promotes bilateral agreements for orderly migration in response to climate stressors but lacks enforcement, relying on voluntary state cooperation and facing criticism for insufficient focus on protection gaps for those forcibly displaced across borders.[88] Complementing this, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (2016), arising from the Nansen Initiative, facilitates international cooperation on cross-border disaster migration, including climate-induced events, through guidelines like the Peninsula Principles on climate displacement, though these remain soft law without binding force.[89] Regionally, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009), ratified by 33 states as of 2023, is the only binding treaty explicitly addressing climate-related internal displacement, obliging states to protect and assist those uprooted by natural disasters and environmental degradation.[90] However, it does not extend to international migration, highlighting the fragmented global architecture where binding protections remain limited to internal contexts in specific regions. Overall, international frameworks prioritize mitigation of drivers and resilience-building over dedicated legal status for cross-border climate migrants, with ongoing UNFCCC negotiations at COPs seeking to bridge gaps through enhanced cooperation rather than new conventions.[91]National Responses and Border Policies
National governments have implemented a range of responses to anticipated climate-induced migration, often prioritizing border security and mobility controls over dedicated humanitarian pathways, as climate-displaced individuals typically do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which requires persecution on specific grounds rather than environmental factors.[90] Policies frequently integrate climate considerations into broader migration management, but explicit protections remain rare, with many nations relying on temporary visas, deportation mechanisms, or bilateral agreements to manage inflows.[10] This approach reflects a securitization trend, where climate migration is framed as a potential security risk, leading to enhanced surveillance and external border partnerships rather than expanded admissions.[92] Australia has pioneered a targeted bilateral response through the Falepili Union agreement with Tuvalu, signed in November 2023 and finalized in May 2024, which permits up to 280 Tuvaluans annually—equivalent to about 2.5% of Tuvalu's population—to relocate to Australia on work, study, or residency visas due to rising sea levels and environmental degradation.[93] [94] In exchange, Australia gains veto rights over Tuvalu's security pacts with other nations, illustrating how climate mobility deals can intersect with geopolitical interests.[93] Despite this, Australia's overall migration system lacks a broad legal basis for climate asylum claims, treating most such arrivals under general economic or humanitarian categories.[95] In the United States, no federal legislation provides permanent protections for climate migrants, with existing asylum processes excluding environmental drivers as qualifying grounds, forcing reliance on discretionary temporary protected status or parole programs that have been inconsistently applied.[96] [90] Border enforcement policies, including Title 42 expulsions used from March 2020 to May 2023 and subsequent restrictions under Executive Order in June 2024, have diverted migrants into remote desert routes where climate-amplified heat and dehydration increase mortality risks, with over 65% of surveyed asylum seekers reporting climate harms as displacement factors.[97] These measures, aimed at curbing irregular crossings, do not differentiate climate-motivated flows from others, exacerbating vulnerabilities without addressing root causes.[97] European Union member states exhibit fragmented approaches, with the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum omitting direct climate references and emphasizing rapid border returns, external processing deals with third countries, and bolstered Frontex operations to deter unauthorized entries, including those potentially driven by environmental stressors.[92] [98] Earlier national provisions in Finland, Sweden, and Italy for climate-related protections were repealed by 2016, reflecting a shift toward stricter controls amid rising irregular migration pressures.[90] The EU's externalization strategy, including funding border management in origin countries via the European Green Deal's migration components, prioritizes prevention and containment over reception, though advocates argue for human rights-based visas to accommodate projected inflows.[99] [100]Asylum and Refugee Status Debates
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, excluding generalized risks from environmental disasters or climate change impacts.[13] This exclusion stems from the convention's focus on targeted human rights violations rather than natural or systemic phenomena, leading to consistent denial of refugee status for those displaced solely by climate-related events.[101] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains that individuals affected by climate change do not qualify as refugees under this framework but may access other protections, such as non-refoulement if return poses an imminent threat to life, though such cases remain exceptional and require individualized evidence of harm.[102] [103] Advocates for expanded recognition argue that climate-induced displacement constitutes a form of indirect persecution, particularly when governments fail to mitigate foreseeable harms, potentially fitting within complementary protection mechanisms like the UN Human Rights Committee's interpretation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits deportation to conditions threatening life or inhuman treatment.[104] They cite projections of up to 1.2 billion people at risk of displacement by 2050 due to climate factors, urging amendments to avoid a protection gap, though these estimates often conflate climate with economic and conflict drivers without isolating causation.[105] Critics counter that broadening the definition would overwhelm asylum systems, as climate effects are diffuse and not attributable to state persecution, diluting protections for traditional refugees; empirical analyses show climate variables explain only a small fraction of asylum flows, with rejection rates exceeding 60% in EU first-instance decisions even when environmental claims are raised.[106] [107] Moreover, verifying "climate persecution" demands unattainable proof of direct nexus, risking arbitrary grants based on generalized forecasts rather than personal targeting.[101] Key judicial precedents underscore these tensions. In Teitiota v. New Zealand (2015–2020), the New Zealand courts rejected refugee status for a Kiribati national citing rising seas, but the UN Human Rights Committee in 2020 found potential non-refoulement violations if climate impacts predictably endanger life upon return, marking a narrow acknowledgment of human rights risks without conferring refugee status.[108] Similarly, the U.S. First Circuit Court in 2024 ruled that "climate refugees" do not form a cognizable particular social group under immigration law, denying asylum to a Honduran claimant fleeing hurricanes, as environmental harm lacks the required social distinction and persecutory intent.[109] These rulings highlight that while courts increasingly reference climate evidence in harm assessments, success rates for explicit climate asylum claims remain near zero, with most denials citing insufficient ties to protected grounds. Policy debates persist without consensus, as no state has unilaterally granted blanket refugee status for climate migrants, though some, like Portugal in 2020, have approved individual visas on humanitarian grounds for Pacific Islanders.[110] International efforts, including UNHCR's 2023 legal guidance, emphasize disaster-specific protocols over refugee expansion, prioritizing internal adaptation and regional mobility frameworks to address cross-border flows without altering the 1951 Convention.[103] Skeptics note that advocacy for "climate refugee" terminology often originates from non-governmental organizations with environmental agendas, potentially overstating climate's causal primacy amid evidence that conflict and poverty drive 80-90% of observed migration patterns in vulnerable regions.[107]Controversies and Critiques
Claims of Exaggeration and Alarmism
Critics contend that projections of massive climate-induced migration, often cited as numbering in the hundreds of millions by mid-century, overstate the role of environmental factors by neglecting human adaptation, economic development, and multifaceted migration drivers such as poverty and governance failures.[6] For example, influential reports from organizations like the World Bank have forecasted up to 143 million internal climate migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America by 2050, yet these estimates rely on models that assume static socioeconomic conditions and minimal adaptive responses, leading to accusations of methodological overreach.[6] Empirical analyses reveal scant evidence for the predicted surges in international migration attributable to climate change, with many studies documenting either negligible effects or even inverse correlations. A 2024 review by European experts found no empirical support for claims that climate impacts would drive increased immigration to Europe, emphasizing instead that migration patterns are predominantly shaped by labor opportunities and networks rather than slow-onset changes like sea-level rise.[111] Similarly, global datasets indicate that while acute events like droughts may prompt temporary internal displacement, long-term emigration rates often decline in warmer or variable climates due to reduced agricultural yields deterring moves, as evidenced by a 2024 IMF analysis showing a 18.7% drop in emigration following persistent heat anomalies.[4] The "climate refugee" framing has been labeled a fabrication that conflates diverse mobility types—such as voluntary economic migration with forced displacement—without rigorous causal attribution, potentially exacerbating policy distortions like securitized borders.[112] Peer-reviewed critiques highlight how apocalyptic narratives depoliticize climate governance by portraying migrants as existential threats, ignoring historical precedents of resilience in vulnerable regions and the lack of consensus on climate as a primary driver.[113] A 2023 Center for Global Development assessment underscores that academic literature rejects "floods" of cross-border refugees, noting instead that exposed areas like low-lying deltas frequently attract net in-migration due to economic pull factors, contradicting alarmist displacement models.[6][19] These claims of exaggeration are bolstered by broader meta-analyses of quantitative studies, which describe the climate-migration linkage as diverse, inconclusive, and often contradictory, with adaptation measures and development investments proving more effective at curbing mobility than emission reductions alone.[20] Critics from institutions wary of institutional biases in climate advocacy argue that hype distracts from targeted interventions, such as infrastructure resilience, while inflating fears that could harm origin communities by stigmatizing their agency.[2]Debates on Causal Determinism
Scholars debate the degree to which climate change acts as a deterministic cause of migration, with some positing direct environmental compulsion and others emphasizing multifactorial influences where climate serves as a secondary or amplifying factor. Proponents of stronger causal links, often framed through "environmental-driver" models, argue that escalating hazards like droughts, floods, and sea-level rise render areas uninhabitable, compelling displacement as an adaptation strategy, particularly in rural agrarian contexts.[114][3] For instance, quantitative analyses have linked temperature increases to elevated emigration rates, with a one percent decadal warming associated with higher bilateral migration flows from affected regions.[4] However, these claims face scrutiny for potential over-attribution, as methodological reviews highlight inconsistencies in measuring migration outcomes and climatic variables, often yielding mixed evidence where climate impacts are context-specific and not universally dominant.[3] Critics of causal determinism contend that attributing migration primarily to climate overlooks entrenched socioeconomic, political, and institutional drivers, reducing complex human decisions to environmental fatalism. Empirical studies underscore that migration patterns are predominantly shaped by economic opportunities, conflict, and governance failures, with climate acting indirectly through "threat multiplier" effects rather than as a standalone determinant.[115][18] For example, in the Sahel region, while droughts exacerbate vulnerabilities, outflows are more strongly correlated with violence and poor resource management than climatic variability alone, as populations often adapt in place or migrate for livelihoods rather than fleeing habitability loss.[116] Similarly, high-profile cases like Syrian displacement, sometimes linked to preceding droughts, reveal civil war as the proximate trigger, with environmental factors insufficient to explain scale or direction without social-political confounders.[117] This perspective warns against deterministic narratives that may inflate projections—such as early estimates of hundreds of millions of "climate refugees"—which lack robust verification against observed trends, where global migration remains below alarmist forecasts despite rising temperatures.[118][119] Challenges in causal inference further complicate the debate, including data aggregation issues, endogeneity from adaptive behaviors, and the rarity of isolating climate's net effect amid confounding variables like urbanization pull factors.[3][46] "Social-causal" frameworks prioritize these interactions, arguing that human agency, policy responses, and economic development mediate outcomes, rendering pure determinism empirically untenable and potentially politically instrumentalized to securitize borders or justify interventions.[114][120] Overall, while climate influences mobility—evident in short-term disaster displacements—long-term patterns align more with voluntary, opportunity-driven movements, supported by reviews showing no consistent evidence of climate as the overriding force across diverse settings.[121][71]Securitization and Political Exploitation
The securitization of climate migration involves framing environmentally driven population movements as existential threats to national stability, border integrity, and global order, often invoking military and intelligence responses over humanitarian ones. This approach, rooted in securitization theory, elevates the issue beyond policy debate by declaring it an urgent danger requiring exceptional measures. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has labeled climate change a "threat multiplier" that could amplify migration flows, potentially overwhelming fragile states and sparking conflicts over resources.[122] Similarly, NATO's 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan identifies climate-induced displacement as a vector for instability, warning that it may strain governance in alliance partner nations and create opportunities for adversarial exploitation.[123] These framings draw on projections of up to 1.2 billion people at risk of displacement by 2050 due to factors like sea-level rise and droughts, though such estimates often blend climate variables with socioeconomic drivers without isolating causal impacts.[124] Empirical evidence for climate migration posing systemic security risks remains limited and contested, with analyses showing that acute disasters prompt temporary displacement rather than sustained mass crossings. Post-disaster patterns indicate that affected populations typically return home once immediate hazards subside, undermining claims of inevitable border crises; for instance, historical data from events like hurricanes reveal net repatriation over time rather than permanent exodus.[125] Securitization discourses frequently link migration to conflict via environmental conflict theories, yet rigorous studies find weak correlations, as poverty, governance failures, and violence dominate migration decisions far more than isolated climate stressors.[126] Critics contend this emphasis misdirects resources toward border fortifications and surveillance instead of addressing root vulnerabilities like adaptation failures in origin countries, potentially exacerbating the very instabilities feared.[127] Politically, the securitization narrative has been leveraged across ideologies to advance disparate agendas, often amplifying unverified projections for rhetorical gain. In Europe, EU strategies have integrated climate migration into security pacts, justifying partnerships with African nations for migration containment while critiqued for prioritizing sovereignty over equity.[128] Right-leaning governments, such as those in the U.S. under certain administrations, have invoked it to rationalize stricter border policies, portraying inflows as destabilizing hordes despite data showing economic migrants outnumbering verifiable climate cases by wide margins. Conversely, some international bodies and NGOs exploit the frame to advocate expansive legal protections, though this risks diluting refugee criteria without evidence of climate's primacy.[129] National security documents from 93 countries analyzed in recent research reveal a pattern of overemphasizing migration's secondary effects on defense postures, diverting focus from direct emissions reductions.[127] Such exploitation persists amid institutional biases in academia and policy circles, where alarmist models garner funding despite failing to predict observed migration trends accurately.[126]Adaptation and Resilience
In-Situ Adaptation Measures
In-situ adaptation measures refer to localized strategies that enable populations to withstand climate impacts without relocating, focusing on enhancing resilience through infrastructure, agriculture, and resource management. These interventions aim to address specific hazards such as flooding, drought, and sea-level rise by modifying environments or livelihoods in place. For example, structural protections like levees and barriers have proven effective in reducing flood-induced displacement; the Thames Barrier in the United Kingdom, operational since 1982, has prevented inundation of central London during high tides and storm surges on over 130 occasions as of 2019, averting potential evacuations and property losses estimated in billions of pounds.[130] Similarly, in the Netherlands, extensive dike systems and polder management have sustained habitation in low-lying deltas despite rising sea levels, with investments exceeding €1 billion annually supporting adaptive maintenance that correlates with low net out-migration rates from vulnerable coastal zones.[131] Agricultural adaptations form a core component, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions prone to drought. Adoption of drought-tolerant crop varieties, such as those developed through programs by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, has increased yields by 20-30% in sub-Saharan Africa under water-stressed conditions, enabling farmers to maintain food security and livelihoods without abandonment of land.[132] Irrigation expansions, including drip systems in India’s semi-arid states, have boosted water efficiency by up to 50% and reduced crop failure rates, with studies showing a 15-25% decline in rural-to-urban migration linked to improved household incomes in pilot areas from 2010 to 2020.[119] Community-based ecosystem restoration, such as mangrove replanting in Bangladesh’s coastal belts, has mitigated cyclone storm surges by 20-50% in affected areas, preserving fisheries and agriculture that support over 1 million residents and curbing seasonal displacement.[130] Empirical evidence underscores that equitable access to these measures can significantly lower climate-driven migration pressures, though outcomes depend on socioeconomic factors and funding. Household-level surveys in Vietnam indicate that communities with subsidized flood-proofing and elevated housing experienced 40% fewer temporary displacements during typhoons compared to non-adapted peers between 2015 and 2022.[133] World Bank resilience programs in Ethiopia have integrated soil conservation and agroforestry, yielding a 10-20% reduction in drought-related out-migration from treated highlands since 2016 by stabilizing pastoral economies.[132] However, limitations persist where adaptation costs exceed local capacities; in low-income settings, unaffordable measures leave populations "trapped" in deteriorating conditions, as observed in parts of the Sahel where incomplete irrigation fails to offset prolonged dry spells, prompting eventual mobility despite initial in-situ efforts.[119] Peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that while these strategies delay displacement—evidenced by stabilized population metrics in adapted versus non-adapted cohorts—they require sustained investment and may reach biophysical limits under high-emissions scenarios.[134]Planned Relocation Programs
Planned relocation programs entail the supervised transfer of communities from climate-vulnerable sites to safer locations, often spearheaded by governments or local authorities as an adaptation measure when protective infrastructure fails. These initiatives address hazards like coastal erosion, sea-level rise, and flooding, though contributing factors such as subsidence and prior land use must be considered alongside climatic influences. Globally, such programs remain infrequent and small-scale, with implementation hindered by exorbitant costs, logistical complexities, and sociocultural disruptions.[135][136] In the United States, the Isle de Jean Charles resettlement in Louisiana marks the first federally funded, climate-driven community-scale relocation. Awarded $48.3 million in Community Development Block Grant funds by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 2016, the program targets the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe, whose island has shrunk from 22,000 acres to 320 acres due to erosion, subsidence, and sea-level rise. The planned "New Isle" site, located 40 miles north, envisions over 500 homes, trails, a community center, and commercial spaces for displaced residents. However, progress has been uneven, with only partial relocations achieved amid disputes over eligibility, housing quality, and tribal exclusion from decisions, leading to a 2023 civil rights complaint against state authorities.[137][138][139] Alaska's Shishmaref village exemplifies prolonged relocation struggles in Arctic regions. Experiencing annual shoreline erosion of 3–5 feet—peaking at over 30 feet in 1997—due to diminished sea ice, thawing permafrost, and intensified storms, residents voted in 2002 to relocate, reaffirming the decision 94–78 in 2016 to sites like Tin Creek. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimated costs at $100–200 million in 2006, with over $25 million already expended on futile shoreline defenses. Despite site approvals and feasibility studies, federal funding shortfalls have stalled full implementation, projecting 10–15 years until the current location becomes uninhabitable.[54][140] In the Pacific, Fiji has relocated six villages by 2022 out of 42 identified for potential movement within 5–10 years, driven by inundation and cyclones. Vunidogoloa, the first government-supported case, shifted 140 residents inland in 2014, though initial lacks like absent kitchens highlighted planning gaps. A national taskforce has drafted standardized procedures, yet barriers persist: securing communal land, funding (e.g., a NZ$2 million trust), and preserving burial sites and spiritual ties, as seen in delays for Nabavatu post-2021 Cyclone Ana.[141] Papua New Guinea's Carteret Islands demonstrate community-led efforts, coordinated by Tulele Peisa since 2005 amid rapid submersion. Targeting relocation to Bougainville, the initiative plans to move 350 families by 2027, with 17 households resettled by late 2024, including the transport of thousands of trees to sustain biodiversity and livelihoods. Requiring K14 million (about $3.7 million USD), the process emphasizes voluntary participation and host community integration, though fewer than 10 households had formally relocated by earlier assessments, underscoring protracted timelines.[142][143] Across cases, planned relocations reveal common pitfalls: diminished well-being and heightened anxiety post-move compared to non-relocated peers, per a 2024 study of sea-level responses; inadequate consultation risking cultural erosion; and reliance on domestic policies absent robust international frameworks. Proponents advocate human rights-based approaches prioritizing consent and alternatives, yet empirical evidence indicates relocations often exacerbate vulnerabilities without comprehensive support.[144][135]Economic Development Alternatives
Economic development alternatives to climate migration focus on strengthening local economies in vulnerable regions through investments in resilient agriculture, infrastructure, and skills training to mitigate displacement pressures. These strategies prioritize enhancing adaptive capacity and livelihood options at origin sites, reducing the relative appeal of relocation by addressing root economic vulnerabilities exacerbated by climate variability. Empirical models demonstrate that GDP growth modulates migration responses to climate stressors; in low-income settings, limited economic resources trap populations in place amid environmental decline, while development enables proactive in-situ improvements or selective mobility.[20] In the Sahel, the Great Green Wall initiative, initiated by the African Union in 2007, exemplifies such efforts by aiming to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land across 11 countries through reforestation, sustainable farming, and agroforestry. The project targets creating 10 million jobs in land restoration and related sectors, intending to bolster food security, curb desertification, and diminish migration incentives driven by resource scarcity and drought. By 2023, it had restored approximately 20 million hectares and generated over 300,000 jobs, though progress lags behind goals due to funding shortfalls and insecurity, highlighting implementation challenges in fostering sustained economic viability.[145][146][147] Bangladesh's experience illustrates how rapid economic expansion, averaging 6.4% annual GDP growth from 2010 to 2023, combined with targeted adaptations like cyclone shelters, embankment repairs, and microfinance for climate-resilient farming, has helped stabilize rural incomes despite recurrent flooding and cyclones. These measures, supported by organizations such as BRAC, have reduced vulnerability for millions, limiting the scale of internal displacement; for instance, post-Cyclone Sidr recovery programs emphasized diversified livelihoods, correlating with lower out-migration rates in fortified coastal districts compared to untreated areas. However, persistent poverty in deltaic zones underscores that growth must be inclusive and climate-integrated to fully offset migration drivers.[148][149] Broader evidence from cross-country analyses supports that climate-smart economic policies, such as rural job creation in non-farm sectors and irrigation expansion, inversely correlate with displacement volumes by improving household resilience. World Bank assessments indicate that without such rural-focused development, climate impacts could propel 44-216 million internal migrants by 2050 in developing regions, but targeted investments could halve this by enhancing local opportunities. Critics note potential overemphasis on development as a panacea, given uneven outcomes influenced by governance and conflict, yet data affirm its role in causal chains linking climate stress to mobility decisions.[150][17]Societal Impacts
Effects on Origin Communities
The departure of individuals from climate-stressed origin communities due to factors such as drought, flooding, and sea-level rise often yields mixed outcomes, with short-term relief from reduced resource pressures offset by longer-term socioeconomic strains including labor shortages and altered demographics. Empirical analyses indicate that while out-migration can temporarily ease environmental burdens in high-vulnerability areas like coastal Bangladesh or the Sahel region, it frequently exacerbates vulnerabilities for those who remain, as productive workers—particularly younger males—leave, leading to imbalances in age and gender structures that hinder local agricultural and infrastructural maintenance.[18][151][152] Remittances from climate-related migrants represent a key positive channel, channeling external income to support household adaptation and disaster recovery in sending areas; for example, monthly remittance flows to affected countries surge immediately after natural disasters, remaining elevated for 3-4 months and funding rebuilding efforts that mitigate further environmental degradation. In developing nations, such transfers totaled $529 billion in 2018, with portions directed toward climate resilience measures like improved water infrastructure or crop diversification in origin communities, often compensating for local income losses from out-migration.[153][154][155] However, these benefits are unevenly distributed, favoring remittance-recipient households over non-recipients and sometimes inflating local costs without addressing systemic vulnerabilities like soil degradation.[156] Conversely, brain drain emerges as a pronounced negative effect in middle-income vulnerable regions, where climate pressures disproportionately drive the emigration of educated and skilled individuals to higher-opportunity destinations, depleting human capital essential for in-situ adaptation such as technological innovation in farming or community-led disaster preparedness. Studies project that this selective out-flow could amplify demographic aging in origins, with climate migration suppressing return flows and concentrating older populations, as observed in projections for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where a 1% decadal temperature rise correlates with heightened emigration rates among mobile demographics.[157][158][151] In the Indian Himalayan region, for instance, sustained out-migration has shifted remaining communities toward less labor-intensive land uses, increasing abandonment of terraced fields and burdens on women and elderly residents for sustenance activities.[152][4] These dynamics underscore causal complexities, where climate acts as an amplifier rather than sole driver of migration; econometric models reveal that underlying economic conditions often determine net impacts, with remittances occasionally offsetting brain drain in resilient communities but failing in those lacking diversified economies. World Bank assessments of internal climate displacement in regions like Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa highlight how out-migration from water-scarce rural areas leads to depopulated zones with diminished adaptive capacity, potentially perpetuating cycles of vulnerability absent complementary policies like skill retention programs.[159][160] Overall, while remittances provide tangible fiscal inflows—estimated to support one in eight people globally through indirect effects—unmitigated human capital loss risks hollowing out origin communities, particularly in low-mobility poor settings where trapped populations face intensified climate risks without migrant-supported buffers.[161][162]Integration Challenges in Destinations
Climate migrants arriving in destination countries, whether internal urban centers or international hosts, encounter multifaceted integration barriers stemming from rapid influxes, mismatched skills, and institutional gaps. Unlike economic migrants who self-select for opportunities, those displaced by climate stressors—such as droughts in the Sahel or flooding in Bangladesh—often arrive with limited education, rural backgrounds, and trauma, hindering labor market entry. Empirical analyses indicate that such groups exhibit employment rates 20-30% below native populations in host societies, with over-reliance on informal sectors leading to exploitation and stalled upward mobility.[163][164] Fiscal pressures exacerbate these issues, as receiving areas bear initial costs for housing, healthcare, and education without commensurate tax contributions from newcomers. A Brookings Institution analysis highlights that while long-term incorporation could yield economic vitality, short-term strains on public budgets—estimated at 1-2% of GDP in high-inflow regions like European border states—fuel resentment and policy backlash.[165] In cases like internal migration to Dhaka from climate-vulnerable Bangladeshi coasts, urban slums have swelled by millions since 2000, overwhelming infrastructure and contributing to a 15% rise in city-level poverty rates.[44] Social cohesion challenges arise from cultural and linguistic divides, with climate-displaced groups forming enclaves that resist assimilation and heighten intergroup tensions. Studies on analogous forced migrations show increased conflict probabilities in destinations, where climate-driven inflows correlate with a 10-15% uptick in local disputes over resources.[166] Lack of legal refugee status for environmental displacees—absent from the 1951 UN Convention—denies access to integration programs, perpetuating undocumented status and exclusion from services, as seen in Pacific islanders resettling in New Zealand with provisional visas that limit family reunification and citizenship paths.[167]- Employment Barriers: Skills gaps and discrimination result in chronic underemployment; for instance, Sahel migrants in European cities face 40% higher unemployment than locals due to unrecognized qualifications.[168]
- Housing and Services Strain: Influxes overload systems, with U.S. Gulf Coast relocations post-hurricanes showing doubled homelessness rates among displacees.[169]
- Cultural Assimilation Failures: Parallel societies emerge, as evidenced by low intermarriage rates (under 5%) and persistent welfare dependency in host communities receiving climate-exacerbated flows from Syria's drought-affected regions.[119][166]
