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History of the Comoros
History of the Comoros
History of the Comoros
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The history of the Comoros extends back to about 800–1000 AD when the archipelago was first inhabited. The Comoros have been inhabited by various groups and sultanates throughout this time. France colonised the islands in the 19th century, and they became independent in 1975.[1]

Prehistory

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The Comoros archipelago, of volcanic origin, was formed during the Cenozoic era. Seismic reflection data acquired during the SISMAORE survey indicate that Mayotte is the oldest edifice, with volcanism starting around 26.5 Ma; at the other end, Grande Comore remains active, dominated by Mount Karthala and a recent tectono-volcanic field identified offshore around the archipelago.[2][3][4]

Before the first human settlements, the archipelago likely had no native terrestrial mammals, apart from fruit bats of the genus Pteropus and other chiropterans, natural colonizers of oceanic islands.[5]

Early settlement and migrations

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Genetic studies based on uniparental markers indicate that the Comorian population has a tri-continental ancestry—African, Island Southeast Asian, and Middle Eastern—resulting from early admixture events that began during the first millennium CE.[6]

Austronesian settlement (8th–13th centuries CE)

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Multiple lines of evidence suggest that the Comoros were initially settled by Austronesian-speaking sailors, probably from Island Southeast Asia, between the 8th and 13th centuries CE, in parallel with the colonisation of Madagascar.[7]

Archaeobotanical findings from early sites such as Sima (Anjouan) show Asian crops including rice (indica and japonica), mung bean and cotton predominating over African staples, supporting an Island Southeast Asian origin.[8]

Genome-wide analyses identify an Austronesian genetic contribution of around 20 percent in Comorian populations, with variation between islands.[9]

Chronological dispersal of Austronesian peoples across the Indo-Pacific[10]

Dembeni phase and early Islam (9th–12th centuries)

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Archaeology identifies a Dembeni cultural horizon (Mayotte and neighboring islands) with multiple sites (9th–10th and 11th–12th centuries) engaged in long-distance Indian Ocean trade.[11] Finds include early Chinese and Persian ceramics and abundant Malagasy rock crystal, indicating wealth and integration into Abbasid then Fatimid trade circuits; funerary evidence (Mecca-oriented burials) points to early Islamisation by the 11th–12th centuries.[12]

Bantu–Swahili integrations and regional networks (late 1st millennium onward)

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From the late first millennium, Bantu-speaking groups from the East African coast settled and intermingled with earlier Austronesian settlers, embedding the islands within Swahili cultural and commercial networks across the western Indian Ocean.[13][14]

Shirazi and Hadhrami influences (15th–16th centuries)

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By the 15th century, Persian-Gulf–linked Shirazi elites and merchants established ports and ruling houses, consolidating Comorian links to the Swahili corridor; in the 16th century, Hadhrami lineages reinforced these dynasties through kinship and religious authority.[15][16] Over the centuries, the Comoros have been settled by a succession of diverse groups from the coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and Madagascar.

European contact and expansion

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Map of Anjouan (1748) by French hydrographer Jacques Nicolas Bellin

Portuguese explorers first visited the archipelago in 1505.

Apart from a visit by the French Parmentier brothers in 1529, for much of the 16th century the only Europeans to visit the islands were Portuguese. British and Dutch ships began arriving around the start of the 17th century and the island of Ndzwani soon became a major supply point on the route to the East Indies. Ndzwani was generally ruled by a single sultan, who occasionally attempted to extend his authority to Mayotte and Mwali; Ngazidja was more fragmented, on occasion being divided into as many as 12 small kingdoms.

Sir James Lancaster's voyage to the Indian Ocean in 1591 was the first attempt by the English to break into the spice trade, which was dominated by the Portuguese. Only one of his four ships made it back from the Indies on that voyage, and that one with a decimated crew of 5 men and a boy. Lancaster himself was marooned by a cyclone on the Comoros. Many of his crew were speared to death by angry islanders although Lancaster found his way home in 1594. (Dalrymple W. 2019; Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN 1635573955).

Both the British and the French turned their attention to the Comoros islands in the middle of the 19th century. The French finally acquired the islands through a cunning mixture of strategies, including the policy of "divide and conquer", chequebook politics and a serendipitous affair between a sultana and a French trader that was put to good use by the French, who kept control of the islands, quelling unrest and the occasional uprising.

William Sunley, a planter and British Consul from 1848 to 1866, was an influence on Anjouan.

French Comoros

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For the history of the native sultanates on several of the major islands, see List of sultans on the Comoros.

France's presence in the western Indian Ocean dates to the early 17th century.[17] The French established a settlement in southern Madagascar in 1634 and occupied the islands of Réunion and Rodrigues; in 1715 France claimed Mauritius (Île de France), and in 1756 Seychelles.[17] When France ceded Mauritius, Rodrigues, and Seychelles to Britain in 1814, it lost its Indian Ocean ports; Reunion, which remained French, did not offer a suitable natural harbor.[17] In 1840 France acquired the island of Nosy-Be off the northwestern coast of Madagascar, but its potential as a port was limited.[17] In 1841 the governor of Reunion, Admiral de Hell, negotiated with Andrian Souli, the Malagasy ruler of Mayotte, to cede Mayotte to France.[18] Mahore offered a suitable site for port facilities, and its acquisition was justified by de Hell on the grounds that if France did not act, Britain would occupy the island.[19]

Although France had established a foothold in Comoros, the acquisition of the other islands proceeded fitfully.[19] At times the French were spurred on by the threat of British intervention, especially on Nzwani, and at other times, by the constant anarchy resulting from the sultans' wars upon each other.[19] In the 1880s, Germany's growing influence on the East African coast added to the concerns of the French.[19] Not until 1908, however, did the four Comoro Islands become part of France's colony of Madagascar and not until 1912 did the last sultan abdicate.[19] Then, a colonial administration took over the islands and established a capital at Dzaoudzi on Mahore.[19] Treaties of protectorate status marked a transition point between independence and annexation; such treaties were signed with the rulers of Njazidja, Nzwani, and Mwali in 1886.[19]

The effects of French colonialism were mixed, at best.[19] Colonial rule brought an end to the institution of Slavery in the Comoros, but economic and social differences between former slaves and free persons and their descendants persisted.[19] Health standards improved with the introduction of modern medicine, and the population increased about 50 percent between 1900 and 1960.[19] France continued to dominate the economy.[19] Food crop cultivation was neglected as French sociétés (companies) established cash crop plantations in the coastal regions.[19] The result was an economy dependent on the exporting of vanilla, ylang-ylang, cloves, cocoa, copra, and other tropical crops.[19] Most profits obtained from exports were diverted to France rather than invested in the infrastructure of the islands.[19] Development was further limited by the colonial government's practice of concentrating public services on Madagascar.[19] One consequence of this policy was the migration of large numbers of Comorans to Madagascar, where their presence would be a long-term source of tension between Comoros and its giant island neighbor.[19] The Shirazi elite continued to play a prominent role as large landowners and civil servants.[19] On the eve of independence, Comoros remained poor and undeveloped, having only one secondary school and practically nothing in the way of national media.[19] Isolated from important trade routes by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, having few natural resources, and largely neglected by France, the islands were poorly equipped for independence.[20]

On September 25, 1942, British forces landed in the Comoros, occupying them until October 13, 1946.[21]

In 1946 the Comoro Islands became an overseas department of France with representation in the French National Assembly.[22] The following year, the islands' administrative ties to Madagascar were severed; Comoros established its own customs regime in 1952.[22] A Governing Council was elected in August 1957 on the four islands in conformity with the loi-cadre (enabling law) of June 23, 1956.[22] A constitution providing for internal self-government was promulgated in 1961, following a 1958 referendum in which Comorans voted overwhelmingly to remain a part of France.[22] This government consisted of a territorial assembly having, in 1975, thirty-nine members, and a Governing Council of six to nine ministers responsible to it.[22]

Agreement was reached with France in 1973 for the Comoros to become independent in 1978. On July 6, 1975, however, the Comorian parliament passed a resolution declaring unilateral independence as a republic. The deputies of Mayotte abstained. The first president of the Comoros, Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, did not last long before being ousted in a coup d'état by Ali Soilih, an atheist with an Islamic background.

Soilih began with a set of solid socialist ideals designed to modernize the country. However, the regime faced problems. A French mercenary by the name of Bob Denard, arrived in the Comoros at dawn on 13 May 1978, and removed Soilih from power. Solih was shot and killed during the coup. The mercenaries returned Abdallah to power[23] and the mercenaries were given key positions in government.

In two referendums, in December 1974 and February 1976, the population of Mayotte voted against independence from France (by 63.8% and 99.4% respectively). Mayotte thus remains under French administration, and the Comorian Government has effective control over only Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli.

Later, French settlers, French-owned companies, and Arab merchants established a plantation-based economy that now uses about one-third of the land for export crops.

Abdallah regime

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Main article: Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros

In 1978, president Ali Soilih, who had a firm anti-French line, was killed and Ahmed Abdallah came to power. Under the reign of Abdallah, Denard was commander of the Presidential Guard (PG) and de facto ruler of the country. He was trained, supported and funded by the white regimes in South Africa (SA) and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in return for permission to set up a secret listening post on the islands. South-African agents kept an ear on the important ANC bases in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam and watched the war in Mozambique, in which SA played an active role. The Comoros were also used for the evasion of arms sanctions.

When in 1981 François Mitterrand was elected president Denard lost the support of the French intelligence service, but he managed to strengthen the link between SA and the Comoros. Besides the military, Denard established his own company SOGECOM, for both the security and construction, and seemed to profit by the arrangement. Between 1985 and 1987 the relationship of the PG with the local Comorians became worse.

At the end of the 1980s the South Africans did not wish to continue to support the mercenary regime and France was in agreement. Also President Abdallah wanted the mercenaries to leave. Their response was a (third) coup resulting in the death of President Abdallah, in which Denard and his men were probably involved. South Africa and the French government subsequently forced Denard and his mercenaries to leave the islands in 1989.

1989–1996

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Said Mohamed Djohar became president. His time in office was turbulent, including an impeachment attempt in 1991 and a coup attempt in 1992.

On September 28, 1995 Bob Denard and a group of mercenaries took over the Comoros islands in a coup (named operation Kaskari by the mercenaries) against President Djohar. France immediately and severely denounced the coup, and backed by the 1978 defense agreement with the Comoros, President Jacques Chirac ordered his special forces to retake the island. Bob Denard began to take measures to stop the coming invasion. A new presidential guard was created. Strong points armed with heavy machine guns were set up around the island, particularly around the island's two airports.

On October 3, 1995, 11 p.m., the French deployed 600 men against a force of 33 mercenaries and a 300-man dissident force. Denard however ordered his mercenaries not to fight. Within 7 hours the airports at Iconi and Hahaya and the French Embassy in Moroni were secured. By 3:00 p.m. the next day Bob Denard and his mercenaries had surrendered. This (response) operation, codenamed Azalée, was remarkable, because there were no casualties, and just in seven days, plans were drawn up and soldiers were deployed. Denard was taken to France and jailed. Prime minister Caambi El-Yachourtu became acting president until Djohar returned from exile in January, 1996. In March 1996, following presidential elections, Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim, a member of the civilian government that Denard had tried to set up in October 1995, became president. On 23 November 1996, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961 crashed near a beach on the island after it was hijacked and ran out of fuel killing 125 people and leaving 50 survivors.

Secession of Anjouan and Mohéli

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In 1997, the islands of Anjouan and Mohéli declared their independence from the Comoros. A subsequent attempt by the government to re-establish control over the rebellious islands by force failed, and presently the African Union is brokering negotiations to effect a reconciliation. This process is largely complete, at least in theory. According to some sources, Mohéli did return to government control in 1998. In 1999, Anjouan had internal conflicts and on August 1 of that year, the 80-year-old first president Foundi Abdallah Ibrahim resigned, transferring power to a national coordinator, Said Abeid. The government was overthrown in a coup by army and navy officers on August 9, 2001. Mohamed Bacar soon rose to leadership of the junta that took over and by the end of the month he was the leader of the country. Despite two coup attempts in the following three months, including one by Abeid, Bacar's government remained in power, and was apparently more willing to negotiate with the Comoros. Presidential elections were held for all of the Comoros in 2002, and presidents have been chosen for all three islands as well, which have become a confederation. Most notably, Mohammed Bacar was elected for a 5-year term as president of Anjouan. Grande Comore had experienced troubles of its own in the late 1990s, when President Taki died on November 6, 1998. Colonel Azali Assoumani became president following a military coup in 1999. There have been several coup attempts since, but he gained firm control of the country after stepping down temporarily and winning a presidential election in 2002.

In May 2006, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi was elected from the island of Anjouan to be the president of the Union of the Comoros. He is a Sunni cleric who studied in the Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. He is nicknamed "Ayatollah" due to his time in Iran and his penchant for turbans.[24][25] Sambi was sentenced to life in imprisonment in the Comoros passport sales scandal.[26]

2007–2008 Anjouan crisis

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Main article: 2008 invasion of Anjouan

Azali Assoumani in power since 2016

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Azali Assoumani is a former army officer, first came to power in a coup in 1999. Then he won presidency in 2002 election, having power until 2006. After ten years, he was elected again in 2016 election. In March 2019, he was re-elected in the elections opposition claimed to be full of irregularities.[27]

Before the 2019 election president Azali Assoumani had arranged a constitutional referendum in 2018 that approved extending the presidential mandate from one five-year term to two. The opposition had boycotted the referendum.[28]

In January 2020, his party The Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC) won 20 out of 24 parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election.[28][29]

On 18 February 2023 the Comoros assumed the presidency of the African Union.[30] In January 2024, President Azali Assoumani was re-elected with 63% of the vote in the disputed presidential election.[31]

See also

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Footnotes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

History of the Comoros

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The history of the Comoros, an archipelago in the western comprising volcanic islands off the coast of southeastern , traces its origins to settlement around the mid-first millennium CE by Austronesian and traders who brought Bantu-speaking individuals from the African mainland as laborers, fostering a multicultural society integrated into regional maritime networks. Over subsequent centuries, independent sultanates emerged on the islands, positioning the Comoros as a vital hub for trade in slaves, livestock, and foodstuffs across the southwestern , with becoming entrenched through Shirazi and influences. European powers, including the and later the , made early contacts from the , but sustained colonization began with French acquisition of in 1841, leading to the archipelago's unification under French administration by 1912 as a neglected overseas territory. Following a 1974 where majorities on , , and Mohéli favored independence while opted to remain , the declared sovereignty in 1975, initiating a turbulent post-colonial period defined by over 20 coup attempts, a socialist-oriented revolution under , a mercenary-backed led by , and island that prompted two islands to briefly seek reintegration with . A federal constitution ratified in 2001 decentralized power to the islands, aiming to resolve fragmentation and stabilize governance amid ongoing economic dependence on exports, remittances, and foreign aid. This era underscores the causal interplay of geographic isolation, ethnic diversity, and external interventions in shaping the nation's persistent political volatility.

Pre-Colonial Era

Early Settlement by Austronesian and

The uninhabited archipelago, located in the western off the East African coast, experienced its initial by Austronesian seafarers from Island , likely originating from populations in present-day or . Genetic analyses of modern Comorian populations indicate the earliest detectable Austronesian gene flow into the region occurred around the CE, predating similar admixture signals on the East African mainland and . This migration aligns with broader Austronesian expansion patterns across the , facilitated by advanced canoe technology enabling long-distance voyages, as evidenced by shared Southeast Asian haplogroups (e.g., B4a1a1) and Y-chromosome markers in Comorian samples. Archaeological correlates, though sparse due to limited excavations, include early sites with imported Asian crop residues like and , suggesting Austronesian agricultural practices took root prior to extensive African contact. Bantu-speaking migrants from the East African littoral subsequently arrived, integrating with the initial Austronesian settlers and forming the demographic foundation of Comorian society. The , which began approximately 3,000–5,000 years ago from West-Central and reached the East African coast by 500 BCE–500 CE, involved agriculturalists bearing ironworking, pottery traditions, and Niger-Congo languages. For the Comoros specifically, linguistic evidence points to Sabaki Bantu substrates—closely related to coastal —arriving via short sea crossings from or , likely intensifying from the 5th–7th centuries CE amid coastal trade networks. Genetic admixture modeling estimates peak Bantu-Austronesian mixing in the around the 8th–10th centuries CE, resulting in a tripartite ancestry profile where African Bantu components predominate (60–80%), overlaid with 10–20% Southeast Asian input and minor traces from later pulses. This synthesis produced hybrid biocultural traits, including matrilocal kinship patterns potentially echoing Austronesian norms amid Bantu . The interplay of these migrations underscores the Comoros' role as an early nexus in seafaring, with Austronesian voyagers establishing beachheads that Bantu expansions later amplified through higher population influx and agricultural intensification. Limited direct archaeological dating—such as uncalibrated radiocarbon from early sites yielding 700–1000 CE ranges—supports this sequence, though erosion and volcanic activity have constrained preservation. Overall, the islands' genetic mosaic reflects causal dynamics of small founding Austronesian groups encountering subsequent Bantu waves, rather than vice versa, challenging narratives of unidirectional African primacy.

Arab Influence, Trade, and Islamization

Arab traders from regions such as Hadhramaut and Persia began integrating into Comorian society as early as the 8th century, leveraging the islands' strategic position along Indian Ocean monsoon trade routes connecting East Africa, Arabia, India, and Indonesia. These routes positioned the Comoros as an entrepôt for goods including slaves, livestock, foodstuffs, wood, vanilla, and coconuts, with the islands serving primarily as way stations rather than major producers. By the 10th century, Arab geographers like al-Idrisi in 1154 documented the islands—referred to as "qumr" (islands of the moon)—in maps highlighting their role in transoceanic commerce extending to ports like Mombasa, Zanzibar, and even Indonesia. Islamization commenced through these traders, who settled, intermarried with local Bantu and Austronesian populations, and disseminated Sunni Shafi'i practices, with oral traditions claiming introductions as early as 632 CE by figures like navigator Said Muhammad following a pilgrimage to . More corroborated historical evidence indicates gradual spread from the 8th to 11th centuries, driven by frequent visits from Arab and Persian merchants who established communities on islands like Ngazidja () and Nzwani (). Shirazi migrants, purportedly from Persia arriving around 933 CE, further entrenched Islamic governance and culture, particularly on Nzwani, where they formed influential lineages that blended with indigenous elites. Conversion was pragmatic, often motivated by economic ties, as adherence to facilitated alliances and participation in the broader Muslim trading network. The influx of settlers catalyzed a fusion of influences, evident in the evolution of chiefdoms toward Islamic polities by the , with over 1,400 mosques attesting to widespread adoption. in slaves intensified under this system, with acting as a transit point for East African captives destined for Arabian and Indian markets, embedding economic dependencies that reinforced cultural dominance among ruling classes. loanwords permeated the Comorian language (Shikomor), and elite families maintained ties through pilgrimage and scholarship, though full Islamization remained uneven, with syncretic practices persisting among rural populations until later consolidation under sultanates. This period marked a shift from animist traditions to a predominantly Muslim identity, setting the stage for formalized Islamic rule.

Rise of Independent Sultanates

The emergence of independent sultanates in the Comoros islands began in the , driven by the arrival of Muslim traders and settlers from the and regions, who intermarried with local Bantu and Austronesian elites to legitimize rule through Islamic titles and genealogies. These "Shirazi" migrants introduced stone architecture, literacy, and intensified in slaves, rice, and spices, transforming decentralized chiefdoms into hierarchical sultanates integrated into broader networks. By the , sultanates had solidified on the major islands, maintaining through elective monarchies advised by councils, , and alliances, while engaging in inter-island rivalries over routes and resources. On (Ndzuani), the most prominent sultanate formed in the early under Hassani Chirazi El Madoua, who established a hereditary yet consultative governed by the Mandjelissa council of nobles. Successors like Mohammed ben Hassan and female rulers such as Djoumbé Halima I (r. 1598–1615) expanded influence, dominating regional trade and occasionally extending over neighboring islands like . Dynastic shifts, including the rise of the El Masela (1645) and Aboubakar (1693) lines, reflected internal power struggles but preserved independence, with sultans like Abdallah I (r. 1792–1803) relocating the capital to to bolster defenses against external threats. Grande Comore (Ngazidja) developed a fragmented landscape of up to 11 rival sultanates by the 17th century, originating from 15th–16th-century states like Itsandra and Bambao, where local clans such as the Hinya Fwambaya allied with incoming Muslim elites. These entities, often led by elective sultans like Queen Wabedja (r. 1700–1743) and Sultan Ahmed (r. 1813–1875), operated autonomously amid chronic warfare, relying on matrilineal kinship and clan councils to distribute power and resources from volcanic highlands to coastal ports. (Mwali) and (Mahoré) hosted smaller sultanates, with maintaining a distinct Islamic until French annexation in 1909, though less documented in primary records. These sultanates preserved autonomy through naval prowess, diplomacy with Arab and traders, and resistance to larger powers like the , fostering a cosmopolitan Swahili-Islamic culture until European encroachments in the eroded their independence via unequal treaties and military interventions. Inter-sultanate conflicts over slaves and commerce persisted, but the polities demonstrated resilience, with sultans like Salim II (r. 1840–1855) rejecting overtures until overwhelming French naval superiority prevailed.

European Contact and French Colonial Rule

Portuguese Exploration and Early European Visits

The conducted the initial European explorations of the Comoros archipelago in the early , with the first recorded landing occurring on Ngazidja () around 1505 during voyages aimed at establishing maritime routes to and . These expeditions sought reliable provisioning points amid the challenges of long sea voyages, utilizing the islands for fresh water, food, and repairs en route to Portuguese holdings like the fort at . The archipelago's position in the made it strategically useful, though Portuguese interactions remained transient, involving trade with local sultanates rather than territorial claims. By 1527, the Comoros appeared on European cartography, featured in the of Portuguese navigator Diogo Ribeiro, reflecting accumulated knowledge from these early probes. Dutch observers in the mid-16th century documented the islands' sultanates as prosperous trading hubs, noting their role in regional commerce with Arab and networks, which influenced European perceptions of the archipelago's economic potential. Subsequent visits by British and Dutch vessels from the late 16th into the reinforced the as a resupply depot for trade routes, with Ndzwani () emerging as a key anchorage. These encounters, however, yielded no sustained European presence, as rivalries among seafaring powers and local resistance deterred settlement; European ships primarily bartered for provisions while navigating the islands' fragmented polities and occasional hostilities. Interactions often highlighted the archipelago's cosmopolitan character, blending Bantu, , and Malagasy elements, but lacked the coercive that later defined colonial expansion.

Establishment of French Protectorate

France first asserted colonial authority in the Comoros archipelago by acquiring in 1841, when the island's Sakalava ruler, facing threats of conquest from sultans on the other Comorian islands and from , ceded sovereignty to via treaty. This move positioned as a strategic for French operations in the , amid broader imperial expansion from and . The establishment of the protectorate over the remaining islands—Grande Comore (Ngazidja), (Nzwani), and (Mwali)—occurred in 1886, driven by local rulers' appeals for French intervention amid chronic inter-sultanate rivalries, succession disputes, and declining trade revenues that weakened independent governance. On April 21, 1886, the of signed a accepting French in exchange for against internal threats, granting control over foreign relations and defense while nominally preserving the sultan's internal authority. followed suit on April 26, with its ruler placing the island under French oversight to stabilize rule amid familial conflicts. 's protectorate was formalized on June 24, 1886, after Said Ali bin Said Omar, leveraging French support to consolidate power over fragmented clans, declared a unified "state of Ngazidja" and submitted to status. These treaties marked a pivotal shift from to dependency, as French residents were installed on each island to enforce compliance, collect , and suppress resistance, often through that exploited the sultanates' disunity. By 1908, the islands were administratively unified under a single linked to , transitioning the protectorate toward direct colonial rule formalized in 1912. Local economies, previously sustained by Swahili-Arab trade networks, faced disruption as French priorities emphasized and strategic ports over indigenous commerce.

Colonial Administration and Economic Exploitation

France established protectorates over the Comorian islands of Grande Comore (Njazidja), Anjouan (Nzwani), and Mohéli (Mwali) through treaties signed in 1886, following its earlier acquisition of Mayotte in 1841. These agreements placed the islands under French influence while nominally preserving local sultanates, with French residents appointed to oversee administration and enforce compliance. By 1908, the Comoros were unified under a single administration subordinated to the French Governor-General of Madagascar, and in 1912, the last sultan abdicated, marking full annexation and the establishment of direct colonial rule with Dzaoudzi on Mayotte as the capital. The administrative structure remained highly centralized, with limited local input until the islands gained overseas territory status in 1946, allowing a territorial assembly but retaining ultimate authority in Paris. Economic policy under French rule prioritized export-oriented , as French companies and elites developed coastal plantations focused on cash crops such as , ylang-ylang, cloves, cocoa, , sugar cane, and . crop cultivation was systematically neglected, fostering dependency on imports and exacerbating food insecurity, while the majority of export revenues were repatriated to France with minimal reinvestment in infrastructure or public services. Plantations dominated the , engaging a significant portion of the population in production for European markets, though profits disproportionately benefited colonial interests rather than Comorian communities. Labor practices reflected exploitative patterns, transitioning from pre-colonial —abolished under French rule—to indentured systems that replicated coercive conditions under new nomenclature, with residents enlisting workers for duties often through or administrative pressure. These arrangements maintained social hierarchies and economic disparities, as coastal elites allied with French operators controlled land and output, while inland populations faced marginalization and prompted migration to for opportunities. Overall, the colonial economy yielded limited development, prioritizing resource extraction over sustainable growth, which contributed to persistent poverty and underinvestment persisting beyond the protectorate era.

Decolonization and Independence

Rise of Nationalist Movements

Following , the Comoros were designated a French overseas territory in 1947, granting limited representation in the French National Assembly but maintaining tight colonial control over internal affairs. Initial political formations emerged in the 1950s, including the conservative Parti Vert (), led by Said Mohamed Cheikh, which advocated gradual reforms while remaining pro-French, and the more progressive Parti Blanc, under Prince Said Ibrahim, emphasizing land redistribution and social changes. These parties participated in local governance but initially prioritized autonomy over full independence, reflecting the archipelago's economic dependence on French subsidies and administration. Nationalist sentiment intensified in the early amid the broader wave of African decolonization, with internal autonomy granted by in 1961 following Madagascar's independence. Comorians in founded the Mouvement de Libération Nationale des Comores (MOLINACO) in 1962, an independence-oriented group that mobilized diaspora support and drew inspiration from regional successes like Tanzania's 1961 sovereignty and Zanzibar's 1963 liberation. By the late , momentum built within the islands, spurred by French administrative neglect and events such as the violent suppression of a 1968 student demonstration; the socialist-leaning Parti Socialiste des Comores (Pasoco), formed that year, gained traction among youth advocating radical change. The death of Said Mohamed Cheikh, president of the Governing Council and Parti Vert leader, in 1970 marked a turning point, radicalizing moderates as his successors, including , increasingly viewed independence as inevitable amid stalled reforms. A of conservative and moderate parties formed the Party for the Evolution of the Comoros (PEC) around 1972, shifting focus to sovereignty demands. Negotiations with culminated in the "Common Declaration" of June 15, 1973, setting a path toward self-rule, followed by a December 22, 1974, referendum where 95% of voters across , , and Mohéli endorsed independence, though overwhelmingly rejected it. This paved the way for unilateral declaration on July 6, 1975, driven by unified nationalist pressure despite French hesitance and internal divisions.

Negotiations with France and 1975 Independence

In June 1973, the government of the and signed an agreement outlining the archipelago's accession to independence, scheduled for , as part of 's broader efforts in its overseas territories. This pact followed years of increasing autonomy granted to the since 1961, when internal was established under a territorial assembly, amid growing nationalist sentiments influenced by pan-African movements and the Organization of African Unity's push against colonial rule. A on held on December 22, 1974, saw 94.57% of voters across the archipelago approve separation from , reflecting strong support on , , and Mohéli, though turnout and results in indicated significant opposition, with approximately 63.8% voting against. Despite the 1973 timeline for a negotiated transition, Comorian leaders, facing pressure from African states and interpreting the as a mandate, accelerated the process; the Chamber of Deputies, boycotted by Mayotte representatives, voted unanimously 33-0 on July 6, 1975, to declare unilateral for all four islands, including . Ahmed Abdallah, then president of the Comorian government council and a former member of the Senate, proclaimed the and assumed the presidency of the new Federal Islamic Republic of the . initially rejected the declaration's applicability to , citing its distinct preferences, and retained administrative control there; a subsequent in Mayotte on February 8, 1976, resulted in 99.4% voting to remain part of . The , on November 12, 1975, admitted to membership and affirmed its sovereignty over the entire archipelago, including , though continued to administer the island separately, leading to ongoing disputes. This unilateral move effectively ended French colonial rule over the majority of the islands after 134 years, but sowed seeds for territorial contention.

Immediate Post-Independence Challenges and Mayotte Dispute

Upon declaring from on July 6, 1975, the Islands—comprising , , and Mohéli—immediately confronted the territorial schism over , the southeasternmost island. In the preceding held on December 22, 1974, voters across the archipelago approved separation from by 94.6 percent overall, but results varied sharply by island: the three northern islands recorded overwhelming majorities exceeding 99 percent in favor, while delivered 63.8 percent against independence, opting instead to retain French administration. The Comorian parliament's unilateral independence resolution encompassed all four islands, with Mayotte's deputies abstaining, yet refused to relinquish control, citing the island's distinct vote and dispatching the Foreign Legion to secure it. This separation deprived the nascent state of Mayotte's relatively developed infrastructure and agricultural output, exacerbating economic vulnerabilities and fueling irredentist claims that persist without resolution, as Comoros views the island as integral to its sovereignty per geographic and historical unity, though Mayotte's populace has repeatedly affirmed French affiliation in later plebiscites. Economically, the transition proved catastrophic due to the abrupt severance of French budgetary support and technical assistance, which had constituted the bulk of the territory's operating funds under colonial rule. With per capita income below $100 annually—one of the world's lowest—the islands depended heavily on imported essentials like rice, flour, sugar, and petroleum, yet post-independence stockpiles dwindled rapidly: by late 1975, rice reserves stood at just 675 tons (much of it seized amid local unrest), flour and sugar supplies were exhausted, and fuel owed suppliers over $2 million, risking blackouts and transport paralysis within months. France's withdrawal of over 500 administrators and technicians crippled key sectors including civil aviation, telecommunications, public health, education, finance, and justice systems, prompting a United Nations assessment mission to warn of imminent state failure absent emergency international aid. Lacking domestic revenue mechanisms or export capacity to offset the void, the government faced insolvency, with famine threats looming from disrupted food imports and agricultural stagnation, underscoring the causal fragility of a subsidy-dependent micro-economy thrust into self-reliance without transitional safeguards. Politically, instability materialized within weeks, as ideological fractures and power vacuums triggered the first of recurrent coups. , elected president in a transitional vote on June 23, 1975, prioritized moderate ties with , but on August 3, 1975—barely a month into his tenure—a bloodless uprising by youthful officers and a coalition of six opposition parties ousted him, installing radical socialist as head of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Abdallah's arrest and the new regime's anti-French rhetoric prompted to accelerate its disengagement, intensifying administrative chaos, while Soilih's efforts to nationalize land and import mercenaries for a "people's army" sown internal divisions without stabilizing governance. This early upheaval, rooted in elite rivalries and unresolved sultanate-era factionalism, set a pattern of mercenary-influenced interventions that undermined institutional development and investor confidence from inception.

Early Post-Independence Regimes and Coups

Ahmed Abdallah's Rule and Mercenary Involvement

Ahmed Abdallah returned to power on May 13, 1978, following a coup d'état orchestrated by French mercenary leader Robert (Bob) Denard and a group of approximately 50 European mercenaries who invaded Grande Comore from a base in the Seychelles. Initially sharing the presidency with Prime Minister Abdallah Mohamed, Abdallah assumed sole executive authority by late May, proclaiming the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros on May 24. A new constitution, emphasizing Islamic principles and federalism while centralizing power, was approved by 99% of voters in a referendum on October 1, 1978, after which Abdallah was elected president for a six-year term. Denard, rewarded for his role in the coup, was appointed commander of the Presidential Guard (Garde Présidentielle, GP), a force that grew to 300–700 personnel, including about 30 French and Belgian officers among a core of European . The GP served as Abdallah's primary instrument of control, securing the regime against internal threats while engaging in direct repression of dissent, such as beating demonstrators in 1983 and arresting around 400 monitors during the 1987 legislative polls. Funded in part by annual South African subsidies of approximately , the guard also facilitated foreign investments and business ventures owned by Denard, including logging and fishing operations, which intertwined mercenary operations with economic networks. This reliance on foreign mercenaries, often with tacit French and South African backing, enabled Abdallah to maintain stability amid ethnic and island-based rivalries but drew international criticism, including temporary revocation of Comoros's Organization of African Unity membership and sanctions. Abdallah's governance consolidated authoritarian rule through the and institutionalization of a one-party system. In 1979, he banned all for 12 years; by 1982, the Comorian Union for Progress (Union Comorienne pour le Progrès) was enshrined as the sole legal party. Running unopposed, Abdallah secured reelection in 1984 with over 99% of the vote. The regime targeted remnants of the prior Soilih government, arresting over 300 individuals in 1979, with four ministers disappearing and others imprisoned or executed; further crackdowns included the 1985 conviction of 77 opponents (17 receiving life sentences) and GP-orchestrated leading to at least seven deaths in 1987. These measures, enforced via the mercenary-led guard, prioritized regime survival over broader governance reforms. Economically, Abdallah's administration depended heavily on foreign aid, which by 1988 covered about 80% of public expenditures, sourced from , the European Community, Arab states, and others to support like roads and ports as well as an oversized . Export revenues from cash crops—primarily , ylang-ylang essence, cloves, and —remained volatile, often offset by imports consuming up to 50% of earnings, while limited diversification and patronage-driven policies exacerbated stagnation and inequality. The regime survived at least three coup attempts between 1978 and 1989, bolstered by the GP's vigilance, though growing tensions over Denard's influence foreshadowed instability.

Assassination of Abdallah and Transitional Instability

On the night of November 26–27, 1989, President was assassinated in his office at the presidential palace in , during an armed confrontation involving elements of his presidential guard and French mercenary forces led by . The killing occurred amid tensions between Abdallah's regime and the mercenaries, whom he had increasingly sought to distance himself from after their role in restoring him to power in ; Denard, who commanded a 300-member guard force, was present during the incident, which French prosecutors later alleged was ordered by him as part of a staged attack, though he was acquitted in a 1999 trial. Initial reports from Denard's group claimed the death resulted from an accidental shooting by a Comorian sergeant named Jaffar, but subsequent investigations pointed to deliberate action by disgruntled guard members, marking the fourth coup attempt against Abdallah since and ending his 11-year autocratic rule. In the immediate aftermath, Denard and his mercenaries seized temporary control of the government, exacerbating instability as the regular Comorian army clashed with the presidential guard, resulting in firefights and the deaths of several soldiers. Said Mohamed Djohar, the head of the , assumed the role of in accordance with constitutional provisions for succession in the event of a vacancy, enabling him to negotiate the mercenaries' withdrawal with French diplomatic support. By early December 1989, Denard departed the islands, allowing Djohar to stabilize the transitional administration amid limited political reconciliation efforts that included opposition figures previously banned under Abdallah. The transitional period from late 1989 to early 1990 featured ongoing instability, including suppressed demonstrations on December 7, 1989, ordered by Djohar, and the formation of a provisional in late December that incorporated exiled opposition elements to prepare for multiparty elections. These elections, the first free presidential vote since in 1975, occurred on January 11 and February 18, 1990, with Djohar securing victory in the runoff against opposition candidate Mohamed Said Fazul, assuming office on for a six-year term. Despite this shift toward , the era underscored persistent influence and elite power struggles, with Denard's highlighting challenges in prosecuting foreign actors in Comorian affairs.

Said Mohamed Djohar's Presidency and 1989-1996 Coups

Said Mohamed Djohar, previously the president of the Comoros Supreme Court, assumed acting following the of President on November 26, 1989, during an attack on the by mutinous soldiers. Djohar ordered the suppression of subsequent demonstrations on December 7, 1989, amid political uncertainty. Multiparty presidential elections, the first since in 1975, were held on , 1990, with a runoff on March 11; Djohar secured victory in the second round with 55 percent of the vote against runner-up Mohamed Said. He was sworn in for a six-year term on March 20, 1990, marking a nominal shift toward multiparty , though his administration faced persistent instability, allegations—including against his son-in-law, the finance minister—and economic decline, with GDP per capita remaining around $700 amid broader underdevelopment. Djohar's rule was repeatedly threatened by coup attempts. On September 26, 1992, while Djohar was visiting Paris, rebels—possibly linked to European mercenaries controlling the presidential guard—launched an unsuccessful bid to seize power, which was quashed without significant bloodshed. The most prominent challenge came on September 28, 1995, when French mercenary Bob Denard, who had previously backed earlier Comorian regimes, led approximately 30 foreign mercenaries in an assault on the presidential palace in Moroni, capturing Djohar and declaring control over the capital. The coup leaders initially claimed victory, but France initially declined a request from Djohar's government for military intervention. French forces ultimately intervened on October 5-6, 1995, prompting Denard's surrender and the release of Djohar after negotiations. Although Djohar briefly resumed ceremonial duties in January 1996 under an Organization of African Unity-brokered agreement, the events led to his effective ouster, paving the way for fresh elections in March 1996 won by Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim. The 1995 coup highlighted ongoing reliance on foreign mercenaries in Comorian and French influence in stabilizing the islands.

Separatist Crises and Federal Reforms

1997 Secessions of Anjouan and Mohéli

In the mid-1990s, the Comoros faced severe economic stagnation, with GDP per capita declining amid hyperinflation exceeding 50% annually by 1996, widespread corruption, and ineffective central governance dominated by Grande Comore elites. Resentment grew on the smaller islands of Anjouan and Mohéli over unequal resource distribution, as federal subsidies favored the capital while peripheral islands suffered unemployment rates above 40% and crumbling infrastructure. These grievances, compounded by President Mohamed Taki Abdoul-Karim's authoritarian tendencies and failure to implement promised reforms, fueled separatist sentiments that viewed secession as a path to reintegration with France for economic stability. Tensions escalated on July 6, 1997, during ' independence anniversary celebrations, when spontaneous protests erupted in against federal mismanagement, drawing thousands and paralyzing the island's main town of . By late July, local leaders formed provisional committees demanding autonomy or , citing chronic neglect and invoking the islands' prior French colonial status as a model for prosperity absent under Comorian unity. On August 3, 1997, 's separatists, led by 75-year-old Koranic teacher Abdallah Ibrahim as provisional president, formally declared from the Union, rejecting federal authority and petitioning for status. Mohéli followed suit on August 11, 1997, with its assembly proclaiming secession under leaders including Said Mohamed Soefu, emphasizing similar economic grievances and a desire for self-determination or French oversight. The declarations triggered immediate federal backlash; in September 1997, Comorian troops from Grande Comore attempted to retake Anjouan but were repelled by local militias barricading roads and ports, resulting in skirmishes that killed at least 20 and displaced hundreds. Anjouan solidified its stance with an October 26, 1997, referendum where over 99% endorsed independence, though turnout and methodology drew skepticism from Moroni due to lack of international oversight. Mohéli's movement remained less militarized, focusing on negotiations for greater autonomy rather than full rupture, reflecting its smaller population of around 20,000 and strategic caution. These secessions fragmented the archipelago, exacerbating fiscal collapse as Anjouan withheld tax revenues estimated at 30% of the national budget, while smuggling and informal trade boomed on both islands. France, wary of precedent for Mayotte, provided limited humanitarian aid but rejected reintegration, urging dialogue amid Organization of African Unity concerns over territorial integrity.

International Mediation and 2001 Constitution

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), committed to the principle of , responded to the 1997 secessions of and Mohéli by appointing a special envoy and mediators to facilitate dialogue between the federal government in and the island authorities. Initial efforts included separate meetings with secessionist leaders and federal representatives in late 1997, though negotiations stalled amid demands from and Mohéli for reintegration with , which the OAU rejected as incompatible with African unity norms. The OAU's neutrality faced criticism from both sides, but its involvement persisted, later supported by regional facilitation from figures like in 1999. The April 1999 coup by Colonel shifted momentum toward reconciliation, as the new regime prioritized ending the fragmentation through OAU-backed talks rather than military confrontation. This led to the Fomboni process on Mohéli island, culminating in the Joint Declaration of Fomboni on August 26, 2000, where parties committed to forming a "New Comorian Union" as the sole international legal entity, with granting islands control over local administration, resources, and economies while preserving national borders. The process advanced with the General Agreement on National Reconciliation signed on February 17, 2001, in Fomboni by representatives of the federal government, , and Mohéli, endorsing equitable resource sharing, democratic governance, protections, and a transitional framework for constitutional reform by January 2002. The agreement paved the way for drafting the Constitution of the Union of the Comoros, which formalized a federal structure emphasizing island autonomy under a central union government. Key provisions included , a rotating presidency among the three islands every four years (with the federal president elected from the non-presiding island), island-specific presidents handling internal affairs, and as the , reflecting the archipelago's demographic reality of over 98% Muslim population. The draft was approved in a national on December 23, 2001, marking the formal reintegration of and and ending the separatist crisis phase that had persisted since August 1997. This constitutional settlement addressed root causes of secession—such as economic disparities and centralized mismanagement—by devolving powers, though implementation challenges persisted due to weak institutions and external influences like French policies on .

2007-2008 Anjouan Rebellion and AU Intervention

In 2007, , the self-proclaimed president of island, defied the Comorian federal constitution by refusing to relinquish power following the expiration of his term. Elected in 2002 under the 2001 federal framework that mandated five-year terms for island presidents, Bacar postponed local elections and organized a disputed vote on June 15 and 29, 2007, claiming victory with 90% of the vote amid widespread allegations of fraud and intimidation. The federal government in Moroni, led by Union President , rejected the results, declaring Bacar illegitimate and imposing sanctions, which escalated tensions as Anjouan forces fortified the island and Bacar appealed for external support. The (AU), responding to appeals from the Comorian government, initially enforced and a naval against starting in late 2007 to compel Bacar's departure, but these measures proved ineffective against his entrenched control. In January 2008, the AU authorized military intervention, deploying a under the framework, including approximately 1,500 troops from , , , and , alongside 400 Comorian soldiers. Preparations intensified in March, with Sudanese commander Yahya Abdallah coordinating amphibious landings, while Bacar's militia, numbering around 200-300 fighters, prepared defenses in the capital . On March 25, 2008, Operation Democracy—named by the —launched with an amphibious assault on Anjouan's coast, involving naval support from and rapid advances by ground forces toward key sites including and . By March 26, coalition troops had secured and most of the island with minimal resistance, reporting fewer than 10 casualties on both sides; Bacar evaded capture by fleeing by speedboat to the nearby French-administered island of . Federal authorities reinstalled an interim administration, paving the way for new island elections in June 2008, won by Mohamed Djaanfari under AU oversight. The intervention marked the AU's first successful military enforcement of constitutional order in Comoros, reinforcing federal unity but highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities to island-level power grabs rooted in economic disparities and historical . Bacar, arrested briefly in by French authorities before release, sought asylum in and later , evading Comorian requests on charges of and . The operation's low cost—estimated under $10 million, funded partly by AU members—and swift resolution contrasted with prior failed diplomatic efforts, underscoring the causal role of credible military deterrence in resolving such intra-state defiance.

Consolidation under Azali Assoumani

Interim Leadership and 2002-2006 Presidency

On April 30, 1999, Colonel Azali Assoumani, chief of staff of the Comorian armed forces, led a bloodless coup d'état that ousted interim President Tadjidine Ben Said Massounde, who had assumed power following the 1996 island coups and failed to quell the separatist movements in Anjouan and Mohéli. Assoumani justified the takeover as necessary to restore national unity and security amid economic collapse and island rebellions, establishing himself as President of the Council of State and head of a transitional government. In May 1999, he issued a decree granting himself sweeping executive and legislative authority while appointing a 13-member transitional council to advise on reunification efforts, though real power remained centralized under military control. Assoumani's interim leadership from 1999 to 2002 emphasized military stabilization and diplomatic engagement to reverse the 1997 secessions, including limited use of force against separatists in 2000 followed by negotiations facilitated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). These initiatives led to the 2000 Fomboni Declaration, where island leaders agreed to a federal framework, paving the way for the December 2001 constitutional referendum that created the Union of the Comoros with semi-autonomous islands rotating the presidency. Economic conditions deteriorated further, with GDP contracting and reliance on French aid increasing, but Assoumani maintained international non-recognition of the secessions and secured OAU/ support for his regime as a stabilizing force. On January 21, 2002, he resigned from the to contest the presidency under the new constitution, transitioning from military rule to electoral legitimacy. In the April 14, 2002, —the first under the federal system—Assoumani, representing (the rotating island for the Union presidency), secured 74.4% of the vote in the first round, amid a by major opposition figures who contested the process's fairness and the military's lingering influence. An independent electoral commission confirmed his victory on May 9, 2002, with turnout at approximately 61%, marking his formal as Union President despite criticisms of inadequate political pluralism. During his 2002–2006 presidency, Assoumani prioritized implementing the federal structure, overseeing island-level elections that installed presidents such as Abdou Soule Elbak for Mohéli and for in 2002, though tensions persisted over fiscal autonomy and revenue sharing from Grande Comore's dominance. The administration pursued modest economic stabilization through under the Initiative in 2004 and increased foreign aid, but growth remained stagnant at around 2% annually, hampered by allegations, exceeding 20%, and dependence on remittances and exports. focused on integration, with readmitted as a full member in 2003 after arrears clearance, and Assoumani chaired the from 2002 to 2004 to bolster regional ties. concerns included restrictions on press freedom and opposition activities, as documented in U.S. State Department reports, though no major coups occurred. Assoumani declined to seek re-election in , adhering to constitutional rotation, which enabled Mohamed Sambi's victory in a multiparty vote on May 16, —Comoros' first peaceful since in 1975. This handover underscored a period of relative consolidation, reducing immediate risks but leaving unresolved issues like inter-island disparities and governance inefficiencies that would resurface in later crises.

Return to Power in 2016 and 2018 Referendum

In the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, the Union of the Comoros operated under the 2001 constitution's rotational presidency system, which mandated that the presidency alternate among the three autonomous islands—Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli—every five years to address historical separatist tensions. With 2016 designated as Grande Comore's turn and Azali Assoumani, a former military leader from the island who had previously served as president from 2002 to 2006, positioning himself as a candidate under the Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores (CRC), the election proceeded in multiple stages. Island-level primaries occurred on February 21, 2016, followed by a national first round on April 10, 2016, where no candidate secured an absolute majority, leading to a second round on May 15, 2016, between Assoumani and Mohamed Ali Said, the candidate of the Juwa Party. Assoumani garnered approximately 43% in the first round, advancing to the runoff. The validated the results on May 16, 2016, declaring Assoumani the winner with an absolute majority in the second round, securing a five-year term starting upon his inauguration. He was sworn in on May 26, 2016, marking his return to power after a decade out of office, during which he had maintained influence through military and political networks. While the election saw participation from multiple candidates and was observed internationally without major fraud allegations at the time, opposition figures expressed concerns over the influence of Assoumani's incumbency advantages from his prior rule and the military's role in stabilizing the islands post-separatist crises. Assoumani's platform emphasized economic stabilization, development, and anti-corruption measures, building on his earlier tenure's efforts to consolidate federal authority. Facing term limits under the rotational system that would preclude his re-election in 2021 (as Anjouan's turn), Assoumani initiated constitutional reforms in 2018 to centralize power and enable consecutive terms. A national referendum was held on July 30, 2018, proposing a new constitution that abolished the island rotation for the presidency, allowed two non-consecutive five-year terms from any island, reduced the autonomous islands' governors' powers, and shifted to a unicameral parliament. Official results reported 92.74% approval on a 63% turnout, with Assoumani hailing it as a mandate for "national reconciliation" and institutional strengthening. The opposition, including the Juwa Party and other coalitions, boycotted the vote, labeling it unconstitutional and accusing the government of suspending the Constitutional Court, manipulating voter lists, and using state resources to coerce participation; they dismissed the outcome as illegitimate and called for its annulment. The referendum's passage enabled Assoumani's continued dominance, as the new framework permitted his candidacy in subsequent elections without rotational constraints, though it exacerbated and drew criticism from international observers for lacking inclusive dialogue. Implementation proceeded with the adoption of the 2018 constitution, which formalized a more structure while retaining federal elements, amid reports of heightened security measures to suppress dissent. This shift prioritized executive authority over the previous power-sharing model, reflecting Assoumani's strategy to mitigate island rivalries through centralization, though opponents argued it risked authoritarian consolidation given the historically fragile democratic institutions.

Elections, Dynastic Concerns, and Developments to 2025

In the 2019 presidential election held on , was declared the winner by the National Electoral Commission with approximately 60% of the vote in a single round, enabling his continued rule despite opposition claims of and irregularities that led to protests and legal challenges. The opposition, including figures like Mohamed Ali Said, rejected the results, citing delayed vote counts and bans on public gatherings, which heightened tensions but did not alter the outcome. Parliamentary elections in January 2020 saw Assoumani's Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC) secure a strong majority, consolidating legislative control amid criticisms of uneven playing fields for opposition parties. The 2024 on January 14 resulted in Assoumani's re-election with 62.97% of the vote against challengers like Sambi's proxy, though turnout was critically low at around 15-20%, prompting opposition boycotts and accusations of electoral manipulation including late voter list publications and ballot shortages. Post-election protests erupted, resulting in one death and over 25 injuries, with a night imposed and opposition leaders decrying the process as non-transparent. Assoumani was sworn in for his fourth term on May 26, 2024, pledging economic growth and stability, while the U.S. Embassy expressed concerns over the electoral commission's handling of results. Dynastic concerns intensified in 2024 when Assoumani appointed his son, Nour El Fath Assoumani, to coordinate government affairs with authority to intervene in decision-making across ministries, a move critics interpreted as grooming for succession and eroding institutional checks. In January 2025, Assoumani publicly stated that a "" would replace him, fueling opposition fears of a hereditary power transfer akin to , though he later clarified media reports as erroneous misinterpretations. Such appointments, alongside Assoumani's circumvention of prior term limits via the 2018 referendum, have raised alarms about authoritarian entrenchment, with analysts noting risks to ' fragile federal balance. Parliamentary elections on January 12, 2025, further entrenched CRC dominance, winning 28 of 33 seats with 66.3% turnout, as opposition parties boycotted or rejected results citing repression and lack of competitiveness. Political developments through 2025 have featured ongoing instability, including crackdowns on dissent and weakened opposition, contrasting with official narratives of progress; reports highlight reasonably conducted polls marred by executive overreach and historical coup-prone volatility. Economically, Assoumani's administration has prioritized growth pledges amid persistent challenges like and remittances dependence, though verifiable gains remain limited by issues.

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  62. http://www.hubert-herald.nl/Comores.htm
  63. https://mwaliregestrar.com/history_of_mwali.html
  64. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/countries/comoros
  65. https://www.expatica.com/fr/uncategorized/comoros-a-long-history-of-coups-70493/
  66. https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/1998/en/95147
  67. https://bep.carterschool.gmu.edu/ending-the-armed-conflict-in-comoros/
  68. https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-AU-and-the-search-for-Peace-and-Reconciliation-in-Burundi-and-Comoros-FINAL-September-2011.pdf
  69. https://mg.co.za/article/1997-12-12-oau-mediates-comoros-stand-off/
  70. https://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Prevention-of-Secessionist-Movements-in-a-Micro-State-Essay-5-MASTER-Copy-SP-2.pdf
  71. https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8316.htm
  72. https://ucdpged.uu.se/peaceagreements/fulltext/com20000826.pdf
  73. https://www.peaceagreements.org/agreements/619/
  74. https://ucdpged.uu.se/peaceagreements/fulltext/com20010217.pdf
  75. https://www.peaceagreements.org/agreements/wgg/1334/
  76. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2009?lang=en
  77. https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/73/
  78. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/78239/comoros-rebel-leader-limbo
  79. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-10-11-voa1-66520342/553514.html
  80. https://reliefweb.int/report/comoros/comoros-union-government-takes-control-rebel-island
  81. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39226-doc-176._the_african_union_operations_in_comoros-maes_and_operations_democracy.pdf
  82. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/3/22/comoros-prepares-anjouan-invasion
  83. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pscsituations.pdf
  84. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/26/1
  85. https://www.france24.com/en/20080325-comoros-takes-control-anjouan-comoros-france-24-exclusive
  86. https://www.modernghana.com/news/922568/outgoing-comoros-leader-azali-looks-set-to-win-new-term.html
  87. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/comoros/34893.htm
  88. https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/azali-assoumani-1959/
  89. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/31853/comoros-assoumani-claims-victory-comorian-presidential-election
  90. http://www.comorosasean.com/the-president.html
  91. https://africa.com/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-comoros/
  92. https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20240116-azali-assoumani-the-comoros-putschist-turned-president
  93. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/comoros
  94. https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2891/
  95. https://www.africanews.com/2016/05/16/assoumani-officially-declared-president-elect-of-comoros//
  96. https://fp.brecorder.com/2016/05/2016051646511/
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  98. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Comoros-2018.pdf
  99. https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-the-comoros/
  100. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/31/controversial-vote-on-presidential-powers-passes-in-comoros
  101. http://constitutionnet.org/news/why-comoros-constitutional-referendum-could-herald-new-era-instability
  102. https://www.dw.com/en/yes-vote-in-comoros-referendum-gives-president-more-power/a-44914328
  103. https://hrf.org/latest/comoros-leader-says-wins-vote-to-extend-presidential-term-limits/
  104. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/comoros-election-exercise-promises-more-of-the-same/
  105. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/comoros-president-named-winner-in-election-rejected-by-opposition-idUSKCN1R72F9/
  106. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/24/comoros-islanders-head-to-the-polls-in-presidential-election
  107. https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/commodities/comoros-presidential-results-delayed-government-bans-public-gatherings-idUSL8N21D4MY/
  108. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/comoros/february-2025
  109. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68002934
  110. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/comoros/january-2024
  111. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/night-curfew-imposed-comoros-after-presidents-re-election-sparks-protests-2024-01-18/
  112. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/comoros-president-sworn-fourth-term-after-disputed-poll-2024-05-26/
  113. https://km.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-statement-on-comoros-election-results/
  114. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/comoros-president-assoumani-gives-son-government-job-2024-07-02/
  115. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/comoros-president-says-child-will-replace-him-opponents-see-succession-plan-2025-01-30/
  116. https://allafrica.com/stories/202501290020.html
  117. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/comoros-ruling-party-wins-parliamentary-elections-opposition-rejects-results-2025-01-15/
  118. https://freedomhouse.org/country/comoros/freedom-world/2025
  119. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/comoros/overview
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