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MONUSCO
MONUSCO
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Key Information

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO (an acronym based on its French name Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo), is a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[2] A planned withdrawal from the country is currently on indefinite hold due to advances by the armed group M23 in the North and South Kivu provinces.[3][4]

MONUSCO was established by the United Nations Security Council in resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) to monitor the peace process of the Second Congo War, though much of its focus subsequently turned to the Ituri conflict, the Kivu conflict and the Dongo conflict.[5] The mission was known as the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo or MONUC, an acronym of its French name Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo, until 2010.

The following nations (in alphabetical order) have contributed with military personnel: Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

In addition, the following nations have contributed with police personnel: Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.[2]

The initial UN presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, before the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1291, was a force of military observers to observe and report on the compliance on factions with the peace accords, a deployment authorised by the earlier UNSCR 1258 (1999).[6] UNSCR 2556 (2020) provides the authority for the current MONUSCO mandate.[7][8]

About US$8.74 billion was spent to fund the MONUC peacekeeping effort during 1999 to 2010.[9] As of October 2017, the total strength of UN peacekeeping troops in DRC is approximately 18,300.[7] More than thirty nations have contributed military and police personnel for peacekeeping effort,[9] with India being the single largest contributor.[10]

History

[edit]

1990s

[edit]

The origin of this second United Nations military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is found in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 17 July 1999 and the following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1258 of 6 August 1999, authorizing the deployment of a maximum of 90 officers.

The first liaison officers arrived in the DRC on 3 September 1999. In November 1999 the number of liaison officers totaled 55, distributed in the capitals of the warring countries (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia) including 24 who were stationed in Kinshasa. In January 2000 they reached the number of 79 and they were spread over the whole territory of DRC. Their mission was to liaise with all the warring factions, give technical assistance and prepare the deployment of military observers.

2000s

[edit]

2000

[edit]

On 24 February 2000 with the resolution 1291, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a maximum of 5,537 military personnel in the DRC, including 500 military observers. On 4 April 2000 the Senegalese Major General Mountaga Diallo was appointed as the commander of MONUSCO's military force. The mandate was to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the redeployment of belligerent forces, to develop an action plan for the overall implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, to work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military captives and the return of the remains, to facilitate humanitarian assistance and to assist the Facilitator of the National Dialogue.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council authorized MONUC to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

In December 2000 there were 224 military personnel deployed, including 148 observers in thirteen points around the country. The observers could only record the non-application of the Ceasefire, the violent fighting at Kisangani and in the Équateur and Katanga provinces as well as the presence of foreign troops in the DRC. The deployment of UN troops was impossible due to the security situation and the reluctance of the Congolese government.

2001

[edit]

Even though the beginning of 2001 was still hampered by sporadic combat, the military observers could fulfill their mission in regards with the disengagement of forces and the withdrawal of some of the Rwandan and Ugandan forces.

In March 2001, the first Uruguayan guard unit arrived in Kalemie. The force was deployed in four sectors at Kananga, Kisangani, Kalemie and Mbandaka. In July 2001, the force strength was of 2,366 soldiers, including 363 military observers distributed across 22 cities, and 28 teams monitoring the disengagement of forces. The contingent soldiers totaled 1,869. They came from South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Guard units protected MONUC installations in Kinshasa, Kananga, Kisangani, Kalemie, Goma, and Mbandaka. A Uruguayan riverine unit and a South African air medical evacuation team were also deployed. The deployed troops were only to protect the sites against looting and theft, the force had neither the mandate nor the strength to protect the civilian population, or even to extract MONUC personnel. Following UNSCR 1355, the military observers, within their capacities, could also contribute to the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process of the armed groups.

With Security Council Resolution 1376, the Security Council launched the third phase of the deployment of MONUC troops, in the eastern DRC. The site for the logistical base was planned to be Kindu, Maniema Province.

2002

[edit]

In 2002, the 450 military observers, split in 95 teams, continued to monitor the Ceasefire along the ex-frontlines. The teams also investigated violations of the Ceasefire. Foreign troops continued to leave the country. The riverine units escorted the first ships on the Congo River, which was again open to commercial traffic. In June 2002 the UN troops' total number was 3,804. Contingents from Ghana and Bolivia joined the force, of which more than a third of the soldiers were Uruguayan. More than one thousand soldiers were deployed in Kisangani. On 14 May 2002, a military observer died near Ikela following the explosion of a mine under his vehicle.

On 30 July 2002, the different parties signed the Pretoria agreement and the nature of the mission of the peacekeepers changed. The military observers monitored the withdrawal of 20,000 Rwandan soldiers, but they also noted the rise of ethnic violence in Ituri Province. At the end of 2002 there were a total of 4,200 UN soldiers in the DRC. Through UNSCR 1445, the Security Council authorized the increase of military personnel to 8,500. The principle of two independent intervention forces – civilian and military – was also approved. MONUC was tasked to support the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) process, without the use of force.

2003

[edit]

Numerous DDRRR operations in collaboration with the civilian component were conducted in the beginning of 2003. Before the start of the transition, UN soldiers were deployed along the front lines. A vast redeployment to the East started. The four coordination centres and 22 bases in the western part of the country were shut down. Over one hundred observers were redeployed and Uruguayan contingents arrived in Bukavu, South Kivu and Lubero, North Kivu. Observer teams monitored serious combat and human rights violations in Ituri. In April 2003, 800 Uruguayan soldiers were deployed in Bunia, Ituri Province under Resolution 1484. In the same month an observer died in a mine explosion. In May 2003 two military observers were savagely killed by a militia.

The withdrawal of 7,000 Ugandan troops in April 2003 led to a deteriorating security situation in the Ituri Province, endangering the peace process. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for establishing and deploying a temporary multi-national force to the area until the weakened MONUC mission could be reinforced. In his second special report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General proposed a reorientation of MONUC missions: to provide support to the transition and to maintain security in key areas of the country. Accordingly, he proposed the creation of a brigade in Ituri to support the peace process.

An IDP camp around a base in Kitshanga

On 30 May 2003, UNSCR 1493 authorized the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia with a task to secure the airport and protect both internally displaced persons in camps and the civilians in the town. UNSCR 1493 authorized an increase of military personnel to 10,800, imposed an arms embargo, and authorized MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri District and also in North and South Kivu, as it deemed the additional provinces to be within MONUC's capabilities,

The French Government had already shown interest in leading the operation. It soon broadened to a European Union (EU) -led mission with France as the framework nation providing the bulk of the personnel and complemented by contributions from both EU and non-EU nations. The total force consisted of about 1,800 personnel and was supported by French aircraft based at airfields in N'Djamena, Chad and Entebbe, Uganda. A small 80-man Swedish Special Forces (SSG) group was also added.

The operation called Operation Artemis was launched on 12 June and the IMEF completed its deployment in the following three weeks. The force was successful in stabilising the situation in Bunia and enforcing the UN presence in the DRC. In September 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed over to the MONUC mission.[11]

Growing military conflict in DRC caused the United Nations to seek additional military help from major powers. In July 2003, India announced that it would be sending an additional 300 personnel and combat aircraft from the Indian Air Force to strengthen the UN peacekeeping effort in DRC.[12]

In September 2003, the Ituri brigade was in place, including soldiers from Uruguay, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Morocco.

In November 2003, a total of 10,415 peacekeepers were in the DRC, comprising infantry units, engineer units, helicopter units, logistic units, medical units and riverine units.

2004

[edit]

Deploying the Ituri brigade and conducting cordon and search operations improved the security conditions in Ituri but, at the same time, the peacekeepers became the target of the militias. On 12 February 2004, a military observer was killed in Ituri.

With the arrival of the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which included members of rebel movements, more than 900 Tunisian and Ghanaian UN troops contributed to the security of Kinshasa.

It was decided that the troops present in the Kivus will be assembled under the unified command of a brigade. In March the Nigerian General Samaila Iliya took over the command of the force.

In June 2004, Bukavu, South Kivu was occupied by rebel general Laurent Nkunda. A military observer was killed. The 1,000 MONUC troops could only protect their own installations. Demonstrations were held all over the country and UN troops opened fire on looters in Kinshasa. MONUC soldiers were again targeted by Ituri militia at the end of 2004.

Though the Secretary General had asked for an increase of 13,100 soldiers, in October 2004 the Security Council by Resolution 1565, authorized a reinforcement of 5,900 military personnel and defined the mandate with the strategic military objectives of the MONUC force as:

  • proactively contributing to the pacification and general improvement of security in the country;
  • providing support for conflict resolution in politically volatile areas;
  • improving border security through regional confidence-building mechanisms, such as the Joint Verification Mechanism, and effective patrolling and monitoring of the arms embargo;
  • gathering and analysing military and other information on spoilers.

Following the UN resolution, the Indian Army announced that it would be sending an additional 850 troops and four combat helicopters to aid the MONUC peacekeeping effort.[13]

A scandal involving widespread sexual abuse by MONUC staff became public in May 2004.[14] The serious allegations included instances of rape and prostitution of minors in Bunia, Ituri.[15]

2005

[edit]

By 2005, the strength of UN peacekeeping forces in Congo reached more than 16,000 troops, split almost equally between the Western Brigade and the Eastern Division.

In February 2005, nine Bangladeshi UN troops were killed during an ambush in Ituri. The actions of the Ituri and Kivu Brigades became more robust and the pressure rose on all armed groups. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots, and other militia leaders were arrested by Congolese authorities and imprisoned in Makala, Kinshasa. Lubanga was accused of having ordered the killing of the peacekeepers in February 2005 and of orchestrating continuous insecurity in the area. On 10 February 2006, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Lubanga for the war crime of "conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities." The Congolese national authorities transferred Lubanga to ICC custody on 17 March 2006.[16]

On 1 March 2005, a vast cordon and search operation in Ituri was conducted by Nepalese, Pakistani and South African Infantry elements with the support of Indian attack helicopters, between 50 and 60 militiamen were killed.

Senegalese General Babacar Gaye was appointed force commander in March 2005 after Spanish General Vincente Diaz de Villegas resigned for personal reasons.

In May 2005, the UN Secretary General asked for a supplementary brigade for Katanga. Joint operations were conducted by the newly arrived integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). UN troops were tasked with the support of the electoral process, contributing protection and transport. In Ituri over 15000 militiamen were disarmed.

In October 2005, by Resolution 1635, the UN Security Council authorized a temporary increase of 300 military personnel to permit a deployment to Katanga.[17]

2006

[edit]
Czech soldier in MONUC, c. 2006

In late January, a group of 80 Guatemalan Special Forces from the Kaibiles were engaged in a four hour firefight with LRA rebels, ending with the deaths of eight Guatemalans and fifteen rebels. They are believed to have been conducting a raid on an LRA encampment to capture LRA Deputy Commander Vincent Otti. The incident caused a significant uproar from both the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan public, who demanded an official inquiry into the engagement.[18]

On 25 April 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671, authorising the temporary deployment of a European Union force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the general elections in the DR Congo, which began on 30 July 2006.

The European Council approved the launching of the EU military operation, EUFOR RD Congo, and appointed Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany) Operation Commander and Major General Christian Damay (France) EU Force Commander. The Operational Headquarters was the German-nominated Armed Forces Operational Command – Einsatzführungskommando – at Potsdam, Germany.[19] The mission was tasked with:

  • supporting and providing security to MONUC installations and personnel;
  • contributing to airport protection in Kinshasa;
  • contributing to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
  • evacuation operations in case of emergency.

This mission came to an end on 30 November 2006.[20]

2007

[edit]

In May 2007, India announced that it would be sending an additional 70 Indian Air Force personnel to join the MONOU effort.[21]

2008

[edit]
Indian peacekeepers on duty, protecting aid workers. India was the single largest contributor of personnel.

In August 2008, an internal investigation led by the Indian Army and other MONOU officers revealed that about ten Indian peacekeepers may have been involved in abuse and exploitation in Congo.[22] Earlier in May 2008, the vice chief of the Indian Army visited Congo to look into these allegations and by August 2008, the Indian Army had launched an official probe to look into these allegations.[22]

On 26 October 2008 Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) forces of Laurent Nkunda seized a major military camp, along with Virunga National Park for use as a base to launch attacks. This occurred after a peace treaty failed, with the resultant fighting displacing thousands.[23] The park was taken due to its strategic location on a main road leading to the city of Goma.

On 27 October 2008 riots began around the United Nations compound in Goma, and civilians pelted the building with rocks and threw Molotov cocktails, claiming that the UN forces had done nothing to prevent the RCD advance.[24] The Congolese national army also retreated under pressure from the rebel army in a "major retreat".[24]

Meanwhile, United Nations gunships and armoured vehicles were used in an effort to halt the advance of the rebels, who claimed to be within 7 miles (11 km) of Goma.[25] Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for DRC Alan Doss explained the necessity of engaging the rebels, stating that "[the UN] can't allow population centres to be threatened ... [the UN] had to engage."[26]

Indian Army personnel were asked to deploy themselves from Goma to adjoining North Kivu province, after the Uruguayan battalion deployed in the region fled.[27] However, after that several Uruguayan battalions were playing a crucial role in the buffer zone between the retreating government soldiers and the advancing rebels.[28]

On 29 October 2008, a French request for an EU reinforcement of 1,500 troops was refused by several countries and appeared unlikely to materialize; however, the UN forces stated they would act to prevent takeovers of population centres.[29][30]

In November 2008, India announced that it would be sending the 3rd battalion of the 3rd Gorkha Rifles regiment to replace a Sikh Light Infantry battalion and join the peace-keeping effort in the Congo.[31] India made the decision to send its elite forces amidst rising concerns that Indian peace-keepers were getting caught in the cross-fire between DRC government troops and rebels.[31]

On 4 November 2008, a 200-fighter strong Mai Mai militia force launched a surprise attack on CNDP troops in Kiwanja, a CNDP-controlled town near Rutshuru, North Kivu. The Mai Mai were initially able to retake the town but a speedy counter-attack returned control to the CNDP less than 24-hours later. After the town was retaken, CNDP forces under the command of Bosco Ntaganda combed through Kiwanja, searching out boys and men – who they accused of collaborating with the Mai Mai – and executing them on the spot. Older members of the community, both men and women, were also murdered and a large number of women were raped and assaulted. By the end of 5 November, over 150 civilians had been killed in Kiwanja in what has since been dubbed the Kiwanja Massacre.[32]

A UN base was situated less than 1 mi (1.6 km) from Kiwanja and over 100 Indian peacekeepers were present at the time of the attacks but the forces lacked basic intelligence capabilities – no one in the base spoke the necessary languages, as their interpreter had been reassigned without replacement a week prior – and the peacekeepers later said they had no idea the massacre was taking place until it was over. Lt. Col. H. S. Brar, commander of the Indian peacekeepers at Kiwanja summarized the failure as the result of "poor communication and staffing, inadequate equipment, intelligence breakdowns and spectacularly bad luck."[33] In its report on the massacre, Human Rights Watch largely supported Brar's assessment but further observed that competing priorities from headquarters in Goma shifted focus to "assuring the security of humanitarian workers, a foreign journalist, and a group of military observers, rather than protecting the civilian population."[34]

In the immediate aftermath of the Kiwanja Massacre, the recently appointed civilian and military heads of the UN peacekeeping force in North Kivu, Hiroute Guebre Sellassie and Gen. Bipin Rawat, brought their commands together for evaluation. As a result, the MONUC civilian and military teams in North Kivu "implemented a number of reforms that drastically improved the performance of peacekeepers and were hailed as a model for other peacekeeping missions." Reforms included the creation of joint protection teams comprising military and police personnel and civil affairs, human rights, and child protection staff operating from the UN's forward bases; a mobile-phone based early warning system, in which community members were provided with devices to alert peacekeepers of unrest; community alert networks that allowed for bases to be contacted around the clock; Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), an expanded role for Congolese translators to also act as community monitors and information gatherers; an emphasis on civilian outreach; increased foot patrols; and deployment of 30–35 troop standing combat units to areas deemed vulnerable.[32]

On 18 November, a draft resolution spearheaded by the French Foreign Ministry was presented before the United Nations Security Council.[35] The resolution, signed by 44 different organizations and with the backing of the British Foreign Office minister Mark Malloch Brown, asked the UN to send 3,000 more peacekeepers to reinforce the 17,000-strong garrison in the Congo, the largest garrison of its kind.[36] This echoed calls from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian aid groups in the region, who were also asking for reinforcements to bring stability to the area. In a shared statement, the coalition of organizations stated that

"[The reinforcements] would help to prevent the atrocities that continue to be committed against civilians on an ever greater scale here in North Kivu [province], on the border of Rwanda and Uganda ... Since August 28, fighting has intensified in many areas, causing deaths, rapes, lootings, forced recruitment and further displacements of civilian populations. The population has thus been immersed in unspeakable suffering. In the last few days, fighting has drawn closer to large populated areas, such as the town of Goma. Fighting has also invaded and torn apart the region of Rutshuru, particularly in the town of Kiwanja, where hundreds of civilian deaths have now been recorded."[37]

Local groups in the Congo also requested help from the European Union, as they would be able to deploy soldiers sooner, working as a "bridging force" until the UN reinforcements arrived. British EU spokeswoman Catriona Little stated that they were "not ruling in or out EU forces".[38]

On 20 November, the UN voted unanimously to send 3,085 more peacekeepers, citing "extreme concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation and in particular the targeted attacks against civilian population, sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers and summary executions." However, it did not extend MONUC's mandate in the Congo, which was set to expire at the end of 2008.[39] The decision was made despite the rebel commitment to pulling back from the front lines and allowing aid to reach the thousands of people still isolated, according to aid groups.[40]

However, a week after the UN vote, the DRC government requested the UN to not deploy any more Indian troops in the east of the country, arguing that there was a need to "redress the balance" of the make-up of the 17,000-strong UN force in the country.[41]

2009

[edit]

On 17 February, Egypt announced that it would send around 1,325 soldiers from the Egyptian Army to support the UN mission in Congo. Egypt also announced that it would send a police force to help in protecting the UN mission in Congo. The Egyptian armed force would work to give support and technical advice to the Congo Army, operate armed missions in conflict zones, and provide medical assistant and support. According to the Foreign Affairs in Cairo, Egypt would send a Mechanized Unit, Special Forces, Field Engineers, and Paratroops. Egypt already has a small unit in Congo consisting of 13 policemen and 23 observers.[42]

In March 2009, the Indian Army questioned more than 100 Indian troops deployed in DRC regarding the abuse allegations against them.[43] After a thorough investigation, which included examination of statements by alleged victims, the Indian Army found "serious irregularities" in charges raised by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services. Consequently, all of the accused personnel were let off due to lack of evidence.[43]

In October 2009, India announced a US$263 million aid package to Congo to help the country's information technology, hydroelectricity and railway sectors.[44] India also renewed its military commitments to MONUC while Congo expressed its support for India's UNSC permanent seat candidature.[44] These developments helped thaw relations between the two countries.

In December, MONUC rushed peacekeeping troops to Dongo in the Kungu territory of Sud-Ubangi District where a new conflict rapidly escalated in an effort to protect the local population.[45] A MONUC helicopter that was restocking the 20 troops stationed there fell under gunfire from armed men. The helicopter crew, all of Russian nationality, facilitated the evacuation of 25 people, including 5 injured people (including the helicopter pilot), who were brought to Brazzaville for emergency medical treatment.[46]

Sources in Kinshasa reported that in mid-November DRC President Joseph Kabila secretly airlifted a battalion of Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) across Congo to put down the rebellion in Dongo and the operation was supported by the United Nations Observes Mission in Congo (MONUC) and the United States Africa Command. Along with RDF regulars, MONUC troops have been fighting alongside Tutsi Rwandan soldiers infiltrated by Rwanda, with the Kabila government's support, into the national army, the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC).[47]

At the weekly MONUC press conference of 16 December 2009, it was announced by MONUC spokesperson Madnodje Mounoubai that the first MONUC peacekeeping troops were deployed in Dongo, where a temporary operational basis is functional, as well as in nearby Bozene. The 500 MONUC troops will come from the Ghanaian, Tunisian and Egyptian contingents as well as troops from the Guatemalan Special Forces. Military equipment such as armored personnel carriers, transport and combat helicopters will also be at their disposal to support their mission.[48]

2010s

[edit]

2010

[edit]

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, MONUC was renamed as of 1 July the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the new phase reached in the country. In August 2010, the Mai Mai rebels ambushed a base of the 19th Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army, killing three Indian peace-keepers.[49] The attack renewed calls in India to decrease the country's military presence in Congo due to growing conflict in the region.

2011

[edit]

In May 2011, the international cooperation minister of DRC expressed his government's desire of an "orderly, progressive withdrawal" of MONUSCO due to "normalization" of DRC's relations with neighboring countries and containment of rebels to a "few isolated zones".[50]

In June 2011, the UN announced that it would withdraw about 2,000 peace-keepers by the end of the month.[51] The UN announcement came only a few days after India's decision to withdraw all of its four Mi-35 combat helicopters from MONUSCO and eventually cease peace-keeping operations in DRC.[52]

2012

[edit]
Members of Uruguayan Riverine Company patrolling Lake Tanganyika, March 2012

On 15 November, MONUSCO helicopter gunships were deployed to support government forces as they fought to hold off a 23 March Movement attack south of Kibumba; the combined army and UN assault killed approximately 64 M23 fighters.[53]

On 20 November 2012, 23 March Movement seized the provincial capital of Goma after the national army retreated. MONUSCO troops observed without intervening, as their mandate only allowed them to protect civilians.[54] French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius called the situation "absurd", noting MONUSCO's greatly superior numbers, and called for the group's mandate to be revised.[55] UN spokesman Eduardo del Buey said peacekeepers "cannot substitute" for the Congo national army, adding that the 1,500 UN troops in Goma held their fire because they did not want to risk civilian lives.[56]

2013

[edit]
Tanzanian special forces during a training exercise in Sake, July 2013

In January 2013 chief of MONUSCO Herve Ladsous told the UN Security Council during a closed-door session that the mission plans to deploy three unmanned aerial vehicles in eastern provinces of DRC. US, UK and some other Security Council members were also supportive of the idea. However, Rwanda, which had denied allegations by UN experts that it has been supporting the March 23 Movement, opposed this proposal. Rwandan delegation informed the UN Security Council that Monusco would be a "belligerent" if it deployed drones in eastern DRC. Other diplomats, including Russian, Chinese, and some from Europe, also expressed reservations. They said there were unanswered questions about who would receive the information from the drones and how widely it would be disseminated, expressing discomfort at the idea of the United Nations becoming an active gatherer of intelligence.[57]

In March 2013, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of an intervention brigade within MONUSCO to carry out targeted offensive operations, with or without the Congolese national army, against armed groups that threaten peace in eastern DRC. The brigade is based in Sake, North Kivu, and is made up of a total of 3,069 peacekeepers. It is tasked with neutralizing armed groups, reducing the threat posed to State authority and civilian security and to make space for stabilization activities.[58] The first Brigade was composed of three battalions, one each from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi with the Brigade being commanded by James Aloizi Mwakibolwa[59] of Tanzania.

On 30 July 2013, the March 23 Movement was given a 48-hour ultimatum by the UN to leave Goma area or face "use of force".[60] Between 21 and 29 August, heavy fighting outside Goma left 57 rebels, 10–23 government soldiers, 14 civilians and one Tanzanian UN peacekeeper dead. Seven-hundred and twenty government soldiers and ten UN peacekeepers were also wounded.[61][62][63][64]

A team of technicians prepares for the inaugural flight of the UAV, December 2013

2014

[edit]

After the 2014 South Kivu attack in June 2014, the UN announced it would send MONUSCO peacekeeping troops to the area to protect the population. "These violent acts are unacceptable and need to stop immediately," said Kobler.[65]

2015

[edit]

In May 2015, Allied Democratic Forces Ugandan rebels ambushed a MONUSCO convoy about 7 miles (11 km) from Beni, killing two Tanzanian soldiers. Four other peacekeepers were reported missing.[66]

In October 2015, Maman Sambo Sidikou succeeded Martin Kobler as head of the MONUSCO.[67]

The head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita (on right) in Kalemie in 2021, observing COVID-19 precautions

2017

[edit]

On 8 December 2017, the Semuliki operating base, 27 miles from the town of Beni, was engaged in a protracted attack which resulted in the deaths of 15 UN peacekeepers and 5 Congolese soldiers killed. 53 UN peacekeepers were also wounded. At least 12 of the dead UN peacekeepers were Tanzanians.[68][69] It is suspected that the attackers were rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).[70] This brought the total casualties of UN forces since the mission commenced in Congo to 93.[71]

2020s

[edit]

2022

[edit]

In March, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine withdrew its aviation unit of eight helicopters.[72]

Anti-MONUSCO protests emerged in late July amidst accusations by Congolese politicians and civilians of failing to take action to end the Kivu conflict within the country. The protestors demanded that MONUSCO leave the country.[73] On 26 July, fifteen people were killed and 50 others were injured as UN peacekeepers opened fire at a protest in Goma, North Kivu.[73] The same day, three peacekeepers and seven civilians were killed during an attack on a MONUSCO base by protesters in Butembo.[73] On 27 July, four protesters at a MONUSCO base in Uvira were killed by electrocution after soldiers shot an electric cable which fell on them. South Kivu governor Théo Ngwabidje Kasi called for investigations as to whether the cable was shot by Congolese security forces or MONUSCO peacekeepers.[74]

In September, Ukraine withdrew its 250 troops from the mission.[72]

2023

[edit]

In August 2023, protesters clashed with soldiers in a protest in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, against MONUSCO forces for the failure to prevent the violence of militants against civilians. According to reports, the death toll reached 56 on September 5, 2023.[75]

2024

[edit]

The Democratic Republic of the Congo called for MONUSCO to withdraw from the country amidst a rising perception that they were failing to protect civilians.[76] MONUSCO initially agreed to a full withdrawal by the end of the year, with the first phase of the withdrawal beginning in July, involving the closure of their main office in Bukavu, South Kivu.[77] In July, amidst an intensifying offensive by the M23 in North Kivu,[78] the pullout was halted and indefinitely postponed. Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner expressed a concern for the creation of a security vacuum, stating "we will take into account the developments that we see on the ground before making responsible decisions and starting this process when the most favourable conditions are met."[4]

2025

[edit]
Special Rapporteur, Paula Gaviria Betancur, in 2025 in the DRC

In January 2025, M23 seized control of the city of Goma, and at least 13 soldiers from the South African National Defence Force and one from the Uruguayan Army were killed.[79][80]

In 2025, UN Special Rapporteur Paula Gaviria Betancur visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) when there were 7 million displaced people. In addition there is armed conflict and she met some of the leaders. She called for international assistance and leadership from the government.[81]

Organization

[edit]

The headquarters of the mission are in Kinshasa, DRC. The mission views the DRC as consisting of 6 sectors, each with its own staff headquarters. In 2005-6 the Eastern Division however was formed at Kisangani and took over brigades in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, along with two or three of the Sector HQs.

The approved budget for MONUC, from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, was US$1.16 billion, the largest for any current UN peacekeeping operation.

Force commanders

[edit]
Locations of MONUC units in December 2009
MONUSCO commanders
From Force commanders To
March 2000 Lt Gen Mountaga Diallo (Senegal) January 2004
January 2004 Samaila Iliya (Nigeria) February 2005
February 2005 Babacar Gaye (Senegal) July 2010
July 2010 Lt Gen Chander Prakash (India) March 2013
April 2013 Lt Gen Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) December 2015
December 2015 Lt Gen Derrick Mgwebi SD SM MMM (South Africa) January 2018[82]
January 2018 Maj Gen Bernard Commins[a] (France) June 2018
June 2018 Lt Gen Elias Martins Filho (Brazil) January 2020
January 2020 Lt Gen Ricardo Augusto Ferreira Costa Neves (Brazil) April 2021
April 2021 Lt Gen Marcos de Sá Affonso da Costa (Brazil) February 2023
February 2023 Lt Gen Otávio Rodrigues de Miranda Filho (Brazil) February 2025
February 2025 Lt Gen Ulisses de Mesquita Gomes (Brazil) present[83]

Sector headquarters

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Force numbers and fatalities

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In July 2004 there were 10,531 UN soldiers under MONUC's command. On 1 October 2004, the UN Security Council decided to deploy 5,900 more soldiers to Congo, although UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had asked for some 12,000.

On 25 February 2005, nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed by members of the Nationalist and Integrationist Front militia in Ituri province. The FNI killed another Nepali peacekeeper and took seven captive in May 2006. Two of the seven were released in late June and the UN was trying to secure the release of the remaining five.[84] By November 2005, MONUC consisted of 16,561 uniformed troops. On 30 July 2006, MONUC forces were charged with keeping the 2006 general election—the first multiparty election in the DRC since 1960—peaceful and orderly. MONUC troops began patrolling areas of eastern DRC after armed clashes broke on 5 August following the chaotic collection of election results. The UN command is also arranging different training programs and competitions in Congo for both Congo and international forces. A similar shooting competition was held between troops from all international forces and was won by a Pakistani infantry battalion.

As of 31 October 2007, the total strength of the UN force was 18,407 uniformed personnel, including 16,661 troops; 735 military observers; and 1,011 police; supported by 931 international civilian personnel, 2,062 local civilian staff, and 585 United Nations Volunteers. By August 2024, in part through the closure of the UN bases in Southern Sector,[85] the UN presence numbered 14,000 military personnel; 660 military observers; 591 police; and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.[86]

As of August 2024, the UN has recorded a total of 444 fatalities among MONUC and MONUSCO personnel.[87] MONUC fatalities (161 total) included 100 military personnel; 10 military observers; 6 UN police; 12 international civilians; and 33 local civilians. MONUSCO fatalities (283 total) includes 159 military personnel; 3 military observers; 18 UN police; 28 international civilians; and 71 local civilians.[88]

Staff and forces

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On 31 October 2007 MONUC had a total of 18,407 uniformed personnel, including 16,661 troops, 735 military observers, 1,011 police, who were supported by 931 international civilian personnel, 2,062 local civilian staff and 585 United Nations Volunteers. As of June 2022, major troop contributors, in order of total number of military personnel are Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, South Africa, Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco (nearly 10,000).

On 20 November 2008, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to reinforce MONUC with 3,085 more peacekeepers to deal with trouble in the 2008 Nord-Kivu conflict.[39] They voted after 44 organizations, led by the French Foreign Ministry, petitioned the council to send reinforcements to stabilize the region.[38]

As of 31 August 2011 MONUSCO forces included 19,084 uniformed personnel, out of which 16,998 were military personnel, 743 were military observers and 1,343 were police (including formed units). In addition the forces included 983 international civilian personnel, 2,828 local civilian staff and 600 UN volunteers.[89]

Command staff

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Ukraine aviation unit flight reconnaissance mission over North Kivu

The names of the MONUSCO command staff are as follows:

Contributing countries

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As of 31 August 2025, the total number of personnel in the mission is 11,684:[92][93][94]

  Troop Contributions (Total)
Country Police Experts Troops and staff officers Total
 Algeria 0 2 0 2
 Bangladesh 200 6 1750 1956
 Benin 0 3 4 7
 Bhutan 0 0 1 1
 Bolivia 0 2 0 2
 Botswana 0 0 3 3
 Brazil 0 2 25 27
 Burkina Faso 23 2 3 28
 Cameroon 9 0 0 9
 Canada 6 0 6 12
 Chad 20 1 1 22
 China 0 5 8 13
 Ivory Coast 16 0 0 16
 Czech Republic 0 1 1 2
 Djibouti 19 0 0 19
 Egypt 194 1 6 201
 France 2 0 0 2
 Gambia 6 0 1 7
 Ghana 5 8 9 22
 Guatemala 0 1 180 181
 India 159 11 1065 1235
 Indonesia 16 3 1027 1046
 Jordan 20 1 138 159
 Kazakhstan 0 1 0 1
 Kenya 5 1 394 400
 Malawi 0 1 747 748
 Malaysia 0 3 3 6
 Mali 18 0 0 18
 Morocco 1 3 898 902
 Nepal 4 10 1140 1154
 Niger 12 1 3 16
 Nigeria 2 2 2 6
 Pakistan 2 9 334 345
 Paraguay 0 3 2 5
 Peru 0 1 2 3
 Romania 5 0 0 5
 Russia 11 3 2 16
 Senegal 543 0 10 553
 Sierra Leone 0 0 1 1
 South Africa 0 0 952 952
 Switzerland 0 0 1 1
 Tanzania[95] 10 2 847 859
 Togo 8 0 0 8
 Tunisia 16 2 7 25
 Turkey 3 0 0 3
 United Kingdom 0 0 3 3
 United States 0 0 2 2
 Uruguay 0 3 659 662
 Zambia 0 2 4 6
 Zimbabwe 0 0 1 1
Totals 1340 100 10244 11684

Civilians

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International civilian employees and volunteers, and DRC nationals: 2,636

Criminal activity

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In 2007 and 2008, in several news and TV reports, the BBC published own evidence about Pakistani MONUC peacekeepers in Mongbwalu had entered in a gold-for-guns trading relationship with Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) militia leaders, eventually drawing Congolese army officers and Indian traders from Kenya into the deal.[96][97] Following its own investigations, the UN concluded that there was no involvement of Pakistani peacekeeper in any such trade relationship. Namely Human Rights Watch harshly criticized the UN for the way it handled the investigation, providing detailed information from several UN documents, arguing that serious allegations of wrongdoing by Pakistani peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo were ignored, minimized or shelved by the UN's Organization of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).[98]

MONUC officials say nothing of substance about mining in Congo, which proceeds in parallel with the bloodletting, arms trading and extortion. For example, Anvil Mining has been involved in massacres in DRC.[29] Anvil directors include former U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brown, who served at U.S. embassies in Brussels, Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville and South Africa. Brown was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (1987–1989) under George Shultz and George H. W. Bush and Director of Central African Affairs (1980–1981). Brown succeeded William Lacy Swing—head of MONUC in DRC—as Ambassador to the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Meanwhile, the former top internal intelligence and security chief of the United Nations Observer's Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has been worked for Anvil mining in Katanga since 2006.[99]

There have been numerous cases of sexual misconduct by UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo.[15] This has been acknowledged by the UN itself (such as the letter of 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly).

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Organization Stabilization Mission in the (MONUSCO) is a operation deployed by the since 1 July 2010 to protect , support stabilization efforts, and assist the Congolese government in consolidating state authority amid ongoing insurgencies and ethnic conflicts in the eastern provinces. It succeeded the United Nations Organization Mission in the (MONUC), which had operated since 1999 in response to the Second Congo War, marking over two decades of UN involvement in the region. Authorized under Security Council Resolution 1925, MONUSCO's mandate emphasizes , disarmament of groups, sector , and facilitation of humanitarian access, with uniformed personnel numbering around 16,000 at its peak but reduced amid drawdown plans. While MONUSCO has achieved partial successes, such as contributing to national reunification, safeguarding displacement camps for hundreds of thousands, and averting a full return to regional war in certain areas, these gains have been undermined by persistent violence from over 100 militias, including the and M23 rebels. The mission has faced substantial criticism for operational ineffectiveness, exemplified by the failure to neutralize major threats despite billions in funding, resulting in thousands of casualties annually, including 1,087 killed in Ituri and since June 2025. Compounding these challenges are recurrent scandals of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, with systemic accountability gaps persisting despite UN policies; for instance, eight MONUSCO personnel were accused of such misconduct in 2023 alone. In light of these shortcomings, the Congolese government demanded the mission's exit, prompting a UN Security Council-approved phased withdrawal under Resolution 2717 (2023), with significant troop reductions by late 2024 and ongoing operations limited to high-risk eastern zones as of 2025.

Background

Origins in Congolese Conflicts

The (DRC) experienced profound state failure under President , who ruled from 1965 to 1997, characterized by systemic , , and economic mismanagement that eroded central authority and fostered widespread despite abundant natural resources. Mobutu's kleptocratic embezzled an estimated $4-5 billion from state coffers, prioritizing personal enrichment and patronage networks over institutional development, which left the military fragmented, infrastructure decayed, and governance reliant on ethnic favoritism rather than merit or law. This vacuum enabled the proliferation of ethnic militias, such as those rooted in Hema-Lendu rivalries in Ituri dating to the 1970s and -Tutsi tensions exacerbated by the 1994 Rwandan genocide's spillover, where extremists regrouped in eastern DRC. Mineral-rich regions, including and deposits in the Kivus, became flashpoints for localized conflicts as and militias exploited weak oversight to fund operations through illicit extraction and smuggling, independent of formal state control. The Second Congo War, erupting in August 1998, amplified these domestic fragilities into a regional cataclysm involving up to nine African states—primarily the DRC government backed by , , and against rebels supported by and —driven by territorial ambitions, ethnic proxy conflicts, and plunder of minerals like essential for electronics. The conflict, often termed Africa's , resulted in approximately 5.4 million excess deaths by 2008, with the vast majority—over 90%—attributable to indirect causes such as , disease, and displacement amid collapsed services, rather than battlefield combat alone. Belligerents systematically looted resources, with and exporting billions in Congolese minerals, perpetuating chaos through economic incentives that incentivized prolonged fighting over resolution. State collapse under Mobutu had primed this escalation by leaving no effective mechanism for resource governance or militia , allowing foreign interventions to exploit ungoverned spaces for strategic and economic gain. By mid-1999, battlefield stalemates and humanitarian devastation compelled belligerents to negotiate the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on July 10, 1999, signed by the DRC, , , , , , and two major rebel groups (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie and Mouvement de Libération du Congo). The accord mandated immediate cessation of hostilities, troop disengagement, prisoner releases, and verification mechanisms, but profound mutual distrust—stemming from repeated violations and accusations of hidden agendas—rendered self-policing unfeasible, necessitating a neutral international monitoring force to oversee compliance and build confidence among parties unable or unwilling to enforce terms independently. This agreement highlighted the war's roots in endogenous governance failures and resource predation, which external actors amplified but did not originate, setting the stage for UN involvement to address the verification impasse.

Establishment and Transition from MONUC

The established the United Nations Organization Mission in the (MONUC) via Resolution 1279 on 30 November 1999, authorizing an initial observer mission to monitor the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, verify disengagement of warring parties, and support humanitarian access, with deployment limited to 90 military liaison officers for an initial period ending 1 March 2000. This modest inception reflected cautious optimism that verification could facilitate broader peace implementation amid the Second Congo War, though the mandate explicitly prohibited enforcement actions or operations in active combat zones to avoid escalation. Resolution 1291 of 24 February expanded MONUC's authorized strength to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers, in direct response to persistent ceasefire violations by multiple armed groups and state actors, while extending the mandate until 31 . The augmentation aimed to enhance monitoring of sanctions compliance and facilitate inter-Congolese , but deployment remained hampered by acute security threats to UN personnel and a mandate confined to , underscoring early limitations in addressing root causes of instability. By 2010, following phased mandate expansions for , support, and civilian protection, the Security Council enacted Resolution 1925 on 28 May 2010, extending MONUC until 30 June 2010 and renaming it the Organization Stabilization Mission in the (MONUSCO) from 1 July 2010 to emphasize stabilization in eastern provinces post the 2006 national . The transition maintained a troop ceiling of approximately 20,500 personnel, including formed police units, signaling intent for a more robust posture against residual threats while anticipating gradual drawdown amid perceived progress in governance consolidation. However, this shift masked underlying entrenchment, as unresolved militia activities and weak state authority precluded mandate fulfillment, perpetuating reliance on UN forces. From inception, MONUC grappled with a narrowly defined mandate that prioritized passive verification over intervention, compounded by host government reluctance under President to grant full operational autonomy, viewing expanded UN presence as a risk amid foreign interventions by and . These constraints, alongside logistical barriers in vast terrain and immediate threats to observers, fostered incremental mandate creep through over a dozen subsequent resolutions, transforming the mission from temporary observers to a protracted stabilization force despite initial expectations of swift resolution.

Mandate and Objectives

Core Mandates for Monitoring and Stabilization

The core mandates of MONUSCO, as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925 adopted on 28 May 2010, authorize the mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within its capacities and areas of deployment, including humanitarian relief workers and defenders.) This foundational directive shifted focus from MONUC's ceasefire observation to stabilization, emphasizing the consolidation of state authority in the (DRC) through support for government-led efforts in security sector reform, without assuming primary responsibility for national security.) The resolution tasks the mission with monitoring and reporting on abuses, facilitating the voluntary of refugees and displaced persons, and verifying the implementation of , , , reintegration, and resettlement processes for former combatants.) Stabilization mandates prioritize enabling conditions for in eastern DRC by supporting the DRC in protecting civilians from armed groups, including through coordinated operations with Forces of the DRC (FARDC) to address threats, while underscoring that MONUSCO operates in a supplementary role.) The mission is directed to facilitate humanitarian access by ensuring safe delivery of and protecting convoys, alongside promoting political processes such as national dialogue and electoral preparations to underpin long-term .) Protection of UN personnel, equipment, and installations forms an integral component, integrated across all tasks to sustain operational presence.) Operational constraints inherent to the mandates include a requirement for host government for deployment and activities, with all actions conducted in close with DRC authorities to respect national sovereignty.) Use of force is limited to or defense of the mandate as a last resort, prioritizing deterrence through robust presence over independent offensive operations, which limits scope in environments dominated by non-state actors and fragmented state control.) These principles reflect an intent to enforce via monitoring, capacity-building support, and civilian protection rather than direct combat substitution, aligning with norms despite Chapter VII robustness.)

Evolution Including Force Intervention Brigade

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098, adopted on 28 March 2013, authorized the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as an integral part of MONUSCO, comprising approximately 3,000 troops from , , and . This brigade was mandated to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm the M23 rebel group and other armed groups threatening stability in eastern (DRC), marking a significant shift from MONUSCO's prior emphasis on monitoring and . The FIB's proactive combat role deviated from core principles of impartiality and minimal , positioning the UN as a direct party to the conflict rather than a neutral observer, which analysts noted could undermine long-term consent from host authorities and combatants. Subsequent mandate renewals reinforced and expanded these elements, with Resolution 2147 on 28 March 2014 extending MONUSCO's mandate until 31 March 2015 and prioritizing civilian protection amid ongoing threats, while retaining the FIB's offensive capabilities. Later resolutions, such as 2556 in December 2020, called for a reconfigured FIB to enhance against persistent armed groups, reflecting an escalation in mission scope to address failures in stabilization despite initial FIB deployments. Critics, including from the International Peace Institute, argued this broadening risked overextension without commensurate political or diplomatic progress, as the UN's combat involvement blurred lines of neutrality and failed to resolve underlying and resource-driven causal factors fueling violence. Annual UNSC extensions, such as Resolution 2765 on 20 December 2024 prolonging the mandate until 20 December 2025, illustrate diplomatic persistence amid static ground realities, where violence in eastern DRC continued despite FIB-augmented efforts. This pattern of renewals, often unanimous or with minimal opposition, highlights inertia in multilateral decision-making, prioritizing mission continuity over adaptive strategies that might incorporate empirical assessments of limited military deterrence against non-state actors embedded in regional proxy dynamics. Studies on peacekeeping enforcement, like those examining FIB outcomes, indicate that while short-term tactical gains occurred, the absence of proportional strategic success underscored the challenges of imposing order without addressing root political instabilities.

Recent Mandate Adjustments and Extensions

In December 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2717 extended MONUSCO's mandate until 20 December 2024, adjusting priorities to emphasize civilian protection amid the resurgence of the M23 rebel group in eastern DRC, while initiating a phased drawdown of forces from less contested areas. The resolution retained MONUSCO's offensive capabilities against armed groups but shifted focus toward supporting the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in stabilization efforts, reflecting recognition that direct peacekeeping roles were yielding diminishing returns against persistent threats. This adjustment aimed to balance Congolese government demands for mission exit with ongoing security deteriorations, including M23 advances that displaced over 1.7 million people by mid-2023. Implementation of the drawdown proceeded with MONUSCO's full withdrawal from province by 25 June 2024, reducing troop presence from approximately 13,500 to 11,500 overall, but subsequent phases in and Ituri were paused in July 2024 due to intensified M23 offensives and hybrid threats involving conventional advances backed by alleged cross-border support. No firm timeline for further reductions was set, highlighting mandate rigidity as empirical data showed MONUSCO's static posture struggled against adaptive insurgent tactics, with over 7 million displaced nationwide by late 2024. On 20 December 2024, Resolution 2765 extended the mandate on an exceptional basis until 20 December 2025, maintaining around 11,000 peacekeepers focused on capacity-building for FARDC, including specialized training programs in Ituri and North Kivu to enhance responses to armed groups. This shift underscored the receding stabilization goal, with MONUSCO prioritizing joint patrols and technical support over independent operations, as M23 territorial gains—controlling key areas near Goma by September 2025—demonstrated the mission's limited adaptability to proxy-driven conflicts. Political pressures from Kinshasa for accelerated exit clashed with these realities, resulting in indefinite holds on full disengagement.

Organizational Structure

Command Hierarchy and Force Commanders

The command hierarchy of MONUSCO places the (SRSG) at the apex as the civilian head of mission, accountable to the Secretary-General for directing all activities, including political, humanitarian, and operational coordination. The SRSG integrates the efforts of military, police, and civilian personnel to align with the mission's stabilization mandate. Bintou Keita of has held this position since her appointment on 7 January 2021. Under the SRSG, the Force Commander directs the military component, comprising troop contingents responsible for offensive and defensive operations, such as civilian protection and support. This role ensures military actions support broader mission objectives while maintaining operational independence within the unified command framework. Recent Force Commanders include Lieutenant General Ulisses de Mesquita Gomes of , appointed in February 2025; Lieutenant General Otávio Rodrigues de Miranda Filho of , who preceded him until early 2025; and Lieutenant General Chander Prakash of , serving from November 2020 to 2023. The (UNPOL) component operates under a reporting to the SRSG or Deputy SRSG for operations, focusing on mentoring Congolese forces, , and in coordination with units. Mody Berethé currently leads UNPOL, integrating police efforts with military patrols to enhance security coherence in volatile eastern provinces. A pivotal example of impact occurred under Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz of , appointed on 17 May 2013 and serving until December 2015, who commanded during the 2013 launch of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) via UN Security Council Resolution 2098. This offensive unit under MONUSCO's direct control marked a shift toward proactive neutralization of armed groups, improving tactical responsiveness despite logistical challenges in joint operations.

Deployment Sectors and Headquarters

MONUSCO's central headquarters is situated in , providing overall command and administrative oversight for the mission across the . Forward headquarters and key operational bases are maintained in eastern regions, with in serving as a primary hub for coordinating activities amid ongoing instability. functions as the headquarters for operations in , facilitating responses to localized threats in that area. The mission's deployment sectors have historically covered conflict-prone eastern provinces, including , , and Ituri, with bases designed to monitor vast territories despite coverage limitations imposed by the DRC's expansive geography. In April 2024, MONUSCO ceased military and police operations in province at the request of the Congolese government, completing the withdrawal by June 30, 2024, and leaving a residual team of 34 personnel to support UN agencies. This disengagement shifted focus and resources toward reinforcing sectors in and Ituri, where persistent armed group activities necessitate sustained presence. Logistical sustainment across these sectors is hampered by the challenging terrain of eastern DRC, including dense forests and poor road networks vulnerable to ambushes, compelling reliance on helicopter and fixed-wing air assets for resupply, medical evacuations, and rapid troop redeployments. Such constraints highlight gaps in ground coverage, as fixed bases cannot fully patrol remote areas, exacerbating difficulties in protecting civilians over approximately 500,000 square kilometers of operational space.

Troop Numbers, Composition, and Fatalities

The uniformed personnel strength of , including its predecessor MONUC, peaked at 20,586 in June 2010, comprising 18,653 troops, 704 military observers, and 1,229 police. This maximum reflected the mission's expansion during the stabilization phase following the 2006 elections. By December 2024, the UN Security Council authorized a reduced ceiling of approximately 13,800 uniformed personnel, including 11,500 military, 600 observers and staff officers, 443 police, and 1,270 officers, amid phased drawdowns initiated in 2023. Actual deployed strength has hovered above 10,000 uniformed personnel into 2025, reflecting ongoing withdrawals while maintaining core capacities in eastern provinces. MONUSCO's force composition emphasizes military elements, accounting for roughly 85-90% of uniformed personnel, with the balance divided between police and observers. Military contingents include infantry battalions for ground operations, aviation units equipped with helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and transport, and specialized logistics and engineering companies for sustainment and infrastructure support. Police components focus on formed units for crowd control and individual officers for capacity-building with Congolese forces, while observers monitor ceasefire compliance and human rights. This structure supports the mission's mandates but has faced logistical strains from vast terrain and supply line vulnerabilities. Cumulative fatalities among MONUC/MONUSCO personnel since 1999 exceed 160 as of 2019, with over 70% uniformed and approximately 21% attributed to malicious acts such as ambushes and improvised explosives. Subsequent incidents, including 13 peacekeepers killed in clashes with M23 rebels in January 2025, have elevated the toll, underscoring persistent operational hazards in hostile environments dominated by armed groups. These losses, predominantly from and attacks, highlight the high-risk nature of deployments despite robust force sizes, with total UN fatalities across missions surpassing 4,300 since 1948, many from violence.

Contributing Countries

Primary Military Contributors

South Asian nations have dominated as primary military contributors to MONUSCO, with India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal providing the majority of troops due to their extensive participation in UN peacekeeping missions. These countries deploy cost-effective contingents, often numbering in the thousands collectively for MONUSCO at peak strengths, reflecting a broader trend where Asian contributors account for over half of UN uniformed personnel globally. African states, particularly , , and , played a key role in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), established in 2013 under a robust mandate to neutralize armed groups; contributed a battalion-sized force of around 1,200 troops to this offensive component. The FIB represented a shift toward more proactive engagements, with these SADC members providing troops motivated partly by regional stability interests alongside UN funding. UN reimbursements incentivize such contributions, offering troop-contributing countries a standard rate of approximately $1,428 per per month, plus allowances for equipment and self-sustainment, drawn from MONUSCO's annual budget exceeding $900 million. This financial model, while enabling large-scale deployments, has drawn criticism for fostering "troop mills" where participating nations prioritize reimbursements—potentially netting millions annually—over sustained strategic commitment, leading to hesitancy in high-risk operations. As MONUSCO draws down toward a 11,500 ceiling by late 2024, contributor rotations continue to emphasize quantity over specialized capabilities adapted to persistent insurgencies.

Civilian, Police, and Support Personnel

As of May 2024, MONUSCO's civilian personnel numbered 2,320, including 308 , comprising international, national general service, and national staff focused on monitoring, security sector reform (SSR), and institutional capacity-building for the (DRC) government. These personnel conduct field assessments of violations, provide advisory support to strengthen judicial and correctional systems, and coordinate with DRC authorities on SSR initiatives to improve accountability and governance in conflict-affected areas. Their efforts emphasize non-coercive measures, such as technical assistance for legal reforms and to mitigate abuses, though operational reach is often hampered by restricted mobility amid pervasive insecurity. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) component, consisting of individual police officers (IPOs) and formed police units (FPUs), supports rule-of-law activities through mentoring the Congolese National Police (PNC) and promoting community-oriented policing. Authorized for up to 443 IPOs and 1,270 FPU members as of late 2024 mandate discussions, actual deployments have declined with the mission's phased drawdown, prioritizing advisory roles over direct enforcement. UNPOL conducts joint patrols with PNC, delivers training on crowd management, arms control, and crime investigation, and facilitates community dialogues to foster trust and reduce localized tensions, thereby aiding civilian protection indirectly. These activities aim to build PNC capacity for sustainable policing but yield limited results in curbing broader armed group violence due to host-state coordination gaps and resource constraints. Support personnel within the and police cadres handle administrative, logistical, and sustainment functions essential for mission operations, including , , and in volatile eastern provinces. High exposure to attacks by non-state actors has resulted in casualties and elevated turnover rates, with personnel rotations accelerated by security incidents that underscore the non-combat elements' vulnerability and constrain long-term expertise transfer. While these components bolster rule-of-law frameworks, their impact on foundational security deficits remains ancillary, as primary stabilization relies on deterrence against persistent insurgencies.

Historical Phases

Initial Deployment and Ceasefire Monitoring (1999-2005)

The United Nations Organization Mission in the (MONUC) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1279 on November 30, 1999, initially deploying up to 500 military observers to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed July 10, 1999, by the (DRC), , , , , and .) The mandate focused on verifying ceasefire observance, force disengagement, and liaison with parties, but excluded enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, limiting MONUC to observation amid persistent violations. Deployment commenced slowly due to logistical challenges in the vast, infrastructure-poor eastern DRC, with initial teams facing security risks from ongoing skirmishes and non-cooperation by armed groups. By mid-2000, Resolution 1291 expanded authorization to 5,537 troops alongside observers, yet actual deployment lagged, reaching only about 2,366 personnel including 363 observers by July 2001, insufficient for comprehensive monitoring across frontlines. Ceasefire verification efforts faltered as hostilities resumed, with Rwandan and Ugandan forces conducting incursions into eastern provinces like North and , undermining disengagement processes overseen by the Joint Military Commission. MONUC reports documented repeated breaches, including rebel advances and foreign troop movements, but the mission's passive role—confined to reporting without intervention authority—proved inadequate against entrenched interests, such as Rwanda's pursuit of militias. The July 30, 2002, Pretoria Agreement between DRC and committed to Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for neutralizing ex-FAR/ threats, with MONUC tasked to collaborate on verification and disarmament; partial pullbacks occurred, repatriating thousands of combatants by 2003, yet incomplete compliance allowed residual incursions to persist. The 2003 Ituri crisis starkly exposed MONUC's monitoring limitations, as ethnic militias like the Lendu and Hema clashed in deadly cycles, resulting in massacres, displacement of over 500,000, and discovery of mass graves amid weak government control. With fewer than 1,000 troops in the region, MONUC prioritized but lacked a robust mandate to neutralize threats or protect civilians beyond compounds, leading to documented failures such as non-intervention during attacks killing hundreds near UN sites in May 2003. Temporary reinforcements via (EU-led, June-September 2003) stabilized briefly, but MONUC's return highlighted systemic constraints, including troop shortages and political hesitancy to confront spoilers. Troop strength grew to approximately 10,500 by late through sequential resolutions, yet these expansions came too late to avert broader catastrophe, with estimates of 3.9 million excess deaths from 1998-2004—mostly non-combat related, from disease and starvation exacerbated by conflict—underscoring the inadequacy of MONUC's early observational focus against resurgent violence.

Stabilization and Electoral Support (2006-2010)

The Organization Mission in the (MONUC) shifted focus toward post-transition stabilization and electoral processes during 2006-2010, building on the 2002 Sun City Agreement's framework for power-sharing and democratic transition. MONUC facilitated implementation of the agreement's provisions, including disarmament of militias and establishment of transitional institutions, while addressing ongoing security challenges from groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of (FDLR). Despite these efforts, FDLR remnants maintained operational capacity in eastern forests, launching cross-border incursions and exploiting mineral resources, which undermined stabilization in border areas. MONUC provided critical logistical and security support for the of the Congo's general elections on July 30, 2006—the first multiparty polls since in 1960—with an authorized strength of up to 17,000 personnel to secure polling stations and transport materials across the vast territory. The mission coordinated with the Independent Electoral Commission, deploying joint assessment teams and enabling for over 25 million citizens, though logistical delays and isolated violence marred preparations. Post-vote, allegations of fraud surfaced widely, including from opposition candidate , who contested results citing irregularities in vote tallying and ballot stuffing; the ultimately upheld Joseph Kabila's victory on November 27, 2006, amid protests in that MONUC helped contain. Stabilization progressed unevenly, with relative calm in western provinces allowing institutional reforms, contrasted by persistent violence in eastern and Orientale regions where the (ADF) and FDLR conducted ambushes and displacements, displacing over 1.2 million people by 2010. MONUC's joint operations with the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) neutralized some threats but faced criticism for inadequate civilian protection amid militia resurgence, as armed groups exploited ungoverned spaces. On May 28, 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1925 renamed MONUC to the Organization Stabilization Mission in the (MONUSCO), effective July 1, 2010, to underscore a mandate prioritizing state consolidation over transitional support while maintaining up to 19,815 troops. This reorientation reflected partial successes in electoral handover but highlighted enduring eastern instability, where militia activities continued to challenge government authority despite MONUC's presence.

Offensive Operations Against Armed Groups (2011-2020)

In March 2013, the authorized the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO through Resolution 2098, marking a shift toward offensive operations against armed groups in eastern DRC, particularly in North and provinces. The FIB, comprising approximately 3,000 troops from , , and , was mandated to neutralize armed groups threatening state authority and civilians, operating alongside the Congolese army (FARDC) but independently of traditional peacekeeping restrictions. This escalation responded to the M23 rebel group's rapid advances, which captured in November 2012 and threatened regional stability. From August to November 2013, FIB and FARDC conducted joint offensive operations against M23, employing artillery barrages, , and helicopter gunship strikes to repel the group from strategic positions around and Rutshuru. These efforts culminated in M23's defeat and surrender on November 7, 2013, with key leaders fleeing to and , temporarily restoring government control over North Kivu's urban centers. However, the victory proved short-lived, as M23 remnants reorganized and other groups like the (ADF) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) exploited the vacuum, continuing attacks that underscored the limits of military neutralization without addressing underlying failures. Post-M23, MONUSCO's FIB extended operations against FDLR and ADF, launching targeted offensives such as those in December 2013 against FDLR positions in and joint FARDC-MONUSCO campaigns against ADF in Beni territory starting in 2014. By November 2018, intensified operations identified and dismantled ADF strongholds, resulting in the neutralization of hundreds of combatants through arrests, surrenders, and eliminations, though ADF shifted to guerrilla tactics. These actions integrated with the 2018-2020 response in Ituri and , where MONUSCO provided logistical support, secured vaccination sites, and conducted periodic sweeps to curb ADF disruptions, reducing but not halting attacks that killed over 1,000 civilians from 2019 to mid-2020. Despite these efforts, empirical outcomes revealed temporary gains: armed group activity persisted, with FDLR and ADF maintaining operational capacity, contributing to a surge in civilian displacement from about 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2013 to over 5.6 million by 2020, primarily in eastern provinces.

Drawdown Amid Persistent Instability (2021-Present)

In December 2021, the UN Security Council streamlined MONUSCO's mandate through resolution 2717, emphasizing a transition to Congolese authorities while prioritizing civilian protection and the mission's eventual drawdown, guided by a Joint Transition Plan developed with the DRC government. This plan conditioned phased withdrawals on the DRC's capacity to assume security responsibilities, amid ongoing instability from armed groups. By November 2023, facing domestic pressure, the DRC government formally requested MONUSCO's complete exit by the end of 2024, leading to an agreed disengagement roadmap endorsed by Security Council resolution 2717 on December 19, 2023. The plan outlined initial withdrawals from by April 30, 2024, followed by phased exits from and Ituri, with MONUSCO ceasing operations in on schedule that date, transferring sites to FARDC control. However, escalating M23 offensives from 2022 onward, including advances capturing key territories in , disrupted the timeline, prompting indefinite pauses in further disengagements due to heightened threats to civilians and mission personnel. The M23's intensified campaigns, backed by external support from as documented in UN reports, compelled MONUSCO to shelter over 1,800 civilians and disarmed FARDC elements at its bases during peak offensives in early 2025, exposing persistent FARDC operational weaknesses. These dynamics stalled full troop reductions, with MONUSCO's authorized strength capped at 11,500 personnel by mid-2025, down from prior levels but remaining critical for defensive operations amid attacks that killed at least 17 peacekeepers that year. The Security Council extended the mandate to December 20, 2025, via resolution 2765, allowing exceptional support to regional forces like SADC's SAMIDRC without altering the drawdown intent.) Despite partial progress, the phase highlighted MONUSCO's constrained role in a context of unresolved cross-border influences and inadequate host-state capabilities.

Operations and Activities

Civilian Protection Initiatives

Following 2098 adopted on March 28, 2013, MONUSCO received a reinforced mandate authorizing the use of all necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in its areas of operations, prioritizing this task above others. This included the establishment of protection sites and forward operating bases to shelter internally displaced persons (IDPs), such as those in Mugunga I and III, Bulengo, and Djugu territory, where MONUSCO forces provided direct security against armed group incursions. Quick reaction forces were deployed to these locations to respond to immediate threats, enabling the temporary safeguarding of thousands of IDPs fleeing violence in eastern provinces like and Ituri. MONUSCO integrated technological assets into its strategies, launching its first unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on December 3, 2013, to enhance over vast and inaccessible terrain in eastern DRC, aiding in the monitoring of armed groups and early warning for threats. These drones supported of civilians by providing real-time for patrols and preemptive deployments, particularly along main supply routes and in high-risk zones. Complementing this, MONUSCO conducted operations with the Armed Forces of the (FARDC), including coordinated patrols and civil-military initiatives in Ituri to secure IDP camps and deter attacks through reinforced presence. Such collaborations involved training FARDC units on protocols to improve responses to imminent dangers. Despite these measures, protection efforts faced significant challenges, as evidenced by the Beni massacres between 2014 and 2016, where (ADF) militants killed over 700 civilians in a series of attacks in , often in areas proximate to MONUSCO bases. In multiple incidents, such as those in October 2014, MONUSCO and FARDC forces failed to intervene effectively despite prior intelligence, allowing attackers to slaughter villagers and displace communities unchecked. The mission's leadership acknowledged shortcomings in halting these atrocities, underscoring the limitations of static base protections and surveillance against mobile, low-tech insurgent tactics.

Institutional Support to DRC Government

MONUSCO has provided advisory and technical support to the of the Congo's security sector (SSR) initiatives, establishing a coordination to assist in reforming the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), national police, and justice systems. This includes facilitating technical working groups and roundtables to enhance institutional capacities, with a focus on vetting processes, investigations, and prosecutions of crimes by security forces. In eastern provinces like Ituri, MONUSCO and FARDC have conducted joint civil-military operations to bolster security against armed groups, combining patrols, , and infrastructure protection as of September 2025. However, empirical assessments indicate limited progress in SSR, as FARDC persists with issues of indiscipline, resource mismanagement, and integration of ex-militias, reflecting insufficient domestic political commitment to prioritize over networks. The mission extended institutional support to electoral processes, notably the 2018 general elections, by offering logistical aid, security coordination, and facilitation of amid threats from armed groups and the outbreak. MONUSCO helped secure polling stations and supported the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) in deploying materials, contributing to the elections proceeding on December 30, 2018, despite documented irregularities and post-vote violations. Félix Tshisekedi's declared victory followed, but international observers noted fraud allegations and a lack of transparency, underscoring how UN backing facilitated continuity of power without resolving underlying deficits. In humanitarian coordination, MONUSCO has aided the DRC government in managing displacement crises, linking state responses with international agencies to address needs of approximately 7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of early 2025, primarily in eastern provinces. This involves supporting contingency planning, access facilitation for aid convoys, and integration of protection mandates into government-led operations, amid requirements for $2.54 billion in 2025 humanitarian funding. Coordination efforts emphasize , yet persistent instability—exacerbated by FARDC withdrawals and rebel advances—highlights gaps where institutional support has not yielded robust national response mechanisms. Government non-cooperation has hindered these efforts, including restrictions on MONUSCO's operational freedom of movement and demands for accelerated withdrawal, as seen in President Félix Tshisekedi's push to end the mission by late 2024. Such constraints, coupled with anti-MONUSCO protests limiting access, have reduced the mission's ability to deliver effective institutional , often resulting in absorption by state structures without corresponding improvements. Overall, while providing targeted support, MONUSCO's role has empirically sustained a status quo of weak state institutions, where external resources bolster incumbents amid and reform aversion rather than fostering self-sustaining .

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Efforts

MONUSCO collaborates with the of the Congo's Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration Communautaire (P-DDRC) to implement DDR processes targeting combatants from local armed groups in eastern provinces. These initiatives facilitate voluntary surrenders, weapon collection, and assembly in transit centers or cantonnement sites for identity verification, biometric registration, and initial processing before . Combatants are then directed toward either integration into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) or civilian reintegration pathways involving orientation and referral to national programs. In the , MONUSCO's support contributed to national DDR phases that demobilized over 111,000 ex-combatants, including efforts to canton fighters from fragmented militias and other local groups in temporary sites for processing and stabilization. Reintegration efforts under these partnerships emphasize vocational skills training, agricultural support, and community to reduce stigma and promote economic self-sufficiency, with MONUSCO providing logistical aid, during assemblies, and sensitization campaigns via radio to encourage surrenders. However, the scale remains limited relative to the estimated tens of thousands of active fighters across hundreds of groups, as many operations process only hundreds at a time in specific locales like . DDR outcomes have been undermined by pervasive , where demobilized individuals—often termed "circular returnees"—rejoin armed groups due to insufficient sustainable livelihoods and the economic pull of involvement. In eastern DRC's mineral-abundant regions, fighters derive income from taxing sites, smuggling and , and , incentives that outweigh civilian amid state service deficits and rates exceeding 50 percent in rural areas. This dynamic sustains viability, as armed affiliation provides both protection and revenue streams unavailable in formal sectors. Illustrative of these breakdowns, post-2013 attempts for M23 combatants faltered, with many former members re-engaging in violence as the group reformed amid unresolved grievances and economic opportunities in 's resource corridors, leading to renewed offensives by 2022. Overall, despite processing over 150,000 ex-combatants through supported DDR channels, more than 120 armed groups continue operating in Ituri, , and as of 2023, reflecting how economic motivations fragment and perpetuate militia structures beyond disarmament's reach.

Effectiveness and Impact

Documented Achievements in Specific Areas

MONUSCO provided logistical and support for key electoral processes in the . During the 2006 general elections, its predecessor MONUC facilitated the transport of election materials and ensured for polling amid post-conflict challenges, enabling the first multiparty vote since 1965. In 2018, MONUSCO contributed by securing polling stations and aiding logistics despite concurrent outbreaks and armed group activities, helping maintain the electoral timeline. In response to the 2018-2020 outbreak, MONUSCO delivered essential logistical aid, including airlifts, ground transport, and protection for health workers, which supported vaccination campaigns reaching over 256,000 people by late 2019 and contributed to eventual containment. Militarily, the mission's Force Intervention Brigade, authorized in 2013, conducted offensive operations that supported the Congolese armed forces in defeating the M23 rebellion, culminating in the group's surrender on November 7, 2013, and halting their control over . Engineering units repaired to improve access and stability. Efforts included rehabilitating the 135-kilometer Baraka-Fizi-Minembwe road in , enhancing mobility for civilians and forces. Quick impact projects, such as bridge restorations and farm road refurbishments in Ituri, benefited over 100,000 residents by bolstering security and economic links. Humanitarian initiatives under MONUSCO facilitated and reintegration, repatriating around 24,000 ex-combatants since 2002 through coordinated programs that reduced armed group ranks. operations in returnee areas further aided displacement reversals in select zones.

of Failures and Inefficacies

Despite over two decades of deployment since its inception as MONUC in 1999, MONUSCO has coincided with persistent high levels of violence in eastern DRC, where annual civilian deaths from armed groups have reached thousands in recent years, comparable to peaks during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). A 2008 survey estimated 5.4 million excess deaths in DRC from 1998 onward, predominantly from indirect causes like disease exacerbated by conflict, with violence continuing post-war to claim additional lives estimated in the hundreds of thousands. As of February 2025, the country hosts 7.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), the largest such population in , with displacement driven primarily by ongoing clashes in North and South Kivu provinces. Specific instances underscore operational inefficacy in halting territorial advances by non-state actors. In November 2012, M23 rebels, estimated at 1,500–3,000 fighters, captured —a city of over one million and MONUSCO's regional headquarters—after Congolese forces collapsed with minimal resistance, despite the presence of approximately 1,500 UN peacekeepers equipped with attack helicopters who fired only limited shots in retreat. The mission's failure to neutralize the threat prompted internal UN reviews acknowledging inadequate mandate enforcement and coordination with DRC forces. Similarly, in Beni territory, (ADF) militants conducted repeated massacres, killing nearly 700 civilians between 2014 and 2016 alone, with attacks persisting into 2025 despite MONUSCO bases nearby and joint operations that yielded no decisive deterrence. From a causal perspective, MONUSCO's extended presence has arguably sustained a cycle of dependency by substituting for effective DRC state institutions without compelling governance reforms, allowing proxy influences—such as Rwanda's documented support for M23 since 2021—to operate unchecked. M23's resurgence and capture of Goma in early 2025, displacing hundreds of thousands, reflects this dynamic, as the mission's defensive posture failed to counter cross-border enablers amid weak FARDC cohesion marked by poor pay, ethnic divisions, and corruption. Violence escalation in 2024–2025, including scores of civilian deaths monthly, rivals war-era intensities without evidence of stabilization attributable to the mission.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Including Human and Financial Toll

The Organization Stabilization Mission in the (MONUSCO) has imposed significant financial burdens, with total assessed contributions reaching $26.9 billion since the mission's inception as MONUC in 1999 through mid-2025, reflecting cumulative expenditures funded primarily by member state dues. Annual budgets have hovered around or above $1 billion, including $1.03 billion appropriated for the 2022/23 period and similar levels for subsequent years amid drawdown efforts. These costs encompass personnel salaries, , , and , yet represent a fraction of broader UN outlays, which total over $100 billion globally since 2000 for missions of varying efficacy. Human costs add a profound dimension, with at least 206 UN personnel fatalities recorded by late 2020—many attributable to malicious acts by armed groups—and totals exceeding 400 across MONUC and MONUSCO phases by 2024, including hostile incidents, accidents, and illness. Peacekeepers have neutralized combatants in targeted operations, such as those under the Force Intervention Brigade, but documented kills number in the low thousands at best relative to persistent threats, while local casualties remain staggering: armed groups have claimed over 1,000 civilian lives in Ituri and since mid-2025 alone, amid annual conflict deaths in the thousands across eastern provinces despite two decades of presence. Weighing inputs against outputs reveals skewed benefits, with short-term civilian evacuations and localized stabilizations failing to translate into enduring or dismantled illicit networks fueling mineral plunder. Empirical assessments indicate no systemic decline in violence intensity post-2010, as incursions and displacement—exceeding 7 million internally—persist, suggesting mission mandates prioritized containment over root causes like failures and cross-border support for rebels. This imbalance underscores inefficiencies, including high administrative overhead (often 20-30% of budgets in UN operations) and engagement rules limiting proactive force, contrasting with potentially more cost-effective national armies or private contractors that achieve per dollar expended at rates up to 10-fold lower in comparable theaters, though and differ. Ultimately, the toll questions viability: $27 billion and hundreds of lives yielded incremental distributions and institutional props but no causal break in conflict cycles, enabling dependency on external forces while domestic capacities stagnate and resource extraction by belligerents continues unabated. Independent analyses this as perpetuating a high-cost stasis, where outputs—measured by reduced battle deaths or stabilized territories—lag far behind investments, prioritizing bureaucratic persistence over adaptive, outcome-driven strategies.

Controversies and Scandals

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Personnel

Despite the United Nations' zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) implemented since 2003, MONUSCO personnel have faced hundreds of substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations spanning the 2000s to the 2020s, encompassing acts such as transactional sex, coercion, and rape targeting vulnerable civilians, including minors in displacement camps. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, primarily under MONUSCO's mandate, has accounted for approximately 36% of all global peacekeeper-perpetrated SEA cases, with patterns indicating systemic vulnerabilities like inadequate pre-deployment vetting and host-country power imbalances that enable exploitation rather than isolated misconduct. Independent analyses, drawing on victim testimonies and UN data, highlight underreporting due to stigma, fear of reprisal, and limited access to complaint mechanisms, suggesting official figures capture only a fraction of incidents. Paternity claims underscore the long-term human cost, with 188 filed against MONUSCO peacekeepers since 2010, of which only 21 have been validated through DNA testing, while over 100 remain pending as of October 2024; these often involve children born to Congolese women exploited in mission areas, abandoned upon troop rotations. Troops from troop-contributing countries such as South Africa, India, Pakistan, and others have been repeatedly implicated, reflecting failures in national accountability where contributing states retain prosecutorial jurisdiction but rarely pursue cases. UN efforts to certify personnel for prior SEA involvement since 2015 have proven insufficient, as repatriation without criminal referral to home countries perpetuates impunity. Convictions for SEA by MONUSCO personnel are virtually nonexistent, with troop-contributing countries prosecuting few if any cases despite substantiated allegations, a pattern evident in broader UN where disciplinary measures like dismissal outnumber judicial outcomes. The UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse has provided assistance to around 3,340 survivors system-wide, including in the DRC, for medical, psychological, and economic needs, yet this addresses symptoms rather than root causes like flawed oversight and dependency dynamics in conflict zones. While UN reports document these issues, their reliance on internal data raises questions of minimization, as peer-reviewed studies reveal higher exposure risks for local women and girls near bases, informed by geospatial and narrative evidence beyond self-reported allegations.

Allegations of Inaction, Bias, and Collusion

Critics have alleged that MONUSCO demonstrated inaction in preempting massacres despite access to , as evidenced in eastern DRC's Beni territory where the (ADF) killed an estimated 80-200 s in a single 2016 attack using crude weapons, amid a pattern of over 250 deaths documented in 2016-2017. The Congo Research Group report implicated FARDC complicity in some failures but underscored MONUSCO's shortfall in fulfilling its protection mandate under Resolution 2098, with peacekeepers often positioned nearby yet unable to halt the assaults due to restrictive or coordination lapses with unreliable local forces. Similarly, the December 2017 ADF attack on MONUSCO and FARDC positions at Semuliki in resulted in 14 peacekeeper deaths and 5 FARDC soldiers killed, highlighting operational vulnerabilities and prior gaps that allowed the militants to overrun the base despite MONUSCO's capabilities. Allegations of bias toward the government include MONUSCO's logistical and technical support for the 2011 elections, which opposition figures and analysts described as deeply flawed due to voter , ballot stuffing, and over 260 documented violations related to the vote. The criticized this assistance as enabling a process that narrowed political space and failed to ensure credibility, with MONUSCO's role prioritizing government partnership over impartial oversight. Further claims point to overlooking FARDC ties to mineral smuggling networks, as UN Group of Experts reports have repeatedly documented Congolese army units facilitating illicit and flows—estimated at 120 tonnes of coltan monthly from areas like Rubaya—yet MONUSCO continued joint operations without addressing these economic incentives for indiscipline. Rumors of collusion have centered on indirect support to FARDC units accused of abuses, including through the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), established in 2013 under Resolution 2098 to neutralize armed groups but reliant on FARDC as operational partners despite their documented alliances with militias like the FDLR and involvement in smuggling. A 2016 UN Group of Experts report cited instances of Tanzanian and FARDC troops colluding with rebels, including sharing intelligence and resources, which undermined FIB offensives and eroded mission neutrality. Joint MONUSCO-FARDC operations, such as those in 2022-2024, have been accused of bolstering government forces implicated in extrajudicial killings—tripling to hundreds in 2017 per UN findings—while placing MONUSCO in perceived belligerence against non-state actors. The International Peace Institute has described FARDC as an "unreliable ally" for the FIB, prone to mutinies and profiteering that perpetuated conflict dynamics rather than resolving them.

Public Backlash, Protests, and Hostility Toward Mission

Public backlash against MONUSCO intensified in the eastern (DRC) during the 2010s and escalated into widespread protests in the , driven by perceptions of the mission's failure to curb rebel violence and protect civilians despite two decades of deployment. Demonstrators frequently accused peacekeepers of inaction amid ongoing atrocities by groups like the M23 and , viewing the UN presence as an ineffective foreign imposition that prolonged instability rather than fostering self-reliance. This sentiment was amplified by local politicians and groups, who framed MONUSCO as complicit in the DRC's dependency on external forces. A pivotal wave of anti-MONUSCO protests erupted on July 25, , in cities including , Beni, and , where crowds numbering in the thousands marched against the mission's mandate renewal, demanding immediate withdrawal. The demonstrations turned violent over subsequent days, resulting in at least 36 deaths—including four Indian peacekeepers—and over 170 injuries, with protesters attempting to overrun UN bases and loot equipment. In alone, clashes on July 26, , killed five people and wounded around 50 others, as demonstrators clashed with both MONUSCO troops and Congolese . Similar unrest spread to other eastern provinces, reflecting deep frustration over unmet protection expectations amid resurgent rebel offensives. Public opinion surveys underscored this hostility, particularly in eastern DRC, where a majority of residents expressed distrust in MONUSCO's and favored local or regional alternatives over prolonged UN involvement. A April 2022 poll by the Congo Research Group found that 44% of respondents nationwide advocated for the mission's immediate exit, with even higher opposition in conflict zones where communities perceived peacekeepers as prioritizing self-preservation over civilian defense. By 2023, anti-MONUSCO had permeated grassroots discourse, with protesters labeling the force an "occupier" that enabled inaction and foreign interference, fueling sporadic attacks on UN convoys and facilities. This pervasive animosity, rooted in tangible deficits rather than abstract , highlighted a causal disconnect between the mission's stated goals and on-the-ground realities. Government further entrenched these views, as DRC officials publicly blamed MONUSCO for persistent chaos while deflecting for domestic military shortcomings, thereby channeling public anger toward the UN as a convenient foil. Between 2023 and , calls for expulsion echoed in rallies and media, with eastern populations prioritizing and indigenous solutions amid skepticism of international interventions' track record. Such dynamics not only eroded operational space for peacekeepers but also underscored empirical failures in building local legitimacy, as communities increasingly saw the mission's persistence as symptomatic of unresolved root causes like resource conflicts and weak governance.

Withdrawal Process

Congolese Government Demands and UN Responses

In September 2023, (DRC) President demanded an accelerated withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the (MONUSCO), requesting completion by December 2023 rather than the previously planned end of 2024, citing the mission's completion of its core objectives and the need to bolster national sovereignty. This stance aligned with longstanding Congolese assertions of , framing MONUSCO's prolonged presence as a hindrance to the development of indigenous security capabilities and full ownership of internal stabilization efforts. The (UNSC) responded by adopting Resolution 2717 on December 19, 2023, which extended MONUSCO's mandate until December 20, 2024, despite the DRC's push, emphasizing the mission's role in protecting civilians amid persistent threats from armed groups. Concurrently, on November 22, 2023, the DRC government and MONUSCO leadership co-signed a disengagement framework outlining an accelerated yet phased exit conditioned on benchmarks such as enhanced Congolese armed forces' control over key areas and reduced violence levels—conditions that remained unmet due to escalating instability in eastern provinces. DRC officials maintained that MONUSCO's extension perpetuated a dependency dynamic, arguing it undermined incentives for domestic military reforms and regional , even as evidence of ongoing reliance on UN logistical and protective support highlighted tensions between rhetorical claims and operational realities. The government's position, amplified amid domestic protests against perceived mission ineffectiveness, prioritized national narrative over immediate security gaps, influencing UNSC deliberations that balanced withdrawal pressures with mandates for orderly transition.

Phased Disengagements and Delays

The phased disengagement of MONUSCO from province began in January 2024, involving the transfer or closure of seven bases to Congolese authorities, with the process concluding on June 30, 2024. Key handovers included the Bunyakiri base to the Armed Forces of the (FARDC) on April 19, 2024, and the Kamanyola base to the Congolese National Police (PNC) on February 28, 2024, accompanied by joint monitoring mechanisms to assess continuity. This phase resulted in the repatriation of over 2,500 troops and the closure of the regional office on June 25, 2024. Planned drawdowns from and Ituri provinces have faced repeated delays since 2022, primarily driven by territorial advances by the M23 rebel group and persistent operational gaps in FARDC capabilities, which have hindered effective handovers. UN Security Council reports highlight that deteriorating security dynamics, including heavy fighting and militia activity involving over 130 armed groups, necessitated pausing further withdrawals to avoid vacuums in mandates. As of 2025, MONUSCO retains a significant troop presence—approximately 10,000 uniformed personnel—focused on these eastern provinces, with the mission's mandate extended indefinitely pending improved conditions for base transfers to PNC and FARDC units under supervised oversight.

Implications for Regional Stability Post-MONUSCO

The phased withdrawal of MONUSCO, culminating in its exit from by June 2024 and ongoing disengagements through 2025, risks creating security vacuums in eastern (DRC), particularly in where M23 rebels have advanced amid perceived Rwandan support. The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) has demonstrated systemic weaknesses, including corruption, extortion, and inadequate training, rendering it ill-equipped to counter armed groups without external backing; as of early 2025, M23 offensives have displaced over 500,000 people since January alone, exacerbating a crisis affecting more than 7 million internally displaced persons, 80% of whom previously relied on MONUSCO-protected areas. This unreadiness could enable further territorial gains by M23 and other militias like the , potentially spilling over into , , and through cross-border incursions and refugee flows, perpetuating proxy conflicts driven by resource control and ethnic grievances rather than resolved by the mission's civilian protection mandate. Regional alternatives, such as the Regional Force (EACRF) and the Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), have yielded mixed results, with EACRF criticized for failing to neutralize threats and perceived biases toward M23 before its withdrawal in 2024, while SAMIDRC faces mandate ambiguities and logistical hurdles in a fragmented operational environment. Bilateral aid or interventions may fill gaps temporarily, but historical patterns indicate persistence of proxy wars, as foreign actors exploit DRC's weak and ungoverned mineral-rich territories without addressing underlying causal drivers like illicit trade networks. MONUSCO's departure underscores the constraints of multilateral in protracted conflicts within failed states, where external forces fail to build sovereign capacity or deter determined interveners, likely sustaining unless Congolese authorities prioritize internal reforms over reliance on transient missions. This legacy highlights that stability requires causal interventions targeting state fragility and regional meddling, rather than prolonged troop presences that mask but do not resolve core dysfunctions.

References

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