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Politics of Myanmar
Politics of Myanmar
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Myanmar (formerly Burma) (Burmese: မြန်မာ) operates de jure as a unitary assembly-independent republic under its 2008 constitution.[1] On 1 February 2021, Myanmar's military overthrew the country's democratically elected government in a coup,[2] causing ongoing anti-coup protests.[3]

Political conditions

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Early history

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The first known city-states emerged in central Myanmar in the second century AD. They were founded by Tibeto-Burman-speaking migrants from present-day Yunnan.[4] The history of Myanmar as a unified entity, formerly called Burma, began with the Pagan Kingdom in 849. In 1057, King Anawrahta founded the first unified Myanmar state at Bagan. In 1287, the Bagan kingdom collapsed following recurring Mongol invasions, leading to 250 years of political divide. In the time period between 1510 and 1752, the area was united as Burma by the Toungoo dynasty, which was the largest Southeast Asian empire in the 16th century. From 1752 to 1885, the Toungoo administrative reforms were continued by the Konbaung dynasty. The thousand-year line of Burmese monarchy ended with the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885.

British rule

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After 1885, the country was administered as part of British India until 1937. British Burma began with its official recognition on the colonial map that marks its new borders containing over 100 ethnicities. It was named Burma after the dominant ethnic group Bamar, who make up 68 percent of the population.

World War II

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During World War II, a coalition of mostly members of the Bamar ethnic group volunteered to fight alongside the Japanese in hope of overthrowing the occupying British forces. Meanwhile, many other ethnic groups supported the Allied forces against the Bamar-backed Japanese forces. This conflict would come to be very significant in the aftermath of World War II when Burma was granted its independence from Great Britain in 1948. Prior to the end of their colonization, the British government had created a novel map of the country with new borders that included some previously sovereign ethnicities. Many groups of racially and culturally diverse people suddenly found themselves as part of a country that was named after the Bamar, a group they did not identify with. The division created during World War II only exacerbated the growing resentment towards the Bamar. By granting independence to Burma, the British government handed the control of all the containing ethnicities over to the Bamar.

Panglong Agreement

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Aung San, who led the fight for independence, was able to convince the leaders of the other ethnic groups that fought alongside the Burmese to remain as one country. The formation of the new Burmese constitution in 1948 was cemented by the Pin-Lone agreement, which was signed by every ethnic leader in support of the newfound union. Aung San's unprecedented assassination prior to the absolute fulfillment of the Pin-Lone agreement undid the unification he led. His death marked the end of the short lived period of peace within the new nation, unleashing a power vacuum that has not been filled properly since. A period of instability with leaders that failed to represent every ethnicity's best interest followed.

Beginning in the late 1950s, and continuing through at least 2024, Myanmar's military has played a major role in shaping or directing the country's politics.[5]: 23 

Socialist republic

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Democracy was suspended in the country following a coup in 1962. The uncertainty and chaos paved the way for a Burmese nationalist government to take over. From 1962 to 1988, the country was ruled by the Burma Socialist Programme Party as a one-party state guided by the Burmese Way to Socialism. The new Burmese leaders turned Burma into a Socialist Republic with isolationism, and a Burmese superiority. The newfound Burmese nationalism put the Bamar majority at the forefront, undoing the unification initiated through the Pin-Lone agreement. Additionally, the growing disdain was enhanced through the forced coexistence between members of different religions. Bamar kingdoms were almost exclusively Buddhist in the past. Most ethnic groups within the Shan, Kayin, Kayar, and Chin state practiced their own versions of Animism, while people of the Islamic faith lived alongside the Buddhists in the Arakan (now Rakhine) state. The annexation of all the diverse groups into the British India deepened the religious polarization. The movement of people across the border caused by the colonization added a large group of Hindu followers to the mix. The strenuous conversion campaigns by the Catholic Christians and their competition with the Methodist colonialists additionally divided minority groups such as the Karen and Kachin within themselves. The colonial departure unleashed the animosity that has been building towards one other. The death of Aung San, and the following leaderships ensured the lasting conflicts between every cultural and religious group.[citation needed] The 1988 Uprising cemented the social, political, and civil unrests that have plagued the country since.

1988 Uprising

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The SPDC junta which took power in 1988 had been responsible for the displacement of several hundred thousand citizens, both inside and outside of Burma. The Karen, Karenni, and Mon ethnic groups have sought asylum in neighbouring Thailand, where they are also abused by an unfriendly and unsympathetic government.[citation needed] These groups are perhaps more fortunate than the Wa and Shan ethnic groups, who have become internally displaced peoples in their own state since being removed from lands by the military junta in 2000. There are reportedly 600,000 of these internally displaced peoples living in Burma today. Many are trying to escape forced labour in the military or for one of the many state-sponsored drug cartels.[citation needed] This displacement of peoples led, and continues to lead to human rights violations as well as the exploitation of minority ethnic groups at the hands of the dominant Bamar group. The primary actors in these ethnic struggles include, but are not limited to, the military, the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence army, United League of Arakan, Restoration Council of Shan State, and the Mong Tai Army.

The military gave up some of its power in 2011, leading to the creation of a semi-democratic system, although problems remained, including outsized influence by the military under the 2008 constitution, as well as economic and ethnic issues. In 2015 the military began taking steps to make peace with various ethnic armed groups calling a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement which was signed by many such groups.

On 31 January 2021, it was reported by multiple media and news outlets that the military had staged a coup and members of the governing party, National League for Democracy, had been arrested and detained by the military. Bo Nagar, commander of the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA), which is fighting against the military in Myanmar’s central regions, told CNN in November 2023, "It’s the beginning of the end of State Administration Council, we are already seeing it."[6] These conflicts arose after the NLD had claimed victory after a successful election in November 2020. While the military contested the results of the election claiming fraudulent without any proof or investigation.[7] This situation was followed by the military performing coup d'état on 1 February 2021, taking the presidential powers from the NLD government by brute force. Shortly after taking control of the government, the military began breaking the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement by taking aggressive actions in territories controlled by its signers.

History

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Independence era

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On 4 January 1948, Burma achieved independence from Britain, and became a democracy based on the parliamentary system.

In late 1946 Aung San became Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council of Burma, a transitional government. But on 19 July 1947, political rivals assassinated Aung San (the current Prime Minister then) and several cabinet members, one of which was his brother.[8] On 4 January 1948, the nation became an independent republic, named the Union of Burma, with Sao Shwe Thaik as its first president and U Nu as its first prime minister. Unlike almost all other former British colonies, it did not become a member of the Commonwealth. A bicameral parliament was formed, consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Chamber of Nationalities.[9] The geographical area Burma encompasses today can be traced to the Panglong Agreement, which combined Burma proper, which consisted of Lower Burma and Upper Burma, and the Frontier Areas, which had been administered separately by the British.[10]

AFPFL/Union government

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In 1961, U Thant, Burma's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and former secretary to the Prime Minister, was elected Secretary-General of the United Nations; he was the first non-Westerner to head any international organization and would serve as UN Secretary-General for ten years.[11] Among the Burmese to work at the UN when he was Secretary-General was a young woman named Aung San Suu Kyi.

Military socialist era

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In 1962, General Ne Win led a coup d'état and established a socialist military government that sought to create a "Burmese Way to Socialism". The military expropriated private businesses and followed an economic policy of autarky, or economic isolation. The Burmese Way to Socialism emphasized that the military was to have a central role in governing the country, and that the Burmese language and Buddhism were central to identity.[12]

There were sporadic protests against military rule during the Ne Win years and these were almost always violently suppressed. On 7 July 1962, the government broke up demonstrations at Rangoon University, killing 15 students. In 1974, the military violently suppressed anti-government protests at the funeral of U Thant. Student protests in 1975, 1976 and 1977 were quickly suppressed by overwhelming force. The military government of General Ne Win was deposed following the massive 8888 Uprising in 1988 when thousands died, but immediately replaced by another military junta.

SPDC era

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The former head of state was Senior General Than Shwe who held the title of "Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council". His appointed prime minister was Khin Nyunt until 19 October 2004, when he was forcibly deposed in favour of Gen. Soe Win. Almost all cabinet offices are held by military officers.

US and European government sanctions against the military government, combined with consumer boycotts and shareholder pressure organised by Free Burma activists, have succeeded in forcing most western corporations to withdraw from Burma. However, some western oil companies remain due to loopholes in the sanctions. For example, the French oil company TotalEnergies and the American oil company Chevron continue to operate the Yadana natural gas pipeline from Burma to Thailand. TotalEnergies (formerly TotalFinaElf) is the subject of a lawsuit in French and Belgian courts for alleged complicity in human rights abuses along the gas pipeline. Before it was acquired by Chevron, Unocal settled a similar lawsuit for a reported multimillion-dollar amount.[13] Asian businesses, such as Daewoo, continue to invest in Burma, particularly in natural resource extraction.

The United States and European clothing and shoe industry became the target of Free Burma activists for buying from factories in Burma that were wholly or partly owned by the government or the military. Many stopped sourcing from Burma after protests, starting with Levi Strauss in 1992. From 1992 to 2003, Free Burma advocates successfully forced dozens of clothing and shoe companies to stop sourcing from Burma. These companies included Eddie Bauer, Liz Claiborne, Macy's, J. Crew, JoS. A. Banks, Children's Place, Burlington Coat Factory, Wal-Mart, and Target. The US government banned all imports from Burma as part of the "Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act" of 2003. Sanctions have been criticised for their adverse effects on the civilian population. However, Burmese democracy movement leader Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly credited sanctions for putting pressure on the ruling military regime.[14][15]

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented egregious human rights abuses by the military government.[16] Civil liberties were severely restricted. Human Rights Defenders and Promoters, formed in 2002 to raise awareness among the people of Burma about their human rights, claims that on 18 April 2007, several of its members were met by approximately a hundred people led by a local USDA Secretary U Nyunt Oo and beaten up. The HRDP believes that this attack was condoned by the authorities.

There is no independent judiciary in Burma[17] and the military government suppresses political activity. The government uses software-based filtering from US company Fortinet to limit the materials citizens can access on-line, including free email services, free web hosting and most political opposition and pro-democracy pages.[18]

In 2001, the government permitted NLD office branches to re-open throughout Burma. However, they were shut down or heavily restricted beginning 2004, as part of a government campaign to prohibit such activities. In 2006, many members resigned from NLD, citing harassment and pressure from the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) and the Union Solidarity and Development Association.

The military government placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest again on 31 May 2003, following an attack on her convoy in northern Burma by a mob reported to be in league with the military. The regime extended her house arrest for yet another year in late November 2005. Despite a direct appeal by Kofi Annan to Than Shwe and pressure from ASEAN, the Burmese government extended Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest another year on 27 May 2006.[19] She was released in 2010.[20]

The United Nations urged the country to move towards inclusive national reconciliation, the restoration of democracy, and full respect for human rights.[21] In December 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the human rights situation in Burma and calling for Aung San Suu Kyi's release—80 countries voting for the resolution, 25 against and 45 abstentions.[22] Other nations, such as China and Russia, have been less critical of the regime and prefer to co-operate on economic matters.[23][24]

Facing increasing international isolation, Burma's military government agreed to embark upon a programme of reform, including permitting multiple political parties to contest elections in 2010 and 2012 and the release of political prisoners. However, organizations such as Human Rights Watch allege continued human rights abuses in ongoing conflicts in border regions such as Kachin State[25] and Rakhine State.

New constitution

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Myanmar's army-drafted constitution was overwhelmingly approved (by 92.4% of the 22 million voters with alleged voter turnout of 99%) on 10 May 2008 in the first phase of a two-stage referendum and Cyclone Nargis. It was the first national vote since the 1990 election. Multi-party elections in 2010 would end 5 decades of military rule, as the new charter gives the military an automatic 25% of seats in parliament. NLD spokesman Nyan Win, inter alia, criticised the referendum: "This referendum was full of cheating and fraud across the country. In some villages, authorities and polling station officials ticked the ballots themselves and did not let the voters do anything".[26]

2010 election

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An election was held in 2010, with 40 parties approved to contest the elections by the Electoral Commission.[27] some of which are linked to ethnic minorities.[28] The National League for Democracy, which overwhelmingly won the previous 1990 elections but were never allowed to take power, decided not to participate.

The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party declared victory, winning 259 of the 330 contested seats. The United Nations and many Western countries have condemned the elections as fraudulent,[29] although the decision to hold elections was praised by China and Russia.[30][31]

2012 by-elections

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In by-elections held in 2012, the main opposition party National League for Democracy, which was only re-registered for the by-elections on 13 December 2011 won in 43 of the 44 seats they contested (out of 46). Significantly, international observers were invited to monitor the elections, although the government was criticised for placing too many restrictions on election monitors,[32] some of whom were denied visas.[33]

The Union Solidarity and Development Party said it would lodge official complaints to the Union Election Commission on poll irregularities, voter intimidation, and purported campaign incidents that involved National League for Democracy members and supporters,[34] while the National League for Democracy also sent an official complaint to the commission, regarding ballots that had been tampered with.[35]

However, President Thein Sein remarked that the by-elections were conducted "in a very successful manner",[36] and many foreign countries have indicated willingness to lift or loosen sanctions on Burma and its military leaders.[37][38][39]

2015 election

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Voting at a polling station
Ballot papers and stamps

Myanmar general elections were held on 8 November 2015. These were the first openly contested elections held in Myanmar since 1990. The results gave the National League for Democracy an absolute majority of seats in both chambers of the national parliament, enough to ensure that its candidate would become president, while NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi is constitutionally barred from the presidency.[40]

The resounding victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy in 2015 general elections raised hopes for a successful political transition from a closely held military rule to a free democratic system. This transition was widely believed to be determining the future of Myanmar.[41][42]

According to the results announced by the Union Election Commission on 13 November 2015, the NLD won 238 seats in the lower house and 348 seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, exceeding the required number to form a government and elect a president.

2021 military coup and subsequent junta

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The Tatmadaw, under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing, seized power from the civilian government after detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratically elected leaders in Naypyidaw.[43][44] A military junta, officially the State Administration Council was subsequently established.

Heads and deputy heads

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Office Name Term of service
Took office Left office Days
Acting President Myint Swe 1 February 2021 Incumbent 1742
First Vice President 30 March 2016 3511
Second Vice President Henry Van Thio
Chairman of the State Administration Council Min Aung Hlaing 2 February 2021 1741
Prime Minister 1 August 2021 1561
Vice Chairman of the State Administration Council Soe Win 2 February 2021 1741
Deputy Prime Minister 1 August 2021 1561
Mya Tun Oo 1 February 2023 1012
Tin Aung San
Soe Htut
Win Shein

Cabinet members

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Portfolio Minister Took office Left office Party
Union Minister for Defence
General Mya Tun Oo
1 February 20213 August 2023 Tatmadaw
Admiral Tin Aung San
3 August 2023[45]Incumbent Tatmadaw
Union Minister for Home Affairs
Lieutenant General Soe Htut
1 February 20213 August 2023 Tatmadaw
Lieutenant General Yar Pyae[45]
3 August 2023Incumbent Tatmadaw
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs1 February 20211 February 2023 USDP
1 February 2023[46]Incumbent 
Union Minister at the State Administration Council Chairman's Office Ministry (1)
Ko Ko Hlaing
8 January 20245 May 2024 Independent
Admiral Moe Aung
5 May 2024Incumbent Tatmadaw
Union Minister at the State Administration Council Chairman's Office Ministry (2)8 January 20245 May 2024 Independent
5 May 2024Incumbent Independent
Union Minister at the State Administration Council Chairman's Office Ministry (3)
Aung Kyaw Hoe
22 January 2024Incumbent Independent
Union Minister at the State Administration Council Chairman's Office Ministry (4)
Admiral Moe Aung
8 January 20245 May 2024 Tatmadaw
5 May 202427 May 2024 Independent
Minister of Border Affairs
Lieutenant General Tun Tun Naung
1 February 2021Incumbent Tatmadaw
Minister of Planning and Finance1 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations1 February 202119 August 2022 Independent
19 August 2022Incumbent Independent
Minister of International Cooperation1 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs[48]2 February 2021 and 30 August 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Information1 February 20211 August 2021 Independent
1 August 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture
Ko Ko
1 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Tin Htut Oo
3 February 20211 February 2023 Independent
Min Naung[46]
1 February 2023Incumbent 
Minister of Cooperative and Rural Development[49]
Hla Moe
24 June 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Transport and Communications
Admiral Tin Aung San
3 February 20213 August 2023 Tatmadaw
3 August 2023Incumbent Tatmadaw
Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation
Khin Maung Yee
2 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Electric Power
Thaung Han
2 May 2022Incumbent Independent
Minister of Energy
Thaung Han
2 May 20225 August 2022 Independent
Myo Myint Oo
5 August 2022Incumbent Independent
Minister of Industry22 May 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Immigration and Population (former MOLIP)1 August 202119 August 2022 USDP
Myint Kyaing[47]
19 August 2022Incumbent Independent
Minister of Labour (former MOLIP)1 February 202119 August 2022[47] Independent
Dr Pwint San
19 August 2022Incumbent Independent
Minister of Commerce3 February 202119 August 2022 Independent
19 August 202224 September 2023 Independent
Tun Ohn
25 September 2023Incumbent Independent
Minister of Education16 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Science and Technology[50]
Myo Thein Kyaw[51]
17 June 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Health (former Health and Sports[52])
Thet Khaing Win
1 February 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs[52]
Min Thein Zan[53]
1 August 2021Incumbent Independent
Minister of Construction
Shwe Lay
2 February 20211 February 2023 Independent
Myo Thant
1 February 2023[46]Incumbent 
Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement4 February 20212 August 2023 PPP
Dr Soe Win
3 August 2023Incumbent Independent
Minister of Hotels and Tourism7 February 20215 August 2021 Independent
5 August 20211 February 2023 Independent
Aung Thaw
1 February 2023[46]2 August 2023 Independent
3 August 2023Incumbent PPP
Minister of Ethnic Affairs
Saw Tun Aung Myint
3 February 20211 February 2023 Independent
Jeng Phang Naw Taung
1 February 2023[46]Incumbent 
Minister of Electricity and Energy (dissolved)
Aung Than Oo
8 February 20212 May 2022[54] Independent


Executive branch

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Main office-holders
Office Name Party Since
Chairman
President
Prime Minister
Min Aung Hlaing Tatmadaw 2 February 2021
Vice Chairman Soe Win Tatmadaw 2 February 2021
Vice President Myint Swe Union Solidarity and Development Party 1 February 2021

The president is the head of state and de jure head of government, and oversees the Cabinet of Myanmar. Currently the Chairman of the State Administration Council is the de facto head of government.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defense Forces (Tatmadaw) has the right to appoint 25% of the members in all legislative assembly which means that legislations cannot obtain super-majority without support from Tatmadaw, thus preventing democratically elected members from amending the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar. He can also directly appoint ministers in Ministry of Defence (Myanmar) which in turn controls Myanmar Armed Forces, Ministry of Border Affairs (Myanmar) which controls border affairs of the country, Ministry of Home Affairs (Myanmar) which controls Myanmar police forces and the administration of the country and Myanmar Economic Corporation which is the largest economic corporation in Myanmar.

Legislative branch

[edit]
The Assembly of the Union.

Under the 2008 Constitution the legislative power of the Union is shared among the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, State and Region Hluttaws.[55] The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw consists of the People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) elected on the basis of township as well as population, and the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) with on an equal number of representatives elected from Regions and States.[56][57] The People's Assembly consists of 440 representatives, with 110 being military personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services.[58] The House of Nationalities consists of 224 representatives with 56 being military personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services.[59]

Judicial system

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Burma's judicial system is limited. British-era laws and legal systems remain much intact, but there is no guarantee of a fair public trial. The judiciary is not independent of the executive branch.[17] Burma does not accept compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction. The highest court in the land is the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is Htun Htun Oo, and the Attorney General is also named Thida Oo.

Wareru dhammathat

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Wareru dhammathat or the Manu dhammathat (မနုဓမ္မသတ်) was the earliest law-book in Burma. It consists of laws ascribed to the ancient Indian sage, Manu, and brought to Burma by Hindu colonists. The collection was made at Wareru’s command, by monks from the writings of earlier Mon scholars preserved in the monasteries of his kingdom. (Wareru seized Martaban in 1281 and obtained the recognition of China as the ruler of Lower Burma and founded a kingdom which lasted until 1539. Martaban was its first capital, and remained so until 1369. It stretched southwards as far as Tenasserim.)[60]

Dhammazedi pyatton

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Mon King Dhammazedi (1472–92) was the greatest of the Mon rulers of Wareru's line. He was famous for his wisdom and the collection of his rulings were recorded in the Kalyani stone inscriptions and known as the Dammazedi pyatton.[61]

Administrative divisions

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Burma is divided into seven regions (previously called divisions-taing) and seven states (pyi-nè), classified by ethnic composition. The seven regions are Ayeyarwady Region, Bago Division, Magway Division, Mandalay Division, Sagaing Division, Tanintharyi Division and Yangon Division; the seven states are Chin State, Kachin State, Kayin State, Kayah State, Mon State, Rakhine State and Shan State. There are also five Self-administrated zones and a Self-administrated Division "for National races with suitable population"[62]

Within the Sagain Region

  • Naga (Leshi, Lahe and Namyun townships)

Within the Shan State

  • Palaung (Namshan and Manton townships)
  • Kokang (Konkyan and Laukkai townships)
  • Pao (Hopong, Hshihseng and Pinlaung townships),
  • Danu (Ywangan and Pindaya townships),
  • Wa Selfadministrated division (Hopang, Mongmao, Panwai, Pangsang, Naphan and Metman townships)

International organisation participation (in terms of food, water, medicine, shelter, etc.)

[edit]

Source:[63]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The politics of Myanmar center on the Myanmar Armed Forces' () entrenched authority, formalized in the 2008 Constitution, which designates the military as the guardian of national sovereignty and allocates it 25 percent of seats in both houses of parliament, along with command over the ministries of defense, home affairs, and border affairs, thereby ensuring its perpetual influence over governance even during civilian administrations. Since the military's seizure of power in the February 2021 coup—undertaken on claims of widespread fraud in the November 2020 parliamentary elections, which delivered a landslide victory to the —the nation has been administered by the (SAC), chaired by Commander-in-Chief Senior General , who assumed the role of interim and acting president under a declared . This power shift has fueled a multifaceted , pitting junta forces against a coalition of ethnic armed organizations and the People's Defense Force formed in opposition to the coup, resulting in substantial military setbacks, including loss of control over significant border regions and urban centers by 2025, though recent counteroffensives have reclaimed some territory. Amid battlefield reversals and diplomatic isolation, the SAC has extended the multiple times while announcing intentions to conduct general elections by December 2025 or early 2026, a move criticized as illegitimate by opponents given the exclusion of major and ongoing violence that has displaced millions and exacerbated ethnic divisions rooted in Myanmar's federal structure of seven states and seven regions.

Historical Development

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Foundations

Pre-colonial Myanmar's political landscape was dominated by successive Burman-centric kingdoms characterized by and varying degrees of centralization. The , flourishing from approximately 200 BCE to 900 CE, featured decentralized governance centered on trade hubs and early Buddhist influences, lacking a unified monarchical structure. The Pagan Empire, established in 849 CE and lasting until 1297 CE, marked a shift to centralized royal authority, with kings leveraging irrigation-based agriculture and Buddhism to consolidate control over valley and subordinate local elites. Subsequent regimes built on this foundation: the (1486–1752 CE) emphasized military expansion and administrative hierarchies to govern a vast stretching into neighboring territories, while the (1752–1885 CE), the last independent line, pursued further centralization through royal oversight of provincial governors (myosas) and a meritocratic , though plagued by succession disputes and aggressive foreign policies. In these systems, the king embodied divine and secular power, advised informally by royal kin and officials but retaining unilateral decision-making on war, justice, and taxation, with reinforcing legitimacy as a chakravartin (wheel-turning ). Colonial intervention began with the , driven by border conflicts and British commercial interests. The First (1824–1826) and Second (1852) wars resulted in the cession of coastal s, while , launched in November 1885, saw British forces capture , depose King Thibaw, and annex Upper Burma on January 1, 1886, abolishing the 1,000-year-old monarchy and exiling the royal family. British administration, initially as a province of under a chief commissioner, prioritized revenue extraction, , and pacification through officers, supplanting indigenous hierarchies with district-level direct rule and a focus on export commodities like and , which eroded traditional subsistence economies. Governance evolved with divide-and-rule tactics, preferentially enlisting ethnic minorities—such as Karens in police roles and hill tribes in auxiliary forces—over the Burman majority, institutionalizing ethnic cleavages and fostering long-term separatist sentiments among peripheral groups. Separation from in 1937 established Burma as a with a governor-appointed executive and a partially elected under the Government of Burma Act, introducing dyarchical elements of local responsibility in and but reserving defense and for British control, spurring Burman nationalist agitation through organizations like the Dobama Asi-ayon. These shifts—from sacral kingship to impersonal and ethnic favoritism—undermined , embedding federalist demands and militarized resistance that shaped post-colonial instability.

Independence and Post-War Instability

Burma achieved independence from British colonial rule on January 4, 1948, following negotiations led by General , who had transitioned from wartime collaboration with Japan to heading the (AFPFL). 's assassination on July 19, 1947, by gunmen linked to political rivals, including supporters of former , eliminated six cabinet members alongside him and deprived the emerging state of its primary unifying figure. , a close associate, assumed the premiership, inheriting a fragile constitutional framework under the 1947 , which promised ethnic minority autonomy but lacked enforcement mechanisms amid Bamar-majority dominance. Post-independence instability erupted almost immediately, with the Burmese army fracturing as the (CPB) seized control of several battalions within months, launching a Maoist-inspired that controlled rural territories and threatened the capital. Ethnic armed groups, perceiving broken promises on , mobilized concurrently: the (KNU) declared armed resistance in January 1949, establishing the and capturing key areas near ; similar revolts followed among Shan, Mon, and Kachin forces seeking secession or greater self-rule. By 1950, the government controlled only urban centers and transport corridors, facing a multi-front that displaced populations and strained resources, with insurgents numbering tens of thousands. The 1948-1958 period, dubbed the "Burmese Way to Chaos" by contemporaries, saw chronic governmental paralysis, with 's administrations cycling through coalitions amid corruption allegations, economic stagnation, and assassination attempts. Military loyalty eroded as officers defected to rebels, prompting ad hoc reliance on irregular militias and foreign arms deals; the , initially understrength at around 15,000 troops, expanded through but prioritized survival over offensive operations. Escalating threats from CPB advances and ethnic federations culminated in 1958, when Prime Minister invited General to form a caretaker military , ceding power temporarily to restore order without a full coup. This intervention stabilized supply lines and suppressed urban unrest but entrenched the army's political role, foreshadowing deeper involvement.

Military Ascendancy and Socialist Experiment

On March 2, 1962, General , Chief of Staff of the Burma Defense Services, orchestrated a bloodless that deposed U Nu's civilian government amid escalating ethnic insurgencies, communist rebellions, and perceived governmental instability. The military established the Revolutionary Council, with Ne Win as chairman, suspending the 1947 constitution, dissolving parliament, and imposing to restore order and centralize authority. Ne Win's regime introduced the "," a doctrine blending , , and state-controlled economics to achieve and purge foreign influences, rejecting both Western and Soviet-style . Key policies included the 1963 nationalization of domestic and foreign banks, which transferred control from Indian, Chinese, and Western entities to state-run institutions, followed by the of major industries such as rice milling, oil extraction, and timber . These measures aimed to redistribute and reduce ethnic minority economic dominance but disrupted supply chains and expertise, contributing to chronic shortages and a economy. The socialist experiment entrenched the Tatmadaw's political dominance, with the assuming administrative roles across and , while foreign trade was curtailed through import substitution and , limiting GDP growth to an average of 2-3% annually in the 1960s-1970s despite Burma's rice-export potential. Demonetizations in 1964 and 1985, invalidating high-denomination notes to combat , eroded public savings and fueled without addressing structural inefficiencies. By 1974, a new formalized the Socialist of the Union of Burma as a under the (BSPP), led by , which monopolized power and suppressed opposition through and purges. Economic outcomes reflected policy rigidities: hovered around $50-60 in the early 1960s, failing to rise significantly due to state monopolies stifling private initiative and , while foreign aid and investment dwindled under neutralist isolation. The regime's emphasis on exacerbated insurgencies by alienating border ethnic groups through forced relocations and resource extraction, solidifying military rule as a bulwark against fragmentation but at the cost of widespread impoverishment and abuses, including arbitrary detentions estimated in the thousands by the . This era's failures, rooted in over-centralization without market incentives or accountability, persisted until mass protests in prompted Ne Win's resignation and a nominal shift to quasi-civilian .

Reform Era and Quasi-Civilian Rule

Following the 2010 general elections, the first held under the 2008 Constitution, U Thein Sein, a retired general and former prime minister under the , assumed the on March 30, 2011, marking the onset of a managed transition to quasi-civilian rule. This period saw initial political liberalizations, including the release of over 200 political prisoners in late 2011, with subsequent amnesties freeing hundreds more, such as 73 in July 2013. Reforms also encompassed easing media , permitting labor unions, and initiating economic policies to attract foreign , which contributed to GDP growth averaging around 7% annually from 2011 to 2015. These steps, initiated top-down by the military-backed government, aimed to legitimize the regime internationally while retaining core controls. The quasi-civilian framework was enshrined in the 2008 Constitution, drafted by the military, which allocated 25% of seats in both houses of parliament to appointees—110 seats in the 440-member () and 56 in the 224-member (). This reservation ensured the military's veto power over constitutional amendments, requiring a 75% . Additionally, the retained authority to appoint ministers of defense, home affairs, and border affairs, as well as to declare emergencies and assume legislative and executive powers, embedding the as a parallel state institution. Thein Sein's administration, dominated by former military officers, exemplified this hybrid system, where civilian facades coexisted with entrenched military prerogatives. The November 8, 2015, general elections represented a pivotal test of the reform process, with the opposition (NLD), led by , securing a by winning 255 of the 330 contested seats in the and 135 of 168 in the . The (USDP), aligned with the military, captured only 30 seats in the lower house, reflecting voter repudiation of the prior regime. Despite constitutional barriers preventing Suu Kyi from the presidency due to her foreign-born mother, NLD formed the government with as president and Suu Kyi as State Counsellor, effectively wielding executive influence. International observers noted the polls as largely free and fair, though marred by exclusions of over 1 million Rohingya voters. Under NLD rule from 2016 to 2021, the government pursued further democratization efforts, including attempts to amend the constitution to reduce military seats, but these failed to garner the requisite 75% approval due to opposition. Ceasefire negotiations advanced with some ethnic armed groups via the 2015 , signed by eight organizations, yet broader federalism demands remained unresolved, perpetuating insurgencies. continued, but military autonomy in security matters constrained civilian oversight, particularly in operations. This era demonstrated the limits of quasi-civilian governance, where electoral mandates clashed with constitutional safeguards preserving military dominance.

2021 Coup and Escalating Civil Conflict

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military, known as the and led by Senior General , executed a , detaining State Counsellor , President , and numerous (NLD) officials hours before the new parliament was set to convene. The junta cited widespread electoral irregularities in the November 2020 general election, where the NLD secured a , as justification, alleging voter list discrepancies and over one million invalid votes without sufficient evidence presented to independent observers. declared a one-year under Article 417 of the 2008 Constitution, assuming executive, legislative, and judicial powers through the (SAC). The coup triggered immediate civil disobedience campaigns and mass protests, with millions participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) by mid-February, including strikes by medical workers, teachers, and civil servants. Security forces responded with escalating violence, using live ammunition against demonstrators starting 9 February, resulting in over 100 deaths by month's end. In response, ousted lawmakers and activists formed the (CRPH) on 1 February and the (NUG) on 16 April 2021 as a parallel government, pledging federal democracy and coordinating resistance efforts. The NUG established the People's Defense Force (PDF) in May 2021, transitioning protests into armed insurgency allied with existing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Conflict intensified as PDFs and EAOs, including the and , launched offensives against junta positions, with the Brotherhood Alliance—comprising the [Arakan Army](/page/Arakan Army), , and —initiating on 27 2023, capturing key border towns and supply routes. By 2025, resistance forces control approximately 42% of Myanmar's territory, while the junta holds 21%, amid widespread defections and economic collapse. The SAC has extended the multiple times, delaying promised elections amid battlefield losses, with reports of junta atrocities including airstrikes on civilians and forced recruitment. Junta actions have resulted in over 6,800 civilian deaths and more than 22,000 arbitrary detentions since February 2021, displacing over 3.5 million internally, according to estimates, though independent verification is limited by access restrictions. documented 889 civilian casualties from landmines and in the first nine months of 2024 alone, including 245 children. Resistance gains have fragmented junta control, particularly in ethnic border regions, but coordination challenges persist among diverse EAOs and PDFs, with some groups pursuing autonomous governance over unified federal structures. The conflict's prolongation stems from the military's entrenched economic interests and constitutional safeguards, enabling sustained resistance despite .

Governmental Framework

Executive Authority

The executive authority in Myanmar resides with the (SAC), formed on February 1, 2021, following the military's seizure of power from the elected government. The SAC, chaired by Senior General , who also serves as Commander-in-Chief of the (Tatmadaw), exercises control over executive functions, including policy-making, administration, and national security. This structure supplanted the civilian-led executive under the 2008 Constitution, which had designated the president as head of government while reserving significant influence for the military. Min Aung Hlaing holds multiple overlapping roles, including acting president since July 22, 2024, after the transfer of duties from Vice President due to health reasons, and until a restructuring in July 2025. Myint Swe, a retired general and military loyalist, died on August 6, 2025, leaving Min Aung Hlaing to continue as interim without formal election. The SAC operates as a military cabinet, with key positions filled by senior officers, such as Vice Senior General Soe Win as first and chief of general staff. This arrangement centralizes power in the military hierarchy, bypassing constitutional mechanisms for civilian oversight. On July 31, 2025, the SAC ended the declared post-coup and announced a transitional structure in preparation for planned elections, though the retains veto authority over key decisions via the National Defence and Security Council. Executive decrees from the SAC have governed economic policy, resource allocation, and efforts, often prioritizing objectives over civilian welfare amid escalating internal conflicts. International observers, including the , have criticized this framework as authoritarian, noting the absence of democratic accountability and the junta's reliance on force to maintain control.

Legislative Mechanisms

The 2008 Constitution vests primary legislative authority in the , Myanmar's bicameral national parliament, which convenes as the Union Assembly and comprises the (lower house) and (upper house). The holds 440 seats, including 330 directly elected members apportioned by population and township, plus 110 appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services. The consists of 224 seats, with 168 elected representatives (three per township and ethnic self-administered areas) and 56 military appointees. Bills originate in either house, require passage by both, and presidential assent, except for money bills which start in the ; the resolves deadlocks and handles constitutional amendments needing 75% approval. Elections for civilian seats occur every five years via first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies, with the military's 25% reserved seats ensuring veto power over amendments. The 2015 and 2020 polls seated (NLD) majorities, enabling quasi-civilian governance under military oversight. However, the legislature's effectiveness was constrained by military influence and constitutional limits on matters. The February 1, 2021, military coup dissolved the sitting , with the citing allegations against the 2020 vote. The (SAC), chaired by Senior General , invoked Article 417 to declare a one-year , assuming executive, legislative, and judicial powers under the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). This enabled , with over 1,000 ordinances issued by mid-2024 on matters from taxation to security, bypassing parliamentary debate. Emergency extensions, renewed six times by July 2024 (each for six months), deferred Hluttaw restoration and elections. In August 2025, the SAC nominally ended the emergency but transferred legislative authority to the NDSC pending new polls, retaining control without convening the dissolved assembly. Plans for nationwide elections starting December 2025 were announced, but as of October 2025, preparations faced insurgent disruptions, candidate disqualifications, and international skepticism over fairness amid ongoing . No legislative sessions have resumed, with SAC decrees filling the void; opposition entities like the (CRPH), formed by ousted lawmakers, claim continuity but hold no territorial authority. This suspension has centralized power, undermining federal and ethnic representation enshrined in the .

Judicial Framework

The judiciary of Myanmar operates under the framework established by the 2008 Constitution, which vests judicial power in the of the Union, its subordinate courts, Courts-Martial, and the Constitutional Tribunal. The serves as the highest appellate authority, with jurisdiction over civil, criminal, and administrative matters, while also supervising lower courts and issuing writs for enforcement. Subordinate civilian courts form a four-tier : Township Courts for initial trials, District Courts for appeals and certain , High Courts at the Region or State level for further review, and specialized courts for self-administered areas. Appointment processes underscore military influence, as the Chief Justice and Supreme Court justices are nominated by the President and approved by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, where the military holds 25% of seats by constitutional reservation. Courts-Martial handle offenses involving armed forces personnel, operating under military law with appeals possible to the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Tribunal, comprising a chairperson and eight members appointed for five-year terms, was tasked with interpreting the Constitution, resolving disputes between government branches, and vetting proposed amendments. Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, the —led by Senior General —asserted direct control over the judiciary, replacing key officials including the and dissolving the Constitutional Tribunal by early 2021. This consolidation eliminated any semblance of institutional independence, with courts repurposed to prosecute dissenters under laws like the Counter-Terrorism Act and Penal sections on , resulting in over 20,000 arbitrary detentions by January 2025. Military and special courts have handled political cases without , often in closed sessions, while civilian judges face coercion to issue junta-favorable rulings or risk removal. Judicial repression has intensified efforts, with convictions facilitating asset seizures and suppression of opposition, amid reports of systemic and coerced confessions.

Military and Security Dynamics

Tatmadaw's Institutional Role

The , Myanmar's armed forces, holds a constitutionally entrenched institutional role as the "eternal guardian" of the state, designed to safeguard national unity and sovereignty amid historical fragmentation. Under Article 20 of the 2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw is defined as the sole patriotic defense organization, tasked with protecting the non-disintegration of the Union, national solidarity, territorial sovereignty, and the Constitution itself, while administering national defense independently from civilian oversight. This framework, drafted by the military following its 1988-2011 , ensures perpetual influence over governance to prevent perceived threats from ethnic divisions or political instability. The of the Defense Services, appointed by the President for a five-year term, serves as the supreme commander with broad autonomy, including the nomination of personnel to reserved legislative seats comprising approximately 25% of each chamber in the (Union Parliament), such as up to 110 seats in the (lower house) and 56 in the (upper house). This quota grants the veto power over constitutional amendments, which require 75% approval, thereby institutionalizing its ability to block reforms diluting its authority. Additionally, the exclusively controls the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs (overseeing police and internal security), and Border Affairs, positions filled by active-duty officers nominated by the . The National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), comprising 11 members including the and Deputy, functions as a pivotal body for defense and security policy, chaired by the in practice and empowered to coordinate responses. Under Articles 417-419, the President, after consulting the NDSC, may declare a for up to one year (extendable), transferring legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the , who exercises them through the NDSC, enabling military assumption of full governance during perceived crises. This mechanism was invoked on February 1, 2021, following disputed election results, leading to the formation of the under Senior General , extending military dominance beyond routine institutional levers.

Ethnic Armed Organizations and Insurgencies

Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar emerged shortly after in 1948, driven by grievances among non-Burman ethnic minorities over the central government's failure to implement and equitable resource sharing as promised in the of 1947. The (KNU), formed in 1947 and operational by 1949, became the first major EAO, launching insurgency in the eastern border regions to demand autonomy amid perceived Burman dominance. Subsequent groups followed, including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) with its armed wing, the (KIA), established in 1961; the (SSA) factions in the 1960s; and the (AA) in 2009, reflecting persistent demands for in peripheral states like Kachin, Shan, Kayin (Karen), and Rakhine. These insurgencies have persisted for over seven decades, fueled by the Tatmadaw's counterinsurgency doctrine of "four cuts"—severing food, funds, intelligence, and recruits from rebels—which displaced millions and entrenched military control over ethnic territories. By the 1990s, ceasefires with groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA, est. 1989 with ~20,000-30,000 fighters) and some SSA factions created de facto autonomous zones, but unresolved political demands led to renewed fighting, as seen in the KIA's 2011 offensive after the collapse of a 1994 truce. EAOs vary in ideology and strength: the KNU (~7,000 fighters) seeks federal democracy; the AA (~15,000-20,000) pursues Rakhine self-rule; while the TNLA and MNDAA, part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), focus on ethnic liberation in northern Shan State. Collectively, EAOs control or contest up to 45% of Myanmar's territory, particularly borderlands rich in jade, timber, and narcotics, though internal rivalries and involvement in illicit economies complicate their legitimacy. The 2021 military coup intensified EAO involvement, as many aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG) and its People's Defence Forces (PDFs), providing training and sanctuary to anti-junta militias amid widespread civil disobedience. This cooperation marked a shift from ethnic-specific struggles to a broader anti-Tatmadaw front, with EAOs like the KNU and KIA integrating PDF units into operations. Key escalations included Operation 1027, launched by the 3BHA (AA, MNDAA, TNLA) on October 27, 2023, which captured Laukkai town in northern Shan by January 2024, overrunning junta bases and border guard forces. The AA advanced in Rakhine, seizing Maungdaw's Border Guard Police base on December 8, 2024, after a six-month siege, while KIA forces gained ground in Kachin, controlling key highways by mid-2024. These offensives displaced over 3 million since the coup and eroded Tatmadaw manpower, estimated at 150,000-200,000 active troops strained by defections. Despite tactical successes, EAO unity remains fragile, with post-victory tensions over resource control and governance emerging, as in KIA-TNLA clashes in northern Shan after junta withdrawals in late 2023. The junta responded by designating the 3BHA groups as terrorist organizations on September 4, 2024, justifying intensified airstrikes and , which have caused disproportionate civilian casualties in ethnic areas. Ceasefire groups like the UWSA maintain neutrality, trading border access for non-aggression, underscoring how pragmatic alliances rather than ideological cohesion sustain the fragmented landscape. Overall, EAOs' advances challenge central authority but risk entrenching ethnic fiefdoms without a viable federal settlement.

Internal Security and Counterinsurgency Strategies

The Myanmar military, known as the , has historically prioritized internal security through counterinsurgency operations aimed at neutralizing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and other insurgent groups, employing doctrines that emphasize denying resources to adversaries. A core tactic, the "four cuts" strategy—developed in the 1960s and formalized under General —seeks to sever insurgents' access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits by targeting civilian support networks in contested areas, often via village relocations, blockades, and punitive raids. This approach, while effective in isolating rebels in remote border regions, has frequently resulted in widespread civilian displacement and allegations of . Following the 1 February 2021 coup, the revived and intensified the four cuts strategy against emerging resistance forces, including People's Defense Forces (PDFs) aligned with the shadow and revitalized EAOs such as the and . Operations involved systematic aid blockades, destruction of agricultural infrastructure, and restrictions on movement to starve opposition-held enclaves, exacerbating humanitarian crises in , Magway, and Rakhine regions. By mid-2023, these measures had displaced over 2.6 million people internally, with the military deliberately impeding relief efforts to weaken rebel logistics. Reports from field observations indicate the strategy's adaptation to urban and semi-urban PDF strongholds, contrasting with its traditional rural focus. Counterinsurgency has relied heavily on asymmetric , including relentless airstrikes and barrages to compensate for ground troop shortages, with over 1,000 air raids documented in 2024 alone targeting resistance positions in northern and western peripheries. The junta's offensives, such as those against the in in 2024, combined infantry sweeps with aerial dominance, though they yielded limited territorial gains amid rebel counterattacks. Auxiliary forces, including pro-junta militias like the Pyusawhti, have supplemented regular units in village-level policing and intelligence gathering, though coordination issues have hampered efficacy. To address manpower deficits—exacerbated by desertions and casualties estimated at 15,000-20,000 since 2021—the activated the dormant 2010 People's Military Service Law on 10 February 2024, mandating for males aged 18-35 and females aged 18-27, with plans to enlist 5,000 per month starting April 2024. Implementation has involved forced recruitment drives, including from Rohingya communities in , often violating age and exemption protocols, leading to public evasion and further unrest. By early 2025, the junta acknowledged "improper implementation" but persisted, framing it as essential for national defense against "terrorist" threats. Despite these efforts, the strategies have correlated with territorial contraction, with the military controlling approximately 21% of Myanmar's land by October 2025, down from pre-coup levels, as EAOs and PDFs consolidated 42% through coordinated offensives like Operation 1027. Analysts attribute this to overreliance on attrition tactics amid eroded local legitimacy, though the maintains operational resilience via air superiority and urban strongholds. The approach's sustainability remains contingent on external arms supplies from allies like and , underscoring a shift toward protracted attrition over decisive victories.

Administrative and Federal Structure

Territorial Divisions

Myanmar's territory is administratively divided into seven regions, seven states, and the , as established under the 2008 Constitution. The regions, largely populated by the Bamar majority, consist of Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, , , Tanintharyi, and ; these are central to economic and urban activity, with serving as the commercial hub and as a cultural center. The states, intended to accommodate ethnic minorities, include , Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan, encompassing peripheral and border areas prone to due to historical marginalization and resource disputes. Subdivisions within these units include districts, townships, towns, wards, and village tracts, totaling over 330 townships as of recent mappings. Certain areas within feature self-administered zones and a division, providing nominal ethnic autonomy: the (controlled by the ) and self-administered zones for the Danu, , Naga, Pa-O, and Palaung groups. These arrangements, formalized since 2010, allow limited local legislative and executive powers but remain subordinate to the and have not resolved underlying separatist tensions. Following the 2021 military coup, territorial control has diverged sharply from this official framework amid escalating civil conflict. The (SAC), the junta's governing body, holds sway over roughly 21 percent of the country's territory as of early 2025, concentrated in urban centers like and , key regions such as parts of and Bago, and select military strongholds. Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), including the in Rakhine, in Kachin, and alliances in Shan, alongside People's Defense Forces in resistance-held areas of and Magway, dominate approximately 60-70 percent of the land, particularly borderlands facilitating cross-border trade and insurgent operations. This fragmentation has politicized territorial divisions, rendering state and region governments—each with elected assemblies (Hluttaws) and chief ministers under pre-coup norms—dysfunctional or junta-appointed in controlled zones, while EAO-administered areas operate parallel systems emphasizing . The SAC's reliance on air strikes and scorched-earth tactics to contest losses, as seen in northern Shan offensives, underscores causal links between central overreach and peripheral rebellions, with no unified federal structure emerging despite constitutional provisions. Control dynamics shift rapidly, with in late 2023 exemplifying EAO gains that halved junta-held territory in some estimates.

Local Governance and Decentralization Challenges

Myanmar's administrative structure under the 2008 Constitution divides the country into seven regions, seven states, one , and self-administered zones/divisions for certain ethnic groups, with regional and state assemblies elected to handle local legislation on matters like , , and . However, these bodies possess limited , as chief ministers are appointed by the president rather than elected by assemblies, fiscal resources remain centrally controlled with minimal revenue-raising powers at subnational levels, and the retains veto authority over key decisions through reserved legislative seats and commander-in-chief influence. This framework perpetuates centralization, exacerbating governance inefficiencies such as poor service delivery in remote areas and dependency on or for funding, which constituted over 90% of subnational budgets as of 2016. Decentralization efforts prior to the 2021 coup faced systemic barriers, including low institutional capacity at local levels—evidenced by only 20-30% of townships having functional development committees—and entrenched , with ranking Myanmar 157th out of 180 countries in perceived in 2020. Ethnic minorities, comprising over 30% of the and concentrated in peripheral states like Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine, have long demanded greater self-rule to address historical marginalization under Bamar-dominated central rule, viewing as essential for resource control and cultural preservation. Yet, pre-coup reforms stalled due to military resistance to power-sharing, as the Tatmadaw's constitutional safeguards prioritize national unity over , leading to stalled peace processes like the signed by only eight of 20 major ethnic armed organizations by 2015. Following the February 1, 2021, military coup, the junta has intensified central control by dissolving elected local councils and imposing military administrators in contested areas, further undermining amid ongoing that has displaced over 3 million people by mid-2024. In response, the (NUG) and allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have established parallel governance structures, including over 300 local administrative bodies by 2023 that manage taxation, justice, and services in resistance-held territories covering approximately 40% of Myanmar's land by late 2024. These bottom-up initiatives foster de facto but encounter challenges like inconsistent legal frameworks across groups, limited technical expertise—particularly in fiscal management where taxation yields irregular revenues—and inter-group rivalries that risk territorial fragmentation rather than cohesive . Coordinating these disparate local systems remains a core obstacle, as evidenced by the NUG's National Unity Consultative Council struggling to harmonize policies among EAOs, some of which prioritize autonomy over integration, potentially complicating post-conflict unification. Resource scarcity compounds issues, with resistance administrations reliant on informal economies and funding, achieving only partial service provision—such as in 50% of controlled areas but healthcare in under 30%—while facing junta blockades. Ultimately, sustainable hinges on resolving ethnic trust deficits and building inclusive institutions, though military dominance and armed conflict continue to prioritize security over devolved governance.

Political Actors and Ideologies

Dominant Parties and Factions

The State Administration Council (SAC), established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing following the February 1, 2021 coup d'état, has dominated Myanmar's political landscape as the de facto ruling authority, comprising military officers and select civilians aligned with the Tatmadaw. The SAC suspended the 2008 constitution, dissolved parliament, and detained leaders of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD), consolidating power under military command until at least July 2025, when it ended the nationwide state of emergency in preparation for planned elections. Min Aung Hlaing, as SAC chairman, directs policy through an inner circle of generals, with limited evidence of significant internal factions challenging his leadership as of October 2025. The (USDP), widely regarded as the military's proxy, serves as the primary political vehicle for junta interests, led by Khin Yi since 2022 as a loyalist. Formed from the remnants of the military's former mass organization, the USDP performed poorly in the 2020 elections but has mobilized ultranationalist supporters and prepared for nationwide campaigning in the junta's anticipated 2025 polls, alongside eight other parties including the National Unity Party and . Despite this, the USDP's influence remains subordinate to SAC directives, functioning more as an electoral facade than an independent force. The NLD, which secured supermajorities in the 2015 and 2020 elections under Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership, has been deregistered and effectively sidelined since the coup, with its central executive committee vowing non-participation in junta-orchestrated votes. Imprisoned NLD figures, including Suu Kyi serving reduced sentences for multiple charges, render the party unable to operate openly, shifting its role to symbolic opposition amid widespread arrests of members. Other factions, such as ethnic-based parties, hold marginal influence in junta-approved electoral contests but lack dominance outside military-controlled structures.

Opposition Movements and Exile Entities

Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, which ousted the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), widespread opposition emerged in the form of civil disobedience campaigns, protests, and eventually armed resistance groups aligned against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta. These movements, often termed the Spring Revolution, initially mobilized through strikes and demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands, particularly in urban centers like Yangon and Mandalay, before escalating into guerrilla warfare as junta repression intensified with arrests, lethal force, and internet blackouts. By late 2021, the opposition had formalized under the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration claiming legitimacy from the ousted parliament's remnants, including the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), comprising elected lawmakers from the 2020 general election where the NLD secured 396 of 476 contested seats in the Union Parliament. The NUG, established on April 16, 2021, operates primarily from exile bases in neighboring countries and Western capitals, with key leaders such as and Minister of Defense U Khun Myint Tun coordinating activities remotely while many ministers reside abroad due to junta arrest warrants. Its structure emphasizes collective leadership across ethnic lines, including a National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) with representatives from 19 organizations, and prioritizes principles like , , and , as outlined in its Federal Democracy Charter adopted in 2021. In , the NUG has focused on internal reforms to enhance effectiveness, issuing bi-weekly updates on governance initiatives, digital service provision in resistance-held areas, and diplomatic outreach, while funding resistance through taxes collected in liberated territories estimated at over $100 million annually via mechanisms like the Spring Currency. Despite claims of broad representativeness, critics note its Burman-majority composition has strained relations with some ethnic groups, contributing to fragmentation in the broader anti-junta coalition. Domestically, opposition manifests through the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), decentralized militias formed starting in May 2021 under the NUG's Ministry of Defense, with over 600 units by 2025 operating in rural and border regions to conduct ambushes, sabotage, and territorial control alongside allied ethnic armed organizations. PDFs, comprising tens of thousands of volunteers—many former protesters and defected soldiers—have captured key towns and supply lines, contributing to the junta's loss of control over approximately 40% of Myanmar's territory by mid-2025, though they face challenges in command cohesion and armament reliant on captured weapons and smuggled arms. These forces emphasize defensive operations to protect civilians from junta airstrikes and ground offensives, which have displaced over 3 million people since the coup. Exile entities, centered on the NUG, engage in international advocacy, securing recognition from entities like the (which designated the NUG a legitimate voice in 2022) and providing parallel diplomatic services, such as passports issued to over 10,000 supporters by 2025. Leaders like Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung have toured and to build alliances, emphasizing sanctions and arms embargoes against the junta, while navigating host-country restrictions in and . Funding streams include diaspora donations and , sustaining operations amid junta bounties on exiles, though internal debates persist over centralization versus decentralization to accommodate diverse resistance factions.

Ethnic and Separatist Agendas

Myanmar's ethnic minorities, constituting approximately 40 percent of the population and encompassing over 130 distinct groups, have pursued agendas centered on , territorial , and federal power-sharing since the nation's in 1948, when the Panglong Agreement's assurances of ethnic equality were not fully implemented. These movements, often led by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), reject the central government's unitary structure, citing historical Burmanization policies, resource exploitation, and military abuses as drivers of . While some groups advocate integration within a federal democratic framework emphasizing state-level and , others prioritize or , controlling narcotics trade, mining, and local administration in border regions. In northern Myanmar, the (KIA), formed in 1961 amid military centralization, demands self-governance for , including control over jade mines and hydroelectric projects, framing its struggle as defense against cultural erosion and forced assimilation. The KIA, allied with the (NUG) post-2021 coup, resumed offensives after a 2011 ceasefire collapse, capturing military outposts and expanding into northern by coordinating with PDFs. Similarly, the (MNDAA), representing , seeks restoration of pre-2009 autonomy lost in a junta offensive that displaced 30,000 civilians; it launched incursions in 2023 as part of the . The (TNLA), for , pursues ethnic self-rule amid Wa-Shan conflicts, with forces estimated at 5,000-10,000 fighters active in Township. Western and southwestern insurgencies feature the (AA), established in 2009 by Rakhine nationalists, which espouses a confederationist vision prioritizing over , governing swaths of Rakhine and States through taxation, courts, and militias totaling around 30,000 personnel. The AA's , initiated October 27, 2023, alongside MNDAA and TNLA, overran junta positions in and Rakhine, prompting Beijing-brokered ceasefires in January 2025 while enabling AA dominance in coastal areas, including bans on civilian exodus in May 2025 to bolster recruitment. Eastern groups like the (KNU) and its armed wing, the (KNLA), founded in 1947, have evolved from independence goals to federalism, demanding Karen State autonomy with rights to forests and cross-border trade; post-coup, they abrogated ceasefires, allying with Kayah resistance to seize in 2024. The (UWSA), with 20,000-30,000 troops, maintains independence in Wa territories under a 1989 truce, funding operations via production despite nominal allegiance to the junta. Shan factions, fragmented among groups like the Shan State Army-North, seek divided statehood amid cultivation disputes. These agendas, while unified against the junta—controlling over 40 percent of territory by mid-2025—reveal tensions, as military gains strain alliances and raise risks, with some EAOs rejecting (NCA) compromises for 2015 signatories. The junta's 2024-2025 terrorist designations against AA, MNDAA, and TNLA underscore escalating confrontations, yet EAO governance in liberated zones, including schools and health services, sustains legitimacy among populations enduring aerial bombardments.

International Engagement

Regional Relations and ASEAN Involvement

China has provided substantial diplomatic and economic support to Myanmar's following the February 1, 2021 coup, prioritizing the protection of its infrastructure investments, including oil and gas pipelines and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under the . This backing intensified amid Western sanctions, with Beijing vetoing stronger UN actions and engaging directly with junta leader to stabilize border regions and counter ethnic armed groups threatening Chinese interests. India has adopted a hedging strategy, maintaining security cooperation with the (SAC) to address border insurgencies and , while providing limited and engaging opposition entities like the . Post-coup advances by ethnic armed organizations along the 1,643-kilometer shared border have prompted to enhance intelligence sharing and infrastructure projects like the , though rebel control over frontier areas complicates these efforts. Relations with remain strained primarily over the Rohingya refugee crisis, exacerbated by the coup's disruption of repatriation talks, leaving over 1 million refugees in camps and occasional cross-border clashes. and , as immediate neighbors, have pragmatically sustained trade—Thailand via informal border markets handling billions in annual flows—while hosting displaced populations and facilitating humanitarian channels, despite domestic pressures from refugee inflows. ASEAN adopted the Five-Point Consensus on April 24, 2021, during an emergency summit, urging an immediate end to violence, constructive dialogue among parties, appointment of a special envoy, humanitarian assistance delivery, and a chair's visit to . Implementation has faltered, with the junta dismissing inclusive dialogue and mediator roles while restricting aid access, leading to only partial envoy engagements and sporadic ceasefires that failed to halt escalating conflict. Annual special envoys, including Malaysia's Tan Sri Othman Hashim appointed in January 2025, have conducted consultations with SAC representatives, neighboring states, and limited opposition stakeholders, but outcomes remain negligible amid ASEAN's non-interference doctrine, which precludes coercive measures. As of October 2025, leaders continue to reaffirm the Consensus in statements from the 46th and subsequent meetings, rejecting the junta's planned 2025-2026 elections as illegitimate and proposing enhancements like a permanent envoy mechanism to sustain relevance. Neighboring members, influenced by , have resisted Myanmar's full exclusion from forums, allowing low-level participation while prioritizing regional stability over democratic restoration, reflecting the bloc's consensus-based limitations in addressing internal .

Global Diplomacy and Sanctions

Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, which ousted the democratically elected government led by , major Western powers and the issued immediate condemnations, refusing to recognize the (SAC) as the legitimate authority. The , , and described the takeover as a reversal of democratic progress, with joint statements marking anniversaries of the event to demand the restoration of civilian rule and the release of detained leaders. These entities prioritized targeted measures over broad economic isolation, aiming to disrupt the junta's revenue streams from natural resources and military-linked enterprises while minimizing harm to civilians. The has imposed extensive sanctions under Executive Order 14014, designating SAC members, military-affiliated conglomerates such as Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company Limited, and revenue-generating entities like the (MOGE). On January 31, 2024, the Treasury Department sanctioned additional military cronies and companies three years post-coup, focusing on oil and gas exports that fund junta operations. Further actions in October 2023 prohibited U.S. to MOGE, citing its role in sustaining military activities against civilians. By September 2025, these measures extended to entities facilitating arms procurement from , reflecting concerns over illicit proliferation networks. The enacted a sanctions regime under Council Decision 2013/183/CFSP, targeting SAC officials, military-controlled firms, and state-owned banks for asset freezes and travel bans, with expansions in response to escalating violence. The sixth round in February 2023 added nine individuals and seven entities, while the eighth round in December 2023 included four more persons and two entities linked to repression. These measures, renewed periodically, explicitly cover the SAC and arms suppliers, though enforcement relies on member state compliance and has not included a full embargo on imports like gems or timber due to evidentiary challenges in tracing junta benefits. United Nations efforts have centered on non-binding resolutions rather than enforceable sanctions, constrained by veto powers of and . Security Council Resolution 2669, adopted December 21, 2022, demanded an end to violence and the release of detainees but omitted an , drawing criticism for insufficient pressure on systematic violations. The General Assembly's 2021 resolution urged member states to halt arms flows to , yet implementation remains voluntary, with no UN-wide blacklist or asset freezes established as of 2025. Diplomatic isolation persists in forums like the , where coordinated statements reject junta legitimacy, though global enforcement varies, allowing some revenue inflows via non-sanctioning partners.

Foreign Influences in the Conflict

has emerged as the primary foreign backer of Myanmar's since the coup, prioritizing stability to safeguard its extensive economic stakes, including oil and gas pipelines, rare earth mineral extraction, and projects valued in billions. has provided technical and financial assistance for the junta's planned 2025 elections, dispatched high-level delegations to confer legitimacy on the regime, and increased military aid amid rebel advances, viewing the junta as the sole entity capable of preventing national fragmentation that could threaten Chinese border security and investments. This support persists despite China's public rhetoric against chaos, as evidenced by over $400 million in arms and equipment supplied since , underscoring a pragmatic alignment with the junta over democratic opposition forces. Russia has deepened military ties with the junta, supplying advanced weaponry and aviation components critical to sustaining aerial operations against resistance forces, with imports exceeding $400 million since the coup despite a non-binding UN adopted in 2021. Moscow's state arms exporter has coordinated directly with on hardware deliveries, including potential drone technology, as the junta faces territorial losses and seeks to offset Western sanctions. This partnership aligns with Russia's broader strategy of engaging pariah regimes, providing the junta with a lifeline amid setbacks, though it has drawn condemnation from Western bodies for enabling atrocities. India maintains a dual-track approach, preserving diplomatic and infrastructure ties with the junta—such as the —while quietly engaging ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) controlling border areas to mitigate spillover violence into its northeastern states, where insurgencies have historical links to Myanmar's peripheries. New Delhi's policy reflects strategic hedging against Chinese dominance, with increased outreach to EAOs since 2023 amid the junta's loss of over 40% of territory, though it avoids overt support for the (NUG) to prevent alienating . Thailand has facilitated junta diplomacy by hosting informal talks and advocating broader international engagement, including economic corridors that benefit both sides, while sheltering over 100,000 refugees and tolerating cross-border trade that indirectly sustains the regime. Bangkok's pragmatic stance prioritizes border stability and migrant labor flows over isolation, contrasting with ASEAN's broader consensus-based paralysis, where the 2021 Five-Point Consensus on dialogue and aid delivery has yielded negligible progress due to non-compliance and internal divisions. Western powers, led by the and , have imposed targeted sanctions on junta leaders, entities, and enablers since 2021, freezing assets and restricting arms flows, yet evasion tactics—such as rerouting through third-party banks like Myanmar Economic Bank—have limited impact, with the regime procuring over $1 billion in arms from non-Western suppliers. While these measures have constrained some revenue streams and exposed regime vulnerabilities, partial rollbacks in 2025 on select arms-linked firms and the absence of secondary sanctions on key partners like have diluted enforcement, prompting criticism from UN experts that they fail to halt atrocities or decisively weaken the military's operational capacity. The has extended via limited scholarships and NUG recognition, but direct to resistance remains absent, reflecting caution over escalation in a China-adjacent theater.

Key Controversies

Human Rights and Atrocity Claims

Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, Myanmar's junta has engaged in systematic violence against , including airstrikes, artillery shelling, and village burnings, resulting in over 5,000 deaths documented by the UN as of September 2024. These actions, often targeting areas controlled by opposition forces or ethnic armed organizations, have been characterized by UN investigators as escalating into widespread atrocities, encompassing extrajudicial killings, , and , with patterns indicative of war crimes and . The junta's intensified operations in 2024, amid territorial losses, have inflicted the highest death toll since the coup, with reports of and property destruction in retaliatory campaigns. Empirical data from UN monitoring highlights the junta's use of indiscriminate aerial bombings, such as the October 2025 paraglider-assisted attack on a gathering that killed dozens, as part of a broader to suppress resistance. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), established by the UN Human Rights Council, has amassed evidence of these violations, building on prior fact-finding missions that identified similar military tactics predating the coup but amplified post-2021. Civilian casualties have surged, with documenting unlawful airstrikes harming non-combatants in junta offensives against coalitions of ethnic and pro-democracy forces. Systemic persists, as the military's control over and media stifles domestic accountability, while international efforts like ICC referrals remain stalled. Atrocity claims extend to non-state actors, though less systematically documented. Ethnic armed groups, such as the in , have faced accusations of repressive policies and abuses against minorities, including the Rohingya, involving forced recruitment and restrictions on movement amid their territorial gains. U.S. State Department reports note instances of extrajudicial killings and civilian targeting by opposition forces in conflict zones, underscoring that while the junta bears primary responsibility for scale and intent, fragmented rebel entities have contributed to localized violations in the escalating . Verification challenges in active combat areas limit precise attribution, but consistent patterns across UN and NGO field reports affirm the junta's dominant role in atrocity-scale abuses driven by efforts to retain centralized power.

Rohingya Policies and International Scrutiny

The Myanmar government's policies toward the Muslim population in , whom it refers to as rather than Rohingya, have centered on denying them recognition as an indigenous ethnic group under the 1982 Citizenship Law. This law establishes citizenship primarily through descent from residents present before British colonial rule in 1823 or from those listed among Myanmar's 135 official ethnicities, excluding the Rohingya/, whom authorities view as descendants of post-colonial migrants from . As a result, this population has been rendered effectively stateless, with limited access to , , healthcare, and , including restrictions to designated townships and requirements for permits for inter-village travel. These measures stem from security concerns over historical insurgencies and demographic pressures in Rakhine, where Buddhist Rakhine locals perceive the Muslim population—estimated at around 1 million pre-2017—as encroaching on resources and identity. Tensions escalated in 2012 with communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims, displacing over 140,000, mostly Muslims, into internal camps, followed by further unrest in 2016. The pivotal 2017 crisis began on August 25, when militants from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched coordinated attacks on 30 police posts and an army base in northern Rakhine, killing at least 12 security personnel and prompting retaliatory clearance operations by the Myanmar military. These operations involved widespread arson, killings, and sexual violence, documented in village burnings via satellite imagery showing over 350 sites destroyed between August and September 2017, leading to the flight of approximately 750,000 to Bangladesh by year's end. Myanmar authorities described the response as proportionate counter-insurgency against ARSA terrorism, denying systematic targeting and attributing fires to fleeing insurgents, while evidence also emerged of ARSA massacres, such as the killing of nearly 100 Hindus in Maungdaw township. International scrutiny intensified post-2017, with a UN Fact-Finding Mission in 2018 concluding that Myanmar's actions constituted serious violations, including and acts with genocidal intent under the 1948 , based on patterns of mass killings, , and . Myanmar rejected these findings as biased and politically motivated, asserting they ignored ARSA provocations and exaggerated claims without full context of . In November 2019, instituted proceedings against at the (ICJ), alleging genocide; the ICJ issued provisional measures on January 23, 2020, ordering to prevent genocidal acts, ensure military non-interference with Rohingya, and preserve evidence, with compliance reporting required. The court rejected 's preliminary objections in July 2022, affirming jurisdiction, though the case remains pending as of 2025 without a final merits ruling. Additional probes include into deportation as a against humanity, initiated in 2019. Responses included targeted sanctions by the , , and others against military leaders and enterprises linked to the operations, such as restrictions on jade and arms exports, though effectiveness has been limited by Myanmar's ties to and . Reports from UN experts continue to highlight ongoing risks of for the remaining 600,000 in Rakhine, amid post-2021 coup instability, but attribute much scrutiny to institutional biases favoring narratives of unilateral persecution over insurgent dynamics. Myanmar maintains repatriation efforts stalled by Bangladesh's security concerns and ARSA's growing presence in camps, where armed groups have consolidated, posing risks back to Rakhine.

Electoral Processes and Legitimacy Disputes

Myanmar's electoral processes are governed by the , which establishes a combining civilian and military elements. The country employs a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system for electing representatives to the (lower house), (upper house), and state/region assemblies from single-member constituencies. The military, through the , appoints 25% of seats in these legislatures, ensuring veto power over constitutional amendments and influence over presidential selection via an comprising elected MPs and defense services representatives. Elections since the 2008 Constitution's adoption have faced recurring legitimacy challenges. The 2010 general election, the first under the new framework, was won by the military-backed (USDP) amid widespread boycotts by opposition groups, including the (NLD), and criticisms of restrictive laws suppressing dissent. In contrast, the 2015 election saw the NLD secure a landslide victory with approximately 57% of contested seats, observed by international missions like the Carter Center, which noted improvements in transparency despite ongoing military influence and irregularities in ethnic areas. The 2020 general election amplified disputes, with the NLD achieving a in contested seats, capturing 258 of 330 in the . The military, led by Senior General , alleged massive voter , citing irregularities in voter lists, advance voting, and over 8 million invalid votes, but provided no independently verifiable evidence to substantiate claims of outcome-altering malfeasance. International observers, including the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and the Carter Center, assessed the polls as largely competitive and reflective of voter intent, though they identified administrative shortcomings, such as incomplete voter rolls in some regions and limited access for monitors during advance voting; no findings supported systemic sufficient to invalidate results. Following the February 1, 2021, military coup, the annulled the 2020 results under a declared , positioning itself as interim authority to rectify alleged electoral flaws and prepare new polls. This triggered a parallel legitimacy contest: the (NUG), formed by ousted NLD lawmakers and allies, asserts continuity from the 2020 mandate, representing elected parliamentary majorities, while the SAC invokes constitutional emergency provisions but faces rejection for lacking electoral basis. SAC plans for future elections, including voter list revisions and party law amendments, have been derided by analysts as engineered to favor military proxies amid ongoing , with no timeline met and ethnic armed groups controlling swathes of territory complicating implementation.

Federalism vs. Unitary State Debates

The debate over federalism versus a unitary state in Myanmar originates from the 1947 Panglong Agreement, in which Aung San and representatives from the Chin, Kachin, and Shan ethnic groups agreed to form a union with provisions for ethnic autonomy and the right to secede after 10 years, aiming to balance central authority with regional self-governance amid independence from British rule. However, post-independence governments, including the military regimes, prioritized a unitary structure to consolidate power, interpreting the agreement as non-binding and failing to enact meaningful federal provisions, which fueled ethnic insurgencies as groups perceived centralization as Bamar ethnic dominance over peripheral minorities comprising about one-third of the population. The 2008 Constitution entrenched a framework, dividing the country into seven Bamar-majority regions and seven ethnic states with limited self-administered zones, but vesting key powers—including command, natural resources, and —in the while reserving 25% of parliamentary seats for unelected appointees to veto amendments. This design, drafted unilaterally by the , offers nominal ethnic autonomy through state legislatures but subordinates them to , rejecting demands for or control over local security forces, as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) argue it perpetuates conflict by denying and resource rights in border areas where they hold de facto control. Proponents of the unitary model, including the , contend that risks national disintegration, citing historical separatist threats and emphasizing sovereignty preservation, though critics note this has sustained over seven decades of involving more than 20 EAOs. Post-2021 military coup, resistance coalitions including the (NUG) and allied EAOs have intensified calls for "federal democracy," advocating a "holding together" with asymmetric autonomy, resource-sharing, and ethnic veto powers to address grievances, as evidenced by governance in junta-liberated territories covering up to 60% of the country by mid-2023. This shift contrasts with the junta's reaffirmation of unitary principles, designating major EAOs like the as terrorist entities in August 2025 to justify centralized . Debates persist on 's form—territorial versus non-territorial, inclusive of non-indigenous minorities—amid concerns that without equitable power , ethnic could exacerbate exclusion for groups like the Rohingya or urban migrants, though from ongoing territorial gains by EAOs underscores unitary centralism's causal failure in quelling .

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