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Organized crime
Organized crime
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Organized crime refers to transnational, national, or local groups of centralized enterprises that engage in illegal activities, most commonly for profit. While organized crime is generally considered a form of illegal business, some criminal organizations, such as terrorist groups, rebel groups, and separatists, are politically motivated. Many criminal organizations rely on fear or terror to achieve their goals and maintain control within their ranks. These groups may adopt tactics similar to those used by authoritarian regimes to maintain power. Some forms of organized crime exist simply to meet demand for illegal goods or to facilitate trade in products and services banned by the state, such as illegal drugs or firearms. In other cases, criminal organizations force people to do business with them, as when gangs extort protection money from shopkeepers.[1] Street gangs may be classified as organized crime groups under broader definitions, or may develop sufficient discipline to be considered organized crime under stricter definitions.

A criminal organization can also be referred to as an outfit, a gangster/gang, thug, crime family, mafia, mobster/mob,[2][3] (crime) ring,[4] or syndicate;[5] the network, subculture, and community of criminals involved in organized crime may be referred to as the underworld or gangland. Sociologists sometimes specifically distinguish a "mafia" as a type of organized crime group that specializes in the supply of extra-legal protection and quasi-law enforcement. Academic studies of the original "Mafia", the Sicilian Mafia, as well as its American counterpart,[6] generated an economic study of organized crime groups and exerted great influence on studies of the Russian mafia,[7] the Indonesian preman,[8] the Chinese triads,[9] the Hong Kong triads,[10] the Indian thuggee, and the Japanese yakuza.[11]

Other organizations—including states, places of worship, militaries, police forces, and corporations—may sometimes use organized-crime methods to conduct their activities, but their powers derive from their status as formal social institutions. There is a tendency to distinguish "traditional" organized crime such as gambling, loan sharking, drug-trafficking, prostitution, and fraud from certain other forms of crime that also usually involve organized or group criminal acts, such as white-collar crime, financial crimes, political crimes, war crimes, state crimes, and treason. This distinction is not always apparent and academics continue to debate the matter.[12] For example, in failed states that can no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance (usually due to fractious violence or to extreme poverty), organized crime, governance, and war sometimes complement each other. The term "oligarchy" has been used to describe democratic countries whose political, social, and economic institutions come under the control of a few families and business oligarchs that may be deemed or may devolve into organized crime groups in practice.[13][failed verification] By their very nature, kleptocracies, mafia states, narco-states or narcokleptocracies, and states with high levels of clientelism and political corruption are either heavily involved with organized crime or tend to foster organized crime within their own governments.[14][15]

In the United States, the Organized Crime Control Act (1970) defines organized crime as "[t]he unlawful activities of [...] a highly organized, disciplined association [...]".[16] Criminal activity as a structured process is referred to as racketeering. In the UK, police estimate that organized crime involves up to 38,000 people operating in 6,000 various groups.[17] Historically, the largest organized crime force in the United States has been Cosa Nostra (Italian-American Mafia), but other transnational criminal organizations have also risen in prominence in recent decades.[18] A 2012 article in a U.S. Department of Justice journal stated that: "Since the end of the Cold War, organized crime groups from Russia, China, Italy, Nigeria, and Japan have increased their international presence and worldwide networks or have become involved in more transnational criminal activities. Most of the world's major international organized crime groups are present in the United States."[18] The US Drug Enforcement Administration's 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment classified Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as the "greatest criminal drug threat to the United States," citing their dominance "over large regions in Mexico used for the cultivation, production, importation, and transportation of illicit drugs" and identifying the Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation, Juárez, Gulf, Los Zetas, and Beltrán-Leyva cartels as the six Mexican TCO with the greatest influence in drug trafficking to the United States.[19] The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 has a target to combat all forms of organized crime as part of the 2030 Agenda.[20]

In some countries, football hooliganism has been linked to organized crime.[21]

Models of organized crime

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Various models have been proposed to describe the structure of criminal organizations.

Organizational

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American Mafia mobster Sam Giancana

Patron–client networks

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Patron–client networks are defined by fluid interactions. They produce crime groups that operate as smaller units within the overall network, and as such tend towards valuing significant others, familiarity of social and economic environments, or tradition. These networks are usually composed of:

  • Hierarchies based on 'naturally' forming family, social and cultural traditions;
  • 'Tight-knit' focus of activity/labor;
  • Fraternal or nepotistic value systems;
  • Personalized activity; including family rivalries, territorial disputes, recruitment and training of family members, etc.;
  • Entrenched belief systems, reliance of tradition (including religion, family values, cultural expectations, class politics, gender roles, etc.); and,
  • Communication and rule enforcement mechanisms dependent on organizational structure, social etiquette, history of criminal involvement, and collective decision-making.[22][23][24][25][26]

Bureaucratic/corporate operations

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Bureaucratic/corporate organized crime groups are defined by the general rigidity of their internal structures. They focus more on how the operation works, succeeds, sustains itself or avoids retribution, they are generally typified by:

  • A complex authority structure;
  • An extensive division of labor between classes within the organization;
  • Meritocratic (as opposed to cultural or social attributes);
  • Responsibilities carried out in an impersonal manner;
  • Extensive written rules/regulations (as opposed to cultural praxis dictating action); and,
  • 'Top-down' communication and rule enforcement mechanisms.

However, this model of operation has some flaws:

  • The 'top-down' communication strategy is susceptible to interception, more so further down the hierarchy being communicated to;
  • Maintaining written records jeopardizes the security of the organization and relies on increased security measures;
  • Infiltration at lower levels in the hierarchy can jeopardize the entire organization (a 'house of cards' effect); and,
  • Death, injury, incarceration or internal power struggles dramatically heighten the insecurity of operations.

While bureaucratic operations emphasize business processes and strongly authoritarian hierarchies, these are based on enforcing power relationships rather than an overlying aim of protectionism, sustainability or growth.[27][28][29][30]

Youth and street gangs

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Jamaican gang leader Christopher Coke

An estimate on youth street gangs in the United States provided by Hannigan, et al., marked an increase of 35% between 2002 and 2010.[31] A distinctive gang culture underpins many, but not all, organized groups;[32][33] this may develop through recruiting strategies, social learning processes in the corrective system experienced by youth, family or peer involvement in crime, and the coercive actions of criminal authority figures. The term "street gang" is commonly used interchangeably with "youth gang," referring to neighborhood or street-based youth groups that meet "gang" criteria. Miller (1992) defines a street gang as "a self-formed association of peers, united by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership and internal organization, who act collectively or as individuals to achieve specific purposes, including the conduct of illegal activity and control of a particular territory, facility, or enterprise."[34] Some reasons youth join gangs include to feel accepted, attain status, and increase their self-esteem.[35] A sense of unity brings together many of the youth gangs that lack the family aspect at home.

"Zones of transition" are deteriorating neighborhoods with shifting populations.[36][37] In such areas, conflict between groups, fighting, "turf wars", and theft promote solidarity and cohesion.[38] Cohen (1955): working class teenagers joined gangs due to frustration of inability to achieve status and goals of the middle class; Cloward and Ohlin (1960): blocked opportunity, but unequal distribution of opportunities lead to creating different types of gangs (that is, some focused on robbery and property theft, some on fighting and conflict and some were retreatists focusing on drug taking); Spergel (1966) was one of the first criminologists to focus on evidence-based practice rather than intuition into gang life and culture. Participation in gang-related events during adolescence perpetuate a pattern of maltreatment on their own children years later.[31] Klein (1971) like Spergel studied the effects on members of social workers' interventions. More interventions actually lead to greater gang participation and solidarity and bonds between members. Downes and Rock (1988) on Parker's analysis: strain theory applies, labeling theory (from experience with police and courts), control theory (involvement in trouble from early childhood and the eventual decision that the costs outweigh the benefits) and conflict theories. No ethnic group is more disposed to gang involvement than another, rather it is the status of being marginalized, alienated or rejected that makes some groups more vulnerable to gang formation,[39][40][41] and this would also be accounted for in the effect of social exclusion,[42][43] especially in terms of recruitment and retention. These may also be defined by age (typically youth) or peer group influences,[44] and the permanence or consistency of their criminal activity. These groups also form their own symbolic identity or public representation which are recognizable by the community at large (include colors, symbols, patches, flags and tattoos).

Research has focused on whether the gangs have formal structures, clear hierarchies and leadership in comparison with adult groups, and whether they are rational in pursuit of their goals, though positions on structures, hierarchies and defined roles are conflicting. Some studied street gangs involved in drug dealing - finding that their structure and behavior had a degree of organizational rationality.[45] Members saw themselves as organized criminals; gangs were formal-rational organizations,[46][47][48] Strong organizational structures, well defined roles and rules that guided members' behavior. Also a specified and regular means of income (i.e., drugs). Padilla (1992) agreed with the two above. However some have found these to be loose rather than well-defined and lacking persistent focus, there was relatively low cohesion, few shared goals and little organizational structure.[40] Shared norms, value and loyalties were low, structures "chaotic", little role differentiation or clear distribution of labor. Similarly, the use of violence does not conform to the principles behind protection rackets, political intimidation and drug trafficking activities employed by those adult groups. In many cases gang members graduate from youth gangs to highly developed OC groups, with some already in contact with such syndicates and through this we see a greater propensity for imitation. Gangs and traditional criminal organizations cannot be universally linked (Decker, 1998),[49][50] however there are clear benefits to both the adult and youth organization through their association. In terms of structure, no single crime group is archetypal, though in most cases there are well-defined patterns of vertical integration (attempting to control all or part of the supply chain), as is the case in arms, sex and drug trafficking.

Individual difference

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Entrepreneurial

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The entrepreneurial model looks at either the individual criminal or a smaller group of organized criminals, that capitalize off the more fluid 'group-association' of contemporary organized crime.[51] This model conforms to social learning theory or differential association in that there are clear associations and interaction between criminals where knowledge may be shared, or values enforced, however, it is argued that rational choice is not represented in this. The choice to commit a certain act, or associate with other organized crime groups, may be seen as much more of an entrepreneurial decision - contributing to the continuation of a criminal enterprise, by maximizing those aspects that protect or support their own individual gain. In this context, the role of risk is also easily understandable,[52][53] however it is debatable whether the underlying motivation should be seen as true entrepreneurship,[54] or entrepreneurship as a product of some social disadvantage.

The criminal organization, much in the same way as one would assess pleasure and pain, weighs such factors as legal, social and economic risk to determine potential profit and loss from certain criminal activities. This decision-making process rises from the entrepreneurial efforts of the group's members, their motivations and the environments in which they work. Opportunism is also a key factor – the organized criminal or criminal group is likely to frequently reorder the criminal associations they maintain, the types of crimes they perpetrate, and how they function in the public arena (recruitment, reputation, etc.) in order to ensure efficiency, capitalization and protection of their interests.[55]

Multi-model approach

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Culture and ethnicity provide an environment where trust and communication between criminals can be efficient and secure. This may ultimately lead to a competitive advantage for some groups; however, it is inaccurate to adopt this as the only determinant of classification in organized crime. This categorization includes the Sicilian Mafia, 'Ndrangheta, ethnic Chinese criminal groups, Japanese yakuza (or Boryokudan), Colombian drug trafficking groups, Nigerian organized crime groups, Corsican mafia, Korean criminal groups and Jamaican posses. From this perspective, organized crime is not a modern phenomenon - the construction of 17th and 18th century crime gangs fulfill all the present day criteria of criminal organizations (in opposition to the Alien Conspiracy Theory). These roamed the rural borderlands of central Europe embarking on many of the same illegal activities associated with today's crime organizations, with the exception of money laundering. When the French revolution created strong nation states, the criminal gangs moved to other poorly controlled regions like the Balkans and Southern Italy, where the seeds were sown for the Sicilian Mafia - the linchpin of organized crime in the New World.[56]

Computational approach

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While most of the conceptual frameworks used to model organized crime emphasize the role of actors or activities, computational approaches built on the foundations of data science and artificial intelligence are focusing on deriving new insights on organized crime from big data. For example, novel machine learning models have been applied to study and detect urban crime[57][58] and online prostitution networks.[59][60] Big data has also been used to develop online tools predicting the risk for an individual to be a victim of online sex trade or getting drawn into online sex work.[61][62] In addition, data from Twitter[63] and Google Trends[64] have been used to study the public perceptions of organized crime.

Model type Environment Group Processes Impacts
National Historical or cultural basis Family or hierarchy Secrecy/bonds. Links to insurgents Local corruption/influence. Fearful community.
Transnational Politically and economically unstable Vertical integration Legitimate cover Stable supply of illicit goods. High-level corruption.
Transnational/transactional Any Flexible. Small size. Violent. Opportunistic. Risk taking Unstable supply of range of illicit goods. Exploits young local offenders.
Entrepreneurial/transactional Developed/high technology regions Individuals or pairs. Operating through legitimate enterprise Provision of illicit services, e.g., money laundering, fraud, criminal networks.

Typical activities

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Organized crime groups provide a range of illegal services and goods. Organized crime often victimizes businesses through the use of extortion or theft and fraud activities like hijacking cargo trucks and ships, robbing goods, committing bankruptcy fraud (also known as "bust-out"), insurance fraud or stock fraud (insider trading).[65] Organized crime groups also victimize individuals by car theft (either for dismantling at "chop shops" or for export), art theft, Metal theft, bank robbery, burglary, jewelry and gems theft and heists, shoplifting, computer hacking, credit card fraud, economic espionage, embezzlement, identity theft, and securities fraud ("pump and dump" scam).[66] Some organized crime groups defraud national, state, or local governments by bid rigging public projects, counterfeiting money, smuggling or manufacturing untaxed alcohol (rum-running) or cigarettes (buttlegging), and providing immigrant workers to avoid taxes.[67]

Organized crime groups seek out corrupt public officials in executive, law enforcement, and judicial roles so that their criminal rackets and activities on the black market can avoid, or at least receive early warnings about, investigation and prosecution.[68][69]

Activities of organized crime include:

Organized crime groups also do a range of business and labor racketeering activities, such as skimming casinos, insider trading, setting up monopolies in industries such as garbage collecting, construction and cement pouring, bid rigging, getting "no-show" and "no-work" jobs, political corruption and bullying.[70]

Violence

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Assault

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Violent crime may be one of a criminal organization's tools used to achieve its goals, due to psycho-social factors (cultural conflict, aggression, rebellion against authority, access to illicit substances, counter-cultural dynamic), or it may simply be committed by individual criminals and the groups they form. Assaults are used for coercive measures, to "rough up" debtors, competition or recruits, in the commission of robberies, in connection to other property offenses, and as an expression of counter-cultural authority.[71] Violence is normalized within criminal organizations (in direct opposition to mainstream society) and the locations they control.[72]

While the intensity of violence is dependent on the types of crime the organization is involved in (as well as their organizational structure or cultural tradition), aggressive acts range on a spectrum from low-grade physical assaults to major trauma assaults. Bodily harm and grievous bodily harm, within the context of organized crime, must be understood as indicators of intense social and cultural conflict, motivations contrary to the security of the public, and other psycho-social factors.[73]

Murder

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Murder has evolved from the honor and vengeance killings of the yakuza or Sicilian mafia[74][75][76][77] which placed large physical and symbolic importance on the act of murder, its purposes and consequences,[78][79] to a much less discriminate form of expressing power, enforcing criminal authority, achieving retribution or eliminating competition.

The role of the hit man has been generally consistent throughout the history of organized crime, whether that be due to the efficiency or expediency of hiring a professional assassin or the need to distance oneself from the commission of murderous acts (making it harder to prove criminal culpability). This may include the assassination of notable figures (public, private or criminal), once again dependent on authority, retribution or competition.

Revenge killings, armed robberies, violent disputes over controlled territories and offenses against members of the public must also be considered when looking at the dynamic between different criminal organizations and their (at times) conflicting needs. After killing their victims, the gangsters often try to destroy evidence by getting rid of the victims' remains in such a way as to prevent, hinder, or delay the discovery of the body, to prevent identification of the body, or to prevent autopsy. Criminals have been known to dispose of dead bodies by hiding the bodies in trash or landfills, feeding them to animals (such as pigs or rats),[80] industrial processes (e.g., chemical baths), injection into the legitimate body disposal system (such as morgues, funeral homes, cemeteries, crematoriums, funeral pyres or cadaver donations), covert killings at health care facilities, disguising as animal flesh (such as food waste or restaurant food), creating false evidence of the circumstances of death and letting investigators dispose of the body, obscuring the victim's identity, or abandoning the body in a remote area where it can degrade significantly. Animal activity, such as consumption by scavengers, can contaminate the crime scene or destroy evidence before being discovered[81]. However, there are also many instances of gangsters putting the bodies of their victims on display as a form of psychological warfare against their enemies.

Vigilantism

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Criminal syndicates often commit acts of vigilantism by enforcing laws, investigating certain criminal acts and punishing those who violate such rules. People who are often targeted by organized criminals tend to be individualistic criminals, people who committed crimes that are considered particularly heinous by society, people who committed wrongdoings against members or associates, rivals or terrorist groups. One reason why criminal groups might commit vigilantism in their neighborhoods is to prevent heavy levels of community policing, that could be harmful to their illicit businesses; additionally the vigilante acts could help the gangs to ingratiate themselves in their communities.

In the US during the roaring twenties, the anti-catholic and anti-semitic Ku Klux Klan was known to be a staunch enforcer of prohibition, as a result Italian, Irish, Polish and Jewish gangsters would at times have violent confrontations against the KKK. On one occasion FBI informant and mobster Gregory Scarpa kidnapped and tortured a local Klansman into revealing the bodies of Civil rights workers who had been killed by the KKK.[82] During World War II, America had a growing number of Nazi supporters that formed the German American Bund, which was known to be threatening to local Jewish people, as a result Jewish mobsters (such as Meyer Lansky, Bugsy Siegel and Jack Ruby) were often hired by the American Jewish community to help defend against the Nazi bund, even going as far as attacking and killing Nazi sympathizers during bund meetings.[83] Vigilante groups such as the Black Panther Party, White Panther Party, and Young Lords have been accused of committing crimes in order to fund their political activities.[84]

While protection racketeering is often seen as nothing more than extortion, criminal syndicates that participate in protection rackets have at times provided genuine protection against other criminals for their clients, the reason for this is because the criminal organization would want the business of their clients to do better so that the gang can demand even more protection money, additionally if the gang has enough knowledge of the local fencers, they may even be able to track down and retrieve any objects that were stolen from the business owner, to further help their clients the gang may also force out, disrupt, vandalize, steal from or shutdown competing businesses for their clients.[85] In Colombia the insurgent groups were trying to steal land, kidnap family members, and extort money from the drug barons. As a result the drug lords of the Medellín Cartel formed a paramilitary vigilante group known as Muerte a Secuestradores ("Death to Kidnappers") to defend the cartel against the FARC and M-19, even kidnapping and torturing the leader of M-19 before leaving him tied up in front of a police station.[86] During the Medellín Cartel's war against the Colombian government, both the Norte del Valle Cartel and Cali Cartel formed and operated a vigilante group called Los Pepes (which also comprised members of the Colombian government, police and former members of the Medellín Cartel) to bring about the downfall of Pablo Escobar; they did so by bombing the properties of the Medellín Cartel and kidnapping, torturing and killing Escobar's associates as well as working alongside the Search Bloc, which would eventually lead to the dismantling of the Medellín Cartel and the death of Pablo Escobar.[87] Because of the high levels of corruption, the Oficina de Envigado would do things to help the police and vice versa, to the point where the police and the cartel would sometimes do operations together against other criminals; additionally the leaders of La Oficina would often act as judges to mediate disputes between the various different drug gangs throughout Colombia, which according to some helped prevented a lot of disputes from turning violent.[88]

On Somalia coastline many people rely on fishing for economic survival, because of this Somali pirates are often known to attack foreign vessels who partake in illegal fishing and overfishing in their waters and vessels that illegally dump waste into their waters. As a result, marine biologists say that the local fishery is recovering.[89] In Mexico a vigilante group called Grupos de autodefensa comunitaria was formed to counter the illegal loggers, the La Familia Michoacana Cartel and a drug cartel/cult known as the Knights Templar Cartel; as they grew, they were being joined by former cartel members and as they got bigger they began to sell drugs in order to buy weapons. The Knights Templar Cartel was eventually defeated and dissolved by the vigilantes' actions but they ended up forming their own cartel called Los Viagras, which has links with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.[90] The Minuteman Project is a far-right paramilitary organization that seeks to prevent illegal immigration across the US-Mexico border; however, doing so is detrimental to gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), who make money through people smuggling, and as a result MS-13 is known to commit acts of violence against members of the Minutemen, to prevent them from interfering with their illegal immigration activities.[91] Throughout the world there are various anti-gang vigilante groups, who profess to be fighting against gang influence, but share characteristics and acts similarly to gangs, including Sombra Negra, Friends Stand United, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, and OG Imba.[92][93] Gangs that are involved in drug trafficking often commit violent acts to stop or force out independent dealers—drug dealers with no gang ties—to keep them from taking customers.

In America, there is an animal welfare organization called Rescue Ink, in which outlaw biker gang members volunteer to rescue animals in need and combat against people who commit animal cruelty, such as breaking up cockfighting rings, stopping the killing of stray cats, breaking up dog fighting rings, and rescuing pets from abusive owners.[94] In the American prison system, prison gangs are often known to physically harm and even kill inmates who have committed such crimes as child murder, serial killing, pedophilia, hate crimes, domestic violence, and rape, and inmates who have committed crimes against the elderly, animals, the disabled, the poor and the less fortunate.[95][96] In many minority communities and poor neighborhoods, residents often distrust law enforcement, as a result the gang syndicates often take over to "police" their neighborhoods by committing acts against people who had committed crimes such as bullying, muggings, home invasions, hate crimes, stalking, sexual assault, domestic violence and child molestation, as well as mediating disputes between neighbors. The ways that the gangs would punish such individuals could range from forced apologies, being threatened, being forced to return stolen objects, vandalizing property, arson, being forced to move, bombings, being assaulted or battered, kidnappings, false imprisonment, torture or being murdered.[97] Some criminal syndicates have been known to hold their own "trials" for members of theirs who had been accused of wrongdoing; the punishments that the accused member would face if "found guilty" would vary depending on the offense.

Terrorism

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In addition to what is considered traditional organized crime involving direct crimes of fraud swindles, scams, racketeering and other acts motivated for the accumulation of monetary gain, there is also non-traditional organized crime which is engaged in for political or ideological gain or acceptance. Such crime groups are often labelled terrorist groups or narcoterrorists.[98][99]

There is no universally agreed, legally binding, criminal law definition of terrorism.[100][101] Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts which are intended to create fear (terror), are perpetrated for a religious, political or ideological goal, deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants (e.g., neutral military personnel or civilians), and are committed by non-government agencies.[98] Some definitions also include acts of unlawful violence and war, especially crimes against humanity (see the Nuremberg Trials), Allied authorities deeming the German Nazi Party, its paramilitary and police organizations, and numerous associations subsidiary to the Nazi Party "criminal organizations". The use of similar tactics by criminal organizations for protection rackets or to enforce a code of silence is usually not labeled terrorism though these same actions may be labeled terrorism when done by a politically motivated group.

Notable groups include the Medellín Cartel, Corleonesi Mafia, various Mexican Cartels, and Jamaican Posse.

Other

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Financial crime

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Organized crime groups generate large amounts of money by activities such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, extortion, theft, and financial crime.[102] These illegally sourced assets are of little use to them unless they can disguise it and convert it into funds that are available for investment into legitimate enterprise. The methods they use for converting its 'dirty' money into 'clean' assets encourages corruption. Organized crime groups need to hide the money's illegal origin. This allows for the expansion of OC groups, as the 'laundry' or 'wash cycle' operates to cover the money trail and convert proceeds of crime into usable assets. Money laundering is bad for international and domestic trade, banking reputations and for effective governments and rule of law. This is due to the methods used to hide the proceeds of crime. These methods include, but are not limited to: buying easily transported values, transfer pricing, and using "underground banks,"[103] as well as infiltrating firms in the legal economy.[104]

Launderers will also co-mingle illegal money with revenue made from businesses in order to further mask their illicit funds. Accurate figures for the amounts of criminal proceeds laundered are almost impossible to calculate, rough estimates have been made, but only give a sense of the scale of the problem and not quite how great the problem truly is. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime conducted a study, they estimated that in 2009, money laundering equated to about 2.7% of global GDP; this is equal to about 1.6 trillion US dollars.[105] The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an intergovernmental body set up to combat money laundering, has stated that "A sustained effort between 1996 and 2000 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to produce such estimates failed."[106] However, anti-money laundering efforts that seize money laundered assets in 2001 amounted to $386 million.[106] The rapid growth of money laundering is due to:

  • the scale of organized crime precluding it from being a cash business - groups have little option but to convert its proceeds into legitimate funds and do so by investment, by developing legitimate businesses and purchasing property;
  • globalization of communications and commerce - technology has made rapid transfer of funds across international borders much easier, with groups continuously changing techniques to avoid investigation; and,
  • a lack of effective financial regulation in parts of the global economy.

Money laundering is a three-stage process:

  • Placement: (also called immersion) groups 'smurf' small amounts at a time to avoid suspicion; physical disposal of money by moving crime funds into the legitimate financial system; may involve bank complicity, mixing licit and illicit funds, cash purchases and smuggling currency to safe havens.
  • Layering: disguises the trail to foil pursuit. Also called 'heavy soaping'. It involves creating false paper trails, converting cash into assets by cash purchases.
  • Integration: (also called 'spin dry): Making it into clean taxable income by real-estate transactions, sham loans, foreign bank complicity and false import and export transactions.[107]

Means of money laundering:

  • Money transmitters, black money markets purchasing goods, gambling, increasing the complexity of the money trail.
  • Underground banking (flying money), involves clandestine 'bankers' around the world.
  • It often involves otherwise legitimate banks and professionals.

The policy aim in this area is to make the financial markets transparent, and minimize the circulation of criminal money and its cost upon legitimate markets.[108][109]

Counterfeiting

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Counterfeiting money is another financial crime. The counterfeiting of money includes illegally producing money that is then used to pay for anything desired. In addition to being a financial crime, counterfeiting also involves manufacturing or distributing goods under assumed names. Counterfeiters benefit because consumers believe they are buying goods from companies that they trust, when in reality they are buying low quality counterfeit goods.[110] In 2007, the OECD reported the scope of counterfeit products to include food, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, electrical components, tobacco and even household cleaning products in addition to the usual films, music, literature, games and other electrical appliances, software and fashion.[111] A number of qualitative changes in the trade of counterfeit products:

  • a large increase in fake goods which are dangerous to health and safety;
  • most products repossessed by authorities are now household items rather than luxury goods;
  • a growing number of technological products; and,
  • production is now operated on an industrial scale.[112]

Tax evasion

[edit]

The economic effects of organized crime have been approached from a number of both theoretical and empirical positions, however the nature of such activity allows for misrepresentation.[113][114][115][116][117][118] The level of taxation taken by a nation-state, rates of unemployment, mean household incomes and level of satisfaction with government and other economic factors all contribute to the likelihood of criminals to participate in tax evasion.[114] As most organized crime is perpetrated in the liminal state between legitimate and illegitimate markets, these economic factors must adjusted to ensure the optimal amount of taxation without promoting the practice of tax evasion.[119] As with any other crime, technological advancements have made the commission of tax evasion easier, faster and more globalized. The ability for organized criminals to operate fraudulent financial accounts, utilize illicit offshore bank accounts, access tax havens or tax shelters,[120] and operating goods smuggling syndicates to evade importation taxes help ensure financial sustainability, security from law enforcement, general anonymity and the continuation of their operations. Al Capone became a notorious example of tax evasion. In 1931, he was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison and ordered to pay $215,000 in back taxes, along with accrued interest[121]

Cybercrime

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Internet fraud

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Identity theft is a form of fraud or cheating of another person's identity in which someone pretends to be someone else by assuming that person's identity, typically in order to access resources or obtain credit and other benefits in that person's name. Victims of identity theft (those whose identity has been assumed by the identity thief) can suffer adverse consequences if held accountable for the perpetrator's actions, as can organizations and individuals who are defrauded by the identity thief, and to that extent are also victims. Internet fraud refers to the actual use of Internet services to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or to others connected with the scheme. In the context of organized crime, both may serve as means through which other criminal activity may be successfully perpetrated or as the primary goal themselves. Email fraud, advance-fee fraud, romance scams, employment scams, and other phishing scams are the most common and most widely used forms of identity theft,[122] though with the advent of social networking fake websites, accounts and other fraudulent or deceitful activity has become commonplace.

[edit]

Copyright infringement is the unauthorized or prohibited use of works under copyright, infringing the copyright holder's exclusive rights, such as the right to reproduce or perform the copyrighted work, or to make derivative works. Whilst almost universally considered under civil procedure, the impact and intent of organized criminal operations in this area of crime has been the subject of much debate. Article 61 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) requires that signatory countries establish criminal procedures and penalties in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. More recently copyright holders have demanded that states provide criminal sanctions for all types of copyright infringement.[123] Organized criminal groups capitalize on consumer complicity, advancements in security and anonymity technology, emerging markets and new methods of product transmission, and the consistent nature of these provides a stable financial basis for other areas of organized crime.[124][125]

Cyberwarfare

[edit]

Cyberwarfare refers to politically motivated hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage. It is a form of information warfare sometimes seen as analogous to conventional warfare[126] although this analogy is controversial for both its accuracy and its political motivation. It has been defined as activities by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks with the intention of causing civil damage or disruption.[127] Moreover, it acts as the "fifth domain of warfare,"[128] and William J. Lynn, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, states that "as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain in warfare . . . [which] has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space."[129] Cyber espionage is the practice of obtaining confidential, sensitive, proprietary or classified information from individuals, competitors, groups, or governments using illegal exploitation methods on internet, networks, software or computers. There is also a clear military, political, or economic motivation. Unsecured information may be intercepted and modified, making espionage possible internationally. The recently established Cyber Command is currently debating whether such activities as commercial espionage or theft of intellectual property are criminal activities or actual "breaches of national security."[130] Furthermore, military activities that use computers and satellites for coordination are at risk of equipment disruption. Orders and communications can be intercepted or replaced. Power, water, fuel, communications, and transportation infrastructure all may be vulnerable to sabotage. According to Clarke, the civilian realm is also at risk, noting that the security breaches have already gone beyond stolen credit card numbers, and that potential targets can also include the electric power grid, trains, or the stock market.[130]

Computer viruses

[edit]

The term "computer virus" may be used as an overarching phrase to include all types of true viruses, malware, including computer worms, Trojan horses, most rootkits, spyware, dishonest adware and other malicious and unwanted software (though all are technically unique),[131] and proves to be quite financially lucrative for criminal organizations,[132] offering greater opportunities for fraud and extortion whilst increasing security, secrecy and anonymity.[133] Worms may be utilized by organized crime groups to exploit security vulnerabilities (duplicating itself automatically across other computers a given network),[134] while a Trojan horse is a program that appears harmless but hides malicious functions (such as retrieval of stored confidential data, corruption of information, or interception of transmissions). Worms and Trojan horses, like viruses, may harm a computer system's data or performance. Applying the Internet model of organized crime, the proliferation of computer viruses and other malicious software promotes a sense of detachment between the perpetrator (whether that be the criminal organization or another individual) and the victim; this may help to explain vast increases in cyber-crime such as these for the purpose of ideological crime or terrorism.[135] In mid July 2010, security experts discovered a malicious software program that had infiltrated factory computers and had spread to plants around the world. It is considered "the first attack on critical industrial infrastructure that sits at the foundation of modern economies," notes the New York Times.[136]

White-collar crime and corruption

[edit]

Corporate crime

[edit]

Corporate crime refers to crimes committed either by a corporation (i.e., a business entity having a separate legal personality from the natural persons that manage its activities), or by individuals that may be identified with a corporation or other business entity (see vicarious liability and corporate liability). Corporate crimes are motivated by either the individuals desire or the corporations desire to increase profits.[137] The cost of corporate crimes to United States taxpayers is about $500 billion.[137] Note that some forms of corporate corruption may not actually be criminal if they are not specifically illegal under a given system of laws. For example, some jurisdictions allow insider trading. The different businesses that organized crime figures have been known to operate is vast, including but not limited to pharmacies, import-export companies, check-cashing stores, tattoo parlors, zoos, online dating sites, liquor stores, motorcycle shops, banks, hotels, ranches and plantations, electronic stores, beauty salons, real estate companies, daycares, framing stores, taxicab companies, phone companies, shopping malls, jewelry stores, modeling agencies, dry cleaners, pawn shops, pool halls, clothing stores, freight companies, charity foundations, youth centers, recording studios, sporting goods stores, furniture stores, gyms, insurance companies, security companies, law firms, and private military companies.[138] One example of this is a tequila factory in Mexico collaborating with the organized crime group CJNG.[139]

Labor racketeering

[edit]

Labor racketeering, as defined by the United States Department of Labor, is the infiltrating, exploiting, and controlling of employee benefit plan, union, employer entity, or workforce that is carried out through illegal, violent, or fraudulent means for profit or personal benefit.[140] Labor racketeering has developed since the 1930s, affecting national and international construction, mining, energy production and transportation[141] sectors immensely.[142] Activity has focused on the importation of cheap or unfree labor, involvement with union and public officials (political corruption), and counterfeiting.[143]

Political corruption

[edit]

Political corruption is the use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain.[144] Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government. An illegal act by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the act is directly related to their official duties. Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities. The activities that constitute illegal corruption differ depending on the country or jurisdiction. For instance, certain political funding practices that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some cases, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions. Worldwide, bribery alone is estimated to involve over 1 trillion US dollars annually.[145][146] A state of unrestrained political corruption is known as a kleptocracy, literally meaning "rule by thieves".

Drug trafficking

[edit]
Drug trafficking routes in Mexico

There are three major regions that center around drug trafficking, known as the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, Thailand), Golden Crescent (Afghanistan) and Central and South America. There are suggestions that due to the continuing decline in opium production in South East Asia, traffickers may begin to look to Afghanistan as a source of heroin."[147]

With respect to organized crime and accelerating synthetic drug production in East and Southeast Asia, especially the Golden Triangle, Sam Gor, also known as The Company, is the most prominent international crime syndicate based in Asia-Pacific. It is made up of members of five different triads. Sam Gor is understood to be headed by Chinese-Canadian Tse Chi Lop. The Cantonese Chinese syndicate is primarily involved in drug trafficking, earning at least $8 billion per year.[148] Sam Gor is alleged to control 40% of the Asia-Pacific methamphetamine market, while also trafficking heroin and ketamine. The organization is active in a variety of countries, including Myanmar, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, China and Taiwan. Sam Gor previously produced meth in Southern China and is now believed to manufacture mainly in the Golden Triangle, specifically Shan State, Myanmar, responsible for much of the massive surge of crystal meth in recent years.[149] The group is understood to be headed by Tse Chi Lop, a Chinese-Canadian gangster born in Guangzhou, China.[150] Tse is a former member of the Hong Kong-based crime group, the Big Circle Gang. In 1988, Tse immigrated to Canada. In 1998, Tse was convicted of transporting heroin into the United States and served nine years behind bars. Tse has been compared in prominence to Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán and Pablo Escobar.[151]

The U.S. supply of heroin comes mainly from foreign sources which include Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, Southwest Asia, and Latin America. Heroin comes in two forms. The first is its chemical base form which presents itself as brown and the second is a salt form that is white.[147] The former is mainly produced in Afghanistan and some south-west countries while the latter had a history of being produced in only south-east Asia, but has since moved to also being produced in Afghanistan. There is some suspicion white Heroin is also being produced in Iran and Pakistan, but it is not confirmed. This area of Heroin production is referred to as the Golden Crescent. Heroin is not the only drug being used in these areas. The European market has shown signs of growing use in opioids on top of the long-term heroin use.[152]

Drug traffickers produce drugs in drug laboratories and drug farms. A drug lab can range in size from small workshops to the size of small towns (such as Tranquilandia). A drug farm is a place where drug crops are grown before being made into illegal narcotics. A drug farm can range in size from smallholdings to large plantations. In addition to drug crops, it is also not uncommon for drug farms to also host livestock, both to have a legal source of revenue to help disguise the dirty money and so that the livestock can provide a source of organic fertilizer (such as manure) for the drug crops.[153] There are multiple instances where traffickers set up some of their drug farms, safe houses and drug labs in remote wilderness areas.[154] Once produced, the fully processed narcotics are then transported to more populated areas to be sold. Oftentimes the traffickers stationed in these remote criminal settlements, sustain themselves with a combination of survival skills and with food, supplies and workers being brought to them by associates. The reason that traffickers have been known to establish such remote compounds is so that the surrounding area can help to provide varying degrees of natural cover. Additionally the traffickers may also hope, that the surrounding terrain and local wildlife might serve to deter or impede either investigative authorities or rival gangs if the location of the clandestine compound were revealed. While usually thought of as an urban issue, drug trafficking is also known to be a problem in both suburban and rural areas as well.[155]

Human trafficking

[edit]

Human trafficking is a modern form of slavery where people are forced, tricked, or pressured into working or doing sexual acts. It can happen anywhere and affect anyone, no matter their age, race, or background.[156]

Sex trafficking

[edit]

Human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a major cause of contemporary sexual slavery and is primarily for prostituting women and children into sex industries.[157] Sexual slavery encompasses most, if not all, forms of forced prostitution.[158] The terms "forced prostitution" or "enforced prostitution" appear in international and humanitarian conventions but have been insufficiently understood and inconsistently applied. "Forced prostitution" generally refers to conditions of control over a person who is coerced by another to engage in sexual activity.[159] Official numbers of individuals in sexual slavery worldwide vary. In 2001 International Organization for Migration estimated 400,000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated 700,000 and UNICEF estimated 1.75 million.[160] The most common destinations for victims of human trafficking are Thailand, Japan, Israel, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United States, according to a report by UNODC.[161]

Illegal immigration and people smuggling

[edit]

People smuggling is defined as "the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation or illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border, in violation of one or more countries laws, either clandestinely or through deception, such as the use of fraudulent documents".[162] The term is understood as and often used interchangeably with migrant smuggling, which is defined by the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime as "...the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national".[163] This practice has increased over the past few decades and today now accounts for a significant portion of illegal immigration in countries around the world. People smuggling generally takes place with the consent of the person or persons being smuggled, and common reasons for individuals seeking to be smuggled include employment and economic opportunity, personal or familial betterment, and escape from persecution or conflict.

Contemporary slavery and forced labor

[edit]

The number of slaves today remains as high as 12 million[164] to 27 million.[165][166][167] This is probably the smallest proportion of slaves to the rest of the world's population in history.[168] Most are debt slaves, largely in South Asia, who are under debt bondage incurred by lenders, sometimes even for generations.[169] It is the fastest growing criminal industry and is predicted to eventually outgrow drug trafficking.[157][170]

Historical origins

[edit]

Pre-nineteenth century

[edit]

Today, crime is sometimes thought of as an urban phenomenon, but for most of human history it was the rural interfaces that encountered the majority of crimes (bearing in mind the fact that for most of human history, rural areas were the vast majority of inhabited places). For the most part, within a village, members kept crime at very low rates; however, outsiders such as pirates, highwaymen and bandits attacked trade routes and roads, at times severely disrupting commerce, raising costs, insurance rates and prices to the consumer. According to criminologist Paul Lunde, "Piracy and banditry were to the pre-industrial world what organized crime is to modern society."[171]

If we take a global rather than a strictly domestic view, it becomes evident that even crime of the organized kind has a long if not a necessarily noble heritage. The word 'thug' dates back to early 13th-century India, when Thugs, or gangs of criminals, roamed from town to town, looting and pillaging. Smuggling and drug-trafficking rings are as old as the hills in Asia and Africa, and extant criminal organizations in Italy and Japan trace their histories back several centuries...[172]

As Lunde states, "Barbarian conquerors, whether Vandals, Goths, the Norse, Turks or Mongols are not normally thought of as organized crime groups, yet they share many features associated with thriving criminal organizations. They were for the most part non-ideological, predominantly ethnically based, used violence and intimidation, and adhered to their own codes of law."[171] In Ancient Rome, there was an infamous outlaw called Bulla Felix who organized and led a gang of up to six hundred bandits. Terrorism is linked to organized crime, but has political aims rather than solely financial ones, so there is overlap but separation between terrorism and organized crime.

Fencing in Ming and Qing China

[edit]

A fence or receiver (銷贓者), was a merchant who bought and sold stolen goods. Fences were part of the extensive network of accomplices in the criminal underground of Ming and Qing China. Their occupation entailed criminal activity, but as fences often acted as liaisons between the more respectable community to the underground criminals, they were seen as living a "precarious existence on the fringes of respectable society".[173]

A fence worked alongside bandits, but in a different line of work. The network of criminal accomplices that was often acquired was essential to ensuring both the safety and the success of fences.

The path into the occupation of a fence stemmed, in a large degree, from necessity. As most fences came from the ranks of poorer people, they often took whatever work they could – both legal and illegal.[173]

Like most bandits operated within their own community, fences also worked within their own town or village. For example, in some satellite areas of the capital, military troops lived within or close to the commoner population and they had the opportunity to hold illegal trades with commoners.[174]

In areas like Baoding and Hejian, local peasants and community members not only purchased military livestock such as horses and cattle, but also helped to hide the "stolen livestock from military allured by the profits". Local peasants and community members became fences and they hid criminal activities from officials in return for products or money from these soldiers.[175]

Types of fences
[edit]

Most fences were not individuals who only bought and sold stolen goods to make a living. The majority of fences had other occupations within the "polite" society and held a variety of official occupations. These occupations included laborers, coolies, and peddlers.[176] Such individuals often encountered criminals in markets in their line of work, and, recognizing a potential avenue for an extra source of income, formed acquaintances and temporary associations for mutual aid and protection with criminals.[176] In one example, an owner of a tea house overheard the conversation between Deng Yawen, a criminal and others planning a robbery and he offered to help to sell the loot for an exchange of spoils.

At times, the robbers themselves filled the role of fences, selling to people they met on the road. This may actually have been preferable for robbers in certain circumstances, because they would not have to pay the fence a portion of the spoils.

Butchers were also prime receivers for stolen animals because of the simple fact that owners could no longer recognize their livestock once butchers slaughtered them.[176] Animals were very valuable commodities within Ming China and a robber could potentially sustain a living from stealing livestock and selling them to butcher-fences.

Although the vast majority of the time, fences worked with physical stolen property, fences who also worked as itinerant barbers also sold information as a good. Itinerant barbers often amassed important sources of information and news as they traveled, and sold significant pieces of information, often to criminals in search of places to hide or individuals to rob.[176] In this way, itinerant barbers also served the role as a keeper of information that could be sold to both members of the criminal underground, as well as powerful clients in performing the function of a spy.

Fences not only sold items such as jewelry and clothing but was also involved in trafficking hostages that bandits had kidnapped. Women and children were the easiest and among the most common "objects" the fences sold. Most of the female hostages were sold to fences and then sold as prostitutes, wives or concubines. One example of human trafficking can be seen from Chen Akuei's gang who abducted a servant girl and sold her to Lin Baimao, who in turn sold her for thirty parts of silver as wives.[177] In contrast to women, who required beauty to sell for a high price, children were sold regardless of their physical appearance or family background. Children were often sold as servants or entertainers, while young girls were often sold as prostitutes.[178]

Network of connections
[edit]

Like merchants of honest goods, one of the most significant tools of a fence was their network of connections. As they were the middlemen between robbers and clients, fences needed to form and maintain connections in both the "polite" society, as well as among criminals. However, there were a few exceptions in which members of the so-called "well-respected" society became receivers and harborers. They not only help bandits to sell the stolen goods but also acted as agents of bandits to collect protection money from local merchants and residents. These "part-time" fences with high social status used their connection with bandits to help themselves gain social capital as well as wealth.

It was extremely important to their occupation that fences maintained a positive relationship with their customers, especially their richer gentry clients. When some members of the local elites joined the ranks of fences, they not only protected bandits to protect their business interests, they actively took down any potential threats to their illegal profiting, even government officials. In the Zhejiang Province, the local elites not only got the provincial commissioner, Zhu Wan, dismissed from his office but also eventually "[drove] him to suicide".[179] This was possible because fences often had legal means of making a living, as well as illegal activities and could threaten to turn in bandits to the authorities.[173]

It was also essential for them to maintain a relationship with bandits. However, it was just as true that bandits needed fences to make a living. As a result, fences often held dominance in their relationship with bandits and fences could exploit their position, cheating the bandits by manipulating the prices they paid bandits for the stolen property.[173]

Safe houses
[edit]

Aside from simply buying and selling stolen goods, fences often played additional roles in the criminal underground of early China. Because of the high floating population in public places such as inns and tea houses, they often became ideal places for bandits and gangs to gather to exchange information and plan for their next crime. Harborers, people who provided safe houses for criminals, often played the role of receiving stolen goods from their harbored criminals to sell to other customers.[173] Safe houses included inns, tea houses, brothels, opium dens, as well as gambling parlors and employees or owners of such institutions often functioned as harborers, as well as fences.[180] These safe houses were located in places with high floating populations and people from all kinds of social backgrounds.

Brothels themselves helped these bandits to hide and sell stolen goods because of the special Ming Law that exempted brothels from being held responsible "for the criminal actions of their clients." Even though the government required owners of these places to report any suspicious activities, lack of enforcement from the government itself and some of the owners being fences for the bandits made an ideal safe house for bandits and gangs.

Pawnshops were also often affiliated with fencing stolen goods. The owners or employees of such shops often paid cash for stolen goods at a price a great deal below market value to bandits, who were often desperate for money, and resold the goods to earn a profit.[181]

Punishments for fences
[edit]

Two different Ming Laws, the Da Ming Lü 大明律 and the Da Gao 大诰, drafted by the Hongwu Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, sentenced fences with different penalties based on the categories and prices of the products that were stolen.

In coastal regions, illegal trading with foreigners, as well as smuggling, became a huge concern for the government during the middle to late Ming era. In order to prohibit this crime, the government passed a law in which illegal smugglers who traded with foreigners without the consent of the government would be punished with exile to the border for military service.[182]

In areas where military troops were stationed, stealing and selling military property would result in a more severe punishment. In the Jiaqing time, a case was recorded of stealing and selling military horses. The emperor himself gave direction that the thieves who stole the horses and the people who helped to sell the horses would be put on cangue and sent to labor in a border military camp.[183]

In the salt mines, the penalty for workers who stole salt and people who sold the stolen salt was the most severe. Anyone who was arrested and found guilty of stealing and selling government salt was put to death.

Nineteenth century

[edit]

During the Victorian era, criminals and gangs started to form organizations which would collectively become London's criminal underworld.[184] Criminal societies in the underworld started to develop their own ranks and groups which were sometimes called families and were often made up of lower-classes and operated on pick-pocketry, prostitution, forgery and counterfeiting, commercial burglary and even money laundering schemes.[184][185] Unique also were the use of slang and argots used by Victorian criminal societies to distinguish each other, like those propagated by street gangs like the Peaky Blinders.[186][187] One of the most infamous crime bosses in the Victorian underworld was Adam Worth, who was nicknamed "the Napoleon of the criminal world" or "the Napoleon of Crime" and became the inspiration behind the popular character of Professor Moriarty.[184][188]

Organized crime in the United States first came to prominence in the Old West and historians such as Brian J. Robb and Erin H. Turner traced the first organized crime syndicates to the Coschise Cowboy Gang and the Wild Bunch.[189][190] The Cochise Cowboys, though loosely organized, were unique for their criminal operations in the Mexican border, in which they would steal and sell cattle as well smuggled contraband goods in between the countries.[191] In the Old west there were other examples of gangs that operated in ways similar to an organized crime syndicate such as the Innocents gang, the Jim Miller gang, the Soapy Smith gang, the Belle Starr gang and the Bob Dozier gang.

Twentieth century

[edit]
Tattooed yakuza gangsters

Donald Cressey's Cosa Nostra model studied Mafia families exclusively and this limits his broader findings. Structures are formal and rational with allocated tasks, limits on entrance, and influence on the rules established for organizational maintenance and sustainability.[192][193] In this context there is a difference between organized and professional crime; there is well-defined hierarchy of roles for leaders and members, underlying rules and specific goals that determine their behavior and these are formed as a social system, one that was rationally designed to maximize profits and to provide forbidden goods. Albini saw organized criminal behavior as consisting of networks of patrons and clients, rather than rational hierarchies or secret societies.[22][23][24]

The networks are characterized by a loose system of power relations. Each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare. Criminal entrepreneurs are the patrons and they exchange information with their clients in order to obtain their support. Clients include members of gangs, local and national politicians, government officials and people engaged in legitimate business. People in the network may not directly be part of the core criminal organization. Furthering the approach of both Cressey and Albini, Ianni and Ianni studied Italian-American crime syndicates in New York and other cities.[194][195]

Kinship is seen as the basis of organized crime rather than the structures Cressey had identified; this includes fictive godparental and affinitive ties as well as those based on blood relations and it is the impersonal actions, not the status or affiliations of their members, that define the group. Rules of conduct and behavioral aspects of power and networks and roles include the following:

  • family operates as a social unit, with social and business functions merged;
  • leadership positions down to middle management are kinship based;
  • the higher the position, the closer the kinship relationship;
  • group assigns leadership positions to a central group of family members, including fictive god-parental relationship reinforcement;
  • the leadership group are assigned to legal or illegal enterprises, but not both; and,
  • transfer of money, from legal and illegal business, and back to illegal business is by individuals, not companies.

Strong family ties are derived from the traditions of southern Italy, where family rather than the church or state is the basis of social order and morality.

The "disorganized crime" and choice theses

[edit]

One of the most important trends to emerge in criminological thinking about OC in recent years is the suggestion that it is not, in a formal sense, "organized" at all. Evidence includes lack of centralized control, absence of formal lines of communication, fragmented organizational structure. It is distinctively disorganized. For example, Seattle's crime network in the 1970s and 80s consisted of groups of businessmen, politicians and of law enforcement officers. They all had links to a national network via Meyer Lansky, who was powerful, but there was no evidence that Lansky or anyone else exercised centralized control over them.[196]

While some crime involved well-known criminal hierarchies in the city, criminal activity was not subject to central management by these hierarchies nor by other controlling groups, nor were activities limited to a finite number of objectives. The networks of criminals involved with the crimes did not exhibit organizational cohesion. Too much emphasis had been placed on the Mafia as controlling OC. The Mafia were certainly powerful but they "were part of a heterogeneous underworld, a network characterized by complex webs of relationships." OC groups were violent and aimed at making money but because of the lack of structure and fragmentation of objectives, they were "disorganized".[197][198]

Further studies showed neither bureaucracy nor kinship groups are the primary structure of organized crime; rather, the primary structures were found to lie in partnerships or a series of joint business ventures.[199][200] Despite these conclusions, all researchers observed a degree of managerial activities among the groups they studied. All observed networks and a degree of persistence, and there may be utility in focusing on the identification of organizing roles of people and events rather than the group's structure.[201][202] There may be three main approaches to understand the organizations in terms of their roles as social systems:[203]

  • organizations as rational systems: Highly formalized structures in terms of bureaucracy's and hierarchy, with formal systems of rules regarding authority and highly specific goals;
  • organizations as natural systems: Participants may regard the organization as an end in itself, not merely a means to some other end. Promoting group values to maintain solidarity is high on the agenda. They do not rely on profit maximization. Their perversity and violence in respect of relationships is often remarkable, but they are characterized by their focus on the connections between their members, their associates and their victims; and,
  • organizations open systems: High levels of interdependence between themselves and the environment in which they operate. There is no one way in which they are organized or how they operate. They are adaptable and change to meet the demands of their changing environments and circumstances.

Organized crime groups may be a combination of all three.

International governance approach

[edit]

International consensus on defining organized crime has become important since the 1970s due to its increased prevalence and impact. e.g., UN in 1976 and EU 1998. OC is "...the large scale and complex criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely or tightly organized for the enrichment of those participating at the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently accomplished through ruthless disregard of any law, including offences against the person and frequently in connection with political corruption." (UN) "A criminal organization shall mean a lasting, structured association of two or more persons, acting in concert with a view to committing crimes or other offenses which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether such crimes or offenses are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, if necessary, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities." (UE) Not all groups exhibit the same characteristics of structure. However, violence and corruption and the pursuit of multiple enterprises and continuity serve to form the essence of OC activity.[204][205]

There are eleven characteristics from the European Commission and Europol pertinent to a working definition of organized crime. Six of those must be satisfied and the four in italics are mandatory. Summarized, they are:

  • more than two people;
  • their own appointed tasks;
  • activity over a prolonged or indefinite period of time;
  • the use discipline or control;
  • perpetration of serious criminal offenses;
  • operations on an international or transnational level;
  • the use violence or other intimidation;
  • the use of commercial or businesslike structures;
  • engagement in money laundering;
  • exertion of influence on politics, media, public administration, judicial authorities or the economy; and,
  • motivated by the pursuit of profit or power,

with the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) having a similar definition:

  • organized criminal: structured group, three or more people, one or more serious crimes, in order to obtain financial or other material benefit;
  • serious crime: offense punishable by at least four years in prison; and,
  • structured group: Not randomly formed but does not need formal structure,

Others stress the importance of power, profit and perpetuity, defining organized criminal behavior as:

  • nonideological: i.e., profit driven;
  • hierarchical: few elites and many operatives;
  • limited or exclusive membership: maintain secrecy and loyalty of members;
  • perpetuating itself: Recruitment process and policy;
  • willing to use illegal violence and bribery;
  • specialized division of labor: to achieve organization goal;
  • monopolistic: Market control to maximize profits; and,
  • has explicit rules and regulations: Codes of honor.[206]

Definitions need to bring together its legal and social elements. OC has widespread social, political and economic effects. It uses violence and corruption to achieve its ends: "OC when group primarily focused on illegal profits systematically commit crimes that adversely affect society and are capable of successfully shielding their activities, in particular by being willing to use physical violence or eliminate individuals by way of corruption."[207][208]

It is a mistake to use the term "OC" as though it denotes a clear and well-defined phenomenon. The evidence regarding OC "shows a less well-organized, very diversified landscape of organizing criminals…the economic activities of these organizing criminals can be better described from the viewpoint of 'crime enterprises' than from a conceptually unclear frameworks such as 'OC'." Many of the definitions emphasize the 'group nature' of OC, the 'organization' of its members, its use of violence or corruption to achieve its goals and its extra-jurisdictional character...OC may appear in many forms at different times and in different places. Due to the variety of definitions, there is "evident danger" in asking "what is OC?" and expecting a simple answer.[209]

The locus of power and organized crime

[edit]

Some espouse that all organized crime operates at an international level, though there is currently no international court capable of trying offenses resulting from such activities (the International Criminal Court's remit extends only to dealing with people accused of offenses against humanity, e.g., genocide). If a network operates primarily from one jurisdiction and carries out its illicit operations there and in some other jurisdictions it is 'international,' though it may be appropriate to use the term 'transnational' only to label the activities of a major crime group that is centered in no one jurisdiction but operating in many. The understanding of organized crime has therefore progressed to combined internationalization and an understanding of social conflict into one of power, control, efficiency risk and utility, all within the context of organizational theory. The accumulation of social, economic and political power[210] have sustained themselves as a core concerns of all criminal organizations:

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Kowloon Walled City in British Hong Kong was controlled by local Chinese triads.
  • social: criminal groups seek to develop social control in relation to particular communities;
  • economic: seek to exert influence by means of corruption and by coercion of legitimate and illegitimate praxis; and,
  • political: criminal groups use corruption and violence to attain power and status.[211][209]

Contemporary organized crime may be very different from traditional Mafia style, particularly in terms of the distribution and centralization of power, authority structures and the concept of 'control' over one's territory and organization. There is a tendency away from centralization of power and reliance upon family ties towards a fragmentation of structures and informality of relationships in crime groups. Organized crime most typically flourishes when a central government and civil society is disorganized, weak, absent or untrustworthy.

This may occur in a society facing periods of political, economic or social turmoil or transition, such as a change of government or a period of rapid economic development, particularly if the society lacks strong and established institutions and the rule of law. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe that saw the downfall of the Communist Bloc created a breeding ground for criminal organizations.

The newest growth sectors for organized crime are identity theft and online extortion. These activities are troubling because they discourage consumers from using the Internet for e-commerce. E-commerce was supposed to level the playing ground between small and large businesses, but the growth of online organized crime is leading to the opposite effect; large businesses are able to afford more bandwidth (to resist denial-of-service attacks) and superior security. Furthermore, organized crime using the Internet is much harder to trace down for the police (even though they increasingly deploy cybercops) since most police forces and law enforcement agencies operate within a local or national jurisdiction while the Internet makes it easier for criminal organizations to operate across such boundaries without detection.

In the past criminal organizations have naturally limited themselves by their need to expand, putting them in competition with each other. This competition, often leading to violence, uses valuable resources such as manpower (either killed or sent to prison), equipment and finances. In the United States, James "Whitey" Bulger, the Irish Mob boss of the Winter Hill Gang in Boston turned informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He used this position to eliminate competition and consolidate power within the city of Boston which led to the imprisonment of several senior organized crime figures including Gennaro Angiulo, underboss of the Patriarca crime family. Infighting sometimes occurs within an organization, such as the Castellamarese war of 1930–31 and the Boston Irish Mob Wars of the 1960s and 1970s.

Today criminal organizations are increasingly working together, realizing that it is better to work in cooperation rather than in competition with each other (once again, consolidating power). This has led to the rise of global criminal organizations such as Mara Salvatrucha, 18th Street gang and Barrio Azteca. The American Mafia, in addition to having links with organized crime groups in Italy such as the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita and Sicilian Mafia, has at various times done business with the Irish Mob, Jewish-American organized crime, the Japanese yakuza, Indian mafia, the Russian mafia, Thief in law and Post-Soviet Organized crime groups, the Chinese triads, Chinese Tongs and Asian street gangs, Motorcycle Gangs and numerous White, Black and Hispanic prison and street gangs. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that organized crime groups held $322 billion in assets in 2005.[212]

This rise in cooperation between criminal organizations has meant that law enforcement agencies are increasingly having to work together. The FBI operates an organized crime section from its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and is known to work with other national (e.g., Polizia di Stato, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), federal (e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Marshals Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Secret Service, US Diplomatic Security Service, United States Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, United States Border Patrol, and the United States Coast Guard), state (e.g., Massachusetts State Police Special Investigation Unit, New Jersey State Police organized crime unit, Pennsylvania State Police organized crime unit and the New York State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation) and city (e.g., New York City Police Department Organized Crime Unit, Philadelphia Police Department Organized crime unit, Chicago Police Organized Crime Unit and the Los Angeles Police Department Special Operations Division) law enforcement agencies.

Academic analysis

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Criminal psychology

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Criminal psychology is defined as the study of the intentions, behaviors, and actions of a criminal or someone who allows themselves to participate in criminal behavior. The goal is to understand what is going on in the criminal's head and explain why they are doing what they are doing. This varies depending on whether the person is facing the punishment for what they did, are roaming free, or if they are punishing themselves. Criminal psychologists get called to court to explain the inside the mind of the criminal.[213][214]

Rational choice

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This theory treats all individuals as rational operators, committing criminal acts after consideration of all associated risks (detection and punishment) compared with the rewards of crimes (personal, financial etc.).[215] Little emphasis is placed on the offenders' emotional state. The role of criminal organizations in lowering the perceptions of risk and increasing the likelihood of personal benefit is prioritized by this approach, with the organizations structure, purpose, and activity being indicative of the rational choices made by criminals and their organizers.[216]

Deterrence

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This theory sees criminal behavior as reflective of an individual, internal calculation[217] by the criminal that the benefits associated with offending (whether financial or otherwise) outweigh the perceived risks.[218][219] The perceived strength, importance or infallibility of the criminal organization is directly proportional to the types of crime committed, their intensity and arguably the level of community response. The benefits of participating in organized crime (higher financial rewards, greater socioeconomic control and influence, protection of the family or significant others, perceived freedoms from 'oppressive' laws or norms) contribute greatly to the psychology behind highly organized group offending.

Social learning

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Criminals learn through associations with one another. The success of organized crime groups is therefore dependent upon the strength of their communication and the enforcement of their value systems, the recruitment and training processes employed to sustain, build or fill gaps in criminal operations.[220] An understanding of this theory sees close associations between criminals, imitation of superiors, and understanding of value systems, processes and authority as the main drivers behind organized crime. Interpersonal relationships define the motivations the individual develops, with the effect of family or peer criminal activity being a strong predictor of inter-generational offending.[221] This theory also developed to include the strengths and weaknesses of reinforcement, which in the context of continuing criminal enterprises may be used to help understand propensities for certain crimes or victims, level of integration into the mainstream culture and likelihood of recidivism / success in rehabilitation.[220][222][223]

Enterprise

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Under this theory, organized crime exists because legitimate markets leave many customers and potential customers unsatisfied.[51] High demand for a particular good or service (e.g., drugs, prostitution, arms, slaves), low levels of risk detection and high profits lead to a conducive environment for entrepreneurial criminal groups to enter the market and profit by supplying those goods and services.[224] For success, there must be:

  • an identified market; and,
  • a certain rate of consumption (demand) to maintain profit and outweigh perceived risks.[52][53]

Under these conditions competition is discouraged, ensuring criminal monopolies sustain profits. Legal substitution of goods or services may (by increasing competition) force the dynamic of organized criminal operations to adjust, as will deterrence measures (reducing demand), and the restriction of resources (controlling the ability to supply or produce to supply).[225]

Differential association

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Sutherland goes further to say that deviancy is contingent on conflicting groups within society, and that such groups struggle over the means to define what is criminal or deviant within society. Criminal organizations therefore gravitate around illegal avenues of production, profit-making, protectionism or social control and attempt (by increasing their operations or membership) to make these acceptable.[220][226][227] This also explains the propensity of criminal organizations to develop protection rackets, to coerce through the use of violence, aggression and threatening behavior (at times termed 'terrorism').[228][229][230][231] Preoccupation with methods of accumulating profit highlight the lack of legitimate means to achieve economic or social advantage, as does the organization of white-collar crime or political corruption (though it is debatable whether these are based on wealth, power or both). The ability to effect social norms and practices through political and economic influence (and the enforcement or normalization of criminogenic needs) may be defined by differential association theory.

Critical criminology and sociology

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Social disorganization

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Social disorganization theory is intended to be applied to neighborhood level street crime,[232] thus the context of gang activity, loosely formed criminal associations or networks, socioeconomic demographic impacts, legitimate access to public resources, employment or education, and mobility give it relevance to organized crime. Where the upper- and lower-classes live in close proximity this can result in feelings of anger, hostility, social injustice and frustration.[233] Criminals experience poverty; and witness affluence they are deprived of and which is virtually impossible for them to attain through conventional means.[234] The concept of neighborhood is central to this theory, as it defines the social learning, locus of control, cultural influences and access to social opportunity experienced by criminals and the groups they form.[235] Fear of or lack of trust in mainstream authority may also be a key contributor to social disorganization; organized crime groups replicate such figures and thus ensure control over the counter-culture.[236] This theory has tended to view violent or antisocial behavior by gangs as reflective of their social disorganization rather than as a product or tool of their organization.[237]

Anomie

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Sociologist Robert K. Merton believed deviance depended on society's definition of success,[238] and the desires of individuals to achieve success through socially defined avenues. Criminality becomes attractive when expectations of being able to fulfill goals (therefore achieving success) by legitimate means cannot be fulfilled.[239] Criminal organizations capitalize on states with a lack of norm by imposing criminogenic needs and illicit avenues to achieve them. This has been used as the basis for numerous meta-theories of organized crime through its integration of social learning, cultural deviance, and criminogenic motivations.[240] If crime is seen as a function of anomie,[241] organized behavior produces stability, increases protection or security, and may be directly proportional to market forces as expressed by entrepreneurship- or risk-based approaches. It is the inadequate supply of legitimate opportunities that constrains the ability for the individual to pursue valued societal goals and reduces the likelihood that using legitimate opportunities will enable them to satisfy such goals (due to their position in society).[242]

Cultural deviance

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Criminals violate the law because they belong to a unique subculture - the counter-culture - their values and norms conflicting with those of the working-, middle- or upper-classes upon which criminal laws are based. This subculture shares an alternative lifestyle, language and culture, and is generally typified by being tough, taking care of their own affairs and rejecting government authority. Role models include drug dealers, thieves and pimps, as they have achieved success and wealth not otherwise available through socially-provided opportunities. It is through modeling organized crime as a counter-cultural avenue to success that such organizations are sustained.[220][243][244]

Alien conspiracy/queer ladder of mobility

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The alien conspiracy theory and queer ladder of mobility theories state that ethnicity and 'outsider' status (immigrants, or those not within the dominant ethnocentric groups) and their influences are thought to dictate the prevalence of organized crime in society.[245] The alien theory posits that the contemporary structures of organized crime gained prominence during the 1860s in Sicily and that elements of the Sicilian population are responsible for the foundation of most European and North American organized crime,[246] made up of Italian-dominated crime families. Bell's theory of the 'queer ladder of mobility' hypothesized that 'ethnic succession' (the attainment of power and control by one more marginalized ethnic group over other less marginalized groups) occurs by promoting the perpetration of criminal activities within a disenfranchised or oppressed demographic. Whilst early organized crime was dominated by the Irish Mob (early 1800s), they were relatively substituted by the Sicilian Mafia and Italian-American Mafia, the Aryan Brotherhood (1960s onward), Colombian Medellín Cartel and Cali cartel (mid-1970s - 1990s), and more recently the Mexican Tijuana Cartel (late 1980s onward), Mexican Los Zetas (late 1990s to onward), the Russian Mafia (1988 onward), terrorism-related organized crime Al-Qaeda (1988 onward), the Taliban (1994 onward), and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (2010s to onward). Many argue this misinterprets and overstates the role of ethnicity in organized crime.[247] A contradiction of this theory is that syndicates had developed long before large-scale Sicilian immigration in the 1860s, with these immigrants merely joining a widespread phenomenon of crime and corruption.[248][249][250]

Legislative frameworks and policing measures

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See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Organized crime encompasses the coordinated criminal endeavors of structured groups comprising three or more individuals that persist over time, collaborating to perpetrate serious offenses for direct or indirect financial or material gain. These entities distinguish themselves through , long-term strategic planning, and alliances designed to maximize profits from illicit enterprises. Central to organized crime are activities supplying illegal to meet public demand, including narcotics distribution, human and , , , and , often enforced via , , and of officials. Groups exhibit self-perpetuation and , prioritizing power alongside profit while adapting to evade through infiltration of legitimate sectors and exploitation of jurisdictional gaps. Unlike ideological , organized crime remains non-political, focusing instead on economic exploitation that responds to and amplifies societal vices. The global scale of transnational organized crime yields illicit revenues conservatively estimated at $1.6 to $2.2 trillion annually, rivaling major legitimate industries and comprising up to 2.7% of laundered global GDP, thereby eroding , inciting , and distorting markets in affected regions. This underground economy thrives in states with weak institutions, where criminal networks not only evade but sometimes supplant authority, posing persistent challenges to and economic stability.

Definition and Characteristics

Organized crime fundamentally consists of structured associations of individuals who collaborate over time to perpetrate serious offenses primarily for economic gain, often employing , , or to maintain operations and evade detection. Key elements include a group of three or more persons with defined roles, continuity beyond isolated acts, rational pursuit of illicit markets with high demand such as drugs or , and mechanisms for internal discipline and external protection. These features distinguish it from criminality by emphasizing enterprise-like efficiency and adaptability to pressures. The Convention against (UNTOC), adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003, provides the primary international legal framework, defining an "organized criminal group" as "a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences... in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit." "Serious crimes" under UNTOC involve offenses punishable by at least four years , encompassing acts like trafficking, corruption, and , with the convention ratified by 191 parties as of 2023. This definition emphasizes transnational aspects but applies broadly, requiring states to criminalize participation in such groups. In the United States, no unified statutory definition exists, but the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), enacted in under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, targets "enterprises" engaged in a "pattern of activity," defined as at least two acts of specified crimes (e.g., , , drug trafficking) within ten years. RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises infiltrated by organized crime, enabling prosecution of leaders for the group's actions and forfeiture of assets, with over 1,000 convictions annually in the peaking period. European Union directives, such as Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, align closely with UNTOC by requiring member states to criminalize involvement in groups formed to commit offenses punishable by at least four years, focusing on structured associations for profit-driven serious crimes. These definitions prioritize empirical indicators of group cohesion and criminal intent over subjective labels, though enforcement varies due to jurisdictional differences in proving continuity and benefit.

Distinguishing Traits from Conventional Crime

Organized crime is characterized by structured groups or networks that engage in ongoing, planned criminal enterprises primarily aimed at generating profit, in contrast to conventional crimes, which are typically opportunistic offenses committed by individuals or groups without sustained organization or long-term coordination. This continuity distinguishes organized crime as a self-perpetuating operation, often spanning years or decades, whereas conventional crimes like isolated thefts or assaults lack such persistence and are not part of a broader illicit . A defining structural trait is the presence of formalized or , including division of labor, roles, and sometimes insulation of leadership from direct criminal acts, enabling resilience against disruptions—features absent in conventional crime's typically unstructured or lone-wolf perpetrators. The FBI identifies this formalized structure as essential, where groups systematically pursue power and money through illegal means, employing and to maintain operations, unlike the spontaneous nature of most street-level offenses. Operationally, organized crime relies on not merely for immediate gain but as an tool to protect territories, enforce contracts, and deter rivals or informants, often escalating to systematic or elimination, which exceeds the incidental violence in conventional crimes like muggings or bar fights. Corruption of public officials and infiltration of legitimate businesses further enable organized groups to launder proceeds and expand influence, creating a symbiotic relationship with economies that individual criminals cannot replicate due to scale and coordination requirements. Economically, organized crime functions as a rational enterprise responding to market demands for illicit goods and services—such as drugs or —through diversified portfolios that mitigate risks, contrasting with conventional crime's focus on singular, low-yield acts without reinvestment or strategies. This profit-driven adaptability, including alliances across borders, underscores its threat to , as evidenced by UNODC assessments of groups exploiting public demand via and , a level of systemic impact far beyond isolated conventional offenses.

Global Scale and Economic Magnitude

Transnational organized crime networks span virtually every country, with operations documented in over 190 nations as of 2023, affecting 83% of the global population through high levels of criminality in their jurisdictions. These groups exploit weak , , and economic disparities to embed illicit activities into legitimate sectors, generating revenues that rival or exceed the GDPs of mid-sized economies. The pervasive scale is evidenced by the infiltration of supply chains, financial systems, and political structures worldwide, often fueling conflict and instability in regions from to . Economic magnitude estimates vary due to methodological challenges, including underreporting and the opacity of illicit flows, but range from 3% to 7% of global GDP annually. A conservative 2015-2016 assessment pegged the value at $3.6 to $4.8 , equivalent to about 7% of then-global GDP, encompassing markets in drugs, , counterfeiting, and environmental crimes. More recent projections, drawing on broader data, align with 3-7% of a 2024 global GDP exceeding $109 , implying $3.3 to $7.6 in yearly proceeds. These figures surpass by factors of six or more and exceed the combined economies of many UN member states. Key components driving this magnitude include drug trafficking, estimated at hundreds of billions annually by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), alongside arms smuggling, cyber fraud, and , which alone accounts for 2-5% of global GDP or $800 billion to $2 trillion yearly. The laundering process facilitates reintegration of proceeds into legal economies, distorting markets and eroding revenues; for example, UN estimates indicate $1.6 trillion laundered globally each year as of 2024, representing 2.7% of GDP. Such impacts compound through secondary effects like violence and , with organized crime revenues funding insurgencies and undermining state institutions in vulnerable areas. Earlier UNODC figures from 2009, at $870 billion or 1.5% of GDP, are widely viewed as underestimates given subsequent expansions in cyber-enabled crimes and synthetic drug markets.

Organizational Models

Hierarchical and Bureaucratic Structures

Hierarchical structures in organized crime consist of interdependent actors with a defined ranking that distinguishes leaders from subordinates, often exhibiting bureaucratic features such as formalized roles, chains of command, and protocols for and . This model, akin to or corporate organizations, enables bosses to delegate control over territories and illicit enterprises to lieutenants and soldiers, fostering discipline and coordinated operations like and . Bureaucratic elements, including oaths and hierarchical approvals for actions, promote internal stability but can rigidify responses to external threats. The , or La Cosa Nostra, exemplifies this structure through its pyramid-like "family" system, where a boss exercises ultimate over an responsible for day-to-day operations, a providing strategic counsel, caporegimes (captains) supervising crews of soldiers who enforce rackets, and non-initiated associates aiding in activities without full membership privileges. Caporegimes collect profits from assigned territories and report upward, while soldiers handle direct enforcement, such as loan-sharking or protection schemes, adhering to unwritten codes that prohibit cooperation with . This bureaucracy, reinforced by a national commission for inter-family arbitration established in the 1930s, allowed syndicates to dominate U.S. markets from the era through the mid-20th century, with at least 26 families active by the . Japanese groups, numbering around 3,200 syndicates as of recent estimates, operate under a multi-layered modeled on the oyabun-kobun (parent-child) , where the kumicho () rules as supreme leader, delegating to saiko-komon (senior advisors), wakagashira (underbosses), and shateigashira (lieutenants) who oversee wakachu (sub-lieutenants) and foot soldiers. This familial bureaucracy emphasizes absolute loyalty, with rituals like sake-sharing ceremonies formalizing bonds and punishments such as (finger amputation) enforcing discipline for failures. Subgroups, often tracing to historical (gamblers) or (street peddlers), maintain detailed financial records from shinogi (rackets like construction ), enabling large syndicates like —peaking at over 20,000 members in the 1960s—to sustain operations despite anti-Yakuza laws enacted in 1992. Such structures confer advantages in monopolizing illicit markets through enforced respect for and but expose vulnerabilities, as targeting apex leaders rarely dismantles groups due to succession mechanisms and persistent demand for illegal goods. In both and cases, bureaucratic longevity stems from cultural codes prioritizing group identity over individual gain, allowing adaptation from traditional vices to modern enterprises like drug trafficking while preserving vertical control.

Patron-Client and Network-Based Operations

In patron-client systems, organized crime groups establish asymmetric relationships where a dominant patron—often a leader or boss—provides subordinates (clients) with protection, resources, financial support, and access to illicit opportunities in exchange for unwavering loyalty, labor, and a share of profits. This model fosters vertical ties akin to familial or feudal bonds, emphasizing personal reciprocity over formal contracts, which enhances internal cohesion but can lead to instability during leadership transitions or betrayals. Scholarly analyses trace these dynamics to cultural traditions, such as the Sicilian Mafia's (Cosa Nostra) reliance on honor codes and kinship-like obligations, where patrons mediate disputes and enforce compliance through intimidation or favors. A prominent example is the Japanese Yakuza's oyabun-kobun structure, literally "parent-child" roles, formalized through rituals like sake-sharing ceremonies to symbolize lifelong indebtedness and hierarchy. The oyabun (patron) assumes paternal authority, guiding and shielding kobun (clients) in exchange for obedience and risk-bearing in activities like or operations; this system, rooted in 18th-century gambling guilds, sustains syndicates with over 20,000 members as of recent estimates, enabling resilience against via embedded social norms. In the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, patrons historically controlled rural estates and labor, extracting rents while offering arbitration in agrarian disputes, a pattern documented in post-World War II Palermo where family-based cosche (clans) numbered around 100 active units by the 1980s, per judicial investigations. These arrangements prioritize trust and reputation, reducing transaction costs in high-risk environments but exposing groups to infiltration if client erodes. Network-based operations, by contrast, feature decentralized, horizontal connections among autonomous actors or cells linked by temporary alliances, shared , or market incentives rather than rigid loyalty. These fluid structures facilitate adaptability in transnational crimes like drug trafficking, where participants—such as suppliers, transporters, and distributors—collaborate opportunistically without a central , minimizing disruption from arrests; for instance, Mexican cartels often devolve into splinter networks post-leader captures, with over 200 groups active by 2023 per security analyses. Chinese Triads exemplify this, operating as loose coalitions of hongs (lodges) with 20,000-50,000 global affiliates, coordinating human smuggling or counterfeiting via brokers while avoiding unified command to evade crackdowns, as seen in Hong Kong's 14K triad's international fragmentation. Such networks leverage technology and brokerage roles for resilience, with studies of 134 European organized crime groups revealing dense cooperation webs spanning 5,239 police-recorded interactions, enabling diversification into cyber-enabled fraud or arms trade without hierarchical bottlenecks. Unlike patron-client models, which embed cultural rituals for longevity, network forms emphasize modularity—cells handle discrete tasks like money laundering via cryptocurrencies—reducing vulnerability but increasing coordination challenges and betrayal risks in profit-driven pacts. FBI assessments confirm this evolution, noting shifts from clans to cells in groups like Balkan syndicates, enhancing global reach since the 1990s amid liberalization of trade routes. Empirical data from network analyses underscore their prevalence in volatile markets, where hierarchical decay post-2000 has spurred 30-50% more adaptive formations in regions like Latin America.

Entrepreneurial and Adaptive Forms

Organized crime groups exhibiting entrepreneurial forms prioritize through opportunistic exploitation of illicit markets, akin to legitimate ventures that identify and capitalize on unmet demands. These entities often consist of individual criminal entrepreneurs or small, flexible crews that coordinate resources to supply illegal goods or services, such as narcotics or contract enforcement, while navigating risks from competitors and authorities. Unlike rigid hierarchies, this model emphasizes economic incentives over ethnic or bureaucratic loyalties, with participants engaging in and to sustain operations. A hallmark of criminal entrepreneurship is the ability to recognize market imperfections, such as prohibitions creating high-demand shortages, and respond with calculated ventures. For instance, in the UK heroin trade following the 1968 Dangerous Drugs Act, entrepreneurial networks rapidly expanded supply chains by importing and distributing to meet surging black-market demand, demonstrating judgement-based decision-making under legal uncertainty. Similarly, in Colombia's cocaine industry during the 1980s and 1990s, small-scale operators and alliances outcompeted larger cartels by adapting production and smuggling techniques, prioritizing efficiency over monopolistic control. Adaptive forms within this paradigm involve dynamic restructuring to counter disruptions, including interdictions or technological shifts. Mexican drug trafficking organizations, for example, have innovated by diversifying from traditional marijuana cultivation to synthetic opioids like since the mid-2010s, leveraging chemical expertise to evade crop eradication efforts and exploit U.S. demand spikes that generated over $500 billion in annual illicit flows by 2020. These groups form temporary joint ventures, such as collaborations with Colombian suppliers in the 1990s, to access new routes or corrupt networks, ensuring resilience through decentralized authority rather than fixed command structures. In the digital era, entrepreneurial criminals have integrated online platforms for and cyber-extortion, with Latin American groups adopting AI tools by 2024 to automate schemes and predict enforcement patterns, thereby sustaining profitability amid evolving global regulations.

Primary Activities

Trafficking in Goods and Substances

Organized crime syndicates generate significant revenues through the illicit trafficking of controlled substances, which remains one of the most profitable activities globally, empowering groups to expand into other criminal enterprises. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that nearly 300 million people used illicit drugs worldwide in recent years, with trafficking networks adapting to crises and targeting vulnerable populations. production surged by 34 percent from 2022 levels, yielding an additional $25 billion in earnings for transnational groups in 2024 alone. Synthetic drugs, including and precursors, dominate seizures, with one INTERPOL-coordinated operation in netting $1.05 billion worth in 2024. Drug routes span continents, with cocaine primarily flowing from South American producers like via to North American markets, while opiates originate from and synthetic opioids from Asian laboratories. marketplaces facilitated over $1.7 billion in cryptocurrency-enabled drug transactions in 2024, reflecting a 20 percent year-on-year increase and the shift to digital platforms. and trafficking persist, though synthetics now rival traditional markets in scale and lethality, contributing to overdose epidemics in consumer countries. Beyond substances, organized crime traffics in tangible goods, including firearms, products, and derivatives, which provide diversified income streams with lower risks in some cases. ranks as the third most prevalent criminal market worldwide, involving the smuggling of , components, and across porous borders. The UNODC's Global Study on Firearms Trafficking documents patterns of diversion from legal stocks and manufacturing in conflict zones, fueling insurgencies and urban violence. Yemen, , and exhibit the highest rates, with criminal networks exploiting instability for import, export, and local distribution. Trade in counterfeit goods constitutes a massive parallel , estimated at $923 billion to $1.13 trillion annually as of earlier assessments, often controlled by the same groups handling drugs and arms. These operations span luxury items, , and pharmaceuticals, with production hubs in and Paraguay leading in prevalence. Counterfeiting links directly to and , as networks use legitimate s for concealment. trafficking, valued up to $20 billion yearly, ranks fourth among organized crime sectors and involves over 4,000 species, from and rhino horn to exotic pets and timber. UNODC reports highlight organized groups' roles across the supply chain, from poaching in and to consumer markets in and , exacerbating and funding insurgent activities. These trafficking streams interconnect, with profits laundered through legitimate businesses and routes shared for efficiency.

Exploitation of People and Labor

Organized crime groups systematically exploit individuals through , coercing them into forced labor, commercial sexual activity, and other involuntary services for profit. The estimates that 27.6 million people were trapped in forced labor globally in 2021, with criminal networks generating approximately $236 billion in illicit annual profits from such exploitation. Trafficking for forced labor has overtaken sexual exploitation as the leading form, registering a 47 percent increase from 2019 to 2022, driven by demand in private sector industries like , , and . Office on Drugs and Crime data from 155 countries indicate that detected victims numbered nearly 75,000 in 2022, with 42 percent subjected to forced labor, though underreporting suggests the actual scale is far larger. Exploitation typically involves recruitment via deception, abduction, or threats, followed by control through violence, , or confiscation of documents. In labor trafficking, victims—often migrants from vulnerable regions—are compelled to work without pay or under threat of harm, in sectors including domestic service, fishing, and garment production; 63 percent of forced labor occurs in the private economy, underscoring organized crime's integration into legitimate supply chains. Sexual exploitation entails forcing individuals, predominantly women and children, into prostitution networks operated by syndicates that use brothels, online platforms, and cross-border . Criminal groups like Mexican cartels traffic Central American migrants northward, subjecting them to , , and forced labor en route or upon arrival in the United States. Historical precedents include Italian-American Mafia infiltration of U.S. labor unions during the mid-20th century, where groups like the were corrupted to enable , , and control over and garment industries, affecting thousands of workers through rigged contracts and . In contemporary cases, street gangs and transnational networks, such as those linked to Eastern European or Asian syndicates, exploit immigrants in domestic work or agriculture via and isolation; for instance, U.S. Department of Justice investigations have uncovered operations where nontraditional organized crime groups manipulate foreign labor certifications to enforce servitude. Recent multinational raids in 2024 rescued over 3,200 potential victims and identified 17,800 irregular migrants exploited by polycriminal networks blending trafficking with and . These activities thrive due to weak controls, , and high demand for cheap labor, with profits laundered through legitimate businesses. While official detections exceeded 200,000 victims from 2020 to 2023, experts emphasize that organized crime's covert operations evade most scrutiny, perpetuating cycles of across continents.

Violence, , and Enforcement

Organized crime groups utilize as a primary mechanism for enforcing internal discipline, protecting illicit operations, and deterring rivals or defectors, functioning as a substitute for formal legal systems in environments where state authority is weak or absent. This includes targeted assassinations, tactics, and public displays of force to signal credibility and maintain monopolies over criminal markets. For instance, violence erupts during territorial disputes or when groups seek to eliminate competitors, as seen in the use of to infiltrate legitimate businesses and governments. Extortion, often structured as protection rackets, involves demanding payments from businesses or individuals under threat of harm, where groups provide "protection" against damages they may orchestrate themselves, thereby generating steady revenue streams. In , the Mafia's pizzo system exemplifies this, imposing costs equivalent to over 1.4% of the region's as of economic analyses in the early 2000s, with empirical models confirming its role in sustaining criminal monopolies through credible threats of , , or violence. Similar practices persist in Japanese operations and Chinese Triad activities, where enforces compliance via fear of reprisal, distinct from bribery by relying on threats of worsened conditions rather than incentives. The scale of violence underscores enforcement's brutality: a assessment attributes approximately 1 million deaths worldwide to organized crime activities between 2000 and 2017, with the Americas registering the highest lethality due to turf wars and retaliatory killings. In , drug s have driven rates exceeding 90 per 100,000 inhabitants in affected regions as of 2022, employing beheadings, mass graves, and public executions to enforce drug trafficking routes and demands. Internally, groups impose codes like the Sicilian Mafia's , punishing betrayal with execution to preserve loyalty and secrecy, as evidenced by spikes in Mafia-related murders correlating with political threats to their operations. These tactics not only extract resources but also cultivate a reputation for ruthlessness, deterring cooperation with .

Financial Manipulation and Cyber Operations

Organized crime groups engage in financial manipulation primarily to launder proceeds from illicit activities such as drug trafficking and , converting illegal funds into legitimate assets through methods like trade-based money laundering (TBML), where criminals falsify trade invoices to over- or under-value goods and disguise cash flows. In TBML schemes, groups exploit discrepancies, such as misrepresenting the price of imported commodities, to integrate criminal proceeds into global supply chains, with the estimating that TBML constitutes 80-90% of tied to . Other techniques include deposits (smurfing) to evade reporting thresholds and using shell companies to layer transactions, as seen in operations where groups purchase high-value assets like or businesses to commingle dirty money with clean revenue. Securities fraud represents another vector, with historical cases linking organized crime to "pump-and-dump" schemes that artificially inflate microcap stock prices through coordinated trading and false promotions before selling off holdings. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, U.S. prosecutors charged dozens of individuals affiliated with New York-area organized crime families, including the Gambino and Genovese groups, with manipulating over-the-counter stocks, defrauding investors of millions via boiler-room operations and threats to ensure compliance. More recently, transnational networks have adapted these tactics digitally, though direct ties to traditional syndicates like the Mafia have diminished, shifting toward looser alliances in fraud rings. Cyber operations have expanded organized crime's financial toolkit, enabling scalable extortion and theft without physical presence, as exemplified by ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) models where developers lease malware to affiliates for a profit share, mimicking hierarchical crime syndicates. Groups like Conti and LockBit, active until disruptions in 2022-2023, generated hundreds of millions annually by encrypting victim data and demanding cryptocurrency ransoms, with Europol's Operation Endgame in 2025 targeting initial access brokers who sell footholds to these networks. In Southeast Asia, compounds in Myanmar and Cambodia host forced-labor scam operations run by triads and other syndicates, perpetrating investment fraud and romance scams that defrauded victims of over $37 billion globally in 2023, per UNODC estimates, with profits laundered via cryptocurrencies and mule accounts. These cyber-financial activities often intersect, as ransomware proceeds fund further manipulations like business email compromise (BEC) schemes, where Nigerian-linked transnational groups impersonate executives to divert wire transfers, contributing to $2.9 billion in U.S. losses in 2023 alone. Interpol's Operation Haechi VI in 2025 recovered $439 million from such cyber-enabled frauds, highlighting the role of organized networks in and scams. Despite pressures, including sanctions and arrests, these operations persist due to jurisdictional challenges and the anonymity of digital tools, underscoring organized crime's adaptation to profit from vulnerabilities in global financial systems.

Historical Evolution

Pre-Modern and Early Instances

In , during the late 20th Dynasty around 1150 BCE, tomb robbers formed organized bands that targeted royal burials in the Valley of the Kings, employing coordinated efforts to breach seals, remove valuables, and distribute spoils among participants, with some groups including officials who exploited insider knowledge. These operations involved hierarchical roles, such as scouts and breakers, and extended to trafficking stolen goods through black markets, persisting despite pharaonic decrees and trials documented in the Abbott and Mayer papyri. Maritime piracy emerged as an organized activity by the second millennium BCE, with groups conducting systematic raids on trade routes; Egyptian records from the reign of (circa 1390–1352 BCE) describe coordinated attacks by seafaring raiders preying on merchant vessels in the , often involving ship-to-ship assaults and enslavement for profit. Such bands operated from hidden bases, sharing intelligence and dividing plunder, a model that foreshadowed later pirate hierarchies while challenging early state naval monopolies on sea commerce. In medieval Europe, frequently manifested through structured gangs led by or dispossessed knights, who extorted protection from peasants and merchants amid weak central authority; English royal records from the 1320s detail groups like the Coterels, a family-based outfit active in and , responsible for over 30 documented felonies including , assault, and against and lay targets. These networks leveraged ties and occasional noble for , operating seasonally and retreating to fortified redoubts, with peak activity during periods of dynastic instability like Edward II's reign. Across the , networks—hereditary brotherhoods documented from the 13th century—specialized in ambushing travelers by posing as companions, then strangling victims with knotted scarves (rumals) in nocturnal attacks, followed by ritual disposal and looting of goods worth thousands of rupees per operation. Operating in bands of 10 to 200 across trade routes, they maintained secrecy through oral codes and familial recruitment, pre-dating British rule as evidenced by pre-colonial chronicles and confessions in Mughal-era trials, though colonial campaigns from 1830 executed over 4,000 members via intelligence from informants. These groups exemplified enduring cultural transmission of criminal specialization, blending economic predation with purported religious sanction to the .

Industrial Era Foundations (19th Century)

The Industrial Revolution's rapid urbanization and economic dislocations in the fostered environments conducive to organized criminal networks, as swelling populations in cities like New York and outpaced institutional controls, enabling gangs to exploit , waves, and nascent markets for illicit goods and protection services. In the United States, beginning around the 1830s, ethnic-based street gangs emerged in immigrant-heavy slums such as Manhattan's Five Points district, where Irish arrivals, comprising over 25% of New York's population by 1850, formed groups like and to control turf through , , and political intimidation tied to local elections and labor disputes. These formations laid early templates for hierarchical gang operations, with leaders enforcing loyalty via violence and sharing proceeds from activities like river and dens, amid a rate in New York that spiked to 10 per 100,000 residents in the due to gang conflicts. In Europe, similar dynamics propelled the consolidation of longstanding secret societies into more structured criminal enterprises, particularly in southern Italy, where the transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism disrupted traditional patronage systems, prompting groups like the Camorra in Naples to evolve from 18th-century prison guilds into 19th-century syndicates dominating smuggling, extortion, and public works contracts by the 1860s unification of Italy. The Sicilian Mafia, coalescing in the mid-19th century, filled voids left by weak central governance post-1812 Bourbon reforms and 1861 national unification, offering private enforcement in rural and urbanizing areas through pizzo (protection payments) from landowners and merchants, with membership estimates reaching several thousand by the 1870s amid sulfur mining booms and land enclosures that displaced peasants. These entities institutionalized clientelist bonds, using oaths of omertà (silence) and familial ties to insulate against state intrusion, contrasting with looser urban gangs elsewhere but establishing profit-driven models that persisted into modern iterations. British industrial cities paralleled these developments, with gangs like London's "Peaky Blinders" precursors and scuttlers engaging in razor-based turf wars over betting shops and markets from the 1840s onward, fueled by factory enclosures and a crime wave where property offenses rose 200% between 1820 and 1860 due to and alcohol-fueled economies. Such groups pioneered in emerging sectors like railways and ports, prefiguring 20th-century syndicates by blending ethnic solidarity—often among displaced rural migrants—with entrepreneurial , though fragmented by intermittent police crackdowns under the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. Overall, these 19th-century foundations underscored organized crime's adaptive response to industrialization's causal pressures: surplus low-skill labor, regulatory gaps, and demand for unofficial , setting precedents for scaled operations beyond mere predation.

20th Century Proliferation and Globalization

The enactment of from 1920 to 1933 catalyzed the proliferation of organized crime by generating enormous profits from illegal alcohol production and distribution, transforming peripheral gangs into structured enterprises. , for instance, amassed over $100 million annually by the late 1920s through bootlegging, speakeasies, and related , equivalent to roughly $1.4 billion in contemporary terms. This era saw homicide rates in major cities surge due to inter-gang rivalries, exemplified by the 1929 St. Valentine's Day Massacre involving Capone's forces. Post-repeal, American Mafia syndicates diversified into gambling, labor unions, and narcotics while consolidating power through the 1931 formation of the Commission by Charles "Lucky" Luciano, which served as a governing body to resolve disputes among families and prevent intra-group wars following the Castellammarese conflict. The Commission's national coordination was exposed at the 1957 in New York, where approximately 60 mob leaders convened, alerting federal authorities to the syndicate's interstate operations and prompting intensified investigations. Globalization accelerated in the mid-20th century as criminal networks exploited wartime disruptions and postwar economic booms for transnational , particularly narcotics. The French Connection, active from the 1940s through the 1970s, routed from Turkish fields to laboratories in controlled by Corsican mafias, then to U.S. markets, supplying up to 80% of American demand before its dismantlement via international cooperation. In , Japanese syndicates expanded post-1945 amid U.S. occupation black markets, evolving from localized extortion to international ventures in and drugs by the . Chinese Triad societies, leveraging diaspora networks in and , intensified opium and trafficking from the Golden Triangle region starting in the early 20th century, with production scaling dramatically after to meet global demand. Improved global shipping and aviation facilitated these cross-continental flows, enabling alliances between disparate groups—such as Italian-American mafias with Latin American suppliers—and embedding organized crime in legitimate trade routes. By century's end, illicit economies rivaled national GDPs in affected regions, driven by profit motives amid regulatory gaps.

Post-Cold War and Digital Age Developments

The dissolution of the in 1991 created economic turmoil and institutional vacuums that facilitated the rapid expansion of Russian organized crime groups, known as the vory v zakone or "thieves in law," which had persisted underground during the Soviet era. These groups capitalized on chaos, controlling up to 40% of Russia's private enterprises by the mid- through , contract killings, and alliances with emerging oligarchs, leading to thousands of murders annually in the early . Internationally, Russian criminals infiltrated Western markets, with figures like establishing operations in the United States by 1992, engaging in , fuel scams, and . Similar dynamics emerged in post-Yugoslav states, where ethnic conflicts and weak governance post- enabled Balkan syndicates to dominate heroin routes from to . In , the fragmentation of Colombian cartels following U.S. extraditions and operations in the late 1980s and early shifted cocaine production and trafficking dominance to Mexican organizations, which consolidated control over routes to the by the mid-. Groups like the , under Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, expanded violently in the 2000s, with the number of major cartels rising from four to nine between the and amid internal wars and government offensives initiated in 2006, resulting in over 300,000 homicides linked to cartel activities by 2020. Mexican syndicates diversified into precursors from and European cocaine markets starting in the early 2000s, leveraging maritime shipping and to evade interdiction. The advent of widespread in the late and integrated cyber operations into organized crime, enabling transnational groups to perpetrate , , and data breaches on a global scale, with losses exceeding $10 billion annually in the U.S. alone by 2023 as reported by the FBI. Traditional syndicates, including those from and , adopted cyber tools for via cryptocurrencies and hacking financial institutions, while the facilitated anonymous marketplaces for drugs, weapons, and stolen data. Pioneered by sites like in 2011, darknet markets grew to handle billions in illicit transactions yearly until disruptions like the 2022 Hydra shutdown, which processed $5.2 billion in cryptocurrency since 2015, though new platforms persistently emerge. United Nations assessments highlight cybercrime's borderless nature, with organized networks exploiting digital infrastructure for coordination and cyber-enabled extortion, underscoring adaptations driven by profit motives over ideological constraints.

Causal Explanations

Rational Actor and Economic Incentives

Organized crime groups function as rational economic entities, aggregating individual decisions where participants calculate expected gains from illicit activities against risks of apprehension and punishment. This aligns with Gary Becker's economic model of crime, which posits that offenders choose illegal paths when the anticipated utility—factoring in probabilities of success, fines, , and moral costs—exceeds legal alternatives. In organized settings, syndicates mitigate these risks through hierarchical structures that specialize in enforcement, , and contract fulfillment, which are infeasible for lone actors in black markets lacking state-backed legal recourse. Empirical evidence from mafia operations, such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, demonstrates this rationality: groups invest in as a cost-effective tool for territorial control and dispute resolution, yielding sustained revenues from rackets estimated to approach legitimate business returns adjusted for hazard premiums. Economic incentives propel entry into prohibited sectors where supply restrictions inflate prices far above production costs, creating supernormal profits for those overcoming barriers like and . Demand inelasticity for vices—narcotics, , and —ensures persistent markets; for instance, global yields roughly $870 billion yearly, equivalent to 7% of world trade excluding counterfeiting and arms. Rational actors exploit regulatory gaps, as seen in historical U.S. alcohol prohibition (1920–1933), which birthed multimillion-dollar bootlegging empires by figures like , with profits funding expansion into labor . Modern analogs include Mexican cartels, where trafficking generates margins exceeding 1000% due to U.S. demand and border enforcement inefficiencies, rationally prioritizing high-volume routes despite interdiction risks. These incentives foster organizational innovation, such as diversification into cyber fraud or human smuggling, where low detection probabilities amplify returns; a 2012 Italian antimafia estimate pegged domestic organized crime turnover at €150 billion, rivaling national GDP sectors. However, rational calculus incorporates opportunity costs: recruits often hail from low-wage environments where legal earnings fail to compete, with "salaries" in historically doubling regional averages while deferring full risks via probationary roles. State interventions, like enhanced penalties, can deter marginally if they elevate expected costs above benefits, though syndicates adapt by corrupting officials or relocating, underscoring the model's emphasis on elasticity over absolute prohibition.

Cultural and Subcultural Dynamics

Organized crime groups sustain operations through subcultures that emphasize loyalty, , and hierarchical discipline, functioning as informal mechanisms in illicit markets where legal is absent. These dynamics mitigate risks inherent to high-stakes illegal activities, where trust deficits could otherwise undermine enterprise viability. Empirical analyses of organizations reveal that such cultural norms, including codes prohibiting cooperation with authorities, are essential for preserving operational and internal cohesion. In the Sicilian Mafia, the code of mandates absolute silence regarding group affairs, rooted in norms of masculine honor that frame informant status as profound dishonor. Studies conducted in Italy demonstrate a negative between endorsement of masculine honor ideologies and intentions to participate in anti-mafia collective action; participants scoring higher on honor measures exhibited lower tendencies, attributing opposition to criminal groups as a violation of personal and communal integrity. This cultural barrier contributes to low defection rates, as evidenced by network analyses of Mafia structures showing dense, resilient ties reinforced by shared values over mere economic incentives. Japanese subcultures similarly institutionalize loyalty via rituals such as , the self-amputation of a finger's distal to signify for rule breaches or failures toward superiors, embedding physical commitment to group hierarchy. Originating from historical adaptations to , these practices blend with broader Japanese values of (giri) and indebtedness (ninjo), enabling yakuza persistence despite legal crackdowns by providing symbolic and reputational deterrents to . Russian vory v zakone ("thieves-in-law") emerged from prison systems with a code rejecting state collaboration and promoting criminal autonomy, yet lacking the rigid of Italian groups, which facilitates pragmatic alliances and resilience across regime changes. Empirical examinations trace this subculture's endurance to Soviet-era origins, where anti-authority norms evolved into post-Soviet mafia adaptability, contrasting with more ritual-bound groups by prioritizing fluid authority over inflexible honor codes. In Mexican cartels, subcultural glorifies violent dominance and risk-taking, often propagated through narco-corridos and public displays, though less codified than in mafias, correlating with elevated intra-group conflict rates due to weaker loyalty enforcements. These variations underscore how subcultures causally adapt to local contexts, balancing internal control with external threats to perpetuate criminal enterprises.

Critiques of Structural and Systemic Blame

Critics of structural and systemic explanations for organized crime contend that attributing its emergence and persistence primarily to , inequality, or institutional failures overlooks individual agency and specific causal mechanisms. While economic deprivation may provide opportunities for illicit activities, indicates that organized crime often arises from rational calculations of high rewards outweighing risks, rather than deterministic structural forces. For instance, Gary Becker's economic model of crime posits that individuals engage in illegal enterprises when expected returns exceed legal alternatives, emphasizing personal decision-making over passive responses to systemic pressures. This perspective challenges the notion that alone drives participation, as the vast majority of impoverished individuals—estimated at less than 1% in high-risk communities—opt for lawful livelihoods despite similar structural constraints. Reverse causality further undermines systemic blame: organized crime frequently entrenches by stifling legitimate economic activity through and , creating self-perpetuating rather than resulting from it. In , Mafia imposes for efficient firms, reducing investment and trapping regions in low-growth equilibria, as modeled in analyses of protection rackets where criminal predation distorts market incentives. Similarly, cross-country studies show organized crime correlating with reduced socioeconomic development in emerging economies, where illicit networks undermine institutions and divert resources from productive uses. These dynamics suggest that blaming exogenous structures inverts the primary causal arrow, ignoring how criminal organizations actively erode the very conditions they are said to stem from. Cultural and historical contingencies explain why organized crime manifests selectively, even among comparably deprived groups, rather than uniformly as a structural . In , the Mafia's 19th-century origins trace not to generalized poverty but to disruptions from socialist peasant leagues, which weakened state enforcement and incentivized private protection syndicates rooted in familial and honor-based networks. Analogous patterns appear in , where persists amid low national poverty rates (under 1% as of 2020), sustained by subcultural norms of loyalty and endurance rather than economic desperation. Such variances highlight the insufficiency of broad systemic factors, as identical deprivation levels yield divergent outcomes based on entrenched social structures and rational adaptations to local power vacuums. Critics argue that overreliance on structural narratives, often prevalent in academic and media analyses, diminishes accountability by framing criminals as inevitable products of environment, thereby neglecting targeted interventions against cultural transmission and economic incentives.

Societal and Economic Impacts

Direct Harms and Victimization

Organized crime inflicts direct physical harms through intentional homicides, which accounted for approximately 22 percent of the global total in 2021, equating to over 100,000 deaths annually when extrapolated from the Office on Drugs and Crime's estimate of 458,000 total s that year. In the , this proportion rises to 50 percent, driven primarily by competition among drug trafficking organizations and gangs for territorial control, resulting in elevated homicide rates in countries like and , where cartel-related violence contributed to over 117,000 murders across in 2023 alone. Victims are disproportionately young males involved in rival groups or civilians caught in crossfire, with organized crime groups employing violence not only for enforcement but also to instill fear and deter cooperation with authorities. Beyond murders, organized crime perpetuates victimization through drug distribution networks that fuel overdose epidemics, particularly via synthetic opioids like trafficked by Mexican cartels into the . In 2023, provisional data indicated nearly 38,000 deaths from synthetic opioid overdoses in the first half of the year, with implicated in over 70,000 U.S. fatalities annually, making it the leading for Americans aged 18-45. These deaths represent indirect but causally linked harms from cartel-supplied and finished products, often adulterated to maximize potency and profits, exacerbating crises independent of consumer demand dynamics. Human trafficking by organized networks constitutes another core direct harm, with 74 percent of convicted traffickers operating in groups that exploit victims for forced labor, sexual exploitation, or organ removal. The UNODC's 2024 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons documented a 25 percent rise in detected victims since 2018, surpassing 200,000 identified cases from 2020 to 2023, though underreporting suggests the actual figure is substantially higher; women and girls comprise 61 percent of detected victims, many subjected to prolonged physical and . These operations thrive on coercion, including beatings, confinement, and , yielding billions in illicit revenue while leaving survivors with lasting trauma and health impairments. Extortion schemes by mafia-style groups and gangs impose economic and psychological victimization on businesses and individuals, curtailing and market participation through threats of . In regions like and northern , such rackets reduce firm entry and increase exits, with empirical models showing even modest extortion rates contracting local GDP by discouraging formal economic activity. Victims, often small enterprises in or retail, face recurrent payments—estimated to generate billions annually for groups like the Sicilian Mafia—under penalty of , , or , fostering a climate of pervasive fear that amplifies indirect harms like business closures and .

Unintended "Benefits" and Market Fillers

Organized crime groups have, in certain contexts of state weakness or failure, assumed roles in supplying and services that mimic public goods typically provided by governments, thereby filling institutional voids. Economic analyses posit that such entities emerge precisely where official mechanisms are unreliable, offering credible commitments to safeguard , enforce contracts, and resolve disputes in low-trust environments. This private provision can reduce immediate transaction costs for local economic actors, though it often entrenches extortionate practices under the guise of . Empirical studies of post-unification illustrate how the developed as an industry specializing in private , capitalizing on the Italian state's inability to establish trustworthy policing and judicial systems in the late , where interpersonal trust was scarce and vendettas prevalent. In , syndicates have demonstrated capacity for rapid mobilization in crises, delivering aid more swiftly than bureaucratic state responses. Following the January 17, 1995, Great Hanshin earthquake in , which killed over 6,400 people and displaced hundreds of thousands, the —Japan's largest group—dispatched convoys of trucks laden with food, water, blankets, and medical supplies to affected areas within hours, establishing distribution centers before government aid fully ramped up. Similar efforts occurred after the , with groups providing thousands of bottles of water, batteries, and instant noodles to evacuation centers, leveraging their hierarchical networks for efficient . These actions, while self-interested—enhancing group legitimacy and recruitment—filled acute gaps in state responsiveness, preventing short-term escalation of disorder in devastated zones. Mexican drug cartels have similarly extended services beyond illicit , investing in and welfare to cultivate acquiescence or loyalty in territories with deficient public provision. Groups like the have funded roads, schools, and clinics in rural areas of states such as and , where government neglect persists; for instance, during the starting in 2020, cartels distributed food baskets, masks, and oxygen tanks to residents, outpacing federal aid in remote regions. Such provisioning, documented through ethnographic and journalistic accounts, substitutes for absent state functions, stabilizing local economies tied to or migration remittances, though it invariably ties communities to cartel violence and . Prohibitions on goods and services with persistent demand generate black markets that organized crime exploits to supply unmet needs, inadvertently sustaining access and economic flows despite legal bans. During the U.S. alcohol era (1920–1933), bootlegging networks ensured alcohol availability, employing thousands in production and distribution—estimated at over 500,000 individuals by some accounts—and spurring innovations in clandestine manufacturing, even as it inflated prices and adulteration risks. Analogously, contemporary illicit drug markets fill voids created by bans, channeling billions in revenue—global estimates exceed $300 billion annually—into informal economies that provide livelihoods in impoverished regions, such as cultivation in or farming in , where legal alternatives are scarce. These markets mitigate absolute shortages but distort incentives toward for market control, underscoring that while they address demand gaps, the net societal costs typically outweigh any localized economic fillers.

Broader Macroeconomic Consequences

Organized crime exerts a drag on macroeconomic performance primarily through mechanisms such as , violence-induced uncertainty, and , which elevate business costs, deter private , and misallocate public resources. Empirical analyses across countries demonstrate that these effects manifest as reduced and lower overall growth rates, with organized crime acting as a barrier to efficient market functioning by substituting informal for legal contracts. In particular, the infiltration of legal economies by criminal groups distorts firm-level decisions, leading to suboptimal choices and hindering broader development. In , regions affected by organizations exhibit a GDP approximately 16% lower than comparable counterfactual scenarios absent such criminal presence, based on post-war synthetic control comparisons for southern areas like and from the 1970s onward. This shortfall reflects not merely resource diversion via and but a net loss in productive activity, corroborated by lower electricity consumption and growth accounting that rules out mere redistribution effects. Similarly, in municipalities dominated by drug cartels, organized crime correlates with diminished export growth and GDP reductions of up to 0.5% following intensified enforcement disruptions, as violence and territorial control erode commercial predictability. World Bank assessments further link such criminal dominance across , including , to stifled regional growth by amplifying informality and repelling . At a national scale in , the economic toll of violence—predominantly cartel-driven—reached 14.6% of GDP in 2021, encompassing direct losses from homicides, , and disrupted productivity alongside indirect burdens like healthcare expenditures and foregone wages. These costs compound through feedback loops where criminal revenues, estimated to infiltrate up to 18% of GDP via diversified rackets, crowd out legitimate sectors such as and transportation. Cross-nationally, organized crime's macroeconomic footprint includes limiting foreign and curtailing economic activity, with studies positing that its standalone presence erodes performance more acutely than alone, though the two often interact to amplify distortions. In Italian regional data from 1996 to 2013, organized crime impeded growth trajectories, with serving as a mitigating but ultimately exacerbating factor in resource misdirection.

Intersections with State Power

Corruption and Political Infiltration

Organized crime groups systematically exploit to infiltrate political institutions, securing , favorable policies, and that sustain their operations. By bribing officials, campaigns, or intimidating rivals, these entities embed themselves in processes, often distorting public resource distribution toward illicit interests such as contracts or regulatory leniency. Empirical studies indicate that such infiltration reduces electoral competition and leads to the selection of less qualified politicians, as seen in Italian municipalities where mafia presence correlates with lower candidate quality and manipulated outcomes. In , the Sicilian Mafia, or Cosa Nostra, has historically forged alliances with politicians, particularly during the post-World War II era when fragmented political systems allowed mafia-backed cliques to wield influence. For instance, mafia groups colluded with local officials to skew public investments toward strategic sectors like and , enabling and . This pattern persisted into the late 20th century, with documented ties between mafia bosses and Christian Democratic Party figures, culminating in high-profile scandals like the 1992 murders of judges and , which exposed systemic political complicity. Mexican drug cartels exemplify aggressive political capture through widespread and of officials at federal, state, and local levels. Cartels like the and Jalisco New Generation have infiltrated and , with cases such as the 2019 arrest of former Security Secretary for accepting millions in bribes from to facilitate trafficking. Corruption enables cartels to operate with impunity, as evidenced by ongoing protection rackets that undermine anti-trafficking efforts and contribute to over 30,000 annual homicides linked to cartel violence. Recent analyses highlight how such infiltration persists despite policy shifts, with cartels exerting influence over electoral processes in cartel-dominated regions like and . In , the maintained deep ties to political figures, particularly through the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was co-founded in 1955 by , a yakuza-linked fixer involved in wartime profiteering. Yakuza syndicates influenced policy via campaign financing and enforcement roles, such as providing "security" during 1960 protests against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in exchange for tolerance of and rackets. Although anti-yakuza laws since 2011 have curtailed overt influence, historical allowed syndicates to challenge state in areas like and entertainment. Russian organized crime groups, evolving from Soviet-era networks, have intertwined with political elites, corrupting electoral processes through vote-buying and . In the transition, vory v zakone (thieves-in-law) infiltrated regional governments, securing licenses for resource extraction in exchange for political loyalty. Contemporary dynamics show state tolerance or co-optation of criminal networks for geopolitical aims, such as sanctions evasion, though independent crime syndicates continue to exert influence via judicial in Central and Eastern Europe-adjacent spheres.

Comparisons to Governmental Dysfunction

Economist Mancur Olson's stationary bandit theory posits that stable governments emerge when predatory groups transition from roving bandits—engaging in hit-and-run extraction that discourages —to stationary ones that monopolize violence over a fixed , extracting taxes in exchange for and public goods to maximize long-term revenue. This framework draws parallels between organized crime syndicates and dysfunctional states: effective criminal organizations mimic stationary bandits by offering localized "order" (e.g., and security) to extract rents sustainably, whereas roving or fragmented criminal predation mirrors short-sighted governmental dysfunction, such as arbitrary expropriation without investment incentives, leading to . In both cases, the absence of credible commitment to future erodes productivity, as evidenced by Olson's analysis of autocratic regimes where rulers prioritize immediate gains over sustained growth, akin to transient violence disrupting . Empirical instances highlight how governmental dysfunction enables organized crime to assume quasi-state roles. In regions of controlled by cartels like or , groups levy informal taxes on businesses and provide protection against rivals or theft—functions neglected by corrupt or ineffective —effectively operating as stationary bandits with annual "revenues" exceeding billions from drug trades and local , outpacing local government budgets in affected municipalities as of 2023 data. Similarly, in during the 19th-20th centuries, the filled voids left by absentee feudal and post-unification state authorities, enforcing contracts and resolving disputes via protection rackets that persisted due to governmental incapacity to monopolize legitimate violence, with influence peaking in the 1980s amid scandals involving hundreds of officials. These dynamics underscore causal realism: state failure in rule enforcement creates incentives for criminal hierarchies to evolve into governance substitutes, perpetuating cycles of violence and extraction without the broader public goods (e.g., ) that distinguish functional states. Critics of structural excuses for crime note that such comparisons reveal not equivalence but asymmetry; organized crime's parasitism amplifies harm in dysfunctional contexts, as seen in where state collapse under (peaking at 1.7 million percent in 2018) allowed colectivos—government-tolerated paramilitaries—to run rackets mirroring enforcement, exacerbating humanitarian crises with over 7 million emigrants by 2023. Yet, unlike legitimate governments, criminal entities lack mechanisms, leading to higher volatility: cartel wars in caused over 30,000 homicides annually in peak years (2018-2020), far exceeding state-perpetrated dysfunction in stable democracies. This highlights source biases in academic narratives often downplaying state predatory potential while overemphasizing socioeconomic "roots" of crime, ignoring first-principles incentives where weak institutions invite organized predation regardless of inequality levels.

State Failures Enabling Criminal Enterprises

State failures, defined as the erosion or collapse of central authority's ability to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence and deliver essential public goods such as security, justice, and economic opportunities, create fertile ground for organized criminal enterprises to proliferate. In these scenarios, governments lose control over territories, leading to power vacuums where criminal groups establish parallel structures for governance, taxation through extortion, and illicit service provision. This dynamic is exacerbated by institutional weaknesses, including ineffective policing, porous borders, and inadequate infrastructure, which allow criminal networks to operate with impunity in remote or abandoned regions. Empirical analyses indicate that such failures correlate with predatory organized crime, as states unable to enforce contracts or resolve disputes drive economic actors toward underground markets dominated by coercive syndicates. A primary mechanism involves the substitution of state functions by criminal organizations, which gain local support by filling voids in service delivery. For instance, in environments of high and fiscal collapse, criminal groups recruit from disenfranchised populations and provide alternative in illicit trades, fostering dependency and loyalty. Cross-national research across 59 countries has linked economic failures—such as widespread black markets and corrupt judicial systems—to elevated levels of organized crime, as legitimate economic channels atrophy and illicit ones expand unchecked. This is particularly acute during state transitions or civil conflicts, where fragmented authority prevents cohesive responses, allowing criminals to embed within communities as quasi-legitimate providers of protection and . Concrete cases illustrate these patterns. In , the 1991 collapse of the central government amid created a vacuum that enabled the rapid organization of pirate syndicates along the coastline, evolving from sporadic acts in the to sophisticated networks by the mid-2000s. These groups exploited the absence of naval enforcement and state institutions, capturing over 200 vessels between 2005 and and extracting ransoms estimated at $400 million in 2011 alone, while onshore clans protected operations through informal alliances. Similarly, in following the 2021 military coup and ensuing , state fragmentation has accelerated organized crime, including large-scale methamphetamine production in border regions and cyber-scam operations in junta-controlled enclaves, with criminal networks capitalizing on ungoverned spaces to expand transnational activities like and arms smuggling. These examples underscore how state incapacity not only permits but incentivizes criminal enterprises to professionalize, often mirroring state-like hierarchies to sustain operations.

Responses and Policy Approaches

Legislative and Enforcement Strategies

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, enacted by the in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act, targets patterns of activity by allowing prosecution of entire criminal enterprises rather than isolated acts, with penalties including up to 20 years imprisonment per count and forfeiture of assets derived from criminal proceeds. This legislation has facilitated the dismantling of traditional families, such as through the 1980s prosecutions that convicted over 1,000 members of New York's , contributing to a reported decline in their influence by the 1990s. Federal prosecutions under RICO yield conviction rates exceeding 80%, underscoring its role in disrupting command structures via evidence from predicate acts like and . In Italy, anti-mafia legislation evolved through measures like the 1982 Rognoni-La Torre law mandating asset confiscation from convicted mafiosi and the 2011 Anti-Mafia Code (Legislative Decree 159/2011), which expanded preventive measures against suspected affiliates based on documented ties to criminal networks. These laws have enabled the seizure of billions in mafia assets, correlating with economic revitalization; for instance, dismantling Sicilian Cosa Nostra operations in the 1990s and 2000s increased local bank lending by up to 10% and boosted productivity in affected municipalities. However, challenges persist, as evidenced by a 2025 European Court of Human Rights ruling critiquing overbroad application of reputation-based confiscations without direct evidence, potentially limiting future enforcement. Enforcement strategies worldwide emphasize proactive gathering, including electronic such as wiretaps, which officials deem essential for penetrating insular groups, as seen in U.S. operations yielding thousands of intercepts annually against drug cartels and gangs. Informant programs, often paired with witness protection under statutes like the U.S. Witness Security Program established in 1970, have proven critical, providing insider testimony that led to high-profile convictions, though they carry risks of informant reliability issues. complements these by depriving organizations of operational funds; the FBI, for example, has seized over $1 billion in assets from transnational groups since 2010, targeting proceeds from trafficking and . Internationally, the Convention against (UNTOC), adopted in 2000 and ratified by over 190 states, mandates harmonized criminalization of offenses like and , while promoting mutual legal assistance and , facilitating over 10,000 such requests annually through mechanisms like . Implementation has strengthened cross-border operations, such as joint task forces disrupting Latin American cartels, but assessments highlight gaps in data transparency and engagement, limiting measurable impact on global organized crime revenues estimated at $870 billion yearly.

International and Technological Countermeasures

International cooperation against organized crime primarily revolves around multilateral treaties and networks that facilitate information sharing, joint operations, and . The Convention against (UNTOC), adopted on November 15, 2000, in , , and entering into force on September 29, 2003, serves as the primary global framework, with 194 parties as of August 2025. It mandates states to criminalize participation in organized criminal groups, , , and obstruction of justice, while promoting mutual legal assistance and ; however, implementation varies due to domestic legal hurdles and uneven enforcement, limiting its impact on disrupting entrenched networks. Organizations like coordinate cross-border efforts, including Project Millennium, which targets major criminal groups through intelligence-led operations, and the I-CAN initiative against the 'Ndrangheta , enhancing police collaboration to dismantle global networks. In , supports operations such as Endgame in 2025, which disrupted botnets used by cybercriminals for distribution tied to organized , resulting in arrests and infrastructure takedowns across multiple countries. Empirical assessments indicate that such collaborations yield tangible results, like increased arrests in cases, but persistent gaps in real-time data exchange and jurisdictional conflicts hinder comprehensive effectiveness against adaptive transnational syndicates. Technological countermeasures leverage data analytics and monitoring to preempt and trace criminal activities. Blockchain intelligence tools enable to track transactions linked to , shifting focus from reactive seizures to proactive prevention, as demonstrated by agencies like the FBI using such analytics to attribute illicit funds. Biometric systems, incorporating AI-driven facial recognition and , have correlated with reductions in rates in deployed areas, with studies showing up to 20-30% drops in targeted offenses through predictive pattern analysis. AI frameworks also counter emerging threats like deepfakes in , though criminals' adoption of similar technologies necessitates ongoing adversarial adaptations by authorities. Despite these advances, issues and privacy concerns in deployment underscore that technology alone cannot supplant robust international enforcement, as organized groups exploit jurisdictional silos and innovate countermeasures.

Debates on Prohibition and Legalization Efficacy

Prohibition of vices such as alcohol and drugs has historically created high-profit black markets enforced through violence rather than , thereby empowering organized crime groups that exploit the risk premiums embedded in illicit trade. Empirical analyses indicate that such bans drive demand underground, where suppliers face no regulatory and must compete violently for , as seen in the economic incentives modeled by the "," which correlates enforcement intensity with increased potency and violence in contraband goods. The U.S. alcohol prohibition from 1920 to 1933 exemplifies this dynamic, as it transformed disparate bootlegging operations into structured syndicates capable of corrupting officials and dominating urban territories. Homicide rates in major cities rose by approximately 78% during the era, with organized crime figures like amassing fortunes estimated at $100 million annually (equivalent to over $1.5 billion in 2023 dollars) from speakeasies and , funding expansions into and . via the 21st Amendment in 1933 correlated with a 50% drop in crime rates, diminished gang revenues, and reduced corruption, as legal markets supplanted illicit ones and generated $500 million in annual by 1935. Contemporary mirrors these patterns, particularly in supplier nations like , where U.S.-driven demand since the has ballooned revenues to $19-29 billion annually by 2010, financing militarized conflicts that claimed over 300,000 lives from 2006 to 2020. Studies attribute this violence not to use per se but to territorial disputes over prohibited flows, with escalations—such as Mexico's 2006 —doubling fragmentation and rates from 8.1 to 17.5 per 100,000 by 2011. Critics of , drawing from cross-national data, argue it sustains organized crime by preventing price competition and quality controls that legal markets provide, though academic sources often underemphasize supply-side persistence due to entrenched institutional biases favoring punitive approaches. Legalization proponents contend it erodes criminal enterprises by diverting revenues to taxed, regulated suppliers, citing U.S. cannabis reforms since Colorado's 2012 voter approval, which saw legal sales capture 70-80% of the market by 2020 and correlate with a 9.2% drop in illicit prices alongside heroin price hikes of 64% from reduced cross-substitution. In Washington state, post-legalization arrests for marijuana offenses fell 85% by 2018, undermining gang incentives for cultivation and distribution. However, evidence is mixed: some panel studies report 10-15% rises in property and violent crimes in legalized states like Washington and Oregon through 2017, potentially from increased impaired driving or youth access, while others find no net crime uptick, attributing variances to confounding enforcement shifts. Portugal's 2001 decriminalization of personal possession—shifting to administrative panels rather than full —offers a partial , reducing drug-related deaths by 80% and infections among injectors by 95% by 2012 without evident surges in organized crime dominance, as trafficking remained prohibited and usage rates stabilized below European averages. Yet, rates rose modestly post-reform, and persistence endures due to non-legalized supply chains, suggesting decriminalization alone insufficiently dismantles entrenched networks. Opponents of broader warn of gateway effects and usage spikes, as modeled in simulations predicting 20-50% increases in hard drug prevalence, potentially amplifying psychopharmacological violence like assaults under intoxication, though causal links remain debated amid data limitations from short post-reform windows. Overall, while demonstrably incubates organized crime through monopoly-like illicit profits, legalization's efficacy hinges on comprehensive to suppress residuals, with empirical gains in and offset by risks of expanded consumption driving ancillary crimes; first-principles analysis favors market competition over bans, yet real-world implementation reveals path dependencies where partial reforms yield incomplete disruption of criminal adaptations.

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