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Sears, Roebuck and Co., commonly known as Sears (/sɪərz/ SEERZ),[8] is an American chain of department stores and online retailer. The company was founded in 1892 by Richard Warren Sears and Alvah Curtis Roebuck and reincorporated in 1906 by Richard Sears and Julius Rosenwald. The company began as a mail-order catalog company and opened its first retail locations in 1925.[9] Through the 1980s, Sears was the largest retailer in the United States.[10]

Key Information

In 2005, Eddie Lampert took control of the company through Kmart.[11][12] The merger resulted in Sears Holdings. Sears' parent company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 15, 2018.[13] After the bankruptcy, Transformco focuses on managing and selling the remaining real estate assets.[14][15]

From 2705 stores at its peak in 2011,[16][17] only 5 stores are still open as of 2025.[3][2][18]

History

[edit]

Beginnings

[edit]
Sears' founders
Richard Warren Sears
Alvah Curtis Roebuck

Richard Warren Sears was born in 1863 in Stewartville, Minnesota, to a wealthy family which moved to nearby Spring Valley.[19] In 1879, his father died shortly after losing the family fortune in a speculative stock deal.[19] Sears moved across the state to work as a railroad station agent in North Redwood, then Minneapolis.

While he was in North Redwood, a jeweler refused delivery on a shipment of watches. Sears purchased them and sold them at a low price to the station agents, making a profit. He started a mail-order watch business in Minneapolis in 1886, calling it the R.W. Sears Watch Company. That year, he met Alvah Curtis Roebuck, a watch repairman. In 1887, Sears and Roebuck relocated the business to Chicago, and the company published Richard Sears's first mail-order catalog, offering watches, diamonds, and jewelry.

In 1889, Sears sold his business for $100,000 ($3.2 million in 2024 dollars) and relocated to Iowa, planning to be a rural banker.[20] He returned to Chicago in 1892 and established a new mail-order firm, again selling watches and jewelry, with Roebuck as his partner, operating as the A. C. Roebuck watch company. On September 16, 1893,[21] they renamed the company Sears, Roebuck, and Co. and began to diversify the product lines offered in their catalogs.

Before the Sears catalog, farmers near small rural towns usually purchased supplies, often at high prices and on credit, from local general stores with narrow selections of goods. Prices were negotiated and relied on the storekeeper's estimate of a customer's creditworthiness. This also had the effect of helping black farmers during the Jim Crow Law era, when storekeepers may not make them the same offers. Sears built an opposite business model by offering in their catalogs a larger selection of products at published prices.[citation needed]

By 1894, the Sears catalog had grown to 322 pages, including many new items, such as sewing machines, bicycles, sporting goods and automobiles (later produced, from 1905 to 1915, by Lincoln Motor Car Works of Chicago [no relation to the current Ford line]).[22] By 1895, the company was producing a 532-page catalog. Sales were over $400,000 ($12 million in 2024 dollars) in 1893 and over $750,000 ($25 million in 2024 dollars) two years later.[23] By 1896, dolls, stoves, and groceries were added to the catalog.

Despite the strong and growing sales, the national Panic of 1893 led to a full-scale economic depression, causing a cash squeeze and large quantities of unsold merchandise by 1895. Roebuck decided to quit, returning later in a publicity role. Sears offered Roebuck's half of the company to Chicago businessman Aaron Nusbaum, who in turn brought in his brother-in-law Julius Rosenwald, to whom Sears owed money. In August 1895, they bought Roebuck's half of the company for $75,000 ($2.5 million in 2024 dollars), and that month the company was reincorporated in Illinois with a capital stock of $150,000 ($4.9 million in 2024 dollars). The transaction was handled by Albert Henry Loeb of Chicago law firm Loeb & Adler (now Arnstein & Lehr); copies of the transaction are still displayed on the firm's walls.[24]

Early 20th century

[edit]
The exterior of the former Sears Merchandise Building Tower, now the John D. and Alexandra C. Nichols Tower
Former Sears Catalog Distribution Center and Retail Store, now Crosstown Concourse, in Memphis, Tennessee

Sears and Rosenwald got along well with each other, but not with Nusbaum; they bought his interest in the firm for $1.3 million in 1903 ($45 million in 2024 dollars).[25] Rosenwald brought to the mail-order firm a rational management philosophy and diversified product lines: dry goods, consumer durables, drugs, hardware, furniture, and nearly anything else a farm household could desire.

Sales continued to proliferate, and the prosperity of the company and their vision for more significant expansion led Sears and Rosenwald to take the company public in 1906, with a stock placement of $40 million ($1 billion in 2024 dollars). They had to incorporate a new company to bring the operation public; Sears and Rosenwald established Sears, Roebuck and Company with the legal name Sears, Roebuck and Co., in the state of New York, which effectively replaced the original company.[26] The current company inherits the history of the old company, celebrating the original 1892 incorporation, rather than the 1906 revision, as the start of the company.

Sears's successful 1906 initial public offering (IPO) marks the first major retail IPO in American financial history and represented a coming of age, financially, of the consumer sector.[27] The company traded under the ticker symbol S and was a component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1924 to 1999.

In 1906, Sears opened its catalog plant and the Sears Merchandise Building Tower in Chicago's West Side.[28] The building was the anchor of what would become the massive 40-acre (16 ha) Sears, Roebuck and Company Complex of offices, laboratories, and mail-order operations at Homan Avenue and Arthington Street. The complex served as corporate headquarters until 1973 when the Sears Tower was completed and served as the base of the mail-order catalog business until 1995.

By 1907, under Rosenwald's leadership as vice president and treasurer, annual sales of the company climbed to roughly $50 million ($1.2 billion in 2024 dollars).[29] Sears resigned from the presidency in 1908 due to declining health, with Rosenwald named president and chairman of the board and taking on full control.[30]

In 1910, Sears acquired the David Bradley Plow company. This acquisition would lead to the manufacturing of riding mowers, chainsaws, tillers, etc., in the Bradley Illinois factory.[31]

The company was badly hurt during 1919–21 as a severe depression hit the nation's farms. To bail out the company, Rosenwald pledged $21 million ($290 million in 2024 dollars) of his personal wealth in 1921.[32] By 1922, Sears had regained financial stability.[citation needed]

Boom years

[edit]
Art Deco 1930s Sears store in Brooklyn, New York City
Store in Raleigh, North Carolina (c. 1952)
Typical Sears mall anchor store in the Lloyd Center in Portland, Oregon, shown here in 2017. The store closed in 2018.[33]

Brick and mortar

[edit]

Rosenwald decided to shift emphasis to urban North America and brought in Robert E. Wood to take charge. Rosenwald oversaw the design and construction of the firm's first department store, built on land within the Sears, Roebuck, and Company Complex. The store opened in 1925. In 1924, Rosenwald resigned the presidency but remained as chair until he died in 1932; his goal was to devote more time to philanthropy.[34]

The first store opened on February 2, 1925, as an experiment in the North Lawndale Sears, Roebuck and Company Complex.[35] Despite its remote location on the outskirts of Chicago, its success led to dozens of further openings across the country, many in conjunction with the company's mail-order offices,[36] typically in lower-middle-class and working-class neighborhoods, far from the main downtown shopping district. This was considered highly unconventional at a time when shopping was concentrated in city centers, but through World War II, there was an extensive streetcar network in Chicago and other U.S. cities. However, rapidly increasing car ownership and the brand's huge popularity helped attract customers.[37]

Sears retail stores were pioneering and broke the conventions of the time in three ways:

  • their location away from central shopping districts,
  • innovative store design, and
  • unconventional product mix and retailing practices.

Many stores at this time were designed by architect George C. Nimmons and his firms. The architecture was driven by merchandising needs rather than the desired outer appearance. This made the stores excellent examples of the modern architecture of the time—styles made famous by Bertram Goodhue and Eliel Saarinen.[36][37]

Its stores were oriented to motorists. Set apart from existing business districts amid residential areas occupied by their target audience, they had ample, free, off-street parking and communicated a clear corporate identity. In the 1930s, the company designed fully air-conditioned, "windowless" stores, such as Sears-Pico in 1939 in Los Angeles,[38][39] which was the first to have an open plan selling floor (instead of breaking up the floor into discrete sections).[36]

Sears was also a pioneer in creating department stores that catered to men and women. The stores included hardware and building materials. It de-emphasized the latest clothing fashions in favor of practical and durable clothing and allowed customers to select goods without the aid of a clerk.

Catalog

[edit]

In 1933, Sears issued the first of its Christmas catalogs known as the "Sears Wishbook", a catalog featuring toys and gifts, separate from the annual Christmas Catalog. From 1908 to 1940, it included ready-to-assemble Sears Catalog Home kit houses.[40]

Americas

[edit]
Sears at Bello Monte in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1950

Sears opened a small store in Downtown Havana, Cuba in 1942. Sears opened its first store in Mexico City in 1947; the Mexican stores would later spin off into Sears Mexico, now owned by billionaire Carlos Slim's Grupo Sanborns, which in 2020 operated more than 75 stores across Mexico.[41]

Sears had sales of US$78 million in other territories in 1953. Over time, Sears expanded into all Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela and all Central American countries.[42][43] Currently[when?] Sears operates in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Expansion

[edit]

From the 1920s to the 1950s, Sears built many urban department stores in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (apart from, but not far from, existing central business districts), and they overshadowed the mail-order business. Following World War II, the company expanded into suburban markets and malls. In 1959, it had formed the Homart Development Company for developing malls. Many of the company's stores have undergone major renovations or replacements since the 1980s. Sears began to diversify in the 1930s, creating Allstate Insurance Company in 1931 and placing Allstate representatives in its stores in 1934 (Allstate was also used as a house brand on a range of motorized vehicles sold by Sears). Over the decades, it established major national brands, such as Kenmore, Craftsman,[44] DieHard, Silvertone, Supertone, and Toughskins — and marketed widely under its private labels, e.g., marketing the Sears Archer 600 typewriter as a rebranded Silverette model, manufactured by Silver Seiko Ltd. of Japan.

The success of Sears outdoor products raised the attention of the Federal Government and the antitrust laws. Sears purchased David Bradley to manufacture farm and lawn equipment. Its success was broken up in 1962 as they sold more plows than John Deere.[45] Sears sold half of the David Bradley factory in Bradley, Illinois to the Newark Ohio Company that was shortly acquired by Roper Industries.

1970s pinnacle

[edit]

Sears reached its pinnacle in the 1970s.[46] In 1974, Sears completed the 110-story Sears Tower in Chicago, which became the world's tallest building, a title it took from the former Twin Towers in New York. Upon moving out of Chicago, Sears sold the Sears Tower in 1988.[47] In the sale contract of the tower, Sears retained its naming rights to the building until 2003, but the Sears Tower retained the name until early 2009, when London-based insurer Willis Group Holdings, Ltd. was given the building's naming rights to encourage them to occupy the building.[48] Sears moved to the new Prairie Stone Business Park in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, between 1993 and 1995.[49] The Sears Centre Arena (renamed to Now Arena in 2020) is a 10,001-seat multi-purpose arena located in Hoffman Estates adjacent to the former Prairie Stone campus.[50]

Video games

[edit]

Sears formed a stable OEM relationship with Atari, Inc., being responsible for distributing home versions of Pong in 1975 and eventually the Atari Video Computer System under their Tele-Games brand, where the company published games under different titles.[51][52] Sears released several models of the VCS as the Sears Video Arcade series starting in 1977, with the final Sears-specific model, the Video Arcade II, releasing during the fall of 1982.[53] Three games developed by Atari were exclusively released by Sears: Steeplechase, Stellar Track, and Submarine Commander.[54]

Mail order

[edit]

The Sears catalog became known in the industry as "the Consumers' Bible".[55] The company began selling to foreign customers after the American occupation of Greenland in World War II and the Philippines, among others, when locals ordered from catalogs left by soldiers.[56] Novelists and story writers often portrayed the importance of the catalog in the emotional lives of rural folk. The catalog also entered the language, particularly of rural dwellers, as a euphemism for toilet paper, as its pages could be torn out and used as such.[57] In addition, for many rural African-Americans, especially in areas dominated by Jim Crow racial segregation, the Sears catalog was a vital retail alternative to local white-population-dominated stores, bypassing the stores' frequent intention to deny them fair access to their merchandise.[58]

However, as the nation urbanized, Sears's catalog business faced competition from city department stores. Rural North America's population was slow-growing and possessed far less spending power than urban North America.

Decline

[edit]
The former Sears Tower, now the Willis Tower, in Chicago

In the 1980s, the company began to diversify into non-retail entities such as buying Dean Witter and Coldwell Banker in 1981. In 1984, it launched Prodigy as a joint venture with IBM and CBS, and introduced the Discover credit card in 1985. However, these actions have been said to have distracted management's attention from the core retail business and allowed competing retailers to gain significant ground, culminating with Walmart surpassing Sears as the largest retailer in the United States in 1990.[46]

In the 1990s, the company began divesting itself of many non-retail entities, which were detrimental to its bottom line. Sears spun off its financial services arm, which included brokerage business Dean Witter Reynolds and Discover Card. It sold its mall building subsidiary Homart to General Growth Properties in 1995.[59] Sears later acquired hardware chain Orchard Supply Hardware in 1996 and started home improvement store The Great Indoors in 1997.[60]

The cost of distributing the once highly influential general merchandise catalog became prohibitive; sales and profits had declined. The company discontinued the catalog in 1993. It dismissed 50,000 workers who had filled the orders.[46] In 1992, the company posted a $3.9 billion loss, the largest ever from a North American retailer.[61]

In 1992, California successfully sued the company for falsely finding things wrong with automobiles in for repair for other reasons.[62] In 1997, criminal charges were made.[63][64] In 1998, Sears announced it had sold the remnants of Western Auto (which it had acquired in 1998) to Roanoke-based Advance Auto Parts. The business deal was not what experts in the after-market automotive industry expected: Sears, Roebuck became "one of the largest shareholders" after obtaining a 40% stake in Advance Auto Parts and merging their two store networks, which included Western Auto's wholesale and retail operations. The existing store network of Advance Auto Parts, comprising 915 stores in 17 U.S. states, merged with 590 U.S.-based Parts America Stores in addition to 40 Western Auto stores in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In 1997, Sears sold 85% of its Mexico affiliate to Grupo Carso. Sears Holdings continued to produce specialty catalogs and reintroduced a smaller version of the Holiday Wish Book in 2007.[clarification needed]

In 2003, Sears sold its U.S. retail credit card operation to Citibank.[65] The remaining card operations for Sears Canada were sold to JPMorgan Chase in August 2005.[66] In 2003, Sears opened a new concept store called Sears Grand. Sears Grand stores carried everything that a regular Sears carried, and more. Sears Grand stores were about 175,000 to 225,000 square feet (16,300 to 20,900 m2).

On November 17, 2004, Kmart Holdings Corporation announced it would acquire Sears, Roebuck, and Co. for $11 billion after Kmart completed its recovery from bankruptcy.[67] As a part of the acquisition, Kmart Holding Corporation, along with Sears, Roebuck, and Co., was transformed into the new Sears Holdings Corporation. The new company started trading on the NASDAQ stock exchange as SHLD; Sears sold its single-letter ticker symbol 'S' in the New York Stock Exchange that it had held since 1910 to Sprint Corporation.[68] The new corporation announced that it would continue to operate stores under both the Sears and Kmart brands. In 2005, the company began renovating some Kmart stores and converting them to the Sears Essentials format, only to change them later to Sears Grands.[69] The combined company's profits peaked at $1.5 billion in 2006.

By 2010, the company was no longer profitable; from 2011 to 2016, the company lost $10.4 billion. In 2014, its total debt ($4.2 billion at the end of January 2017) exceeded its market capitalization ($974.1 million as of March 21, 2017). Sears declined from more than 3,500 physical stores to 695 U.S. stores from 2010 to 2017.[70] Sales at Sears stores dropped 10.3 percent in the final quarter of 2016 when compared to the same period in 2015.[71]

Sears spent much of 2014 and 2015 selling off portions of its balance sheet; namely, Lands' End and its stake in Sears Canada, one of the biggest e-commerce players in Canada, with CAD$505 million in sales in 2015—more than Walmart and others who had begun pushing aggressively into online sales, such as Canadian Tire.[72] Sears stated that the company was looking to focus on becoming a more tech-driven retailer. Sears's CEO and top shareholder said the sell-off of key assets in the last year had given the retailer the money it needs to speed up its transformation.[72] Sears Holdings had lost a total of US$7 billion in the four years to 2015. In part, the retailer was trying to curb losses by using a loyalty program called Shop Your Way.[72] Sears believed the membership scheme would enhance repeat business and customer loyalty in the long term.[72]

Between September 26 and October 12, 2017, a malware was installed in the computers operated by a service provider for sears.com and kmart.com e-commerce sites in which the credit card information of 100,000 customers were exposed via a malicious script. The breach was not publicly announced until April 2018.[73][74]

CEO Eddie Lampert also concluded an arrangement that sold the Craftsman brand to Stanley Black & Decker Inc. for approximately US$900 million.[75] In October 2017, Sears and appliance manufacturer Whirlpool Corporation ended their 101-year-old association, reportedly due to pricing issues, although Whirlpool continued supplying Sears with Kenmore-branded appliances.[76] In May 2018, Sears announced it had formed a "special committee" to explore the sale of Kenmore.[77]

Bankruptcy and current operations

[edit]
A closed Sears store at Stones River Town Centre, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in April 2019, with signage still intact. The store closed two months earlier, in February 2019.

On September 24, 2018, the retailer's CEO warned that the company was "running out of time" to salvage its business.[78] Sears Holdings filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 15, 2018, ahead of a $134 million debt payment due that day.[79] On November 23, 2018, Sears Holdings released a list of 505 stores, including 266 Sears stores, that were for sale in the bankruptcy process, while all others would hold liquidation sales.[80]

On January 16, 2019, Sears Holdings announced it would remain open after Lampert won a bankruptcy auction for the company with an offer to keep about 400 stores open.[81] On February 7, 2019, a bankruptcy judge approved a $5.2 billion plan by Sears's chairman and biggest shareholder to keep the business going. The approval meant roughly 425 stores, including 223 Sears stores, and 45,000 jobs would be preserved.[82]

A new Sears Home & Life store in Lafayette, Louisiana, as depicted in November 2020. It closed in June 2023 along with all other remaining small-format Sears stores in the U.S.

In April 2019, Sears announced the opening of three new stores with a limited set of merchandise under the name Sears Home & Life.[83] Also that month, Sears closed its store at Windward Mall in Kaneohe, Hawaii, and its store at Oakbrook Center in Oak Brook, Illinois (which was razed and already rebuilt as a 1-story store), making it the first post-bankruptcy closure for the brand since being bought by ESL.[84][85]

On June 3, 2019, the company announced that Transform Holdco would acquire Sears Hometown & Outlet Stores. As per deal, it might need to divest its Sears Outlet division to gain approval.[86] On August 7, 2019, it was announced that 26 stores would close that October, including 21 Sears stores, among them the last Sears stores in Alabama and West Virginia, at Riverchase Galleria in Hoover and at Huntington Mall in Barboursville, respectively.[87] The announcement also included plans to "accelerate the expansion of our smaller store formats which includes opening additional Home & Life stores and adding several hundred Sears Hometown stores after the Sears Hometown and Outlet transaction closes."[88] On August 31, 2019, management announced that Transform would close an additional 92 stores, including 15 Sears stores, by the end of 2019. Near the end of 2019, Sears sold the brand name DieHard to Advance Auto Parts for $200 million.[89]

A total of 100 more stores closed by December 2019.[90] 51 Sears stores were closed in February 2020.[91] More stores continued to close throughout 2020[92] and 2021[93] including the final Sears in Maine at The Maine Mall.[94]

In 2021, an unauthorized party accessed Transformco computer servers between June 3 and June 15 that held employee payroll and healthcare information that affected current and past Sears and other Transformco employees.[95]

The Sears store at Woodfield Mall in Schaumburg, Illinois, the last Illinois Sears store to close on November 14, 2021

In September 2021, the company's website listed 35 Sears stores.[96] That month, Sears announced that it would close more stores, including the last Sears store in New York City.[97] The New York City Sears closed by November 24, 2021, with the potential to be redeveloped.[98][99] Transformco announced in December 2021 its plans to sell the 2.3 million sq ft (210,000 m2) Sears headquarters in Hoffman Estates, which includes 100 acres (40 ha) of undeveloped land.[100]

On January 19, 2022, Sears shut the remaining 15 Sears Auto Centers in the United States.[101]

In May 2022, it was announced that roughly 100 more Sears Hometown stores, including the last four in Michigan, would close permanently.[102][103][104] On December 13, 2022, Sears Hometown filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.[105] It was later revealed that all remaining Sears Hometown stores would be liquidated and permanently closed.[106]

On December 12, 2022, Sears Authorized Hometown Stores, LLC, and affiliated debtor Sears Hometown, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and on December 26 announced the liquidation of the 115 largely owner-operated Hometown stores.[105][107]

Demolition of the company's former headquarters in Hoffman Estates began in August 2024 in order to build datacenters.[108]

As of October 2025, there were five Sears stores remaining.[2] The last store in Puerto Rico closed on August 31, 2025.[6][3] The company's U.S. website, Sears.com, remains active for online purchases.[109]

Corporate affairs

[edit]
[edit]
  • Logo used in 1907
    Logo used in 1907
  • Logo used from 1966 to 1984
    Logo used from 1966 to 1984
  • Logo used from 1984 to 1994
    Logo used from 1984 to 1994
  • Logo used from 1994 to 2004; a red version of this logo is still used by Sears Mexico.
    Logo used from 1994 to 2004; a red version of this logo is still used by Sears Mexico.
  • Logo used from 2004 to 2010 in the United States
    Logo used from 2004 to 2010 in the United States
  • Logo used from 2010 to 2019
    Logo used from 2010 to 2019
  • Logo used from 2019 to 2020
    Logo used from 2019 to 2020
  • Logo used from 2020 to present
    Logo used from 2020 to present

Sponsorships

[edit]

Before the company filed for bankruptcy, Sears sponsored many entertainment and sporting events.

From 2006 until 2020, it had the naming rights to an 11,000-seat multi-purpose family entertainment, cultural and sports center in Hoffman Estates, the Now Arena.[110]

The company sponsored the television series Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.[111] The company also underwrote the PBS television series Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, under the name The Sears-Roebuck Foundation, from the show's premiere in 1968 until 1992.[112]

Through the Sears Auto Centers, the company sponsored the Formula Drift Darren McNamara Sears/Falken Saturn Sky drift car.[citation needed] It sponsored the NASCAR Truck Series, using the Craftsman brand as the title sponsor, from the series' inception in the 1995 NASCAR SuperTruck Series presented by Craftsman to the 2008 season, when the agreement ended.[113] It sponsored the #10 Gillett Evernham Motorsports car of Scott Riggs for the September 2, 2007, running of the Sharp AQUOS 500 at California Speedway through its Sears Auto Center branch.[citation needed] However, Riggs failed to qualify for the event. In 2016, Craftsman became the title sponsor of the World Racing Group, World of Outlaws Sprint car racing series.[114][failed verification]

Employee relations

[edit]
Sears building in the Edificio La Nacional building in Mexico City, across from the Palacio de Bellas Artes

Sears has struggled with employee relations. One notable example was the shift in 1992 from an hourly wage based on longevity to a base wage (usually between US$3.50 and US$6 per hour) and commissions ranging from 0.5% to 11%. Sears said the new base wage, often constituting a substantial (up to 40%) cut in pay, was done "to be successful in this highly competitive environment".[115]

In early October 2007, Sears cut commission rates for employees in some departments to between 0.5% and 4% but equalized the base wage across all Home Improvement and Electronics departments. In 2011, commission rates on non-base items were cut by 2% in the electronics department. In late 2009, the electronic department's commission on "base items" was cut to 1%. As of 2017, appliances is the only remaining department where compensation is based entirely on commission. Other departments give a base pay plus commission. In many stores, jewelry department associates receive a low base salary with a 1% commission on their sales.

In March 2019, Sears said that it was ending life insurance benefits for an undisclosed number of its 90,000 retirees. A few months earlier, the company had handed out over $25 million in bonuses to executives.[116] This key Sears Retiree Benefit was worth between $5,000 and $15,000 for most of the pool (29,000) of eligible retired employees.[117]

In May 2019, former Sears Holdings chairman and CEO Eddie Lampert, months after purchasing the remains of Sears from the holding company, threatened not to pay out the $43 million in pension payments[118] owed to 90,000 former Sears and Kmart employees and retirees.[119] A Forbes editorial pointed out that Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury at the time, was a board member of Sears Holding until 2016 and was, at the time, one of three directors of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which manages administration of pensions for defunct or bankrupt businesses.[120]

Leadership

[edit]

President

[edit]
  1. Richard W. Sears, 1886–1908
  2. Julius Rosenwald, 1908–1924
  3. Charles M. Kittle, 1924–1928
  4. Robert E. Wood, 1928–1939
  5. Thomas J. Carney, 1939–1942
  6. Arthur S. Barrows, 1942–1946
  7. Fowler B. McConnell, 1946–1958
  8. Charles H. Kellstadt, 1958–1960
  9. Crowdus Baker, 1960–1968
  10. Arthur M. Wood, 1968–1973
  11. A. Dean Swift, 1973–1981
  12. Edward R. Telling, 1981–1982
  13. Archie Boe, 1982–1986
  14. Richard M. Jones, 1986–

Chairman of the board

[edit]
  1. Julius Rosenwald, 1924–1932
  2. Lessing Rosenwald, 1932–1939
  3. Robert E. Wood, 1939–1954
  4. Theodore V. Houser, 1954–1958
  5. Fowler B. McConnell, 1958–1960
  6. Charles H. Kellstadt, 1960–1962
  7. Austin T. Cushman, 1962–1967
  8. Gordon M. Metcalf, 1967–1973
  9. Arthur M. Wood, 1973–1978
  10. Edward R. Telling, 1978–1981
  11. Edward A. Brennan, 1981–1982
  12. Edward R. Telling, 1982–1986
  13. Edward A. Brennan, 1986–1995
[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sears

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from Grokipedia

Sears, Roebuck and Company, commonly known as Sears, was an American retailer founded in 1893 by Richard W. Sears and Alvah C. Roebuck as a mail-order business initially focused on watches and jewelry in Chicago. The company revolutionized consumer access to goods through its expansive catalogs, which by the early 1900s offered everything from household items to prefabricated homes, serving rural America before expanding into urban department stores starting in 1925. At its peak in the mid-20th century, Sears became the world's largest retailer, employing over 300,000 people and introducing enduring private-label brands such as Craftsman tools in 1927, Kenmore appliances, DieHard batteries, and Allstate insurance in 1931. Sears maintained retail supremacy into the 1980s, operating thousands of stores and pioneering credit options like the , but began faltering in the amid competition from discount chains like and failure to modernize inventory and . The 2005 merger with under hedge fund manager intensified decline through real estate sales, cost-cutting that neglected stores, and financial maneuvers prioritizing shareholder payouts over operational investment, culminating in Chapter 11 in October 2018 with $11.3 billion in against $6.9 billion in assets. Post-bankruptcy, Sears emerged under Transform Holdco but continued shrinking, closing most locations due to persistent unprofitability and e-commerce disruption; by March 2025, only eight stores remained operational nationwide. This trajectory underscores causal failures in strategic adaptation and leadership accountability over exogenous market shifts alone.

Founding and Early Development

Origins as a Watch Seller (1886–1893)

In 1886, Richard Warren Sears, then a 23-year-old railroad station agent stationed in Redwood Falls, Minnesota, encountered a shipment of pocket watches rejected by a local jeweler due to a pricing dispute. Sears purchased the lot and resold the watches to fellow station agents and jewelers at a markup, generating a $5,000 profit within six months. This success prompted him to resign his position and establish the R.W. Sears Watch Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, specializing in mail-order sales of timepieces to leverage the expanding railroad network for distribution. By 1887, Sears relocated the operation to , , a central rail hub that facilitated broader reach. There, he hired Alvah C. Roebuck, a , to handle repairs and assembly, expanding the product line modestly to include diamonds and jewelry alongside watches. The company issued its first catalog that year, emphasizing quality goods with a pioneering to build customer trust in an era of prevalent mail-order fraud. Sales grew rapidly, with Sears advertising directly to railroad employees and rural consumers underserved by local retailers. In 1889, amid booming demand, Sears sold the business for $100,000 and briefly retired to , intending to enter banking. Dissatisfied, he reentered the field in 1891 by partnering with Roebuck to launch A.C. Roebuck & Company in , continuing the focus on watches via . By September 1893, the partners restructured and renamed the enterprise Sears, Roebuck and Company, returning to with an expanded 196-page catalog that, while diversifying slightly, still centered on watches as the foundational product line. This period laid the groundwork for Sears' reputation in reliable, affordable timekeeping, capitalizing on technological improvements in watch manufacturing and the U.S. postal system's reliability.

Partnership with Roebuck and Catalog Launch (1893–1908)

In 1893, Richard W. Sears formalized his partnership with Alvah C. Roebuck by incorporating Sears, Roebuck and Company in Chicago, expanding from Sears's earlier watch mail-order operations started in Minneapolis in 1886 and relocated to Chicago in 1887. Roebuck, initially hired that year as a watch repairman from Indiana, provided essential technical support for handling returned and defective watches, enabling the business to build credibility through reliable service. The partnership shifted focus to broader mail-order catalogs, moving beyond watches and jewelry featured in earlier editions like the 1888 offering. By 1894, Sears, Roebuck issued a 322-page general merchandise catalog advertised as the "Cheapest Supply House on ," including items such as , machines, bicycles, and musical instruments, which diversified revenue and appealed to rural customers underserved by local retailers. This launch capitalized on railroad networks for distribution and emphasized low prices through direct manufacturer sourcing, fostering rapid adoption among farmers. Financial pressures and health issues prompted Roebuck to sell his stake in , though the company retained his name in its title; he continued briefly as a repairman before retiring around 1900. Investors Aaron Nusbaum and then joined, recapitalizing the firm at $150,000 and stabilizing operations amid aggressive expansion. Sales grew from approximately $745,595 in to $10.6 million by 1900, reflecting the catalog's success in penetrating rural markets via generous credit terms like "No Money Down." By 1906, the company had reincorporated publicly with $40 million in capital, employed 9,000 workers, and approached $50 million in annual sales, surpassing competitor through thicker catalogs—often exceeding 1,000 pages by the early 1900s—stocking diverse goods from hardware to furniture. Branch houses opened in cities like and to streamline fulfillment. In 1908, amid volatility, Sears stepped down as president but remained chairman, with Rosenwald assuming leadership to guide further growth.

Growth of the Mail-Order Empire

Expansion of Catalog Operations (1908–1920)

In 1908, became president of Sears, Roebuck and Company, ushering in a phase of professionalized that emphasized , , and reliable fulfillment for catalog orders. Under his direction, the company shifted from promotional hype to factual advertising, reducing instances of overstated product claims to foster long-term customer trust and mitigate delivery shortfalls. Annual sales expanded dramatically, rising from $40.8 million in 1908 to $235 million by 1920, reflecting a roughly sixfold increase driven by broadened product lines and enhanced distribution networks targeted at rural markets. By 1908, Sears distributed 3.6 million catalogs annually, primarily to Midwestern farming communities underserved by local retailers. The catalogs themselves grew thicker and more comprehensive, featuring thousands of items from clothing and tools to household goods, with detailed illustrations and guarantees of satisfaction. A key innovation came in 1911 with the introduction of installment plans, allowing customers to purchase higher-value items without upfront , at a time when commercial banks largely avoided lending to non-business consumers. This policy boosted order volumes by enabling deferred payments on essentials like farm equipment and appliances. Product diversification accelerated, including the launch of prefabricated kit homes—complete with , fixtures, and instructions—shipped for assembly, appealing to homesteaders and expanding catalog revenue streams. By 1916, these efforts positioned Sears as the nation's largest retailer, with mail-order operations handling millions of transactions yearly through an integrated .

Innovations in Rural Retail Access

The Sears, Roebuck and Company catalog served as a pivotal innovation by delivering urban-level retail variety directly to rural households, circumventing the scarcity and markup of local country stores that typically stocked only essentials. Launched in its expanded form by following the 1893 partnership between Richard W. Sears and Alvah C. Roebuck, the catalog featured thousands of items—from clothing and tools to —with detailed textual descriptions, price lists, and early photographic illustrations to aid remote decision-making. This approach leveraged the expanding railroad network for efficient distribution, enabling farmers and isolated communities to access competitive pricing and selection without urban travel. The U.S. (RFD) service, established experimentally in 1896 and made permanent nationwide by 1902, was instrumental in scaling Sears' rural reach by providing free of to over 80% of rural addresses by 1910, thus streamlining catalog dissemination and order returns. Prior to RFD, rural residents often traveled miles to post offices, limiting mail-order feasibility; its adoption reduced barriers, spurring catalog sales growth from under $1 million in 1895 to over $10 million by 1900. Sears capitalized on this by mailing millions of catalogs annually—reaching 50 million by 1916—while emphasizing fixed, no-haggle prices to undercut local monopolies. Further logistical advancements, such as the 1913 system, transformed goods fulfillment by permitting low-cost shipping of bulky items up to 50 pounds via the U.S. , directly benefiting rural recipients who previously relied on costlier freight services. This innovation, combined with Sears' centralized warehouses processing orders within 24-48 hours, reduced delivery times to weeks rather than months. The company's "satisfaction or your " guarantee, prominently featured in catalogs from the late onward, mitigated purchase risks for distrustful rural buyers, fostering loyalty and repeat business. Between 1908 and 1920, Sears extended its rural innovations to include prefabricated housing , with the first modern homes cataloged in 1908 and over 100 models offered by the , allowing farmers to order complete dwellings shipped by rail for assembly on-site. These , comprising up to 30,000 pieces per house, democratized affordable in underserved areas, with Sears selling approximately 75,000 units overall before discontinuing the program in 1940. Such offerings underscored the catalog's evolution into a comprehensive rural lifeline, integrating retail with practical needs amid America's agrarian expansion.

Transition to Physical Retail

First Store Openings (1925–1930s)

In 1924, , a former executive at competitor , joined Sears as vice president of factories and advocated for a shift toward urban retail stores to counter competition and serve America's growing manufacturing centers, where mail-order reach was limited by and automobile ownership. His strategy emphasized locating stores on cheaper suburban or peripheral land with ample parking, stocking auto parts and tires to align with rising car usage, and standardizing layouts for efficiency. Sears opened its inaugural retail store on February 2, 1925, within the first floor of the company's Merchandise Building, an existing mail-order distribution facility, as an experiment to test in-person sales alongside catalog operations. This was quickly followed by the first freestanding retail store, independent of any catalog center, on October 5, 1925, in , occupying a renovated former hardware building at Fourth and Sycamore streets. Expansion accelerated rapidly: eight stores operated by the end of 1925, growing to 27 by late 1927 through targeted openings in mid-sized cities. In 1928 alone, Sears added 138 stores, averaging over 11 per month, as Wood scaled the model amid favorable economic conditions. By 1930, the chain reached approximately 300 outlets nationwide, with retail sales volumes surpassing mail-order catalogs by 1931, reflecting successful adaptation to consumer shifts. The slowed but did not halt growth; Sears opened additional stores in the early , reaching 324 by 1932, and formalized a store planning department that year to prioritize merchandise flow over adapting to existing buildings. This period marked Sears' pivot from rural catalog dominance to a hybrid model, with retail proving resilient due to low prices, broad assortments, and Wood's emphasis on volume over margins. By the late , store numbers had nearly doubled from levels, solidifying physical locations as the company's primary revenue driver.

Nationwide Store Network Buildout (1940s–1950s)

Following the economic constraints of World War II, Sears, Roebuck and Co. accelerated its physical store expansion under the leadership of chairman Robert E. Wood, who anticipated surging consumer demand driven by postwar prosperity, suburban migration, and widespread automobile adoption. Between 1945 and 1951, the company invested $300 million to construct 92 new retail stores while relocating 212 existing ones to more advantageous sites, such as highway-adjacent locations and nascent suburban shopping districts. This strategic buildout reflected Wood's recognition that shifting demographics—fueled by the GI Bill, low-interest home loans, and industrial relocation—necessitated accessible, large-format stores over central-city placements. The expansion emphasized modern, efficient store designs optimized for high-volume merchandising, including expansive parking lots and layouts prioritizing customer flow from entry to checkout. By the mid-1950s, Sears operated more than 700 stores across the , surpassing earlier growth from the 319 outlets in 1929 and establishing the retailer as a dominant force in bridging rural mail-order roots with urban and suburban retail realities. This period's store network development directly contributed to sales doubling from $1 billion in 1945 to over $2 billion by 1946, underscoring the causal link between physical presence and market capture amid America's consumer boom.

Peak Expansion and Diversification

Post-War Boom and Suburban Stores (1950s–1960s)

Following , Sears capitalized on the economic expansion and consumer spending surge, achieving annual sales of $1 billion in , which doubled the next year amid widespread prosperity and resumed production. The company's established catalog and retail infrastructure positioned it to meet rising demand for , appliances, and automobiles, fueling further investment in physical stores. In the and , Sears pivoted toward suburban expansion to capture the migration of families to outlying areas, driven by , highway development, and increased . This strategic shift involved opening stores in new shopping centers tailored to automobile-centric consumers, with Sears often acting as the primary to draw traffic. By the mid-, the retailer operated more than 700 stores across the United States, a substantial portion of which were suburban outlets reflecting this focus. Examples include its role as the anchor tenant in the York County Shopping Center, which opened in 1955 and marked an early suburban retail development in Pennsylvania. Sears' suburban stores featured expansive layouts with dedicated sections for tools, appliances, and , leveraging proprietary brands like Kenmore and Craftsman to differentiate from competitors. This era solidified Sears' dominance in retail, as its mall-anchored model supported the growth of enclosed shopping environments and contributed to the atomization of urban retail into dispersed suburban hubs. Between 1946 and 1952, the company added nearly 100 new stores, many in response to suburban demand, enhancing its network before the full mall boom of the late 1950s and 1960s.

Acquisitions, Brands, and International Ventures (1960s–1970s)

Sears solidified control over Warwick Electronics between 1951 and 1960, acquiring virtually complete ownership of the firm that produced televisions, radios, phonographs, and tape players to support its appliance and electronics sales. In 1960, the company established Enterprises as a to pursue diversification beyond core retail, which by 1970 acquired Metropolitan to broaden its insurance operations. Sears emphasized proprietary brands during this era to differentiate merchandise and foster customer loyalty. The DieHard battery line, launched in 1967, exemplified durability marketing with its "rugged, ready for anything" positioning for automotive replacements. Kenmore appliances expanded significantly in the 1970s, incorporating new categories like refrigerators, freezers, and air conditioners to capitalize on suburban household growth. International efforts focused on North American neighbors via established partnerships. In , the 1952 joint venture with Simpson's Limited formed Simpsons-Sears, which opened its inaugural store in , in 1953 and grew to multiple full-line locations across provinces by the 1970s, blending catalog and retail models. In , operations initiated in 1947 expanded with additional urban stores through the , reaching a network of over 40 outlets by 1981 despite decelerating growth in the 1970s amid economic pressures. These ventures leveraged Sears' expertise but faced local competition and regulatory hurdles.

Late 20th-Century Challenges and Pinnacle

1970s Revenue Peak and Strategic Shifts

Sears, Roebuck and Co. attained its revenue pinnacle during the , with annual sales exceeding $10 billion by the early years of the decade and reaching a record $17.95 billion in , driven primarily by merchandise operations comprising 90% of net sales. This era represented the apex of the company's retail dominance, where its sales approximated 1% of U.S. circa 1969, underscoring its position as the nation's preeminent general merchandise retailer ahead of competitors like . However, underlying pressures from inflationary economics and the ascent of discount formats such as began to erode profit margins, with net income plunging 47.7% in fiscal 1974 despite a 6.4% sales increase to $13.1 billion, signaling the onset of sustained challenges. In response, Sears implemented strategic pivots aimed at preserving profitability amid intensifying competition. Management accelerated a repositioning toward higher-priced, higher-margin goods targeting upscale consumers—a tactic originating in the late 1960s but amplified through the —which temporarily enhanced earnings but fundamentally mismatched the value-conscious preferences of its traditional middle-market base. This upscale orientation, coupled with centralized control from , diminished local adaptability and responsiveness to regional demands, fostering internal inefficiencies and a disconnect from evolving shopper behaviors favoring discounters' low prices over Sears' promotional pricing model. A emblematic investment of this confident epoch was the 1973 completion of the 110-story Sears Tower, then the world's tallest structure, serving as the relocated corporate headquarters at a cost exceeding $150 million and housing key operations including the Insurance headquarters. While projecting unassailable stature, such capital-intensive commitments diverted focus from core retail innovation, even as external attributions for declining performance—such as economic malaise—prevailed over internal reckonings with competitive threats and operational rigidities. By decade's end, these shifts presaged a broader diversification imperative, though retail fundamentals had already begun to falter against nimbler rivals.

Diversification into Credit, Real Estate, and Media

In the early , Sears pursued aggressive diversification beyond retailing to offset slowing growth, acquiring financial firms to build an integrated "Sears Financial Network" that leveraged its vast customer base of over 50 million households. This strategy, led by Chairman Edward R. Telling, aimed to transform Sears into a comprehensive provider by combining brokerage, , , and offerings under one roof, initially generating $400 million in gains by 1985 but ultimately straining resources as retail operations faltered. Sears expanded into credit through its longstanding proprietary card program and the launch of the in 1985, which introduced innovations like no annual fee and cash-back rewards to compete with Visa and . The card's first test transaction occurred on September 26, 1985, in , with nationwide rollout accelerated to January 23, 1986, via a $100 million push; by integration with insurance—Sears' 1931-founded subsidiary—it enabled bundled services like auto loans and policies at store counters, processing millions of accounts through the network. In real estate, Sears acquired Coldwell Banker in 1981 for an undisclosed sum, positioning it as the network's property arm to offer home financing, appraisals, and brokerage tied to retail purchases like appliances. This complemented the simultaneous $607 million purchase of Dean Witter Reynolds, the fifth-largest U.S. brokerage, enabling in-store stock trading and financial planning; by 1984, these units contributed to $6 billion in diversified revenues, though synergies proved limited as real estate cycles and regulatory hurdles emerged. Sears ventured into media via the 1984 formation of Trintex, a joint venture with and , rebranded as Prodigy and launched commercially in 1988 as an early consumer online service offering news, shopping, and email for $12.95 monthly. Targeting Sears' middle-class shoppers, Prodigy aimed to preempt emerging digital competition by integrating previews with catalog ordering, but subscriber growth stalled below 2 million amid technical issues and pricing disputes, prompting Sears to divest its stake in 1996.

Analysis of Decline

Strategic Mismanagement and Failure to Adapt (1980s–2000s)

In the , Sears, under CEO Edward Brennan, pursued a emphasizing apparel and "soft goods" to attract middle-class consumers, exemplified by the 1985 "Softer Side of Sears" campaign and the "Store of the Future" redesign that added departments and improved layouts in select stores. However, this pivot misread shifting consumer preferences toward value-oriented hardlines like tools and appliances—Sears' traditional strengths—while competitors such as prioritized everyday low pricing and efficient supply chains, eroding Sears' from 15% of U.S. general merchandise in 1980 to under 10% by decade's end. Brennan's resistance to deeper cost-cutting, including reluctance to aggressively reduce vendor markups or streamline inventory, left Sears with operating margins trailing Walmart's by over 5 percentage points annually. Sears' early foray into digital services via the 1984 Prodigy with and positioned it as a pioneer in online retailing, offering catalog browsing and ordering to subscribers by 1988. Yet, Prodigy's closed "walled garden" model, high subscription fees ($12.95 monthly plus hourly charges), and failure to integrate seamless —such as real-time inventory or open-web access—limited it to niche adoption, with only 2 million users by 1990 and no scalable pivot to broader shopping amid rising and web competition. By the mid-1990s, as Amazon launched in 1995, Sears underplayed online potential, allocating under 1% of IT budget to digital retail transformation despite internal recognition of the threat, allowing rivals to capture early growth. Into the 1990s and early 2000s, Sears clung to enclosed-mall locations, which comprised 90% of its 800+ stores by 2000, ignoring suburban big-box trends that and Target exploited for lower costs and higher traffic; this mall dependency inflated overhead by 20-30% relative to standalone formats. Merchandising errors persisted, with inconsistent private-label refreshes failing to counter Target's trendy assortments or Home Depot's specialized hardlines, resulting in annual sales per square foot dropping from $400 in 1990 to $300 by 2005. Leadership under Arthur Martinez (1995-2000) achieved modest gains through vendor negotiations and Kenmore/Craftsman focus but balked at aggressive store closures or supply-chain reinvestment, leaving Sears vulnerable as same-store sales declined 2-4% yearly amid the dot-com shift. These choices reflected a complacency rooted in prior dominance, prioritizing short-term —like the 1993 spin-offs of and Dean Witter—over adaptive retail innovation.

Impact of Competition from Walmart, Target, and Amazon

's emergence as a low-price leader in the and 1990s directly eroded Sears' dominance in general merchandise retailing through superior efficiency and everyday low pricing strategies that undercut Sears' higher markups. By 1991, surpassed Sears to become the largest U.S. retailer by volume, a shift that reflected Sears' inability to match Walmart's cost advantages and rapid store expansion into suburban and rural markets where Sears had previously held sway. Sears' same-store began declining steadily as captured in apparel, home goods, and tools, contributing to Sears' overall revenue stagnation while Walmart's grew exponentially. Target intensified competitive pressure on Sears during the same period by positioning itself as an upscale discounter with curated merchandising and store aesthetics that appealed to middle-class shoppers seeking value without the perceived dowdiness of Sears' aging formats. Opening its first stores in 1962, Target overtook Sears in annual revenue by the late , drawing away customers with broader assortments and lower prices on comparable items, which exacerbated Sears' merchandise selection issues and led to further losses in departments like and housewares. Unlike Sears, which clung to proprietary brands like Kenmore and Craftsman without aggressive pricing, Target's strategy of national brands at discounts highlighted Sears' pricing rigidity, resulting in comparable store sales drops for Sears amid Target's consistent growth through the . Amazon's rise from 1994 onward accelerated Sears' decline by pioneering convenient , vast selection, and rapid delivery, areas where Sears' legacy catalog business failed to evolve into a competitive platform despite early investments. Sears' plummeted 50% between 2013 and 2017 to $1.3 billion, even as its physical store count shrank, while Amazon captured 69% of U.S. by 2018, underscoring Sears' underinvestment in digital and . In appliances, a core Sears strength, fell from 41% in 2001 to 29% by 2013 as Amazon's model offered broader choices and price comparison tools that exposed Sears' premiums. This shift compounded losses to brick-and-mortar rivals, as Sears' hybrid model neither matched Walmart's or Target's physical efficiencies nor Amazon's digital prowess, leading to a combined erosion that left Sears with just 1.6% of retail domain share by the late 2010s.

Financial Engineering: Buybacks, Debt, and Asset Stripping

Under Eddie Lampert's leadership as chairman and CEO of from 2005 onward, the company pursued aggressive financial strategies emphasizing shareholder returns through repurchases, payments, and asset , often financed by increased leverage. Between 2005 and , Sears repurchased approximately $5.8 billion in shares, reducing outstanding shares by about 56.9 million at a total cost of $5.9 billion, which critics argued depleted cash reserves needed for operational investments amid declining retail performance. These buybacks continued into later years, with an additional $1.5 billion spent on 22.9 million shares in the three years following , prioritizing short-term price support over long-term capital expenditures. Sears's debt burden escalated significantly during this period, rising to $5.6 billion by 2018, much of it in the form of loans from Lampert's , , which profited from high interest payments estimated at $200–225 million annually to Lampert and affiliated entities. ESL's control allowed for related-party financing that funneled value back to the fund, including secured debt backed by Sears's holdings, while the company's overall liquidity deteriorated, with short-term debt increasing by $325 million (19.7%) in fiscal 2014 alone. This leverage amplified returns for ESL but constrained Sears's ability to modernize stores or compete with low-cost rivals, as debt service diverted funds from core retail operations. Asset stripping accelerated from around 2011, with Lampert directing spinoffs and sales that transferred valuable properties and brands away from . In 2014, Sears spun off for $2 billion; in 2015, it created Seritage Growth Properties, a that acquired interests in over 200 Sears properties for $2.7 billion, enabling lease-back arrangements that generated fees but left Sears as a diminished tenant. Further divestitures included the 2017 sale of the Craftsman brand to for $900 million and sales of other subsidiaries totaling around $5.6 billion between 2012 and 2018, proceeds of which supported buybacks and payments rather than reinvestment. In April 2019, Sears's estate sued Lampert and ESL, alleging these maneuvers stripped $2 billion in assets through fraudulent transfers intended to hinder creditors, including undervalued deals and payments to insiders while Sears was insolvent. Lampert defended the strategies as necessary value creation, noting ESL's net profit of about $1.4 billion from its Sears stake despite overall losses exceeding $3 billion on the investment.

Bankruptcy and Post-Bankruptcy Era

2018 Bankruptcy Filing and Store Closures

, the of and , filed for Chapter 11 on October 15, 2018, in the U.S. Court for the District of . At the time of filing, the reported approximately $6.9 billion in assets and $11.3 billion in liabilities, with around 700 and stores remaining operational across the . The filing was driven by years of declining sales, mounting debt from leveraged buyouts and asset sales, and inability to compete effectively with discount retailers and e-commerce giants, resulting in a 30 percent revenue drop in the most recent quarter prior to . As part of the initial proceedings, Sears announced the closure of 142 underperforming stores by the end of 2018, in addition to 46 locations already slated for shutdown that had been disclosed in August 2018. These closures were intended to streamline operations and reduce ongoing losses from unprofitable sites, with sales beginning immediately at the affected stores. The company secured to support continued operations during , aiming to preserve a smaller footprint of viable locations. Subsequent to the filing, additional store closures accelerated, including 40 more locations announced in November and 80 others by late March 2019, further eroding Sears' physical retail presence. By the conclusion of , the combination of pre-bankruptcy and post-filing shutdowns had eliminated hundreds of stores, contributing to the loss of tens of thousands of jobs and marking a significant contraction from Sears' peak of over 3,500 locations in earlier decades. The bankruptcy process highlighted systemic financial pressures, including over $5 billion in secured debt, which constrained the company's ability to invest in modernization or inventory.

Eddie Lampert's Transformco Acquisition and Criticisms

In the wake of Sears Holdings' Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on October 15, 2018, ESL Investments, the hedge fund controlled by Eddie Lampert—Sears' executive chairman since 2013—submitted a stalking-horse bid to acquire the company's remaining assets through its affiliate, Transform Holdco LLC (later rebranded as Transformco). The $5.2 billion offer, announced as the winning bid on January 17, 2019, encompassed substantially all of Sears' intellectual property, inventory, and approximately 425 operating stores (223 Sears and 202 Kmart locations), while assuming certain liabilities; the cash component was approximately $140 million, with the balance tied to debt assumptions and other considerations. A U.S. bankruptcy judge approved the transaction on February 7, 2019, over objections from unsecured creditors, enabling Transformco to complete the acquisition on February 11, 2019, and preserve around 45,000 jobs at the time. Lampert positioned the deal as a pathway to restructure and revitalize the retailer through cost-cutting, digital focus, and asset optimization, rather than full liquidation. Post-acquisition, operated the acquired stores under Sears and brands while pursuing a strategy of rapid store rationalization, streamlining, and partnerships for brands like Kenmore and Craftsman. By mid-2019, it expanded by acquiring Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores in a merger valued at providing those entities with to sell assets like Sears Outlet and Buddy's Home Furnishings. However, closures accelerated, reducing the footprint from 425 stores in 2019 to about 40 combined Sears and locations by 2023, alongside a pivot toward , licensing deals, and monetization. 's model emphasized extracting value from non-core assets, including leasing back sold properties and offloading brands, which Lampert defended as necessary to address Sears' chronic underperformance predating his involvement. The acquisition drew sharp criticisms, primarily from creditors and analysts who viewed it as an extension of Lampert's prior tactics that prioritized shareholder payouts over operational investment. During the proceedings, a coalition of unsecured , including mall landlords and suppliers, opposed the bid, alleging Lampert had orchestrated a "multi-faceted scheme" since the 2005 Kmart-Sears merger to siphon billions in assets through dividends, stock buybacks, and sales of and subsidiaries—totaling over $2 billion extracted while Sears' store network deteriorated from neglect. In April 2019, Sears' estate sued Lampert and ESL, claiming they looted assets like the Craftsman brand (sold for $900 million in 2017) and holdings to benefit the at the expense of the operating company, rejecting higher bids that could have yielded better recoveries. Critics, including retail analysts, argued the low cash infusion in the deal perpetuated a "slow " rather than genuine revival, as evidenced by ongoing closures and minimal capital expenditures on stores or technology to compete with rivals. Litigation persisted beyond the acquisition, with Sears' estate seeking clawbacks of payments to Lampert's entities; a 2022 ruling partially favored creditors, though Lampert appealed unsuccessfully to the U.S. in March 2023, which declined to hear the case. Detractors, such as former Sears executives and investor observers, attributed the retailer's terminal decline to Lampert's conglomerate-like approach, which fragmented focus and underinvested in and despite extracting personal gains estimated at $1.4 billion from his Sears stake. While Lampert countered that external factors like Amazon's rise and Sears' legacy burdens necessitated such moves, empirical trends—such as Sears' erosion from 7% in to near-zero by —underscore criticisms that the acquisition preserved a hollowed-out shell rather than fostering sustainable operations.

Current Operations (as of 2025)

Remaining Stores and Real Estate Strategy

As of September 2025, Sears operates only five full-line stores in the United States, a sharp decline from its peak of over 3,500 locations. These remaining outlets are primarily in , , and , with operations focused on basic retail functions amid ongoing lease commitments. The minimal store footprint reflects Transformco's strategy of maintaining a nominal physical presence to fulfill long-term lease obligations on former Sears properties, rather than prioritizing consumer sales. Transformco, which acquired Sears' assets out of in 2019, controls approximately 200 former Sears and sites, with about half held as non-owned leasehold interests. The company's arm, Transformco Properties, emphasizes redeveloping these assets to extract value, such as converting underutilized spaces for alternative uses like s or mixed-use developments. For instance, in December 2021, Transformco sold the former Sears headquarters in , for redevelopment into a campus, demonstrating a shift from retail operations to property monetization. This approach allows retention of valuable leases—some extending decades—while minimizing operational costs through skeleton crews and limited inventory at active stores. Critics, including retail analysts, argue that this real estate-centric model perpetuates store operations as a means to preserve lease rights for potential subleasing or renegotiation, rather than genuine retail revival, contributing to Sears' de minimis market presence. Transformco has not publicly outlined expansion plans for physical stores, instead leveraging the portfolio for integrated services like home warranties and licensing, underscoring a pivot away from traditional department store retailing. Recent closures, such as those in Whittier and , in mid-2025, further illustrate the selective pruning to align with property value optimization over sustained operations.

Shift to Licensing and Minimal Retail Presence

Following the 2018 bankruptcy and acquisition by in , Sears drastically reduced its physical retail footprint, closing hundreds of stores and retaining only a handful of operational locations by 2025. As of March 2025, the company operated just eight full-line stores nationwide, primarily in states like , Washington, and , serving as vestiges of its former network amid ongoing rent negotiations for relief on leases. This minimal presence reflects a strategic pivot away from expansive brick-and-mortar operations, which had become unprofitable due to high fixed costs and competition, toward a model emphasizing asset efficiency and brand monetization over traditional retailing. Transformco, under Eddie Lampert's control, has prioritized licensing Sears' proprietary brands to third-party manufacturers and retailers, generating revenue streams with lower operational overhead. Iconic brands such as Kenmore appliances and DieHard batteries were licensed out starting in 2017, allowing production and distribution through partners like vacuum cleaner makers and battery suppliers, expanding availability beyond Sears' shrinking stores. For instance, DieHard was fully sold to Advance Auto Parts in 2019 for $200 million, granting Transformco a perpetual royalty-free license to continue selling the products in its remaining outlets while enabling broader market penetration by the buyer. Similarly, Craftsman tools, sold to Stanley Black & Decker in 2017 for $525 million upfront plus future payments, operate under transitional royalty-free terms for Sears, preserving brand equity through external licensing. These arrangements underscore a deliberate de-emphasis on in-house manufacturing and inventory, focusing instead on trademark preservation and passive income. By 2025, this licensing-centric approach has positioned Sears as a "hollow brand" sustained primarily to protect for deals, with via sears.com supplementing the scant physical sites but not driving significant volume. Transformco's lean operations prioritize optimization from former properties over retail expansion, aligning with a broader post-bankruptcy emphasis on profitability amid declines to $10.52 billion in fiscal 2025, down 19.4% from the prior year. Critics argue this model extracts value from legacy assets without reinvestment in consumer-facing , though proponents cite it as pragmatic adaptation to dominance.

Key Products, Brands, and Innovations

Iconic Brands: Craftsman Tools, Kenmore Appliances, DieHard Batteries

Sears developed Craftsman tools as a private-label brand starting in 1927, acquiring the name from the Marion-Craftsman Tool Company for $500 and registering the trademark on May 20 of that year. Initially sold via Sears catalogs and retail stores, Craftsman hand tools were produced by multiple U.S. manufacturers, emphasizing durability and a lifetime warranty policy introduced in the 1920s that allowed free replacements for broken tools, fostering long-term customer loyalty among DIY enthusiasts and professionals. By the mid-20th century, Craftsman had become a staple for American households and mechanics, with annual sales peaking at millions of units; for instance, the brand's wrenches and sockets were marketed as "made to last a lifetime," contributing to Sears' reputation for value-driven merchandise. Production increasingly shifted overseas in the 2000s and 2010s amid cost pressures, diminishing the "Made in USA" appeal that had defined its iconic status, before Sears sold the brand to Stanley Black & Decker in early 2017 for approximately $900 million to raise capital. Kenmore appliances originated in 1913 as Sears' brand for sewing machines, expanding to full household lines with the first electric appliance—a vacuum cleaner—debuting in 1927, followed by washers, dryers, and refrigerators manufactured by partners like Whirlpool and Frigidaire. The brand gained popularity for reliable, mid-range performance; by the early 2000s, Kenmore held significant U.S. market share, with models like automatic washers incorporating innovations such as post-World War II electric dryers and energy-efficient features that appealed to suburban homeowners. Sears' exclusive distribution reinforced Kenmore's association with accessible quality, though manufacturing quality varied by OEM partner, leading to mixed reliability reports in consumer surveys during the 1990s and 2000s. Following the 2018 bankruptcy, Transformco retained ownership of Kenmore, licensing it for sale through non-Sears channels like independent dealers and online platforms, with over 450 new products introduced by 2010 focusing on modern features like smart connectivity, though the brand's core identity remains tied to its Sears-era legacy of practical durability. DieHard batteries were launched by Sears in after nine years of development by supplier Globe-Union, featuring a pioneering thin-walled case that resisted cracking in extreme temperatures and provided 35% more starting power than competitors at the time. Marketed with dramatic ads claiming they could "start in -65°F or survive a attack," DieHard quickly dominated the segment, selling over 200 million units cumulatively by the 2010s through Sears auto centers and capturing a loyal base with a three-year free replacement warranty. The brand's emphasis on ruggedness aligned with Sears' tool-and-hardware focus, generating billions in revenue over decades; production was handled by and others until Sears sold DieHard to in December 2019 for $200 million, allowing the brand to expand beyond Sears while retains limited licensing for remaining stores. As of 2025, DieHard continues as a standalone premium battery line, underscoring its evolution from a Sears-exclusive to an independent powerhouse.

Contributions to Consumer Goods and Retail Practices

Sears, Roebuck and Company pioneered the modern mail-order catalog system in the United States, beginning with Richard W. Sears' initial 1887 catalog focused on watches and jewelry, which expanded by 1893 into a comprehensive "Consumers Guide" offering thousands of products directly to rural consumers underserved by local stores. This model leveraged efficient rail distribution and services introduced in 1913, enabling Sears to handle five times more orders within six months of the service's launch and double revenue within five years, democratizing access to goods like tools, , and appliances through detailed descriptions and photographic engravings. The company introduced an unconditional as early as its first catalogs, a practice that built consumer trust by allowing returns without question, which was innovative for the and contributed to rapid growth by mitigating purchase risks in an age of limited product . This policy, upheld rigorously, differentiated Sears from competitors reliant on local merchants' variable quality and supported expansion into diverse , including prefabricated houses sold via catalog kits starting in 1908. Sears advanced consumer practices with its "No Money Down" installment plans, formalized in the early 20th century, which allowed purchases spread over time without initial payment, fueling sales growth to $235 million annually by 1920 and influencing broader retail adoption of easy to stimulate . By the , these plans, combined with proprietary credit cards used by nearly half of U.S. households in the 1970s, normalized installment buying for big-ticket items, though they later contributed to overextension risks amid economic shifts. In physical retail, Sears transitioned from catalogs to large-scale stores starting with its first outlet in Chicago in 1925, over 300 by 1929, featuring centralized merchandising and vast inventories that mirrored catalog efficiency in urban settings. Supporting this were massive merchandise buildings, such as the Chicago complex begun in 1905, which formed the world's largest mercantile plant by integrating warehousing, assembly, and distribution to minimize costs and enable just-in-time fulfillment. These practices emphasized volume pricing, direct sourcing from manufacturers, and standardized products, setting benchmarks for scale-driven retail efficiency that influenced subsequent department store and big-box models.

Corporate Structure and Governance

Evolution of Ownership and Headquarters

Sears, Roebuck and Co. originated as a mail-order business founded by Richard W. Sears and Alvah C. Roebuck in 1893, initially operating from , , after relocating from ; the company's headquarters remained in throughout its early decades, supporting expansion into catalog sales and retail stores. joined as a partner in 1895 and became president in 1908 following Sears' retirement, steering the firm toward profitability and growth while maintaining private ownership initially before it transitioned to public trading. The headquarters complex in housed mail-order operations from 1906 until the 1990s, reflecting the company's centralization in the city. In 1973, Sears relocated its executive to the newly constructed Sears Tower in downtown , the world's tallest building at the time, symbolizing its retail dominance with over 3,000 stores nationwide. Ownership remained diffusely held as a until the early , when hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert's acquired out of bankruptcy in 2003 and orchestrated a merger with Sears announced in November 2004; the deal closed on March 24, 2005, forming Corporation, with Lampert as chairman and controlling shareholder holding about 15% of Sears prior to the combination. By 1994, amid cost-cutting, Sears sold the Sears Tower and shifted headquarters to a new campus in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, completing the move in 1995 to consolidate operations in a more suburban setting. Sears Holdings filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 15, 2018, after years of declining sales and debt exceeding $5 billion; Lampert's ESL, through affiliate Transform Holdco LLC, acquired substantially all assets for $5.2 billion in a court-approved sale finalized February 11, 2019, privatizing the remnants under Transformco ownership with headquarters retained in Hoffman Estates. This shift marked the end of public ownership, concentrating control with Lampert's entities amid criticisms of asset sales prioritizing real estate over retail viability.

Logos, Branding, and Sponsorships

Sears' earliest logos featured the full name "Sears, Roebuck and Co." in a cursive script executed as a wavy line, used from 1886 to 1923. By 1949, the design simplified with a blockier font for "Sears" while retaining script elements for "Roebuck & Co.," eliminating the wavy styling until 1960. The 1966 logo introduced a modern, uppercase "SEARS" in a custom sans-serif font with distinctive flared strokes, paired with "ROEBUCK AND CO." in a thinner variant, serving as the primary mark until 1984. In 1984, Sears adopted a logo with "SEARS" in a bold, italicized typeface, emphasizing dynamism, which remained in use until 1994. This evolved into a non-italic version from 1994 to 2004, with a variant persisting for . The 2004 redesign featured a cleaner, rounded "SEARS" until 2010, followed by a minimalist version from 2010 to 2019. Following the 2019 bankruptcy and acquisition by , Sears introduced a simplified in 2020, aiming for a refreshed, positive image amid reduced operations. Branding efforts historically tied to Sears' mail-order origins, evolving to emphasize in-store reliability and brands, though later mismanagement contributed to diluted identity through financial focus over customer-centric updates. Prior to , Sears maintained an Event Marketing Group since 1993 to oversee sponsorships, including title sponsorship of the from its 1995 inception through at least 2005 renewals. It held to Sears Centre Arena in , from the venue's 2006 opening until 2020, hosting concerts, sports, and events. Additional commitments included WNBA partnerships starting in 1997 with a $10 million renewal in 1999, and trophies until withdrawal in 2002.

Leadership History

Founders and Early Leaders

Richard Warren Sears, born December 7, 1863, in Reed Falls Township, , began his career as a railroad station agent in North Redwood, . In 1886, he acquired a shipment of unwanted watches from a jeweler and resold them profitably to other agents, prompting him to establish the R.W. Sears Watch Company in that year. By 1887, Sears relocated the business to and partnered with watch repairman , who joined to handle repairs and manufacturing aspects. The duo expanded into a mail-order catalog operation in 1888, initially focusing on watches and jewelry. On August 2, 1893, they incorporated as Sears, Roebuck and Co. in Illinois, with Sears serving as president; the firm began issuing its first general catalog in 1894, broadening offerings to include a wider array of merchandise. Alvah Roebuck, born January 9, 1864, contributed technical expertise but grew uneasy with Sears' aggressive financial risks and expansion; he sold his interest in 1895 due to health issues and departed the company. That same year, clothing manufacturer , along with associates, acquired Roebuck's stake for $75,000, injecting needed capital and operational discipline. , born August 12, 1862, in , to German Jewish immigrants, had previously built a successful apparel firm. He assumed the vice presidency in 1896 and implemented rigorous inventory controls, quality standards, and efficiency measures that stabilized and scaled the business. Under his influence, annual sales surged from $1.3 million in 1897 to over $50 million by 1907. Sears, plagued by chronic health problems including , retired as president in 1908, though he retained influence as chairman until 1914. Rosenwald succeeded him as president, serving until 1925, then as chairman until his death on January 6, 1932; during this era, he pioneered employee profit-sharing and stock ownership programs, fostering loyalty amid rapid growth. Rosenwald's tenure marked the transition from a speculative mail-order venture to a structured retail powerhouse, emphasizing verifiable guarantees and over mere volume.

Notable CEOs: From Rosenwald to Lampert

Julius Rosenwald joined Sears, Roebuck and Company in 1895 after acquiring Alvah Roebuck's stake alongside Aaron Nusbaum, reorganizing the fledgling mail-order operation into a more systematic enterprise focused on reliable supply chains and customer trust through guarantees like money-back policies. By 1910, Rosenwald had ascended to president, implementing rigorous inventory management and ethical merchandising that expanded the catalog to over 100,000 items by 1900 and grew annual sales from $1.2 million in 1895 to $53.3 million by 1907. Facing near-collapse after World War I due to agricultural downturns eroding rural customer bases, Rosenwald pledged $21 million of personal funds in 1921 to avert bankruptcy, enabling recovery through diversified product lines and operational efficiencies that positioned Sears as America's dominant retailer by the 1920s. He transitioned to chairman in 1925, prioritizing merit-based hiring and profit-sharing, which boosted employee retention amid economic volatility, though his philanthropy drew resources away from pure corporate expansion. Robert E. Wood succeeded Rosenwald as president in 1928, shifting Sears from catalog dominance to physical retailing by leveraging post-World War I automobile proliferation for suburban store placements. A former Army quartermaster general with logistics expertise from supplying troops in Europe, Wood opened the first urban Sears store in Chicago in 1925 while vice president, then accelerated expansion to 618 retail outlets by 1931, capturing urban markets neglected by mail-order rivals like Montgomery Ward. Under his 26-year presidency ending in 1954, Sears achieved $3 billion in annual sales by 1945—surpassing all competitors—and pioneered soft-goods departments, installment credit for appliances, and massive distribution centers like the Chicago Merchandise Building completed in 1930, which handled 25% of U.S. tire shipments. Wood's decentralized management empowered regional vice presidents, fostering adaptability during the Great Depression, where Sears gained market share as competitors faltered, though his aversion to heavy advertising limited brand differentiation against emerging discounters. Post-Wood leadership featured shorter tenures and incremental strategies amid suburban sprawl and television's rise, with executives like Richard Sears' successors maintaining stability but failing to counter Walmart's low-price assault starting in the ; sales peaked at $41 billion in 1973 before stagnation set in due to bureaucratic and underinvestment in modernization. Edward Brennan served as CEO from 1985 to , introducing private-label expansions and early pilots, yet Sears lost ground as catalog operations, generating $4 billion annually, were shuttered in 1993 amid shifting consumer habits toward specialty retail. Arthur Martinez, CEO from to 2000, rebranded apparel via the acquisition for $1.3 billion in 2002 (post-tenure) and boosted online sales to $500 million by 2000, but debt from expansions exceeded $4 billion, eroding margins against efficient rivals. Eddie Lampert, founder of , engineered the $11 billion merger of and in 2005 to form , assuming chairmanship and later CEO role in 2013, emphasizing financial restructuring over operational overhaul. Lampert divested non-core assets, including $1.5 billion in sales-leasebacks by 2014 and brands like Craftsman to for $900 million in 2017, generating $5.2 billion in liquidity but funding minimal store upgrades amid a closure of over 1,000 locations from 2010 to 2018. Sales plummeted 50% to $16.7 billion by 2017, with EBITDA turning negative due to deferred maintenance—evidenced by a 2016 vendor report citing outdated systems—and internal that stifled , as critiqued in analyses attributing decline to Lampert's hedge-fund model prioritizing debt reduction over customer-facing investments. The 2018 Chapter 11 liquidated 142 stores and $5.5 billion in assets, with Lampert's bid to acquire remnants via preserving a skeletal operation of 425 stores, though empirical metrics like a 13% erosion since 2005 underscore causal failures in adapting to , where Amazon captured 37% of U.S. online retail by 2017.

Employee Relations and Labor Controversies

Historical Unionization and Wage Practices

Sears, Roebuck and Company maintained a predominantly non-union workforce throughout much of its history, with only about 5 percent of its retail and mail-order employees belonging to unions as of 1950. The company actively resisted unionization efforts, particularly during the era and , when workers attempted to organize amid broader labor movements. Sears employed consultants like Nathan Shefferman, a prominent anti-union operative, to counter organizing drives; for instance, Shefferman's firm received seed funding from Sears in the 1930s to establish the Labor Relations Association, aimed at blocking affiliations with groups such as the AFL Retail Clerks. Despite occasional successes, such as a 1953 employee vote at one facility to affiliate with the AFL Retail Clerks or a 1980 warehouse election in favoring the Teamsters, overall union penetration remained minimal, as Sears expanded rapidly post- with nearly 100 new stores that diluted organizing momentum. To deter , Sears positioned itself as an among non-union employers by offering comprehensive benefits that predated widespread industry norms, including life and , sick pay, paid vacations, and separation allowances introduced in the early . Under leaders like , the company implemented profit-sharing starting in 1916, earmarking 10 percent of pretax earnings for employee retirement plans; by the , full-time workers owned approximately a quarter of the company's through these mechanisms. Sears management explicitly argued that direct company-provided security exceeded what unions could offer, with personnel executives stating in the that "no union could ever have as great and as personal concern for the well-being of employees as the company itself." These practices, including employee attitude surveys from 1938 onward to gauge and address morale, helped sustain low by fostering loyalty without . Wage structures at Sears emphasized longevity-based hourly pay for much of the , supplemented by incentives like commissions for sales staff, though specific average wages varied by role and location with limited public data from the era. The profit-sharing model tied compensation to company performance, distributing portions of directly to employees and reinforcing non-union alignment by aligning worker interests with corporate success. Isolated disputes, such as Teamsters Local 107's contention over proposed work rule changes affecting pay and benefits, highlighted tensions in later decades but did not alter the historical pattern of limited union influence. Overall, Sears' approach prioritized internal welfare programs over union concessions, contributing to its reputation as a high-road non-union employer until competitive pressures eroded these advantages in the late .

Layoffs, Pension Issues, and Worker Criticisms

Sears underwent extensive layoffs during its operational decline in the , accelerating after became CEO in 2013 following the 2005 merger. By the October 2018 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, the workforce had shrunk to approximately 68,000 employees across under 700 stores, down from over 300,000 at the company's historical peak in the late and around 355,000 combined post-merger. In 2018 alone, more than 92,000 jobs were eliminated amid widespread store closures. cuts included 220 positions in 2018 and 200 more in 2018, with the latter primarily affecting the Hoffman Estates facility. Post-bankruptcy, 250 additional layoffs occurred in 2019 alongside further store shutdowns exceeding initial projections. The company's pension plans faced severe underfunding, totaling a $1.4 billion shortfall by early 2019 and covering about 90,000 retirees at roughly 64% funded status. The (PBGC) terminated and assumed the plans, committing to cover the vast majority of benefits while seeking recovery as a . Retiree groups criticized management for prioritizing shareholder dividends—including $509 million to shareholders, some linked to Lampert's —over adequate pension contributions, leading to lawsuits in both U.S. and Canadian operations. Lampert argued that escalating pension withdrawal liability, potentially exceeding $1.6 billion, drained operational cash and hindered competitiveness against e-commerce rivals. Worker criticisms intensified under Lampert's tenure, with employees reporting chronic understaffing, deferred maintenance on stores, and morale erosion from relentless cost reductions. reviews reflected this discontent, showing only 19% approval for Lampert among Sears staff in 2016, with frequent complaints about slashed commissions, inadequate training, and a focus on asset sales over retail investment. Laid-off employees highlighted abrupt terminations without severance, contrasting with perceived executive gains from property deals via entities like Seritage Growth Properties. These grievances fueled lawsuits and public backlash, attributing Sears' retail erosion to leadership prioritizing over operational renewal amid broader sector shifts to online competition.

Data Breaches and Security Failures

2017 Data Incident Details

In September 2017, Sears Holdings Management Corporation, the parent company operating Sears and Kmart stores, suffered a cybersecurity incident stemming from malware infection at its third-party customer support vendor, 7.ai, which provided online chat services. The breach enabled unauthorized access to payment card details, including credit card numbers, expiration dates, and card security codes, entered by customers during interactions on the Sears website between September 26 and October 12, 2017. Sears estimated that fewer than 100,000 customers were potentially impacted, with no evidence of compromise to other personal data such as names, addresses, Social Security numbers, or email addresses. The incident was detected and contained by 7.ai on October 12, 2017, after which Sears was informed and promptly initiated its response protocol. Affected customers received notifications from Sears, along with offers for free credit monitoring and protection services to mitigate risks of fraudulent activity. This event highlighted vulnerabilities in third-party vendor dependencies, as 7.ai also serviced and other retailers, leading to a broader exposure affecting hundreds of thousands of payment cards across clients during the same period. No lawsuits or regulatory fines were publicly reported directly from this incident, though it underscored ongoing challenges in supply-chain cybersecurity for legacy retailers like Sears amid declining operational resources. Separately, in May 2017, stores—under —experienced another point-of-sale breach where targeted readers at select locations, compromising swiped card data from an unspecified number of transactions. This earlier event, described by Sears as involving "unauthorized activity," prompted customer alerts and card reissuance recommendations but lacked detailed impact figures in public disclosures. Both incidents reflected systemic lapses in an era of Sears' financial distress, where cost-cutting may have strained IT maintenance and vendor oversight.

2021 Breach and Aftermath

In June 2021, , the company operating remaining Sears and stores following the 2018 bankruptcy, detected unauthorized access to certain computer servers on its network. The intrusion occurred between June 3 and June 15, 2021, and was identified on June 24, 2021, after an internal investigation revealed that files containing personal information had potentially been compromised. The affected data primarily involved current and former employees, including Social Security numbers, financial account information, names, addresses, dates of birth, and numbers, with no evidence of customer details or broader retail transaction data being exposed. Transformco responded by engaging cybersecurity experts to contain the breach, enhancing measures, and notifying affected employees in accordance with state data protection laws. The company provided complimentary credit monitoring and protection services to those impacted to mitigate risks of . Notifications were filed with state attorneys general, affecting small numbers of residents in various jurisdictions, such as 13 in . The aftermath included investigations into potential lawsuits by law firms representing affected employees, alleging inadequate data safeguards amid Transformco's operational challenges. No large-scale settlements or regulatory fines were publicly reported, and the incident did not halt ongoing Sears store closures, which continued as part of Transformco's efforts amid declining revenues. The breach underscored persistent cybersecurity vulnerabilities in legacy retail operations, though its scope was limited compared to prior customer-facing incidents.

Cultural and Economic Legacy

Role in Democratizing Retail and American Consumerism

Sears, Roebuck and Co. pioneered the mail-order catalog business, beginning with watches and jewelry in 1886 under Richard W. Sears, who expanded to a general merchandise catalog in 1893 with partner Alvah C. Roebuck. This model delivered a wide array of goods directly to consumers' doorsteps, circumventing rural general stores that often charged high markups and limited selections. By 1897, Sears distributed over 300,000 catalogs annually, reaching farmers and small-town residents who previously faced geographic barriers to urban retail variety. The catalog's fixed pricing, money-back guarantees, and installment payment options lowered barriers to entry, enabling average Americans to access quality products like clothing, tools, and household items at competitive prices. This innovation disrupted local monopolies, fostering competition that benefited consumers through affordability and choice, while also subverting discriminatory practices in the Jim Crow South by allowing customers to order without facing in-person bias from white-owned stores. Sears' approach symbolized the rise of mass consumerism, diffusing commercial values and encouraging a culture of planned purchasing and credit-based acquisition across socioeconomic lines. By the early , the company's catalogs had become cultural artifacts, showcasing modern inventions and lifestyles that aspirational buyers emulated, thus accelerating the shift toward a consumer-driven economy. Sears further democratized retail with its first physical store opening in in 1925, transitioning from catalog dominance to urban and suburban expansion that anchored shopping centers post-World War II. This evolution made consumer credit widely available to working-class families, embedding installment buying into everyday and amplifying participation in the burgeoning of material abundance. Overall, Sears' strategies exemplified free-market efficiencies in distribution and financing, empowering millions to engage in retail on equal footing regardless of location or local constraints.

Lessons for Retail: Free-Market Competition vs. Corporate Inertia

Sears' decline exemplifies the perils of corporate inertia in the face of relentless free-market competition, where incumbents fail to adapt to efficiency-driven challengers like and digital disruptors like Amazon. Once holding a commanding 13.7% U.S. retail in the , Sears saw its position erode as competitors prioritized and customer-centric . 's focus on everyday low prices, achieved through superior and data-driven , allowed it to undercut Sears' while expanding rapidly; by 2005, surpassed Sears in revenue, growing from $191 billion to over $300 billion annually by leveraging scale and just-in-time efficiencies that Sears neglected. Similarly, Amazon's model capitalized on Sears' own historical catalog but executed it with modern technology, capturing online sales that Sears underinvested in, spending less than 1% of revenue on IT upgrades in the compared to rivals' higher allocations. Corporate manifested in Sears' bureaucratic structure and short-term cost-cutting, which stifled and long-term . Under CEOs like Edward Brennan and Alan Lacy in the and , Sears prioritized —such as selling off prime assets for $7.3 billion between 2005 and 2015—over capital expenditures, resulting in deteriorating store conditions and a subpar experience. This contrasted sharply with Walmart's per-square-foot ratio, where competitors outspent Sears five-to-one, enabling fresher merchandise and better layouts that drew price-sensitive consumers away. Sears' internal silos and resistance to organizational change, evident in failed experiments like the "Great Indoors" rebranding and Lands' End acquisition, exemplified how entrenched hierarchies delayed responses to market signals, leading to a 90% drop from peak levels by 2018. The free-market lesson from Sears underscores that sustained retail success demands continuous adaptation to consumer preferences and competitive pressures, rather than resting on legacy advantages. Disruptors thrive by minimizing costs through and scale—Amazon's fulfillment network reduced delivery times, while Walmart's RFID cut shrinkage—pressuring laggards into . Sears' filing on October 15, 2018, with $5.5 billion in debt and only 687 stores remaining, highlights how inertia invites ; retailers ignoring this risk , as evidenced by Sears' inability to counter Walmart's 2,500+ supercenters or Amazon's Prime , which together captured over 40% of U.S. retail by 2020. Firms must cultivate cultures of experimentation and efficiency to harness market incentives, lest they succumb to the very competition that once propelled their rise.

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