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Route of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand (red line) in the Achaemenid Empire. The satrapy of Cyrus the Younger is delineated in green.

The Ten Thousand (Ancient Greek: οἱ Μύριοι, hoi Myrioi) were a force of mercenary units, mainly Greeks, employed by Cyrus the Younger to attempt to wrest the throne of the Persian Empire from his brother, Artaxerxes II. Their march to the Battle of Cunaxa and back to Greece (401–399 BC) was recorded by Xenophon, one of their leaders, in his work Anabasis.

Campaign

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Xenophon's Anabasis.[1]

Between 401 and 399 BC, the Ten Thousand marched across Anatolia, fought the Battle of Cunaxa, and then marched back to Greece.

In his Anabasis, Xenophon states that the Greek heavy troops routed their opposition twice at Cunaxa at the cost of only one Greek soldier wounded. Only after the battle did they hear that Cyrus had been killed, making their victory irrelevant and the expedition a failure.[2]

The Ten Thousand found themselves far from home with no food, no employer, and no reliable allies.

They offered to make their Persian ally Ariaeus king, but he refused on the grounds that he was not of royal blood and would not find enough support among the Persians to keep the throne.

They then offered their services to Tissaphernes, a leading satrap of Artaxerxes, but he demanded their complete surrender, which they refused. This presented Tissaphernes with a problem – a large army of heavily armed troops, which he could not defeat by frontal assault. He supplied them with food and, after a long wait, led them northwards for home.

Meanwhile he succeeded in luring away the Persian general Ariaeus and his light troops.[citation needed]

The Greek senior officers accepted the invitation of Tissaphernes to a feast where they were taken prisoner, led before the king, and executed.[3]

The Greeks elected new officers, Timasion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philesius, and Xenophon[4], and set out to march northwards to the Black Sea, through Corduene and Armenia.[5]

Retreat of the Ten Thousand at the Battle of Cunaxa, by Jean-Adrien Guignet. Louvre

Xenophon and his men initially had to deal with volleys from a minor force of harassing Persian missile cavalry. Every day, this cavalry, finding no opposition from the Ten Thousand, moved cautiously closer and closer.

One night, Xenophon formed a body of archers and light cavalry. When the Persian cavalry arrived the next day, now shooting within several yards, Xenophon suddenly unleashed his new cavalry in a charge, smashing into the stunned and confused enemy, killing many and routing the rest.[6]

Tissaphernes pursued Xenophon with a vast force, and when the Greeks reached the wide and deep Great Zab river, they seemed to be surrounded. A Rhodian proposed a plan in exchange for a talent; all goats, cattle, sheep, and donkeys were to be slaughtered and their bodies stuffed with hay, laid across the river, and sewn up and covered with soil so as not to be slippery. This was refused, for it would have been impossible to implement, and so the Greeks simply turned around, with the Persians refusing to pursue.[7]

That Xenophon was able to feed his force in the heart of a vast empire with a hostile population was considered astonishing. Dodge notes:

On this retreat also was first shown the necessary, if cruel, means of arresting a pursuing enemy by the systematic devastation of the country traversed and the destruction of its villages to deprive him of food and shelter. And Xenophon is moreover the first who established in the rear of the phalanx a reserve from which he could at will feed weak parts of his line. This was a superb first conception.[8]

The Ten Thousand eventually made their way into the land of the Carduchians, a wild tribe inhabiting the mountains of modern southeastern Turkey,

...a fierce, war-like race, who had never been conquered. Once the Great King had sent into their country an army of 120,000 men, to subdue them, but of all that great host not one had ever seen his home again.[9]

The Ten Thousand made their way in and were fired at with stones and arrows for several days before they reached a defile where the main Carduchian host stood. In the Battle of the Carduchian Defile, Xenophon had 8,000 men make a diversionary attack on this host whilst he marched the other 2,000 under cover of a rainstorm to a pass revealed by a prisoner, and

...having made their way to the rear of the main pass, at daylight, under cover of the morning mist, they boldly pushed in upon the astonished Carducians. The blare of their many trumpets gave notice of their successful detour to Xenophon, as well as adding to the confusion of the enemy. The main army at once joined in the attack from the valley side, and the Carducians were driven from their stronghold.[10]

After heavy mountain fighting, the Greeks made their way to the northern foothills of the mountains at the Centrites River, only to find a major Persian force blocking the route north. With the Carduchians surging toward the Greek rear, Xenophon again faced the threat of total destruction in battle.

Xenophon's scouts quickly found another ford across the river, but the Persians moved and blocked this as well. Xenophon sent a small force back toward the other ford, causing the anxious Persians to detach a major part of their force. Xenophon stormed and completely overwhelmed the force remaining at his ford, while the Greek detachment made a forced march to this bridgehead.

This was among the first attacks in depth ever made, 23 years after Delium and 30 years before Epaminondas' more famous use of it at Leuctra.

Xenophon and the Ten Thousand hail the sea, 19th-century illustration

Winter had by now arrived as the Greeks marched through Armenia "absolutely unprovided with clothing suitable for such weather",[11] inflicting more casualties than they suffered through their ambush of a local satrap's force and the flanking of another force.

At a stage when the Greeks were in desperate need of food, they decided upon attacking a wooden castle known to have provisions. The castle, however, was located on a hill surrounded by forest. Xenophon ordered small parties of his men to appear on the hill road; and when the defenders flung boulders, a soldier would leap into the trees, and he "did this so often that at last there was quite a heap of stones lying in front of him, but he himself was untouched." Then, "the other men followed his example, and made it a sort of game, enjoying the sensation, pleasant alike to old and young, of courting danger for a moment, and then quickly escaping it.

When the stones were almost exhausted, the soldiers raced one another over the exposed part of the road", storming the fortress, where most of the now neutralized garrison barely put up a fight. The inhabitants threw their children over the walls, before throwing themselves down to their deaths, both men and women.[12]

Thálatta! Thálatta! (Θάλαττα! θάλαττα!, "The Sea! The Sea!").
Trapezus (Trebizond) was the first Greek city the Ten Thousand reached on their retreat from inland Persia, 19th-c. illustration by Herman Vogel

Xenophon records the joyful moment when the Ten Thousand (by then actually far fewer), from the heights of Mount Theches, saw the sea and friendly Greek colonies on the coast, which signified their escape had been made good, whereupon they shouted Θάλαττα! θάλαττα! : Thalatta! Thalatta! ("The sea! The sea!").[13]

Soon after, Xenophon's men reached Trapezus on the coast of the Black Sea (Anabasis 4.8.22). Before they departed, the Greeks made an alliance with the locals and fought one last battle against the Colchians, vassals of the Persians, in mountainous country. Xenophon ordered his men to deploy their line extremely thin, so as to overlap the enemy, while keeping a strong reserve.

The Colchians, seeing they were being outflanked, divided their army to check the Greek deployment, opening a gap in their line through which Xenophon rushed in his reserves, scoring a Greek victory.[14]

Failure of plans for shipment to Europe

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On their arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine, the Greek mercenaries sent their Spartan general Cheirisophus to Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral stationed at Byzantium in 400 BC, to obtain a sufficient number of ships to transport them to Europe.[15]

However, when Cheirisophus met them again at Sinope, he brought back nothing from Anaxibius, but civil words and a promise of employment and pay as soon as they came out of the Euxine.[16]

Final conflict with Pharnabazus (399 BC)

[edit]
Achaemenid satrap Pharnabazus fought the Ten Thousand to prevent them from plundering Bithynia and Hellespontine Phrygia.

The Ten Thousand under Xenophon continued to the west, some by ship, but most of them by land, and arrived in Bithynia after numerous skirmishes and plunderings. Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was involved in helping the Bithynians against these plundering raids of the Ten Thousand. He was also trying to stop them from entering Hellespontine Phrygia. His cavalry, which made several raids on the Greek mercenaries, is said to have killed about 500 of them.[17]

An Athenian mercenary peltast (left) supporting an Achaemenid knight of Hellespontine Phrygia (center) attacking a Greek psilos (right), Altıkulaç Sarcophagus, early fourth century BCE[18][19]

Pharnabazus then arranged with the Spartan Anaxibius for the rest of the Ten Thousand to be shipped to Byzantium.[20] On their arrival at Chrysopolis, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, Anaxibius, being bribed by Pharnabazus with great promises to withdraw them from his satrapy, promised to pay them and brought them over to Byzantium. Here Anaxibius attempted to send them forward on their march without fulfilling his agreement. A fight ensued, in which Anaxibius was compelled to flee for refuge to the Byzantine acropolis, and which was quelled only by the remonstrances of Xenophon.[21]

Soon after this, the Greeks left the town under the command of the adventurer Coeratades; and Anaxibius issued a proclamation, subsequently acted on by the harmost Aristarchus, that all of Cyrus's soldiers found in Byzantium should be sold as slaves.[22]

In view of his originality and tactical genius, Xenophon's conduct of the retreat caused Dodge to name the Athenian the greatest general to precede Alexander the Great.[23]

Order of battle

[edit]

According to Xenophon, the Ten Thousand were composed of:

In addition, they were backed up by a fleet of 35 triremes under Pythagoras the Spartan and 25 triremes under Tamos the Egyptian, as well as 20,000 Persian troops under Ariaeus the Persian. (Although Xenophon lists them as 100,000, most modern historians believe Ariaeus' troops numbered only about 20,000).

Until shortly after the Battle of Cunaxa, Spartan general Clearchus was recognized as the commander of the army. When Tissaphernes arrested and executed Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Agias (possibly the same person as Sophaenetus), and Socrates, their places were taken by Xenophon the Athenian, Timasion the Dardanian, Xanthicles the Achaean, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Philesius the Achaean, with the Spartan Cheirisophus as the general commander.

When the Ten Thousand started their journey in 401 BC, Xenophon stated that they numbered around 10,400. At the time Xenophon left them two years later, their number had dwindled to just under 6,000.

Cultural influences

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  • The 1965 novel The Warriors is inspired by Anabasis. It tells the story of a gang (the Dominators) from New York's Coney Island forced to fight their way home from the Bronx after an all-city gang meeting at which a would-be gang-unifier is killed, the Dominators are blamed, and lose their leader. The novel was adapted into the 1979 film The Warriors. In the film, the would-be emperor figure is named Cyrus, the Coney Island gang's fallen leader is named Cleon, and the film's final scenes take place at the edge of the sea.
  • The novel The Sea, the Sea by Iris Murdoch, winner of the 1978 Booker Prize,[26] was named for this event.
  • David Drake's 1988 novel The Forlorn Hope features a plot revolving around a group of mercenaries caught behind enemy lines, who must fight their way out. Drake's own writings describe Xenophon's Anabasis as the model for the first segment of the book.
  • Harold Coyle's 1993 novel The Ten Thousand shows the bulk of US Forces in modern Europe fighting their way across and out of Germany after the Germans steal nuclear weapons being removed from Ukraine.
  • The 1997 video game Age of Empires has a campaign mission called "Xenophon's March" based on this event. In the mission, the player has to lead a squad of Greek troops through hostile territory to get home.
  • The 2001 novel The Ten Thousand by Michael Curtis Ford is a fictional account of this group's exploits.[27][28]
  • Shane Brennan's In the Tracks of the Ten Thousand: A Journey on Foot through Turkey, Syria and Iraq (London: Robert Hale, 2005) is an account of his 2000 journey to retrace the steps of the Ten Thousand.
  • Valerio Massimo Manfredi's 2007 novel L'armata perduta (The Lost Army) tells the story of the army through Abira, a Syrian girl, who decides to follow a Greek warrior named Xeno (Xenophon).
  • John G. Hemry's The Lost Fleet series, is based on the Anabasis and Arthurian legend. After a lost battle deep in enemy space, the leadership of the alliance fleet gets captured and executed, and the long-lost hero must lead his desperate fleet home to safety.
  • Paul Kearney's 2008 novel The Ten Thousand is set in a fantasy world based on Xenophon's record of the historical Ten Thousand.
  • John Ringo's 2008 novel The Last Centurion tells the story of a U.S. Stryker company left in Iran after a worldwide plague, which must repeat the journey of the Ten Thousand. The Ten Thousand and Anabasis are frequently mentioned.
  • Finnish artist Petri Hiltunen has portrayed the campaign in his two-part comic album "Anabasis". It was published by Arktinen Banaani in 2011 (Anabasis: 1. Osa, Kyyroksen sotaretki) and 2013 (Anabasis: 2. Osa, Tuhanten miesten marssi).
  • The 2018 novel The Falcon of Sparta by British author Conn Iggulden provides a fictionalized account of the plight of the Ten Thousand.
  • In the 2018 limited series The Terror, Anabasis is recommended as a literary parallel to the grueling walk out by the men of the Franklin expedition.

See also

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References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ten Thousand

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The Ten Thousand (: οἱ μύριοι, hoi myrioi) were a force of approximately 10,000 Greek soldiers, primarily hoplites and peltasts from various city-states, hired in 401 BC by , of , to support his bid to usurp the Achaemenid throne from his elder brother, . Recruited through and other commanders, the Greeks formed the core of Cyrus's right wing during the march from through and toward . At the Battle of Cunaxa near the Euphrates River, Cyrus's forces clashed with Artaxerxes's larger army; the Greek phalanx routed the Persian left, but Cyrus was killed in the melee, leaving the mercenaries leaderless and their contract voided amid betrayal by the Persian satrap Tissaphernes. Under new commanders, including the Athenian Xenophon who emerged as a key strategist, the survivors—reduced by combat and disease—faced encirclement and massacre threats, prompting a decision to retreat northward over 1,500 miles through Armenian highlands, Carduchian mountains, and hostile tribes, battling Persian irregulars and enduring harsh winters with minimal supplies. Their disciplined infantry tactics repeatedly overcame numerically superior foes, culminating in the iconic sighting of the Black Sea at Trapezus, where they cried "Thalatta! Thalatta!" (The sea! The sea!), symbolizing survival against imperial odds. Xenophon's firsthand Anabasis ("The March Up Country"), written circa 370 BC, chronicles the expedition's logistics, leadership debates, and moral fortitude, serving as both historical record and on virtue in adversity. The feat exposed Persian military vulnerabilities—vast empire but fragile cohesion—emboldening Greek panhellenism and directly informing later conquests, as the route's demonstration of penetrability influenced Philip II and Alexander the Great's invasions a century later.

Historical Context

Cyrus the Younger's Rebellion

was appointed satrap of , , and around 408 BC by his father , granting him command over Achaemenid forces in western Asia Minor and fostering his accumulation of regional authority. In this role, he cultivated alliances with Greek poleis, notably providing financial support to Sparta's during the Peloponnesian War's final stages, which bolstered Spartan naval efforts and secured their victory in 404 BC, while enhancing Cyrus's leverage among Hellenic states. Darius II's death in 404 BC precipitated a , with claiming the throne despite 's ambitions, fueled by favoritism from their mother and perceived weaknesses in his brother's early rule amid post-war fiscal strains. faced accusations of plotting but escaped execution through 's advocacy, returning to circa 403 BC to initiate clandestine military and logistical preparations disguised as border skirmishes with neighboring satraps. These efforts exploited the Achaemenid system's allowance for satrapal fiscal autonomy, enabling him to stockpile resources distant from Susa's oversight. The empire's centralized , reliant on satraps for provincial defense yet hampered by slow imperial communication and mobilization across vast distances, permitted to develop an independent power center in without prompt intervention. This structural flaw, compounded by the inconsistent quality and loyalty of Persian levies drawn from diverse subjects, contrasted with 's strategy of leveraging western alliances for superior forces, underscoring causal vulnerabilities in the regime's ability to counter peripheral threats decisively.

Recruitment and Deception of the Greeks

initiated recruitment of Greek mercenaries in 401 BC through intermediaries to obscure his true intentions of challenging his brother for the Persian throne. He leveraged complaints against the satrap , portraying the mobilization as a defensive response to threats against Ionian Greek cities under his control, which allowed him to assemble forces without arousing immediate suspicion at the royal court. Key agents included the Lacedaemonian exile Clearchus, whom funded with 10,000 darics to raise troops in the Thracian Chersonese, ostensibly to protect Greek settlers from local tribes; similarly, Thessalian received advance pay for 4,000 men, while commanders like Proxenus of Thebes, Sophaenetus of Stymphalus, and Socrates of Achaea were enlisted to gather contingents under pretexts of campaigns against the Pisidians or himself. The Greek recruits, primarily heavy infantry hoplites, hailed from regions including the , , and , drawn by the promise of steady pay—one daric per month per soldier, a equivalent to a substantial amid economic dislocation. Following the Peloponnesian War's end in 404 BC, widespread unemployment among demobilized soldiers fueled the mercenary market, as Greek city-states demobilized forces without reintegration prospects, prompting individualistic pursuits of profit over civic obligations. This contrasted sharply with Persian levies, often conscripted from subject peoples through imperial coercion rather than voluntary enlistment for remuneration, highlighting the Greeks' tactical edge rooted in motivated professionalism. Deception was central to maintaining compliance, as withheld revelation of the expedition's ultimate aim—a march to against Artaxerxes—framing it instead as a limited satrapal conflict to avoid desertions or demands for higher . Commanders like Clearchus, aware of the broader stakes due to prior dealings with , propagated the misleading narrative to their troops, ensuring the roughly 10,000–13,000 committed without full knowledge of the risks involved in traversing the empire's heartland. This stratagem succeeded initially, as the mercenaries' economic incentives outweighed suspicions, though it sowed tensions exposed after 's death at Cunaxa.

Composition and Organization

Forces and Equipment

The Greek mercenary force in the Younger's expedition numbered approximately 14,000 combatants at the muster prior to the in 401 BCE, comprising heavy and alongside a modest element. records 10,400 hoplites as the core, equipped for formation with bronze helmets, cuirasses, greaves, large round shields (typically 3 feet in diameter), 7-9 foot dory spears for thrusting, and short swords for close combat. This heavy armament prioritized unit cohesion and over individual mobility, enabling the to withstand numerically superior Persian forces through disciplined ranks. Complementing the hoplites were 2,500 peltasts—light skirmishers armed with javelins, small crescent-shaped pelte shields, and daggers or short spears, clad in minimal leather or fabric protection for agility in harassment and pursuit roles—plus 200 Cretan archers with composite bows, 300 Rhodian and Eliote slingers using lead bullets or stones, and 1,000 cavalrymen on Thessalian or similar mounts, bearing lighter spears, swords, and possibly small shields. These lighter troops provided screening and flanking support, leveraging ranged capabilities absent in the hoplite line. Cyrus supplemented the Greeks with an estimated 100,000 barbarian auxiliaries, including Paphlagonian and other levies, though these were less reliable and more numerous but inferior in training and equipment to the professional Hellenic contingent. Logistically, the expedition emphasized mobility with a compact baggage train of pack mules, donkeys, and personal attendants (often slaves accompanying soldiers), carrying essentials like tents, rations, and spare gear but avoiding cumbersome Persian-style supply chains. Reliance on foraging, river crossings, and rapid marches—averaging 15-20 miles daily—underscored the force's efficiency, as the Greeks consumed local provisions and minimal carried stores, contrasting with the Achaemenid army's dependence on vast, vulnerable depots. This setup sustained the mercenaries across 1,500 miles from to Cunaxa, highlighting their adaptability forged in Peloponnesian War-era campaigns.

Initial Command Structure

Clearchus of Sparta served as the nominal overall commander () of the Greek mercenary contingent, appointed by after Cyrus provided him with funds to assemble and lead approximately 10,000 to 13,000 hoplites and peltasts from various Greek poleis. Other key generals included Proxenus of Thebes, who recruited and commanded a force of about 5,000 Boeotians and other central Greeks, and Menon of , who brought roughly 1,000 Thessalian hoplites known for their cavalry traditions but adapted to infantry roles. These appointments were merit-based, selected for their prior military experience and ability to raise troops, rather than royal fiat, with Cyrus acting through intermediaries to obscure the expedition's true purpose against his brother . The force's structure was loosely federated, organized by regional origins such as Arcadian, Achaean, and Ionian contingents, each maintaining internal cohesion under their while coordinating under Clearchus. Subunits known as lochoi—tactical companies of around 100 men—were led by lochagoi (captains), often elected by their men or appointed by generals, enabling flexible maneuvers but fostering divided loyalties amid competing claims for pay and precedence. This decentralized model, rooted in citizen-militia traditions repurposed for pay, stood in stark opposition to the Persian Empire's absolutist hierarchy, where satraps and the enforced obedience through fear and rather than contractual obligation. Early tensions foreshadowed command fractures, as evidenced by Menon's contingent's indiscipline during assembly at Thapsacus in 401 BC, where his troops plundered local resources and quarreled with other units over arrivals and rations, prioritizing short-term gains over unified discipline. Such incidents underscored the mercenaries' pragmatic ethos—driven by wages of one per month per —over ideological allegiance to , with generals like Clearchus imposing Spartan-style order through threats of flogging to mitigate rivalries among Arcadian and Ionian lighter troops.

Advance to Cunaxa

Route and Early Encounters

The expedition departed from in the spring of 401 BC, with leading his assembled forces eastward in secrecy to avoid alerting his brother . The initial route traversed western Asia Minor, progressing through and into greater , where the army covered stages of varying lengths, often 20-30 parasangs (approximately 70-100 kilometers) between major settlements, as detailed in Xenophon's account. Continuing through and , the encountered minimal resistance, benefiting from Cyrus's deception that portrayed the campaign as a against rather than a bid for the throne, which delayed Persian mobilization. Upon reaching , the army navigated the rugged pass, where Cyrus's local allies had already neutralized a small Persian of about 400 men, allowing the main force to advance unhindered and fostering early confidence in their operational superiority. Descending to the Syrian coast near Issus and Myriandrus, the troops then turned inland, crossing the River at Zeugma using a bridge of boats constructed by local Phoenicians, without facing organized opposition due to the prevailing misinformation. From there, the march proceeded along the toward , spanning roughly 1,500 miles (2,400 km) in total, with daily advances typically ranging from 15 to 20 miles, sustained by foraging and local supplies that highlighted the endurance of the Greek hoplites and peltasts. These early phases demonstrated strategic successes in maintaining momentum and surprise, as minor brushes with outlying revealed the Persians' reluctance or inability to contest the invaders effectively in open terrain.

Logistical Challenges

The expedition's advance across and into exposed the Greek forces to logistical strains from prolonged marches over rugged terrain and intensifying summer heat, though initial provisions were secured through Cyrus's control of western satrapies and contributions from his non-Greek allies, who transported grain, livestock, and water via pack animals. These contingents, numbering over , offset the Greeks' lighter supply trains—typically limited to personal kit and minimal wagons—allowing the army to cover approximately 1,500 kilometers in about four months without widespread privation early on. Water access posed recurring challenges in the Babylonian plains, where distances between rivers like the and exceeded daily march capacities, forcing reliance on carried reserves and opportunistic wells amid dusty conditions that exacerbated thirst; notes disciplined halts near watercourses, but the heat felled a small number of men through exhaustion before Cunaxa. As the army neared the battlefield in late 401 BC, Artaxerxes' scorched-earth measures—igniting fields and villages to withhold —compelled foraging detachments to scour margins for and dates, revealing the Persians' vulnerability to denying their own tribute-dependent system while the Greeks' mobility enabled short-term adaptation without collapse. Disease and desertions remained limited during this phase, with heat-related ailments claiming perhaps dozens amid thousands, countered by practices like nocturnal advances to evade peak temperatures; records indicate isolated cases, such as Thracian auxiliaries fleeing in due to hardships, but overall cohesion held, contrasting the Persian reliance on static levies prone to dissolution without imperial . This resilience stemmed from the mercenaries' professional ethos and decentralized provisioning, which prioritized speed over the encumbrances of satrapal tribute hauls that burdened Artaxerxes' host.

Battle of Cunaxa

Deployment and Persian Opposition

As the armies converged near Cunaxa in early 401 BC, Cyrus deployed his forces with the Greek mercenaries forming the right wing, positioned aggressively to exploit their discipline while shielded on the outer flank by the River. Clearchus commanded the left portion of the Greek line, nearest to 's center, with Proxenus, the Arcadian , and others arrayed alongside; this inner flank under Clearchus anchored the Greeks to the main body, emphasizing cohesive tactics over dispersed engagements. himself took the center with his personal and select Asiatic troops, planning a decisive thrust toward his brother Artaxerxes, while Ariaeus led the left wing of less reliable barbarian infantry. Opposing this, Artaxerxes positioned himself in the center of the Persian army, directing a numerically overwhelming force that ancient accounts portray as vastly superior in manpower, enabling potential envelopment of Cyrus's flanks through sheer volume. , a participant, claimed the Persians fielded 1,200,000 infantry, 200,000 cavalry (including horse archers for harassing maneuvers), and 150 scythed chariots, while similarly inflated figures to around 400,000 foot and thousands of horse; modern analyses deem these exaggerations but acknowledge a core of perhaps 40,000-100,000 troops drawn from satrapal levies, still dwarfing Cyrus's combined host. The Persian array featured dense masses of levied and wings poised for outflanking, with Artaxerxes relying on volume and mobility to counter the ' qualitative edge, as riders and archers screened advances to disrupt close-order formations. In contrast, the under Clearchus rejected Persian invitations to skirmish, holding the in tight order to ignore arrow volleys and preserve against the horde's pressure, a tactical choice rooted in prioritizing shock combat over attrition.

Combat and Cyrus's Defeat

The Greek hoplites, positioned in the center under Clearchus, advanced against the Persian infantry opposing them, chanting the paean and clashing shields to intimidate enemy cavalry. Upon closing to melee range, the Persians broke and fled without significant resistance, allowing the Greeks to pursue while maintaining formation. This rout demonstrated the phalanx's superiority in close-quarters combat against less cohesive Persian foot soldiers, who lacked comparable discipline and armament. Prior to the infantry clash, Persian scythed chariots attempted to disrupt the Greek lines but were circumvented by soldiers opening deliberate gaps, preventing any breakthroughs; only one Greek suffered a minor wound from an during this phase. Subsequent Persian charges along the Greek flanks failed to inflict damage, as the dense formation—bristling with overlapping spears—repelled the horsemen, who could neither penetrate nor demoralize the ranks effectively. Concurrently, personally led a detachment of 600 elite in a daring charge toward Artaxerxes II's position in the Persian center-right, initially shattering a contingent of 6,000 enemy troops and slaying their commander Artagerses. pressed the assault, reportedly wounding the king himself in the ensuing melee, but was struck by a below the eye and killed, along with eight of his attendants; his death occurred amid close combat, underscoring the risks of such a focal leadership charge. Xenophon reports no fatalities among the Greek heavy infantry in their sector, with overall casualties limited to a handful of wounded, primarily among lighter-armed peltasts exposed on the flanks. While the Greeks achieved a clear tactical victory by dispersing their direct opponents, Cyrus's elimination negated these gains, as his death deprived the army of unified command and purpose, rendering the battle a strategic defeat for the rebels.

Leadership Crisis

Persian Betrayal and Execution of Generals

Following the in late summer 401 BC, where was killed, the Greek mercenaries routed the Persian left but lacked strategic direction without their patron. assumed de facto command of approximately 10,000 hoplites and peltasts, initiating negotiations with , the satrap who had allied with but realigned with King after the battle's outcome. proposed truces and promised to escort the westward toward the sea in exchange for their non-aggression, swearing mutual oaths of to reduce hostilities during joint marches along the River. Tensions persisted as the Greeks suspected Persian delays and harassment, yet Clearchus sought to formalize peace. In early autumn 401 BC, Tissaphernes invited the Greek generals to a parley near his camp to finalize terms, again under oaths guaranteeing safe conduct and return. The delegation included Clearchus, Proxenus of Boeotia, Menon of Thessaly, Agias (or Agis) of Arcadia, and Socrates of Achaea, accompanied by around 20 lochagoi (company captains) and interpreters. Upon arrival, hidden Persian cavalry ambushed and seized the unarmed group without resistance, violating the sworn assurances; the captives were bound and transported eastward to Artaxerxes' presence. Artaxerxes, viewing the leaders as threats to Persian authority, ordered their immediate execution in late 401 BC near . Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and were beheaded on the king's command, their heads and hands displayed to demoralize the Greek army; several captains suffered or as further exemplars. Xenophon's account in Anabasis portrays this as unprovoked Persian perfidy against sacred oaths, though some modern analyses question if prior Greek maneuvers—such as Clearchus's execution of Persian envoys—constituted initial breaches, potentially justifying ' actions under Achaemenid norms of retaliation; primary evidence, however, supports the Greeks entering the parley in compliance with terms. Ariaeus, Cyrus's Persian lieutenant who had defected to , facilitated the betrayal by confirming Greek vulnerabilities. The executions decapitated the Greek command structure, plunging the 10,000 into disarray amid encirclement by hostile Persian forces and uncertain supply lines over 1,000 miles from the Aegean. This act exemplified Achaemenid , prioritizing elimination of mercenary leadership to avert rebellion, but inadvertently unified surviving officers like through shared outrage over the oath-breaking.

Xenophon's Rise and Democratic Election

Following the Persian execution of the five senior Greek generals—Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and —under a flag of truce in the aftermath of the in 401 BC, the mercenary force of approximately 7,000 hoplites and peltasts descended into panic and mutiny, with soldiers scattering in fear of annihilation deep in enemy territory. , a 30-year-old Athenian volunteer who had joined the expedition through his friend Proxenus rather than holding prior command, seized the initiative by interpreting a personal dream as divine urging to rally the troops. That same night, amid the camp's chaos, convened an emergency assembly () of lochagoi (company commanders) and addressed the demoralized men, imploring them to reject despair, appoint capable successors immediately, and commit to a northward toward the Euxine Sea as the path to salvation and return to . He stressed individual agency and collective discipline, arguing that the ' phalanx tactics and cohesion rendered them invincible against Persian forces if unified, contrasting this with the treachery of satrap that had decapitated their prior command. The assembly responded by democratically electing seven new strategoi (generals) via acclamation and vote: Cheirisophus the Lacedaemonian (retained from prior role), , Philesius of , Sophaenetus of Stymphalus, Cleanor of Orchomenus, and Agasias of Stymphalus, with Timasion of Dardanus later added. This meritocratic process—favoring those who demonstrated rhetorical skill, tactical insight, and resolve in crisis—restored command structure within hours, underscoring the adaptive resilience of Greek mercenary governance rooted in participatory , which enabled the force to pivot from offensive ambitions under to survival-oriented retreat, unhindered by the centralized intrigue that characterized Achaemenid Persian administration.

Retreat to the Black Sea

March Through Armenia and Hardships

Following the execution of the Greek generals in 401 BC, the surviving mercenaries, numbering approximately 8,000 to men, initiated their northward under new leadership including . They first traversed the rugged terrain of Carduchian territory, encountering fierce ambushes in narrow mountain passes where local tribes hurled rocks and logs from heights, inflicting casualties despite Greek counterattacks with fire and slingers. Over seven days, the Greeks razed villages for supplies but suffered ongoing harassment, highlighting the challenges of against entrenched hill-dwellers. Crossing the Centrites River into around late 401 BC, the army initially found more arable lands with villages yielding grain, wine, and livestock through parties organized under strict discipline to avoid straggling. However, as winter deepened into 400 BC, they ascended the under the guidance of a local headman provided by a Persian collaborator, navigating pathless snow drifts up to breast-deep for men and deeper for pack animals. claimed numerous toes and lives, with reporting that stragglers froze overnight despite exhortations to maintain formation and share fires; compounded losses as became impossible in the barren peaks, leading to the consumption of pack mules and gear. To cross swollen rivers like the headwaters, the improvised bridges using ropes from hides and saplings lashed together, or inflated skins as rafts, demonstrating adaptive amid logistical strain. These environmental ordeals reduced the force by an estimated several thousand through exposure, , and combat over the retreat, though exact figures vary; Xenophon's account emphasizes perseverance via phalanx cohesion and motivational harangues, culminating in the euphoric sighting of the at Trapezus in March 400 BC, where the cry "Thalatta! Thalatta!" echoed relief after 120 days of northern march.

Conflicts with Local Forces and Pharnabazus

Following their arrival at Calpe Harbor in spring , the Greek mercenaries anticipated arranging sea transport to western Greek colonies, but encountered resistance from Persian satrap , who deployed cavalry and to disrupt their and prevent consolidation of the position. , governing , aimed to neutralize the threat posed by the battle-hardened force, coordinating with local tribal elements wary of Greek incursions. As the dispersed to gather supplies from nearby villages, Pharnabazus's under commanders Spithridates and Rhathines launched a surprise attack, exploiting the mercenaries' vulnerability. The rapidly reformed into formation, advancing against the Persian horsemen and foot soldiers; the heavy infantry's cohesion overwhelmed the lighter-equipped foes, routing them after intense pursuit. Greek losses totaled approximately 13 hoplites, contrasted with over 200 Persian dead and numerous captures, underscoring the 's tactical dominance in close-quarters engagements against irregular charges. Despite the victory, internal divisions arose over distribution of spoils, with Arcadian and Achaean contingents favoring prolonged plundering in the area. advocated withdrawal, citing risks of Pharnabazus returning with reinforcements and potential alliances with hostile locals like the Chalybes, who had earlier skirmished with the rearguard during the approach to Calpe. This decision compelled abandonment of immediate shipping plans, as Persian naval presence and blockade threats rendered coastal resupply untenable; the army instead marched southwest to , prioritizing overland mobility for survival. In late 399 BC, near Chrysopolis and Chalcedon in Bithynia, Pharnabazus mounted a final pursuit to safeguard his regional garrisons and estates from Greek depredations. His forces raided the mercenaries' unguarded baggage, prompting a swift counterattack that drove the Persians into the sea, recovering losses with negligible casualties. Facing disputes over further spoils and the imperative to evade renewed Persian concentrations, the Greeks disengaged, focusing on transit to Thracian allies rather than territorial gains. These defensive victories, marked by disproportionate enemy losses, empirically validated the Greeks' infantry superiority while highlighting logistical imperatives that precluded exploitation.

Aftermath in Thrace and Greece

Alliance with Sparta and Further Campaigns

In early , following their arrival at , the remnants of the Ten Thousand—reduced to approximately 8,000 men—entered service under Seuthes I, king of the Odrysian , who promised them a month's pay and land allotments in exchange for aiding his conquest of coastal tribes. Seuthes's forces, combined with the , conducted raids that expanded his territory from the to the , but persistent delays in payments sparked mutinies, including a violent confrontation at Lampsacus where Greek officers seized hostages to compel fulfillment. negotiated partial compensation, averting full-scale reprisals, though the alliance dissolved amid mutual distrust, with the mercenaries wintering in before relocating to seek new employment. Sparta, emboldened by reports of Persian military frailties revealed during Cyrus's failed revolt, recruited around 5,000 of the veterans in spring 399 BC under the harmost Thibron, augmenting them with 1,000 Neodamode and other Greeks to launch expeditions against the Tissaphernes in western Asia Minor. Thibron's army liberated cities like and from Persian garrisons, leveraging the mercenaries' discipline to repel local resistance, but his failure to control plundering of allied Greek poleis prompted his recall by the Spartan ephors later that year. Dercylidas succeeded him, employing the veterans in 398 BC for amphibious operations across the Hellespont, securing truces with and through feints and diplomacy rather than pitched battles, which garrisoned Ionian cities and raided Persian estates without significant losses. These campaigns reflected Sparta's strategic pivot toward direct challenges to Persian satrapal authority, utilizing the Ten Thousand's proven experience against irregular and fortified positions to project power into , thereby straining Achaemenid resources and foreshadowing broader Greco-Persian confrontations in the Corinthian War. The veterans' tactical knowledge, honed in the Anabasis retreat, enabled efficient operations over extended supply lines, underscoring the causal role of their survival in shifting Spartan confidence from defensive hegemony to offensive interventionism against Persia.

Dissolution and Veteran Outcomes

Upon reaching in in 399 BC, the remnants of the Ten Thousand, numbering around 6,000 men after attrition from combat, , and desertions during and subsequent operations, began to disband under Spartan oversight. The Spartans, having assumed command at , integrated significant portions of these veterans into their forces rather than allowing wholesale dispersal, leveraging their proven discipline and combat effectiveness against Persian satraps like . A contingent of these survivors joined King Agesilaus II's expedition to Asia Minor in 396 BC, where they contributed to Spartan raids and battles, enhancing the king's army with seasoned hoplites experienced in operating far from home bases. , as a prominent leader, received a grant of land at Scillus near Olympia from the Spartans circa 392 BC, establishing a prosperous estate stocked with tithes from Persian spoils, which supported his literary and agricultural pursuits until its confiscation by the Eleans after Sparta's defeat at Leuctra in 371 BC. The veterans' reintegration yielded tangible military and economic benefits for ; their expertise bolstered in the early fourth century BC, providing a reservoir of professional soldiers that offset citizen-militia limitations and facilitated operations against both Persian and Greek foes, while individual returns to poleis or contracts injected capital from expedition spoils into local economies. Some, paradoxically, later accepted employment from Persian authorities, underscoring the mercenaries' pragmatic despite their demonstration of imperial vulnerability. This cadre of survivors thus amplified Greek martial capacity in the decades preceding Alexander's conquests.

Military Analysis

Tactical Superiority of Greek Phalanx

The hoplite , consisting of tightly packed ranks of armored wielding eight-foot spears and large overlapping shields, excelled in repelling Persian charges at the on September 3, 401 BC, where approximately 10,000 Greek mercenaries faced an estimated 100,000 Persian troops under . The formation's depth and mutual support allowed front-rank spears to present a continuous wall of points, deterring mounted assaults while rear ranks maintained pressure to advance en masse, causing Persian horsemen to veer off or flee rather than engage directly. This tactical rigidity, rooted in collective discipline rather than individual maneuver, exploited the phalanx's superior shock resistance against lighter-armed opponents unaccustomed to sustained close-quarters pressure. Empirical outcomes underscored this edge: records zero Greek fatalities in the main clash, as Persian lines disintegrated upon contact with the advancing , permitting the Greeks to overrun opposing without prolonged exposure to or scythed chariots. Persian reliance on massed arrow volleys and flanking failed to disorder the shielded formation, whose hoplites endured through overlapped aspides before closing to exploit their reach advantage in . Such low casualties stemmed from the 's capacity to absorb and counter initial probes, contrasting with Persian forces' vulnerability to panic in direct confrontations due to inferior armor and training uniformity. In subsequent engagements during the retreat, the integrated skirmishers—light troops armed with javelins—to screen the against mountain ambushes by tribes like the Carduchians, adapting the heavy formation's limitations in broken terrain by harassing pursuers from afar before reforming for defense. This hybrid approach preserved integrity for open battles while leveraging mobility to deny local forces decisive engagements. The phalanx's cohesion derived from the hoplites' shared of endurance and interdependence, honed through prior campaigns, enabling ranks to hold under duress where Persian levies—often coerced satrapal contingents with fragmented command—routed from comparable threats. This discipline, evident in sustained advances despite numerical inferiority, highlighted causal factors like unit motivation and tactical familiarity over sheer manpower.

Adaptations in Irregular Warfare

During the retreat through the mountainous regions inhabited by the Carduchians in late 401 BCE, the Greek mercenaries encountered persistent guerrilla-style ambushes from tribal fighters who exploited the rugged terrain to launch hit-and-run attacks with arrows and stones, rendering traditional formations ineffective. To counter these threats and secure provisions, records the deployment of raiding parties comprising light-armed peltasts and slingers to burn villages, capture livestock, and disrupt enemy concentrations, often advancing ahead of or flanking the main column. Fire signals were systematically used at night to coordinate these operations, illuminate troop positions, and signal retreats or advances, allowing the army to maintain cohesion across difficult passes despite limited visibility and enemy fires on surrounding heights. Further adaptations emerged against the Mossynoecians in spring 400 BCE, whose warriors dwelt in wooden towers and conducted woodland ambushes, again favoring mobility over massed . The responded by prioritizing ranged weapons—slingers, archers, and javelin-throwers—to suppress tree-top attackers and clear forested paths, supplemented by charges with axes and swords when closing distances proved feasible. This tactical shift, driven by the inability to maneuver heavy hoplites in dense, uneven terrain, emphasized skirmishing and opportunistic strikes, enabling the force to traverse hostile coastal territories without sustaining prohibitive losses. These irregular methods proved vital for survival, as organized raids—typically 200-400 men strong, dispatched daily under armed escort—yielded , , and wild fruits sufficient to feed the roughly 8,000 remaining troops amid scorched-earth resistance from locals. Xenophon's counsel to structure such parties methodically, rather than allowing disorganized scavenging, minimized vulnerabilities to counter-raids and ensured logistical resilience, sustaining the army's combat effectiveness over 1,500 kilometers of adversarial march. The success of these innovations underscores a pragmatic compelled by environmental and numerical necessities, where necessity overrode doctrinal adherence to phalanx-centric warfare.

Scholarly Debates

Accuracy of Xenophon's Narrative

Xenophon's Anabasis employs a third-person style, presenting events as observed by an external narrator while introducing the author himself as a participant-character, which lends a veneer of detachment despite evident self-promotion in highlighting his decisions and successes. This approach, akin to , allows to emphasize his strategic acumen without overt first-person , though scholars note it serves to craft a heroic amid the expedition's chaos. Such as a direct participant is evident, yet it is mitigated by the text's emphasis on verifiable logistical and tactical details, which resist wholesale fabrication given their alignment with practical constraints of ancient marching and supply. The geographical precision in the Anabasis—detailing routes, rivers, passes, and settlements—has been corroborated by modern expeditions retracing the Cyrean march, confirming Xenophon's against contemporary surveys of and . For instance, descriptions of key sites like the Carduchian mountains and the ascent to the match archaeological and topographical data, underscoring reliability in spatial reporting over mere recollection. Logistical elements, such as daily march distances (typically 15-20 stadia) and encounters with terrain, further align with feasible military movements, supporting the narrative's core veracity against claims of systematic distortion. Ancient sources provide partial corroboration, with (14.37.1–4) quoting verbatim on battle formations and outcomes, indicating direct reliance rather than independent contradiction. Plutarch's accounts in Artaxerxes similarly align on pivotal events like the and the subsequent retreat, without impugning 's framework. While debates persist over rhetorical embellishments, such as extended speeches attributed to commanders, these are conventional historiographical devices rather than evidence of invented events; the absence of major discrepancies across sources affirms the Anabasis as a fundamentally reliable primary account, tempered only by authorial perspective.

Controversies Over Numbers and Casualties

Historians debate the precise size of the Greek mercenary force under Cyrus the Younger, with Xenophon reporting approximately 10,000 effective combatants—primarily hoplites and peltasts—embarking on the northern retreat after the Battle of Cunaxa on March 5, 401 BC. Diodorus Siculus, relying on Ephorus' account in Book 14, estimates the initial Greek contingent at around 13,000 heavy infantry supplemented by light troops, suggesting Xenophon's figure reflects a post-battle consolidation excluding early deserters and non-combatants. This discrepancy arises from Xenophon's focus on the core force that elected new leaders, while Diodorus aggregates pre-expedition enlistments; logistical studies affirm both scales as feasible given Cyrus' recruitment across Greek city-states and the army's baggage train capacity for grain and supplies over 1,500 miles. Casualty figures remain contentious, particularly regarding attrition versus combat losses, with the force diminishing to roughly 6,000 by the sighting of the on May 12, 400 BC—a 40-50% reduction from the post-Cunaxa baseline. Pitched engagements inflicted minimal Greek deaths, such as fewer than 100 at Cunaxa due to phalanx cohesion overwhelming Persian cavalry flanks, and similar low tolls against Tissaphernes' satraps; higher attrition stemmed from winter marches through , where , , and ambushes claimed hundreds, as detailed in 's episodic reports of specific detachments lost to snowdrifts and raids. Scholarly reconstructions, factoring ancient march rates of 15-20 miles daily and supply foraging, deem this erosion rate realistic for unprovisioned operations in subzero conditions without systematic underreporting, as logs discrete events like the 500 lost in the Centrites River crossing. Skeptical viewpoints, often from analysts minimizing Greek prowess, posit inflated numbers to dramatize the retreat's improbability, arguing the absence of corroborating Achaemenid inscriptions undermines claims of such a formidable incursion. Proponents counter that Persian royal annals, like those at , prioritize victories and omit peripheral threats from satrapy borders, leaving Greek accounts as the primary point alongside incidental references in Hellanicus fragments; no archaeological evidence contradicts the scale, and desertion tallies in align with multi-ethnic cohesion strains under leadership vacuums. This debate underscores source limitations but supports the expedition's documented endurance without evidentiary fabrication.

Legacy

Impact on Perceptions of Persian Vulnerability

The retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa in 401 BC exposed the Persian Empire's core logistical and administrative frailties, as roughly 10,000 Greek hoplites marched over 1,200 miles northward through and , encountering fragmented resistance from satraps unable to muster coordinated imperial forces. Local rulers like and Pharnabazus relied on irregular levies and bribery attempts rather than decisive engagements, revealing the empire's dependence on decentralized satrapies prone to internal rivalries and , which hindered effective control over vast interiors. This empirical demonstration of ungovernability—evident in the Greeks' ability to , negotiate passages, and defeat pursuers piecemeal—contrasted sharply with the centralized projected by Persian kings, underscoring how the empire's expanse amplified vulnerabilities to mobile, self-reliant invaders. The iconic cry of "Thalatta! Thalatta!" ("The Sea! The Sea!") raised by the survivors upon reaching the from Mount Theches in early 400 BC encapsulated this defiance, signifying not mere survival but the psychological rupture in perceptions of Persian dominance; a force stranded deep in the heartland had pierced the empire's facade of impregnability, proving that disciplined infantry could operate autonomously far from supply lines or naval support. This moment, chronicled in Xenophon's account, disseminated awareness among of the Achaemenid realm's interior disarray, shifting elite discourse from deference—rooted in memories of Xerxes' invasions—to pragmatic recognition of exploitable weaknesses, such as inadequate fortifications and unreliable loyalties among provincial elites. As a harbinger of conquest, the Anabasis informed the of subsequent Hellenic ambitions, directly influencing Alexander the Great's 334 BC invasion by validating the viability of penetrating Persian highlands via similar routes and capitalizing on satrapal disunity, as the Macedonians echoed the Ten Thousand's traversals while amplifying them with superior integration. The episode privileged causal factors like Greek phalangite cohesion and adaptive leadership over idealized notions of Persian grandeur, fostering a view that empire's scale bred overextension rather than strength, and that individual agency in free polities outmatched the inertia of autocratic hierarchies.

Cultural and Philosophical Influences

Xenophon's Anabasis reflects influences through its emphasis on ethical leadership and self-control in perilous circumstances, portraying Xenophon himself as embodying virtues Socrates championed, such as rational deliberation and moral resilience. As a direct associate of , Xenophon integrates philosophical inquiry into the narrative, using the mercenaries' trials to illustrate how individual enables collective endurance, distinct from Plato's more abstract dialogues by grounding Socratic principles in real-world exigency. The text explores in adversity as a practical ethic, where leaders foster homonoia (like-mindedness) among fractious troops via persuasive and shared purpose, transforming a demoralized force into a cohesive unit capable of navigating hostile terrain and internal discord. This community-building amid chaos underscores a realism in , balancing with mutual reliance, though analyses note its fragility when cultural affinities wane and prevails. Culturally, Anabasis pioneered the military autobiography, influencing Hellenistic historians like , whose emulates its structure and introspective leadership accounts, and shaping Greek educational curricula for its accessible and exemplars. It embedded themes of pragmatic realism in ethics, defending survival-oriented decisions—such as tactical alliances or resource seizures—as judicious adaptations rather than lapses, a view critiqued by idealists for subordinating honor to utility but affirmed by as essential for ordered liberty in .

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  78. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/xenophon-and-the-athenian-democracy/xenophon-the-democratic-orator/CB57AFFD4EEA6DB329CC78CF7590AA04
  79. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-xenophon/xenophons-influence-in-imperial-greece/A07CD558911CED35A5B342DF63C3F8BA
  80. https://aeon.co/essays/the-ancient-greek-rebel-leader-who-saw-socrates-solo-dancing
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