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Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)
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This article is about a disputed branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and is not to be confused with Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
For a more comprehensive list, see Ukrainian Orthodox Church (disambiguation).
Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Moscow Patriarchate (disputed)
Emblem
ClassificationChristian
OrientationEastern Orthodox
PrimateMetropolitan Onufriy
Bishops114[1] (53 governing)
Clerics12,551 (2022)[1]
Nuns2,727[citation needed]
Parishes8,097 (May 2024)[2]
Monastics4,620 (2022)[3]
Monasteries161 (2022)[3]
LanguageChurch Slavonic, Ukrainian, Russian
LiturgyByzantine Rite
TerritoryUkraine
Origin
Recognition
  • 27 May 2022[a]
  • 24 March 2023[b]
Members6% of the Ukrainian Orthodox population[c]
Official website
Part of a series on the
Eastern Orthodox Church
Christ Pantocrator (Deesis mosaic detail)
Mosaic of Christ Pantocrator, Hagia Sophia
Overview
Background
Organization
Autocephalous jurisdictions
Autocephalous Churches who are officially part of the communion:

Autocephaly recognized by some autocephalous Churches de jure:

Autocephaly and canonicity recognized by Constantinople and 3 other autocephalous Churches:

Spiritual independence recognized by Georgian Orthodox Church:


Autonomous jurisdictions

Semi-Autonomous:

Episcopal assemblies
Noncanonical jurisdictions
Ecumenical councils
  • Other possible ecumenical councils:
  • Other important councils:
History
Theology
Liturgy and worship
Liturgical calendar
  • The four fasting periods:
Major figures
Saints (Russian (until 15th century), Russian (post-15th century), Serbian, American)
Other topics

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC),[d] commonly referred to by the exonym Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP),[e] is an Eastern Orthodox church in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was officially formed in 1990 as the successor to the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as the Ukrainian branch of the ROC.[10][7]

On 27 May 2022, following a church-wide council in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church announced its full independence and autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate. The council made this decision in protest of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and particularly in response to Russian Orthodox Church head Patriarch Kirill's support for the invasion.[4] The UOC (did not and) has never declared full autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church.[11] As of 2025, its leadership is also still published in the ROC's calendar.[12]

Since the Unification Council on 15 December 2018 which formed the separate Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has disputed the claims by the Moscow Patriarchate of its ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the territory of Ukraine.[13][14][15][16]

The Russian Orthodox Church does not currently recognize a change in their relationship to the UOC.[17][6][18] However, in June 2023 ROC hierarch Metropolitan Leonid (Gorbachev) of Klin, scorned the UOC's decision to separate from the Moscow Patriarchate, saying, "When the opportunity presented itself to get out from under the wing of Moscow, they did it," and declared that the ROC would absorb the UOC's dioceses in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine.[19]

On 20 August 2024, the Ukrainian parliament banned the Russian Orthodox Church by adopting the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations". The law gave Ukrainian religious organizations affiliated with the ROC nine months to break off its relations with the Patriarchate of Moscow in accordance with the Canon law of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

Name

[edit]

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church insists on its name being just the Ukrainian Orthodox Church,[20] stating that it is the sole canonical body of Orthodox Christians in the country,[20] a Ukrainian "local church" (Ukrainian: Помісна Церква). The church rejects being labeled "Russian" or "Moscow."[21]

It is also the name that it is registered with the State Committee of Religious Affairs in Ukraine.[22]

It is often referred to as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) or UOC (MP)[23] in order to distinguish between the two rival churches contesting the name of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Following the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, on 20 December 2018, the Ukrainian parliament voted to force the UOC-MP to rename itself in its mandatory state registration, its new name must have "the full name of the church to which it is subordinated".[24][25][26] This was protested by UOC-MP adherents.[27] On 11 December 2019 the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to retain its name.[28] The UOC had argued that their governing center is in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, not in Russia's capital, Moscow, and therefore it should not be renamed.[28]

On 27 December 2022 the Constitutional Court of Ukraine ordered the UOC to change its name and indicate its affiliation with Russia.[2][29] It took into account the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights in the case "Ilin and others against Ukraine" that stated Ukrainian law could force "religious organization, wishing to be registered, to take a name which makes it impossible to mislead the faithful and society as a whole and which makes it possible to distinguish it from existing organizations."[29]

In May 2024 of the 8,097 UOC parishes 22 of them directly indicated their affiliation in their name.[2]

Relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church

[edit]

Prior to the February 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine the church stated that it was one of the "self-governing" churches under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). (In the terminology of the current Statute of the ROC, a "self-governing Church" is distinguished from an "autonomous Church").[30][31][32]

The UOC claims since May 2022 that 'any provisions that at least somehow hinted at or indicated the connection with Moscow were excluded'; since then it is a matter of dispute as to whether the Church is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church.[17] Despite claims that the church did not publish its new statute,[5] the new statute is publicly available on government,[33] news,[34] and official church[35] websites.

The ROC defines the UOC-MP as a "self-governing church with rights of wide autonomy".[30] It has also ignored all UOC-MP's declarations of it not being connected with it anymore and continues to include UOC-MP clerics in various commissions or working groups.[17][6]

According to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Primate of the UOC-MP is the most senior[36] permanent member of the ROC's Holy Synod and thus has a say in its decision-making in respect of the rest of the ROC throughout the world.

Despite the de facto annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, the eparchies of the UOC in Crimea initially continued to be administered by the UOC.[37] In June 2022 the Moscow Patriarchate claimed to transfer Crimea from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Moscow Patriarchate.[38] The UOC continues to list the Crimean eparchies as its own, and has not recognized any change to its territorial boundaries based on decisions taken by the ROC.[39] On 27 March 2023, Archbishop Viktor (Kotsaba) said that the territories of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church include the Crimea and Donbas areas of Ukraine.[40]

On 21 June 2023, Metropolitan Leonid (Gorbachev) of Klin, a hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, decried the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's decision to separate from the Moscow Patriarchate and declared that the Russian Orthodox Church would absorb UOC dioceses in areas of Ukraine occupied by Russia.[19]

In a Patriarchal calendar for 2024 released by the Russian Orthodox Church in December 2023 all the then bishops of the (designated itself as not connected to Russia) UOC were listed as bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church.[18] In response, Archbishop Jonah (Cherepanov) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church said that the UOC does not recognize any of the ROC's attempts to make decisions affecting Ukrainian dioceses.[41] Later, the UOC's official website stated the following: "In order not to become an object of manipulation, everybody wishing to obtain official information about the UOC and its episcopate should refer solely to official sources of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This pertains also to information included in church calendars."[42]

The UOC publicly distended itself from the World Russian People's Council headed and led by ROC head Patriarch Kirill of Moscow of late March 2024.[43] During this Congress a document was approved that stated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a "Holy War."[43] The document also stated that following the war "the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter the zone of Russia's exclusive influence".[43] This was to be done so "The possibility of the existence of a Russophobic political regime hostile to Russia and its people on this territory, as well as a political regime controlled from an external center hostile to Russia, should be completely excluded."[43] The document also made reference to the "triunity of the Russian people" and it claimed that Belarusians and Ukrainians "should be recognised only as sub-ethnic groups of the Russians".[43] The UOC stated on 28 March 2024 that they "dissociates itself from the ideology of the Russian world."[43]

History

[edit]
See also: History of Christianity in Ukraine

Under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople

[edit]

Metropolises in Moscow, Lithuania and Galicia

[edit]

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church considers itself the sole descendant in modern Ukraine of the Metropolis of Kiev and all Rus' that was established in the 10th century following the baptism of Kievan Rus'. Due to the Mongol invasion of Rus' in the 13th century, the metropolitan seat was moved to Vladimir and later to Moscow. In the Kingdom of Galicia and Volhynia to the south-west, a separate metropolis was erected - the Metropolis of Halych. Similarly, in the north-west, another metropolis was erected at the behest of Algirdas, the Grand Duke of Lithuania - the Metropolis of Lithuania.

Revival

[edit]

In 1596, the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galich and all Rus' Michael Rohoza accepted the Union of Brest transforming dioceses of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople into the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church under the Holy See's jurisdiction. In 1620, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople Cyril Lucaris reestablished Orthodox dioceses for the Orthodox population of what was then the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth — under the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia, and all Russia Job Boretsky as the Patriarchal Exarch.

Merger into the Moscow Patriarchate

[edit]
Main article: Metropolis of Kiev (Patriarchate of Moscow)

Following the transfer of the Cossack Hetmanate under the sovereignty of the Tsardom of Russia in 1654, the Kyivan metropolis in 1686[44][45] was transferred by the Patriarch Dionysius IV under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, following the election of Gedeon Svyatopolk-Chetvertynsky as the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia, and all Russia with the help of the Hetman of Zaporizhian Host Ivan Samoylovych. In late 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople indicated that information about that it transferred jurisdiction over Ukraine to the Moscow Patriarchate was inaccurate as Constantinople temporarily provided Moscow with stewardship over the Ukrainian church.[46] The Russian Orthodox Church immediately rejected that statement and called for further discussion and revision of historical archives.[47]

Soon, Gedeon gradually lost control of the dioceses which had been under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of Kyiv. In January 1688, Gedeon's title was changed by Moscow to the ″Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galich, and Little Russia″. Gedeon's successors were effectively mere diocesan bishops under the Moscow Patriarchate and later Russia's Most Holy Synod.

Before the Battle of Poltava, when Ivan Mazepa sided with Carl XII, the new Metropolitan Ioasaf along with bishops of Chernigov and Pereyaslav was summoned by Peter the Great to Hlukhiv where they were ordered to declare an anathema onto Mazepa. After the battle of Poltava, in 1709 Metropolitan Ioasaf was exiled to Tver and in 1710 a church censorship was introduced to the Kyiv metropolia. In 1718 Metropolitan Ioasaf was arrested and dispatched to Saint Petersburg for interrogation where he died.

From 1718 to 1722, the Metropolitan See in Kyiv was vacant and ruled by the Kyiv Spiritual Consistory (under the authority of the Most Holy Synod); in 1722 it was occupied by Archbishop Varlaam.

Synodal period

[edit]

In 1730, Archbishop Varlaam with all members of the Kyiv Spiritual Consistory were put on trial by the Privy Chancellery. After being convicted, Varlaam as a simple monk was exiled to the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery in Vologda region where he served a sentence of imprisonment of 10 years. After the death of the Russian Empress Anna in 1740, Varlaam was allowed to return and recovered all his Archiereus titles. He however refused to accept back those titles and, after asked to be left in peace, moved to the Tikhvin Assumption Monastery. In 1750 Varlaam accepted the Great Schema under the name of Vasili and soon died in 1751.

In 1743, the title of Metropolitan was re-instated for Archbishop Raphael Zaborovsky.

On 2 April 1767, the Empress of Russia Catherine the Great issued an edict stripping the title of the Kyivan Metropolitan of the style "and all Little Russia".[48]

Fall of monarchy in Russia and Exarchate

[edit]
See also: Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
Participants of the 1917 Local Council. Metropolitan Antony Khrapovitsky is to the right of Patriarch Tikhon.

Metropolitan Vladimir Bogoyavlensky chaired the All-Ukrainian Church Council that took a break between its sessions on 18 January 1918 and was to be resumed in May 1918. On 23–24 January 1918, the Red Guards of Reingold Berzin occupied Kyiv (see Ukrainian–Soviet War). In the evening of 25 January 1918, Metropolitan Vladimir was found dead between walls of the Old Pechersk Fortress beyond the Gates of All Saints, having been killed by unknown people.

In May 1918, the Metropolitan of Kyiv and Galich Antony Khrapovitsky was appointed to the Kyiv eparchy, a former candidate to become the Patriarch of Moscow at the Russian Local Council of 1917 and losing it to the Patriarch Tikhon. In July 1918 Metropolitan Antony became the head of the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Eventually he sided with the Russian White movement supporting the forces of Anton Denikin's of South Russian entity, while keeping the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych. After the defeat of the Whites and the exile of Antony, in 1919-21 the metropolitan seat was temporarily held by the bishop of Cherkasy Nazariy (also the native of Kazan). After the arrest of Nazariy by the Soviet authorities in 1921, the seat was provisionally held by the bishop of Grodno and newly elected Exarch of Ukraine Mikhail, a member of the Russian Black Hundreds nationalistic movement. After his arrest in 1923, the Kyiv eparchy was provisionally headed by various bishops of neighboring eparchies until 1927. After his return in 1927 Mikhail became the Metropolitan of Kyiv and Exarch of Ukraine until his death in 1929.

In 1945, after the integration of Zakarpattia Oblast into the USSR, eastern parts of the Eparchy of Mukačevo and Prešov were transferred from the supreme jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the jurisdiction of the Exarchate of Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and a new Eparchy of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod was formed.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union and self rule

[edit]
Map showing the percentage of religious organizations that were UOC-MP affiliated by oblast of Ukraine, 2006

On 28 October 1990,[49] the Moscow Patriarchate granted the Ukrainian Exarchate a status of a self–governing church under the jurisdiction of the ROC (but not the full autonomy as is understood in the ROC legal terminology). However, the Ukrainian branch remained crucial to the Moscow Patriarchate, because of historical and traditional roots in Kyiv and Ukraine, and because nearly a third of the Moscow Patriarchate's 36,000 congregations were in Ukraine.[50]

Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan), who succeeded Filaret (Denysenko), was enthroned in 1992 as the Primate of the UOC under the title Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, with the official residency in the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, which also houses all of the Church's administration.

The UOC-MP, prior to 2019, was believed to be the largest religious body in Ukraine with the greatest number of parish churches and communities counting up to half of the total in Ukraine and totaling over 10,000. The UOC also claimed to have up to 75 percent of the Ukrainian population.[51] Independent surveys showed significant variance. According to Stratfor, in 2008, more than 50 percent of Ukrainian population belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarch.[52] Razumkov Centre survey results, however, tended to show greater adherence to the rival Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate.[53]

Many Orthodox Ukrainians do not clearly identify with a particular Orthodox jurisdiction and, sometimes, are even unaware of the affiliation of the parish they attend as well as of the controversy itself, which indicates the difficulty of using survey numbers as an indicator of a relative strength of the church. Additionally, the geographical factor plays a major role in the number of adherents, as the Ukrainian population tends to be more churchgoing in the western part of the country rather than in the UOC-MP's heartland in southern and eastern Ukraine. Politically, many in Ukraine see the UOC-MP as merely a puppet of the ROC and consequently a geopolitical tool of Russia, which have stridently opposed the consolidation and recognition of the independent OCU.[54]

Russo-Ukrainian War and changing allegiances of parishes

[edit]
See also: 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism and Russo-Ukrainian War

Since 2014, the church has come under attack for perceived anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian actions by its clergymen.[55]

In spring 2014, Ukraine lost control over Crimea, which was unilaterally annexed by Russia in March 2014.[56][57][f] The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) Metropolitan of Feodosia and Kerch Platon Udovenko, and other Ukrainian Orthodox Church priests, blessed Russian weapons and met with representatives of (the then formed Russian administrative unit) Republic of Crimea.[59] Notwithstanding this Russian annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) kept control of its eparchies in Crimea until June 2022.[37][38]

Continuing during the spring of 2014 in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian protests escalated into an armed separatist insurgency. Early in April 2014, masked gunmen took control of several of the region's government buildings and towns.[56][60] This action led to the creation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic.[56][61] This further resulted in an armed conflict between Russian Separatist forces in Donbas and the Ukrainian Army.[62] Instances were recorded of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) clergymen supporting the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic.[10][59] On 14 September 2015, the church urged the pro-Russian separatists to lay down their arms and take advantage of the amnesty promised to them in the Minsk II agreement.[63]

From 2014 until 2018 around 60 Moscow Patriarchate parishes switched to the Kyivan Patriarchate in transfers the leadership. The Moscow patriarchate says these changes were illegal.[64] According to the Razumkov Center, among the 27.8 million Ukrainian members of Orthodox churches, allegiance to the Kyiv Patriarchate grew from 12 percent in 2000, to 25 percent in 2016—and much of the growth came from believers who previously did not associate with either patriarchate.[65] In April 2018, the Moscow patriarchate had 12,300 parishes and the Kyivan Patriarchate 5,100 parishes.[64]

In 2017, Ukraine passed laws which the Moscow Patriarchate interpreted as discriminatory.[66]

Greater autonomy from the ROC

[edit]

From 29 November to 2 December 2017, the Russian Orthodox Church Bishops’ Council met to consider the matter of autonomy to the UOC-MP. The members decided to write a separate chapter of the ROC Statute to confirm the status of UOC-MP which contained the following provisions:

  1. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is granted independence and self-governance according to the Resolution of the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church which took place on 25–27 October 1990.
  2. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is an independent and self-governed Church with broad autonomy rights.
  3. In her life and work the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is guided by the Resolution of the 1990 Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the 1990 Deed of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Statute on the governance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[67]
Metropolitan Onufriy Berezovsky in Kyiv, 8 May 2016

In December 2017, the Security Service of Ukraine published classified documents revealing that the NKGB of the USSR and its units in the Union and autonomous republics, territories and regions were engaged in the selection of candidates for participation in the 1945 council that elected Patriarch Alexy I of Moscow from the representatives of the clergy and the laity. This included "persons who have religious authority among the clergy and believers, and at the same time checked for civic or patriotic work". A letter sent in September 1944 and signed by the head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fedotov and the head of the Fifth Division 2nd Directorate of Karpov stated that "it is important to ensure that the number of nominated candidates is dominated by the agents of the NKGB, capable of holding the line that we need at the Council."[68][69]

On 13 December 2018 a priest of the church, Volodymyr Maretsky, was sentenced in absentia to 6 years of imprisonment for hindering the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014 during the Russo-Ukrainian War.[70] In November–December 2018, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) carries out raids across the country targeting the UOC churches and priests.[71][72][73]

In the week following the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on 15 December 2018, several parishes announced they would leave the UOC (MP) and join the new church.[74]

On 20 December 2018, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's national parliament) passed a legislation to change the UOC's registered name. Ukrainian deputy Oleksandr Bryhynets [uk] described the law as stipulating if "the state is recognized as the aggressor state, the church whose administration is based in the aggressor state must have in its title the full name of the church to which it is subordinate". The law also gave such a church "no right to be represented in military units on the front line".[24] The Russian Orthodox Church is based in Russia, which is considered by Ukraine as an aggressor state following the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. The UOC was part of the Russian church at that time, but considered to be a "self-governing church with rights of wide autonomy",[30] thus, the UOC argued that its governing center was in Kyiv and it could not be legally renamed on the basis of this law.[28] On 11 December 2019 the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to retain its name.[28]

The January 2019 establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) by Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, joined two other churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), along with two bishops who formerly belonged to the UOC-MP.[50] The remaining UOC-MP hierarchy continued to dismiss Patriarch Bartholomew's actions in Ukraine and remained loyal to the UOC-MP, while the church retained the vast majority of its parishes. A May 2019 report by the European Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Moscow Patriarchate claimed 11,000 churches in Ukraine, while the new OCU claimed 7,000.[50]

Russian invasion of Ukraine

[edit]
See also: Religion and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Church of the Ascension of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Lukianivka destroyed by Russian troops during Russia's failed Kyiv offensive of February – April 2022[75][76][77]

On 24 February 2022, Metropolitan Onufriy stated that the large scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on that day was "a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his own brother out of envy. Such a war has no justification either from God or from people."[78] In April 2022, after the Russian invasion, some UOC parishes signaled their intention to switch allegiance to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The attitude and stance of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow to the war is one of the oft quoted reasons.[79] (At the time the UOC and the other Orthodox churches stated that the church known as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) was one of the "self-governing" churches under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).[30])

St. George's church of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Sviatohirsk Lavra monastery complex after Russian shelling on 12 May 2022

On 12 May 2022, the synod of the UOC met for the first time since the start of the war and issued a statement of support for Ukraine's armed forces, while condemning the Russian invasion.[80] Some critics claim that the church collaborates with Russian clergymen and that the church turns a blind eye towards these collaborators.[81] The same day the church issued another statement in which it insinuated that "the religious policy during the presidency of P.O. Poroshenko and the destructive ideology of the so-called Orthodox Church of Ukraine" had led to the 24 February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[82]

On 27 May 2022 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church held a synod and the same day released a declaration in which it stated "it had adopted relevant additions and changes to the Statute on the Administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which testify to the complete autonomy and independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."[4][83][84][85] An official request for autocephaly (an autocephalous church does not report to any higher-ranking bishop) was not made; the consent of Russian Orthodox Church (for independence) was not sought; neither was sought the approval of (the) other Orthodox churches.[17] The church did not publish its new constitution.[5] In an announcement on Telegram, Archpriest Nikolai Danilevich (head of the UOC's Department of External Church Relations) stated: "The UOC disassociated itself from the Moscow Patriarchate and confirmed its independent status, and made appropriate changes to its statutes.[86] All references to the connection of the UOC with the Russian Orthodox Church have been removed from the statutes. In fact, in its content, the UOC statutes are now those of an autocephalous Church."[83][87] In its 27 May 2022 declaration the church first (point was to) condemned the war, its secondly called on both Ukraine and the Russian Federation to continue the peace negotiations "for a strong and reasonable dialogue that could stop the bloodshed" and it thirdly stated it disagreed with "the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia regarding the war in Ukraine".[4][83] In the statement it also expressed its disagreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly in January 2019 to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and it asked for end of the "forcible seizure of churches and the forced transfer of parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."[4][83] Prior to 27 May 2022, more than 400 parishes had left the Moscow Patriarchate as a consequence of the invasion.[88]

On 27 May 2022 the church also decided to open foreign parishes.[4] By April 2023 it had established more than 40 parishes in 15 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Hungary, France, Switzerland, Sweden).[89]

On 29 May 2022, Metropolitan Onufriy did not mention Patriarch Kirill during the liturgy as someone who had authority over him (like before), instead he commemorated all heads of churches, similar to primatial divine liturgies. Onufriy also did not commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria, Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens (Greece), and Archbishop Chrysostomos II of Cyprus - indicating that communion is still interrupted between them.[90][85] Despite the removal of direct mentions of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Charter of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II the statute refers to declares the canonical dependence on the ROC. According to a Ukrainian theologian Oleksandr Sahan [uk], the church have done these changes in order to avoid renaming in accordance with the Ukrainian law.[91]

In June 2022 the Moscow Patriarchate decided to re-transfer Crimea from the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate by creating the Metropolitanate of Crimea.[38] Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had kept control of its eparchies in Crimea.[37][38] The UOC continues to list the Crimean eparchies and has not recognized any change to its territorial boundaries based on decisions taken by the ROC.[39] On 27 March 2023, Archbishop Viktor (Kotsaba) said that the territories of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church include the Crimea and Donbas areas of Ukraine.[40]

On 30 June 2022 the Lviv City Council decided to ban the Moscow Patriarchate on the territory of Lviv.[92]

During the Russian occupation of Kharkiv Oblast Metropolitan of Izium and Kupiansk Elisey blessed Russian appointed Governor Vitaly Ganchev.[93] During the Russian occupation of Sumy Oblast Metropolitan of Romny Iosif requested that his Metropolitanate would be under direct subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church.[93] All Luhansk Oblast bishops of the UOC were present at a meeting with the leader of the (a part of Ukraine declared independent by pro-Russian forces in 2014) Luhansk People's Republic, Leonid Pasechnik, in the summer of 2022.[94] Metropolitan Panteleymon of Luhansk and Alchevsk was present during the annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts ceremony in Moscow, Russia, on 30 September 2022.[94] Metropolitan Ilarion of Donetsk and Metropolitan Lazar of Crimea had received invitations to this ceremony, but declined to go.[94] Metropolitan Panteleymon refused the possibility that his Metropolitanate would be under direct subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church and he himself does not have Russian citizenship.[94] Metropolitan Onufriy did not publicly condemn collaborating UOC clergymen, and they were not dismissed from the church.[10][94][95][96][93] Metropolitan Onufriy did ban from the church UOC clergymen that transferred themself to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).[97][98] Following the liberation of Romny on 4 April 2022 Metropolitan Iosif is believed to have fled to Russia, and he was replaced by Metropolitan Roman on 19 October 2022.[99] After in the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive Ukraine recaptured Izium (on 10 September 2022) Metropolitan Elisey also went fugitive and he was replaced also.[99][g]

By early November 2022 the Security Service of Ukraine had exposed 33 alleged "agents" and alleged unofficial artillery observers among the UOC priests and clergy.[101] It had opened 23 criminal proceedings.[101] This was part of a series of searches conducted by Ukrainian law enforcement at premises of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, over 350 church buildings and 850 persons were investigated.[102][103] In 2022 in total 52 criminal cases involving 55 UOC clergymen, including 14 bishops, were opened.[102] 17 UOC clergymen were sanctioned by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.[104] They were accused of proposing that the dioceses they lead join the Russian Orthodox Church; agreeing to cooperate with the occupation authorities; promoting pro-Russian narratives; and justifying Russia's military aggression in Ukraine.[104]

On 2 December 2022 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy entered a bill to the Verkhovna Rada that would officially ban all activities of the UOC in Ukraine.[105] On the same day, the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery was claimed to be extrajudicially transferred from the UOC to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU),[106] but the UOC refuted this.[107]

On 14 December 2022 Ukraine handed over a UOC priest to Russia in a prisoner exchange.[108] The priest had been sentenced for treason in Ukraine.[108][h]

On 27 December 2022 the Constitutional Court of Ukraine recognized as in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine the 20 December 2018 law to change the UOC-MP's registered name to indicate affiliation with Russia.[29] The court also upheld the law that restricted access to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations of Ukraine to clergy from a church "from outside Ukraine" "which carried out military aggression against Ukraine."[29]

Although the UOC-MP in a press conference on 31 December 2022 again stated that ‘any provisions that at least somehow hinted at or indicated the connection with Moscow were excluded’, the Russian Orthodox Church ignored this and continued to include UOC-MP clerics in various commissions or working groups despite these individuals not agreeing to this.[6] For instances: late December 2022 UOC-MP Archpriest Volodymyr Savelyev was against his knowing included in the ROC Publishing Council for the period 2023–2026, after finding this out he demanded to be expelled from the council (while simultaneously condemning "the aggressive war waged by Russia against my homeland — Ukraine").[6]

In January 2023 13 representatives of the UOC-MP were deprived of their Ukrainian citizenship, including two metropolitans.[110] In February 2023 five UOC-MP (either) metropolitans, archbishops and bishops were deprived of their Ukrainian citizenship (Metropolitan Feodosiy Platon was banned from entering Ukraine).[110]

The religious buildings and other property of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Cultural Reserve [uk] (although state property) have been used for decades by the UOC-MP free of charge.[111] On 10 March 2023, the Reserve announced that the 2013 agreement on the free use of churches by the religious organisation would be terminated (on the grounds that the church had violated their lease by making alterations to the historic site, and other technical infractions[112]) and the UOC-MP was ordered to leave the territory by 29 March.[111] The UOC-MP answered back that there were no legal grounds for the eviction and called it "a whim of officials from the Ministry of Culture."[111] On 17 March 2023 the press secretary for Russian President Vladimir Putin Dmitry Peskov stated that the decision of the Ukrainian authorities not to extend this lease to representatives of the UOC-MP "confirms the correctness" of the (24 February 2022) Russian invasion of Ukraine.[111] The UOC-MP did not fully leave Kyiv Pechersk Lavra following 29 March 2023.[113][95]

On 7 April 2023 Ukrainska Pravda reported that their research had uncovered that several high ranking UOC-MP clergymen, including Metropolitan Onufriy, had obtained a Russian passport.[114] The UOC-MP denied that its clergymen and its leader, Metropolitan Onufrii, had Russian citizenship.[115] Metropolitan Onufriy did not deny he used to have it, but claimed he had obtained a Russian passport to fulfill his desire of living out his last days in the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, but that he did not have this ambition anymore.[116]

On 10 April 2023 the Rivne Oblast Council voted to ban the activities of the UOC in Rivne Oblast.[92] The following day the Volyn Oblast Council banned the activities of the church in Volyn Oblast.[92]

On 10 April 2023 registration data analyser company Opendatabot [uk] stated that 277 parishes had left the Moscow Patriarchate since the February 2022 Russian invasion, of those 227 parishes 63 had done so in (the first three months of) 2023.[117] Opendatabot concluded that on 10 April 2023, 8,505 churches were subordinate to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.[117]

Saint Michael church (1906) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Komyshuvakha after Russian shelling in the Easter night, 16 April 2023.[118] Visible is the icon of Saint Matrona of Moscow.

On 13 April 2023, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church consecrated Holy Chrism in Kyiv, for the first time in 110 years.[119]

On 27 April 2023 the Zhytomyr Oblast Council voted to ban the activities of the church in Zhytomyr Oblast.[120]

On 28 April 2023 the Vinnytsia Oblast Council terminated all land lease contracts of the church in Vinnytsia Oblast.[121]

On 3 May 2024 Opendatabot concluded that 8,097 churches were subordinate to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.[2]

On 25 June 2024 Ukraine handed over a UOC priest to Russia in a prisoner exchange.[122] The priest had been sentenced to 5 years in prison "for justifying Russian armed aggression."[122] On 26 June 2024 this priest, Metropolitan Ionafan, was met by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow who awarded Ionafan with the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh [wikidata], first class.[122]

Outlawing of "religious organizations to operate under the control of a state that carries out aggression against Ukraine"

[edit]
See also: Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations"

On 20 August 2024, the Verkhovna Rada (the national parliament of Ukraine) adopted the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations",[123][124] introducing the possibility of banning Ukrainian religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church nine months from the moment the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience [uk] issues the order, if this religious organization does not sever relations with the Russian Orthodox Church in accordance with Orthodox canon law.[125][126][127][128] On 24 August 2024, Independence Day of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the law.[129] The same day law was also published in Holos Ukrainy, the law came into force on the day following this publication.[129]

On 2 July 2025 the Ukrainian citizenship of (head of the church) Metropolitan Onufriy was terminated by a decree of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.[130] (Among the accusation that he had obtained Russian citizenship, which he admitted to[131]) the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) accused Onufriy of maintaining ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, "whose representatives openly support Russian aggression against Ukraine", and had deliberately opposed obtaining canonical independence from this church.[130] The SBU also concluded that, "despite the full-scale invasion of Russia", Onufriy continued to support the policy of the Russian Orthodox Church and its leadership, in particular Patriarch Kirill of Moscow.[130]

Administrative divisions

[edit]
Further information: Eparchies and Metropolitanates of the Russian Orthodox Church § Ukraine
Eparchies of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in 2011

In October 2014 the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine was subdivided into 53 eparchies (dioceses) led by bishops. Also there were 25 vicars (suffragan bishops).

In 2008 the Church had 42 eparchies, with 58 bishops (eparchial - 42; vicar - 12; retired - 4; with them being classified as: metropolitans - 10; archbishops - 21; or bishops - 26). There were also 8,516 priests, and 443 deacons.[132] Technically each Orthodox parish is an individual legal entity.[10]

Notwithstanding the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) kept control of its eparchies in Crimea until June 2022.[37][38] In January 2019 the head of the Information and Educational Department of the UOC-MP, Archbishop Clement, stated that "from the point of view of the church canon and the church system, Crimea is Ukrainian territory."[133]

In June 2022 the Moscow Patriarchate decided to re-transfer Crimea from the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.[38] They did this by creating the Metropolitanate of Crimea.[38] The UOC continues to list the Crimean eparchies and has not recognized any change to its territorial boundaries based on decisions taken by the ROC.[39] On 27 March 2023, Archbishop Viktor (Kotsaba) said that the territories of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church include the Crimea and Donbas areas of Ukraine.[40]

Following the February 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine the church opened more than 40 parishes in 15 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Hungary, France, Switzerland, Sweden).[4][89]

List of Primates

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Metropolitan Gedeon
Metropolitan Varlaam
Metropolitan Joasaph
Archbishop Varlaam
Metropolitan Raphael
Metropolitan Timothy
Metropolitan Arseniy
Metropolitan Antony
Metropolitan Michael
Metropolitan Constantine
Metropolitan Nicholas
Metropolitan Alexis
Metropolitan John
Metropolitan Ioasaph
Metropolitan Onuphrius
See also: List of Metropolitans and Patriarchs of Kyiv

Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galich, and all Little Russia

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  • Metropolitan Gedeon Svyatopolk-Chetvertynsky 1685–1690, the first Metropolitan of Kyiv of the Russian Orthodox Church, until 1688 was titled as the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Galicia, and all Ruthenia
  • Metropolitan Varlaam 1690–1707
  • Metropolitan Ioasaph 1707–1718
  • none 1718–1722
  • Archbishop Varlaam 1722–1730
  • Metropolitan Raphael 1731–1747, until 1743 as Archbishop
  • Metropolitan Timothy 1748–1757
  • Metropolitan Arseniy 1757–1770, in 1767 Metropolitan Arseniy became Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych

Note: in 1770 the office's jurisdiction was reduced to a diocese's administration as Metropolitan of Kyiv and Galicia. The autonomy was liquidated and the church was merged to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Exarch of Ukraine

[edit]

Due to emigration of Metropolitan Antony in 1919, until World War II Kyiv eparchy was often administered by provisional bishops. Also because of political situation in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church introduced a new title in its history as the Exarch of Ukraine that until 1941 was not necessary associated with the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych.

  • Metropolitan Mikhail (Yermakov) 1921–1929 (Bishop of Grodno and Brest, 1905–1921; Archbishop of Tobolsk, 1925; and Metropolitan of Kyiv, 1927–1929)
  • Metropolitan Konstantin (Dyakov) 1929–1937 (Metropolitan of Kharkiv and Okhtyrka, 1927–1934 and Metropolitan of Kyiv 1934–1937)
  • none 1937–1941, exarch was not appointed

Metropolitan of Volyn and Lutsk, Exarch of West Ukraine and Belarus

[edit]
Further information: Territories of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union

On canonical territory of the Polish Orthodox Church of the recently annexed territories of western Ukraine and western Belarus

Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych, Exarch of Ukraine

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Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine

[edit]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)

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The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) is a self-governing church canonically subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, operating primarily in Ukraine with administrative autonomy granted by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1990 amid the Soviet Union's dissolution and Ukraine's push for independence. Led by Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky) of Kyiv and All Ukraine since his election in 2014, the church maintains doctrinal fidelity to Eastern Orthodoxy while navigating Ukraine's post-Soviet religious landscape. As of early 2024, it encompasses approximately 10,500 parishes and communities, positioning it as a major religious institution despite ongoing transitions of some congregations to rival bodies. The UOC-MP traces its spiritual lineage to the baptism of Kyivan Rus' in 988, preserving ancient liturgical traditions, monastic centers like the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and a vast network of clergy serving millions of faithful, though empirical assessments of its statutes reveal persistent canonical dependencies on Moscow that undermine claims of full operational independence. Since Russia's 2022 invasion, the church has encountered heightened scrutiny, including state-mandated reviews confirming structural ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and legislative pressures to sever them, amid allegations of individual clergy involvement in pro-Russian activities—claims the institution broadly denies while affirming prayers for Ukraine's defense and civilian welfare.

Name and Terminology

Official Designations and Historical Names

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), known in Ukrainian as Ukrayins'ka Pravoslavna Tserkva (Украї́нська правосла́вна церква), is the church's self-adopted official designation, reflecting its status as a self-governing entity with wide granted by the (ROC) on October 28, 1990. This title omits any explicit reference to the , which the UOC has consistently rejected as an externally imposed exonym implying direct subordination, despite its widespread use in media and academic contexts to distinguish it from other Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions. Prior to 1990, the body operated under the canonical framework of the ROC as the Exarchate of Ukraine (or Exarchate), a territorial administration established in October 1943 and formalized in 1945 following the restoration of the after . Historically, the UOC's jurisdictional roots trace to the Metropolis of Kyiv and , transferred from the to the ROC in 1686 via a synodal letter, though this act's validity has been contested in canonical disputes. During the early Soviet era (1917–1943), the church structure fragmented amid anti-religious campaigns, with surviving elements reorganized under ROC oversight as the Temporary Church Administration for in 1941 before the exarchate's creation. In its 1990 autonomy statute, ratified by the ROC , the UOC retained doctrinal and liturgical alignment with while gaining administrative independence in , a status reaffirmed in its governing documents until a May 27, 2022, council severed remaining administrative ties to the ROC amid geopolitical tensions, without altering the core self-designation. This evolution underscores the UOC's emphasis on ecclesiastical autonomy over explicit hierarchical nomenclature, distinguishing it from pre-1990 exarchal titles that denoted direct ROC oversight.

Distinction from Other Ukrainian Orthodox Bodies

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), commonly abbreviated as UOC-MP, differs from other Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions primarily in its canonical subordination to the (ROC), headquartered in , despite possessing self-governing status granted by the ROC in 1990. This autonomy allows the UOC-MP to manage internal affairs, elect its (Metropolitan since 2014), and conduct services in Ukrainian, but ultimate authority rests with the Moscow Patriarchate, including appeals to the ROC and adherence to Moscow's doctrinal oversight. In contrast, the (OCU), established in 2018 through the unification of the (UOC-KP) and the (UAOC) with dissident UOC-MP parishes, received a tomos of autocephaly from the on January 6, 2019, granting it full independence without subordination to any external patriarchate. Canonical recognition further delineates the bodies: the UOC-MP retains communion with the ROC and aligned churches such as the Serbian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches, which view the OCU as schismatic due to Moscow's 2018 severance of ties with over the . Conversely, the OCU enjoys recognition from , the Churches of , , and , among others, totaling at least seven autocephalous churches by 2023, though this remains contested amid broader Orthodox schisms. The UOC-MP's declared "independence" from the ROC on May 27, 2022, citing the Russian invasion, but this lacked formal or mutual recognition, leaving ties intact in practice, including shared liturgical texts and historical episcopal lineages. In terms of scale and demographics, the UOC-MP historically commanded the largest network, with approximately 12,000 parishes and 8,000 priests as of 2022, concentrated in eastern and , though over 1,000 parishes transitioned to the OCU by mid-2023 amid concerns and de-Russification efforts. The OCU, starting smaller with around 7,000 parishes post-2018, has grown through transitions but represents a newer entity focused on Ukrainian national identity, often incorporating elements from the pre-2018 UAOC, which traced its autocephaly to a 1921 declaration during Ukraine's brief but lacked broad recognition until the 2019 tomos. Doctrinally, both adhere to without substantive liturgical variances, but the UOC-MP emphasizes continuity with Russian imperial traditions, while the OCU prioritizes vernacular Ukrainian practices and distances itself from Moscow's geopolitical influence.

Canonical and Jurisdictional Status

Relationship to the

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the (UOC-MP) was established on October 27, 1990, when the of the (ROC) granted self-governing status with broad to the former Ukrainian Exarchate of the ROC, allowing it to elect its own (the Metropolitan of and All ) and manage internal administrative, financial, and educational affairs independently. However, this did not confer full ; the UOC-MP remained canonically subordinate to the , with its commemorating the ROC's of and All Rus' in the , key doctrinal decisions requiring ROC approval, and the UOC-MP's statutes explicitly referencing subordination to the ROC's charter and . This jurisdictional tie positioned the UOC-MP as an integral part of the ROC's structure, distinct from fully independent Orthodox churches, with the ROC retaining ultimate authority over matters, inter-Orthodox relations, and the appointment or recognition of bishops in disputed cases. The relationship mirrored other autonomous entities within the ROC, such as the Japanese or Chinese Orthodox Churches, where local governance coexists with Moscow's oversight, reflecting the ROC's expansive territory claims encompassing as historically Russian spiritual domain. Tensions escalated after the ROC's 2018 schism with the Ecumenical Patriarchate over the latter's granting of to the (OCU), prompting the UOC-MP to align with Moscow's rejection of the OCU as uncanonical. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, the UOC-MP's issued statements condemning the war as fratricidal and, on May 27, 2022, voted to cease liturgical commemoration of Patriarch Kirill, approve an independent statute, and declare administrative independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, framing it as a break from political influence rather than a full ecclesial . Despite this, the 2022 declaration has not achieved canonical separation, as the ROC rejected it as invalid without mutual consent, maintaining that UOC-MP clergy and structures remain under its and in eucharistic communion, while UOC-MP statutes continue to bind it to ROC norms on matters like ordinations and disputes. Ukrainian governmental expert analyses in 2023–2025 confirmed ongoing subordination, citing provisions requiring alignment with Moscow's decisions and the absence of protocols, leading to a , 2024, law banning religious organizations tied to , with the UOC-MP facing potential dissolution unless it fully severs links—a process complicated by disputed liturgical practices and loyalties. As of October 2025, the relationship persists in a liminal state: administratively distanced by but canonically contested, with no recognition of UOC-MP by the ROC or broader Orthodox consensus beyond .

Autonomy Declarations and Canonical Disputes

In October 1990, the elevated the Ukrainian Exarchate to the status of a self-governing church with broad , formalized by a decision of the ROC Holy Synod on October 28, allowing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to manage its internal affairs independently while remaining in canonical dependence on the Patriarchate for doctrinal and hierarchical matters. This arrangement, rooted in the ROC Bishops' Council resolutions of early 1990, granted administrative self-rule—such as electing its own and —but required 's approval for episcopal ordinations and major acts, preserving the ROC's jurisdictional oversight over as its historical "canonical territory." Tensions over this limited autonomy intensified after Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and Russia's annexation of Crimea, prompting calls within the UOC for fuller separation amid perceptions of Moscow's political influence. On May 27, 2022, during Russia's full-scale invasion, the UOC's Local Council in Kyiv adopted a declaration affirming "complete self-sufficiency and independence" from the ROC, prohibiting the commemoration of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in liturgies, removing references to Moscow's jurisdiction in statutes, and expressing aspirations for full canonical independence. UOC Metropolitan Onufriy Berezovsky, the primate, stated that post-2022, the church was "no longer part" of the Moscow Patriarchate, emphasizing administrative severance while initially avoiding a formal Eucharistic break. However, the ROC rejected this as insufficient for independence, with Patriarch Kirill and Russian officials asserting continued canonical subordination and vowing not to abandon the "canonical" UOC, viewing Ukraine as integral to Moscow's territory under 1686 historical precedents. Canonical disputes escalated with the 2018-2019 granted by the to the (OCU), which merged prior non-canonical groups and drew clergy from the UOC; the UOC denounced this as invalid, citing Constantinople's encroachment on Moscow's , leading the ROC to break Eucharistic communion with in October 2018. The UOC maintains the OCU's lacks legitimacy due to inclusion of schismatics without repentance, refusing recognition and labeling it a "pseudo-church," while the OCU counters that the UOC remains a ROC lacking true . As of 2025, the UOC's post-2022 status remains contested: Ukrainian investigations revealed ongoing structural ties to via documents and finances, despite statutory changes, prompting Ukraine's August 2024 law banning ROC-affiliated entities unless ties are fully severed by court verification, which the UOC contests as infringing religious freedom. Other Orthodox churches, aligned with either or , withhold recognition of the UOC's claims, perpetuating jurisdictional limbo without a unifying .

Recognition by Other Orthodox Churches

Prior to the 2019 establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) was recognized by all 14 autocephalous Orthodox churches as the sole canonical Orthodox jurisdiction in Ukraine, a status rooted in its historical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church following the 1686 transfer of the Kyiv Metropolis. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's granting of autocephaly to the OCU on January 6, 2019, prompted a schism, with only four autocephalous churches subsequently recognizing the OCU: the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Patriarchate of Alexandria (October 8, 2019), the Church of Cyprus (November 24, 2019), and the Church of Greece (October 12, 2019). The remaining churches—Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Georgian, Romanian, Antiochian, Jerusalem, Polish, Albanian, and Czech Lands and Slovakia—have withheld recognition from the OCU, maintaining the UOC-MP's canonical standing as the legitimate local church, often citing violations of canonical norms in the OCU's formation, such as the reinstatement of schismatic clergy without repentance. On May 27, 2022, a UOC-MP in declared full administrative and canonical from the Patriarchate, severing liturgical commemorations of the Russian patriarch and amending statutes to eliminate 's oversight. However, the rejected this as unilateral and invalid, asserting continued jurisdictional ties evidenced by ongoing use of -approved statutes, , and episcopal appointments. No other autocephalous churches have issued formal recognitions of this or revised their prior stance on the UOC-MP's canonicity, leaving its post-2022 status disputed but unchanged in the eyes of the non-OCU-recognizing majority, who prioritize pre-schism canonical order over Ukraine's domestic declarations. This inertia reflects broader Orthodox deference to established hierarchies amid geopolitical tensions, with churches like the Serbian and Bulgarian explicitly upholding the UOC-MP against perceived encroachments by the OCU.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern Origins (Kievan Rus' to 17th Century)

The origins of the Orthodox Church in Ukrainian territories trace to the Christianization of Kievan Rus' in 988, when Grand Prince Vladimir I ordered the mass baptism of Kyiv's residents following his own conversion to Byzantine Christianity in Chersonesus. This event established Eastern Orthodoxy as the state religion, supplanting paganism and integrating Rus' into the Byzantine ecclesiastical sphere. The Metropolis of Kiev and All Rus' was subsequently formed under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, with its metropolitan seat in Kyiv serving as the primary ecclesiastical center for the Rus' lands. Following the Mongol invasion and sack of Kyiv in 1240, the metropolitan see temporarily shifted northward to cities like Vladimir-on-Klyazma, yet Kyiv retained its titular primacy as the canonical mother church of Rus'. Ukrainian territories, falling under the Grand by the mid-14th century and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after 1569, maintained Orthodox structures despite increasing Catholic pressures and legal restrictions on the hierarchy. Metropolitans were appointed by , often Greeks or locals navigating dual loyalties amid political fragmentation. The 1596 Union of Brest saw most Orthodox bishops in the submit to the Roman while retaining Byzantine rites, forming the Ruthenian Uniate Church and effectively dissolving the official Orthodox in Ukrainian lands. Orthodox resistance persisted through brotherhoods and lay initiatives, leading to the clandestine restoration of the hierarchy in 1620 when Patriarch Theophan III of , during a visit to , consecrated Job Boretsky as Metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia, and all , reestablishing canonical Orthodox governance under . By the late , geopolitical shifts, including Cossack alliances with Muscovy and financial incentives from Tsar Peter I, prompted Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV in 1686 to issue a synodal letter subordinating the Kiev Metropolis to the Moscow Patriarchate for purposes of and administration, while nominally preserving ties to . This act, confirmed amid controversy and later contested by subsequent patriarchs, integrated the Ukrainian Orthodox structure into Russian oversight, marking the transition from direct Constantinopolitan jurisdiction.

Integration into Russian Orthodoxy (1686-1917)

In 1686, the Metropolis of Kyiv, which had remained under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople since the Christianization of Rus' in the 10th century, was subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate through a tomos issued by Patriarch Dionysius IV. This act followed diplomatic pressure from Tsar Feodor III and regents Sofia Alekseyevna and Vasily Golitsyn, who leveraged economic incentives and threats against the financially strained patriarchate; the tomos permitted the ordination of the Kyiv metropolitan by Moscow clergy and the commemoration of the Moscow patriarch in liturgies, but stipulated ongoing nominal ties to Constantinople, including annual reports and the right of appeal. Moscow interpreted the arrangement as a full jurisdictional transfer, installing Metropolitan Gedeon as the first under its direct authority, while Constantinople later contested its permanence, viewing it as a temporary concession amid Ottoman-Muscovite politics rather than a cession of canonical territory. The integration deepened after the 1686 treaty, aligning with Muscovite expansion into following the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, where Cossack had sought Russian protection amid Polish-Lithuanian conflicts. By the early , under Peter the Great's reforms, the —including its Ukrainian dioceses—was restructured into the in 1721, subordinating ecclesiastical governance to state oversight via the Ober-Procurator, effectively merging church administration with imperial bureaucracy and extending centralized control over Kyiv's 10 eparchies. This facilitated the absorption of Uniate (Greek Catholic) communities, particularly after the 1795 incorporated , where Russian authorities dissolved autonomous church structures and imposed Moscow's liturgical uniformity, converting over 1.8 million Uniates by force in the under Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow's influence. Throughout the , integration manifested as systematic , driven by the imperial state's use of the church as a tool for ; edicts like the 1801 ukase under Alexander I restricted Ukrainian-language preaching and publications in churches, while the Valuev Circular of 1863 and Ems Ukase of 1876 prohibited Slavic vernaculars in beyond Russian, suppressing local traditions in favor of Great Russian norms to reinforce loyalty amid rising Ukrainian national consciousness. By 1917, the Metropolis operated as 28 eparchies fully embedded in the Russian Orthodox Church's hierarchy, with metropolitans appointed from and seminary curricula emphasizing Russian imperial theology, though underlying tensions from suppressed autocephalist movements foreshadowed post-revolutionary fractures. This period's causal dynamics stemmed from geopolitical conquests enabling ecclesiastical centralization, where the church's role in state-building prioritized unity over historical autonomies, often at the expense of regional identities. ![Highest authority of Russian Orthodox Church in 1917][float-right]

Soviet Era and Exarchate (1917-1991)

Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine faced immediate disruption amid civil war and the establishment of Soviet power, with diocesan structures subordinated to the new Ukrainian Soviet government while remaining canonically tied to the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1921, Patriarch Tikhon appointed Archbishop Mikhail (Bulgakov) as Exarch of Ukraine to administer the church within the Ukrainian SSR, but this body operated under severe constraints as Soviet authorities initiated antireligious policies, including the confiscation of church property and suppression of ecclesiastical activities. By the mid-1920s, the Exarchate reluctantly endorsed principles of limited autocephaly at a 1922 Kyiv conference, reflecting pressures for Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence amid broader ROC declarations of loyalty to the Soviet state, though these gestures did little to avert closures and arrests. The 1930s Great Purge intensified repression, decimating the clergy and laity; thousands of priests were executed, imprisoned, or exiled, reducing active Orthodox parishes in Ukraine from over 8,500 in the early 1920s to mere dozens by 1939 as part of USSR-wide campaigns that shuttered monasteries and seminaries. During World War II, German occupation from 1941 allowed a temporary resurgence, with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) reemerging in Nazi-controlled areas, but Soviet reconquest in 1943-1944 led to its forcible dissolution and merger into the ROC under Stalin's directives. Stalin's September 1943 meeting with ROC hierarchs revived the Moscow Patriarchate to mobilize patriotic sentiment for the war effort, enabling the reestablishment of the Ukrainian Exarchate with expanded operations; by 1945, several thousand parishes reopened, particularly in eastern Ukraine, while western regions—annexed post-1939—saw forced integration of local Orthodox structures into the Exarchate to consolidate control. Postwar, the served as an instrument of Soviet policy, with appointed exarchs—often regime loyalists—overseeing efforts and suppressing nationalist elements, as evidenced by the 1946 liquidation of the in , whose and faithful were compelled to join Orthodox structures under . Khrushchev's 1958-1964 antireligious drive halved remaining parishes USSR-wide, dropping Ukraine's Orthodox churches from approximately 8,500 pre-campaign to 4,500, with registering 4,383 parishes in 1958 amid widespread demolitions and dismissals. Under Brezhnev, repression eased into controlled stagnation, with the church numbering around 6,800 parishes USSR-wide by the late 1970s—many in —under strict state oversight via the Council for Religious Affairs, which vetted appointments and curtailed evangelism. Gorbachev's from 1985 prompted tentative liberalization, allowing limited church rebuilding and public discourse on faith, though the remained subordinate; by 1990, amid Ukraine's independence movements, the ROC granted it self-governing status with the title "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," retaining canonical ties to while permitting Ukrainian-language in some contexts, a concession reflecting eroding Soviet control. Throughout the era, the Exarchate's survival hinged on accommodation with atheist authorities, fostering a hierarchical structure loyal to the and enabling its role in ideological conformity, despite underlying tensions over national identity.

Post-Independence Ukraine (1991-2013)

Following 's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church continued operating under the self-governing status granted by the Moscow Patriarchate on October 28, 1990, which provided for internal administration while maintaining canonical subordination to the . This arrangement positioned the church as the direct successor to the pre-independence Ukrainian Exarchate, with Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) serving as its primate and exarch. In early 1992, amid rising and state support for ecclesiastical independence, Filaret formally petitioned the Moscow Patriarchate for full at its Council of Bishops held March 31 to April 4, 1992; the request was denied, citing insufficient canonical grounds and potential for . Tensions escalated as Filaret refused to resign, leading to his suspension by the Moscow Patriarchate on May 27, 1992, and on June 11, 1992, on charges including abuse of authority and fomenting division. Filaret, backed by a minority of and , responded by convening a on June 25, 1992, to establish the schismatic , which claimed continuity with the pre-1686 Metropolis but lacked recognition from other Orthodox churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's Council of Bishops, meeting in on June 27, 1992, elected Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan), previously of Rostov and Novocherskassk, as the new Metropolitan of and all , affirming loyalty to while emphasizing the church's Ukrainian character. Vladimir's arrival in on June 20, 1992, drew large crowds of supporters, signaling broad clerical and lay adherence to the Moscow-aligned structure despite the . Under his primacy, which lasted until his death in 2014, the church navigated political pressures from successive Ukrainian governments—ranging from President Leonid Kravchuk's initial favoritism toward autocephalist groups to President Viktor Yushchenko's 2008 appeals for a unificatory from —while resisting full separation to preserve canonical legitimacy. The period saw institutional consolidation and expansion amid post-Soviet religious liberalization, with the church registering parishes across and engaging in charitable and educational initiatives, though it faced competition from the Kyiv Patriarchate and . Relations with the Patriarchate remained hierarchical, with key decisions requiring approval, yet pursued incremental , such as through the 1990 charter's provisions for synodal . By 2013, the church had solidified as 's largest Orthodox jurisdiction, prioritizing doctrinal fidelity to over nationalistic reconfiguration.

Euromaidan, Annexation, and Donbas Conflict (2014-2021)

During the Euromaidan protests from November 2013 to February 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) maintained an official stance of neutrality, emphasizing dialogue and condemning violence from all sides. The church's Holy Synod issued appeals for peace and reconciliation, reflecting its historical ties to former President Viktor Yanukovych, who had supported the UOC-MP. Some hierarchs, such as Metropolitan Agafangel of Odesa, openly criticized the protests as unconstitutional, while others, including priests providing aid to demonstrators, participated minimally compared to rival Orthodox bodies like the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate. Internal divisions emerged, with younger clergy leaning toward patriotic sentiments amid rising anti-Russian feelings. Following Yanukovych's ousting on February 22, 2014, and Russia's annexation of in March, the UOC-MP, under acting Metropolitan Onufriy (elected permanent primate in August 2014), opposed the reduction of Ukraine's territory. On March 3, 2014, Onufriy wrote an to Russian President , urging the withdrawal of Russian troops from to prevent bloodshed and affirming Ukraine's . The declined to transfer Crimean eparchies to the , retaining administrative control despite Moscow's claims. Onufriy repeatedly described the ensuing conflict, ignited by separatist uprisings in April 2014, as "fratricidal" and incompatible with Christian teachings, calling for cessation of hostilities. The Synod's August 13, 2014, statement explicitly supported Ukraine's , using the term "soborna" (conciliar, implying unity). In separatist-controlled areas of , UOC-MP parishes predominated, with many clergy remaining operational under authorities in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Republics from 2014 onward. While official church policy prohibited political involvement, some priests delivered sermons justifying separatist actions or cooperated with local "governments," leading to accusations of from Ukrainian authorities; by 2021, several faced investigations. Conversely, UOC-MP clergy in government-held areas served as chaplains and provided . The church's dual presence exacerbated perceptions of divided loyalties, contributing to over 100 church seizures or re-registrations favoring rival denominations in western and between 2014 and 2021. The period saw intensified pressure on the UOC-MP amid Ukraine's pursuit of Orthodox autocephaly. In February 2018, the UOC-MP requested that grant full canonical independence in response to Constantinople's involvement, but this was not realized. The Bishops' Council of May 13, 2018, reaffirmed the church's administrative self-governance while upholding canonical ties to , rejecting participation in a proposed unifying . After the Ecumenical Patriarchate granted the of to the on January 6, 2019, approximately 1,000 UOC-MP parishes (about 7-10% of total) transitioned to the new entity by late , often amid local disputes and legal battles over property. Onufriy condemned the but maintained the UOC-MP's non-participation, prioritizing ecclesiastical unity under despite geopolitical strains.

Full-Scale Russian Invasion and Aftermath (2022-2025)

On February 24, 2022, coinciding with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv and All Ukraine condemned the military action as a "fratricidal war," appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to halt the aggression, and called on Russian forces to lay down arms immediately. This stance contrasted with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow's endorsement of the invasion as a "holy war" against Western influences. In direct response to Kirill's position, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's Council convened on May 27, 2022, in , declaring full independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. The council resolved to cease commemorating in liturgies, prohibit his name in services, and affirm the UOC's autonomy while maintaining its self-governing statutes without subordination to ; Metropolitan Onufriy subsequently withdrew from the Russian Orthodox Church's Holy Synod. Despite these measures, Ukrainian security services questioned their sufficiency, citing persistent canonical and informal ties that could facilitate Russian influence. The prompted significant internal shifts, with defections accelerating as parishes sought to align with Ukrainian independence efforts. Between and 2023, 967 UOC communities transitioned to the , including 496 in 2022 and 471 in 2023; transfers slowed in 2024 to approximately half the prior year's rate, totaling over 1,100 since 2022 per government records. These movements often involved local votes amid heightened national scrutiny of Moscow-linked institutions. Ukrainian authorities intensified measures against perceived collaboration, with the (SBU) opening over 180 criminal cases against UOC clergy for aiding Russian forces since February 2022; by September 2025, courts convicted 38 clerics of offenses including and intelligence gathering, including 23 bishops under investigation. Specific instances involved priests spying for Russia's FSB or supporting occupation administrations in and regions. In August 2024, Ukraine's parliament passed legislation enabling the prohibition of religious organizations linked to , explicitly targeting those under Moscow's influence; by mid-2025, this prompted inspections of over 10,000 UOC sites, though full implementation remained contested, with the church operating under legal challenges and appeals. The law's rationale centered on , given documented FSB infiltration risks, despite UOC claims of complete severance. Russian military actions inflicted widespread destruction on religious , including UOC churches; by 2024, at least 660 faith-based sites across denominations were damaged or destroyed by shelling, with notable cases like the Saint Michael Church in Komyshuvakha obliterated in April 2023. In occupied territories, repurposed or seized UOC properties, dismissing non-collaborating hierarchs and installing pro-Moscow clergy. As of October 2025, the UOC continued services in government-controlled areas but faced ongoing pressures, including property disputes and reduced flock amid the protracted conflict.

Doctrinal and Liturgical Characteristics

Adherence to Eastern Orthodox Tradition

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), as an entity within , professes fidelity to the dogmatic definitions established by the seven Ecumenical Councils (from I in 325 to Nicaea II in 787), rejecting innovations such as the addition to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and affirming the divinity of Christ, the , and the theosis of humanity through . This adherence aligns with the broader canonical framework of Orthodoxy, emphasizing conciliarity () and the authority of patristic tradition over individual interpretation. The church's self-governance declaration in May 2022 explicitly preserved its doctrinal continuity with historical Orthodoxy, without alterations to core beliefs amid jurisdictional shifts from . Liturgically, the UOC-MP follows the , centering on the of St. for most Sundays and feasts, with the Liturgy of St. Basil the Great used during and on certain major occasions; these services incorporate traditional elements such as antiphonal chanting, processions, and the in the anaphora. The seven mysteries (sacraments)—, , , , , Matrimony, and Unction—are administered in accordance with patristic norms, emphasizing their mystical efficacy as channels of divine energy rather than mere symbols. , monastic (including ), and the of saints and relics form integral practices, with parishes maintaining typikon-based calendars that prioritize , vigils, and feast cycles derived from early Christian usage. While predominates in formal settings as a liturgical inherited from Kievan Rus', the UOC-MP permits Ukrainian vernacular translations in service books, such as the official Ukrainian edition of the Liturgical Gospel, enabling broader accessibility without compromising ritual integrity—a flexibility rooted in Orthodox precedents for local adaptations, as seen in other autocephalous churches. This approach underscores causal continuity with Byzantine heritage, where linguistic evolution has historically supported evangelization, though purists within the church advocate retaining Slavonic for its sacral depth. adheres to synodal principles, with bishops elected per canons like those of the Apostolic and Trullan Councils, ensuring hierarchical unity under the Metropolitan of Kyiv while rejecting papal-like primacy. Theological education in UOC-MP seminaries, such as Kyiv's Holy Trinity Seminary, emphasizes of Scripture through the (e.g., Cappadocians, ), philokalic spirituality, and anti-heretical stances against Protestant or Roman Catholic , reinforcing empirical fidelity to conciliar consensus over scholastic rationalism. Despite geopolitical pressures post-2014, no doctrinal deviations have been documented; claims of "Russkiy Mir" ideology influencing theology stem from jurisdictional rhetoric rather than alterations to Orthodox or , with the church affirming Ukraine's in pastoral letters while upholding tradition's apolitical essence.

Liturgical Languages and Cultural Adaptations

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) employs as its primary liturgical language, a standardized form of adapted for Russian Orthodox usage and preserved for its role in maintaining doctrinal continuity and historical fidelity across Slavic Orthodox traditions. This language dominates the , , and other sacraments in most parishes, particularly in eastern and , where it serves as the official medium for texts approved by the Moscow Patriarchate. Church Slavonic's archaic structure—rooted in 9th-10th century translations by Saints Cyril and Methodius—ensures uniformity but has prompted debates on accessibility, as comprehension varies among contemporary worshippers. Vernacular adaptations allow for Ukrainian and Russian in services, especially in homilies, readings, and select chants, to address linguistic diversity and regional needs. Ukrainian-language liturgies are officially permitted and more prevalent in western eparchies like Volyn, with isolated instances in Kyiv, reflecting the Church's 2010s endorsements of translated service books to accommodate national linguistic shifts without altering core rites. By 2022, amid wartime pressures, Metropolitan Onufriy emphasized Ukrainian in public addresses and supported hybrid services blending Slavonic with Ukrainian elements, though full vernacular Divine Liturgies remain exceptional rather than normative. Russian persists in eastern parishes, correlating with demographic patterns, but its use has declined post-2014 due to geopolitical tensions. Cultural adaptations emphasize fidelity to Eastern Orthodox canons while incorporating Ukrainian ethnoreligious elements, such as of localized saints (e.g., St. Anthony and Theodosius of the Caves) and integration of folk-inspired hymns or iconographic motifs tied to Cossack-era traditions. Parishes retain Ukrainian customs in non-liturgical practices, including calendar observances and charitable rites adapted to agrarian heritage, preserving within Moscow's jurisdictional framework. These modifications—often via translated texts or regional synodal approvals—avoid substantive doctrinal changes, as evidenced by adherence to Russian-synodal liturgical standards post-1686 subordination. Such balance has sustained the UOC-MP's appeal in mixed-language communities, though critics from autocephalist factions argue it insufficiently nationalizes worship compared to rivals.

Organizational Structure

Dioceses, Eparchies, and Parishes

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) is administratively structured into eparchies, equivalent to dioceses in Eastern Orthodox terminology, each led by a ruling hierarch such as a metropolitan or bishop. These eparchies oversee local parishes, monasteries, and clergy within defined territorial boundaries, typically aligning with Ukraine's oblasts, cities, or regions. The central Metropolis of Kyiv and All Ukraine, headed by the primate Metropolitan Onufriy, holds primacy and includes vicar bishops for specific districts. As of January 1, 2024, the UOC-MP encompassed 10,919 registered religious organizations, including 10,586 parishes and communities, alongside monasteries and educational institutions. By mid-2024, independent data analysis reported 8,097 active churches remaining under UOC-MP control in proper, reflecting ongoing transitions and wartime disruptions. Earlier assessments, such as in 2011, indicated 45 eparchies with 42 diocesan hierarchs and additional vicars, suggesting a structure that has since expanded but faced contractions in occupied areas. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion, Russian authorities have incorporated at least eight UOC-MP eparchies from occupied territories directly into the Russian Orthodox Church, affecting over 1,600 parishes as of April 2025. Concurrently, in Ukrainian-controlled regions, approximately 1,185 parishes transitioned to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine between 2022 and late 2024, reducing the UOC-MP's footprint while parishes in remaining eparchies continue operations under local bishops. Each eparchy maintains synodal governance, with parishes as the foundational units comprising clergy and laity engaged in liturgical and charitable activities.

Synodal Governance and Clergy Composition

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Patriarchate (UOC-MP) is administered through a , serving as its highest governing body, chaired by the Metropolitan of and All . The handles doctrinal, administrative, and disciplinary matters, including episcopal elections and responses to challenges, with decisions requiring a majority vote among its members. It comprises permanent members—typically senior metropolitans numbering around five to seven—and temporary members selected from diocesan bishops for specific sessions, ensuring representation from across 's eparchies.
On May 27, 2022, following Russia's full-scale invasion, the Holy Synod issued a declaration affirming the UOC-MP's full independence and autonomy from direct administrative subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, while maintaining prayerful commemorations of the Russian patriarch under review. This move, ratified at an extraordinary council in Kyiv, aimed to sever jurisdictional ties amid geopolitical pressures, though canonical subordination to Moscow persisted in practice, as evidenced by ongoing ROC oversight in episcopal ordinations. Synod membership has seen adjustments, such as the 2023 appointment of Metropolitan Serhiy (Hentsytsky) as a permanent member to replace Metropolitan Ilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol, reflecting internal realignments due to wartime displacements. The UOC-MP's comprises hierarchs, , deacons, and monastics, with bishops (hierarchs) numbering 114 as of December 2022 across 53 dioceses, including 53 diocesan and 61 bishops. This episcopate oversees roughly 10,919 registered parishes as of January 2024, down from over 12,000 pre-2022 due to community transfers to the and wartime disruptions. , the core of parochial ministry, serve these communities, with historical data indicating thousands actively ordained, though precise recent counts remain limited; many received training in , contributing to scrutiny over loyalties. At least 20 high-ranking clerics hold Russian as of April 2023, highlighting compositional ties to the amid Ukraine's security concerns. Deacons and monastic supplement this structure, often in urban cathedrals and rural parishes, with the regulating ordinations to maintain canonical standards.

Leadership and Primates

Succession of Metropolitans of Kyiv

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), granted self-governing status by the Russian Orthodox Church in October 1990, initially retained Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) as its primate, who had served as Metropolitan of Kyiv since 1966. However, Filaret's persistent advocacy for full autocephaly led to his suspension by a council of the Russian Orthodox Church in May 1992 and subsequent anathema in 1997, prompting his formation of the rival Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate. Following Filaret's removal, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church elected Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan), born Viktor Markiyanovich Sabodan in 1935, as Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine on May 28, 1992, with confirmation from Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow. Vladimir, previously Metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk, led the church for over two decades, emphasizing canonical loyalty to Moscow while navigating Ukraine's post-independence political landscape; he reposed on July 5, 2014, at age 78. The Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church then selected Metropolitan Onuphriy (Berezovsky), born Orest Berezovsky in 1944, as locum tenens, followed by his election as Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine on August 13, 2014, again affirmed by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Previously Metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovina since 2003, Onuphriy has maintained the church's subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate amid escalating tensions, including the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion in 2022, while condemning aggression and asserting administrative independence. As of October 2025, Onuphriy remains in office, overseeing approximately 12,000 parishes despite state pressures and schismatic challenges.
MetropolitanTermKey Events
Vladimir (Sabodan)1992–2014Elected post-Filaret schism; death prompted succession.
Onuphriy (Berezovsky)2014–presentElected amid post-Maidan instability; navigated wartime neutrality claims.

Role and Actions of Metropolitan Onufriy (2014-Present)

Metropolitan Onufriy (Orest Berezovsky) was elected primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) on August 13, 2014, by the church's Holy Synod following the death of Metropolitan Vladimir, with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow confirming the decision shortly thereafter. As Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Onufriy assumed leadership of a church facing heightened scrutiny over its ties to Moscow amid Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution and the annexation of Crimea, emphasizing continuity in canonical subordination while navigating calls for greater autonomy. In the initial years of his primacy, Onufriy focused on maintaining ecclesiastical unity and pastoral activities, including overseeing diocesan structures and liturgical practices, amid political pressures following the 2014 conflict's onset. His , secured in the second round of voting among 74 bishops, reflected support from monastic factions within the church, positioning him to address internal debates on without immediate rupture from the Moscow Patriarchate. On February 24, 2022, the day of Russia's full-scale invasion of , Onufriy issued a statement condemning the military aggression as "fratricidal" and a grave sin, urging Russian President to halt the advance immediately and withdraw troops to prevent further bloodshed. In response to the , he mobilized the church for humanitarian efforts, including aid distribution and shelter for displaced persons, while repeatedly calling for peace negotiations and an end to hostilities in subsequent addresses. At the UOC's Council of Bishops on May 27, 2022, Onufriy supported amendments to the church's statutes proclaiming full and , declaring that the UOC was no longer structurally part of the Patriarchate and possessed all marks of thereafter. He ceased participation in the and affirmed the church's independent management of internal and external affairs, though Ukrainian authorities continued to question residual links. Throughout 2022-2025, Onufriy defended the UOC's neutrality in the conflict, rejecting demands for outright severance from beyond the 2022 declarations and blocking certain inter-church dialogues perceived as compromising the church's position. In July 2025, Ukrainian President revoked Onufriy's citizenship, citing alleged pro-Russian activities, a move the contested by reiterating the church's post-2022 independence and his sole Ukrainian passport status. Despite these pressures, Onufriy has sustained leadership over approximately 8,000 parishes as of 2025, prioritizing doctrinal fidelity and resistance to state interventions in church governance.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Russian Influence and Espionage

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) of the Moscow Patriarchate has faced numerous allegations from Ukrainian authorities of serving as a conduit for Russian influence and espionage, particularly since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. These claims center on the church's canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), led by Patriarch Kirill, who has publicly endorsed the invasion as a "holy war" and Russia's geopolitical aims. Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) investigations have identified instances where UOC-MP clergy allegedly collected intelligence on Ukrainian military positions, stored weapons, or disseminated pro-Russian propaganda, leveraging parish networks for subversive activities. By September 2025, the SBU had initiated 180 criminal cases against UOC-MP priests for such offenses, including treason and collaboration with Russian forces. Specific espionage cases highlight patterns of recruitment by Russian intelligence services like the FSB or . In August 2024, SBU arrested a in accused of spying for Russian military intelligence, having been recruited prior to the 2022 to report on troop movements and infrastructure; the priest allegedly used church facilities to coordinate with handlers. Similar charges emerged in March 2024, when SBU dismantled a pro-Russian network linked to UOC-MP structures, involving who spread narratives justifying the and undermining Ukrainian efforts. Over 100 UOC-MP and bishops have faced charges for aiding occupiers in occupied territories, including blessing Russian troops or facilitating logistics, with some receiving sentences of up to 15 years. These activities are attributed to the church's enduring administrative ties to , including financial flows and personnel appointments controlled by the ROC, despite UOC-MP's 2018 declaration of "independence" in decision-making. UOC-MP leadership, including Metropolitan Onufriy, has denied systemic Russian control, asserting the church's loyalty to and condemning the war as "fratricidal," while claiming investigations amount to . Russian state media and the ROC echo this, portraying SBU actions as suppression of canonical Orthodoxy and citing over 100 cases against as evidence of Kyiv's intolerance. However, empirical data from declassified SBU evidence, including intercepted communications and seized documents from sites like the Kyiv-Pechersk , substantiates many individual cases, revealing FSB directives to exploit church networks for . Critics note that while not all 12,000 UOC-MP parishes engage in , the structure's opacity—rooted in ROC oversight—enables infiltration, with only a fraction of publicly defecting to independent Ukrainian bodies amid the conflict.

Political Involvement and Neutrality Claims

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has consistently maintained that it adheres to an apolitical stance, emphasizing its role in spiritual guidance and rather than partisan engagement. Metropolitan Onufriy, the since 2014, reiterated this position in a 2020 statement, asserting that the UOC-MP "has always called for and effectively promoted the cause of peace" without endorsing political factions. In response to the 2022 Russian invasion, Onufriy issued appeals framing the conflict as a "Cain crime" and urging Russian President to withdraw troops immediately, while calling on Ukrainian faithful to defend statehood and support the armed forces. These declarations align with the church's broader claims of administrative autonomy from since 1990, formalized further in May 2022 when it declared independence from the Russian Orthodox Church's direct oversight amid wartime pressures. Despite these assertions, Ukrainian authorities and security services have documented instances of political involvement by individual UOC-MP , particularly in pro-Russian activities since 2014. The (SBU) reported opening 180 criminal cases against UOC-MP priests for alleged collaboration with Russian forces, including propaganda dissemination and support for occupation since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Specific allegations include facilitating Russian or justifying aggression, contributing to perceptions of the church as a vector for Moscow's influence, though the UOC-MP has characterized such cases as isolated deviations not reflective of its canonical leadership. Onufriy has publicly renounced Russian citizenship in July 2025 following a Ukrainian , underscoring efforts to distance the institution from geopolitical alignments. Critics, including Ukrainian lawmakers, argue that the UOC-MP's lingering canonical ties to —despite claims—undermine its neutrality, especially given the Russian Orthodox Church's endorsement of the war as a "holy" endeavor. This tension culminated in the August 2024 parliamentary ban on religious organizations affiliated with the , targeting the UOC-MP for perceived security risks rather than doctrinal issues. The church countered by affirming its commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and rejecting political instrumentalization, with Onufriy blocking internal attempts at pro-war to preserve focus. Empirical data from polls, such as an April 2024 survey showing 83% Ukrainian support for restricting UOC-MP activities, highlight public skepticism toward its neutrality amid ongoing conflict.

Responses to Russian Military Actions

Metropolitan Onufriy, of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), issued a public address on , 2022, the day of Russia's full-scale , describing the entry of Russian troops into as "the beginning of the kinetic phase of fratricidal " and a "greatest tragedy," while appealing directly to Russian President to halt military operations immediately, stating, "You can do this, and we believe and want you to do it." The statement affirmed the UOC's support for 's and , rejecting any justification for the . In the ensuing weeks, the UOC organized ecumenical and internal prayers for peace, the defense of , and an end to the "fratricidal war," with participating in national unity services and some priests volunteering for military chaplaincy on the Ukrainian side. Approximately 100 UOC departed for the independent amid the conflict, while others publicly denounced Russian invaders. On May 27, 2022, the UOC's Council of Bishops formally severed administrative ties with the Patriarchate, explicitly condemning Russia's military aggression against and rejecting 's endorsement of the invasion as incompatible with church teachings. This decision, adopted amid ongoing hostilities, prohibited commemorations of Kirill in services and aimed to affirm the UOC's autonomy, though canonical subordination to persisted in practice until then. Earlier responses to Russian actions in 2014, including the annexation of and conflict in , were more restrained, with the UOC condemning violence and misuse of church properties by separatists but avoiding direct attribution to , while emphasizing calls for and peace without severing ties. Onufriy declined to stand during parliamentary honors for Ukrainian fighters in but later urged cessation of hostilities in the region. Throughout the war, the UOC has provided , sheltering refugees in monasteries and parishes, though critics, including Ukrainian authorities, have questioned the completeness of its disavowal of Russian influence given delayed structural changes. In the wake of 's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian government enacted measures targeting religious organizations with ties to Russian entities, including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). On March 3, 2022, introduced a temporary ban on activities by religious groups controlled from , justified as a response to Moscow's use of religious institutions for and . This was followed by intensified (SBU) operations, including over 400 searches of UOC-MP sites by mid-2023, uncovering materials supporting Russian aggression and evidence of clergy involvement in subversive activities. Legal actions against UOC-MP clergy escalated, with dozens charged under articles for (Article 111) and (Article 111-1) of Ukraine's . By August 2024, at least 26 UOC-MP priests and hierarchs had been convicted of or aiding Russian forces, including cases of priests relaying Ukrainian military positions via church networks, as in in 2024 and in 2025. These prosecutions were grounded in of dual loyalties, given the Patriarchate's explicit endorsement of the as a "holy war," though UOC-MP leadership, including Metropolitan Onufriy, condemned the aggression in March 2022 and declared administrative independence from in May 2022. Critics, including , argued that while individual cases warranted action, broader measures risked without . A pivotal legislative step came with Bill No. 8371, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on August 20, 2024, and signed by President Zelenskyy on August 24, 2024, amending laws to prohibit religious organizations affiliated with entities in Russia, the aggressor state. The law requires a three-to-nine-month verification process by Ukraine's State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience to assess ties, potentially leading to liquidation via court order if subordination to Moscow is confirmed—focusing on canonical, financial, and doctrinal links despite UOC-MP's self-proclaimed autonomy. As of September 2025, the agency filed a lawsuit to ban the UOC-MP centrally, with courts examining ongoing liturgical references to Patriarch Kirill and historical statutes retaining Moscow's influence. Property disputes intensified, with state-initiated proceedings to revoke UOC-MP usage rights for state-owned sites like the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, where a June 2022 contestation led to partial evictions amid claims of illegal occupation post-1990s restitution. By 2025, several monasteries faced termination of agreements, transferring control to the state or rival (OCU), though outright seizures remained limited to security-linked cases rather than blanket . UN experts in October 2025 raised alarms over potential , citing risks to 6,000 UOC-MP parishes, while Ukrainian authorities emphasized the measures' proportionality to wartime threats from Russian-linked networks. Implementation challenges persisted into late 2025, with UOC-MP appeals invoking constitutional religious freedoms under Article 35, amid debates over whether independence suffices absent full canonical rupture.

Inter-Church Relations and Schisms

Conflict with the (OCU)

The conflict between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), known as UOC-MP, and the (OCU) intensified following the OCU's formation on December 15, 2018, through a unification that merged elements of the and the , with granted by the on January 6, 2019. The UOC-MP, which did not participate in the and views the OCU as schismatic lacking validity under Orthodox tradition, has consistently refused recognition, leading to parallel hierarchies competing for parishes, clergy, and laity across . This jurisdictional rivalry has manifested in disputes over ecclesiastical authority, with the UOC-MP asserting its historical primacy in Ukraine's territory while the OCU claims legitimacy as the sole autocephalous body representing Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Parish transitions from the UOC-MP to the OCU have been a central flashpoint, with approximately 1,500 to 2,000 UOC-MP communities re-registering under the OCU between 2019 and 2025, though the UOC-MP contests many as coerced or procedurally invalid. Specific annual figures include 496 transitions in 2022, 471 in 2023, and 218 in 2024, often facilitated by local community votes under Ukrainian law but frequently challenged in courts by UOC-MP clergy who argue violations of internal church governance. These shifts have reduced the UOC-MP's network from over 12,000 parishes pre-2019 to around 8,000 by mid-2025, while bolstering the OCU to roughly 9,000, reflecting broader societal pressures amid Ukraine's push for from . Legal and property disputes have proliferated, with Ukrainian courts adjudicating competing claims to church buildings, icons, and , often favoring OCU-aligned communities after local re-registrations. The UOC-MP has reported over 100 instances of forcible seizures since 2019, including evictions from key sites like Kyiv's Saint Michael Cathedral in 2023, where UOC-MP priests were removed following a disputed transition. In response, UOC-MP Metropolitan Onufriy has excommunicated defecting to the OCU, deeming such moves canonical treason, while the OCU frames transitions as voluntary reunifications correcting historical subordination to . Violence has accompanied some transitions, with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for documenting occasional clashes involving physical confrontations, , and injuries during re-registration attempts, though noting a general decline in such incidents post-2019. Notable episodes include a brawl at a cathedral on October 17, 2024, where OCU supporters clashed with UOC-MP faithful over handover proceedings, resulting in injuries and police intervention. UN experts in October 2025 expressed concern over escalating pressures on UOC-MP communities, including judicial tied to these disputes, amid broader wartime scrutiny of Moscow-linked institutions, while OCU representatives have condemned vigilante actions by radicals as uncanonical. The persists without resolution, exacerbating divisions in 's Orthodox landscape, where empirical data indicate sustained UOC-MP adherence in rural and eastern regions despite urban and governmental shifts toward the OCU.

Opposition to 2018 Autocephaly Grant

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the (UOC-MP) opposed the Ecumenical of 's initiative to grant to a unified Ukrainian Orthodox body, arguing that it contravened Orthodox norms by unilaterally revoking the 1686 transfer of the to the jurisdiction of the and endorsing schismatic entities without pan-Orthodox consensus. On October 11, 2018, when announced its intent to proceed with , the UOC-MP's leadership, under Metropolitan Onufriy, immediately criticized the move as an overreach, emphasizing that the Ecumenical lacked over the Ukrainian Church, which had been under 's omophorion for over three centuries. This position aligned with the Russian Orthodox Church's broader condemnation, which severed eucharistic communion with on October 15, 2018, a decision the UOC-MP echoed by prohibiting concelebration with 's . In a defensive response, the UOC-MP's Council of Bishops convened on October 13, 2018, and appealed to to grant the UOC-MP independence () directly from the , framing it as a necessary measure to preserve unity amid perceived external interference rather than endorsing Constantinople's process, which they deemed invalid for involving non- groups like the and the [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church](/page/Ukrainian_Autocephalous_Orthodox Church). Metropolitan Onufriy, in subsequent statements, reiterated that could not legitimately be bestowed on schismatics, as it would deepen divisions rather than heal them, and urged fidelity to order over political pressures from the . He refused to participate in the December 15, 2018, unification council that formed the (OCU), labeling it uncanonical and warning that such actions risked broader schism within world . Following the issuance of the of to Metropolitan Epiphanius of the OCU on January 6, 2019, the UOC-MP's and of Bishops on February 20, 2019, formally declared the document null and void, asserting it legitimized schismatics who remained anathematized under Moscow's canons and lacked recognition from most Orthodox churches. The opposition rested on the principle that requires the mother church's consent and should not be imposed by revoking historical jurisdictional transfers without universal Orthodox agreement, a view shared by several local churches including those of , , and Antioch. Despite internal discussions on administrative autonomy from —culminating in a 2022 —the UOC-MP consistently rejected the 2018-2019 process as politically motivated and canonically flawed, prioritizing preservation of its self-perceived canonical status over unification with the OCU.

Ties to Moscow Patriarchate vs. Broader Orthodoxy

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) maintains formal canonical subordination to the (ROC) under the Patriarchate, as established by its 1990 autonomy statute, which designates it as a self-governing entity within the ROC's jurisdictional boundaries while requiring key decisions, such as the enthronement of the Metropolitan of , to involve 's approval. Although the UOC-MP's declared independence from the ROC on May 27, 2022, citing the , internal documents and statutes continue to reference ongoing liturgical and administrative ties to , and the ROC has rejected this separation, asserting the UOC-MP remains an integral part of its structure. In contrast to this direct linkage with Moscow, the UOC-MP's position within broader has been complicated by the 2018 Moscow-Constantinople schism, triggered when the Ecumenical Patriarchate granted autocephaly to the (OCU) via on January 6, 2019, prompting the ROC to sever eucharistic communion with on October 15, 2018. As a result, the UOC-MP, aligned with the ROC, does not commemorate Bartholomew I in its liturgies and lacks full intercommunion with Constantinople-aligned churches, including those of , , and that have recognized the OCU. This isolation extends to practical limits on concelebration and shared sacraments with pro-Tomos churches, though the UOC-MP retains canonical recognition and communion with Moscow-supporting autocephalous churches such as , Antioch, and Georgia, which view the 2018 as invalid. Prior to 2018, the UOC-MP enjoyed universal recognition across Orthodox churches as the sole Orthodox body in , but the has polarized its standing: while ROC-aligned entities affirm its validity, critics in the Ecumenical Patriarchate's orbit regard its Moscow ties as compromising its amid geopolitical tensions, without formally declaring it schismatic. As of 2025, no has resolved the rift, leaving the UOC-MP's broader Orthodox ties contingent on alignment with 's canonical claims rather than independent affirmation.

Current Challenges and Empirical Status (as of 2025)

Parish Transitions and Membership Data

Since the establishment of the (OCU) in 2019, over 1,700 religious communities have transitioned from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) to the OCU, according to data from Ukraine's State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS). These shifts accelerated following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, driven by factors including concerns and ecclesiastical independence preferences, though the UOC-MP has contested many as procedurally invalid or lacking genuine parish majorities. Annual transitions peaked in the early war years before declining:
YearNumber of Transitions
2022496
2023471
2024218
The slowdown in 2024 reflects stricter legal requirements for transitions, -related disruptions, and exhaustion of willing communities, with only nine parishes shifting in September 2024 alone. As of January 1, 2025, the UOC-MP retains 9,792 registered religious communities, making it Ukraine's largest by parish count despite the outflows, down from approximately 12,300 in 2018. The OCU, by contrast, has grown through these accessions but lacks equivalently centralized reporting; DESS data confirms the UOC-MP's numerical lead in communities. Membership figures, inferred from registered parishes and sociological surveys rather than direct censuses, show a steeper decline for UOC-MP affiliation amid wartime patriotism. A 2024 poll by the Ukrainian Sociological Information and Analytical Center found self-identified UOC-MP adherents at 5.5% of the population (roughly 2 million adults), down from 13% in , while OCU affiliation rose to 35%. These percentages capture declarative loyalty rather than active participation, which remains lower across Orthodox denominations (under 20% weekly attendance per Razumkov Centre data), and may overstate OCU gains due to in post-invasion surveys. The UOC-MP asserts sustained grassroots loyalty, with millions of nominal members, but empirical indicators like and records—harder to verify independently—align more closely with the poll trends than pre-war self-reports of 20-25 million faithful. In August 2024, Ukraine's adopted Law No. 8371, which empowers courts to prohibit religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Federation as the aggressor state, following assessment by a state expert commission; this legislation has been applied primarily to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) of the Patriarchate due to perceived ongoing ties to the . On September 4, 2025, the Ukrainian government petitioned the Sixth of Appeal to ban UOC activities outright, citing insufficient severance from despite the church's May 27, 2022, declaration of autonomy. The State Service of on Ethnic and Freedom of Conscience filed a related on September 2, 2025, seeking liquidation of the UOC's Metropolis leadership and transfer of its property to state control, with hearings pending as of October 2025. Property disputes have intensified amid parish transitions and state interventions, particularly following the 2022 invasion. The Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a historic UOC site under Moscow-linked administration since Ukraine's independence, became a focal point when the government terminated the UOC's lease for the lower on March 29, 2023, mandating evacuation by April 2023; a Kyiv commercial court upheld this on August 11, 2023, ordering the UOC to restore the premises to the National Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Reserve. UOC monks remained in portions as of May 2025, contesting via claims of private property rights and ongoing litigation delays. Similar conflicts have arisen at other sites, such as the , where eviction efforts targeted UOC control amid opposition from figures resisting the ban. When UOC parishes vote to affiliate with the (OCU)—with over 500 such transitions recorded by early 2022, slowing thereafter—legal battles over church building ownership frequently ensue, as Ukrainian law ties property to the registering but allows re-registration challenges. Instances of forcible seizures by OCU groups have been documented, prompting UOC complaints of raider assaults and vandalism on its properties. United Nations experts expressed concern on October 1, 2025, over reports of such , including property deprivations targeting the UOC, while Ukrainian authorities justify actions as measures against Russian influence. Law 8371 includes a nine-month transition period for affected entities to merge or prove disassociation, potentially resolving some ownership claims through court-ordered transfers but exacerbating disputes in contested locales.

Humanitarian and Pastoral Activities Amid War

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) reported undertaking humanitarian initiatives to support civilians affected by the conflict, including refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and those in frontline areas. Parishes and monasteries organized aid distribution, such as food packages and essential supplies, often in coordination with local social services; for example, clergy from a Lviv parish delivered provisions to a refugee reception center at Arena Lviv stadium. Church facilities served as temporary shelters, with basements repurposed for protection during shelling, and bells rung as air raid warnings to alert parishioners. Pastoral care persisted amid hostilities, with priests conducting services, funerals, and sacraments in damaged or besieged locales, providing spiritual consolation and psychological support to mourners and the traumatized. In the Volodymyr-Volyn Diocese, actively assisted vulnerable populations through direct . By August 2025, the UOC-MP had extended charitable aid to 2,360 families of forced migrants since January of that year, focusing on basic needs amid ongoing displacement. These efforts were framed by church statements as non-partisan responses to human suffering, though they occurred against a backdrop of state scrutiny over alleged ties to .

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