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Vegetative state
View on Wikipedia| Vegetative state | |
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| Specialty | Neurology, critical care medicine |
A vegetative state (VS) or post-coma unresponsiveness (PCU)[1] is a disorder of consciousness in which patients with severe brain damage are in a state of partial arousal rather than true awareness. After four weeks in a vegetative state, the patient is classified as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). This diagnosis is classified as a permanent vegetative state some months (three in the US and six in the UK) after a non-traumatic brain injury or one year after a traumatic injury. The term unresponsive wakefulness syndrome may be used alternatively,[2] as "vegetative state" has some negative connotations among the public.[3] It is occasionally also called Apallic syndrome or Apallisches syndrome, borrowings from German, primarily in European or older sources.[4]
Definition
[edit]There are several definitions that vary by technical versus layman's usage. There are different legal implications in different countries.
Medical definition
[edit]Per the definition of the British Royal College of Physicians of London, "a wakeful unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks is referred to as a persistent (or 'continuing') vegetative state".[5]
Vegetative state
[edit]The vegetative state is a chronic or long-term condition. This condition differs from a coma: a coma is a state that lacks both awareness and wakefulness. Patients in a vegetative state may have awoken from a coma, but still have not regained awareness. In the vegetative state patients can open their eyelids occasionally and demonstrate sleep-wake cycles, but completely lack cognitive function. The vegetative state is also called a "coma vigil". The chances of regaining awareness diminish considerably as the time spent in the vegetative state increases.[6]
Persistent vegetative state
[edit]Persistent vegetative state is the standard usage (except in the UK) for a medical diagnosis, made after numerous neurological and other tests, that due to extensive and irreversible brain damage, a patient is highly unlikely ever to achieve higher functions above a vegetative state. This diagnosis does not mean that a doctor has diagnosed improvement as impossible, but does open the possibility, in the US, for a judicial request to end life support.[7] Informal guidelines hold that this diagnosis can be made after four weeks in a vegetative state. US caselaw has shown that successful petitions for termination have been made after a diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state, although in some cases, such as that of Terri Schiavo, such rulings have generated widespread controversy.
In the UK, the term is discouraged in favor of two more precisely defined terms that have been strongly recommended by the Royal College of Physicians (RCP). These guidelines recommend using a continuous vegetative state for patients in a vegetative state for more than four weeks. A medical determination of a permanent vegetative state can be made if, after exhaustive testing and a customary 12 months of observation,[8] a medical diagnosis is made that it is impossible by any informed medical expectations that the mental condition will ever improve.[9] Hence, a "continuous vegetative state" in the UK may remain the diagnosis in cases that would be called "persistent" in the US or elsewhere.
While the actual testing criteria for a diagnosis of "permanent" in the UK are quite similar to the criteria for a diagnosis of "persistent" in the US, the semantic difference imparts in the UK a legal presumption that is commonly used in court applications for ending life support.[8] The UK diagnosis is generally only made after 12 months of observing a static vegetative state. A diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state in the US usually still requires a petitioner to prove in court that recovery is impossible by informed medical opinion, while in the UK the "permanent" diagnosis already gives the petitioner this presumption and may make the legal process less time-consuming.[7]
In common usage, the "permanent" and "persistent" definitions are sometimes conflated and used interchangeably. However, the acronym "PVS" is intended to define a "persistent vegetative state", without necessarily the connotations of permanence,[citation needed] and is used as such throughout this article. Bryan Jennett, who originally coined the term "persistent vegetative state", has now recommended using the UK division between continuous and permanent in his book The Vegetative State, arguing that "the 'persistent' component of this term ... may seem to suggest irreversibility".[10]
The Australian National Health and Medical Research Council has suggested "post coma unresponsiveness" as an alternative term for "vegetative state" in general.[11]
Lack of legal clarity
[edit]Unlike brain death, permanent vegetative state (PVS) is recognized by statute law as death in only a very few legal systems. In the US, courts have required petitions before termination of life support that demonstrate that any recovery of cognitive functions above a vegetative state is assessed as impossible by authoritative medical opinion.[12] In England, Wales and Scotland, the legal precedent for withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in cases of patients in a PVS was set in 1993 in the case of Tony Bland, who sustained catastrophic anoxic brain injury in the 1989 Hillsborough disaster.[5] An application to the Court of Protection is no longer required before nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn or withheld from PVS (or "minimally conscious", MCS) patients.[13]
This legal grey area has led to vocal advocates that those in PVS should be allowed to die. Others are equally determined that, if recovery is at all possible, care should continue. The existence of a small number of diagnosed PVS cases that have eventually resulted in improvement makes defining recovery as "impossible" particularly difficult in a legal sense.[7] This legal and ethical issue raises questions about autonomy, quality of life, appropriate use of resources, the wishes of family members, and professional responsibilities.
Signs and symptoms
[edit]Most PVS patients are unresponsive to external stimuli and their conditions are associated with different levels of consciousness. Some level of consciousness means a person can still respond, in varying degrees, to stimulation. A person in a coma, however, cannot. In addition, PVS patients often open their eyes in response to feeding, which has to be done by others; they are capable of swallowing, whereas patients in a coma subsist with their eyes closed.[14]
Cerebral cortical function (e.g. communication, thinking, purposeful movement, etc.) is lost while brainstem functions (e.g. breathing, maintaining circulation and hemodynamic stability, etc.) are preserved. Non-cognitive upper brainstem functions such as eye-opening, occasional vocalizations (e.g. crying, laughing), maintaining normal sleep patterns, and spontaneous non-purposeful movements often remain intact.
PVS patients' eyes might be in a relatively fixed position, or track moving objects, or move in a disconjugate (i.e., completely unsynchronized) manner. They may experience sleep-wake cycles, or be in a state of chronic wakefulness. They may exhibit some behaviors that can be construed as arising from partial consciousness, such as grinding their teeth, swallowing, smiling, shedding tears, grunting, moaning, or screaming without any apparent external stimulus.
Individuals in PVS are seldom on any life-sustaining equipment other than a feeding tube because the brainstem, the center of vegetative functions (such as heart rate and rhythm, respiration, and gastrointestinal activity) is relatively intact.[14]
Recovery
[edit]Many people emerge spontaneously from a vegetative state within a few weeks.[10] The chances of recovery depend on the extent of injury to the brain and the patient's age – younger patients having a better chance of recovery than older patients. A 1994 report found that of those who were in a vegetative state a month after a trauma, 54% had regained consciousness by a year after the trauma, whereas 28% had died and 18% were still in the vegetative state. For non-traumatic injuries such as strokes, only 14% had recovered consciousness at one year, 47% had died, and 39% were still vegetative. Patients who were vegetative six months after the initial event were much less likely to have recovered consciousness a year after the event than in the case of those who were simply reported vegetative at one month.[15] A New Scientist article from 2000 gives a pair of graphs[16] showing changes of patient status during the first 12 months after head injury and after incidents depriving the brain of oxygen.[17] After a year, the chances that a PVS patient will regain consciousness are very low[18] and most patients who do recover consciousness experience significant disability. The longer a patient is in a PVS, the more severe the resulting disabilities are likely to be. Rehabilitation can contribute to recovery, but many patients never progress to the point of being able to take care of themselves.
The medical literature also includes case reports of the recovery of a small number of patients following the removal of assisted respiration with cold oxygen.[19] The researchers found that in many nursing homes and hospitals unheated oxygen is given to non-responsive patients via tracheal intubation. This bypasses the warming of the upper respiratory tract and causes a chilling of aortic blood and chilling of the brain which the authors believe may contribute to the person's nonresponsive state. The researchers describe a small number of cases in which removal of the chilled oxygen was followed by recovery from the PVS and recommend either warming of oxygen with a heated nebulizer or removal of the assisted oxygen if it is no longer needed.[19] The authors further recommend additional research to determine if this chilling effect may either delay recovery or even may contribute to brain damage.
There are two dimensions of recovery from a persistent vegetative state: recovery of consciousness and recovery of function. Recovery of consciousness can be verified by reliable evidence of awareness of self and the environment, consistent voluntary behavioral responses to visual and auditory stimuli, and interaction with others. Recovery of function is characterized by communication, the ability to learn and to perform adaptive tasks, mobility, self-care, and participation in recreational or vocational activities. Recovery of consciousness may occur without functional recovery, but functional recovery cannot occur without recovery of consciousness.[20]
Causes
[edit]There are three main causes of PVS (persistent vegetative state):
- Acute traumatic brain injury
- Non-traumatic: neurodegenerative disorder or metabolic disorder of the brain
- Severe congenital abnormality of the central nervous system
Potential causes of PVS are:[21]
- Meningitis
- Encephalitis
- Increased intracranial pressure
- Brain tumor
- Brain abscess
- Ischemic stroke
- Intracerebral hemorrhage
- Subarachnoid hemorrhage
- Brain herniation
- Hypoxic-anoxic brain injury
- Toxins such as uremia, ethanol, atropine, opiates, lead, dimethylmercury, endrin, parathion, and colloidal silver[22]
- Physical trauma: Concussion, contusion, etc.
- Seizure, both nonconvulsive status epilepticus and postconvulsive state (postictal state)
- Electrolyte imbalance, which involves hypoxia, hyponatremia, hypernatremia, hypomagnesemia, hypoglycemia, hyperglycemia, hypercalcemia, and hypocalcemia
- Postinfectious: Acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM)
- Endocrine disorders such as adrenal insufficiency and thyroid disorders
- Degenerative and metabolic diseases including urea cycle disorders, Reye syndrome, and mitochondrial disease
- Systemic infection and sepsis
- Hepatic encephalopathy
In addition, these authors claim that doctors sometimes use the mnemonic device AEIOU-TIPS to recall portions of the differential diagnosis: Alcohol ingestion and acidosis, epilepsy and encephalopathy, infection, opiates, uremia, trauma, insulin overdose or inflammatory disorders, poisoning and psychogenic causes, and shock.
Diagnosis
[edit]Despite converging agreement about the definition of persistent vegetative state, recent reports have raised concerns about the accuracy of diagnosis in some patients, and the extent to which, in a selection of cases, residual cognitive functions may remain undetected and patients are diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state. Objective assessment of residual cognitive function can be extremely difficult as motor responses may be minimal, inconsistent, and difficult to document in many patients, or may be undetectable in others because no cognitive output is possible.[23] In recent years, a number of studies have demonstrated an important role for functional neuroimaging in the identification of residual cognitive function in persistent vegetative state; this technology is providing new insights into cerebral activity in patients with severe brain damage. Such studies, when successful, may be particularly useful where there is concern about the accuracy of the diagnosis and the possibility that residual cognitive function has remained undetected.
Diagnostic experiments
[edit]Researchers have begun to use functional neuroimaging studies to study implicit cognitive processing in patients with a clinical diagnosis of persistent vegetative state. Activations in response to sensory stimuli with positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and electrophysiological methods can provide information on the presence, degree, and location of any residual brain function. However, use of these techniques in people with severe brain damage is methodologically, clinically, and theoretically complex and needs careful quantitative analysis and interpretation.
For example, PET studies have shown the identification of residual cognitive function in persistent vegetative state. That is, an external stimulation, such as a painful stimulus, still activates "primary" sensory cortices in these patients but these areas are functionally disconnected from "higher order" associative areas needed for awareness. These results show that parts of the cortex are indeed still functioning in "vegetative" patients.[24]
In addition, other PET studies have revealed preserved and consistent responses in predicted regions of auditory cortex in response to intelligible speech stimuli. Moreover, a preliminary fMRI examination revealed partially intact responses to semantically ambiguous stimuli, which are known to tap higher aspects of speech comprehension.[25]
Furthermore, several studies have used PET to assess the central processing of noxious somatosensory stimuli in patients in PVS. Noxious somatosensory stimulation activated midbrain, contralateral thalamus, and primary somatosensory cortex in each and every PVS patient, even in the absence of detectable cortical evoked potentials. Somatosensory stimulation of PVS patients, at intensities that elicited pain in controls, resulted in increased neuronal activity in primary somatosensory cortex, even if resting brain metabolism was severely impaired. However, this activation of primary cortex seems to be isolated and dissociated from higher-order associative cortices.[26]
Also, there is evidence of partially functional cerebral regions in catastrophically injured brains. To study five patients in PVS with different behavioral features, researchers employed PET, MRI and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) responses to sensory stimulation. In three of the five patients, co-registered PET/MRI correlate areas of relatively preserved brain metabolism with isolated fragments of behavior. Two patients had had anoxic injuries and demonstrated marked decreases in overall cerebral metabolism to 30–40% of normal. Two other patients with non-anoxic, multifocal brain injuries demonstrated several isolated brain regions with higher metabolic rates, that ranged up to 50–80% of normal. Nevertheless, their global metabolic rates remained <50% of normal. MEG recordings from three PVS patients provide clear evidence for the absence, abnormality or reduction of evoked responses. Despite major abnormalities, however, these data also provide evidence for localized residual activity at the cortical level. Each patient partially preserved restricted sensory representations, as evidenced by slow evoked magnetic fields and gamma band activity. In two patients, these activations correlate with isolated behavioral patterns and metabolic activity. Remaining active regions identified in the three PVS patients with behavioral fragments appear to consist of segregated corticothalamic networks that retain connectivity and partial functional integrity. A single patient who sustained severe injury to the tegmental mesencephalon and paramedian thalamus showed widely preserved cortical metabolism, and a global average metabolic rate of 65% of normal. The relatively high preservation of cortical metabolism in this patient defines the first functional correlate of clinical–pathological reports associating permanent unconsciousness with structural damage to these regions. The specific patterns of preserved metabolic activity identified in these patients reflect novel evidence of the modular nature of individual functional networks that underlie conscious brain function. The variations in cerebral metabolism in chronic PVS patients indicate that some cerebral regions can retain partial function in catastrophically injured brains.[27]
Misdiagnoses
[edit]Statistical PVS misdiagnosis is common. An example study with 40 patients in the United Kingdom diagnosed with PVS reported 43% of the patients were considered to have been misdiagnosed, and another 33% had recovered whilst the study was underway.[28] Some PVS cases may actually be a misdiagnosis of patients being in an undiagnosed minimally conscious state.[29] Since the exact diagnostic criteria of the minimally conscious state were only formulated in 2002, there may be chronic patients diagnosed as PVS before the secondary notion of the minimally conscious state became known.
Whether or not there is any conscious awareness with a patient's vegetative state is a prominent issue. Three completely different aspects of this should be distinguished. First, some patients can be conscious simply because they are misdiagnosed (see above). In fact, they are not in vegetative states. Second, sometimes a patient was correctly diagnosed but is then examined during the early stages of recovery. Third, perhaps some day the notion itself of vegetative states will change so to include elements of conscious awareness. Inability to disentangle these three example cases causes confusion. An example of such confusion is the response to an experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging which revealed that a woman diagnosed with PVS was able to activate predictable portions of her brain in response to the tester's requests that she imagine herself playing tennis or moving from room to room in her house. The brain activity in response to these instructions was indistinguishable from those of healthy patients.[30][31][32]
In 2010, Martin Monti and fellow researchers, working at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit at the University of Cambridge, reported in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine[33] that some patients in persistent vegetative states responded to verbal instructions by displaying different patterns of brain activity on fMRI scans. Five out of a total of 54 diagnosed patients were apparently able to respond when instructed to think about one of two different physical activities. One of these five was also able to "answer" yes or no questions, again by imagining one of these two activities.[34] It is unclear, however, whether the fact that portions of the patients' brains light up on fMRI could help these patients assume their own medical decision making.[34]
In November 2011, a publication in The Lancet presented bedside EEG apparatus and indicated that its signal could be used to detect awareness in three of 16 patients diagnosed in the vegetative state.[35]
Treatment
[edit]Currently no treatment for vegetative state exists that would satisfy the efficacy criteria of evidence-based medicine. Several methods have been proposed which can roughly be subdivided into four categories: pharmacological methods, surgery, physical therapy, and various stimulation techniques. Pharmacological therapy mainly uses activating substances such as tricyclic antidepressants or methylphenidate. Mixed results have been reported using dopaminergic drugs such as amantadine and bromocriptine and stimulants such as dextroamphetamine.[36] Surgical methods such as deep brain stimulation are used less frequently due to the invasiveness of the procedures. Stimulation techniques include sensory stimulation, sensory regulation, music and musicokinetic therapy, social-tactile interaction, and cortical stimulation.[37]
Zolpidem
[edit]There is limited evidence that the hypnotic drug zolpidem has an effect.[37] The results of the few scientific studies that have been published so far on the effectiveness of zolpidem have been contradictory.[38][39]
Epidemiology
[edit]In the United States, it is estimated that there may be between 15,000 and 40,000 patients who are in a persistent vegetative state, but due to poor nursing home records exact figures are hard to determine.[40]
History
[edit]The syndrome was first described in 1940 by Ernst Kretschmer who called it apallic syndrome.[41] However the term vegetative had been attested to in the OED since 1764, then described as an organic body capable of growth and development but devoid of sensation and thought.[10] Thus the related term persistent vegetative state was coined in 1972 by Scottish spinal surgeon Bryan Jennett and American neurologist Fred Plum to describe a syndrome that seemed to have been made possible by medicine's increased capacities to keep patients' bodies alive.[10][42]
Society and culture
[edit]Ethics and policy
[edit]An ongoing debate exists as to how much care, if any, patients in a persistent vegetative state should receive in health systems plagued by limited resources. In a case before the New Jersey Superior Court, Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital, a community hospital sought a ruling that dialysis and CPR for such a patient constitutes futile care. An American bioethicist, Jacob M. Appel, argued that any money spent treating PVS patients would be better spent on other patients with a higher likelihood of recovery.[43] The patient died naturally prior to a decision in the case, resulting in the court finding the issue moot.
In 2010, British and Belgian researchers reported in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine that some patients in persistent vegetative states actually had enough consciousness to "answer" yes or no questions on fMRI scans.[34] However, it is unclear whether the fact that portions of the patients' brains light up on fMRI will help these patient assume their own medical decision making.[34] Professor Geraint Rees, Director of the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience at University College London, responded to the study by observing that, "As a clinician, it would be important to satisfy oneself that the individual that you are communicating with is competent to make those decisions. At the moment it is premature to conclude that the individual able to answer 5 out of 6 yes/no questions is fully conscious like you or I."[34] In contrast, Jacob M. Appel of the Mount Sinai Hospital told the Telegraph that this development could be a welcome step toward clarifying the wishes of such patients. Appel stated: "I see no reason why, if we are truly convinced such patients are communicating, society should not honour their wishes. In fact, as a physician, I think a compelling case can be made that doctors have an ethical obligation to assist such patients by removing treatment. I suspect that, if such individuals are indeed trapped in their bodies, they may be living in great torment and will request to have their care terminated or even active euthanasia."[34]
Notable cases
[edit]- Tony Bland – first patient in English legal history to be allowed to die
- Paul Brophy – first American to die after court authorization
- Sunny von Bülow – American heiress, socalite, and philanthropist. She lived almost 28 years in a persistent vegetative state until her death.
- Gustavo Cerati – Argentine singer-songwriter, composer, and producer who died after four years in a chronic disorder of consciousness state.
- Prichard Colón – Puerto Rican former professional boxer and gold medal winner who spent years in a vegetative state after a bout.
- Nancy Cruzan – American woman involved in a landmark United States Supreme Court case.
- Gary Dockery – American police officer who entered, emerged, and later reentered a persistent vegetative state.
- Eluana Englaro – Italian woman from Lecco who spent 17 years in a vegetative state until her death when a legal ruling authorized the removal of her feeding tube.
- Elaine Esposito – American woman who was a previous record holder for having spent 37 years in a chronic disorder of consciousness state.
- Lia Lee – Hmong girl who spent 26 years in a vegetative state after a seizure, and was the subject of a 1997 book by Anne Fadiman.
- Martin Pistorius – South African man whose vegetative state progressed to minimally conscious after 3 years, locked-in syndrome after another 4 years, and fully came out of a coma after another 5 years. He is now a web designer, developer, and author. In 2011, he wrote a book called Ghost Boy, in which he describes his many years of being in a state of chronic disorder of consciousness.
- Annie Shapiro – Canadian woman and survivor of a vegatative state after 29 total years of being comatose. In 1992, she awakened fully recovered and lived her last 10 years peacefully. Her case is the longest a person has been in a coma and recovered.
- Haleigh Poutre – American women at the center of a legal controversy regarding removal of life support.
- Karen Ann Quinlan – American women at center of right to die lawsuit.
- Terri Schiavo – American women at the center of a seven year legal battle between her husband and parents over whether to stop life sustaining measures.
- Aruna Shanbaug – Indian woman in persistent vegetative state for 42 years until her death. Owing to her case, the Supreme Court of India allowed passive euthanasia in the country.
- Ariel Sharon – Prime Minister of Israel (2001–2006). Was in a vegetative state after a stroke for 8 years until his death in 2014.[44]
- Chayito Valdez – Mexican singer and actress.
- Vice Vukov – Croatian singer and politician.
- Helga Wanglie – American women at center of legal battle between doctors and her family regarding life sustaining measures.
- Otto Warmbier - American college student whose parents requested his life support to be removed after being evacuated from the Pyongyang Friendship Hospital to Cincinnati in a vegetative state following an arrest during a tourist trip.
See also
[edit]- Anencephaly
- Brain death
- Botulism
- Catatonia
- Karolina Olsson
- Locked-in syndrome
- Process-oriented coma work, an approach to working with residual consciousness in patients in comatose and persistent vegetative states
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- ^ Dolce G, Sazbon L (2002). The post-traumatic vegetative state. Thieme. ISBN 978-1-58890-116-3.
- ^ a b Georgiopoulos M, Katsakiori P, Kefalopoulou Z, Ellul J, Chroni E, Constantoyannis C (2010). "Vegetative state and minimally conscious state: a review of the therapeutic interventions". Stereotactic and Functional Neurosurgery. 88 (4): 199–207. doi:10.1159/000314354. PMID 20460949.
- ^ Snyman N, Egan JR, London K, Howman-Giles R, Gill D, Gillis J, Scheinberg A (October 2010). "Zolpidem for persistent vegetative state--a placebo-controlled trial in pediatrics". Neuropediatrics. 41 (5): 223–37. doi:10.1055/s-0030-1269893. PMID 21210338. S2CID 24173900.
- ^ Whyte J, Myers R (May 2009). "Incidence of clinically significant responses to zolpidem among patients with disorders of consciousness: a preliminary placebo controlled trial". American Journal of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation. 88 (5): 410–18. doi:10.1097/PHM.0b013e3181a0e3a0. PMID 19620954. S2CID 19666318.
- ^ Hirsch J (May 2005). "Raising consciousness". The Journal of Clinical Investigation. 115 (5): 1102. doi:10.1172/JCI25320. PMC 1087197. PMID 15864333.
- ^ Kretschmer E (1940). "Das apallische Syndrom". Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie. 169: 576–79. doi:10.1007/BF02871384.
- ^ Jennett B, Plum F (April 1972). "Persistent vegetative state after brain damage. A syndrome in search of a name". Lancet. 1 (7753): 734–37. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(72)90242-5. PMID 4111204.
- ^ Pope TM (23 June 2010). "Appel on Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital". Medical Futility Blog.
- ^ "Former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon dies after eight-year coma | Ariel Sharon | The Guardian". www.theguardian.com. Retrieved 2025-08-28.
This article contains text from the NINDS public domain pages on TBI. [1] Archived 2005-10-19 at the Wayback Machine and [2].
Further reading
[edit]- Sarà M, Sacco S, Cipolla F, Onorati P, Scoppetta C, Albertini G, Carolei A (January 2007). "An unexpected recovery from permanent vegetative state". Brain Injury. 21 (1): 101–03. doi:10.1080/02699050601151761. PMID 17364525. S2CID 22730610.
- Canavero S, Massa-Micon B, Cauda F, Montanaro E (May 2009). "Bifocal extradural cortical stimulation-induced recovery of consciousness in the permanent post-traumatic vegetative state". Journal of Neurology. 256 (5): 834–36. doi:10.1007/s00415-009-5019-4. PMID 19252808. S2CID 17087007.
- Canavero S, ed. (2009). Textbook of therapeutic cortical stimulation. New York: Nova Science. ISBN 978-1-60692-537-9.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - Canavero S, Massa-Micon B, Cauda F, Montanaro E (May 2009). "Bifocal extradural cortical stimulation-induced recovery of consciousness in the permanent post-traumatic vegetative state". Journal of Neurology. 256 (5): 834–36. doi:10.1007/s00415-009-5019-4. PMID 19252808. S2CID 17087007.
- Connolly K (23 November 2009). "Car crash victim trapped in a coma for 23 years was conscious". The Guardian.
- Machado C, Estévez M, Rodríguez R, Pérez-Nellar J, Gutiérrez J, Carballo M, Olivares A, Fleitas M, Pando A, Beltrán C (January 2012). "A Cuban perspective on management of persistent vegetative state". MEDICC Review. 14 (1): 44–48. doi:10.37757/MR2012V14.N1.3. PMID 22334112.
Vegetative state
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Terminology
Core Medical Definition
A vegetative state is a disorder of consciousness in which patients exhibit wakefulness, evidenced by preserved sleep-wake cycles and eye-opening, but demonstrate no behavioral signs of awareness of themselves or their environment, nor any purposeful or voluntary interaction with external stimuli.[2] This condition arises from severe brain injury disrupting higher cortical functions while sparing subcortical arousal systems, such as those in the brainstem and diencephalon, allowing reflexive autonomic and motor responses but precluding integrated cognition or volition.[13] The term "persistent vegetative state" applies when the condition endures beyond one month, though prognosis varies by etiology, with traumatic causes showing potential for recovery up to 12 months post-injury and non-traumatic up to three months.[14] Core diagnostic criteria, per the 1994 Multi-Society Task Force consensus, require: (1) no awareness of self or environment and inability to interact with others; (2) no sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli; (3) no language comprehension or expression; (4) intermittent wakefulness with sleep-wake cycles; (5) preserved hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions sufficient for survival with supportive care; (6) bowel and bladder continence; and (7) variably preserved cranial-nerve and spinal reflexes.[2] These criteria emphasize behavioral observation over neuroimaging alone, as arousal without responsiveness distinguishes the state from coma (lacking wakefulness) and minimally conscious states (showing inconsistent but discernible awareness).[15] Misdiagnosis risks exist due to subtle fluctuations or medication effects, necessitating repeated assessments by trained examiners.[16] In 2010, the term "unresponsive wakefulness syndrome" was proposed to replace "vegetative state" for its less pejorative connotations while retaining the clinical essence of dissociated wakefulness and unawareness, reflecting evolving ethical considerations in neurology without altering diagnostic thresholds.[13] Empirical validation of these definitions relies on standardized scales like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, which operationalize criteria through structured testing of auditory, visual, motor, oromotor, communication, and arousal domains, confirming absence of command-following, localization, or object manipulation indicative of awareness.[17] This framework prioritizes observable, reproducible behaviors as proxies for underlying neural integrity, grounded in the causal disconnection between preserved reticular activating system function and impaired thalamocortical connectivity.[18]Evolution of Terms and Classifications
The term "persistent vegetative state" was introduced in 1972 by Scottish neurosurgeon Bryan Jennett and American neurologist Fred Plum to describe patients who had emerged from coma but exhibited no behavioral evidence of awareness, while retaining sleep-wake cycles and reflexive motor functions.[19][2] This nomenclature emphasized the preservation of "vegetative" autonomic processes, such as breathing and digestion, akin to brainstem-mediated functions, distinguishing the condition from coma (total unarousability) or brain death.[19] The phrase drew from earlier, sporadic uses of "vegetative" in neurology to denote mindless vitality, but Jennett and Plum formalized it as a syndrome of wakeful unresponsiveness following severe brain injury.[20] In 1994, the Multi-Society Task Force on the Persistent Vegetative State refined classifications, defining "persistent" as lasting at least one month post-coma and introducing "permanent" for cases deemed irreversible—typically after 12 months for nontraumatic etiologies or three months for traumatic ones, based on recovery data showing negligible improvement beyond those thresholds.[2] This temporal distinction aimed to guide prognosis and ethical decisions, supported by longitudinal studies indicating that 50-70% of patients in PVS due to trauma might partially recover within the first year, versus far lower rates thereafter.[2] However, the adjective "persistent" was later dropped in favor of simply "vegetative state" (VS) for durations exceeding four weeks, reflecting a shift toward behavioral criteria over strict timelines in bodies like the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine.[21] Criticism of "vegetative state" mounted due to its pejorative implications, evoking dehumanizing imagery of plant-like existence and potentially biasing public and clinical perceptions toward futility, despite evidence from neuroimaging suggesting covert cognition in some cases.[13] In 2010, the European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness proposed replacing it with "unresponsive wakefulness syndrome" (UWS) to focus on observable lack of responsiveness amid preserved wakefulness, avoiding emotive language while maintaining diagnostic fidelity.[13][21] UWS and VS are now often used interchangeably in peer-reviewed literature, with UWS gaining traction in European guidelines for its neutrality, though VS persists in American standards; both require exclusion of awareness via standardized scales like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised.[22][21] This terminological evolution reflects ongoing tensions between precise neurobehavioral description and ethical avoidance of stigma, informed by advances in functional MRI revealing potential misdiagnosis rates of up to 40% under behavioral assessment alone.[21]Distinctions from Related Disorders of Consciousness
The vegetative state, also termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, is distinguished from coma by the presence of arousal without behavioral evidence of awareness. In coma, both arousal and awareness are absent, with patients exhibiting no spontaneous eye opening, sleep-wake cycles, or response to stimuli beyond basic reflexes; this state typically lasts days to weeks following severe brain injury.[23] In contrast, vegetative state patients demonstrate preserved brainstem-mediated arousal, including intermittent eye opening and diurnal sleep-wake patterns, but display only reflexive or spontaneous behaviors uncorrelated with the environment, such as grimacing or limb withdrawal to pain, without purposeful interaction.[6][3]| Condition | Arousal (e.g., Eye Opening, Sleep-Wake Cycles) | Awareness (Behavioral Evidence) | Distinguishing Clinical Features |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coma | Absent | Absent | Unarousable; no brainstem reflexes in prolonged cases; often evolves to vegetative state if recovery occurs.[23] |
| Vegetative State | Present | Absent | Reflexive movements only; no contingent responses to commands or environment.[6] |
| Minimally Conscious State | Present | Fluctuating, minimal | Purposeful behaviors like following simple commands or visual pursuit, inconsistent but reproducible.[6][3] |
| Locked-in Syndrome | Present | Intact | Preserved cognition and volition; vertical eye movements or blinking for communication; motor pathways disrupted (e.g., ventral brainstem lesion).[24][25] |
| Brain Death | Absent | Absent (irreversible) | No brainstem function; apnea, absent pupillary/corneal reflexes; legally equivalent to death.[26] |
Pathophysiology and Causes
Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness Loss
In the vegetative state, also termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, consciousness loss arises from a dissociation between preserved arousal mechanisms and disrupted higher-order cortical integration required for awareness. Arousal, enabling sleep-wake cycles and eye opening, is maintained by the intact ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) in the brainstem, which projects diffusely to the thalamus and cortex to sustain vigilance without necessitating cognitive content.[29][30] Damage to this system typically precludes the vegetative state, as seen in deeper comas or brain death.[31] Awareness, conversely, depends on thalamocortical loops that integrate sensory, attentional, and executive functions across distributed networks. In vegetative states, severe bilateral lesions or diffuse axonal injury—often from trauma, anoxia, or vascular events—severely impair these loops, leading to functional disconnection between thalamic relays and cortical association areas such as the prefrontal, premotor, and parietotemporal regions.[32] Positron emission tomography (PET) studies reveal hypometabolism in these zones, with particularly reduced regional cerebral metabolic rates for glucose (rCMRGlu) in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus, hubs of the default mode network (DMN) implicated in self-referential processing and internal mentation.[32][33] This disconnection manifests as bistable cortical dynamics akin to sleep-like OFF-periods during wakefulness, where neuronal ensembles fail to sustain causal interactions and complexity, as evidenced by transcranial magnetic stimulation-electroencephalography (TMS-EEG) perturbations showing diminished propagation and reduced perturbational complexity index values compared to healthy or minimally conscious states.[34] Functional MRI (fMRI) corroborates this with global reductions in between-network connectivity, particularly in thalamocortical and frontoparietal pathways, yielding loosely structured brain graphs that preclude the integrated information theorized necessary for phenomenal experience.[35] Recovery trajectories often correlate with reconnection of these pathways, as ARAS-cortical tract integrity improves in patients emerging to minimally conscious states.[36] Empirical models emphasize that consciousness loss is not merely quantitative (e.g., metabolic suppression) but qualitative, involving breakdown in recurrent processing and feedback loops that enable content-specific representation. For instance, while reflexive brainstem-mediated responses persist, the absence of PCC self-inhibition and oscillatory disruptions prevent the global ignition of conscious percepts.[37] These mechanisms underscore why vegetative states resist simple arousal enhancement; interventions like deep brain stimulation targeting thalamic nuclei aim to restore loop integrity but yield variable outcomes due to underlying structural heterogeneity.[38]Primary Etiologies and Risk Factors
The vegetative state most commonly arises from severe brain injuries that disrupt higher cortical functions while sparing brainstem arousal mechanisms. Primary etiologies are broadly classified as traumatic or nontraumatic, with traumatic causes accounting for approximately 30-50% of cases in adults, often linked to diffuse axonal injury and secondary hemorrhages from high-impact events such as motor vehicle collisions or falls.[2] Nontraumatic etiologies predominate in older populations and include hypoxic-ischemic insults from cardiac arrest or near-drowning, which lead to widespread neuronal death due to oxygen deprivation lasting beyond 5-10 minutes.[2] [39] Vascular events, such as ischemic strokes or intracerebral hemorrhages affecting the thalamus and cortex, represent another key nontraumatic pathway, particularly in individuals over 60 years with hypertension or atrial fibrillation.[39] Infectious processes like viral encephalitis or bacterial meningitis can precipitate the state through cerebral edema and necrosis, while metabolic derangements—such as profound hypoglycemia or hyperammonemia in liver failure—disrupt neuronal metabolism selectively in vulnerable regions.[2] Less frequently, primary brain tumors or degenerative conditions like end-stage dementia contribute, though these rarely isolate wakefulness from awareness without confounding comorbidities.[2] Risk factors amplify susceptibility across etiologies. For traumatic origins, male sex, age under 40, and behaviors involving alcohol intoxication or high-speed activities elevate incidence, as evidenced by epidemiological data showing motor vehicle crashes as the leading precipitant in younger cohorts.[2] Nontraumatic risks include cardiovascular disease predisposing to anoxic events, with diabetes and substance abuse disorders increasing coma vulnerability through glycemic instability or respiratory depression.[40] Advanced age correlates with poorer tissue resilience to insults, while premorbid conditions like epilepsy heighten seizure-related hypoxic risks.[41] Overall, the severity and duration of the initial brain insult—measured by Glasgow Coma Scale scores below 8—serve as the strongest predictors of progression to persistent vegetative state.[2]Clinical Presentation
Observable Signs and Behavioral Patterns
Patients in a vegetative state, also termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, exhibit preserved arousal mechanisms manifesting as spontaneous eye opening and sleep-wake cycles, yet demonstrate no behavioral evidence of awareness of self or environment.[30][13] Eye opening occurs periodically without relation to external stimuli or internal volition, often accompanied by roving eye movements characterized by slow, constant velocity trajectories lacking saccadic jerks, fixation, or pursuit of objects.[30] These cycles reflect brainstem integrity but do not correlate with environmental cues or circadian entrainment.[30] Behavioral repertoire is restricted to reflexive and spontaneous actions without purposeful intent or reproducibility in response to commands. Common patterns include primitive limb movements, such as grasping upon direct contact, and brainstem-mediated reflexes like yawning, chewing, swallowing, or guttural vocalizations.[30] Responses to noxious stimuli typically elicit stereotyped motor patterns, including decorticate or decerebrate posturing, without localization, withdrawal, or avoidance behaviors indicative of comprehension.[30] Startle reflexes may occur to intense auditory or visual inputs, such as loud noises or bright lights, but these are inconsistent and non-adaptive.[30] Absence of key awareness markers defines the pattern: no sustained visual tracking, no oriented head turns toward stimuli, and no command-following, such as finger or limb movement on verbal request.[13][17] Occasional quasi-voluntary appearances, like transient smiling or frowning, arise from reflexive arcs rather than emotional processing.[30] These signs collectively distinguish vegetative state from minimally conscious state, where reproducible, contingent behaviors emerge.[17]Indicators of Potential Awareness
Subtle behavioral fluctuations in patients classified as vegetative state (also termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) may signal potential awareness, though these often fail to meet standardized diagnostic thresholds for minimally conscious state due to inconsistency or subtlety. Examples include sporadic visual fixation or pursuit of objects, localization toward auditory or noxious stimuli, resistance to passive eye opening, and variations in spontaneous blink rates exceeding reflexive norms.[42] [43] In a cohort of severe brain injury patients transitioning from unresponsive wakefulness, visual fixation emerged as the predominant initial sign (observed in 57% of cases), followed by localization to noxious stimulation (27%), typically as isolated indicators rather than clusters.[43] Such responses, when reproducible under controlled conditions, challenge pure vegetative diagnoses but require repeated validation to distinguish from reflexive or stochastic activity.[44] Neuroimaging modalities provide stronger empirical indicators of covert awareness, detecting volitional brain activity absent in overt behavior. Functional MRI (fMRI) paradigms elicit command-following by instructing patients to imagine specific actions, such as playing tennis (activating premotor and parietal regions) or navigating spatial environments (engaging hippocampal and parahippocampal areas), yielding activation patterns akin to those in healthy controls.[45] A landmark 2006 study identified this capacity in a 23-year-old woman in vegetative state for five months post-trauma, with reproducible responses across sessions.[45] Subsequent research estimates covert awareness in 10-20% of behaviorally unresponsive patients, with multi-task fMRI paradigms (e.g., semantic processing or mental arithmetic) enhancing sensitivity beyond single tasks.[46] [47] Electroencephalography (EEG) offers a portable alternative for bedside detection, capturing event-related potentials or spectral changes indicative of intentional processing. In a 2011 cohort study of 16 vegetative patients, EEG motor imagery tasks (e.g., imagining hand movements) revealed command-following in three (19%), with brain signals matching instructed conditions and distinguishing from artifacts.61224-5/fulltext) High-density EEG further corroborates this, identifying covert responses in up to 15% of cases unresponsive to behavioral scales like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised.[48] Combining EEG with fMRI across modalities raises detection rates, as discrepant results in single tests may reflect task-specific impairments rather than absent awareness.[47] These findings underscore neural dissociation between behavioral output and internal cognition, though false positives from residual automation remain a methodological concern addressed via statistical thresholding and replication.[49]Diagnosis
Standard Behavioral Assessments
The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) serves as the primary standardized tool for behavioral assessment in diagnosing vegetative state, evaluating auditory, visual, motor, oromotor/feeding, communication, and arousal functions through hierarchical scoring of responses to sensory stimuli and commands.[50] Scores below specific thresholds, such as total CRS-R ≤2 on arousal and no higher than reflexive responses on other subscales, indicate vegetative state by confirming preserved wakefulness without evidence of awareness or purposeful behavior.[16] Developed in 2004 and validated for reliability in trained hands, the CRS-R requires 30-60 minutes per administration and repeated testing over multiple sessions to account for fluctuating arousal and inconsistent responses.[51] Key subscales include auditory (e.g., response to spoken commands or sounds, scored from no response to accurate localization) and motor (e.g., progression from no movement to functional object use), where vegetative state is characterized by absence of command-following or contingent behaviors.[52] Visual subscale tests fixation or tracking, and oromotor assesses oral reflexes without volitional swallowing; low scores across these domains support vegetative diagnosis when combined with clinical history of severe brain injury.[53] The scale's inter-rater reliability exceeds 0.90 when standardized protocols are followed, outperforming unstructured clinical observation in detecting subtle signs that might indicate minimally conscious state instead.[50] Other assessments, such as the Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Treatment (SMART), supplement CRS-R by focusing on multimodal sensory responses but lack the same breadth for differential diagnosis.[54] Routine behavioral exams emphasize excluding confounds like sedation or fatigue, with assessments conducted during optimal arousal periods; failure to demonstrate reproducible, non-reflexive behaviors—such as oriented eye movements or gesture replication—reinforces vegetative state classification.[55] These tools prioritize empirical observation of causal links between stimuli and outputs, avoiding overinterpretation of ambiguous reflexes as awareness.[56]Advanced Neuroimaging and Functional Tests
Advanced neuroimaging and functional tests address limitations of behavioral assessments, which can miss covert awareness in up to 40% of cases diagnosed as vegetative state (VS) or unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS).[7] These techniques probe neural activation, metabolism, and connectivity to differentiate VS/UWS from minimally conscious state (MCS) and detect hidden command-following or sensory processing.[28] Functional MRI (fMRI) paradigms, such as mental imagery tasks requiring patients to alternately imagine playing tennis or navigating a familiar route, have revealed volitional brain activity in non-communicative individuals, indicating preserved consciousness despite absent behavioral signs.[57] A 2006 study by Owen et al. first demonstrated this in a 23-year-old woman in apparent VS post-trauma, with activation in supplementary motor and parahippocampal regions matching healthy controls.[58] Positron emission tomography (PET), particularly with [18F]FDG, assesses cerebral glucose metabolism to identify preserved thalamocortical networks, which are disrupted in VS/UWS but relatively intact in MCS.[59] A 2024 meta-analysis of 18 studies found FDG-PET sensitivity of 93% and specificity of 94% for distinguishing MCS from VS/UWS, outperforming structural MRI.[60] In prognostic contexts, higher metabolic rates in prefrontal and precuneus regions correlate with recovery potential, as seen in longitudinal data from traumatic brain injury cohorts.[61] Electroencephalography (EEG) provides a portable alternative, measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) like mismatch negativity or P300 to auditory stimuli, which signal implicit awareness. Recent analyses of EEG entropy and dynamic complexity patterns differentiate VS/UWS from MCS with accuracies up to 85% in small cohorts, leveraging machine learning on resting-state data.[58][28] Despite these advances, implementation challenges persist: fMRI requires stable patients and specialized centers, with reproducibility varying across studies due to heterogeneous etiologies (e.g., anoxic vs. traumatic).[62] Only 5-20% of behaviorally diagnosed VS/UWS patients show detectable fMRI responses, underscoring that negative findings do not rule out consciousness.[57] PET's radiation exposure limits serial use, while EEG's sensitivity to artifacts demands expertise. Multimodal integration—combining fMRI, PET, and EEG—enhances diagnostic precision, as evidenced by a 2024 clinical protocol achieving 90% agreement with behavioral revisions in 50 patients.[63] These tests inform ethical decisions on life support but remain adjunctive, not replacing Coma Recovery Scale-Revised as the gold standard.[64] Ongoing trials emphasize standardization to mitigate false positives from confounds like residual muscle activity.[61]Misdiagnosis Prevalence and Consequences
Misdiagnosis of the vegetative state (VS), now termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), primarily involves classifying patients with minimal conscious state (MCS) or emerging MCS as UWS due to reliance on behavioral observation alone, which fails to detect inconsistent or subtle signs of awareness. A retrospective analysis of 40 patients referred for presumed VS in a UK rehabilitation unit found that 43% (17 patients) were misdiagnosed, with purposeful responses to stimuli evident upon systematic re-evaluation, including following simple commands and localization of pain.[65] Similar rates have been reported in subsequent studies, with informal bedside assessments yielding misdiagnosis errors up to 40%, often because examiners overlook fluctuating arousal or non-reflexive behaviors.[66] A 2020 multicenter study of prolonged disorders of consciousness confirmed a 35.3% misdiagnosis rate when comparing initial clinical consensus to repeated standardized behavioral scales like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R).[67] These errors persist despite diagnostic guidelines, as single or infrequent assessments by non-specialists contribute to false negatives for consciousness, with rates of undetected MCS in presumed UWS patients ranging from 37% to 43% across multiple cohorts evaluated with validated tools.[5] Factors exacerbating prevalence include assessor inexperience, lack of standardized protocols, and assumption of reflex-only activity in patients with preserved wakefulness cycles but no overt responsiveness. Recent data indicate that even in specialized settings, up to 41% of UWS cases may harbor undetected conscious processing when advanced behavioral testing is applied repeatedly.[68] Consequences of misdiagnosis are profound, often leading to therapeutic nihilism where potentially recoverable patients are denied targeted rehabilitation, which has shown efficacy in promoting functional gains for MCS individuals. Unlike true UWS, where long-term recovery is rare, misdiagnosed MCS patients demonstrate improvement in over one-third of cases beyond one year post-coma, including transitions to higher consciousness levels and reduced dependency.[69] Premature withdrawal of life-sustaining measures, informed by erroneous UWS labels, risks hastening death in patients capable of awareness or emergence, as evidenced by cases where re-diagnosis revealed command-following abilities post-initial assessment.[5] Such errors also strain ethical decision-making, potentially overriding family advocacy for continued care and contributing to legal disputes over prognosis accuracy, while underutilizing resources like sensory stimulation programs that could mitigate secondary complications such as contractures or infections in responsive patients.[7] Overall, these diagnostic pitfalls underscore the need for multimodal confirmation to avoid irreversible harms from conflating reflexive wakefulness with absent consciousness.Prognosis and Outcomes
Prognostic Indicators and Trajectories
Prognostic outcomes in vegetative state (VS), also termed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, are influenced primarily by etiology, with traumatic brain injury (TBI) associated with substantially higher rates of consciousness recovery compared to non-traumatic causes such as anoxic or hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy.[70][9] In adults with TBI-induced VS, approximately 52% regain consciousness within one year, whereas only 15% do so following non-traumatic etiologies.[70] Younger age further improves prognosis across etiologies, with patients under 40 years exhibiting higher recovery probabilities than older individuals.[70][9] Duration of VS serves as a critical temporal indicator, with recovery likelihood diminishing markedly over time; for TBI, consciousness recovery rates are 78% by 12 months but rare beyond that threshold, while non-traumatic VS shows 17% recovery by six months and only 7.5% by 24 months.[9] The American Academy of Neurology defines permanent VS as persisting beyond 12 months post-TBI or three months post-non-traumatic injury in adults, reflecting near-absent further improvement.[70][9] Clinical assessments, such as the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R), provide behavioral indicators; higher motor scores (e.g., withdrawal to pain) correlate with favorable outcomes, while cognitive-motor dissociation—detectable via command-following on neuroimaging despite absent behavioral responses—predicts functional recovery with an odds ratio of 4.6 at one year.[71] Advanced neurophysiological tests enhance prognostic accuracy beyond behavioral evaluation alone. Electroencephalography (EEG) reactivity, including task-based paradigms, yields 65-83% sensitivity and 79-86% specificity for predicting consciousness emergence, outperforming resting-state measures in some models.[72] Functional MRI (fMRI) task-based activation shows 79% sensitivity and 84% specificity, with hybrid models combining EEG and fMRI achieving up to 87% sensitivity and 89% specificity.[72] These modalities identify preserved thalamocortical connectivity, a marker of recovery potential absent in profound VS cases.[71]| Etiology | Consciousness Recovery at 1 Year (Adults) | Good Functional Recovery at 1 Year (Adults) |
|---|---|---|
| Traumatic (TBI) | 52%[70] | 7%[70] |
| Non-Traumatic (e.g., Anoxic) | 15%[70] | <1%[70] |
