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Federalization of Syria
Federalization of Syria
Federalization of Syria
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Part of a series on
the Syrian civil war
Syrian peace process
History
Start of Syrian Revolution2011
Arab League initiatives I and II2011–12
Churkin peace plan2012
Kofi Annan peace plan (Geneva I)2012
Lakhdar Brahimi peace plan2012
U.S.–Russia peace proposal (2013)2013
Geneva II Mideast peace conference2014
Staffan de Mistura peace plan2015
Zabadani agreement2015
Vienna talks2015
Geneva III2016
US-Russia ceasefire proposal (2016)2016
Geneva IV2017
Idlib demilitarization2018
Northern Syria Buffer Zone2019
Second Northern Syria Buffer Zone2019
Syrian Constitutional Committee2019
Syrian-Turkish normalization2022–24
Fall of the Assad regime2024
Syrian caretaker government2024–25
Syrian Revolution Victory Conference2025
Syrian National Dialogue Conference2025
Syrian transitional government2025
Primary concerns
Secondary concerns
Peace brokers
Proposals
Projects
States directly involved in the Peace Process
Syrian Arab Republic
(Syrian caretaker government and Syrian transitional government)
Rojava
Supreme Legal Committee in Suwayda
Governorates and districts of Syria
Governorates and districts of Syria
Map of Syrian Civil War
Syrian Civil War frontlines until the opposition offensives of 2024
De facto cantons of Rojava (2016)
The regions of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

Proposals for the federalization of Syria were made early during the Syrian Civil War,[1] were implemented in the mostly Kurdish north and east regions of Syria,[2] and a federalized or decentralised structure was called for by groups in several parts of Syria in 2025.[3][4]

The Rojava conflict led to Kurdish-dominated regions becoming a self-governing federation, Rojava, with a constitution written in 2014,[2] and revised in 2016[5] and 2023,[6] each time stating that Rojava (Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, DAANES, in the 2023 version) was part of the Syrian state.[6] As of 2016, there was little support for federalization[7][8] outside of Rojava.[9]

Following the late 2024 fall of the Assad regime, Rojava started negotiations with the Syrian transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa on integration of Rojava with the rest of Syrian state structures, with an eight-point agreement signed on 10 March 2025[10] and continued intentions for a decentralised national structure as of late August 2025.[3] In late August 2025, Hikmat al-Hijri called for an autonomous Druze region in the Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria and Alawite groups created the Political Council for Central and Western Syria (PCCWS) that explicitly called for a secular, federalised structure for Syria.[4]

Proposals during the Syrian Civil War

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Federalisation was proposed during the Syrian Civil War as a way of ending the war.[1][7][9][8][11] In the broadest sense, it means turning the centralized Syria into a federal republic with autonomous subdivisions. Many powers and actors involved in the Syrian Civil War have entertained the idea of "federal division", not least among them Russia, United Nations representatives, the United States[9] and Israel.[12] Bashar al-Assad during his rule had publicly rejected the idea of federalism, asserting that the Arab majority in Syria is opposed to such proposals.[a] Most of the neighbouring countries in the region have also dismissed the proposal, including the members of the Arab League and Turkey.[18][19]

Since federalization could more or less follow ethnic and possibly also religious-sectarian lines, it was dismissed as "division of the country" and "Balkanization" by its opponents.[7][8] While Assad remained in power, most factions of the Syrian opposition, such as the Syrian National Council and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, consistently rejected the idea of federalization.[20] On the other hand, Kurdish opposition parties strongly promoted the idea.[9] The Egypt-based opposition party Syria's Tomorrow Movement takes an intermediate position.[21][22]

Timeline

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On 17 March 2016, representatives of the regions of north and east Syria, which had been autonomous cantons since 2014, following the Rojava conflict, declared the region to be a federation of autonomous cantons modelled after the cantons of Switzerland; Afrin Canton, Jazira Canton and Kobanî Canton, as well as the Shahba region. The federation (also called Rojava) is considered by its protagonists to be a model for Syria as a whole.[23] Rojava representatives negotiated successive versions of the region's constitution in 2014,[2] 2016,[5] and 2023,[6] with each version stating that Rojava was part of the Syrian state. The 2023 version named the region's governing system to be the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).[6]

In 2016, Rojava's federalisation was dismissed by the Syrian government and disapproved of by Turkey and the United States.[24]

In September 2016, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, came out in an interview as one of the first regional politicians taking a public stand for the federalization of Syria. He said that the establishment of a federal system in Syria would "guarantee to preserve the institutions and unity" and that a federal system would be "the most appropriate solution and will protect the country from destruction."[25]

In October 2016, a Russian initiative for federalization with a focus on northern Syria was reported, which at its core called for the existing institutions of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria to be recognised by the Syrian government, which rejected the call.[26]

After multilateral peace talks in Astana in January 2017, Russia offered a draft for a future constitution of Syria, which would inter alia turn the "Syrian Arab Republic" into the "Republic of Syria", introduce decentralized authorities as well as elements of federalism like "association areas", strengthen the parliament at the cost of the presidency, and realize secularism by abolishing Islamic jurisprudence as a source of legislation.[27][28][29][30] The same month, United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said that "implementation of a Dayton style accord in Syria and introduction of some form of a federal solution in Syria (...) may indeed be the right way forward or the only way forward in the end of all this."[31]

Post-Assad

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Northern and eastern Syria

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See also: SDF–Syrian transitional government clashes (2025–present) § Syria–SDF, and Syrian peace process § Post-Assad negotiations

Following the late 2024 fall of the Assad regime, Rojava started negotiations with the Syrian transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, with a first meeting on 31 December 2024.[32] The East Aleppo offensive (2024–2025) led to an eight-point agreement signed on 10 March 2025 between Rojava and the al-Sharaa government, of which the fourth point declared the "integration of all civil and military institutions of North-East Syria into the administration of the Syrian state".[10]

In August 2025, Rojava representatives discussed "democratic integration within a decentralised system for Syria" with US officials and plans for meetings between Rojava and al-Sharaa government representatives continued.[3] On 31 August, Sipan Hemo of the SDF General Command stated his view that the al-Sharaa government "lack[s] the awareness" of what democratic integration would mean. He interpreted the March massacres of Alawites, the southern Syria clashes and the exclusion of DAANES and the Suwayda region from the 2025 Syrian parliamentary election as showing that the al-Sharaa government "lacks a democratic integration mindset" and "monopolize[s] everything without consulting anyone", while the SDF "want[s] to build a democratic Syria that expresses the will of all components, Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Armenians, and others, where they can represent themselves".[33]

Southern Syria

[edit]

On 25 August 2025, following the Southern Syria clashes, Hikmat al-Hijri called for autonomy of a Druze region in the Suwayda Governorate, while a Jabal al-Druze spokesperson, Fadi Badriya, stated that the Druze were "demanding independence and separation".[4]

Central and western Syria

[edit]

On 27 August 2025, Alawite representatives declared the creation of the Political Council of Central and Western Syria (PCCWS[4]), intended to represent residents of Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and parts of Hama, which called for federalisation of Syria. It referred to the al-Sharaa government as a "terrorist system that seized power at a particular political moment".[34] According to Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the PCCWS calls for secular, human rights based administration including executive, legislative and judicial authorities and calls for referring suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court with the aim of transitional justice.[35]

Historical antecedents

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Map showing the states of the French Mandate from 1921 to 1922

During the French mandate, Syria was subdivided into various autonomous entities, most of which bore the designation "state" (in French État; in Arabic Dawlat):

These autonomous entities did not correspond to the administrative division of Ottoman Syria. France ceded Hatay to Turkey in 1939, and Lebanon became an independent state (separate from the rest of Syria) in 1945.

See also

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Notes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Federalization of Syria

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![Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi.jpg][float-right]
The federalization of Syria refers to a series of proposals and partial implementations aimed at the unitary Syrian state into a federal system with autonomous regions, primarily to address ethnic, sectarian, and regional grievances intensified by the (2011–2024) and the subsequent overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's in December 2024. Early ideas emerged during the conflict to devolve power to areas like the Kurdish-majority northeast, where the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES, or Rojava) established semi-autonomous cantons controlling approximately one-third of Syrian territory and much of its oil resources by 2025. Following Assad's fall, led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under Ahmed al-Sharaa, the transitional government explicitly rejected federalism in favor of a centralized structure, declaring "no division of Syria in any form" while initiating negotiations for integrating Rojava under Damascus's authority. This stance has sparked debates over stability, with proponents arguing federalism could equitably distribute power amid Syria's diverse demographics—Arabs (87%), Kurds (10%), and others—preventing renewed conflict, while critics warn it risks permanent fragmentation along sectarian lines akin to Iraq or Yugoslavia. As of 2025, Syria's transitional constitutional framework emphasizes local governance without formal federal units, though U.S.-backed Kurdish forces retain control in the east, complicating unification efforts.

Historical Antecedents

Ottoman and Pre-Mandate Structures

The territories comprising modern were conquered by the Ottoman in following Selim I's defeat of the at the . These lands were administered as part of eyalets (provinces), primarily and , with governors (beylerbeys) appointed from to oversee collection, levies, and justice, though enforcement often relied on local intermediaries due to the empire's vast extent. By the reforms, the structure evolved into vilayets such as the (centered on ), , and later , introducing provincial councils but preserving delegated to maintain order. The Ottoman millet granted recognized non-Muslim religious communities—such as Orthodox , , and —semi-autonomy in personal status laws, , and internal , led by their own patriarchs or rabbis who answered to the for and . This framework, rooted in Islamic protections, extended precedents for communal across the empire's diverse populations, though it primarily applied to religious minorities rather than ethnic groups. For Muslim sects and tribes, analogous occurred through recognition of leaders, fostering stability by aligning imperial oversight with existing social hierarchies rather than imposing centralization. In Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern , tribal confederacies maintained significant , with Ottoman sultans granting hereditary to chiefs in exchange for border defense and cavalry service, as seen in alliances dating to the that integrated Kurdish emirs into the empire's without dissolving tribal . , concentrated in the coastal Jabal Ansariyah mountains, endured periodic but retained de control through sheikhs who mediated affairs amid weak central penetration, culminating in late-19th-century uprisings against Ottoman demands for greater integration. Similarly, communities in Jabal Druze exercised semi- under emirs, who negotiated exemptions and with provincial governors, leveraging mountainous to resist full subjugation. From the late , ayan— notables comprising landowners, merchants, and militia commanders—emerged as pivotal power brokers in Syrian cities like and , contracting for farms (iltizam) and assembling private forces to fill gaps in imperial administration. This devolution, exacerbated by janissary ' entrenchment, prioritized pragmatic alliances over ideological unity, relative stability through to kin, , or rather than distant sultanic , a pattern that persisted until the Tanzimat's centralizing push in the 1830s–1860s. Such structures underscored causal reliance on decentralized , where elites' vested interests in order sustained governance absent consistent central armies.

French Mandate and Early Independence Efforts

Following the San Remo Conference in April , where the Allied powers allocated the former Ottoman territories of and to French administration as a Class A Mandate, French authorities implemented a policy of territorial division to consolidate control and mitigate unified Arab resistance. On December 1, , France established separate administrative entities including the States of Damascus and Aleppo, alongside the autonomous Alawite territory, while carving out Greater as a distinct entity predominantly under Maronite Christian influence. In July 1922, a loose Syrian Federation was formed encompassing Damascus, Aleppo, and the Alawite State, yet this structure excluded Druze-majority areas, which were organized into a separate Druze State in 1921, exemplifying France's divide-and-rule strategy aimed at exploiting sectarian and ethnic differences to prevent a cohesive nationalist front. These divisions provoked widespread opposition from Syrian nationalists, who viewed them as artificial fragmentation undermining aspirations for a unified Greater Syria, as briefly realized under Emir Faisal's short-lived Arab Kingdom in 1920 before French military intervention. The policy fueled the of 1925-1927, initiated in the Druze State by against French encroachment and sectarian partitioning, which rapidly expanded to , , and other regions, involving coordinated uprisings by Druze, Sunni , and other groups demanding and territorial unity. French forces, employing aerial and ground offensives, suppressed the revolt by 1927, resulting in thousands of casualties and temporary stabilization of the divided mandates, but it intensified Arab demands for a single, indivisible state as a bulwark against further balkanization. During the 1930s, amid mounting nationalist pressure organized by the National Bloc, France merged the States of Damascus and Aleppo into the State of Syria in 1930, incorporating the Alawite and Druze territories with limited autonomy, while proposing a 1936 Franco-Syrian Treaty that outlined gradual independence within a unitary framework rather than perpetuating federal divisions. Syrian nationalists rejected residual federal elements, insisting on full unification to counteract colonial legacies of ethnic separation, though the treaty faced ratification failure in the French parliament due to domestic opposition. World War II disrupted progress, with Vichy French control yielding to Free French forces by 1941, who pledged independence; Syria achieved formal sovereignty on April 17, 1946, as a unitary republic, reflecting nationalists' triumph over partitionist designs. The immediate post-independence period from 1946 to 1963 was characterized by acute instability, marked by at least seven military coups starting with Husni al-Za'im's overthrow of President Shukri al-Quwatli on March 30, 1949, followed by rapid successions including Adib Shishakli's dictatorship from 1951 to 1954. This turmoil, exacerbated by regional influences and internal factionalism, underscored the fragility of decentralized governance inherited from mandate-era divisions, prompting a nationalist backlash that favored centralized authority to forge national cohesion and avert perceived vulnerabilities to ethnic fragmentation or foreign interference. The era's chaos, culminating in the United Arab Republic union with Egypt from 1958 to 1961 and the Ba'athist seizure of power in March 1963, reinforced a doctrinal emphasis on unitarism as a corrective to colonial balkanization attempts, setting the stage for subsequent consolidative policies.

Ba'athist Centralization and Suppression of Regionalism

Upon seizing power in a coup, consolidated Ba'athist rule through a highly centralized state apparatus, prioritizing Damascus-based control over regional to maintain regime stability. This approach manifested in policies that systematically marginalized ethnic and regional minorities, framing any devolutionary impulses as threats to socialist . Alawite dominance in the and security services—Assad's own sect comprising about 10-12% of the population—ensured loyalty through ethnic patronage, contradicting Ba'athist rhetoric of class-based inclusivity by embedding sectarian favoritism in governance. A core element of this centralization targeted Kurdish populations in northeastern Syria via Arabization efforts, intensified under Hafez al-Assad from the 1970s onward. The 1962 census, whose effects persisted into the Assad era, arbitrarily classified around 120,000 Kurds as non-nationals, denying them citizenship and rendering subsequent generations stateless, which restricted access to education, employment, and property rights. In 1974, Ba'athist Decree No. 521 initiated the "Arab Belt" project in Al-Hasakah Governorate, aiming to resettle Arab families on seized Kurdish lands and alter demographics by confiscating up to 1,200 square kilometers of farmland from approximately 140,000 Kurds. These measures, including bans on Kurdish language use in public and renaming of villages, fostered deep-seated separatist grievances by equating regional identity with disloyalty. The regime's suppression of Islamist opposition further entrenched centralization, exemplified by the against the uprising. In , Syrian forces under —Hafez's brother—bombarded the of , killing an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians and Brotherhood members over , effectively dismantling the group's urban base in Sunni-majority areas. This brutality, rooted in Alawite-led security forces' fear of Sunni majoritarian rule, reinforced Damascus's monopoly on coercion while purging potential regional power centers, such as Brotherhood strongholds in and . Far from promoting equitable , these actions highlighted ethnic favoritism, as Alawite militias were granted , solidifying a state that viewed or confederal arrangements as existential risks. Ba'athist economic planning exacerbated regional neglect, channeling resources to coastal Alawite heartlands and Damascus at the expense of peripheral governorates. Centralized state enterprises and subsidies favored urban centers, leaving eastern and rural areas with underdeveloped infrastructure; for instance, by the 1980s, agricultural regions like Deir ez-Zor received minimal investment despite comprising over 40% of farmland, breeding resentment through stark income gaps—per capita GDP in Damascus was roughly double that of Hasakah. This disparity, driven by political calculus rather than inefficiency alone, underscored how centralization prioritized regime survival over balanced development, cultivating empirical grounds for later demands for devolved governance.

Proposals and Developments During the Civil War (2011-2024)

Initial Proposals and Sectarian Motivations

The Syrian uprising erupted in 2011 with widespread protests predominantly from the majority, driven by long-standing grievances against the Alawite-dominated regime of , which had consolidated power through centralized control favoring minority sectarian . The regime's response involved brutal crackdowns, including mass arrests and assaults on protest hubs like and , resulting in over 5,800 documented by the end of 2011, including 395 children, and escalating to more than 7,500 civilian fatalities by early 2012 as reported by observers. These actions intensified Sunni perceptions of existential from Alawite overrepresentation in security forces and state institutions, where Alawites, comprising about 10-12% of the population, held disproportionate influence despite Sunnis forming roughly 70% of Syria's demographic. In response to the regime's hyper-centralized repression, early opposition coalitions, including local coordination committees and exile groups, began advocating decentralization measures by mid-2011 as a pragmatic alternative to unitary governance, framing it as essential for sectarian accommodation and self-governance to prevent further escalations akin to Iraq's post-2003 sectarian collapse. These initial calls, articulated in opposition conferences such as the April 2011 Meeting, emphasized devolving powers to provincial councils to address Sunni-majority regions' marginalization, motivated less by than by imperatives against perceived Alawite favoritism in and . Verifiable protest demographics from urban centers like Homs and Aleppo underscored Sunni-led mobilization, with regime defections from Sunni officers highlighting internal fractures exacerbated by centralized command structures unresponsive to diverse sectarian needs. By 2013-2014, as the conflict militarized, think tanks and Syrian intellectuals advanced more structured confederal models, proposing power-sharing arrangements across sectarian lines—such as autonomous zones for , Sunnis, and others—to avert genocide-scale observed in neighboring Iraq, where centralized failures post-Saddam had fueled Sunni-Shiite massacres. Proponents, including analysts at institutions like the , argued that confederalism aligned with Syria's pre-existing ethnic and religious mosaics, causal on dominance while preserving nominal unity, though such ideas faced from unitary-state advocates fearing . These proposals gained traction amid of regime-orchestrated sectarian militias targeting Sunni areas, with over total by mid-2014 reinforcing the rationale for decentralized safeguards against one-group . The influx of jihadist fighters from groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, swelling from in to thousands by via foreign pipelines, further eroded prospects for cohesive opposition under a unitary framework, as ideological clashed with pragmatic federal visions and amplified sectarian polarization through attacks on Alawite communities. This complication, fueled by external backers channeling fighters into Sunni rebel ranks, shifted early demands toward fragmented strategies, underscoring how transnational undermined indigenous power-sharing efforts rooted in verifiable local demographics and regime-induced grievances.

Kurdish-Led Autonomy Initiatives

In mid-July , Syrian regime forces withdrew from Kurdish-majority areas in northern , enabling the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to assume control and establish initial self-administration structures. This vacuum arose amid the escalating , allowing Kurdish forces under the People's Units (YPG) to prioritize self- against both regime remnants and emerging threats like the (). By , the PYD formalized three autonomous cantons—Afrin, , and Jazira—collectively termed Rojava, focusing on and amid ongoing conflict. The Battle of Kobani from September 2014 to January 2015 exemplified Kurdish resilience, where YPG forces, numbering around 1,500-2,000 defenders, repelled an offensive involving up to fighters through and fortified positions. U.S.-led airstrikes, exceeding in the Kobani vicinity, targeted concentrations and supply lines, providing causal leverage that enabled YPG advances and the eventual recapture of the town by 2015. This empirical against , absent comparable regime or opposition efforts in the , solidified Kurdish control over the cantons by demonstrating effective decentralized defense capabilities. Amid the Geneva peace talks in early 2016, Kurdish representatives advocated for a federal structure encompassing northern Syria's diverse regions, proposing decentralized administration to accommodate ethnic and governance needs. Though rejected by Damascus, the PYD unilaterally declared a federal for Rojava in March 2016, extending de facto beyond Kurdish areas to include Arab-majority zones captured from , which stabilized territories through localized resource management and security councils. Critics highlight PYD governance flaws, including authoritarian consolidation via suppression of rival Kurdish factions like the Kurdish National Council, through arrests and exclusion from local councils since 2012. The PYD's organizational ties to the (PKK), established as its Syrian offshoot in 2003, have fueled accusations of importing PKK-style militancy and , undermining pluralistic federal claims despite military gains. Such internal dynamics reveal causal trade-offs, where effective anti-ISIS operations coexisted with centralized control that marginalized non-PYD actors.

Assad Regime and Opposition Responses

The Assad consistently , viewing it as a to national unity and a potential precursor to partition amid the civil war. In response to early protests in , the enacted 107, establishing elected councils with administrative powers over services like and , but these bodies retained no fiscal autonomy or legislative authority, serving primarily as a mechanism to co-opt demands without devolving real power from Damascus. The 2012 constitution, promulgated by referendum on February 26, 2012, reaffirmed Syria as an "indivisible" unitary state with full sovereignty, explicitly prohibiting any waiver of territory and centralizing authority under the president, who holds veto power over decisions; this framework offered nominal decentralization but preserved Ba'athist central control, with no empirical transfer of competencies observed during the war. officials, including Bashar al-Assad, framed federal proposals as externally imposed divisions exploiting sectarian lines, aligning with Arab nationalist ideology that prioritized a singular state structure over ethnic autonomies. Mainstream Syrian opposition groups, particularly nationalist and Islamist factions, echoed this rejection of , insisting on restoring a unitary state post-Assad to preserve territorial integrity and counter perceived Western designs for . Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), evolving from Jabhat al-Nusra, advocated for a centralized Islamic model under , dismissing as incompatible with unified caliphate-like sovereignty and viewing Kurdish autonomy bids as divisive plots; HTS leaders like Abu Mohammad al-Jolani emphasized national in Idlib from 2017 onward, suppressing local separatist tendencies. Similarly, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), formed in 2012 as the primary exile opposition umbrella, committed in its founding documents to a "democratic, pluralistic" unitary republic, rejecting federal arrangements that could legitimize de facto divisions.) This opposition stance was bolstered by sentiment among Syria's , with polls indicating widespread resistance to as a form of partition. A survey by the Syrian Center for Policy Research found that a large of respondents rejected , favoring administrative decentralization only if centrally overseen, while Kurdish respondents showed stronger support; nuanced views emerged on limited local powers but not ethnic-based federation. The Day After organization's 2015-2016 polling across regime, opposition, and Kurdish areas revealed that fully half of respondents strongly opposed , associating it with state fragmentation rather than stability. A 2019 Arab Reform Initiative analysis cited surveys showing 90% of Syrians unfavorable to , prioritizing national cohesion over concessions to minorities amid fears of Iraq-style sectarian carve-outs. Internal debates within opposition coalitions from 2015 to 2020 highlighted tensions but ultimately reinforced unitary preferences, driven by Islamist dominance. During unity talks in 2015, SNC and allied Islamist groups like debated governance models, with Salafi factions arguing against in favor of ideologically unified Islamic rule to avoid "fitna" (division); moderates conceded decentralization for inclusivity but deferred to caliphate-inspired centralism. By 2017-2020, as HTS consolidated in , intra-coalition rifts saw Islamists override proposals for Kurdish-inclusive , prioritizing Arab-majority control and uniformity to rally fighters against regime fragmentation tactics. These positions reflected causal fears that would entrench warlordism and external interference, undermining the opposition's goal of singular .

De Facto Implementations

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava)

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) emerged as a de facto governing entity in northeastern Syria starting with initial declarations in 2012 and formalized as the AANES in 2018, encompassing expanded territories beyond its original three cantons through military advances. Its administrative structure draws from democratic confederalism principles, incorporating co-presidencies—pairing male and female leaders—in executive roles across institutions and mandating at least 40% quotas for women and ethnic minorities in organizational positions to promote inclusivity. Local governance relies on communal assemblies for decision-making on issues like resource allocation and services, ostensibly decentralizing power from central authorities. Despite these mechanisms, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), affiliated with the (PKK), exerts predominant control through its People's Units (YPG) , enabling top-down of policies that sidelined competing Kurdish factions like the and limited pluralism. Empirical assessments highlight suppression of dissent, including arrests of Arab tribal leaders and figures opposing PYD , fostering resentment in non-Kurdish areas where legitimacy remains contested. control and provision, while stabilizing some locales, often prioritize PYD-aligned , undermining claims of . Economically, AANES achieved partial self-sufficiency by seizing control of roughly 90% of Syria's pre-war fields, concentrated in and Hasakah governorates, following ISIS's territorial losses after 2017; production hovered around 50,000-80,000 barrels per day amid and infrastructure decay, contrasting with Damascus's historical of the region's 10-15% contribution to national GDP under Ba'athist centralization. Local investments in and small industries supplemented revenues, but opaque and regime blockades on imports exposed vulnerabilities, with to and sustaining operations despite . On security, the (SDF)—a PYD-led incorporating Arab fighters—secured territorial gains against , expelling the group from over 25,000 square kilometers including in 2017 and Deir ez-Zor pockets by 2019, through integrated ground operations. These victories depended critically on U.S.-led airstrikes and support, with roughly 900 American troops stationed post-2019 to deter ISIS resurgence and maintain detention of 10,000 fighters, underscoring AANES's strategic reliance on foreign backing amid internal fractures and encirclement by hostile . This dependency risks without sustained external , as evidenced by prior U.S. drawdown threats exposing SDF vulnerabilities to localized insurgencies.

Other Regional Control Dynamics

In province, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) established dominance by early 2017 following the consolidation of jihadist factions, forming the Syrian Salvation Government to manage administrative functions such as taxation, civil registries, , and healthcare services for approximately 3 million . This operated a Sharia-based judicial , enforcing strict Islamist norms including patrols, gender segregation in spaces, and suppression of dissenting political expression, which differentiated its from more secular models elsewhere. While providing amid humanitarian crises—such as distributing and maintaining local security—HTS's rule perpetuated ideological rigidity, with reports of arbitrary detentions and executions for perceived infractions underscoring the authoritarian character of its control. Southern Syria's Suwayda governorate, predominantly Druze, developed quasi-autonomous structures through local militias like Rijal al-Karamah (Men of Dignity), which emerged around 2013 to counter ISIS threats and resist Assad regime conscription drives, achieving de facto self-governance over security and protests against economic mismanagement. The regime exhibited tacit tolerance toward these groups pre-2024, avoiding full confrontation to prevent broadening the conflict front, as evidenced by limited military engagements despite periodic clashes, allowing Druze leaders to negotiate local ceasefires and maintain tribal councils for dispute resolution. This arrangement enabled basic service provision and order in a 500,000-population area but fostered isolation from national institutions, with Druze forces numbering around 2,000 fighters by 2023. These dynamics exemplify warlordism's in Syria's , where localized actors filled vacuums left by central , averting total by securing territories and delivering rudimentary amid nationwide fragmentation affecting over half the by 2017. However, such inherently risked perpetuating , as competing loyalties and fueled inter-group skirmishes— saw intra-rebel infighting displacing thousands annually—and hindered unified reconstruction, with empirical patterns failed states where proxy influences exacerbated rather than resolved divides. In Alawite coastal enclaves, pro-regime militias like the National Defense Forces exercised operational in defense operations, tolerated by for their in holding strategic areas against , further illustrating how ethnic-tied warlord structures sustained partial functionality at the of cohesive .

Arguments For and Against Federalization

Potential Benefits: Decentralization and Stability

Federalization in could address deep-seated sectarian and ethnic grievances through power-sharing mechanisms that devolve political authority to regional levels, thereby diminishing incentives for prolonged . In multi-ethnic states, empirical analyses of post-conflict arrangements demonstrate that formalized power-sharing institutions correlate with reduced risks of recurrence by accommodating diverse group interests and preventing zero-sum competitions for central control. Iraq's post-2003 federal provides a pertinent example, where the achieved relative stability and despite nationwide , enabling the to manage internal affairs autonomously and avoid the sectarian strife plaguing other areas. This preserved unity while allowing regional development, with the Regional Government fostering through localized policies that attracted and diversified beyond oil dependency, contrasting with the central government's challenges. Decentralization would similarly empower Syrian regions to oversee local resources, such as Euphrates for and in the northeast, promoting efficient and economic incentives tailored to regional needs rather than distant central directives. In Iraq's , such has supported higher per capita income and infrastructure projects, suggesting potential for Syria's resource-rich areas to drive reconstruction and reduce dependency on national budgets strained by . Security benefits arise from federal structures permitting regionally recruited and motivated forces, as evidenced by the Kurdish-led in Rojava, which defeated in key battles like Kobani in 2014-2015 and liberated vast territories through decentralized command responsive to local terrains and threats. This contrasts with the Syrian Arab Army's centralized failures, where defections and poor coordination enabled advances; federal militias could thus sustain localized defenses against jihadist resurgence more effectively than a uniform national force.

Criticisms: Risks of Partition and Weak Central Authority

Critics argue that federalization in Syria risks entrenching de facto partition, as decentralized structures could evolve into secessionist entities amid ethnic and sectarian divisions, mirroring the Yugoslav federation's collapse. In Yugoslavia, the post-Tito era saw federalism fail to contain nationalist aspirations, leading to violent fragmentation into independent states between 1991 and 2008, exacerbated by a lack of strong central authority to enforce unity. Syria's demographic composition, with Arabs comprising approximately 87% of the population, heightens these fears, as minority autonomies could isolate majority Arab regions and invite irredentist claims, undermining the territorial integrity forged under centralized rule. Empirical data underscores widespread Arab opposition to , driven by concerns over diminished national and potential minority power in a . A survey by found that over 90% of respondents , viewing it as a precursor to division rather than stable governance. Similarly, respondents in both regime-controlled and opposition-held areas overwhelmingly opposed federal arrangements, prioritizing centralized control to prevent balkanization. This resistance persists post-2024, with recent analyses noting fears that would fragment Syria into unviable entities susceptible to external domination. A weakened central under would compromise Syria's capacity to deter external , exposing regions to predation by neighbors like and . The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) exemplifies this : following U.S. considerations of troop drawdowns in , Turkish forces exploited the power vacuum to launch incursions, capturing territories and displacing Kurdish populations, as central coordination was absent. Without a unified command, federal subunits lack the resources for independent defense, inviting Turkish interventions against Kurdish entities or Iranian entrenchment in Alawite or Shia areas, as causal dynamics of state weakness facilitate proxy conflicts over territorial control. Such fragmentation not only dilutes military cohesion but also hampers economic reconstruction, as divided fiscal authority perpetuates patronage networks over national resilience.

Empirical Comparisons with Other Multi-Ethnic States

Switzerland's federal system, comprising 26 cantons with significant in , taxation, and policing, has sustained stability in a multilingual with German, French, Italian, and Romansh speakers since the . This fosters consensus through and fiscal , enabling cultural minorities to retain control without secessionist pressures, as evidenced by the absence of major ethnic conflicts since the of 1847. Empirical from comparative studies highlight how shared economic and inter-cantonal , rather than ethnic quotas, mitigated linguistic divides, with GDP converging across regions by the late . India's federal framework, established under the , has accommodated over 2,000 ethnic groups and 22 languages by reorganizing states along linguistic lines starting with the States Reorganisation Act, which created 14 states from 27 provinces and princely states. This , blending unitary oversight with subnational , quelled separatist movements like the Telugu agitation of 1952, promoting political stability as regional parties integrated into national coalitions; ethnic violence, while present, has not escalated to state collapse, with federal interventions under Article 356 used 115 times between 1951 and 1990 to maintain order. Causal factors include centralized fiscal transfers (60% of state revenues from ) and judicial federalism, which balanced diversity without entrenching zero-sum ethnic . In contrast, Lebanon's confessional , codified in the 1943 allocating parliamentary seats by religious (e.g., 6:5 Christian-Muslim ), induced governance by tying offices to demographic quotas, fostering patronage that prioritized sectarian over merit. This contributed causally to the 1975-1990 , which killed over 150,000 and displaced 1 million, as demographic shifts (Palestinian influx and ) eroded pact legitimacy, enabling militias to supplant state . Post-war Taif Accord revisions in 1989 failed to dismantle quotas, perpetuating veto powers that blocked reforms and sustained , with public reaching 150% of GDP by 2019. Ethiopia's , implemented via the dividing the state into 11 ethnically delimited regions, aimed to devolve power but exacerbated conflicts by institutionalizing group identities, leading to over 4 million internally displaced persons from ethnic clashes between and 2022. disputes, such as those in and Amhara regions, intensified to rigid territorial assignments ignoring migrations, culminating in the 2020-2022 Tigray War that claimed ,000 lives and fragmented federal cohesion. Studies attribute failures to the system's emphasis on ethnic , which empowered regional elites to mobilize grievances without cross-ethnic incentives, contrasting with more integrative models. Iraq's 2005 federal constitution granted the Kurdistan Region autonomy, yielding relative prosperity with Erbil's GDP per capita at $5,000 by 2014 versus Baghdad's $2,500, bolstered by oil revenues and Peshmerga security. However, central government's weakness—exemplified by the 2014 Iraqi Security Forces collapse, losing 40% of territory to ISIS—stemmed from sectarian power-sharing (muhasasa) that paralyzed decision-making and alienated Sunnis, enabling ISIS to seize Mosul on June 10, 2014, amid governance vacuums. Post-ISIS, Kurdish autonomy persisted but highlighted scalability issues, as Baghdad's recapture of Kirkuk in 2017 underscored federal fragility without robust central institutions.

International and Regional Perspectives

Support from Kurdish Allies and Western Powers

The Syrian Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its allies within the (SDF) have consistently advocated for a federal in since establishing the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES, commonly known as Rojava) in 2012, culminating in a formal declaration of federal autonomy across three cantons on March 17, 2016. This push reflects Kurdish strategic interests in securing self-governance amid the civil war, leveraging control over oil-rich territories to negotiate decentralized power rather than reintegration under a centralized Damascus authority. United States support for Kurdish-led federalism has been tacit and operationalized through a military partnership with the SDF initiated in 2015 to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS), involving over 900 U.S. troops at peak deployment, extensive air strikes, and provision of weapons, ammunition, and training valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually during the campaign. This alliance enabled the SDF to capture key territories like Raqqa in 2017 and maintain de facto control over approximately 25% of Syrian land, including the Euphrates Valley, as a bulwark against ISIS resurgence and Iranian influence, though U.S. officials emphasized the arrangement as temporary and conditional on counterterrorism cooperation rather than endorsement of permanent autonomy. Despite designations of the SDF's core YPG component as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—a U.S.-listed terrorist organization—Washington prioritized pragmatic alliances, overlooking ideological ties to sustain battlefield effectiveness against shared threats. European backing has manifested through NGO assessments and advocacy highlighting Rojava's progressive policies, such as mandatory 50% female representation in governance bodies and women's protection units (YPJ), with reports from organizations like the Heinrich Böll Foundation documenting these as empirical advances in gender equity amid conflict. However, such endorsements often emphasize ideological alignments with democratic confederalism while understating the PKK's documented role in YPG command structures and violent activities, reflecting potential institutional biases toward leftist autonomy models over security concerns raised by NATO allies like Turkey. Kurdish diaspora networks in Europe and the United States amplified these narratives through lobbying efforts, including presentations to UN envoys during Geneva peace talks in 2016-2017, where Rojava delegates proposed federal decentralization as a stability mechanism, though without formal UN adoption. This support aligned with Western geopolitical aims to fragment Assad's centralized control and counter jihadist and proxy threats, rather than unqualified altruism.

Opposition from Arab States, Turkey, and Russia

Turkey opposes federalization in Syria primarily due to concerns over Kurdish along its , equating the YPG-led (SDF) with the (PKK), a designated terrorist threatening Turkish . To counter the federal of Rojava, Turkey conducted from 2016 to 2017, clearing ISIS from northern and establishing a buffer zone under Turkish-backed Syrian National Army control. This was followed by Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, which captured the Afrin region from YPG forces, displacing over 100,000 Kurds and integrating the area into a unitary administrative framework aligned with Damascus. Operation Peace Spring in October 2019 further expanded Turkish influence eastward, seizing territory from the SDF to prevent contiguous Kurdish cantons, thereby enforcing opposition to partitioned governance. Russia, as the primary backer of the Assad regime, has aligned with Damascus's rejection of federalism to maintain a centralized state amenable to Russian military basing and influence, avoiding fragmentation that could dilute control over key assets like Tartus naval base and Hmeimim airbase. In the Astana talks initiated in January 2017, Russia co-facilitated de-escalation zones with Turkey and Iran but prioritized ceasefires under Assad's authority rather than endorsing autonomous models, reflecting a commitment to Syria's territorial integrity as a bulwark against Western-backed divisions. This stance persisted, with Russian diplomacy post-2017 reinforcing unitary reconstruction over decentralization proposals that risked empowering opposition-held enclaves. Arab states, coordinated via the Arab League, have consistently opposed Syrian federalization to uphold principles of non-intervention and indivisible sovereignty, wary of separatist precedents that could inspire domestic ethnic or sectarian challenges in like Iraq, Jordan, or Gulf monarchies. In March 2016, explicitly the Kurdish-led declaration of federal regions in northern , deeming it a violation of national unity and aligning with Assad's position against partition. Subsequent statements, including in September 2025, reaffirmed commitment to 's territorial wholeness amid post-conflict transitions, prioritizing centralized governance to mitigate spillover risks like refugee flows or jihadist safe havens.

Iranian and Gulf Positions

Iran has historically prioritized the preservation of Syria's centralized unitary under to safeguard its strategic "Shiite " corridor extending from through and to in , arms transfers and proxy influence. Federalization, by devolving to autonomous regions potentially controlled by Sunni majorities or Kurdish groups, would fragment this corridor, exposing Iranian supply lines to disruption by non-aligned or hostile entities and undermining Tehran's sectarian against Sunni dominance. Post-Assad developments in reinforced this , with Supreme Leader publicly opposing the new Syrian and advocating for its potential overthrow to restore a unified state amenable to Iranian interests, viewing decentralized governance as a vector for "terrorist" resurgence that erodes regional stability on which Iran's influence depends. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, exhibited initial support for Syrian opposition factions during the early civil war phase but pivoted after Russia's 2015 intervention toward pragmatic engagement with Assad's unitary regime, driven by fears that federalism would entrench minority autonomies—such as Kurdish or Druze enclaves—potentially aligning with rivals like Turkey or Israel and complicating sectarian containment efforts against Iranian expansion. Saudi Arabia explicitly opposes federalism or territorial division, citing risks to its interests in southern Syria, including Druze areas, where fragmentation could invite external interference or empower non-state actors threatening Riyadh's vision of a cohesive Arab state order. The UAE accelerated this anti-federal consensus through normalization steps, reopening its Damascus embassy in December 2018 and hosting Assad at regional summits, thereby reinforcing a preference for centralized authority to mitigate chaos from empowered peripherals that might bolster Islamist networks or Iranian proxies indirectly. This stance reflects broader Gulf hesitance, prioritizing influence preservation via a strong Damascus over decentralized models that could perpetuate proxy competitions and weaken Sunni Arab leverage.

Post-Assad Era Developments (2024 Onward)

Interim Government Formation and Centralization Push

Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, rapidly asserted dominance over Damascus and key urban centers, establishing an interim government by early January 2025 that prioritized centralized authority to counter the civil war's legacy of territorial fragmentation. Al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, positioned himself as transitional president, issuing pledges for an inclusive government while advancing a framework that subordinated local governance to national control, including limited local councils under central oversight rather than devolved powers. This approach reflected a causal emphasis on reunifying disparate factions to secure international aid flows, which began increasing amid stabilization efforts, though HTS's jihadist origins raised skepticism among donors regarding long-term viability. On March 13, 2025, al-Sharaa formalized this centralization by signing a five-year interim constitutional that enshrined a , explicitly designed to prevent by vesting executive in and mandating subordination of regional entities to a national framework. Empirical measures included targeted crackdowns on residual warlord elements and Assad loyalists, such as the December 26, 2024, security operations in coastal Alawite areas following attacks that killed 14 policemen, which neutralized localized threats and facilitated power consolidation. These actions, involving arrests of nearly 300 regime holdouts and suppression of sectarian incitement, aimed to preempt fragmentation while channeling aid toward a singular administrative hub, though reports documented associated extra-judicial killings and abductions exceeding prior benchmarks. The interim leadership's statements in early 2025 underscored rejection of federal arrangements, particularly Rojava's autonomy claims, with officials prioritizing integration into a national army over militia persistence to enforce a cohesive command structure. Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani reiterated in July and October 2025 that "any form of division or federalism" was non-negotiable, framing decentralization as a pathway to partition incompatible with Syria's post-war imperatives. This stance aligned with HTS's pre-offensive governance in Idlib, where prior "Syrianisation" efforts had centralized services under strict oversight, signaling a pattern of using unity rhetoric to amass control amid external pressures for reconstruction funding.

Ongoing Kurdish Autonomy Negotiations

In March 2025, Syria's interim government, led by HTS successor Ahmad al-Sharaa, signed an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate SDF civil and military institutions into national structures by the end of the year, granting Kurds constitutional rights such as language use and education previously suppressed under Assad. This deal emerged from negotiations in Damascus amid post-Assad transitional pressures, with the SDF's 100,000-strong forces positioned as a potential bolster to the national army but requiring merger under central command. Subsequent implementation talks revealed tensions, as Kurdish representatives sought guarantees for regional and cultural preservation within the Autonomous Administration of North and East (AANES), while the interim insisted on full SDF dissolution into state apparatus to prevent de . in execution fueled clashes starting August 2, 2025, along the AANES- , including sieges in Sheikh and Ashrafiyah, culminating in a ceasefire on October 7, 2025, that reaffirmed integration commitments but left disputes unresolved. Turkish-backed offensives, concluding on April 12, 2025, in northern heightened pressures on Rojava, with leveraging proxies to challenge Kurdish control and obstruct separate , aligning with demands for SDF demobilization to PKK-linked threats. The U.S., previously mediating via envoy Thomas Barrack, saw its influence diminish as troop numbers dropped from approximately 2,000 in late 2024 toward 1,000 by mid-2025, with further drawdowns paused amid stability concerns but signaling reduced leverage for Kurdish federalist bargaining. These dynamics underscore the interim government's centralization push against Kurdish preferences for devolved powers, with ongoing Damascus talks as of 2025 focusing on phased SDF in areas like Hasakah while preserving minimal regional administration.

Reconstruction Implications for Federal Structures

The reconstruction of Syria, estimated by the World Bank to require $216 billion as of , 2025, highlights structures as a determinant of in allocating funds for infrastructure, housing, and economic revival. Federal arrangements could enable decentralized budgeting, allowing resource-rich regions like the Kurdish-controlled northeast to leverage revenues for targeted rebuilding, such as repairing facilities and networks damaged in the civil war. This approach might mitigate risks prevalent in centralized systems, where historical precedents show funds often diverted through patronage networks, by empowering regional authorities with fiscal autonomy over exports from fields producing up to 80,000 barrels per day pre-conflict. However, the interim government's opposition to , reiterated by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on , , favors centralized control of revenues, as evidenced by the national of 600,000 barrels of crude from in —potentially sidelining regional initiatives despite U.S. sanctions such flows. In practice, this unitary push risks uneven recovery, with zones advancing via efforts while contested areas lag, exacerbating economic disparities that analysts link to heightened sectarian tensions in multi-ethnic contexts. U.S. sanctions adjustments, including a , , 180-day of Caesar Act penalties, prioritize streamlined distribution under a national framework to forestall jihadist exploitation of fragmented territories, conditioning on unified reconstruction oversight. While proponents contend it could accelerate growth in secure enclaves by attracting subnational investments—mirroring decentralized models that have boosted post-war GDP in comparable states—the absence of such structures may through , heightening to mismanagement amid institutional weaknesses.

Challenges and Future Prospects

The interim constitutional declaration adopted by Syria's transitional government in March 2025 centralizes executive power and omits safeguards for regional autonomy, posing a foundational barrier to federalization by entrenching unitary governance over decentralized structures. This five-year framework, ratified with minimal consultation, prioritizes national unity under a singular authority, directly clashing with demands for federal devolution that would grant subnational entities legislative and administrative control. Critics, including Kurdish representatives, argue it reproduces authoritarian centralism, lacking mechanisms for inclusive power-sharing and exposing minorities to majority rule without veto protections. Demographic imbalances exacerbate these hurdles, as Arabs form over 80% of Syria's population, necessitating broad Arab-majority consent for any federal constitution, while Kurds, comprising roughly 10%, hold limited leverage to impose autonomy unilaterally. The transitional leadership, dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has explicitly rejected federalism, with figures like Ahmed al-Sharaa viewing it as divisive and antithetical to a cohesive Islamic state, favoring instead centralized administration to prevent fragmentation. In anticipated constitutional assemblies following planned 2025 elections, Islamist delegates are poised to advocate sharia-based supremacy, subordinating federal equality to unified religious oversight and creating veto points where regional powers could be curtailed in favor of Damascus's dominance. Historical precedents the risks of superficial reforms without binding . The Russian-backed draft , proposed after Astana talks, suggested nominal changes like renaming the state the " of " to dilute Arab-centric but stopped short of federal provisions, offering token that failed to address power imbalances and dissolved amid rejection by Assad's regime. Such drafts, lacking thresholds or independent , devolved into pacts, perpetuating conflict by central authorities to renege on commitments, a pattern likely to recur without robust legal safeguards like entrenched minority vetoes or international oversight in Syria's post-2024 context.

Security and Jihadist Threats

The (SDF), controlling northeastern in a de facto autonomous , played a pivotal in dismantling the Islamic State's territorial between and , conducting operations that reclaimed over square kilometers and eliminated key ISIS with U.S. support. Despite this, ISIS remnants persisted, launching 27 attacks in SDF-held areas in November 2024 alone, highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities in decentralized zones. In contrast, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) long-term control of Idlib province since 2017 fostered an autonomous enclave that served as a haven for jihadist factions, enabling the evolution of transnational groups into localized threats before HTS consolidated power by eradicating rivals. Such semi-autonomous regions, insulated from central oversight, incubated extremism by allowing ideological entrenchment and foreign fighter inflows, as evidenced by Idlib's in sustaining al-Qaeda affiliates until HTS's internal purges. Under , the Syrian Army's structural weaknesses—marked by widespread , defections exceeding personnel by , and reliance on irregular militias—facilitated territorial fragmentation during the civil war, ceding control to non-state and jihadist gains in ungoverned spaces. This central incapacity, compounded by overstretch across multiple fronts, allowed proxy forces backed by external powers to proliferate, undermining national cohesion. In a federalized Syria, devolved regional militias could replicate these dynamics, inviting intensified Turkish incursions against Kurdish forces—as seen in operations displacing SDF units since —and Iranian proxy escalations targeting Sunni-dominated areas, potentially sparking inter-militia proxy conflicts that unified counter-jihadist efforts. Following Assad's ouster in December 2024, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa pledged to integrate rebel factions into a national framework, stating that all fighters would disband and submit to state to foster unity. However, empirical patterns of HTS's betrayals, including its al-Qaeda origins and absorption of foreign jihadists, breed ; reports indicate HTS has elevated some 10,000 foreign fighters—many from —into roles, raising risks of ideological infiltration and renewed global jihadist mobilization. Federal structures might mitigate jihadist threats through localized SDF-style defenses but could exacerbate them by fragmenting command, as Idlib's demonstrates, unless rigorous central vetting overrides regional loyalties—a prospect undermined by HTS's uneven moderation record.

Economic and Demographic Realities

Syria's , estimated at approximately 25.6 million in mid-2025, is predominantly Sunni Muslim, comprising around 74% of the total, with Sunni forming ethnic dispersed across central, eastern, and urban . This demographic concentration underscores demands for in , as federal arrangements prioritizing ethnic or sectarian enclaves—such as Alawite coastal territories or Kurdish northeastern zones—could marginalize the Sunni 's influence, fostering isolated, economically unviable statelets prone to absent widespread . The country's energy resources exacerbate this tension, with proven oil and gas fields largely situated in the east, including Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, and Shaddadi provinces, areas aligned with de facto federalist entities like the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration. As of early 2025, Syrian oil production hovered at 80,000–100,000 barrels per day, primarily from these eastern fields, while natural gas output reached about 8 million cubic meters per day in government-controlled zones, with untapped potential in the resource-poor west where over 80% of the population resides in densely populated governorates like Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. This east-west resource-population mismatch incentivizes centralized fiscal mechanisms for revenue redistribution, as fragmented federalism would hinder unified infrastructure development and equitable access to hydrocarbons essential for national reconstruction. Since the fall of the Assad regime on , , over 1.08 million Syrian refugees have returned from neighboring , with UNHCR monitoring peaks in returns to mixed urban and rural areas rather than isolated ethnic zones. These movements, totaling more than 1.4 million by mid-2025 per updated estimates, prioritize familial and communal reintegration in Sunni-majority heartlands, favoring unitary policies that facilitate resettlement and service provision over federal ethnic , which could entrench divisions and complicate for returnees. Such dynamics highlight the causal risks of without buy-in, as demographic pressures and economic imperatives align toward cohesive state structures to avert balkanized underdevelopment.

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