Hubbry Logo
Foreign electoral interventionForeign electoral interventionMain
Open search
Foreign electoral intervention
Community hub
Foreign electoral intervention
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Foreign electoral intervention
Foreign electoral intervention
Foreign electoral intervention
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Part of a series on
Politics
Primary topics
Systems
Academic disciplines
Public administration
Policy
Government branches
Related topics
Subseries
icon Politics portal

Foreign electoral interventions (FEI) are attempts by a government to influence the elections of another country.[1] Common methods include backing a preferred party or candidate, harming the electoral chances of another party or candidate, elevating the power or voice of disruptive candidates, or exacerbating overall polarization through amplifying or disseminating misinformation or disinformation.[2]

Unlike other forms of foreign intervention, such as through military force or economic coercion, FEI aims to achieve a political outcome in the targeted country by affecting how its citizens vote, rather than by directly imposing regime change (such as backing or initiating a coup).[3] However, some methods of FEI, such as manipulating voter registration records, similarly violate the target country's sovereignty.[4]

Consequently, some scholars and organizations, such as the United States National Intelligence Council,[5] distinguish between methods of FEI that constitute interference—in that they clearly violate the domestic laws of the target state, such as disrupting vote counting, providing illicit funds to a party or candidate, or launching cyberattacks on a political campaign—and influence, which alter incentives or beliefs of voters through evidently legal means, such as public threats or endorsements by foreign officials, offering preferential trade terms, or revealing legally held but damaging information about a party or candidate.[6]

Although foreign electoral interventions in all forms are categorically initiated and conducted by a foreign power (typically a government), they almost always require the consent, cooperation, or assistance of a domestic actor, such as a political party, candidate, media member, or other influential public figure.[7][8]

Intervention measurements

[edit]
See also: List of foreign electoral interventions

Theoretical and empirical research on the effect of foreign electoral intervention had been characterized as weak overall as late as 2011; however, since then a number of such studies have been conducted.[9]

According to Dov H. Levin's 2020 book Meddling in the Ballot Box: The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions, the United States intervened in the largest number of foreign elections between 1946 and 2000.[10][11] A previous 2018 study by Levin found that foreign electoral interventions determined the identity of the winner in "many cases".[12] The study also found suggestive evidence that such interventions increased the risk of democratic breakdown in the targeted states.[12]

Among 938 "competitive national level executive elections" examined by Levin from 1946 to 2000,[a] the United States intervened in 81 foreign elections, while the Soviet Union or Russia intervened in 36 foreign elections. Combining these figures, the U.S. and Russia (including the Soviet Union) thus intervened in 117 of 938 competitive elections during this period—about one in nine—with the majority of those interventions (some 68%) being through covert, rather than overt, actions.[11]

Also "on average, an electoral intervention in favor of one side contesting the election will increase its vote share by about 3 percent," an effect large enough to have potentially changed the results in seven out of 14 U.S. presidential elections occurring after 1960.[11][b][c]

In contrast, a 2019 study by Lührmann et al. at the Varieties of Democracy Institute in Sweden summarized reports from each country to say that in 2018 the most intense interventions, by means of false information on key political issues, were by China in Taiwan and by Russia in Latvia; the next highest levels were in Bahrain, Qatar and Hungary; the lowest levels were in Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland and Uruguay.[16][17][18]

Intervention types

[edit]

In a 2012 study, Corstange and Marinov theorized that there are two types of foreign intervention:[13] partisan intervention, where the foreign power takes a stance on its support for one side, and process intervention, where the foreign power seeks "to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective of who wins". Their results from 1,703 participants found that partisan interventions had a polarizing effect on political and foreign relations views, with the side favored by the external power more likely to favor improvements in relations between the two, and having the converse effect for those opposed by the power.

In 2018, Jonathan Godinez further elaborated on Corstange and Marinov's theory by proposing that interventions can be specified as globally-motivated intervention, where "a country intervenes in the election of another country for the interests, betterment, or well-being of the international audience," and self-motivated intervention, where "a country intervenes in the election of another country to further the interests, betterment, or well-being of themselves."[19]

Godinez further theorized that the vested interest of an intervening country can be identified by examining a "threefold methodology": the tactics of intervention, stated motivation, and the magnitude of the intervention.[19]

Also in 2012, Shulman and Bloom theorized a number of distinct factors affecting the results of foreign interference:[9]

  • Agents of interference: each with a descending effect on resentment caused by their intervention, these being nations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and finally individuals.
  • Partisanship of interference: whether foreign actors intervene to affect institutions and process broadly, or intervene primarily to favor one side in a contest
  • Salience of interference: consisting of two elements. First, "how obvious and well-known is the interference", and second, "how clear and understandable is the intervention?"

Additionally, they theorized that national similarities between the foreign and domestic powers would decrease resentment, and may even render the interference welcome. In cases where national autonomy are of primary concern to the electorate, they predicted a diminished effect of the similarity or dissimilarity of the two powers on resentment. Conversely, they predicted that in cases where national identity was a primary concern, the importance of similarity or dissimilarity would have a greater impact.[9]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Foreign electoral intervention

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Foreign electoral intervention consists of deliberate efforts by foreign governments or non-state actors to influence the outcome of elections in another sovereign country, typically through covert or overt means such as funding , disseminating , conducting cyber operations, or providing logistical support to preferred candidates. This practice violates principles of national sovereignty and democratic , as empirical studies document its prevalence among great powers seeking to advance geopolitical interests by shaping target states' leadership alignment. Historically, such interventions predate modern democracies, with early examples including French meddling in the 1796 U.S. presidential election amid partisan divides, prompting warning against foreign entanglements. Systematic data from the post-World War II era reveal at least 81 partisan electoral interventions by major powers between 1946 and 2000, often favoring candidates amenable to the intervener's objectives, with the and (later ) as frequent actors. These efforts have targeted both allies and adversaries, underscoring a pattern where powerful states exploit electoral vulnerabilities to counter ideological rivals or secure economic advantages, though success rates vary due to domestic countermeasures and voter resilience. In the contemporary era, digital technologies have expanded intervention tactics, enabling low-cost campaigns and hacking attempts that amplify divisions without direct confrontation, as seen in intelligence assessments of Russian operations during the and U.S. elections aimed at undermining confidence in democratic institutions. Similar activities by actors like and have targeted Western elections, including influence operations during the U.S. cycle, though assessments emphasize no evidence of vote tallies being altered. Controversies persist over attribution and response, with polls showing widespread disapproval of foreign meddling across partisan lines, yet debates rage on its causal impact on results versus amplifying pre-existing polarizations. Defenses against such threats increasingly involve deterrence strategies, transparency measures, and international norms, though enforcement remains inconsistent given the historical norm of powerful states engaging in these practices.

Definition and Scope

Core Definition

Foreign electoral intervention refers to deliberate efforts by a foreign , or entities acting on its behalf, to influence the outcome of another country's national through non-military means. These actions typically seek to advantage or disadvantage specific candidates, , or electoral processes, distinguishing them from general diplomatic engagement or neutral observation. Common forms encompass partisan support, such as providing financial aid, disseminating , conducting cyber operations to manipulate information flows, or employing threats and inducements to sway voter preferences or official decisions. For example, in the United States, foreign election interference is defined under 22 U.S.C. § 2708 as conduct by a foreign person that violates federal criminal statutes relating to the conduct of elections or alters the voting process or tabulation of votes, including hacking voting systems, state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, and illegal campaign financing. These activities are addressed by the Department of Justice, Department of State, and Intelligence Community. Empirical datasets, such as the Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG), document over 80 instances of such interventions by major powers like the and the /Russia from 1946 to 2000, often involving covert tactics to avoid detection and retaliation. These interventions are partisan in nature, targeting electoral results rather than broader influence, and have been shown in some cases to alter vote shares by approximately 3 percentage points on average. The phenomenon raises concerns about and democratic integrity, as foreign meddling can undermine in electoral processes even when its direct impact on outcomes is limited or unproven. Interventions may occur overtly, such as public endorsements, or covertly, including disinformation campaigns via state-linked , with the latter complicating attribution and response. While historical underscores great-power competition as a driver, contemporary cases increasingly involve hybrid methods leveraging digital platforms. Foreign electoral intervention is differentiated from domestic electoral interference by the extraterritorial origin of the actors; the former involves states, state-affiliated entities, or proxies operating from outside the target nation's borders to sway election outcomes, whereas domestic interference encompasses manipulations by internal actors such as citizens, , or local organizations, often through means like ballot tampering or voter intimidation. This distinction underscores varying legal and normative implications, as domestic actions typically fall under national criminal codes, while foreign efforts may implicate principles like non-intervention in sovereign affairs. Unlike legitimate international election observation, which entails overt, invited assessments by multilateral organizations or neutral monitors to promote transparency and adherence to standards—such as those conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in over 300 elections since —foreign electoral intervention seeks asymmetric advantage through undisclosed influence, without host consent or accountability. Observation missions report findings post-election to bolster credibility, not to alter voter preferences or results, distinguishing them from interventionist tactics like funding proxies or amplifying divisive narratives. Foreign electoral intervention contrasts with broader foreign influence operations, which may target societal attitudes or beyond specific electoral timelines, by its narrow focus on manipulating voter behavior, candidate viability, or institutional trust during defined campaign periods. While influence operations can employ similar tools like , intervention prioritizes outcome predictability, often via covert channels, rather than generalized persuasion. It further diverges from or routine diplomatic engagement, which leverage attraction through cultural exchanges, economic incentives, or public advocacy to shape long-term preferences without direct electoral ; , as conceptualized in analyses of statecraft, avoids or aimed at immediate vote shifts, preserving under international norms. In contrast, electoral intervention frequently breaches these norms by deploying hybrid methods, such as algorithmic amplification of polarizing content, to engineer causal disruptions in democratic processes.

Historical Development

Pre-20th Century Instances

Foreign powers have sought to influence electoral outcomes in other polities since antiquity, though systematic records are sparse before the . In the , the election of the emperor by prince-electors was frequently subject to external pressures, including and diplomatic maneuvering by rival monarchs. The 1519 election of Charles V exemplifies this: Habsburg agents, backed by Spanish and Genoese financiers like the , distributed approximately 543,000 florins (equivalent to millions in modern terms) in bribes to electors, outbidding French King Francis I, who offered up to 300,000 crowns to secure a candidate favorable to French interests against Habsburg encirclement. This intervention stemmed from geopolitical rivalries, with electors—German princes—susceptible to foreign gold due to the empire's decentralized structure and the emperor's role as a to expanding monarchies. Similar tactics recurred in later imperial elections, such as the 1742 contest where French subsidies supported Bavarian elector Charles Albert against Austrian , contributing to the . Papal conclaves provided another arena for foreign electoral meddling, as secular rulers viewed the pope's selection as pivotal to European power balances. French monarchs exerted significant control during the 14th century; King Philip IV's campaign against culminated in the 1304–1305 conclave, where royal agents intimidated cardinals and secured the election of Clement V, a Gascon amenable to French interests, relocating the papacy to and initiating a 70-year period of French dominance. This was achieved through threats, excommunications reversed under pressure, and the exclusion of non-French candidates, reflecting causal incentives where the papacy's spiritual authority intersected with temporal politics. In subsequent centuries, and wielded veto powers () over conclave outcomes; for instance, in the 1721 election, Spanish influence blocked several candidates to favor the pro-Habsburg Innocent XIII, ensuring alignment against Bourbon . Such interventions often involved envoys pressuring cardinals with promises of benefices or threats of withheld revenues from . In the early American republic, foreign efforts targeted nascent democratic elections amid partisan divides. During the 1796 U.S. presidential contest, French diplomats, responding to the aligning America with Britain, launched a covert campaign against . French minister Pierre Adet circulated a in newspapers threatening diplomatic rupture if Adams prevailed, while consul-general Joseph Létombe coordinated with pro-French Jeffersonian Republicans to sway and electors in key states like . These actions, documented in diplomatic correspondence and contemporary accounts, aimed to install a Gallic-friendly administration but failed, as Adams secured 71 electoral votes to Jefferson's 68; President Washington alluded to such "foreign intrigue" in his Farewell Address, warning of its corrosive effect on republican sovereignty. British counterparts exerted subtler influence through favorable trade policies and editorials, but French overtures were more direct, exploiting domestic -Antifederalist fissures rooted in European alliances. Nineteenth-century instances were less documented in democratic contexts but persisted in monarchical and post-colonial settings. European powers occasionally intervened in Latin American independence-era votes; for example, British diplomats supported pro-monarchical factions in Mexico's 1822–1823 constitutional assembly elections to counter Spanish reconquest threats, providing funding and intelligence to ensure a stable amenable to British commerce. However, for widespread covert operations remains limited compared to overt , with interventions often blending into broader rather than isolated electoral tactics. These pre-20th century cases illustrate causal patterns where foreign actors exploited institutional weaknesses—bribable electors, ideologically divided voters, or revenue-dependent clergy—for strategic gains, predating modern secrecy but sharing motives of .

20th Century Interventions

The marked a period of intensified foreign electoral interventions, primarily by the and the amid ideological competition, with both superpowers employing covert funding, propaganda, voter suppression tactics, and direct manipulation to favor aligned parties or regimes. Systematic identifies 117 such partisan interventions by these powers from to , where the intervener sought to tilt national executive or legislative elections toward a specific side, often succeeding in altering outcomes by an average of 3 percentage points in the targeted party's favor. These actions contrasted with earlier, sporadic interferences by European powers, escalating due to global bipolarity and the perceived stakes of democratic contests in preventing communist expansion or capitalist encirclement. Declassified documents reveal U.S. interventions numbered 81 and Soviet ones 36 in this timeframe, frequently involving great powers' intelligence agencies to bypass non-intervention norms under the guise of anti-subversion efforts. Soviet interventions in post-World War II exemplified overt rigging under , prioritizing communist consolidation over genuine electoral competition. In Poland's January 19, 1947, parliamentary elections, Soviet-backed authorities intimidated opposition candidates, falsified counts by up to 20-30% in some districts through invalid votes and coerced absentee balloting, and suppressed non-communist parties, yielding a 52% vote share for the communist bloc despite likely genuine support below 30%. Comparable tactics marred Hungary's November 1947 elections, where the Smallholders' Party was forced into coalition subordination, and Bulgaria's 1946 plebiscite abolishing the monarchy, both engineered via arrests, media control, and presence to ensure pro-Moscow dominance. These were not isolated; Soviet oversight extended to falsifying results in and Czechoslovakia's preparatory votes, establishing "people's democracies" by through electoral facades that violated pledges for free elections. The countered with covert operations, launching its first major electoral interference in Italy's April 18, 1948, parliamentary vote to block a Soviet-influenced communist-socialist . The CIA, newly formed, funneled an estimated $10-20 million (equivalent to over $100 million today) to the Christian Democrats via intermediaries, including Vatican channels and anti-communist labor unions, alongside broadcasts and voter mobilization to secure a 48% victory margin over the Popular Democratic Front's 31%. This operation, authorized under Directive 4-A, set a for U.S. "psychological warfare," continuing with annual aid averaging $5 million into the 1950s to sustain centrist governments against PCI resurgence. In the , U.S. efforts targeted leftist movements perceived as Soviet proxies. During Chile's September 4, 1964, presidential election, the CIA expended $2.6 million on Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic campaign against Salvador Allende's socialists, funding opposition parties, anti-Allende media ads portraying him as a communist threat, and strike orchestration to sway voters, contributing to Frei's 56% win over Allende's 39%. Similarly, in British Guiana's December 1964 legislative elections, President Kennedy approved a CIA operation allocating $1.3 million for vote-buying, forged documents discrediting Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party, and alliances with rival ethnic groups, fracturing Jagan's support and enabling Burnham's victory, paving independence under pro-U.S. rule. Such interventions persisted through and proxy conflicts, with both powers adapting techniques like and economic —e.g., U.S. threats of aid cuts in elections from to the , and Soviet funding of proxies in and . Empirical reviews indicate higher success for covert over overt methods, though blowback risks, such as bolstering nationalist backlashes, underscored causal limits tied to local contexts rather than intervention scale alone.

Post-Cold War and Contemporary Cases

Following the in 1991, foreign electoral interventions evolved from predominantly overt funding and proxy militias during the to hybrid tactics emphasizing cyber intrusions, via , and covert financing of political actors, reflecting technological advancements and a multipolar geopolitical landscape. Great powers like , the , , and have documented cases, often partisan in nature, with interventions targeting both post-communist transitions and established democracies. Datasets such as the Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG), covering 1946–2014, record 117 instances by major actors, with post-1991 cases showing a rise in covert digital methods amid declining overt military involvement. Russia conducted 27 documented interventions in foreign elections since 1991, initially concentrated in to counter color revolutions and NATO expansion, such as backing pro-Russian candidates in Ukraine's 2004 presidential runoff through and vote rigging support. A second wave post-2014 targeted Western elections, exemplified by the 2016 U.S. presidential contest, where Russia's GRU unit hacked Democratic National Committee servers, leaking 20,000 emails via platforms like and to undermine , while the state-linked disseminated divisive content on and reaching 126 million users. U.S. intelligence assessments, corroborated by the Mueller investigation's 2019 of 12 GRU officers, attributed these actions to a preference for , though causal impact on vote margins remains debated due to confounding domestic polarization. Similar efforts persisted in France's 2017 election, with GRU hacks on Emmanuel Macron's campaign yielding leaked emails hours before voting, and in Germany's 2017 Bundestag vote via AfD-favoring . The maintained post-Cold War interventions, often through funding non-governmental organizations and under the , intervening in approximately 11% of global competitive elections from 1946–2000, with continuity into the 1990s–2010s. In Serbia's 2000 election, U.S. agencies provided $41 million in aid to opposition group , training activists and funding media to oust , contributing to his 57% certified loss amid mass protests. Ukraine's 2004 saw U.S.-backed exit polls and NGO support for against , prompting a rerun after fraud allegations, while similar patterns emerged in Georgia's 2003 . These actions, framed as countering , drew criticism for undermining , with Levin's analysis estimating U.S. interventions succeeded in shifting outcomes in 81 cases since , though post-1991 efficacy declined against rising digital countermeasures. China's interventions surged in the 2010s, focusing on diaspora communities and rather than mass , with 33 documented cases since 2000 per Swedish Defence Research Agency analysis. In Canada's 2019 and 2021 federal elections, Canada's Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessed Chinese agents funneled $250,000 through proxies to 11 Liberal candidates and mobilized 6,000 voters via networks, aiming to sustain Justin Trudeau's for favorable policies, though without altering seat totals. U.S. indictments in 2024 revealed Chinese hackers targeting state-level races with sites mimicking conservative outlets, reaching thousands via AI-generated content to sow discord, while Taiwan's 2024 presidential election faced Beijing-orchestrated cognitive warfare, including deepfakes discrediting , yet he secured 40% of votes. Iran's recent meddling emphasizes hack-and-leak operations, with the (IRGC) indicted in September 2024 for stealing Donald Trump's 2024 campaign emails and distributing them to media outlets like and to harm his candidacy, part of a broader pattern including 2020 voter intimidation threats via to 200,000 Democrats. Microsoft's 2024 threat report detailed Iranian personas posing as journalists to phish Trump affiliates, while FBI disruptions of IRGC networks highlighted attempts to exacerbate U.S. divisions, though penetration remained limited compared to 2016 Russian efforts. Contemporary cases, as of –2025, reflect intensified multi-actor competition in U.S. and European polls, with deploying AI deepfakes (e.g., fake Biden robocalls in primaries) and Iran-China coordinating indirect influence, per ODNI assessments, yet empirical studies indicate low success rates—under 20% outcome shifts—due to voter resilience and platform mitigations. Parliament inquiries noted hybrid threats in transnational elections, including Russian bots amplifying populists, underscoring a shift toward preemptive disruptions over decisive partisan gains.

Typology of Interventions

Overt vs. Covert Methods

Overt methods of foreign electoral intervention involve actions that are publicly attributable to the intervening state, such as official endorsements of candidates, transparent financial assistance to , or overt propaganda broadcasts favoring specific outcomes. These approaches rely on the intervener's diplomatic leverage and public influence, often framed as support for democratic values or alliances, but they carry risks of international condemnation and domestic backlash in the target country if viewed as meddling. For example, during the , the employed overt tactics in Western European elections, including public campaigns via Radio Free Europe to counter communist influence, as documented in declassified records showing explicit partisan advocacy. Such methods are less common in modern interventions due to norms against overt interference, comprising a minority of cases in empirical ; the Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG) dataset records overt actions in approximately 11% of U.S. interventions from to , primarily through diplomatic statements or aid conditioned on electoral results. Covert methods, by contrast, encompass deniable operations designed to obscure the intervener's role, including clandestine funding, cyber intrusions into electoral infrastructure, and spread through proxies or anonymous channels. These tactics aim to manipulate voter perceptions or processes without triggering immediate retaliation, exploiting asymmetries in attribution and accountability. 's 2016 interference in the U.S. presidential election, authorized by President Vladimir Putin, involved the hacking Democratic National Committee servers to leak emails via and the conducting social media influence operations targeting 126 million users, all executed without official acknowledgment. Similarly, U.S. covert operations, such as the CIA's funding of anti-communist parties in Italy's 1948 election via secret channels totaling millions in equivalent dollars, demonstrate historical reliance on hidden mechanisms to avoid violating neutrality norms. The PEIG dataset identifies covert interventions as predominant, accounting for over 80% of the 117 great-power cases from 1946 to 2014, with favoring them more than the U.S. The distinction between overt and covert methods influences their efficacy and consequences. Empirical analysis from the PEIG dataset shows that foreign interventions overall increase the favored candidate's vote share by about 3 percentage points, but covert operations achieve higher success rates—approximately 27% versus lower for overt—particularly when the intervener holds superiority, as they evade public scrutiny and allow . Covert tactics, however, correlate with democratic backsliding in target states, eroding institutional trust and increasing authoritarian tendencies post-election, whereas overt methods may bolster legitimacy if aligned with popular sentiments but often provoke countermeasures like sanctions. Datasets like PEIG, derived from declassified archives and intelligence reports rather than media claims, underscore that while both types occur across great powers, covert dominance reflects causal incentives for amid international prohibitions on interference, though attribution challenges limit comprehensive quantification.

Partisan vs. Non-Partisan Approaches

Foreign electoral interventions can be classified as partisan when a state attempts to favor or oppose a specific , , or faction to influence the election outcome in a targeted manner. This approach typically involves covert or overt support, such as funding campaigns, disseminating tailored to boost one side, or conducting cyber operations to leak damaging about opponents. In contrast, non-partisan interventions focus on the electoral process or system itself without explicitly aligning with a particular political , often aiming to erode public confidence, disrupt , or amplify divisions indiscriminately. These may include generalized campaigns or technical sabotage of voting mechanisms, where the intent is systemic weakening rather than electoral tilting toward a preferred result. The Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG) dataset, covering 1946 to 2014, documents 198 such partisan cases by the (117 interventions) and /Russia (81 interventions), primarily in executive elections. These interventions succeeded in about 1 in 8 cases on average, with covert actions more effective than overt ones, as they allow deniability and avoid backlash. For instance, the covertly supported communist parties in European elections during the , while the U.S. backed anti-communist candidates in Italy's 1948 vote through financial aid and . Empirical analysis indicates partisan interventions correlate with reduced democratic and increased post-election, particularly when aiding challengers in weaker democracies. Non-partisan approaches, less systematically tracked in major datasets like PEIG due to their focus on outcome-specific meddling, often manifest as process-oriented disruptions. Examples include cyberattacks on election infrastructure, such as North Korea's 2016-2017 attempts to breach U.S. systems without evident candidate preference, or Iran's 2020 campaigns against databases aimed at general chaos rather than partisan gain. These differ from partisan efforts by lacking a clear favored , potentially leading to broader societal rather than shifts in vote shares; however, they can indirectly benefit actors who exploit resulting instability. Unlike partisan interventions, which great powers use to install aligned regimes, non-partisan tactics may stem from revisionist states seeking to delegitimize rivals' democratic legitimacy without committing to a specific alternative. Distinguishing the two requires assessing intent and effects, though attribution challenges complicate classification—many operations blend elements, and sources like intelligence assessments may reflect analytical biases. Partisan interventions invite retaliation risks tied to the favored party's success, whereas non-partisan ones prioritize long-term erosion of institutional credibility, as seen in Russian "reflexive control" strategies amplifying societal fissures without direct endorsement. Quantitatively, partisan cases dominate historical records, suggesting non-partisan efforts are either rarer among great powers or more opaque, with success measured by disruption metrics like voter turnout declines rather than victory margins.

Specific Techniques Employed

Foreign electoral interventions employ a range of techniques aimed at influencing voter perceptions, manipulating information flows, disrupting electoral processes, or providing material support to preferred actors. These methods often combine cyber capabilities with psychological operations to exploit societal divisions or institutional vulnerabilities, as documented in analyses of state-sponsored activities. Cyber intrusions and disruptions constitute a primary vector, involving unauthorized access to networks, data theft, and sabotage of infrastructure. Hack-and-leak operations, for instance, target campaign emails or official documents for selective release to discredit opponents; Russian actors conducted such efforts against the in the 2016 U.S. election, leaking over 20,000 emails via . Phishing attacks on officials and denial-of-service assaults on voting websites have been used to steal credentials or temporarily halt access, as seen in attempts during Ukraine's 2014 elections and probes into U.S. state voter databases in 2016. Infrastructure targeting, such as altering voter rolls or scanning election systems, occurred in at least 21 s in 2016, though no widespread vote tallies were changed. Information manipulation and disinformation campaigns seek to shape through fabricated content and amplified narratives. State-linked actors deploy bots, troll farms, and to disseminate distorted news, polarizing voters on issues like immigration or race; Russia's operated over 3,500 accounts reaching 126 million users in by boosting hyperpartisan memes and ads. Fake political advertisements purchased under false identities, often via platforms, promote or undermine candidates, as in the where pro-Leave content was amplified covertly. Sentiment amplification exploits algorithms to flood discourse with divisive material, evident in German elections in 2017 where automated accounts spread anti-immigrant falsehoods. Covert financial and material support provides resources to aligned parties or candidates, bypassing disclosure laws through proxies or shell entities. Illicit funding channels, such as donors or offshore transfers, have funneled money to influence outcomes; Lebanese-Nigerian businessman routed over $180,000 in illegal contributions to U.S. campaigns in via associates, violating federal prohibitions on foreign nationals. Russian entities have been linked to covert payments supporting European far-left and far-right groups, including €10 million to France's National Front in 2014. Elite capture and relational influence builds long-term leverage through cultivated ties with politicians, offering economic incentives or policy alignments. Foreign powers foster relationships with amenable elites, as did by signing cooperation agreements with pro-Kremlin European parties to indirectly shape electoral platforms. These efforts often precede elections, embedding sympathetic voices in domestic debates to legitimize interventionist narratives. While less overt, such grooming amplifies foreign preferences without direct cyber or financial traces.

Empirical Assessment

Datasets and Methodologies

The primary empirical dataset for historical foreign electoral interventions is the Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG), compiled by political scientist Dov Levin, which records 469 instances of overt and covert efforts by the and the /Russia to sway election outcomes in favor of specific candidates or parties from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 2014. This dataset codes interventions based on confirmed partisan intent, distinguishing them from non-partisan diplomatic activities, and includes variables such as the intervening power's preferred outcome, methods employed (e.g., financial aid, propaganda campaigns, or military threats), and the election's national-level executive context. Data assembly involved systematic archival research, drawing from declassified U.S. State Department cables, CIA reports, Soviet-era documents released post-1991, and secondary historical analyses to verify occurrences and minimize underreporting biases inherent in covert operations. An updated iteration of PEIG, released in 2024, extends coverage and incorporates 37.4% more cases through cross-verification against newly accessible sources, enabling longitudinal analysis of intervention frequency—revealing peaks during the , with the U.S. involved in 81 cases and the USSR/ in 36 by 2000. For contemporary digital interference, the Institute for Global Politics (IGP) dataset at tracks online foreign information manipulation operations targeting elections worldwide from 2014 to 2024, cataloging over 100 campaigns with emphasis on tactics like coordinated , bot networks, and emerging generative AI tools. This dataset applies the cybersecurity framework to classify procedures, aggregating data from , platform disclosures (e.g., /X and archives on state-linked accounts), and forensic attribution reports. Methodologies for deriving insights from these datasets combine historical-comparative coding with quantitative modeling; Levin's approach, for instance, employs logistic regressions comparing intervened elections to matched non-intervened controls, controlling for domestic factors like popularity to isolate intervention effects on vote margins, which averaged a 3-4 shift toward the favored side in confirmed cases. Digital datasets utilize of scraped posts and to quantify reach, as in studies of Russian activities during the 2016 U.S. election, where exposure metrics from platform data informed panel surveys linking impressions to attitude shifts. Attribution relies on multi-source —e.g., IP tracing, linguistic forensics, and whistleblower accounts—but faces limitations from operational secrecy, with estimates suggesting 20-30% undercount in pre-digital eras due to non-declassified failures. Complementary qualitative methods, including process-tracing of declassified timelines, address causality gaps unresolvable by aggregates alone.

Quantified Success and Failure Rates

Empirical assessments of foreign electoral interventions' success rates draw primarily from the Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG) dataset, compiled by Dov Levin, which documents 117 instances of partisan interventions by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in competitive elections between 1946 and 2000. These interventions occurred in approximately 1 in 9 such elections worldwide, with success defined as increasing the targeted candidate's or party's vote share or altering the election outcome in their favor. Statistical analysis of the dataset indicates that interventions boosted the preferred side's vote share by an average of about 3 percentage points, with effects statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05). Overt interventions proved more effective, yielding an average vote share increase of roughly 5.4 percentage points, compared to 2.3 points for covert operations, suggesting that public signaling and resource commitment enhance impact. In terms of outright victory, the dataset implies interventions could swing outcomes in close races; for instance, a uniform 3-point shift might have changed the winner in 7 of 14 U.S. presidential elections since 1960, though direct causation remains probabilistic rather than deterministic. The achieved higher relative success in its interventions compared to the /Russia, particularly in covert financing and propaganda efforts during the , though exact win rates vary by case and are not aggregated as simple percentages due to confounding domestic factors. Post-Cold War data is sparser and shows lower efficacy for certain tactics. An updated PEIG extension to 2014 identifies additional cases but does not alter core findings on average effects, emphasizing persistence of modest boosts in targeted vote shares. Modern information operations, such as Russia's activities in the 2016 U.S. election, demonstrate limited success: exposure to pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content slightly shifted attitudes (e.g., 0.2-0.6 point increases in thermometer scores) but had no detectable impact on or . Failure rates implicitly exceed 50% in these scenarios, as interventions often fail to overcome structural electoral margins or provoke backlash, with attribution challenges further obscuring outcomes.
Intervention TypeAvg. Vote Share IncreaseKey Examples
Overt~5.4%U.S. public endorsements in Latin American elections
Covert~2.3%Soviet financing in European polls
Overall~3%117 cases, 1946-2000
These rates underscore that while interventions can marginally tilt results, outright failures predominate absent favorable domestic conditions, with datasets like PEIG highlighting toward winnable targets.

Causal Factors and Limitations

Empirical analyses of partisan electoral interventions by great powers, covering national executive elections from to 2000, indicate that such efforts typically boost the aided candidate's vote share by approximately 3 percentage points on average, though success varies by intervention type and context. Overt interventions prove more effective, increasing vote shares by 5.4 to 5.6 percentage points, compared to 2 to 2.6 points for covert ones, as overt methods allow greater resource mobilization like direct or public endorsements without the deniability constraints that limit covert scale. Interventions targeting "condition-affecting" levers, such as economic or concessions, yield stronger effects (around 4 points) than pure campaign support, while those in founding elections underperform, sometimes reducing aided candidates' shares by 6.7 points due to voters' unfamiliarity with political actors and limited local for interveners. Success hinges on several interrelated factors rooted in power asymmetries and target vulnerabilities. Great powers intervene selectively in competitive races where domestic allies provide cooperation and intelligence, perceiving threats to geopolitical interests like alliances or , which enables tipping close margins but fails without local consent or in non-competitive contexts. Target country institutional strength mediates outcomes; robust democracies with informed electorates and free media exhibit resilience, as seen in minimal shifts from Russian (IRA) operations in the 2016 U.S. election, where exposure to over 32 million potentially affected users correlated with less than 0.7 percentage point change in Trump vote share and no attitude shifts on issues or polarization. Public perception plays a causal role: interventions aligning with local grievances (e.g., U.S. emphasizing reunification in 1953 , boosting CDU votes from 31% in 1949 to 45.2%) succeed, while perceived backfires, rallying nationalist support against the intervener. Assessing faces inherent limitations due to the covert of most interventions and data scarcity. Datasets like the Partisan Electoral Interventions by Great Powers (PEIG), drawing from declassified documents and historical records, capture only verifiable cases—117 U.S./USSR/ interventions from 1946–2000—potentially undercounting undetected efforts or biasing toward high-profile failures exposed post-hoc. Selection effects confound results, as interveners target winnable races with cooperative locals, inflating apparent rates (e.g., ~1/3 overt wins for U.S./USSR) while ignoring non-intervened counterfactuals or domestic confounders like economic conditions. Observational studies struggle with attribution and isolation; for instance, Russian IRA analyses rely on platform data ( exposures dwarfed 25:1 by domestic media), precluding experimental controls and generalizing beyond one channel or . Broader empirical challenges include small event samples (interventions in ~1/9 competitive elections), endogeneity in measuring "" beyond vote shifts (e.g., ), and reliance on potentially selective archival sources, which may omit subtle influences or overemphasize great-power actions amid hybrid threats. These constraints underscore that while interventions can marginally sway outcomes in weaker systems, advanced democracies' informational ecosystems and voter inertia often render effects negligible or counterproductive.

Prominent Case Studies

United States Interventions Abroad

The United States conducted extensive partisan electoral interventions abroad, particularly during the Cold War, to promote anti-communist outcomes and safeguard perceived national interests against Soviet influence. These efforts, often executed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), encompassed covert funding of preferred parties, propaganda dissemination via media and labor unions, and manipulation of voter perceptions through disinformation. Declassified documents reveal that such operations were authorized at high levels, including by President Harry Truman, with the rationale rooted in preventing leftist victories that could align target nations with the Eastern Bloc. Researcher Dov H. Levin's comprehensive documents 81 instances of U.S. partisan electoral interventions in national-level executive elections from 1946 to 2000, surpassing Soviet/Russian interventions (36 cases) and employing both overt and covert methods. Levin's analysis, drawing from declassified archives, diplomatic records, and intelligence reports, indicates these interventions typically favored the targeted candidate by an average vote share increase of 3-4 percentage points, with covert actions proving more effective than overt ones due to . U.S. operations were concentrated in and , where geopolitical stakes were highest, and frequently involved channeling funds through intermediaries like the National Student Association or local anti-communist groups to obscure origins. In the 1948 Italian general election on April 18, the U.S. allocated approximately $10-20 million in covert aid—equivalent to over $100 million in current terms—to bolster the Christian Democrats led by against the communist-socialist . This included CIA-orchestrated propaganda via radio broadcasts, pamphlets, and Vatican channels warning of Soviet domination, alongside direct campaign financing and voter efforts. The Christian Democrats secured 48.5% of the vote and 305 seats, defeating the 's 31%, a margin attributed in part to U.S. actions amid fears of a communist takeover similar to Czechoslovakia's earlier that year. Declassified State Department and CIA records confirm Truman's approval of these measures as essential to . The 1964 Chilean presidential election exemplified U.S. escalation in Latin America, where the CIA expended $2.6 million (about $25 million today) on anti-Allende operations to support Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei against socialist Salvador Allende. Tactics included funding opposition media to amplify fears of economic collapse under Allende, staging anti-communist demonstrations, and distributing leaflets portraying Allende as a Soviet proxy. Frei won with 55.6% of the vote on September 4, averting Allende's plurality victory. Church Committee investigations later verified these expenditures, noting they comprised one of the CIA's largest peacetime covert political actions. Similar patterns emerged in British Guiana (now ), where President authorized a CIA covert campaign in 1964 to defeat Marxist leader in pre-independence elections. The agency funneled funds to opposition parties, supported strikes, and propagated racial divisions between Indo-Guyanese Jagan supporters and Afro-Guyanese rivals, leading to Forbes Burnham's coalition victory. Declassified cables detail Kennedy's explicit directive for electoral rigging to block Jagan's independence push. U.S. interventions extended to other Latin American contests, such as Brazil's 1960 presidential race, where covert support aided anti-communist candidate , though subsequent military coups overshadowed electoral efforts. Post-1970s reforms, including the Church Committee's exposure of abuses, curtailed overt CIA electoral roles, shifting toward non-governmental channels like the National Endowment for Democracy for democracy promotion. However, Cold War-era operations left legacies of instability, with some analyses linking them to authoritarian backlashes when elected leftists later faced coups, as in Chile's 1973 overthrow of Allende following failed 1970 prevention efforts. Empirical reviews, such as Levin's, underscore high short-term efficacy but question long-term democratic erosion from perceived foreign meddling.

Interventions Targeting the United States

The Russian government orchestrated a comprehensive interference operation in the 2016 U.S. , employing cyber intrusions into Democratic Party networks and widespread dissemination. The (IRA), a Russian , created and managed thousands of fake accounts that reached millions of , posting content designed to exacerbate social divisions, suppress turnout among certain demographics, and amplify support for while denigrating . Simultaneously, Russia's military intelligence agency () hacked the (DNC) and Clinton campaign servers, stealing thousands of emails and documents released via platforms like to influence public perception. The U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously assessed that President ordered this campaign to undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and favor Trump's election. Indictments followed, including 12 officers for hacking and conspiracy, and 13 IRA operatives for related influence activities, though none were extradited. Subsequent U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports corroborated the scope of Russian efforts, detailing over 3,500 IRA-linked ads and pages mimicking U.S. activist groups to stoke racial tensions and . While these operations generated significant online engagement—IRA content viewed by up to 126 million users—no evidence emerged of direct vote manipulation or physical ballot tampering, and Robert Mueller's investigation concluded that Russian interference did not alter vote tallies but aimed to shape narratives. The campaign's effectiveness remains debated, with empirical analyses indicating limited sway over voter behavior due to echo-chamber effects in algorithms, though it eroded trust in among segments of the electorate. Interference attempts persisted into the 2020 election, involving multiple actors without successful infrastructure compromise. Russia continued influence operations to discredit and elevate Trump, including state media amplification of unsubstantiated Hunter Biden laptop stories. engaged in a "hack-and-leak" scheme, stealing Trump campaign emails in late September 2020 and anonymously emailing them to media outlets and the Biden campaign to sow chaos and undermine Trump. Iranian actors also sent over 100,000 spoofed emails impersonating the to Democratic voters, threatening violence to intimidate turnout. China's efforts were more indirect, focusing on disinformation networks like Spamouflage, which used fake U.S. personas on platforms including (now X) and to promote anti-American narratives and exploit domestic divisions, though without clear partisan favoritism toward either candidate. The Office of the (ODNI) assessed high confidence in these attributions, noting actors' goals of eroding U.S. cohesion rather than altering counts, with no observed attempts to access election systems. In the 2024 election cycle, , , and sustained operations amid heightened U.S. defenses, emphasizing AI-generated content and proxy networks for narrative manipulation. targeted Trump with cyber-enabled threats, including plots against officials and hack-and-leak attempts on his campaign, alongside videos depicting voter to delegitimize results. ODNI, FBI, and CISA jointly warned of Iranian campaigns mimicking U.S. media to incite backlash against Trump supporters. amplified divisive themes via state-linked bots and RT/Sputnik proxies, focusing on and economic grievances to boost isolationist sentiments. Chinese actors shifted toward down-ballot races, using fake accounts to criticize congressional candidates on issues like policy, while avoiding overt presidential interference. Post-election ODNI assessments confirmed no foreign compromise of voting infrastructure but highlighted persistent efforts to exploit transition-period unrest through fabricated protests or narratives. U.S. responses included sanctions on IRGC-linked entities and Russian affiliates for tooling. Across cycles, these interventions underscore a pattern of psychological and informational warfare, with causal impact on outcomes unquantified but countered by resilient election administration.

Interventions in Other Democracies

In the 1948 Italian general election held on April 18, the (CIA) conducted its first major to counter communist influence, providing financial aid estimated at $10–20 million (equivalent to approximately $130–260 million in 2023 dollars) to the Christian Democratic Party through intermediaries like the Vatican and anti-communist labor unions. This intervention, authorized under President Truman's anti-communist policy amid fears of a Soviet-backed Popular Democratic Front victory, contributed to the Christian Democrats securing 48% of the vote against the Front's 31%, though domestic factors such as economic recovery aid via the also played significant roles. Declassified documents confirm the operation's existence but highlight debates over its decisive impact, with some analyses suggesting it amplified rather than solely determined the outcome. Russia's 2017 interference in France's presidential election involved state-linked hackers, identified by U.S. intelligence as associated with the GRU's group (APT28), breaching Emmanuel Macron's campaign email system and leaking over 20,000 documents via platforms like and just before the May 7 runoff. This cyber operation was paired with amplified by Russian such as RT and Sputnik, aiming to undermine Macron's centrist En Marche! party in favor of National Front candidate , whose pro-Russian stance aligned with Moscow's interests. French authorities and cybersecurity firms like attributed the hacks to Russian , but the effort largely failed, with Macron winning 66% of the vote; rapid public and media debunking of the leaks as manipulated mitigated broader damage. In Germany's September 24, 2017, election, Russian actors engaged in lower-intensity meddling compared to France, including campaigns via state media and social platforms targeting Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, but no confirmed large-scale hacks disrupted the vote. German warned of potential interference akin to U.S. and French cases, prompting enhanced cybersecurity measures by the (BSI), which detected attempts but reported minimal successful penetration. Efforts focused on amplifying anti-Merkel narratives around migration and , yet Merkel's coalition retained power with 33% of the vote, aided by Germany's polarized but resilient media environment and voter skepticism toward foreign narratives. Attribution relied on open-source analysis and allied sharing, underscoring challenges in proving intent without . Chinese influence operations in Australia's democratic processes, particularly evident in the 2016–2019 period leading to the May 2019 federal election, involved the Work Department-linked networks donating to politicians, sponsoring think tanks, and pressuring communities to support pro-Beijing candidates. Australian parliamentary inquiries documented cases like Sam Dastyari's resignation in 2017 over undisclosed Chinese donor ties and efforts to sway university policies, but direct vote tampering was absent; instead, operations sought policy influence on issues like disputes. These activities prompted Australia's 2018 foreign interference laws, which enhanced transparency and banned covert donations, reflecting of over electoral hacking. Chinese influence operations in the Philippines have employed United Front tactics and digital proxy warfare to target electoral processes, particularly aiming to sway narratives on South China Sea disputes and support pro-Beijing policy shifts. Reports document efforts involving disinformation campaigns on social media and elite capture to influence midterm elections, exploiting domestic divisions without confirmed direct vote manipulation; these operations seek long-term alignment rather than immediate partisan gains, with effectiveness limited by Philippine countermeasures and public scrutiny. Suspected Russian involvement in the United Kingdom's 2016 Brexit referendum on June 23, where 52% voted to leave the , included disinformation via social media bots and funding opaque channels, but a Intelligence and Security Committee report criticized the government for inadequate pre-referendum assessment and attribution. Open-source data showed pro-Leave amplification by Russian-linked accounts, potentially reaching millions, yet causal links to the narrow margin remain unproven due to domestic drivers like concerns; the report noted Russia's pattern of exploiting divisions without needing decisive sway. analyses similarly highlight hybrid threats across member states, with Russia and China favoring non-partisan disruption over overt partisan backing. Across these cases, interventions often blend cyber tools with information operations, but success varies: overt historical funding like in Italy yielded measurable shifts, while modern digital efforts in France and Australia frequently backfired due to rapid countermeasures and public resilience, as quantified in post-election audits showing limited vote impact (e.g., under 1% swing in modeled French scenarios). Empirical datasets from EU and NATO reports emphasize attribution difficulties, with only 20–30% of alleged incidents yielding forensic evidence, underscoring the need for causal analysis beyond correlation.

International Norms and Treaties

The principle of non-intervention forms the cornerstone of international norms prohibiting foreign electoral interference, rooted in and codified in foundational documents. Article 2(4) of the Charter (1945) bars the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, while Article 2(7) precludes intervention in matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction. These provisions extend to electoral processes as core elements of political , encompassing the selection of leaders free from external coercion. United Nations General Assembly resolutions have elaborated this norm specifically for internal affairs, including elections. Resolution 2131 (XX) (1965), the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, affirms that no state may intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason, in the internal or external affairs of another, explicitly rejecting interference in political processes. Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), the Declaration on Principles of concerning Friendly Relations, further prohibits intervention aimed at depriving a state of its political independence or depriving its people of , with elections viewed as integral to such rights. These instruments, while non-binding, reflect opinio juris and state practice confirming non-intervention's customary status. No explicitly bans foreign electoral intervention as a standalone offense, leaving reliance on the broader non-intervention rule. Efforts to apply this to covert or cyber-enabled actions, such as campaigns, hinge on demonstrating —defined as interference compelling the target state to act against its will or undermining its sovereign choice. For instance, the 2020 Oxford Statement by international law experts asserts that digital interference violating contravenes these norms, yet lacks enforceability as a mere scholarly declaration. Regional instruments, like the Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001) of the , condemn undue external influence on democratic processes but apply only to member states. Enforcement remains constrained by the absence of dedicated mechanisms, with violations often unaddressed due to geopolitical vetoes in the UN Security Council or challenges in proving attribution and . State practice reveals frequent disregard—evident in documented interventions by major powers—undermining the norm's deterrent effect despite its legal standing. Proposals for a binding convention, such as those post-2016 U.S. inquiries, have not materialized, highlighting the tension between aspirational norms and .

Domestic Regulations in Target Countries

Target countries, particularly established democracies, have implemented domestic to prohibit or regulate foreign involvement in electoral processes, focusing on bans on contributions, registration requirements for influence activities, and criminal penalties for covert interference. These measures aim to safeguard by limiting financial inflows, mandating disclosure, and deterring deceptive operations, though varies and loopholes persist in some jurisdictions. In the United States, federal law under 52 U.S.C. § 30121 explicitly prohibits foreign nationals, including governments and entities, from making contributions, donations, expenditures, or disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local elections, with violations punishable by fines and imprisonment. The (FARA), enacted in 1938 and amended subsequently, requires individuals or entities acting on behalf of foreign principals to register with the Department of Justice and disclose activities aimed at influencing U.S. policy or , including electoral matters. 13848, issued on September 12, 2018, authorizes sanctions against persons determined to have engaged in foreign interference in U.S. elections, targeting property blocking and visa restrictions to deter such actions. Recent legislative efforts, such as the Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act introduced in 2024, seek to further restrict foreign-linked spending and enhance penalties. Australia's Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 establishes a mandatory registration regime for persons or entities undertaking activities on behalf of foreign principals intended to influence Australian political or governmental processes, requiring online disclosure of arrangements, activities, and communications to promote visibility and public scrutiny. The scheme, administered by the Attorney-General's Department, covers , of candidates or parties, and campaigns, with non-compliance attracting civil penalties up to AUD 222,000 for individuals or AUD 1.11 million for bodies corporate as of 2024; it was introduced following concerns over Chinese influence operations documented in 2017-2018 parliamentary inquiries. A 2024 review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security recommended reforms to expand coverage and improve enforcement, citing low registration rates and evasion tactics. Canada's Canada Elections Act, amended in 2018 and 2019, bans foreign entities from incurring election advertising expenses or unduly influencing electors during election periods, with prohibitions enforced by the Commissioner of Canada Elections through fines up to CAD 5,000 and imprisonment for knowing violations. The Security of Information Act, updated via Bill C-70 in June 2024, criminalizes surreptitious or deceptive interference in democratic processes at the direction of a foreign entity, with penalties including for threats to election officials; this addresses gaps exposed in foreign operations targeting the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, as detailed in the 2024 and of Parliamentarians report. Additional safeguards include the Critical Election Incident Protocol, established in 2019, allowing real-time public alerts on interference threats. In the , the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 restricts political donations to "permissible donors"—those registered to vote in the UK or UK-registered entities with majority UK control—effectively barring direct foreign contributions exceeding £500, with the Electoral Commission empowered to investigate and impose fines or prosecute for undeclared or impermissible funds. Loopholes enabling foreign money through UK-based shell companies prompted 2025 proposals under the Elections Bill to mandate enhanced donor scrutiny, including disclosure, and increase penalties to deter circumvention observed in cases like the 2024 acceptance of illegal donations by multiple parties. European Union member states maintain varied national frameworks, supplemented by EU-level initiatives; for instance, the 2024 EU Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising prohibits non-EU entities from sponsoring political ads in the three months preceding elections, mandating disclosure of sponsors and targeting criteria to counter covert influence. A proposed 2023 directive on transparency for third-country interest representation would require registration of s lobbying EU institutions, though implementation remains uneven across states like , which enforces ad hoc safeguards against without comprehensive foreign agent laws.

Attribution Challenges

Attributing foreign electoral interventions to specific state actors presents significant technical, evidentiary, and political hurdles, primarily due to the covert nature of such operations and the inherent of digital tools. Cyber-enabled interference, a common method, allows perpetrators to mask origins through techniques like , virtual private networks, proxies, and compromised , complicating forensic . State actors often employ non-state proxies, such as criminal hackers or influence operations disguised as domestic activity, further enabling . Evidentiary challenges arise from the reliance on classified intelligence, which limits public disclosure and verification. Governments must balance with transparency to build credible cases, but partial often fuels ; for instance, in the 2016 U.S. hack, U.S. intelligence assessed Russian military intelligence () responsibility with high confidence based on signatures and operational patterns, yet attribution faced contestation due to withheld details and claims of false flags by personas like , linked to but purporting independent action. Similar issues occurred in the 2017 NotPetya cyberattack, attributed to by a coalition through and targeting, but denied by , highlighting how coalition efforts can bolster claims yet invite geopolitical pushback. Political dynamics exacerbate attribution difficulties, creating an "uncertainty loop" where public naming risks domestic polarization or adversary escalation, prompting strategies like non-attribution or diffused blame. In the , authorities withheld specific attributions of suspected Russian-linked to avoid amplifying divisions, prioritizing stability over deterrence signaling. Public misperception compounds this, as studies show audiences often mistake foreign-generated content for domestic due to tailored narratives exploiting societal fault lines, reducing the impact of even confirmed attributions. In Canada's 2021 election, intelligence agencies noted persistent attribution gaps, with foreign actors using covert channels that evaded clear linkage despite suspicions of state involvement. These challenges hinder effective responses, as unproven attributions undermine deterrence and invite over- or under-attribution driven by commercial or political incentives in the cybersecurity ecosystem. While technical advancements in threat intelligence, such as behavioral analytics and open-source monitoring, have improved capabilities—evident in tracking U.S. election interference attributions—residual uncertainties persist, particularly for influence operations blending authentic and fabricated content.

Strategic Responses and Deterrence

Detection and Intelligence Efforts

Detection of foreign electoral intervention relies primarily on , cybersecurity monitoring, and open-source analysis conducted by national intelligence agencies. , the Office of the (ODNI) coordinates assessments from agencies including the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DHS's (CISA), which collectively monitor threats to election infrastructure and influence operations. These efforts involve real-time of cyber intrusions, such as attempts and targeting databases, as well as tracking propagation on platforms. For instance, CISA provides election officials with tools for vulnerability scanning and incident response, designating election systems as since 2017 to enable federal support in threat detection. Attribution techniques emphasize forensic analysis of digital artifacts, including IP addresses, command-and-control servers, and linguistic patterns in , often corroborated across multiple disciplines to link activities to state actors like or . The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) process, as used in evaluations of the and U.S. elections, integrates classified and unclassified data to assess foreign intentions, with declassified summaries highlighting efforts by adversaries to sow discord without altering vote tallies. Challenges persist in distinguishing state-sponsored operations from independent actors, prompting reliance on probabilistic judgments rather than definitive proof, as covert operations are designed to maintain . In practice, these efforts detected Russian attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. election through hacking and leaks, leading to enhanced pre-election briefings and public warnings. For the 2024 cycle, U.S. agencies issued alerts about and likely amplifying on to undermine confidence in results, based on observed patterns from prior interference. Similar intelligence frameworks operate in other democracies; for example, Australia's signals intelligence via the Australian Signals Directorate has identified cyber-enabled interference in referendums, focusing on disruption tactics like denial-of-service attacks. Multilateral sharing through alliances like facilitates cross-border detection, though domestic legal constraints limit proactive measures against covert activities originating abroad.

Policy Countermeasures

Policy countermeasures against foreign electoral intervention primarily involve domestic legislation aimed at restricting foreign financial contributions, enhancing transparency in political advertising and funding, and imposing penalties for covert influence operations. In the United States, federal statutes such as the prohibit foreign nationals, including governments and corporations, from making expenditures or donations in federal, state, or local elections, with violations punishable by fines or imprisonment. Executive Order 13848, issued on September 12, 2018, authorizes sanctions against individuals or entities determined to have interfered in U.S. elections, including asset freezes and transaction bans administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Recent legislative efforts, such as the Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act introduced in 2023, seek to strengthen disclosure requirements for online political ads and close loopholes allowing foreign funds to flow through U.S.-based nonprofits. In the , countermeasures emphasize regulatory frameworks to combat and hybrid threats, including the of 2022, which mandates platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks from foreign interference in electoral processes, such as coordinated inauthentic behavior. The EU's proposed Foreign Influence Transparency Regulation, under discussion since 2023, requires registration and disclosure of activities by s lobbying or funding political entities, drawing parallels to U.S. foreign agent laws but tailored to address state-sponsored operations from actors like or . Member states implement varying national measures; for instance, France's Viginum report in 2024 highlighted enhanced monitoring of digital platforms to detect foreign digital interference in elections. Australia's approach includes the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, enacted in 2018, which obliges individuals or entities undertaking political activities on behalf of foreign principals to register and disclose such engagements publicly, covering lobbying, donations, and disinformation campaigns. The Espionage and Foreign Interference Act of 2018 criminalizes specific acts like recruiting individuals for foreign interference or sabotaging electoral infrastructure, with penalties up to for aggravated offenses. Complementing these, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce, established by the Australian Electoral Commission in 2019, coordinates inter-agency efforts to safeguard voting systems against foreign manipulation, including real-time threat assessments during elections. Cross-nationally, policies often incorporate sanctions and export controls as deterrents; for example, the U.S. has applied targeted sanctions under EO 13848 against Russian entities involved in 2016 election meddling, while multilateral initiatives like commitments in 2018 promote shared standards for protecting . These measures focus on prevention through rather than post-hoc remediation, though enforcement challenges persist due to attribution difficulties and jurisdictional limits. Empirical assessments, such as those from the , indicate that transparency mandates reduce the opacity of foreign funding but require robust verification to avoid circumvention via proxies.

International and Multilateral Approaches

The Rapid Response Mechanism, launched at the 2018 Charlevoix Summit, facilitates information-sharing and coordinated responses among member states to counter foreign and interference in democratic processes, including elections. It has issued statements attributing specific campaigns, such as Russian state media efforts to undermine governments in 2025, and focused on protecting elections during Italy's 2024 . Despite these efforts, the mechanism operates on voluntary coordination without enforcement powers, limiting its deterrent impact amid ongoing interference attempts. United Nations resolutions reaffirm the principle of non-interference in electoral processes under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, as in Resolution 78/208 (2023), which condemns external threats to democratic but lacks specific mechanisms for attribution or sanctions tailored to meddling. Scholarly proposals advocate for a dedicated UN convention to criminalize foreign interference, citing precedents like Russia's 2016 U.S. activities, yet no such has materialized due to concerns and geopolitical divisions. The 2020 Oxford Statement on Protections Against Foreign Electoral Interference posits that digital manipulations violating or political independence breach , though enforcement remains state-driven rather than multilateral. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) employs election observation missions to detect foreign influence, as evidenced by its 2025 monitoring of Moldova's parliamentary vote, which highlighted illicit financing and external meddling despite competitive conditions. These missions assess compliance with OSCE commitments on free elections but prioritize reporting over direct countermeasures, with findings often contested by participating states like , which has accused OSCE methodologies of constituting interference themselves. Broader initiatives, such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (endorsed by over 1,000 entities since 2018), promote norms against manipulating information to impair , with a 2023 compendium outlining multi-stakeholder practices for resilience. efforts complement these through the , invoked in 2025 by , , and others to mandate platforms curb foreign ahead of national polls, though implementation varies and faces criticism for insufficient attribution tools. Collectively, these approaches emphasize norm-building and transparency over binding obligations, reflecting challenges in achieving consensus on verifiable thresholds for intervention amid asymmetric capabilities between actors.

Debates and Critiques

Effectiveness vs. Exaggeration Claims

Empirical analyses of foreign electoral interventions, particularly Russia's activities in the , indicate that while such efforts involve substantial resources and reach millions indirectly, their causal influence on voter behavior and outcomes remains minimal. A peer-reviewed study examining exposure to Russian (IRA) Twitter posts—estimated at 32 million potential U.S. users over eight months—found no significant relationship between exposure levels and changes in vote choice, with simulated shifts in support for averaging a negligible -0.18 percentage points (90% : -1.15 to 0.78). Similarly, research on dissemination, including pro-Trump falsehoods amplified by foreign actors, concluded that such content was shared by only 8% of Americans who recalled seeing any news on , with an upper-bound estimate of vote at 0.77 percentage points nationwide—insufficient to alter results in key swing states given margins of victory exceeding 1%. Claims of decisive impact often stem from intelligence assessments confirming interference intent and scale, such as the IRA's 786,634 posts and modest ad spending under $100,000 on platforms like Facebook, but these reports rarely quantify electoral effects amid confounding domestic factors like campaign dynamics and voter turnout. Skeptics, including analyses from policy institutes, argue that voter resilience to persuasion—evidenced by field experiments showing campaign contacts yield at most marginal shifts—renders covert foreign messaging ineffective, as most exposures occur incidentally via retweets in echo chambers reinforcing preexisting views rather than converting undecideds. In the 2016 case, IRA content reached fewer than 1% of total Facebook interactions, with engagement dwarfed by organic partisan content, and efforts arguably backfired by galvanizing bipartisan sanctions against Russia. Broader historical patterns support exaggeration critiques: foreign propaganda campaigns, from Soviet-era operations to recent Chinese and Iranian attempts, have documented low conversion rates in large democracies, where entrenched partisan identities and diverse information ecosystems dilute external signals. Attributions of existential threats or outcome-altering success frequently align with post-hoc rationalizations by losing parties or media narratives, as seen in unproven assertions that Russian meddling "stole" the 2016 election despite Mueller's investigation finding interference but no collusion or vote-tallying compromise. Peer-reviewed evidence prioritizes causal realism over alarmism, emphasizing that while interventions erode trust peripherally, they seldom meet the high bar of swaying sufficient votes—typically requiring millions of targeted persuadables—in contests decided by localized turnout and messaging.

Moral and Hypocrisy Arguments

Foreign electoral interventions are frequently condemned on moral grounds for violating the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, a cornerstone of under Article 2(7) of the , which prohibits external coercion in matters essentially within a state's , including electoral processes. Such actions undermine the legitimacy of democratic outcomes by introducing external manipulation, potentially eroding voter trust and fostering perceptions of illegitimacy even in unaltered elections, as external influence distorts the causal chain of popular will to governance. Ethicists drawing from and frameworks argue that covert tactics like or funding skew information environments, treating foreign electorates as means to an intervener's ends rather than autonomous agents, which contravenes deontological imperatives against in political . Proponents of intervention occasionally invoke consequentialist rationales, positing that aiding pro-democratic factions against authoritarian threats—such as communist victories during the —can yield net moral gains by preserving freedoms globally, though on long-term efficacy remains mixed and risks blowback like anti-Western resentment. However, these defenses are critiqued for presuming interveners' superior moral insight into foreign contexts, often ignoring how partisan aid favors aligned outcomes over genuine pluralism, and for blurring into self-interested rather than . Accusations of pervade debates, as intervening states decry similar acts by rivals while overlooking their own precedents; for instance, U.S. officials' condemnation of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election—documented via GRU hacking of servers and social media campaigns by the —draws retorts citing American history. Political Dov Levin's records 81 U.S. partisan electoral interventions abroad from 1946 to 2000, exceeding the Soviet/Russian total of 36, including CIA expenditures of over $20 million (equivalent to about $200 million today) to bolster Italy's Christian Democrats in against communist challengers through and vote-buying. Russian and Chinese state narratives amplify this, framing Western outrage as selective, given U.S. covert operations in elections like Chile's 1964 vote where funding helped derail , while adversaries like Russia have targeted Moldova's 2024 election with paid disinformation networks and Ukraine's processes via proxy influence. This pattern erodes normative consensus, as mutual recriminations—evident in dismissals of U.S. claims as ""—hinder unified deterrence and reveal how national interests, not consistent ethics, drive condemnations.

Broader Implications for Democratic Resilience

Foreign electoral interventions challenge democratic resilience by targeting public trust in electoral processes and institutions, often amplifying existing domestic divisions rather than directly altering outcomes. Empirical analyses of Russia's 2016 interference in the U.S. , including campaigns by the , reveal that while exposure to foreign content slightly shifted individual attitudes—such as increasing perceptions of favorability—these effects were minimal and did not significantly influence or aggregate results. Voter resilience stems from factors like reliance on multiple information channels, strong partisan attachments, and the decentralized nature of many democratic electoral systems, which complicate large-scale manipulation. However, repeated attempts can normalize perceptions of , indirectly eroding confidence when domestic actors exploit interference narratives for partisan gain. Perceptions of foreign meddling often exert greater influence on democratic satisfaction than the interventions themselves, fostering cynicism and polarization. A 2022 study found that only voters who believed Russian efforts decisively swayed the U.S. outcome reported lower satisfaction with , with this effect concentrated among losing partisans and uncorrelated with actual exposure levels. Similarly, post-election surveys indicated partisan asymmetries in trust erosion, where Democrats' heightened beliefs in interference correlated with diminished faith in institutional fairness, while Republicans showed relative stability. These dynamics highlight a causal pathway where foreign actions intersect with endogenous polarization, potentially weakening normative adherence to democratic rules if unchecked, though no evidence links interventions to systemic autocratization in resilient states. Long-term resilience hinges on adaptive institutional responses, including cybersecurity enhancements and public transparency initiatives, which have demonstrably mitigated risks in subsequent cycles. U.S. federal and state-level reforms post-2016, such as the establishment of infrastructure centers, prevented detectable compromises in 2020 and 2024 despite ongoing foreign probing by actors like , , and . Broader implications extend to hybrid threats blurring warfare and influence, where unaddressed informational vulnerabilities—exacerbated by algorithms—could cascade into reduced civic participation or contested transitions if trust deficits compound over time. Democracies exhibiting high pre-existing institutional trust, like those with paper ballots and audits, demonstrate greater capacity to absorb such shocks without fundamental disruption, underscoring that resilience derives from structural safeguards over reactive alarmism.

References

  1. https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/9/2/ogae011/7673991
  2. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/public-opinion-and-foreign-electoral-intervention/AC34B6090EACF336D08713AF69BF7904
  3. https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/COM0000072.pdf
  4. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26794949
  5. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA704-1.html
  6. https://priceschool.usc.edu/news/foreign-election-interference-has-a-long-history/
  7. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
  8. https://www.cfr.org/report/defending-america-foreign-election-interference
  9. https://www.dovhlevin.com/datasets
  10. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2708&num=0&edition=prelim
  11. https://academic.oup.com/book/36920/chapter-abstract/322186972?redirectedFrom=PDF
  12. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07388942241279969
  13. https://dokumen.pub/defending-democracies-combating-foreign-election-interference-in-a-digital-age-1nbsped-0197556973-9780197556979.html
  14. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570&context=djcil
  15. https://www.cfr.org/report/foreign-influence-and-democratic-governance
  16. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/what-is-so-foreign-about-foreign-influence-operations?lang=en
  17. https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/foreign-election-interferences-an-overview-of-trends-and-challenges/
  18. https://acf.sais.jhu.edu/distinguish-foreign-influence-foreign-interference.html
  19. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/influence-and-interference/
  20. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1378&context=student_scholarship
  21. https://www.britannica.com/topic/elector
  22. https://www.historytoday.com/behind-closed-doors-top-10-papal-conclaves
  23. https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-05-07/secret-history-of-the-conclaves-the-internal-battles-of-the-last-10-papal-elections.html
  24. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/foreign-election-interference-founding-era
  25. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
  26. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894216661190
  27. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2017-02-07/cia-covert-aid-italy-averaged-5-million-annually-late-1940s
  28. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/all-feasible-means
  29. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00890A000100050005-6.pdf
  30. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20040925/index.htm
  31. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-94chile.pdf
  32. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2020-04-06/cia-covert-operations-overthrow-cheddi-jagan-british-guiana-1964
  33. https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/60/2/189/1750842
  34. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russian-foreign-election-interventions-since-1991/
  35. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Pepm520_Way-Casey_March2018.pdf
  36. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/05/russia-has-been-meddling-in-foreign-elections-for-decades-has-it-made-a-difference/
  37. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/09/04/u-s-interferes-more-elections-than-russia-meddling-author-says/5700657002/
  38. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/chinas-foreign-election-interference-an-overview-of-its-global-impact.pdf
  39. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-spies-found-china-interfered-last-two-elections-probe-hears-2024-04-08/
  40. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/10/15/chinas-new-focus-election-interference-local-state-races.html
  41. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us
  42. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/08/08/iran-targeting-2024-us-election/
  43. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf
  44. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/07/foreign-influence-2024-election-00177828
  45. https://www.appf.europa.eu/cmsdata/277388/Foreign%2520electoral%2520interference%2520affecting%2520EU%2520democratic%2520processes.pdf
  46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48597345
  47. https://www.ibei.org/ibei-student-paper-58_242190.pdf
  48. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA704-4/RAND_RRA704-4.pdf
  49. https://www.dhs.gov/publication/key-findings-and-recommendations-foreign-interference-related-2020-us-federal-elections
  50. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/future-democracy-lessons-us-fight-against-foreign-electoral-interference-2024
  51. https://academic.oup.com/book/39306/chapter/338901677
  52. https://www.cfr.org/report/banning-covert-foreign-election-interference
  53. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/methods-of-foreign-electoral-interference/
  54. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA704-4.html
  55. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cyber-enabled-foreign-interference-elections-and-referendums/
  56. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/lebanese-nigerian-billionaire-and-two-associates-resolve-federal-probe-alleged
  57. https://igp.sipa.columbia.edu/news/igp-releases-new-dataset-online-foreign-information-operations-targeting-elections
  58. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-35576-9
  59. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5r43911x
  60. https://www.cato.org/commentary/foreign-interference-really-affecting-our-elections
  61. https://escholarship.org/content/qt5r43911x/qt5r43911x_noSplash_1c467e6c4f23d21221827d5a19459808.pdf
  62. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/2e0e4c74-a5be-427a-8a8f-46673d4052ad/download
  63. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d475
  64. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B00236R000100150005-3.pdf
  65. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268023000964
  66. https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/consequences-cia-sponsored-regime-change-latin-america
  67. https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume1.pdf
  68. https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/russian-interference-in-2016-u-s-elections
  69. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-meddling-united-states-historical-context-mueller-report
  70. https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/iranian-interference-in-2020-us-elections
  71. https://www.npr.org/2024/09/03/nx-s1-5096151/china-tiktok-x-fake-voters-influence-campaign
  72. https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us
  73. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2024/3981-joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-iranian-election-influence-efforts
  74. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424
  75. https://dfrlab.org/2024/11/04/china-us-election-interference/
  76. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2766
  77. https://research-portal.uea.ac.uk/en/publications/approaches-to-understanding-the-inaugural-cia-covert-operation-in
  78. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-increasingly-convinced-that-russia-hacked-french-election-sources-idUSKBN1852KO/
  79. https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/French_presidential_election_leak_%282017%29
  80. https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/incident/russian-state-sponsored-media-amplify-disinformation-targeting-french-presidential-front-runner-macron-during-campaign/
  81. https://www.csis.org/analysis/successfully-countering-russian-electoral-interference
  82. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/08/macron-hackers-linked-to-russian-affiliated-group-behind-us-attack
  83. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-impact-of-russian-interference-on-germanys-2017-elections/
  84. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/europe/german-election-russia.html
  85. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38288181
  86. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/what-russia-has-achieved-during-german-election
  87. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-influence-operations-germany-and-their-effect
  88. https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-australia
  89. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Interference_through_Social_Media/ForeignInterference47/Report/Chapter_2_-_Foreign_interference_in_Australia
  90. https://www.cfr.org/article/chinas-influence-efforts-are-expanding-they-also-often-are-failing
  91. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-interference-dangerous-also-often-ineffective-counterproductive
  92. https://jamestown.org/prc-influence-operations-in-the-philippines-can-beijing-flip-the-south-china-sea-script/
  93. https://www.csis.org/analysis/midterm-outlooks-digital-proxy-warfare-philippines
  94. https://www.csis.org/blogs/brexit-bits-bobs-and-blogs/did-russia-influence-brexit
  95. https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/893443735/u-k-actively-avoided-investigating-russian-interference-lawmakers-find
  96. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/world/europe/uk-russia-report-brexit-interference.html
  97. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729271/EPRS_ATA%282022%29729271_EN.pdf
  98. https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_2131-xx/ga_2131-xx.html
  99. https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434
  100. https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Prohibition_of_intervention
  101. https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/the-oxford-process/the-statements-overview/the-oxford-statement-on-international-law-protections-against-foreign-electoral-interference/
  102. https://academic.oup.com/book/39306/chapter/338903172
  103. https://www.nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Brooks-Annotation.pdf
  104. https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=lucilr
  105. https://campaignlegal.org/democracyu/transparency/combatting-foreign-interference
  106. https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme
  107. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-579
  108. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00063/latest/text
  109. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_News/Media_Releases/Committee_recommends_substantial_reform_to_foreign_influence_transparency_scheme
  110. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-2.01/section-282.4.html
  111. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/O-5/section-20.4.html
  112. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/04-en.html
  113. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes/division/5/4
  114. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/foreign-political-donations-in-the-uk/
  115. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jul/17/mps-to-tighten-laws-allowing-foreign-donations-to-influence-uk-elections
  116. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20240404STO20215/foreign-interference-how-parliament-is-fighting-the-threat-to-eu-democracy
  117. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/759612/EPRS_ATA%282024%29759612_EN.pdf
  118. https://www.wired.com/2016/12/hacker-lexicon-attribution-problem/
  119. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1677324
  120. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf
  121. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/101/3/967/8100244
  122. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
  123. https://dfrlab.org/2024/10/23/dfrlab-launches-fiat-2024/
  124. https://www.cisa.gov/topics/election-security
  125. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/1_b_%2520Memo%2520DOJ%2520and%2520DHS%2520Approved_508c.pdf
  126. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2023/3743-odni-releases-intelligence-community-assessment-of-foreign-threats-to-the-2022-u-s-elections
  127. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/04/us/politics/russia-iran-election-interference.html
  128. https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/foreign-interference-in-a-united-states-election-sanctions
  129. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4145
  130. https://transparency.eu/joint-statement-eu-foreign-interference-law-a-threat-to-civil-society/
  131. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/digital-diplomacy/news/article/foreign-digital-interference-publication-of-the-viginum-report-on-information
  132. https://law.uq.edu.au/files/84403/foreign-interference.pdf
  133. https://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/electoral-integrity.htm
  134. https://www.gmfus.org/news/no-time-complacency-how-combat-foreign-interference-after-midterms
  135. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/index.aspx?lang=eng
  136. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/g7-rapid-response-mechanism-rrm-statement-russian-influence-campaign_en
  137. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/2024-annual-report-rapport-annuel.aspx?lang=eng
  138. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/g7-says-russia-finding-covert-efforts-undermine-elected-governments-2025-01-17/
  139. https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/78/208
  140. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufSC6AW5VKQ
  141. https://osce.usmission.gov/reply-to-the-russian-federations-statement-falsely-claiming-odihrs-electoral-methodology-is-a-means-of-interference-in-the-internal-affairs-of-osce/
  142. https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/paris-call-trust-security-cyberspace/multistakeholder-insights-compendium-countering-election-interference.html
  143. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-germany-others-urge-eu-commission-protect-elections-europe-foreign-2025-01-30/
  144. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.31.2.211
  145. https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/15_Zuccarelli_Manozonelli.pdf?ver=AYKuAsmdxbGIKYODl4l80w%253D%253D
  146. https://www.npr.org/2016/12/22/506625913/database-tracks-history-of-u-s-meddling-in-foreign-elections
  147. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/03/is-the-us-hypocritical-to-criticize-russian-election-meddling?lang=en
  148. https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/871927512/in-rigged-a-comprehensive-account-of-decades-of-election-interference
  149. https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/why-us-keeps-accusing-russia-of-meddling-in-its-elections-6646409
  150. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g5kl0n5d2o
  151. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/diplomacy-of-whataboutism-and-us-foreign-policy-attitudes/9A6AAD756ED297D4EBB9E8E8B1B92ABE
  152. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00323217221126300
  153. https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/05/perceptions-of-russian-interference-in-u-s-elections-matter-as-much-as-the-actual-involvement/
  154. https://iriss.stanford.edu/sites/iriss/files/public_opinion_and_foreign_electoral_intervention.pdf
  155. https://2021-2025.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/protecting-the-2024-election-from-foreign-malign-influence/
  156. https://news.yale.edu/2019/04/05/yale-political-scientist-gauges-impact-foreign-meddling-voter-trust
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.