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Whataboutism
Whataboutism
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Whataboutism
TacticManipulation and propaganda strategy
TypeTu quoque (appeal to hypocrisy, ad hominem) and red herring (distraction from relevant topic of discussion)
LogicInformal fallacy

"Whataboutism" or "whataboutery" (as in, "but what about X?") refers to the propaganda strategy of responding to an accusation with a counter-accusation instead of offering an explanation or defense against the original accusation. It is an informal fallacy that the accused party uses to avoid accountability—whether attempting to distract by shifting the conversation's focus away from their behaviour or attempting to justify themselves by pointing to the similar behaviour (which may be true or false, but irrelevant) of their opponent or another party who is not the current subject of discussion.[1]

From a logical and argumentative point of view, whataboutism is considered a variant of the "tu quoque" pattern, which is a subtype of the ad hominem style of argument.[2][3][4][5]

The communication intent is often to distract from the content of a topic (red herring). The goal may also be to question the justification for criticism and the legitimacy, integrity, and fairness of the critic, which can take on the character of discrediting the criticism, which may or may not be justified. Common accusations include double standards, and hypocrisy, but it can also be used to relativize criticism of one's own viewpoints or behaviors (A: "Long-term unemployment often means poverty in Germany." B: "And what about the starving in Africa and Asia?").[6] Related manipulation and propaganda techniques in the sense of rhetorical evasion of the topic are the change of topic and false balance (also called "bothsidesism").[7]

Some commentators have defended the usage of whataboutism and tu quoque in certain contexts. Whataboutism can provide necessary context into whether or not a particular line of critique is relevant or fair, and behavior that may be imperfect by international standards may be appropriate in a given geopolitical neighbourhood.[8] Accusing an interlocutor of whataboutism can also in itself be manipulative and serve the motive of discrediting, as critical talking points can be used selectively and purposefully even as the starting point of the conversation (cf. agenda setting, framing, framing effect, priming, cherry picking). The deviation from them can then be branded as whataboutism.[citation needed] Both whataboutism and the accusation of it are forms of strategic framing and have a framing effect.[9]

Etymology

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The term whataboutism is a compound of what and about, is synonymous with whataboutery, and means to twist criticism back on the initial critic.[10][11][12][13]

Origins

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According to lexicographer Ben Zimmer,[14] the term originated in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Zimmer cites a 1974 letter by history teacher Sean O'Conaill which was published in The Irish Times where he complained about "the Whatabouts", people who defended the IRA by pointing out supposed wrongdoings of their enemy:

I would not suggest such a thing were it not for the Whatabouts. These are the people who answer every condemnation of the Provisional I.R.A. with an argument to prove the greater immorality of the "enemy", and therefore the justice of the Provisionals' cause: "What about Bloody Sunday, internment, torture, force-feeding, army intimidation?". Every call to stop is answered in the same way: "What about the Treaty of Limerick; the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921; Lenadoon?". Neither is the Church immune: "The Catholic Church has never supported the national cause. What about Papal sanction for the Norman invasion; condemnation of the Fenians by Moriarty; Parnell?"

— Sean O'Conaill, "Letter to Editor", The Irish Times, 30 Jan 1974

Three days later, an opinion column by John Healy in the same paper entitled "Enter the cultural British Army" picked up the theme by using the term whataboutery: "As a correspondent noted in a recent letter to this paper, we are very big on Whatabout Morality, matching one historic injustice with another justified injustice. We have a bellyfull [sic] of Whataboutery in these killing days and the one clear fact to emerge is that people, Orange and Green, are dying as a result of it."[15] Zimmer says the term gained wide currency in commentary about the conflict between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland.[14] Zimmer also notes that the variant whataboutism was used in the same context in a 1993 book by Tony Parker.[14]

In 1978, Australian journalist Michael Bernard wrote a column in The Age applying the term whataboutism to the Soviet Union's tactics of deflecting any criticism of its human rights abuses. Merriam-Webster details that "the association of whataboutism with the Soviet Union began during the Cold War. As the regimes of [Joseph] Stalin and his successors were criticized by the West for human rights atrocities, the Soviet propaganda machine would be ready with a comeback alleging atrocities of equal reprehensibility for which the West was guilty."[16]

Zimmer credits British journalist Edward Lucas for beginning regular common use of the word whataboutism in the modern era following its appearance in a blog post on 29 October 2007,[14][17] reporting as part of a diary about Russia which was re-printed in the 2 November issue of The Economist.[17] On 31 January 2008 The Economist printed another article by Lucas titled "Whataboutism".[18] Ivan Tsvetkov, associate professor of International Relations in St Petersburg also credits Lucas for modern uses of the term.[19]

Analysis

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Psychological motivations

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The philosopher Merold Westphal said that only people who know themselves to be guilty of something "can find comfort in finding others to be just as bad or worse."[20] Whataboutery, as practiced by both parties in The Troubles in Northern Ireland to highlight what the other side had done to them, was "one of the commonest forms of evasion of personal moral responsibility," according to Bishop (later Cardinal) Cahal Daly.[21] After a political shooting at a baseball game in 2017, journalist Chuck Todd criticized the tenor of political debate, commenting, "What-about-ism is among the worst instincts of partisans on both sides."[22][23]

Intentionally discrediting oneself

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Whataboutism usually points the finger at a rival's offenses to discredit them, but, in a reversal of this usual direction, it can also be used to discredit oneself while one refuses to critique an ally. During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, when The New York Times asked candidate Donald Trump about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's treatment of journalists, teachers, and dissidents, Trump replied with a criticism of U.S. history on civil liberties.[24] Writing for The Diplomat, Catherine Putz pointed out: "The core problem is that this rhetorical device precludes discussion of issues (e.g. civil rights) by one country (e.g. the United States) if that state lacks a perfect record."[24] Masha Gessen wrote for The New York Times that usage of the tactic by Trump was shocking to Americans, commenting, "No American politician in living memory has advanced the idea that the entire world, including the United States, was rotten to the core."[25]

Concerns about effects

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Joe Austin was critical of the practice of whataboutism in Northern Ireland in a 1994 piece, The Obdurate and the Obstinate, writing: "And I'd no time at all for 'What aboutism' ... if you got into it you were defending the indefensible."[26] In 2017, The New Yorker described the tactic as "a strategy of false moral equivalences",[27] and Clarence Page called the technique "a form of logical jiu-jitsu".[28] Writing for National Review, commentator Ben Shapiro criticized the practice, whether it was used by those espousing right-wing or left-wing politics; Shapiro concluded: "It's all dumb. And it's making us all dumber."[29] Michael J. Koplow of Israel Policy Forum wrote that the usage of whataboutism had become a crisis; concluding that the tactic did not yield any benefits, Koplow charged that "whataboutism from either the right or the left only leads to a black hole of angry recriminations from which nothing will escape".[30]

Defense

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Contextualization

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Some commentators have defended the usage of whataboutism and tu quoque in certain contexts. Whataboutism can provide necessary context into whether or not a particular line of critique is relevant or fair. In international relations, behavior that may be imperfect by international standards may be quite good for a given geopolitical neighborhood and deserves to be recognized as such.[8]

Distorted self-perception

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Christian Christensen, Professor of Journalism in Stockholm, argues that the accusation of whataboutism is itself a form of the tu quoque fallacy, as it dismisses criticisms of one's own behavior to focus instead on the actions of another, thus creating a double standard. Those who use whataboutism are not necessarily engaging in an empty or cynical deflection of responsibility: whataboutism can be a useful tool to expose contradictions, double standards, and hypocrisy. For example, one's opponent's action appears as forbidden torture, one's own actions as "enhanced interrogation methods", the other's violence as aggression, one's own merely as a reaction. Christensen even sees utility in the use of the argument: "The so-called 'whataboutists' question what has not been questioned before and bring contradictions, double standards, and hypocrisy to light. This is not naïve justification or rationalization [...], it is a challenge to think critically about the (sometimes painful) truth of our position in the world."[31][32]

Lack of sincerity

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In his analysis of Whataboutism, logic professor Axel Barceló of the UNAM concludes that the counteraccusation often expresses a justified suspicion that the criticism does not correspond to the critic's real position and reasons.[33]

Abe Greenwald pointed out that even the first accusation leading to the counteraccusation is an arbitrary setting, which can be just as one-sided and biased, or even more one-sided than the counter-question "what about?" Thus, whataboutism could also be enlightening and put the first accusation in perspective.[34]

Idealization

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In her analysis of whataboutism in the 2016 United States presidential election, Catherine Putz notes in 2016 in The Diplomat Magazine that the core problem is that this rhetorical device precludes discussion of a country's contentious issues (e.g., civil rights on the part of the United States) if that country is not perfect in that area. It requires, by default, that a country be allowed to make a case to other countries only for those ideals in which it had achieved the highest level of perfection. The problem with ideals, she said, is that we rarely achieve them as human beings. But the ideals remain important, she said, and the United States should continue to advocate for them: "It is the message that is important, not the ambassador."[35]

Protective mechanism

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Gina Schad sees the characterization of counterarguments as "whataboutism" as a lack of communicative competence, insofar as discussions are cut off by this accusation. The accusation of others of whataboutism is also used as an ideological protective mechanism that leads to "closures and echo chambers".[36] The reference to "whataboutism" is also perceived as a "discussion stopper" "to secure a certain hegemony of discourse and interpretation."[37]

Deflection

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A number of commentators, among them Forbes columnist Mark Adomanis, have criticized the usage of accusations of whataboutism by American news outlets, arguing that accusations of whataboutism have been used to simply deflect criticisms of human rights abuses perpetrated by the United States or its allies.[38] Vincent Bevins and Alex Lo argue that the usage of the term almost exclusively by American outlets is a double standard,[39][40] and that moral accusations made by powerful countries are merely a pretext to punish their geopolitical rivals in the face of their own wrongdoing.[41]

Left-wing academics Kristen Ghodsee and Scott Sehon argue that mentioning the possible existence of victims of capitalism in popular discourse is often dismissed as "whataboutism", which they describe as "a term implying that only atrocities perpetrated by communists merit attention." They also argue that such accusations of "whataboutism" are invalid as the same arguments used against communism can also be used against capitalism.[42]

Scholars Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere argue it is not whataboutism to document and denounce authoritarianism in different countries, and noted global parallels such as the role Islamophobia played in China's Xinjiang internment camps and the US's War on terror and travel bans targeting Muslim countries, as well as influence of corporations and other international actors in the documented abuses which is becoming more obscured. Franceschini and Loubere conclude that authoritarianism "must be opposed everywhere", and that "only by finding the critical parallels, linkages, and complicities can we develop immunity to the virus of whataboutism and avoid its essentialist hyperactive immune response, achieving the moral consistency and holistic perspective that we need in order to build up international solidarity and stop sleepwalking towards the abyss."[43]

In proverbs and similes

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Jesus' statement, "Let he who is without fault cast the first stone" (John 8:7), the similar parable of the beam in the eye (Matthew 7:3) and proverbs based on it such as "He who sits in a glass house should not throw stones" are sometimes compared to whataboutism. Nigel Warburton sees the difference in the fact that the point of view in the Bible and in Proverbs is different from that in politics. Jesus is in the right to remind the sinner of his own guilt, because he himself has no guilt, he is on the side of good. Although a wrongdoer can sometimes be in the right by pointing out an actual shortcoming, this does not change the difference in principle.

The whataboutery move seems to rest on the false assumption that wrongdoing is mitigated if others have done something similar, and the feeling that accusers need to be innocent of the crime of which they are accusing others. 'You think I'm doing something terrible, so look around you at all the others doing much the same as me. What is more, you don't have a credible position from which to attack me.' At best that is just self-serving rationalisation, but as a tactical move it can work.[44]

Use in political contexts

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Soviet Union and Russia

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Although the term whataboutism spread recently, Edward Lucas's 2008 Economist article states that "Soviet propagandists during the cold war were trained in a tactic that their western interlocutors nicknamed 'whataboutism'. Any criticism of the Soviet Union (Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, imprisonment of dissidents, censorship) was met with a 'What about...' (apartheid South Africa, jailed trade-unionists, the Contras in Nicaragua, and so forth)." Lucas recommended two methods of properly countering whataboutism: to "use points made by Russian leaders themselves" so that they cannot be applied to the West, and for Western nations to engage in more self-criticism of their own media and government.[18] In his book The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West (2008), Edward Lucas characterized whataboutism as "the favourite weapon of Soviet propagandists".[45]

Following the publication of Lucas's 2007 and 2008 articles and his book,[45] opinion writers at prominent English language media outlets began using the term and echoing the themes laid out by Lucas, including the association with the Soviet Union and Russia. Journalist Luke Harding described Russian whataboutism as "practically a national ideology".[46] Juhan Kivirähk and colleagues called it a "polittechnological" strategy.[47]

Writing in The National Interest in 2013, Samuel Charap was critical of the tactic, commenting, "Russian policy makers, meanwhile, gain little from petulant bouts of 'whataboutism'".[48] National security journalist Julia Ioffe commented in a 2014 article, "Anyone who has ever studied the Soviet Union knows about a phenomenon called 'whataboutism'."[49] Ioffe said that Russia Today was "an institution that is dedicated solely to the task of whataboutism",[49] and concluded that whataboutism was a "sacred Russian tactic".[50][51][52] Garry Kasparov[better source needed] discussed the Soviet tactic in his 2015 book Winter Is Coming, calling it a form of "Soviet propaganda" and a way for Russian bureaucrats to "respond to criticism of Soviet massacres, forced deportations, and gulags".[53] Mark Adomanis commented for The Moscow Times in 2015 that "Whataboutism was employed by the Communist Party with such frequency and shamelessness that a sort of pseudo mythology grew up around it."[54] Adomanis observed, "Any student of Soviet history will recognize parts of the whataboutist canon."[54]

Writing in 2016 for Bloomberg News, journalist Leonid Bershidsky called whataboutism a "Russian tradition",[55] while The National called the tactic "an effective rhetorical weapon".[56] In their book The European Union and Russia (2016), Forsberg and Haukkala characterized whataboutism as an "old Soviet practice", and they observed that the strategy "has been gaining in prominence in the Russian attempts at deflecting Western criticism".[57] In her 2016 book, Security Threats and Public Perception, author Elizaveta Gaufman called the whataboutism technique "A Soviet/Russian spin on liberal anti-Americanism", comparing it to the Soviet rejoinder, "And you are lynching negroes".[58] Foreign Policy supported this assessment.[59] Daphne Skillen discussed the tactic in her 2016 book, Freedom of Speech in Russia, identifying it as a "Soviet propagandist's technique" and "a common Soviet-era defence".[60] Writing for Bloomberg News, Leonid Bershidsky called whataboutism a "Russian tradition",[55] while The New Yorker described the technique as "a strategy of false moral equivalences".[27]

In a piece for CNN, Jill Dougherty compared the technique to the pot calling the kettle black.[61] Dougherty wrote: "There's another attitude ... that many Russians seem to share, what used to be called in the Soviet Union 'whataboutism', in other words, 'who are you to call the kettle black?'"[61] Julia Ioffe called whataboutism a "sacred Russian tactic",[51][52] and also compared it to accusing the pot calling the kettle black.[61]

Russian journalist Alexey Kovalev told GlobalPost in 2017 that the tactic was "an old Soviet trick".[62] Peter Conradi, author of Who Lost Russia?, called whataboutism "a form of moral relativism that responds to criticism with the simple response: 'But you do it too'".[63] Conradi echoed Gaufman's comparison of the tactic to the Soviet response, "Over there they lynch Negroes".[63] In 2017, journalist Melik Kaylan explained the term's increased pervasiveness in referring to Russian propaganda tactics: "Kremlinologists of recent years call this 'whataboutism' because the Kremlin's various mouthpieces deployed the technique so exhaustively against the U.S."[64] Kaylan commented upon a "suspicious similarity between Kremlin propaganda and Trump propaganda".[64] Foreign Policy wrote that Russian whataboutism was "part of the national psyche".[65] EurasiaNet stated that "Moscow's geopolitical whataboutism skills are unmatched",[66] while Paste correlated whataboutism's rise with the increasing societal consumption of fake news.[67]

Notable examples

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Several articles connected whataboutism to the Soviet era by pointing to the "And you are lynching Negroes" example (as Lucas did) of the 1930s, in which the Soviets deflected any criticism by referencing racism in the segregated American South. The tactic was extensively used even after the racial segregation in the South was outlawed in the 1950s and 1960s. Ioffe, who has written about whataboutism in at least three separate outlets,[68][52][69] called it a "classic" example of whataboutism,[49] citing the Soviet response to criticism, "And you are lynching negroes", as a "classic" form of whataboutism.[49]

The Soviet government engaged in a major cover-up of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. When they finally acknowledged the disaster, although without any details, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) then discussed the Three Mile Island accident and other American nuclear accidents, which Serge Schmemann of The New York Times wrote was an example of the common Soviet tactic of whataboutism. The mention of a commission also indicated to observers the seriousness of the incident,[70] and subsequent state radio broadcasts were replaced with classical music, which was a common method of preparing the public for an announcement of a tragedy in the USSR.[71]

In 2016, Canadian columnist Terry Glavin asserted in the Ottawa Citizen that Noam Chomsky used the tactic in an October 2001 speech, delivered after the September 11 attacks, that was critical of US foreign policy.[72] In 2006, Putin replied to George W. Bush's criticism of Russia's human rights record by stating that he "did not want to head a democracy like Iraq's," referencing the US intervention in Iraq.[73]

Some writers also identified examples in 2012 when Russian officials responded to critique by, for example, redirecting attention to the United Kingdom's anti-protest laws[74] or Russians' difficulty obtaining a visa to the United Kingdom.[75]

The term receives increased attention when controversies involving Russia are in the news. For example, writing for Slate in 2014, Joshua Keating noted the use of "whataboutism" in a statement on Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, where Putin "listed a litany of complaints about Western intervention."[76]

In 2017, Ben Zimmer noted that Putin also used the tactic in an interview with NBC News journalist Megyn Kelly.[77]

Russophobia allegation

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The practice of labelling whataboutism as typically Russian or Soviet is sometimes rejected as russophobic. Glenn Diesen sees this usage as an attempt to delegitimize Russian politics. As early as 1985, Ronald Reagan had introduced the construct of "false ethical balance" to "denounce" any attempt at comparison between the US and other countries. Jeane Kirkpatrick, in her essay The Myth of Moral Equivalence (1986)[78] saw the Soviet Union's whataboutism as an attempt to use moral reasoning to present themselves as a legitimate superpower on an equal footing with the United States. The comparison was inadmissible in principle, since there was only one legitimate superpower, the USA, and it did not stand up for power interests but for values. Glenn Diesen sees this as a framing of American politics, with the aim of defining the relationship of countries to each other analogously to a teacher-pupil relationship, whereby in the political framework the USA is the teacher. Kirkpatrick invoked Harold Lasswell's understanding of the enforcement of an ideological framework using political dominance to analyze the semantic manipulations of the Soviet Union.[79] According to Lasswell, every country tries to impose its interpretive framework on others, even by the means of revolution and war.[80] For Kirkpatrick, however, these interpretive frameworks of different states are not equivalent.

China

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A synonymous Chinese-language metaphor is the "stinky bug argument" (traditional Chinese: 臭蟲論; simplified Chinese: 臭虫论; pinyin: Chòuchónglùn), coined by Lu Xun, a leading figure in modern Chinese literature, in 1933 to describe his Chinese colleagues' common tendency to accuse Europeans of "having equally bad issues" whenever foreigners commented upon China's domestic problems. As a Chinese nationalist, Lu saw this mentality as one of the biggest obstructions to the modernization of China in the early 20th century, which Lu frequently mocked in his literary works.[81]

In response to tweets from Donald Trump's administration criticizing the Chinese government's mistreatment of ethnic minorities and the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials began using Twitter to point out racial inequalities and social unrest in the United States which led Politico to accuse China of engaging in whataboutism.[82]

Donald Trump

[edit]
After receiving a question about the alt-right, president Trump replies "What about the alt-left?"

Writing for The Washington Post, former United States Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul wrote critically of Trump's use of the tactic and compared him to Putin.[83] McFaul commented, "That's exactly the kind of argument that Russian propagandists have used for years to justify some of Putin's most brutal policies."[83] Los Angeles Times contributor Matt Welch classed the tactic among "six categories of Trump apologetics".[84] Mother Jones called the tactic "a traditional Russian propaganda strategy", and observed, "The whataboutism strategy has made a comeback and evolved in President Vladimir Putin's Russia."[85]

In early 2017, amid coverage of interference in the 2016 election and the lead up to the Mueller Investigation into Donald Trump, several people, including Edward Lucas,[86] wrote opinion pieces associating whataboutism with both Trump and Russia.[27] "Instead of giving a reasoned defense [of his health care plan], he went for blunt offense, which is a hallmark of whataboutism", wrote Danielle Kurtzleben of NPR, adding that he "sounds an awful lot like Putin."[87]

When, in a widely viewed television interview that aired before the Super Bowl in 2017, Fox News host Bill O'Reilly called Putin a "killer", Trump responded by saying that the US government was also guilty of killing people. He responded, "There are a lot of killers. We've got a lot of killers. What do you think — our country's so innocent?"[88][89] This episode prompted commentators to accuse Trump of whataboutism, including Chuck Todd on the television show Meet the Press[90] and political advisor Jake Sullivan.[88]

Use by other states

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Europe

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The term "whataboutery" has been used by Loyalists and Republicans since the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.[91][92][93]

Asia

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The tactic was employed by Azerbaijan, which responded to criticism of its human rights record by holding parliamentary hearings on issues in the United States.[94] Simultaneously, pro-Azerbaijan Internet trolls used whataboutism to draw attention away from criticism of the country.[95]

The Turkish government engaged in whataboutism by publishing an official document listing criticisms of other governments that had criticized Turkey for its dramatic purge of state institutions and civil society in the wake of a failed coup attempt in July of that year.[96]

The tactic was also employed by Saudi Arabia and Israel.[97][98] In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that "the [Israeli] occupation is nonsense, there are plenty of big countries that occupied and replaced populations and no one talks about them."[99][citation needed] In July 2022, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman engaged in this tactic by raising the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, and the torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers during the Iraq War, after US President Joe Biden raised the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018 by agents of the Saudi government, during a conversation with Mohammed as part of Biden's state visit to Saudi Arabia.[100]

Iran's foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif used the tactic in the Zurich Security Conference on February 17, 2019. When pressed by BBC's Lyse Doucet about eight environmentalists imprisoned in his country, he mentioned the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. Doucet picked up the fallacy and said "let's leave that aside."[101]

The Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has been accused of using whataboutism, especially in regard to the 2015 Indian writers protest and the nomination of former Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi to parliament.[102][103]

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See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Whataboutism is a rhetorical tactic employed to deflect or an by redirecting attention to comparable or analogous faults committed by the accuser, their allies, or unrelated parties, often without addressing the substantive merits of the original claim. This approach functions as a variant of the ("you too") , wherein the moral standing or consistency of the critic is challenged rather than the validity of their argument being engaged. While it can highlight genuine that undermines an accuser's to judge, it typically evades causal for the matter at hand, as the existence of parallel wrongs does not negate the truth or severity of the initial allegation. The term "whataboutism" emerged in Western discourse during the to characterize systematic Soviet propaganda strategies that countered critiques of communist policies—such as abuses or territorial aggressions—by invoking American shortcomings like or interventions abroad. Soviet diplomats and media outlets were reportedly trained in this method to equate dissimilar issues, thereby relativizing moral judgments and portraying Western condemnations as selective or insincere. Post-Cold War, the tactic has persisted and proliferated across ideological lines in and domestic debates, serving state actors and partisans alike to erode the force of accountability demands without conceding ground. Critics argue that whataboutism undermines rational by prioritizing equivalence over evidence-based evaluation, potentially enabling repeated under the guise of mutual , though proponents may view it as a necessary corrective to one-sided narratives in polarized environments. Its prevalence in modern and media reflects broader challenges in attributing responsibility amid asymmetric power dynamics and information asymmetries, where selective outrage can itself constitute a form of deflection. Empirical analyses of its deployment, particularly in contexts, indicate it correlates with reduced public support for punitive measures against perceived adversaries when counter-examples are invoked effectively.

Definition and Etymology

Core Definition

Whataboutism refers to the rhetorical strategy of deflecting an or by countering with a question or claim about a comparable or unrelated wrongdoing by the accuser, their allies, or another party, thereby attempting to relativize or neutralize the original point without direct refutation. This tactic typically takes the form of phrases like "What about...?" followed by an example intended to imply , , or selective outrage, such as responding to allegations of abuses in one country by highlighting similar issues elsewhere. At its core, whataboutism functions as a diversionary maneuver that shifts focus from the substantive merits of the critique to the purported inconsistencies of the critic, often exploiting real or exaggerated flaws to erode credibility rather than engaging evidence-based defense. Unlike straightforward arguments, which directly charge the accuser with identical to invalidate their position, whataboutism frequently invokes disparate or scaled examples—such as comparing failures to international interventions—to broaden the scope and dilute for the initial allegation. Though commonly critiqued as evasive or fallacious, whataboutism can occasionally serve a legitimate purpose by exposing verifiable double standards in application of principles, provided the counterexample is directly analogous and does not preclude addressing the original issue; however, its deployment often prioritizes rhetorical equivalence over or empirical resolution, rendering it invalid when the raised fails to negate the validity of the primary claim. In practice, this distinguishes it from principled : a valid response integrates the into a broader defense, whereas whataboutism halts by implying mutual guilt suffices as absolution.

Linguistic Origins

The term "whataboutism" is a portmanteau combining the "what" with the preposition "about," appended with the "-ism" to denote a distinctive practice or . This linguistic construction evokes the rhetorical pivot of responding to an accusation with a counter-question beginning "What about...?", thereby deflecting scrutiny. The earliest documented use of "whataboutism" in print appeared in a letter to the editor by Lionel Bloch published in The Guardian on May 23, 1978. In it, Bloch critiqued the tactic as employed by defenders of Soviet-bloc regimes, who habitually countered Western criticisms of communist abuses—such as the imprisonment of dissidents—with retorts highlighting hypocrisies in capitalist societies, exemplified by queries like "What about conditions for Black Americans?" or "What about atrocities?". This attestation framed the term as a of evasive argumentation prevalent in discourse. A closely related variant, "whataboutery," predates "whataboutism" slightly and originated in the context of Northern Ireland's Troubles during the 1970s. It described similar deflection strategies used by both Loyalist and Republican factions to shift focus from one side's violence to the other's, such as responding to IRA bombings with "What about British army shootings?". The term gained wider currency in the 2000s, notably through a 2008 Economist article attributing its tactical essence to Soviet propaganda training, which emphasized mirroring Western flaws to neutralize moral critiques. By the 2010s, "whataboutism" entered mainstream lexicographical recognition, appearing in dictionaries like those of Merriam-Webster, reflecting its adaptation to describe analogous rhetoric in diverse political contexts.

Historical Origins

Pre-20th Century Precursors

The of deflecting criticism by invoking the critic's or comparable faults predates the , appearing in dialectical and oratorical practices as a form of refutation. Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations (c. 350 BC) identifies sophistical arguments that target the arguer's character or consistency rather than the proposition itself, such as imputing inconsistency to the opponent to invalidate their stance without addressing its merits; this includes tactics where the alleges the critic fails to live by their own standards, thereby shifting scrutiny away from the original claim. These methods, employed by itinerant teachers like and in the 5th century BC, prioritized persuasive success over dialectical truth, enabling debaters to evade refutation by redirecting attention to personal failings. In forensic contexts, such as Athenian assembly speeches and trials, orators routinely countered accusations of wrongdoing by citing the accusers' analogous misconduct, a strategy that mirrored later formulations. For example, , in his Philippics (c. 351–341 BC), defended against charges of Athenian policy failures by highlighting Philip II of Macedon's own aggressions and hypocrisies, though this often served rhetorical deflection more than logical rebuttal. Roman rhetoricians like adapted similar techniques in legal defenses, as seen in (52 BC), where he justified Milo’s actions by emphasizing his opponents' greater violence and inconsistencies, thereby diluting the prosecution's moral authority without fully disproving the charges. Medieval scholastic debates further exemplified these precursors, with logicians like Peter of Spain (c. 1245) classifying arguments that exploit the opponent's under fallacies of refutation, treating them as invalid diversions from the thesis. By the , Enlightenment polemics invoked comparable tactics; for instance, during debates over the , loyalists countered patriot critiques of British tyranny by pointing to colonial hypocrisies like , as noted in his 1775 speech on conciliation, though he himself critiqued such evasions as undermining principled discourse. These instances illustrate a persistent pattern: while occasionally highlighting genuine double standards, the tactic more frequently functioned as a relevance-shifting maneuver, lacking the causal linkage needed for valid counterargument.

Soviet-Era Development

Soviet propagandists systematically employed whataboutism as a deflection tactic during the , particularly from the 1950s onward, in response to Western critiques of the USSR's domestic repressions and foreign policies. This approach involved countering accusations—such as those regarding the labor camps or suppression of dissent—by redirecting attention to comparable flaws in capitalist democracies, like in the United States or colonial exploitation by European powers. The technique was ingrained in diplomatic and media training, enabling Soviet officials to equate moral failings across systems rather than addressing substantive charges, thereby undermining the accuser's legitimacy. A canonical example occurred in exchanges over human rights: when queried about Soviet political imprisonments, propagandists would invoke American treatment of African Americans, citing events like the 1963 Birmingham church bombing or ongoing Jim Crow laws to argue hypocrisy in U.S. criticism. Similarly, condemnations of the 1968 Prague Spring invasion prompted retorts highlighting U.S. military actions in Vietnam, where over 58,000 American troops died and civilian casualties exceeded 1 million by war's end in 1975. These responses were not mere ad hoc rebuttals but part of a broader ideological strategy to portray socialism as relatively superior by relativizing ethical standards, often disseminated through state media like Pravda and international outlets such as Radio Moscow. The tactic's institutionalization reflected the USSR's emphasis on (aktivnye meropriyatiya), a KGB-coordinated blending and psychological operations formalized in the 1950s under Nikita Khrushchev's efforts, which sought to rehabilitate Soviet image abroad while deflecting scrutiny. By the , whataboutism had become a staple in debates and bilateral talks, where Soviet delegates routinely pivoted from arms control violations to Western support for apartheid in , which persisted until 1994. Western analysts, observing this pattern, formalized the term "whataboutism" around 1978 to encapsulate the method's evasive essence, distinguishing it from genuine comparative analysis by its refusal to concede any point. This era marked the tactic's maturation into a core element of Soviet rhetorical defense, prioritizing systemic equivalence over accountability.

Rhetorical and Logical Dimensions

Relation to Tu Quoque Fallacy

Whataboutism frequently manifests as an instance of the fallacy, a subtype of argumentation in which a critic's accusation is deflected by highlighting the critic's own comparable , thereby implying that the original claim lacks validity due to the accuser's inconsistency rather than engaging its substantive merits. This alignment stems from both tactics prioritizing the arguer's character or conduct over the argument's logical structure, often resulting in evasion rather than resolution. For example, in debates over violations, responding to allegations against one state by citing identical abuses by the accusing state exemplifies embedded within whataboutism, as it shifts focus to without disproving the initial charge. However, whataboutism extends beyond strict by not always targeting the critic personally; it may invoke third-party examples or unrelated historical precedents to undermine perceived double standards, broadening the deflection to systemic or comparative inconsistencies. Scholars note that while remains a fallacy of relevance—dismissing an argument based on the proponent's flaws without addressing evidence— can occasionally serve epistemic purposes, such as probing for selective outrage, though it risks invalidity when the invoked counterexample fails to negate the original issue's truth. In international law contexts, for instance, whataboutist claims invoking have been critiqued for eroding normative consistency, as they equate non-ideal behaviors without advancing causal analysis of the disputed action. The overlap renders whataboutism vulnerable to tu quoque classification in logical analysis, particularly when deployed defensively in political , where empirical data on the accused wrongdoing is sidestepped in favor of accusatory symmetry. Yet, distinctions arise in scope: demands direct personal (e.g., "You criticize my but pollute yourself"), whereas whataboutism permits looser analogies (e.g., "You decry our intervention but ignore your ally's"), potentially amplifying deflection across broader discourses. This relational dynamic underscores whataboutism's rhetorical potency but logical precariousness, as validity hinges on whether the genuinely exposes inconsistency in application rather than merely diverting scrutiny.

Criteria for Validity

Whataboutism qualifies as valid when it normatively challenges the legitimacy of an accusation by demonstrating selective application of standards, thereby invoking principles of fairness and consistency rather than evading substantive engagement. In rhetorical terms, this occurs when the counter-reference highlights or pertinent to the accuser's authority, such as in public or institutional contexts where is obligatory. For instance, in , normative whataboutism gains traction when critics exercise public power—e.g., through bodies like the (ICC) or UN Human Rights Council—triggering duties of non-arbitrariness and equal treatment under similar circumstances. Key criteria for such validity include to the underlying norm: the invoked counter-example must involve a sufficiently analogous breach of the same ethical, legal, or , avoiding irrelevant deflections to unrelated issues. Additionally, it must operate within a framework of public accountability, where the accuser's position derives legitimacy from consistent enforcement, as inconsistent outrage erodes perceived fairness—e.g., critiquing one state's while overlooking comparable actions by allies. , whether particular (self-exemption) or general (differential treatment of others), must be exposed without positing that the original act is excused by equivalence; instead, it shifts the burden to justify the disparity, fostering epistemic rigor.
  • Analogical Comparability: The situations compared must share core causal features, such as intent, scale, or violation type, ensuring the response tests principled consistency rather than fabricating false equivalences.
  • Contextual Duty of Fairness: Validity presupposes an expectation of impartiality, heightened in asymmetric power dynamics (e.g., Global South states questioning Western-led sanctions).
  • Non-Deflective Intent: The tactic must engage the accusation's foundation—e.g., undermining moral standing—without substituting it, as mere deflection renders it fallacious even if factually accurate.
Empirical application in discourse, such as debates over ICC arrest warrants for figures like amid unaddressed Western interventions, illustrates constructive validity when it prompts rebuttals on selectivity, thereby refining normative frameworks without absolving wrongdoing. Absent these criteria, whataboutism devolves into rhetorical evasion, prioritizing equivalence over accountability.

Conditions of Invalidity

Whataboutism qualifies as invalid when it devolves into a fallacy by invoking the accuser's to outright dismiss or negate the substantive merits of the , rather than merely questioning the consistency of the applied standard. In such cases, the response fails to engage with whether the impugned act violates an objective norm, instead treating the accuser's inconsistencies as a sufficient . For example, responding to an allegation of abuses with "but your country has committed similar violations" does not refute the factual or legal basis of the claim if the norm in question is non-reciprocal or peremptory, such as prohibitions under jus cogens in . This form of deflection has been routinely rejected in international criminal tribunals, where tu quoque defenses are deemed irrelevant because they do not justify the defendant's conduct under universal standards. Invalidity also arises from false equivalence in the comparison, where the invoked counterexample involves acts or contexts of materially different scale, intent, or relevance, undermining any genuine claim of inconsistent judgment. If a critic condemns a large-scale invasion while having supported a limited humanitarian intervention under UN auspices, equating the two ignores disparities in authorization, casualties, and legal frameworks, rendering the whataboutism a distraction rather than a valid exposure of bias. Academic analyses emphasize that for whataboutism to avoid fallacy, the excluded cases must demonstrate selective application of the same criterion to comparable situations; absent this parallelism, it constitutes a relevance error or red herring. Furthermore, whataboutism is fallacious when unsubstantiated or deployed in horizontal relations lacking obligations of impartiality, such as between without a shared institutional framework demanding consistency. Assertions of by third parties fail if unsupported by evidence or if the accuser has not wielded public authority imposing fairness duties, as in private-like interstate disputes. In these scenarios, the tactic erodes discourse by prioritizing deflection over causal accountability, particularly when norms preclude reciprocity, as affirmed in contexts like the International Criminal Court's rejection of in prosecuting war crimes regardless of allied precedents.

Psychological and Strategic Underpinnings

Motivations for Deployment

Whataboutism is frequently deployed as a defensive mechanism to deflect accusations and evade substantive , allowing the responder to redirect rather than address the merits of the . This tactic exploits perceived inconsistencies in the critic's position, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the original charge without conceding fault. Psychologically, individuals resort to whataboutism to alleviate moral discomfort or arising from challenges to their beliefs or actions, functioning as an emotional when rational rebuttals are unavailable or unconvincing. In such cases, it preserves group loyalty or by framing the criticism as hypocritical rather than valid, reducing the psychological burden of . Strategically, particularly in political and international arenas, whataboutism aims to erode the critic's and diminish public support for countermeasures, as evidenced by experimental findings showing that counter-accusations lower approval for sanctions against the targeted entity. By highlighting comparable transgressions elsewhere, it fosters equivalence narratives that neutralize outrage and promote , often prioritizing victory in over truth-seeking resolution. A core driver involves invoking hypocrisy to challenge the critic's standing, where the responder implies that the accuser's own flaws invalidate their judgment, thereby restoring rhetorical balance even if the original issue persists unresolved. This motivation persists across contexts, from interpersonal debates to state , as it efficiently disrupts linear argumentation without requiring empirical defense of one's conduct.

Effects on Argumentation and Perception

Whataboutism functions rhetorically to redirect attention from the specific accusation or issue under discussion to comparable faults elsewhere, often undermining the original argument's focus without refuting its substantive claims. This redirection typically manifests as an instance of the fallacy, where the critic's alleged is invoked to discredit their position, yet such a move fails to address the merits of the charge itself, thereby stalling dialectical progress and preserving the on the initial point of contention. In structured debates, this tactic can erode the argumentative rigor by substituting relevance with deflection, as the introduction of extraneous comparisons dilutes scrutiny of the primary evidence or causal links at hand. On , whataboutism fosters a cognitive equivalence between the accused action and the counter-example, which psychologically deflects moral or evaluative judgment from the focal event and can normalize deviance by implying mutual . Empirical in shows that exposure to whataboutist —such as a state highlighting an adversary's abuses in response to its own—significantly reduces domestic public support for condemning the targeted , with experimental indicating drops in approval for sanctions or by up to 10-15 percentage points among informed respondents. This effect arises from heightened perceptions of in the critic, leading audiences to recalibrate their ethical assessments toward rather than absolute standards, particularly in partisan contexts where amplifies the deflection. In broader perceptual terms, repeated deployment of whataboutism contributes to audience desensitization, where consistent counter-accusations train observers to anticipate and dismiss critiques preemptively, thereby entrenching polarized worldviews and impeding consensus on factual . Scholarly examinations note that while valid uses may illuminate inconsistent standards—enhancing epistemic —the predominant invalid applications impair collective reasoning by prioritizing emotional parity over evidential , often resulting in stalled policy or public inaction on verifiable harms. For instance, in legal and diplomatic arenas, labeling responses as whataboutism can itself signal an intent to evade , further distorting perceptions of legitimacy in adversarial exchanges.

Legitimate Defenses and Applications

Exposing Double Standards

Whataboutism functions as a legitimate rhetorical device for exposing double standards when it identifies morally or factually comparable situations that elicit disparate judgments, thereby challenging the universality of the critic's principles without denying the original accusation. This application underscores inconsistencies in ethical or legal frameworks, prompting scrutiny of selective application rather than serving as evasion. Empirical research indicates that such uses are effective in altering perceptions when the invoked parallels involve recent, similar actions by the accuser, as they activate fairness heuristics and erode credibility. For instance, a 2024 study in International Organization analyzed over 2,500 U.S. survey respondents and found that whataboutism reduced approval for U.S. criticism of foreign states by 18 percentage points (from 56% to 38%) when highlighting equivalent U.S. hypocrisy, but had negligible impact with outdated or dissimilar examples. In international politics, this tactic reveals biases in "rules-based order" advocacy. Russia's responses to Western condemnation of its 2022 invasion of often referenced the U.S.-led , which proceeded without explicit UN Security Council approval and caused an estimated 200,000-250,000 civilian deaths by 2011, per Iraq Body Count data, yet faced no comparable or sanctions regime. Similarly, NATO's 2011 intervention in , authorized under UN Resolution 1973 but extending beyond civilian protection to , resulted in prolonged instability and over 20,000 deaths, drawing muted criticism from the same actors now emphasizing in . These parallels test whether opprobrium stems from principled norms or geopolitical alignment, as undermines claims of impartiality. Domestic examples further illustrate validity in highlighting institutional inconsistencies. In U.S. discourse, comparisons between the 2020 Black Lives Matter-associated unrest—linked to $1-2 billion in insured damages across 140 cities, per estimates—and the January 6, 2021, Capitol breach expose variances in federal response and media framing. While the former saw over 14,000 arrests but deferred prosecutions in many jurisdictions amid narratives of "mostly peaceful" protest, the latter prompted 1,200+ federal charges by 2023 with near-universal pursuit, despite lower property damage (under $2.7 million). Such disparities, when invoked to question uniform accountability standards rather than equate culpability, compel examination of partisan influences on justice application. Critically, legitimacy hinges on equivalence: the counterexample must mirror the accused act in scale, intent, and context, avoiding deflection by focusing on the critic's standards. When successful, this fosters epistemic rigor, as audiences penalize perceived —e.g., support for U.S. critiques dropped from 59% to 37% in parallel experiments—promoting consistent over tribal loyalty. Pathological dismissal of such queries as mere "whataboutism" risks entrenching double standards, insulating flawed arguments from valid challenge.

Enhancing Epistemic Consistency

Whataboutism, when deployed non-defensively, promotes epistemic consistency by challenging selective outrage and enforcing uniform application of evaluative standards across analogous situations, thereby exposing potential biases in assessment or principled reasoning. Philosophers Scott Aikin and John Casey argue that such moves constitute legitimate appeals to the completeness of considered, functioning as meta-level critiques of inconsistency rather than evasions of substantive . This aligns with first-order commitments to treat like cases alike, as differential treatment without justification risks distorting and empirical evaluation. In dialectical contexts, whataboutism enhances rigor by redirecting focus to unexamined parallels, compelling responders to articulate distinguishing factors or revise prior judgments, which guards against exemptions driven by ideological partiality. For example, Tracy Bowell distinguishes "good" whataboutisms that illuminate overlooked inconsistencies from rhetorical dodges, noting their utility in revealing how partial frames can undermine objective discourse. Empirical studies on argumentation, such as those analyzing online debates, further indicate that valid whataboutist prompts correlate with reduced polarization when they elicit evidence-based rebuttals rather than shutdowns. Critics of blanket dismissals of whataboutism, including contributions in , emphasize its role in second-order accuracy: hypocrisy avoidance demands not only consistent verdicts but verification that those verdicts reflect full contextual data, preventing epistemic silos where favored actors evade scrutiny. Thus, in truth-seeking enterprises, judicious whataboutism counters systemic tendencies toward inconsistent standards, as observed in institutional analyses where dominant narratives overlook comparable faults in aligned parties. This practice, rooted in tu quoque's non-fallacious variants for detection, fosters causal realism by prioritizing verifiable parallels over narrative convenience.

Empirical Cases of Constructive Use

In discussions of New Zealand's refugee policies following Russia's 2022 invasion of , commentators employed whataboutism to compare the expedited acceptance of over 2,000 Ukrainian refugees with the slower processing of applicants from , , and , despite similar humanitarian crises. This tactic highlighted potential ethnic or geographic biases in decisions, as Ukrainian approvals reached 90% within months while non-European rates lagged below 50% in comparable periods. It spurred public and policy debates on equitable treatment, leading to advocacy for streamlined processes across nationalities and internal reviews of selection criteria by . A 2024 case in transatlantic energy diplomacy involved responding to U.S. rebukes over its continued Russian imports—totaling 6.7 billion cubic meters in 2023—by citing American purchases of $1.1 billion in Russian uranium oxide that year, essential for . Surveys of over 2,500 U.S. respondents demonstrated this counterpoint reduced support for on from 59% to 49% and approval of U.S. criticism from 56% to 38%, as it underscored inconsistent application of standards amid Europe's broader reliance on Russian supplies. The exchange contributed to recalibrated U.S.-EU dialogues on diversified energy sourcing, including accelerated LNG terminal approvals in and . In climate policy advocacy, whataboutism has surfaced in contrasts between the swift, trillion-dollar global mobilization against —such as the $14 trillion in fiscal stimulus by nations in —and the protracted underfunding of climate mitigation, where annual investments hovered at $600 billion despite projected $2.9 trillion yearly needs by 2030. This comparison, notably in analyses urging parity in urgency, has informed proposals for "green recoveries," influencing frameworks like the EU's €750 billion NextGenerationEU fund, which allocated 37% to , and U.S. infrastructure bills incorporating $550 billion in clean energy provisions. Such uses promote epistemic alignment by pressuring policymakers to apply equivalent rigor across existential threats.

Criticisms and Pathological Uses

Role in Propaganda and Deflection

Whataboutism operates in as a diversionary , whereby responders to accusations evade substantive defense by countering with unrelated or analogous faults of the accuser, thereby relativizing the original grievance and stalling accountability. This approach, akin to the logical fallacy, does not refute the merits of the criticism but instead fosters to neutralize its impact. Historically, the systematized whataboutism during the to deflect Western critiques, such as those concerning gulags or , by pivoting to U.S. domestic issues like and ; a was "And you are lynching Negroes," which appeared in Soviet diplomatic and media responses as early as and persisted through the . This tactic, documented in declassified exchanges and analyses, allowed the USSR to portray itself as an equal or superior moral actor without addressing of its own abuses, such as the 20 million deaths attributed to Stalinist policies by post-Soviet archival data. In modern Russian statecraft, whataboutism continues as a core propaganda instrument, particularly in justifying the 2022 invasion of ; officials and outlets like RT have invoked U.S.-led interventions in (2003, resulting in over 200,000 civilian deaths per Iraq Body Count) and (2011) to argue Western hypocrisy, claiming no moral standing to condemn Moscow's actions despite the invasion's documented war crimes, including the Bucha massacres verified by UN reports in April 2022. This deflection, analyzed in studies, shifts discourse from Russia's violation of the 1994 —wherein it pledged to respect Ukraine's sovereignty in exchange for —to NATO's eastward expansion, which predates but does not causally justify the unprovoked assault. Beyond state actors, whataboutism enables deflection in non-state and partisan , where it erodes epistemic focus by promoting a "" narrative that equates disparate scales of wrongdoing; for instance, pro-Russian narratives during the conflict have paired aggression with Western drone strikes in (over 13,000 reported by 2021 Airwars data), diluting calls for targeted sanctions or isolation. Scholarly examinations confirm its efficacy in international , where it influences public attitudes by exploiting perceived double standards, yet it pathologically hampers of conflicts by substituting redirection for evidence-based rebuttal.

Erosion of Moral Accountability

Whataboutism contributes to the erosion of moral by redirecting attention from an actor's specific to analogous or unrelated faults by others, thereby implying a false that excuses or minimizes the original offense. This deflection substitutes substantive defense or admission of fault with a relativizing counter-accusation, preventing the isolation and evaluation of individual responsibility under ethical frameworks like , where moral duties remain absolute regardless of others' compliance. In practice, it fosters a rhetorical environment where perpetrators evade , as the focus shifts to universal rather than causal for particular actions, such as policy failures or ethical lapses. Historical applications illustrate this mechanism, notably in Soviet propaganda during the , where criticisms of gulags or purges were met with retorts like "And you are lynching Negroes," equating domestic repression with distant racial injustices to undermine the critics' standing without addressing the USSR's own conduct. Similarly, contemporary state actors, including Russian officials responding to the 2022 invasion of by invoking U.S. interventions in (2003) or (2011), employ whataboutism to portray aggression as normative rather than aberrant, diluting demands for restitution or sanctions. This pattern avoids the causal realism of linking specific decisions—such as territorial violations—to their human costs, instead promoting a where no entity bears unique blame. The broader consequence is a degradation of public discourse into , where repeated invocations normalize deflection over resolution, as evidenced in political that prioritizes equivalence over empirical reckoning with outcomes like civilian casualties or institutional failures. Such usage not only shields actors from consequences but also erodes societal incentives for , as audiences habituated to arguments grow desensitized to isolated , potentially perpetuating cycles of unaddressed misconduct across domains from to interpersonal .

Weaponization as a Label

The accusation of whataboutism is frequently deployed as a to discredit arguments that expose double standards or , thereby circumventing substantive engagement with the underlying claims. Rather than refuting the validity of comparative critiques, opponents label such responses as fallacious deflections, which preserves their narrative authority without necessitating justification for inconsistencies. This tactic, akin to an dismissal, shifts focus from the merits of the analogy to the supposed impropriety of the responder's method, often in contexts where the original accusation demands selective moral outrage. In debates, for instance, Western critiques of Russian actions in have prompted responses highlighting U.S.-led interventions in (2003) or (2011), only for these to be branded whataboutism to insulate the accuser's position from scrutiny over analogous violations of or . Such labeling avoids reconciling professed principles—like opposition to —with historical precedents, as seen in analyses where the term functions to enforce a of condemnable acts favoring allied narratives. Critics argue this selective application erodes genuine , transforming a descriptor of evasion into a shield against reciprocal ethical demands. Domestically in U.S. politics, the label has been invoked to marginalize queries into elite misconduct; for example, investigations into Hunter Biden's business dealings (2014–2020) elicited whataboutism charges when juxtaposed against Trump family enterprises, despite both involving potential conflicts of interest during parental tenures in office. This pattern, documented in partisan media clashes, illustrates how the term can neutralize inquiries into systemic favoritism, particularly when the accuser's side benefits from institutional protections like delayed scrutiny or . Empirical reviews of discourse reveal that overuse correlates with power asymmetries, where dominant viewpoints employ it to maintain unexamined moral superiority. Furthermore, in discussions of Israel's Gaza operations post-October 7, 2023, defenders' references to Palestinian Authority incitement or Hamas charter provisions (1988) are routinely dismissed as whataboutism, precluding analysis of mutual escalatory dynamics. This application, per observers, prioritizes unidirectional victimhood frames over balanced causal assessment, potentially prolonging conflicts by obviating incentives for self-critique among all parties. While not inherently invalid, the weaponized label risks fostering echo chambers, as it discourages the required for resolving entrenched disputes through evidence-based comparisons rather than insulated indignation.

Political and International Contexts

Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia

Whataboutism emerged as a core technique in the during the , systematically employed to deflect Western criticisms of its policies by highlighting comparable or perceived flaws in capitalist democracies. Soviet diplomats and media outlets were trained to respond to accusations of domestic repression, such as the existence of the labor camps, with counter-accusations like "And you are lynching Negroes," referencing racial violence and segregation in the United States. This tactic, formalized in Soviet rhetorical training by the , aimed to undermine the of critics rather than address substantive issues, often equating isolated Western incidents with systemic Soviet practices. In practice, Soviet propagandists applied whataboutism across multiple domains, including responses to criticisms of the 1968 invasion of by invoking U.S. military actions in , or deflecting queries at international forums by citing American interventions in . The strategy's effectiveness stemmed from its exploitation of genuine Western inconsistencies, fostering that portrayed both sides as equally culpable and eroding targeted critiques. By the late period, this approach had become institutionalized, with state media outlets like Pravda routinely deploying it to maintain ideological equivalence amid empirical asymmetries in and scale of abuses. Post-Soviet revived and refined whataboutism as a staple of statecraft and information operations, adapting it to contemporary geopolitical tensions. Putin himself has frequently employed it in public statements, such as during the June 2021 Geneva summit with U.S. President , where queries on Russian domestic repression or aggression in prompted deflections to U.S. policies like the or alleged CIA interference. Russian state media, including RT and Sputnik, amplified this in coverage of the 2014 annexation of and the 2022 invasion of , countering accusations of unprovoked aggression by referencing NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention or U.S. drone strikes, thereby framing Russian actions as retaliatory or symmetrical. This persistence reflects a causal continuity from Soviet-era tactics, where deflection preserved legitimacy by relativizing moral standards, though post-1991 adaptations incorporated digital amplification and targeted audiences skeptical of Western narratives. Empirical analyses of Russian from 2000 to 2021 document over 100 instances of official whataboutism, often prioritizing equivalence over refutation, which has complicated international accountability efforts on issues like interference or chemical weapons use. While effective in domestic consolidation—polls showing sustained Russian public support for Ukraine operations partly attribute to such framing—the tactic's reliance on selective comparisons has drawn scrutiny for ignoring contextual differences, such as consent in interventions or verifiable casualty disparities.

United States Domestic Politics

In domestic politics, whataboutism manifests as a common tactic in partisan discourse, where accusations against one side prompt counter-accusations of comparable misconduct by the other, often to undermine claims of moral or legal superiority. This approach gained prominence during the Trump administration (2017–2021), as critics of policies like family separations at the border faced retorts highlighting the Obama administration's deportation records, which exceeded 3 million removals from 2009 to 2016. Similarly, defenses of Trump's trials invoked Bill Clinton's 1998–1999 proceedings, noting charges despite differing contexts, to argue against perceived selective outrage. Legal controversies amplified its use, particularly in 2023 when federal indictments against Trump for retaining classified documents at elicited Republican claims of hypocrisy, citing Biden's discovery of classified files from his vice-presidential tenure in unsecured locations like a Wilmington garage, with over 300 documents recovered by November 2022. Critics from outlets like Time dismissed these parallels as invalid due to differences in cooperation—Biden's team self-reported, while Trump's involved obstruction allegations—but proponents maintained that reflected bias, given no charges against Biden by mid-2023. In reciprocal fashion, scrutiny of Hunter Biden's foreign business dealings, including a 2014 board position amid his father's oversight, drew Democratic accusations of whataboutism when linked to Trump's 2019 over similar pressures. Policy debates further entrenched the tactic, as seen in responses to the , 2021, Capitol breach, where estimates of $2.7 million in damage and five deaths prompted conservative comparisons to 2020 protests, which caused over $1–2 billion in insured damages across 140 cities per insurance analyses. Mainstream media coverage disparities fueled claims of double standards, though left-leaning sources like framed such equivalences as evasion rather than substantive critique. By the Biden era, border security discussions mirrored this: amid 2.5 million encounters in fiscal year 2023, administration defenses against migrant crises invoked Trump's family separation , despite data showing Biden reversals led to record releases into the U.S. This pattern, while exposing genuine inconsistencies, often stalled accountability, as both parties leveraged it amid polarized trust in institutions—Gallup polls from 2023 indicated only 26% confidence in media and 16% in .

Applications in China and Other States

The Chinese government has systematically deployed whataboutism in diplomatic discourse and to deflect international criticism of its domestic policies, particularly human rights abuses and territorial assertions. For example, in response to Western accusations of against Uyghur Muslims in , Chinese officials and spokespersons have countered by invoking the historical displacement and decimation of Native American populations in the United States, framing such critiques as hypocritical given America's own past. This tactic echoes Soviet-era practices but is amplified through modern platforms, including "" diplomats on who, as of 2020, used to highlight U.S. domestic unrest—such as the protests and police violence—to undermine condemnations of Chinese censorship or surveillance. Such responses extend to bilateral tensions, as seen in early 2020 when the U.S. restricted Chinese media outlets like Xinhua and CGTN for activities; China reciprocated by expelling American journalists and accusing the U.S. of similar media controls, thereby shifting focus from its own restrictions on foreign reporting. Empirical analysis indicates this strategy effectively erodes public support in target audiences for punitive measures against , with experimental studies showing whataboutism reduces U.S. backing for policies like sanctions by up to 10-15 percentage points across issues such as trade and . Chinese state responses often prioritize moral equivalence over substantive defense, as in 2021 critiques of U.S. prison conditions or pursuit of whistleblowers like when addressing China's detention camps. Beyond , analogous applications appear in other authoritarian contexts, where regimes use deflection to neutralize external pressure on governance failures. In , officials have responded to sanctions over nuclear activities and protests by citing U.S. military interventions in and as equivalent aggressions, though less systematically documented than China's state-orchestrated efforts. Similarly, Venezuelan leadership under has employed whataboutism against by referencing U.S. historical support for coups in , aiming to portray interventions as selective enforcement rather than accountability for exceeding 1 million percent in 2018. This pattern aligns with broader autocratic tactics that equate democratic flaws with authoritarian controls, often via skewed laws to mirror and discredit Western standards. While effective for domestic cohesion, these uses rarely resolve underlying issues, instead perpetuating stalemates in international forums.

Cultural and Contemporary Manifestations

In Proverbs, Media, and Social Discourse

Whataboutism manifests in proverbial expressions that highlight or mutual fault, such as the English "the pot calling the kettle black," which dates to at least the and critiques one party for accusing another of a shared without . Similarly, the biblical admonition in John 8:7—"Let him who is without sin among you be the first to throw a stone"—has been interpreted as a tu quoque-style deflection, urging critics to examine their own flaws before condemning others, though it does not absolve the accused's actions. These sayings underscore a cultural recognition of inconsistent moral posturing, yet they differ from pathological whataboutism by often implying a call for universal rather than evasion. In media, whataboutism appears as a deflection tactic in reporting and commentary, particularly during geopolitical critiques; for instance, Russian responses to Western condemnations of the 2014 annexation frequently invoked U.S. interventions in (2003) or (1999) to question the accusers' legitimacy, a pattern documented in analyses of from 2000 to 2021. American has similarly employed it in domestic coverage, such as equating criticisms of one with unrelated flaws in opponents, as explored in rhetorical studies of post-2016 where the term surged in usage to label partisan deflections. Scholarly examinations classify such media applications as redirecting attention from substantive issues, potentially eroding analytical depth, though constructive uses can highlight double standards when paired with evidence-based comparisons. Within social discourse, whataboutism proliferates on platforms like (now X) and , where users respond to accusations—such as environmental —with counters like "What about China's emissions?" (which accounted for 30% of global CO2 in 2023), often halting resolution by shifting focus without addressing the original claim. This tactic, analyzed as a rhetorical in , frustrates civil debate by prioritizing equivalence over causation, with a 2025 survey noting its role in 40% of polarized online exchanges on U.S. politics. Empirical studies of argumentation reveal that while it can expose genuine inconsistencies, unchecked deployment in everyday interactions correlates with diminished trust in discourse, as participants disengage rather than engage specifics.

Recent Developments (2020s)

In the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of beginning February 24, , Russian and officials frequently employed whataboutism to counter Western condemnations, drawing parallels to U.S. interventions in (2003) and (2001) as equivalent violations of . This tactic aimed to relativize the unprovoked nature of the invasion, which resulted in over 500,000 combined military casualties by mid-2025 according to Ukrainian and Western estimates, though Russian sources disputed these figures. Critics, including analysts at the , argued that such deflections failed to address Russia's breach of the 1994 , wherein it pledged to respect Ukraine's borders in exchange for . During the 2024 U.S. presidential election cycle, whataboutism surfaced prominently in debates over classified documents, with supporters of former President contrasting his retention of materials at —leading to a 37-count in June 2023—with President Joe Biden's handling of files found in his garage and Penn Biden Center office, which were voluntarily returned without charges by mid-2023. Biden's report on February 8, 2024, described his memory as "hazy" but declined prosecution due to insufficient evidence of willful retention, prompting Trump allies to invoke equivalence despite differences in cooperation and volume of documents recovered. This pattern extended to broader election integrity claims, where responses to , 2021, Capitol inquiries often pivoted to 2020 election irregularities or Antifa-linked violence during 2020 protests, which caused an estimated $1-2 billion in insured damages nationwide. Following Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks on , which killed approximately 1,200 people and involved hostage-taking of over 250, whataboutism appeared in international discourse as critics of 's response—resulting in over 41,000 Palestinian deaths by October 2024 per figures—deflected calls for condemnation by referencing prior Israeli settlements or blockades, while some pro- advocates countered accusations of disproportionate force by demanding explicit denials of Hamas's actions. discussions on October 16, 2023, explicitly rejected such relativism, with speakers emphasizing that the attacks constituted without contextual equivalence. This dynamic highlighted whataboutism's role in polarizing media coverage, where outlets like Al Jazeera noted efforts to force Hamas condemnations to sidestep historical grievances. By , analyses in U.S. outlets identified a surge in whataboutism's domestic application, correlating with declining in institutions—polls showed only 22% confidence in per Gallup's 2024 survey—fostering cynicism that equated minor infractions across parties, such as Trump's Iran strike orders without congressional approval in hypothetical scenarios or Biden-era policy extensions. Such usage, per commentators in The Bulwark, eroded accountability by implying systemic equivalence rather than evaluating actions on merits, exacerbating partisan gridlock amid events like the 2024 election's challenges.

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